Anti-Saloon League of Maryland,
1898-1924

by

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A. B., Gettysburg College, 1965
M. S. L. S., University of North Carolina, 1966

Thesis
Presented to the History Department of Salisbury State College in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts in History

Salisbury State College
Salisbury, Maryland
June 1985
This project for the M. A. degree in History has been approved for the History Department by

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Date 7/30/85
Abstract

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The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland, 1898-1924
Thesis directed by Mr. Donald Whaley

There has been very little study of the role which state anti-saloon leagues played in the struggle for national constitutional prohibition. Using Maryland as a case study, the narrative examines the methods and policies which the state leagues used in pursuing their agitation, and notes the degree to which these leagues exercised autonomy from the dictates of the national organization, the Anti-Saloon League of America. The study also investigates a basic question of prohibition scholarship as to whether temperance sentiment developed along rural/urban lines or, as recent studies suggest, was primarily based on social class.

Following a survey of bibliographical materials cited in the secondary literature, potential primary source records were identified. Exhaustive review of the joint microfilm edition of the Temperance and Prohibition Papers, the American Issue and materials in the Ohio Historical Society collection uncovered much relevant information. The Baltimore Sun, the Baltimore Methodist, and the U.S. Census of Population also provided substantial data. Although most of the Maryland League's official papers remain undiscovered, sufficient evidence has been gathered to reconstruct the essential record.
The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland developed out of the Maryland Temperance Alliance in 1898. The Maryland League formally affiliated with the Anti-Saloon League of America in 1900. With the exception of the Superintendency of Reverend C. A. Griese from 1904-1907, the Maryland League enjoyed capable leadership. Superintendents Nicholson, Anderson, Hare, and Crabbe were all able to advance the fortunes of the League in securing additional "dry" territory. The Maryland League also enjoyed financial stability, not only as a result of its able, aggressive leadership, but also because of the overwhelming support of the Protestant evangelical churches, and the continuing interest of well-to-do benefactors.

This combination of financial stability and able, aggressive leadership allowed the Anti-Saloon League of Maryland to battle the entrenched Baltimore-based political organizations on an equal basis. However, the state League was never able to secure a state-wide temperance or prohibition law. This failure was a consequence of the Maryland legislative tradition of "state-wide local self-government" employing the wholesale trading of political favors. This trading allowed the "wet" political bosses to stalemate the strong rural temperance contingency in the legislature. The rise to power of urbane Baltimore politicians such as Albert C. Ritchie following World War I put a further obstacle in the path of the Maryland League's efforts. Following successive biennial defeats of state-wide enforcement legislation, the League abandoned its legislative agitation in 1924, and henceforth con-
centrated its energies upon less-dramatic "educational" activities.

The study reveals that the state leagues played a vital role in the Anti-Saloon League of America's campaign for the Eighteenth Amendment. It also shows that viable state leagues had the power to operate with virtual impunity from the dictates of national League authority. In addition, the Maryland experience indicates that the most consistent indicator of temperance sentiment was rural/urban residency, contradicting the recent scholarship of Timberlake and others who suggest instead that social class was the dominant factor.

This abstract of about 500 words is approved as to form and content.

Signed

Donald M. Whaley, Thesis Director

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The League's Early Years</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reorganization of the League,</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Anderson Superintendency, 1907-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A Change in Strategy,</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hare Superintendency, 1914-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Crabbe Superintendency, 1917-24:</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Success, Local Stalemate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Maryland Anti-Saloon League and the Secondary Literature,</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Comparative Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Summary</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

The scholarship dealing with the Anti-Saloon League of America concentrates on the study of the national organization, largely ignoring the role which the state units played in the struggle for national constitutional Prohibition. Using Maryland as a case study, the narrative will examine the methods and policies which the state leagues had at their disposal in pursuing their agitation at the state and local levels. Also, the study will determine the degree to which the state leagues exercised autonomy from national policies and regulations. In addition, the research will investigate a basic question of prohibition scholarship as to whether temperance sentiment developed primarily along class lines as more recent studies suggest, or whether the earlier findings of a rural/urban demarcation are more valid.

The temperance reform movement was imbued with Victorian concepts of "morality" and "decency" long ago abandoned by the mainstream of American society. The passing of these concepts makes it more difficult for current observers to understand the motivations and the sincerity of those who participated in the struggles against the liquor traffic. The temperance crusades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were responses to fundamental social and economic changes. The post-Civil War
period saw a tremendous expansion of heavy industry which created a need for a plentiful supply of inexpensive labor, a need filled by immigrants from southeastern and central Europe. These workers were poor, semi-literate, spoke very little English, and had little or no acquaintance with the procedures of "democratic" government. This new labor force was by necessity concentrated into densely-populated urban centers. The resultant meteoric growth of cities between 1870 and 1900 severely strained the traditional mechanisms of municipal government.

Most reformers considered the increasingly widespread corruption, graft, and exploitation of municipal governments to be a direct consequence of this influx of immigrants. Reformers saw a triumvirate of political bosses, bureaucracy, and big business interests taking advantage of this confusion in municipal administration to enrich and empower themselves at the public's expense. The reformers saw the liquor dealers and the saloon as vitally associated with the success of these corrupt interests. Most of these "progressive" reformers felt that as long as the liquor trade remained politically entrenched, no effective social or governmental reform would be possible. Despite attempts by urban apologists to portray the saloon as a "poor man's club" dispensing positive social benefits, most "decent" people considered it a blight. The great majority of saloons were either owned outright or had mortgages held against them by the brewers and distillers. In such saloons, only the "company" brand was sold, and the enterprises' sole objective was to sell as much as it could. The majority of saloons were dingy and dirty, and did
not hesitate to sell to drunkards or even to children. In addition, saloons in the red-light districts often served as centers for prostitution.

The liquor trade therefore was a prime target of both social and political reformers. The social reformers were interested because of the saloon's deleterious effects on the poor, while the political reformers expressed concern because of the ominous threat which the saloon's activities seemed to pose for the traditional democratic institutions of self-government. These reformers believed that a drunken mass could neither improve itself socially or economically nor participate usefully and responsibly in the political process. They saw the alien poor as a threat from below, easily manipulated by the economically and politically powerful industrialists and political bosses. The Populists and Progressives in particular believed that these two groups would grind down the middle class between them. By removing the visible source of the problem, namely the saloon, the reform element expected that all the "decent" interests would benefit.

The prohibitionists who dominated the temperance movement following the Civil War were different from those who led earlier fights for temperance reform. The new generation of reformers generally had not suffered from alcoholism themselves as had much of the membership of the Washingtonians, Order of Good Templars, and Sons of Temperance. Also in contrast, the newer generation was better educated than the general population, and was upwardly mobile in society. Both the old and new reformers were predominantly
of old American stock, and held to the moral values of work, self-discipline, and frugality. Like their forebears, the new prohibitionists tended to see themselves as middle class (hard-working, paying bills, home-loving) as opposed to the upper class which they considered "idle," and the lower class which they thought of as "vicious." Although the mainstay of temperance voting strength was always in rural areas, the movement prior to 1920 drew a large portion of its leadership from urban areas. The prohibitionists considered themselves heirs of the abolitionist tradition and, having rid the nation of human bondage, would now use moral suasion to attack a different sort of slavery, alcohol. Several organizations rose to take up the challenge.

The first of these groups was the Prohibition Party, organized in 1869 as an outgrowth of the Order of Good Templars. The Party ran its first slate in 1872, seeking to abolish the liquor traffic by means of attaining political power. This group had serious notions of becoming a major political party, supplanting either the Republicans or the Democrats. As evidence of this purpose, the Party took on a broad reform program similar to that of the Populists of the 1890's. However, aside from its role as a spoiler in New York State in the Presidential election of 1884, the Prohibition Party never became a serious factor in national politics, nor did it significantly participate in the later drive for Constitutional Prohibition.

Of more significance to the twentieth-century temperance
movement was the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Founded in 1874, it greatly influenced the nation's social history for over forty years. The WCTU reached its full potential upon the accession of Frances Willard as its President in 1879. She announced that American women would "lift the banner of the party that declares for home protection and saloon destruction." The WCTU under Miss Willard developed a broad base of reform goals and even attempted the formation of a political party, the Home Protection Party, to further its goals and objectives. However, the most significant contribution of the WCTU to alcohol reform was in the field of temperance education. From the 1880's until the 1920's, the WCTU directly influenced the contents of textbooks used in most of the nation's schools. The temperance community considered this activity a definite material aid in the subsequent development of a consensus of opinion towards prohibitory reform. After Frances Willard's death in 1898, the organization was unable to maintain its previous level of prestige or vigor, and the WCTU devolved into the role of spear carrier for the Anti-Saloon League of America.

The Anti-Saloon League drew its support from individuals who objected to the third-party approaches of the Prohibition Party and the WCTU. At the time that the Prohibition Party and the Home Protection Party were failing in their attempts to attract a significant following, the movement for an alternative program picked up strength. This alternate approach was to be non-partisan, not affiliated with any political party, and would
focus on the single issue of the liquor traffic. In this regard, the National Temperance Congress was held in 1890 in New York City, while in 1891, the National Temperance Convention took place at Saratoga Springs, New York. As a result of these two meetings, "local action leagues" began to form, some of which banded together in state alliances such as the Christian Temperance Alliance of Pennsylvania, the Anti-Saloon League of the District of Columbia, and the Anti-Saloon League of Ohio. The District of Columbia League invited other leagues and temperance organizations to Washington, D.C. in 1895 to discuss the propriety of establishing a national alliance against the trafficking in liquor.

