Board Liability Limitation, Indemnification and the Cost of Debt
| dc.contributor.author | Dallas, George S. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bradley, Michael | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Dong | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-08T19:05:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-06-08T19:05:10Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We document a strong negative relation between the presence of director liability limitation and indemnification-L-index, and the cost of debt. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that firms with higher L-index attracts directors with expertise, the only mechanism through which L-index benefits bondholders based on extant literature. Directors with higher L-index set lower pay-for-performance sensitivity for CEO, which harm bondholders. Unexpectedly, firms with higher L-index seem to take less risk, not more, that may benefit bondholders. After controlling for L-index, G-index is associated with higher cost of debt, which may suggest the beneficial effect of takeovers on bondholders. | en_US |
| dc.genre | journal articles | en_US |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.13016/M20859 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Dallas, GS, Bradley, M, Chen, D (2010) Board Liability Limitation, Indemnification and the Cost of Debt. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | 10.2139/ssrn.1535723 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11603/4002 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | University of Baltimore | |
| dc.title | Board Liability Limitation, Indemnification and the Cost of Debt | en_US |
| dc.type | Text | en_US |
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