Forty-nine temperance and religious organizations gathered in Washington, D.C. in December of 1895. The Anti-Saloon League of America arose from this meeting. The various organizations attending encompassed a broad range of philosophies and opinions regarding the proper approach to be taken against the liquor traffic. For this reason, the 1895 Convention decided that the League would not advocate Prohibition in the broad sense, but would instead concentrate the presently-divided temperance forces on a more modest single issue, the suppression of the saloon.\(^\text{11}\) The leadership explained that "it is not a question of the man that gets drunk. It is the question of an institution that exists for the purpose of making men drunk."\(^\text{12}\) The Convention's motto was "the Saloon must go," and the League's stated purpose was "the suppression of the saloon."\(^\text{13}\)

The League was to be non-partisan, though intensely involved in the political process, and was to maintain an attitude of
neutrality upon questions of public policy not directly and immediately concerned with the traffic in strong drink. The League was to be a federation of existing temperance agencies, and not a separate and competing force against the work of any existing organization. However, the League quickly became a competing force as it began to concentrate on the establishment of new state leagues patterned after the successful Ohio League rather than trying to recruit additional potentially-divisive temperance organizations. The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland, established in 1898, was one of these new leagues.

The Maryland League faced a significant challenge. In 1900, Baltimore City claimed one-half of the State's total population and was the only urbanized area in Maryland. From 1880 to 1920, the City underwent very rapid growth, fueled considerably by immigrants from central and eastern Europe. Counterbalancing the influence of Baltimore City was a rural area dominated by an old-stock long-term resident "native" population. The City and Southern Maryland were predominantly Catholic, with the rest of the State Protestant. The state legislature, despite the burgeoning growth of Baltimore, was dominated numerically by the outlying regions which retained representation disproportionate to their populations. The city could not force its will on the counties, but through shrewd political alliances and bargaining, could hamstring legislation inimical to its interests.

This study will closely examine the state-wide struggles of the Anti-Saloon League as well as some of the contests in the local areas. It will also scrutinize the non-political aspects
of the temperance movement in Maryland, especially the role of the churches, both Protestant and Catholic, as they interacted with the League. An examination of official League records, analysis of Census data, and perusal of local, state, and national newspapers will reveal the nature and character of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League, as well as the manner in which it worked with the national organization.
CHAPTER 1 NOTES


4. Odegard, p. 41.


CHAPTER 2
THE LEAGUE'S EARLY YEARS

The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland was heir to a strong legacy of organized temperance activity. Prior to the Civil War, the Washingtonians, the American Temperance Society, and the Sons of Temperance worked actively in Maryland to promote temperance. The first phase of organized prohibitory reform known nationally as the First Wave, led to state-wide Prohibition legislation in many states. In Maryland, the temperance issue was handled in the same tradition as most other legislative matters. This tradition, rooted in strong, diverse parochial interests, restricted efforts at comprehensive legislation, and limited the earliest enactments to local licensing laws.

Following the Civil War, what was known as Prohibition's Second Wave brought forth more-determined efforts by brand-new organizations. The organizations of state units of the Women's Christian Temperance Union (1874), the Maryland State Temperance Alliance (1877), the Prohibition Party (1884), and local "temperance leagues" put the movement in a position to apply persistent pressure to the opposition. The most important of these organizations to this study was the Maryland State Temperance Alliance.

The Alliance was founded in 1877 by William Daniel, a Baltimore businessman who also organized the Prohibition Party in
Maryland. Mr. Daniel was President of the Alliance for twelve years. He had organized the Alliance to serve as an umbrella group for the various interests working on the liquor problem. Up into the 1890's, the Alliance served this purpose. It was a well-organized and active group, composed of prominent citizens primarily from Baltimore. Realizing and accepting the nature of the Maryland state governmental process, the Alliance's policy and philosophy worked towards obtaining temperance measures for the various towns and counties.

The most prominent person involved in the legislative work of the Alliance was Jonathan K. Taylor. Taylor, who joined the Alliance in 1879, developed the art of legislative lobbying into a science. The proprietor of a very successful Baltimore insurance firm, his sales talents resulted in the formation of permanent Temperance Committees in the Maryland General Assembly in 1888, as well as passage of a state textbook law in 1889.¹ This textbook law, sponsored by the Women's Christian Temperance Union, was similar to laws passed in many other states about this time. The law specified that the public schools could only use approved textbooks for physiology instruction, books which among other things properly detailed the dangers of alcohol to the human system. Taylor remained the chief benefactor of the Alliance through the 1890's.

The Maryland State Temperance Alliance, despite its generally-successful record, began to develop serious problems during the 1890's. Much of this difficulty was directly traceable to the debate developing nationally between advocates of the "partisan"
approach and those favoring the "non-partisan" tactics. The State's Prohibition Party, unhappy with the drift of the Alliance towards the "non-partisan" philosophy being used successfully in Ohio, broke with the Alliance, draining away a significant portion of its financial resources. The Alliance's leadership thereupon began to make serious overtures to the newly-organized American Anti-Saloon League. They sent delegates to the first national convention in Washington, D.C., in 1895. In May of 1896, the Alliance's Executive Board invited the national League's Superintendent, the Rev. Dr. Howard B. Russell, to speak at the annual state convention and present the League's program to the membership. Despite Dr. Russell's presentation, the convention defeated a resolution to affiliate with the Anti-Saloon League. This defeat did not discourage the Board, however.

The Alliance sent delegates to the second national Anti-Saloon Convention, held in Washington, D.C., December 8-10, 1896. The Convention program recognized the Maryland State Temperance Alliance and praised it as an "aggressive non-partisan society." Apparently buoyed by the proceedings of the convention, the Executive Board of the Alliance met on December 21, 1896, drafted a new constitution, and changed the name of their organization to "the Anti-Saloon League of Maryland." The new constitution unequivocally pledged "to avoid affiliation as a League with any political party upon any question of public policy not directly concerned with the destruction of the traffic in intoxicating drink." This pledge was nearly word-for-word a statement of national League policy.
Despite this pronounced drift towards the policy and nomenclature of the national group, the Maryland association seemed to adopt a "go-slow" attitude in changing appearances. Its stationery was only slightly revised, referring now to the Maryland State Temperance League. At the Third Convention of the Anti-Saloon League of America in Columbus, Ohio, in January, 1898, the Proceedings labelled the Maryland State Temperance League as "one of our thrifty auxiliaries."7

This progress of the Maryland League towards full affiliation with the national organization continued in 1898. John J. Cornell, Secretary of the state League, in a frank letter to the Rev. Dr. Russell, dated May 28, spoke of the financial situation of the Maryland League and the implications of this situation for its legislative work.8 He asked Dr. Russell for contractual terms by which he could come to Maryland during the month of November to organize, raise money, and arouse sentiment. Dr. Russell responded with a "memorandum of agreement," dated July 1, 1898, agreeing to provide two speakers during November, to work about a month, speaking seven times a week. The state League was to pay the national association two hundred dollars per week plus expenses from the proceeds (subscriptions) raised by the speakers.9 This memorandum, in conjunction with a letter from John J. Cornell to Howard B. Russell, dated August 26, 1898,10 is apparently the basis of Ernest H. Cherrington's later statement that the Maryland League affiliated with the Anti-Saloon League of America in 1898.11 However, a more appropriate date for this affiliation would seem to be the December, 1899, appointment of the first "professional"
superintendent.

The first Superintendent of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League was Samuel Edgar Nicholson, a member of the Society of Friends. His background included activity as a minister, newspaper editor, and Indiana state legislator. He had worked with the Anti-Saloon League of America for several years, having served two years as its Secretary. A temperance leader with a national reputation and background, Nicholson's appointment to the Maryland post reflected the intense interest which the national organization had regarding temperance prospects in the state. The Anti-Saloon League of America was still struggling to establish its credibility as a meaningful force, and it saw in its inheritance of a viable state organization a golden opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of its policies and practices over those of the Prohibition Party and other competing temperance organizations.

Nicholson began his work in January, 1900, at the state League's offices at 116 W. Mulberry Street in Baltimore. Through the generosity and leadership of Jonathan K. Taylor, the League owned its own Headquarters Building. This situation gave the state League added stability, as it minimized overhead expenditures.

Nicholson entered the scene just as the Maryland General Assembly began its biennial ninety-day session. At the time of Nicholson's arrival, nearly one-half of the territory of Maryland was under some form of dry legislation. This territory included much of the Eastern Shore, Montgomery County, plus numerous towns and election districts. The new Superintendent immediately attacked
tradition by lobbying for the enactment of a general local-option law, an assault which fell short. "Local-option" gave the electorate of a jurisdiction the choice of voting either for "license" or "no-license". A majority vote for license meant that an area would be "wet", while a vote for no-license meant that it would be "dry". Despite the failure of the League to obtain the general local-option law, it was able to defeat several harmful bills, and to help pass a few beneficial local laws. Nicholson determined that until the League could develop an organized statewide sentiment against the saloon, the most practical course of action was to push for strict enforcement of those laws which were already in force.

The Maryland League agitated in Anne Arundel County to get the local authorities to crack down on violators of the liquor laws. Judge James Revell ordered a special session of the Grand Jury, and obtained eight indictments. Concurrently, the state League cooperated with the Anti-Saloon League of Montgomery County to force compliance with that county's prohibition ordinance. In this instance, twenty-eight local-option cases were brought before the court, and twenty-six convictions were obtained. Similar efforts undertaken four years earlier had seen only five trials and one conviction from eighty-seven indictments. Clearly, the Maryland Anti-Saloon League had struck the proper chord to encourage local officials to enforce the law. Judge James B. Henderson spoke from the bench to give encouragement to the temperance movement, and a Prohibitionist in Montgomery County allowed himself to say "I give the Anti-Saloon League credit for retaining and
enforcing the local option law."{16}

In an effort to further mobilize broad public sentiment for enforcement, Dr. Nicholson pursued a policy aimed at strengthening the League's relationship with the churches. Despite having made great progress, Nicholson believed that the greatest obstacle in the way of further success in Maryland lay in the lack of unity and the sense of competitiveness among the religious and moral forces.\(^{17}\) Another problem was that the temperance people from areas which had no saloons seemed to show little concern for those areas suffering from the traffic. With the aid of his Headquarters Committee, Nicholson worked at a program to break down these parochial attitudes. At the December, 1901, Washington, D.C., Convention of the Anti-Saloon League of America, he noted that the Maryland League was now operating in all but five counties.\(^{18}\) He further reported that he had spoken in eighty-five towns over the past two years and that an increasing number of churches were opening their doors to League speakers. The Baltimore Methodist Episcopal Conference, the Maryland Methodist Protestant organization, and the Baltimore Presbytery were among those that specifically endorsed the work of the League and urged the full cooperation of their constituents. In addition, a report of the General Synod of the Lutheran Church noted that "we commend the American Anti-Saloon League to our people for continued cooperation and support . . . and bid it God-speed in its further efforts against the saloon."\(^{19}\) Likewise, the Baltimore Methodist praised the League, declaring "the tendency to rum rule checked."\(^{20}\) The Methodist
commented on the "unusual and unexpected potency of the League efforts," and went on to say that "the results more than justify the claims of the League to the sympathy, cooperation, and support of the good citizenship of the State."

Superintendent Nicholson's report to the Seventh National Convention of the League in Washington, D.C., in December, 1902, was not quite so enthusiastic. He labelled 1902 as a year of achievement in that while the League did not get all it wanted, it got more than many had expected. He pointed out that one-half of the territory in Maryland was now dry (without saloons), the result of many pieces of local legislation over the years. In his review of the 1902 General Assembly, Nicholson noted that thirty-one of the fifty-five bills favorable to the League's program had passed, and that the Speaker of the House of Delegates had remarked that without the work of the League, the results would have been less successful. 21

The passage of legislation did not mean the battle was over. The League believed it necessary to take up efforts to ensure that the new laws were enforced. It believed that previous "moral legislation" had been repealed because "the unholy combination of the liquor power of the State, gamblers, and some Baltimore city officials" had not permitted the laws to be observed. 22 The League caused 175 Grand Jury indictments to be brought. Sixty were prosecuted and won, four were lost, and sixty others continued. Also, three local option elections were held, and all were won, putting twenty-four saloons out of business.23
The League's successes provoked undisguised recriminations from its opponents. The Baltimore Argus, a liquor trade newspaper, charged that "bigots, zealots, and Puritanical fools make up the Anti-Saloon League of Maryland."\textsuperscript{24} The paper also asserted that the League's representatives had "Pharasaical minds and hearts as foul as slime and filth can make them."\textsuperscript{25} The Argus also accused Nicholson of purchasing two million dollars worth of real estate from the proceeds of Sunday collections, including forty-two acres in Druid Hill Park in Baltimore at eight hundred thousand dollars.\textsuperscript{26} It is doubtful that all the Sunday collections in all of the "friendly" churches in Maryland totalled two million dollars in all of 1902. The American Eagle, another liquor publication, took a more temperate approach to the situation, remarking that "the time is now at hand when we . . . must consider the efforts of the Anti-Saloon League in endeavoring to drive us out of business."\textsuperscript{27} In the Eagle's words, the League was "proving to be vastly annoying."

The annoyance of the Argus and the Eagle did not deter the work of the Maryland League during 1903. Nicholson characterized the League as being in "a growing, healthy condition."\textsuperscript{28} Nicholson endeavored to corral the allegiance of like-minded groups in its campaigns. He used the wide-open "beer resorts" on the Chesapeake Bay as an issue by which to bring together the diverse reform elements. The League, the Baltimore ministerial groups, the Society for the Prevention of Vice, and the Baltimore World combined to attack the Bay resorts. However, the League's primary
thrust continued to be directed towards winning over the churches. Nicholson worked especially hard at trying to get the League "as intimately associated with Church work as possible." He saw the churches as a stable, dependable, grass-roots force which would be invaluable for the long-term struggle.

The Executive Committee of the Maryland League therefore invited each of the church bodies to appoint two members to the Committee. As of December, 1903, eight denominations had done so. Nicholson reported that a slowly-increasing number of churches were opening their doors to League speakers, and that he personally spoke to 194 congregations during 1903. He admitted however, that the churches had not yet become "accustomed" to the idea of a "League Sunday," one Sunday a year on which a League speaker would deliver the sermon and solicit "subscriptions" (pledges of financial support). In Nicholson's view, local attitudes continued to hamper the work. He concluded that although the League's income was rising, it was still not enough to meet the need.

The needs of the League had grown during 1903. Through its work, 430 Grand Jury indictments were returned against violators of the liquor laws, and only five cases were lost. The most effective work was said to be going on in Montgomery, Cecil, Talbot, Wicomico, Calvert, Harford, Frederick, Garrett, Washington, and Carroll Counties. The weakest areas seemed to be Southern Maryland, and the Baltimore metropolitan area. However, the League's outlook was said to be brighter than ever
before, and with a vast amount of work on hand, and with only a limited number of workers, had managed to reach "fighting ground." Despite its successes, the League felt its work was hampered by the lack of search-warrant legislation which would enable law enforcement personnel to search for stocks of illegally-held liquor. The League would continue to seek a remedy for this deficiency in the 1904 General Assembly.

The annual state convention of the League, held in Baltimore on December 3 and 4, 1903, was the instrument employed to rally the forces for the upcoming legislative battles. The importance which the national League placed upon the work in Maryland was attested to by the presence of a number of speakers of national repute, including William H. Anderson of Illinois and Purley A. Baker, the Anti-Saloon League of America's national Superintendent. The fervor aroused by the speakers was somewhat muted with the announcement that Superintendent Nicholson would be leaving Maryland to take over the leadership position in Pennsylvania. The 1904 legislative campaign would be under the supervision of his replacement, Reverend C. A. Griese.

It now fell to Reverend Griese to maintain the momentum that Nicholson had begun. Griese, however, did not seem to be a campaigner with the stamina of his predecessor. His reports to the national conventions convey no evidence of personal forays into the outlying regions of the State. It is perhaps noteworthy that he changed the name of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League's newspaper from the Searchlight to the Maryland Home and Fireside.
However, the enthusiasm and initiatives of the various county leagues brought much progress in local areas against the saloon. An example of this local enthusiasm was the effort by the Montgomery County League to root out the 150 retail outlets which paid U.S. Revenue taxes. In a supposedly "dry" county no retailer should have been paying such taxes. The county League succeeded in getting rid of all but two of the offenders and, because of the laws in operation at the time in regard to informers, received one-half of the fines collected - in this case, $3,500.33

In 1904, both Talbot and Wicomico Counties went dry as a result of local option votes, leaving Worcester County as the only county on the Eastern Shore still under "license." By 1904, eight counties in Maryland were completely dry, and four more were dry except for one town in each. The League could boast that two-thirds of the geographic area in Maryland was now under Prohibition.34 The League admitted however, that the summer resorts along the Bay and Ocean, and the clubs in Washington, D.C., continued to be sources of irritation to the State's "moral forces." All in all, the Superintendent's 1904 report took a rather passive stance, stating that in previous years some temperance legislation had been enacted, and that now emphasis was to be placed upon enforcement.35

Reverend Griese's report for 1906 was a bit more optimistic. He reported that the League had had more than usual success in the State legislature, with seven of eight pro-liquor bills going down to defeat. On the other hand, Griese proudly pointed to
the fact that thirty-two of forty temperance measures had been
enacted into law. He also noted that "with a few conspicuous
exceptions, the courts and its officers are with us." He felt
that the moral support of these agencies had hitherto been "inert."
He also reported the gain of more dry territory, the result of
several towns voting in favor of local option. In addition,
Griese felt that licensing laws had been upgraded, and he charac-
terized Baltimore City as rapidly becoming a "lid-on" city,
especially in regard to Sunday openings. The Superintendent
further noted that the brewers seemed generally in favor of law
enforcement, and were blaming the distillers for the wrong-doing.

The national leadership of the Anti-Saloon League, however,
apparently was not satisfied with the rate of progress in Maryland
under Griese. A report in 1907 stated that "Griese had been sick
for months," and was "unable to do the work he wanted." This
report commented that the Maryland State Temperance Alliance
had done its work, as had Nicholson, and their efforts had advanced
the cause. This report characterized Maryland as "one of the most
promising and pleasant fields of Anti-Saloon League labor," and
asserted that a change had to be made to reorganize the State
work on a more business-like basis. A later report indicated
that Griese was removed to get the services of a man with broader
experience, someone who had been identified with the national
program. Whatever the reason, Griese was removed, and a
concerted effort would be made to make dramatic changes in the
traditional Maryland way of doing things. Activism in the form
of constant, visible activity would be directed towards more comprehensive approaches to the liquor problem in Maryland. The League was no longer to be satisfied with local option bits and pieces. The Maryland League invited William H. Anderson, the highly-successful Superintendent in Illinois, to be its leader. The Maryland League felt that there was no reason why what was successful in Illinois would not work in Maryland.
CHAPTER 2 NOTES


Anti-Saloon League of America, Proceedings of the Third National Convention, Columbus, Ohio, January 11-13, 1898, p. 57 (joint microfilm edition, Anti-Saloon League of America series, roll 1, frame 167).

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Chapter 3
REORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE,
THE ANDERSON SUPERINTENDENCY, 1907-13

William H. Anderson took charge of the Anti-Saloon League of Maryland on February 1, 1907. A native of Illinois, he previously served as Superintendent of the Illinois Anti-Saloon League. Anderson was well-known in national League circles. He achieved this prominence because of his success in maneuvering temperance measures through the Illinois legislature. Illinois, though much larger than Maryland in geographic size and population, was similar in one respect. As Chicago's needs and desires had to be satisfied in Springfield, so did Baltimore City's in Annapolis.

Anderson was a lawyer and he was very active in the Methodist Episcopal Church. His friends considered him "keen, agressive, and relentless," possessing "rare qualities of leadership." However, his enemies charged that he was a "foreigner", and that he was tactless, arrogant, a liar, and a cheat. Anderson sought out controversy. He was an activist who put in long hours for the cause, and his zeal and determination generally brought him out ahead in any exchange. The new Superintendent had a firm notion of what he wanted and exact plans of how to go about getting it.
Shortly after arriving in Maryland, Anderson assessed the temperance situation as "promising." The American Issue of February 15, 1907, editorialized that "we have frequently said that if we desired to be a state Anti-Saloon League Superintendent, we would prefer Maryland to any other field," and that (Anderson) "will find a great number of staunch temperance people well-skilled in campaigning." Anderson was a bit more sanguine, noting that "independent and antagonistic interests" had hitherto retarded progress. He thereupon persuaded the Maryland League's Headquarters Committee to adopt in substance the model State Constitution of the Anti-Saloon League of America thereby bringing the state organization, at least in theory, in line with national procedures. Anderson also put into operation what he termed "approved business practices" for better management of day-to-day affairs.

Anderson also discovered that there was no state League newspaper (Griese's Home and Fireside had expired). Anderson soon persuaded the national organization to establish a Maryland edition of the American Issue. The new Superintendent characterized the response of the churches and the financial response of the people as only "satisfactory," but he predicted nonetheless that Baltimore would become the nation's first dry large city, and that Maryland would "soon be in the Solid South against the saloon."

To make good his predictions, Anderson outlined his program for the Maryland League. In his first annual report, he set forth
five proposals. First, he endorsed continued efforts to secure a state-wide local-option bill. Second, the League was to secure pledges from adherents, and members of the cooperating churches and organizations to vote only for candidates "right" on the issues. Third, Anderson sought to secure pledges of support to vote only for U.S. Congressional candidates who favored the Littlefield "Inter-State Liquor Shipment Bill." The Littlefield Bill sought to suspend the commerce clause of the Constitution so that the police powers of the state to which the liquor was shipped could operate without restriction. This bill was of particular interest to the Maryland Eastern Shore, because the dry Shore was a convenient market for Delaware liquor wholesalers. Fourth, Anderson recommended that a permanent League attorney be employed to better aid in securing enforcement of temperance laws already enacted. Fifth, Anderson requested authority to raise a special fund to supplement the church subscriptions. 6

Organizationally, Anderson enlarged the office force of the Maryland League. He hired two additional clerical workers and appointed the Reverend Marna S. Poulson as Assistant Superintendent. In addition, Anderson decided that the headquarters building at 116 W. Mulberry Street in Baltimore was too small, rented it out, and moved the League's offices to Suite 801-802 of the American Building, also in Baltimore. Also, he set up a Legislative Office in the Carvel Hall Hotel in Annapolis, as well as an office in Hagerstown under the leadership of the Reverend Cyrus B. Keen. Anderson also inherited the responsibility of overall
supervision of activities in Delaware, a "missionary" state unable to support its operations from locally-generated revenue. Delaware's activities, expanded to include those of the Maryland Eastern Shore, were directed from Wilmington as the Peninsula District, under the care of John M. Arters. Thus, Anderson, in the course of a year, transformed the Maryland League from a well-meaning, semi-amateurish, one-office effort to a slickly-professional four-office operation. This organization received its first meaningful test in the 1908 legislative session of the Maryland General Assembly.

The Baltimore Methodist of January 2, 1908, noted that the Anti-Saloon League, as "the agent of the moral forces," was writing up bills for the General Assembly of Maryland. Anderson, admitted to the Maryland Bar on January 7, 1908, registered as Legislative Counsel for the Anti-Saloon League, and took up residence at the League's Annapolis office for the duration of the legislative session. The primary item on the Anti-Saloon League agenda was "a sweeping bill" which would unify and codify the "chaos" accumulated through many years of piecemeal legislation. Anderson noted that a compilation of liquor laws done in 1899, took 192 pages. He said the proposed bill was very similar to legislation he shepherded in Illinois, with additional features drawn from Alabama and Kentucky anti-shipping laws. These anti-shipping provisions were aimed at preventing Baltimore City liquor dealers from circumventing local dry laws by shipping their goods into dry areas.
Anderson opened the attack for his comprehensive legislation by saying that "the only question is whether the people have the right to settle the saloon question for themselves, and whether self-government and majority rule must take a back seat in the presence of the liquor traffic." He pressed the offensive by analyzing the attitudes of the State's newspapers towards the League's program. Anderson noted that despite the influence of the liquor interests' large advertising budgets, the majority of newspapers in the counties, with the exception of those in Cumberland, were favorable to local option. For example, he considered the *Baltimore News*, fair on all aspects of the issue, though it favored high licensing fees instead of local option. The *News*, in a January 16, 1908, editorial lamented that liquor advertising was being withdrawn because its news articles were not critical of the temperance movement. To counteract such pressures, Anderson applied some of his own. He issued a warning that "no newspaper need expect to be received indefinitely into the homes of Christian temperance people which ... antagonizes legislation which can protect them against the liquor traffic."  

The next element of Anderson's campaign was the holding of a "Concerted Discussion" on Sunday, January 26, 1908. On January 9, 1908, he sent a letter to every pastor in the State, asking that they discuss during that day's morning service the following:

1. The privilege of voting directly and effectively against the saloon in counties, divisions of counties, and portions of Baltimore City as a right incident to self-government.
2. The Anti-Saloon League movement of Maryland as an omni-partisan, inter-denominational agency of the churches and temperance forces for cooperative work against the saloon, and especially for securing a local-option law embodying the above propositions, and the necessity for adequately, regularly, and permanently supporting such agency.

3. The importance of informing our representatives in both houses of the Legislature of our wishes in this connection, and assuring them of support in voting for this and other righteous measures.

The Baltimore Methodist's hope for 1,000 sermons fell somewhat short, as the American Issue reported that 500 ministers cooperated. In the Baltimore area, seventy-seven Methodist, eighteen Presbyterian, twelve Baptist, and five African Methodist churches participated. Somewhat surprisingly, four Episcopalian, two Lutheran and two Roman Catholic congregations also joined the effort. The ministers were asked to send to each of his local newspapers an announcement that he would be speaking in favor of local-option, plus a brief of his sermon. Anderson suggested to the clergy in the Baltimore area that they especially contact the Baltimore Sun, as the Sun published more high-license matter and less local-option and Anti-Saloon news than the others. The Concerted Discussion of January 26, 1908, was the preliminary to the next element of Anderson's plan, a "monster" rally.

The "Great Local Option Rally" was held at the Lyric Theater in Baltimore on the afternoon of January 26. Each clergyman contacted in regard to the Concerted Discussion was asked to supply a list of names of men who would promise to attend the Rally, at least ten men from the smallest churches, and fifty from the largest. The League then contacted each of these people, and personally invited them to the rally. Anderson
advised the ministers that "if you think we are asking a good
deal now-a-days please remember we are the agency of the Christian
people for telling when and how to strike to get the results
desired, and we cannot reach them except through the pastors."
In another letter, sent out to the ministers on January 18, he
further advised that "the League wins victories because it takes
chances and does everything that can be done." On January 23,
Anderson sent out still another broadside, calling on his "Brothers"
to "through our prayers, focus at Annapolis the power of Him Whom
we serve." He also asked for letters, and exhorted the pastors
to "please use your personal influence, outside the pulpit, to
get your leading men to write..." The Lyric Rally seemed a
success, with 4,000 in attendance. The national League Superintend-
ent labelled it "the greatest Anti-Saloon League meeting ever held
in this country." Not content to rest upon this success, Ander-
son planned his next move.

The next move was the hiring of a special train to take local-
option supporters from Baltimore to Annapolis to attend the Feb-
ruary 18 public hearing on the Anti-Saloon League's bill. Anderson
wrote that "If we can take 1,000 people to Annapolis, the most
skeptical will be convinced that the people are aroused." The
Methodist Episcopal, Methodist Protestant, Methodist Episcopal
South, Baptist, General Synod Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Reformed
ministerial groups all gave their complete support. As a result,
1,800 people made the trip to Annapolis, creating a "tremendous
crush." The next week, the opposition returned the favor, bringing
1,800 supporters to a hearing for opponents of the bill. The effect of the demonstrations seemed to cancel each other out.

The League was concerned about the make-up of the Temperance Committees. The Baltimore News reported that John J. Mahon, the "boss" of the Democratic organization in Baltimore City, may have had a lot to do with re-constituting the Committees from the previous Legislature. Also, the League, suspecting that legislators were afraid of the Bill's effect on their districts, offered a $100 reward for anyone who could prove that any area's interests would be hurt. Anderson also changed Section 20 of the bill to quiet Roman Catholic fears regarding restrictions on sacramental wine, as well as general concerns about infringing on an individual's rights to have liquor in his home. Anderson attempted to quiet the fears of the dry element by stating that the bill would not jeopardize any existing temperance laws, but would instead hold them in place. In fact, said Anderson, local areas would now have the opportunity of adding "search and seizure" and "anti-shipping" restrictions. The purpose of the "search and seizure" provisions was to give local authorities the power to confiscate liquor being shipped or sold in violation of the law. Fearing that the Chairman of the Temperance Committee would try to delay reporting the bill to the floor, Anderson made a call for an Emergency Extra Campaign Fund. However, the chairman did report the bill out, though unfavorably, and the House of Delegates subsequently voted it down 56-43, the Baltimore City legislators voting 23-1 against it, and the county people voting
42-33 in favor. Once more, in the city-county struggle, the city prevailed.

Anderson was very disappointed at the outcome. However, he did not give up the fight. He issued a call for an "Indignation Meeting" at the Lyric for Sunday, March 15, in an effort to demonstrate to the Senate that an "outraged public" demanded further action. This effort proved to be fruitless. Anderson charged that the "bosses of the organization beat the bill in the House by compelling legislators to violate pledges under threat of defeating their personal legislation." So it was, Anderson had his first taste of Maryland politics. Although eighty-one other temperance measures did pass, including one providing for a local-option vote for Worcester County, the loss of the centerpiece was a hard defeat. In a letter sent out to subscribers in 1908, Anderson labelled the events "a merely preliminary fight," and warned that "the fight this winter will be one of unparalleled bitterness in the temperance history of the State." The Baltimore World blamed Anderson for the defeat of the General Local Option Bill, saying it was mismanaged. However, the Board of Directors of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League thought otherwise and gave the Superintendent its vote of confidence.

Anderson set out to obtain a bit of revenge from those he believed were instrumental in the bill's defeat. He lobbied Governor Crother not to appoint Delegate Edgar Ash, or Senator James Dawkins to patronage positions as Police Judges in Baltimore. The Governor appointed other people to these posts, an action
which the *Liquor Trades Journal* of Baltimore blamed on the Maryland League. Anderson also went after J. "Fred" Talbott, the Second District Congressman from Baltimore City. However, Mr. Talbott won by an even larger majority than before. The League explained off the result as a case of Talbott's opponent being too colorless and since the League had not endorsed the opponent, it was not a loss for them.

In an effort to favorably influence the makeup of the next legislature, the League's Board of Directors authorized Anderson to secure $100 a year pledges from 200 people to be used towards electing a legislature favorable to the Anti-Saloon cause. The first effort along this line was to be made in the general elections of 1909. Anderson opened the work with a "Concerted Discussion" on January 31, 1909, for men only. The "men only" requirement was due to the fact that only men had the vote; and to have women in the audience would diminish the impact of the crowd upon the professional politicians. Over the next four days, rallies were held at Frederick, Hagerstown, Cumberland, and Annapolis. Anderson asked each pastor at these meetings to give the League a list of his church's voting membership. He urged upon the churches "the importance of promptly cooperating."

The Maryland League polled every candidate for the Legislature as to his stand on the Local Option Bill. The League then published a complete list of names with the notation "Satisfactory" or "Wrong" beside each. The situation in Baltimore City and County, however, presented a quandary for Anderson. He noted
that "although the Democratic nominees are known to be pledged, the bosses are against the local option bill." Thus, their pledges seemed of doubtful worth. On the other hand, the Republican nominees generally ignored the League's questionnaire, and therefore the League could not endorse or support them. However, the League did support the one Republican in Baltimore who declared for local option (Eldridge), and he was the only Republican elected in his district. The League did go after Senator Dawkins with a vengeance, sending out 20,000 letters in his district. Dawkins survived, although his plurality was reduced from 3,000 in 1907 to only 600 in 1909. All in all, the 1909 campaign did not go well for the League, although Anderson did point out that all the minority candidates (Republican) who declared for local option ran ahead of their ticket. The League felt that the general policy of seldom sending a man back to the legislature for a second term took a lot of the terror out of feeling accountable for one's voting record. Therefore, pledges were no better than the integrity of the legislator, and there was relatively little the League could do in response.

The year 1910 began with an appeal from a columnist of the Baltimore Methodist that "it behooves every temperance person to make some investment in the League," and that "if the temperance people will put the money into the hands of the Anti-Saloon League for legislative agitation and campaign purposes, . . . the League will do business." The American Issue began the year by noting that "the Maryland League has been seriously hampered in the past
year by its friends" not contributing sufficiently to expand the work.40

The League re-introduced to the 1910 Legislature the same local option bill which suffered defeat in 1908. The Issue expressed the feeling that the Temperance Committees seemed friendlier than in 1908 and believed that the ultimate fate of the bill would be up to the Governor. The Speaker of the House appeared to be a temperance man, as did the Governor, but because political and party considerations might have an effect, it was up to the people to let them know how they felt.41

Anderson feared that T. Leigh Marriott, the chairman of the House Temperance Committee, would not report out the League's bill for consideration. He therefore sent Marriott a letter asking for a prompt report. The bill did go to the floor, where it once more lost, this time by only two votes. Bolstered by the narrowness of the decision, the League then introduced a similar bill in the Senate which excluded Baltimore City from the purview of the legislation and which restricted local option contests to the dates of the general elections. However, this effort to meet the stated objections to the bill was to no avail, as the Senate refused to consider the measure.

Anderson, needless to say, was not pleased by the results. He was very disappointed in the slow progress in church support. He declared that the local option bill had been defeated by the apathy of the temperance people.42 In response, the League's Board of Trustees reorganized and expanded itself to include
representatives of all church denominations. The Board also instructed the Superintendent to perfect the League's organization in every county and ward.  

Anderson believed that a requirement for the League's program to work was a general system of local organization which could establish immediate contact with the individual citizen. The church organization, though absolutely vital to success, needed to be supplemented. "The past year (1910)," wrote Anderson, "has been a testing time." He pledged to continue the fight for the General Local Option bill, along similar lines, in the next legislature.

Superintendent Anderson's report for the year ending January 31, 1911, further appraised the League's political and financial situation. He appealed to the political leaders of both parties to avoid another bitter, unnecessary fight on the liquor question by passing it back to the voters for decision.  

Also, upon reflection, he took a more charitable line than that of the previous summer regarding the League's financial shortages. Instead of castigating the churches, he placed primary blame now on such things as bad weather at the time of the League's biggest meetings, and the Baltimore Post Office's insistence that the League pay a penny postage for each American Issue delivered in the city. Anderson felt that although the League was not as healthy financially in proportion to the anti-saloon sentiment, it was probably in the best condition ever as regards its influence and power.

The November 1911 General Elections seemed to confirm Anderson's impression of the League's power. The League used the same
tactics employed in 1909, publishing lists of candidates, noting which were supporters and which were enemies. Among the highlights of the election were the victories of four of the five Republicans in Baltimore City who declared for local option. The four were elected from districts which normally went Democratic by 3,000 votes. In Carroll County, a Republican who had voted for local option twice as a member of the House of Delegates won a seat in the State Senate, the first time a Republican had won a Senate race in the county since 1867. In Washington County, the wet candidate lost, and his ticket went down with him. During the election campaign, the League mailed 90,000 letters and flooded the Baltimore City Second and Third Districts with 65,000 half-tone circulars. Helping make this success possible was a special campaign fund of $10,000, $5,000 of which was contributed by five men. Also of help was the development of a complete mail follow-up system by which the League could keep in contact with its supporters regarding subscriptions and political developments.

The outlook seemed good for the 1912 legislative session.

As the 1912 legislative session began, the temperance forces believed they saw a more friendly attitude in Annapolis than they had seen earlier. One commentator remarked that the "vindictive bitterness" seemed gone. The Concerted Discussion was now an annual tradition. The 1912 Discussion took place on January 28. The League prepared leaflets explaining their bill, and listed the names of all the legislators. Leaflets were to be "furnished free to any pastor who will get them into the hands of the men of
his church." The Baltimore Methodist commented that "no pastor who is dead earnest on this question will permit anything to keep him from taking part in this concerted movement." Furthermore, the "real fighting will begin at Annapolis as soon as the churches are ready." The Methodist periodical went on to say that "it has been a matter of reproach that not less than half a dozen Methodists... voted against the local option bill last time," and that "there is no room within the membership of a self-respecting church for any man who disgraces his church in order deliberately to consort with the liquor traffic." The editor of The Methodist was the Reverend Dr. Charles M. Levister who coincidentally was the President of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League. The League, through the church magazine, sought to invoke "discipline" on the members of the Methodist Church, whether they were private citizens or legislators.

Anderson's optimism as to the 1912 legislative session was tempered by the remembrance of bright expectations dashed to defeat in 1910. Anderson worried about the manner in which House Speaker James M. Trippe selected the Temperance Committee. Baltimore's Mayor James H. Preston, a staunch opponent of local option, personally selected Trippe as Speaker. The League estimated that the Temperance Committee was packed two to one in favor of the wets. A row soon developed between Anderson and Trippe. Trippe accused Anderson of releasing "confidential" correspondence to the press, of making false statements concerning Trippe's stand on the local option bill, of making false statements about the chairman
of the Temperance Committee, and spreading untruths about political maneuvering aimed at unseating the recently elected Baltimore local option men.  

Anderson invited Trippe to try to prove his charges, an invitation which Trippe apparently did not accept. The Baltimore Methodist stepped in to say that Trippe succeeded in stirring up the pastors of the State. It noted that the clergy had expected the League to do the work for them, but when Trippe attacked the League and labelled it a "cause without merit," the "sparks began to fly."  

The Methodist Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal South, and the Baptist ministerial groups all adopted strong resolutions supporting the League, and sent them to the Speaker.

The Baltimore Sun commented on the vitriolic exchanges between the League and its opponents. The Sun commented that "the debate never changes a vote," and is but "formality and millinery."  

Nonetheless, the paper expected the attacks and counter-attacks to be "thrilling." A group of Baltimore businessmen expressed their opinion by taking out a front-page ad in the Sun with the headline "An appeal to our friends in the dry counties of Maryland."  

The ad labelled the local option bill as "unfair, unjust, and unnecessary," that they wished to work out the saloon problem "in their own way," and that they were trying to attract capital to Baltimore, not confiscate it. The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland responded by placing a front-page ad in the following day's newspaper. The League pointed out that the City delegates helped defeat a local option bill which expressly excluded the
City. Also, to counter the claim that the loss of the liquor trade would reduce tax revenues and throw people out of work, the League offered the example of newly-prosperous Salisbury which had gone under local option in 1904. When all the shouting and argument was over, the local option bill passed the House of Delegates, but failed in the Senate by one vote following some amendments and political maneuvering. Again, the League came close to achieving its goal of a comprehensive temperance law. The Maryland League's Board of Directors resolved that if the Local Option Bill as amended did not pass in 1914, that they would start at once to campaign for legislators committed to a state-wide constitutional amendment for prohibition.

The consistent failure of the League to persuade the Maryland General Assembly to pass its comprehensive measure should not be construed to mean that Anderson was unsuccessful in stirring up sentiment. The Lyric rallies, the Annapolis demonstrations, and the general successes with other temperance legislation are indicators that the League did make an impression on Maryland politics. Anderson however, did not of course do the work by himself. As mentioned previously, Anderson appointed District Superintendents in Hagerstown and Wilmington, Delaware. He further built up the organization by appointing J. Bibb Mills as the state League's Attorney in 1909. Also, in 1911, Anderson sent Reverend Keen from Hagerstown to Salisbury to organize an additional district office. This new office was necessary because the Delaware League at this time decided to try and pay its own
way, separate from Maryland. Anderson's efforts at decentralizing the League's operations laid a heavy burden on the competence of his field workers. He sought to upgrade their competence through training.

Anderson considered his annual conference and "school of methods" to be the secret of the League's successes. He lectured workers, primarily ministers, on "the League's way," and his way of doing things. Anderson counseled his audiences on such things as the League's arguments regarding alternatives to local option (usually high license fees), the necessity of avoiding political party alliances in the name of the League, and the necessity of foreswearing timidity and caution in pressing the cause. Energy and enthusiasm were Anderson trademarks, and he attempted to transmit these characteristics to the field workers. In addition to his annual conference, Anderson held conferences in the various counties. In 1910 for example, he held meetings in twenty of the twenty-three counties of Maryland. Anderson believed that only by building a state-wide grass-roots network could the temperance sentiment achieve its maximum expression.

The key elements in developing this maximum expression were the churches, especially the evangelical Protestant denominations, and most particularly the Methodists. The Methodist allegiance was particularly important in Maryland because, according to the 1890 U.S. Census, the Methodists had a total of 1,324 churches in Maryland, well over one-half of all the congregations in the state. Their churches peppered the countryside from Garrett County to the
Eastern Shore. The Methodists had a church in nearly every town and village and at most major crossroads. Outside the large cities, congregations tended to be small, probably more serious about the tenets of their religion, and probably more receptive to their ministers than were the larger urban congregations. The average Methodist church in Maryland had 93 members, while the average Catholic parish had 837 members.64

The most prominent denominations on the side of the Anti-Saloon League and the Methodists were the Presbyterians (109 churches with 12,483 members), and the Baptists (100 churches with 16,238 members). The most consistent religious opponents of the League's local option policies were the memberships of the Jewish faith (nine congregations with 3,575 members), the Roman and Orthodox Catholics (169 parishes with 141,410 members), the Lutherans (129 churches with 24,648 members) and the Episcopalians (249 churches with 24,223 members).65 In total, the major church denominations which declared their support of the League totaled 1,805 congregations with 183,868 members, against their opponents 556 churches with 193,856 members, an apparent standoff.

Reality of course is usually more complex than appearances. The League's church support, diffused across the State, had the potential of affecting many Senators and Delegates, whereas the opposition's support, concentrated in Baltimore City and its suburbs, was likely to influence relatively few legislators. Also, although the leadership of a major denominational group might declare policy in favor of one or the other side of the temperance
issue, these expressions did not receive unanimous obedience down at the grassroots. For example, Anderson constantly complained that not all of the churches of "cooperating" denominations were cooperating in allowing the League speakers into their pulpits to solicit pledges. The larger churches in particular seemed to prefer to put the League in their "budget," rather than let them directly solicit pledges from the congregations. The budget plan almost always resulted in far less income for the League. On the other side of the fray, the opinions of Archbishop Gibbons did not always coincide with the activities of the parish priests. Even Archbishop Gibbons relaxed sufficiently to appoint a representative to the League's Board of Directors. Also, a number of Episcopal and Lutheran churches participated in League programs, apparently according to the inclinations of individual pastors. Paradoxically, those Lutheran, Episcopalian, and Catholic churches which did participate in League activities tended to be in "wet" areas, areas in which the denominations usually supporting the League showed below-normal enthusiasm.

A possible explanation of this paradox is that the Episcopalians, Lutherans, and Catholics in the "wet" areas saw first-hand the worst aspects of the saloon problem and its effects on the people. This first-hand perspective, augmented by elements of Rauschenbusch's Social Gospel, spurred individuals to support the most-visible movement working to solve the saloon problem. Conversely, the urban Methodists, Presbyterians, and other supporters of temperance often viewed the League as a competitor to their
denomination's organized temperance efforts. More involved with denominational "politics" than their rural counterparts, ambitious individuals believed that they would receive more credit for the success of the reform through their church efforts than they would through the League, and therefore would not aid the League any more than necessary. Fortunately for the League, this attitude was a minority viewpoint.

However, another threat to the League's supremacy in "leading the Church in action against the Saloon" was the National Inter-Church Temperance Federation. The Federation held its first meeting in 1907. Anderson attended the meetings, and wrote (apparently in 1911) a scathing review of the Federation for the American Issue. He denounced the Federation as being unrepresentative of the churches, and said that most of the prominent people involved "have also been identified or in sympathy with open and frequently unscrupulous opposition to the Anti-Saloon League." Among those "unscrupulous" opponents were several noteworthy Prohibitionists, although Anderson was careful to exempt Joshua Levering of Baltimore, a prominent friend of the League, from the general condemnation. Anderson further stated that "in our judgement there is no future before this 'Federation' until it purges itself by something more than mere perfunctory resolutions of 'appreciation of other temperance agencies'." Apparently the Federation purged itself to the satisfaction of the Maryland League, as the Baltimore Methodist of May 2, 1912, announced that Reverend Andrew B. Wood of the Inter-Church Federation, in
conjunction with J. Bibb Mills, was going to present the state League's case to the Baltimore City churches.

Another element of the city's population to which the League took its case was schoolchildren. In cooperation with the W.C.T.U., the League distributed 50,000 copies of a Scientific Temperance Foundation pamphlet to be used in preparing essays for prizes. The League had to distribute the material itself because school authorities declined to assist. The distribution of this pamphlet was a reflection of a change in the W.C.T.U.'s attitude towards the state League. Despite the W.C.T.U.'s 1909 State Convention's endorsement of the State-wide Local Option Bill, relations between the two associations had been "correct," but not warm. The Maryland League's expression of "hearty sympathy" for women's suffrage in 1912 helped establish a dialogue with the W.C.T.U. The League went the final distance towards full cooperation when it elected Mrs. Sarah T. Miller, a member of the W.C.T.U. Executive Committee, as one of the three Vice-Presidents of the state League. Thus, by 1913, the League and the W.C.T.U. were working together.

The League and the Prohibition Party however, were still not working together. Anderson stated that the policy of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League was not to give the Prohibition Party any material assistance, any more than if they were Republicans or Democrats. He also rejected the Prohibition Party's call for a state-wide Prohibition law in 1909. Anderson argued that such a law could not be passed, and would set the work back for
years if the League tried to pass such a law, for there was no organization to hold the law, nor system to enforce it. He insisted that he was not against the Party, and would be "glimpse to see the Party get all the incidental benefits out of a wise policy of cooperating, and shall rejoice in anything which increases its power for the destruction of the liquor traffic." Anderson later praised the Prohibitionists for cooperating in declining to nominate candidates for the legislature from Frederick County, stating that "this evidence of cooperation is highly appreciated." However, the Prohibition Party remained at odds with the League. The Party's state newspaper, the Battle Cry, charged that the League firmly but quietly dominated the Methodist Church. The paper further asserted that the League was throwing away millions of dollars, money which if put into Methodist temperance work, would have been much better spent. Clearly, the Prohibitionists were not ready to line up with the League's anti-saloon principles, and the Party would continue for a time to pursue its own course. However, this course did not seem to have very much effect in one direction or the other upon the League's activities. One organization which did have an effect was the Montgomery County Anti-Saloon League.

The Montgomery County Anti-Saloon League altered Anderson's philosophy regarding the usefulness of county leagues in advancing the overall work. Soon after his arrival in Maryland, Anderson expressed the opinion that county leagues were not helpful to the state League's program because they diffused energies and resources,
which in turn contributed to setbacks which then led to discouragement and apathy. Following the defeat of the state League's General Local Option Bill in the 1908 Legislature, he changed his thinking. Anderson expressed the opinion that the Montgomery County Anti-Saloon League seemed to be the model county league of the country, because it was of great help in local enforcement vigilance, and in the promotion of sentiment. Anderson thereupon encouraged the development of other county leagues, most notably in Frederick, Anne Arundel, Worcester, Washington, and Prince George's Counties. However, inefficient work in Washington and Prince George's Counties during the 1909 elections dampened Anderson's enthusiasm for unsupervised programs. The Maryland League also cooperated with the District of Columbia League, particularly in regard to law enforcement in suburban Montgomery and Prince George's Counties. There were frequent requests for information, and for references for people to do detective work. One reason for this close interaction was undoubtedly that the Superintendent of the District of Columbia League was also an active member of the Montgomery County League. Another reason for close ties was Anderson's sending his assistant Superintendent to Washington in 1909 to help in reorganizing the League's work in the District.

Anderson had occasion himself to spend some time in the District of Columbia in 1909 and 1910. During this time, he served as acting Legislative Superintendent for the Anti-Saloon League of America while still carrying on the Maryland activities.
In addition, he began a decade of service on the National Executive Committee of the League. Although he complained of being "crowded" into National positions, Anderson also acknowledged that the Maryland work profited from the national associations. In addition to the legislative work, Anderson's national activity included writing articles for the national edition of the American Issue, replying to critics of the League, and acting as a trouble-shooter, scouting church groups, looking for trouble which might be brewing. Anderson frequently corresponded with Ernest H. Cherrington, who was Editor of the American Issue, Director of the American Issue Publishing Company, and a member of the National Board. Cherrington was Anderson's alter ego at the national level, an indefatigable worker. Anderson's relationships with other members of the League leadership were not always so smooth. He had a serious squabble with Purley Baker, the National Superintendent, over Anderson's alleged aspersions against former Superintendent Russell, and over Anderson's alleged unseemly ambition. Anderson's drive and perseverance, mixed with an overbearing sense of righteousness and self-worth, is evident from his correspondence. These personality characteristics would go far in explaining why he seemed to be at the center of controversy, whether in Maryland or Ohio. If Anderson's personality inspired dislike and suspicion from like-minded people, it could not help but infuriate his enemies. In fact, Robert Lee Ulman, a whiskey salesman, went so far as to attempt to assault Anderson in the League's Baltimore office. Anderson's
personality, summarized by some as arrogant and tactless, appeared to be a fatal flaw. This personality drove Anderson tantalizingly close to success, but at the same time kept him from attaining his ultimate goal, the passage of comprehensive temperance legislation. However, Anderson did manage to have success in Maryland, away from the General Assembly.

Anderson was very successful in raising money for the Maryland League. Whereas in Superintendent Griese's last year, the Maryland League took in less than $1,000 in receipts, Anderson's first year brought in $11,154. In 1909, this number rose to $21,026, in 1910, to $27,654, slipped slightly to $23,385 in 1911, rose again to $38,438 for 1912, and in Anderson's final year, topped out at $50,090. While it is interesting to note that Anderson was extremely successful in increasing the state League's receipts, a more significant point was a decreasing reliance on small-amount member contributions. Even though the church contributions increased significantly between 1907 and 1913, there seemed to be a limit as to the amount available from that source. Prior to Anderson's arrival, the League's chief support came from the churches. By 1913, Anderson reported that the churches' contributions totaled $17,408, only 35% of the gross receipts. The newly-dominant category was "Special Contributions," which in 1913 amounted to $20,411. Anderson made a point of currying favor with wealthy businessmen, especially those he happened to meet at the Methodist Conferences. He patiently "worked" these individuals in an effort to make the League a major part of their
Anderson recruited William F. Cochran to follow in the tradition of Jonathan K. Taylor as a major contributor to the League's cause. Mr. Cochran stayed with the state League for many years, and was instrumental in maintaining its viability during the 1920s and 1930s. Cochran served the Maryland League until his resignation in 1949, due to ill health. Anderson was a very persuasive individual with the power to make lasting impressions upon those with whom he came in contact. The National League sought to capitalize on these persuasive powers by making him a regular contributor to the American Issue.

Anderson wrote for both the national and Maryland editions of the Issue. Outside of the Ohio edition which served, with minor embellishments, as the national edition, the Maryland version of the Issue seemed one of the most highly regarded of the state papers. In the listing of state editors appearing in the Anti-Saloon League Yearbook, Anderson's name appeared second, directly below that of the Ohio editor.

The Ohio edition of the American Issue served not only as the national paper but also as the basis for the various state papers, the state Leagues being entitled to a certain number of unique pages of the eight-page paper. According to Anderson's contract with the National League, a subscription list of 3,000 entitled Maryland to the maximum of four pages. In September of 1908, the Maryland subscriptions already totaled about 2,500, and by October, were up to 2,800, causing Anderson to begin hectoring the Issue to give Maryland its four pages. By the Spring of
1909, the Maryland edition had its four pages, and kept them. Anderson submitted the copy for all four pages, filling them with news of past events, promoting things yet to come, as well as providing "sermons" on general anti-saloon topics of interest. Anderson considered the Maryland edition of the Issue a vital tool for maintaining the work. A review of the League's Yearbooks indicates a direct correlation between a successful state League, and a regularly-published temperance newspaper. In addition to his writing for the American Issue, Anderson also found time to write The Church in Action Against the Saloon, a book published by the American Issue Press. Anderson's high visibility as a result of his writing gave him much publicity and made him a target for employment offers from state Leagues whose work was not prospering.

Anderson left Illinois in 1906, assuming he would take the job as New York State Superintendent. When negotiations concerning New York broke down, the Maryland group offered him their position. Once settled in Maryland, the National League was the first suitor, hoping to have Anderson as permanent Legislative Superintendent. The Pennsylvania League offered feelers to Anderson in early 1910, followed by New York and the national association again in 1912. The 1912 offers sparked a considerable reaction in Maryland, prompting the Headquarters Committee of the state League to issue full-page ads in the Baltimore newspapers pleading for support to encourage Anderson to stay. The Baltimore Methodist quoted someone from the Headquarters Committee that it would be
"a serious setback" if Anderson were to leave now.103 The Headquarters Committee went on to issue a plea to the pastors and churches to help keep Anderson in Maryland by opening their pulpits to the League workers.104 Whether as a result of this campaign, or for other practical reasons, Anderson decided to stay. On May 20, 1913, ostensibly to quiet fears that he was again thinking of leaving, Anderson said that "I have not at any time given any serious consideration to the proposition of leaving Baltimore before the close of the next Legislative session."105 However, before very much longer, Anderson did give "serious consideration" to leaving.

In December of 1913, immediately prior to the opening of the 1914 Maryland legislative session, Anderson announced his acceptance of the position of Superintendent of the New York Anti-Saloon League. It is not clear why Anderson decided to leave Maryland. From appearances, the New York League seemed disorganized and financially moribund,106 up against a Tammany Hall political machine with power dwarfing anything in Maryland. Perhaps Anderson saw in New York State an opportunity to make an even bigger name for himself, as the supreme authority in the most populous state of the Union. Nonetheless, before leaving, Anderson secured a $5,000 subscription from Mr. Cochran for the New York work, and in addition, as part of the agreement with New York, took his two expert clerical assistants with him, Anderson personally guaranteeing their salaries!107 Thus, at a very critical time, Anderson in effect gutted the Baltimore office of the Maryland League, and
siphoned $5,000 away from the Maryland work to a state with infinitely more resources. Despite the timing and character of the move, Anderson apparently did not create many enemies because of it. The Maryland League invited him back to speak at the Lyric meeting in Baltimore in January, 1916. The Baltimore Methodist later referred to Anderson's "host of friends down in this neck of the woods," to his being "our steadfast friend," and to his being "the doughty champion." \textsuperscript{108}

Anderson changed the Maryland League in its organization, its way of doing things, and in the scope and nature of its programs. Anderson made the Maryland League into a high-profile organization, capable of demanding and receiving attention. Because of Anderson's successful organization of the work in Maryland, he and the state League could stand up to the national organization without fear of retribution. All in all, he left the Maryland League in good condition. The 1913 National Convention espoused a new national program to submit a proposal for a Constitutional Amendment to the U.S. Congress for national Prohibition. The Maryland League was ready and able to help.
CHAPTER 3 NOTES


2 Baltimore Methodist, March 19, 1908, p. 4; and February 15, 1912, p. 5.


4 Anti-Saloon League of America, Proceedings of the Twelfth National Convention, Norfolk, Va., September 16-19, 1907, p. 103.

5 Anti-Saloon League of America, Twelfth National Convention, pp. 104-5.

6 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 16, 1908, p. 5.

7 Baltimore Methodist, January 2, 1908, pp. 4-5.

8 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 11, 1908, p. 6.

9 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 18, 1908, p. 5.


11 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 18, 1908, p. 6.


13 Baltimore Methodist, January 16, 1908, p. 5; and American Issue (Maryland edition), February 1, 1908, p. 5.


21 American Issue (Maryland edition), February 29, 1908, p. 5.

22 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 25, 1908, p. 5.

23 American Issue (Maryland edition), February 15, 1908, p. 5.


26 American Issue (Maryland edition), March 28, 1908, p. 5.


28 American Issue (Maryland edition), June 6, 1908, p. 2.

29 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 30, 1908, p. 3.

30 American Issue (Maryland edition), November 14, 1908, p. 6.


32 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 29, 1909, p. 4.


36 American Issue (Maryland edition), November 20, 1909, p. 4.


39 Baltimore Methodist, January 6, 1910, p. 6

40 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 8, 1910, p. 2.

41 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 22, 1910, pp. 2-3.
42 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 28, 1910, p. 4.
43 Baltimore Methodist, June 2, 1910, p. 12.
48 Anti-Saloon League of America, Proceedings of the Fourteenth National Convention, Washington, D.C., December 11-14, 1911, p. 120.
49 Anti-Saloon League of America, Fourteenth National Convention, p. 120.
50 Baltimore Methodist, January 11, 1912, p. 5.
51 Baltimore Methodist, January 11, 1912, p. 6.
52 Baltimore Methodist, January 18, 1912, p. 4.
53 Baltimore Methodist, February 1, 1912, p. 3.
55 Baltimore Methodist, February 15, 1912, p. 5.
57 Baltimore Sun, March 18, 1912, p. 9.
58 Baltimore Sun, March 18, 1912, p. 1.
60 American Issue (Maryland edition), June 8, 1912, p. 1.
61 American Issue (Maryland edition), July 4, 1908, p. 4.
62 American Issue (Maryland edition), June 10, 1911, p. 3.


American Issue (Maryland edition), January 8, 1910, p. 2; May 28, 1910, p. 3; et al.


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Baltimore Methodist, May 2, 1912, p. 11.

American Issue (Maryland edition), May 24, 1913, p. 7.

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American Issue (Maryland edition), July 25, 1908, p. 5.

American Issue (Maryland edition), May 1, 1909, p. 2.

American Issue (Maryland edition), May 1, 1909, p. 4.

American Issue (Maryland edition), October 23, 1909, p. 5.


American Issue (Maryland edition), May 9, 1908, p. 6.

84 American Issue (Maryland edition), November 13, 1909, p. 5.


86 American Issue (Maryland edition), December 18, 1909, p. 2.


88 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 16, 1908, p. 4.


91 American Issue (Maryland edition), June 28, 1913, p. 6.

92 American Issue (Maryland edition), December 18, 1909, p. 2.

93 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 16, 1908, p. 4.

94 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 29, 1909, p. 2; May 14, 1910, p. 6; June 10, 1911, p. 2; May 30, 1914, p. 1; and Baltimore Methodist, May 2, 1912, p. 11.

95 American Issue (Maryland edition), March 30, 1912, p. 5.


98 Letter from Alexander S. Cochran, dated April 7, 1949.

Letter from William H. Anderson, dated September 12, 1908 (joint microfilm edition, Ernest H. Cherrington series, roll 1, frame 263); and

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Baltimore Methodist, April 25, 1912, p. 17; and


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Chapter 4

A CHANGE IN STRATEGY,
THE HARE SUPERINTENDENCY, 1914-17

William H. Anderson resigned his position as Superintendent of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League effective December 31, 1913. The Assistant Superintendent, the Reverend Dr. Charles M. Levister, a Methodist clergyman, took charge of League affairs for the month of January, 1914. Dr. Levister also assumed the responsibility as editor of the Maryland edition of the American Issue. Mr. Anderson's permanent replacement arrived in Maryland on February 1, 1914.

The Reverend Dr. Thomas M. Hare assumed the Maryland Superintendency following several years as Superintendent of the West Virginia Anti-Saloon League. A Methodist Episcopal clergyman, originally from Ohio, Dr. Hare previously held superintendencies in Cleveland, Ohio, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, and South Carolina. A national League spokesman described him as "forceful and captivating on the platform."¹ One of Hare's first excursions as Maryland Superintendent was to Salisbury to meet with Eastern Shore Senators to draft a bill barring liquor shipments into Wicomico County. The Senators praised Dr. Hare's "moderation."² The new Superintendent also made a good impression on the Baltimore Preachers Meeting which in March, 1914, passed a resolution: "Resolved that we welcome Superintendent Hare as the leader of the church in action.
against the saloon, that we pledge to him our loyal cooperation, and that we accord to him the privilege of the floor in our Preachers Meeting."^3

Hare joined the Maryland League in the midst of the 1914 legislative session. The League considered the 1913 elections a disaster. Their unsuccessful attempt to defeat the popular Senator Blair Lee swept "hostile and unpledged" men into the Legislature.^4 In the face of the hostile legislature, and in the absence of a Superintendent, the Headquarters Committee and the Board of Trustees of the League together formed a Board of Strategy to supervise the legislative lobbying. The Baltimore Methodist, noting the feeling among the legislators that the elections repudiated the Anti-Saloon League, said that "it is up to the temperance people to show this is not true."^5 The first decision of the Board of Strategy was to drop the long fight for General Local Option, and instead press for Constitutional state-wide Prohibition.

Senator Snader of Carroll County introduced the Prohibition Bill on March 10. The bill, introduced late in the session, with insufficient "preparation" of the legislators, had a tough fight facing it. The annual January Lyric Theatre mass meeting attempted to demonstrate that the temperance forces were not discouraged. It also attempted to show that the movement was not dependent on any one individual (Anderson) for success. The meeting seemed a rousing success, resulting in a $27,000 subscription collection, the largest to that date for any Anti-Saloon League meeting.^6 However, the pattern of the activity in the legislature followed a
familiar line.

The League's proposed prohibition amendment went down to a decisive defeat in the House of Delegates by a vote of 57-42. However, a great deal of "local" legislation passed. The League claimed that the threat of the state-wide bill encouraged many legislators to protect themselves by voting for the local bills, after voting against the state-wide proposal. Among legislation which did pass were anti-shipping measures for the Eastern Shore, and the restoration of the right to vote on license/no-license to Charles, Garrett, Carroll, and St. Mary's Counties. In the course of the next eighteen months, all four of these counties voted dry, eliminating over 200 saloons. Despite the League's failure to win the "big one," it seemed clear that sentiment for prohibition legislation was on the rise.

Dr. Hare attributed this consistent local success to the League's thorough organization in the State, down to the precinct level. Also important was the League's new effort at unifying all elements of the temperance forces. The Maryland League called a Get-Together Convention, held in Baltimore on May 14 and 15, 1914. Three hundred and ninety-three delegates attended, representing the W.C.T.U., the Prohibition Party, as well as the Anti-Saloon League. The Convention discussed the organization, literature, and financing of a campaign to secure state-wide prohibition. In a spirit of harmony, the League divided the State work into departments, with each organization appointing representatives to each group. The League went still further, and invited other sympathizers and their
organizations to participate. The first order of business for the new alliance was preparation for the 1915 general elections. A differently-comprised state legislature was a necessary prerequisite for a successful state-wide prohibition fight. Also, because the 1913 national convention of the Anti-Saloon League of America passed a resolution calling for a constitutional amendment for national prohibition, it was possible that the next state legislature might have to decide whether or not to ratify. Thus, it was doubly important that the 1915 elections go well. The annual meeting of the League's board of trustees unanimously supported the new direction of Superintendent Hare. They saw the issue before the citizenry as "the right of the people to rule."10

Dr. Hare was optimistic as to the outcome of the election campaigns. He believed that "surface indications are that sentiment in favor of Prohibition has climbed more rapidly here than anywhere else."11 The results of the 1915 elections seemed to confirm Dr. Hare's belief. The American Issue announced that a majority of both the Senate and House elected in 1915 pledged themselves to vote for state-wide prohibition. Under Hare's policy of decentralizing authority, the legislators made the pledges to local county groups on the theory that the promises would be kept better than if made to the state league.12 This theory would receive a severe test in the 1916 legislative session. The Wicomico News felt that the Wicomico County delegation was a unit in favor of submitting the prohibition question state-wide, and remarked that "the sentiment here is too strongly temperance
for them to be otherwise." By January, however, the News worried that "the State Organization" would persuade them away. The League's annual January Lyric meeting attempted to remind the legislators of their pledges.

The Lyric meeting in January, 1916, was the usual rousing affair. Nationally-prominent speakers included Wayne Wheeler, the National Legislative Superintendent, and William H. Anderson, back from New York. The Baltimore Methodist pointed out that "our own victorious superintendent, Dr. Thomas Hare, will also be there." The League leaders, believing they were now in a commanding position, moved quickly to secure their advantage.

Senator Speicher of Garrett County introduced the League's bill, and spoke in its favor, as did Senator Warfield of Carroll County. Senator Frick of Baltimore City immediately began a fight to exempt the city from the provisions of the bill. The drys pushed for an immediate vote, sure that they had enough support, but afraid that Governor Harrington, though from a dry area, might waver, and begin working for a Baltimore exemption. However, the Temperance Committee voted the bill out favorably, as originally proposed, by a vote of five in favor, and four against. In favor of the prohibition bill were Ward of Wicomico, Corddry of Worcester, Sewell of Talbot, Balderston of Cecil, and Baker of Harford Counties. Opposed to the measure were Shriver, Degenhard, Kelly, and Leijune of Baltimore City. The split on the vote was totally along rural-urban lines. The minority committee report noted ten reasons why the prohibition bill should not pass, including that it was "tyranny,"
it was against "personal liberty," it would deprive people of property without due process, and that it would not work in Baltimore. Senator Mudd of Charles County argued in favor of the Baltimoreans saying that if the Senators from Baltimore say the people there are against prohibition, they must be right, or the people would not have elected them. Also, because Baltimore Senators voted for what Charles County wanted in the past, he (Mudd) would return the favor. Senator Smith of Baltimore County, waging a campaign to persuade the Eastern Shore Senators to vote to let the City have a separate vote, reported progress, but noted that the Senators feared "annihilation" back home should they change their stand. The League and its supporters did not fail to respond to this assault.

Charles M. Levister, the League's Assistant Superintendent, wrote that the issue was not the forcing of prohibition on Baltimore, or the alleged ill effects of trying to do so, but was rather one of allowing people to vote on it. He continued by saying that "merely because someone believes the law cannot be enforced, is no reason not to try it." Another temperance supporter argued that one should not "measure money against humanity," and made a plea for the "common people of Maryland," asking "why are the citizens of Baltimore to be throttled, and stifled and trampled upon." The Baltimore Sun essentially took the position of the wets, editorializing that "Prohibition should not be forced upon the city by the dry counties," because "chaotic conditions always result when attempts are made to enforce a law against public
sentiment." Still another reader, from Carroll County, ridiculed the Sun claim that the city could not prosper with prohibition, by asking if the city would now be unable to pave its streets without "blood money?" Also joining the fray in behalf of the League was the evangelist Billy Sunday, who noted the presence of foreign-born residents in the opposition, and said (to much applause) that they had no right to criticize "the way we do things in America," and that if they did not like it, they "better beat it back across the sea to where you belong." Amid reports that Governor Harrington was leaning towards the League position, the wets hit upon a device by which they might emerge with at least a partial victory.

The Baltimore City delegates discovered a soft spot in the Eastern Shore's unity of purpose. This vulnerable point centered on leasing the oyster beds which many Shoremen tonged for their livelihood. The Sun picked up on the dispute by coming out strongly in favor of leasing the hitherto "free" beds to the highest bidder, not as revenge against prohibition, but as a prudent means of recovering income lost from the liquor industry. Although the Eastern Shore delegation began to waver, the Sun noted that "Dr. Hare has a really remarkable grip . . . upon them," and that the prohibition lobby was "one of the most skillful, most autocratic, and perhaps the largest ever known to Annapolis." One Eastern Shore delegate, Charles Brohawn of Cambridge, felt that the
"ultra-temperance" men were one-sided, and that he resented being put in one camp or the other by the Anti-Saloon League. Nonetheless, Delegate McIntosh of Baltimore County introduced an amendment to the League bill calling for a separate local option vote by each wet area. This amendment served to prevent the dry areas from voting prohibition into sections with wet sentiment. In effect, the McIntosh Amendment acknowledged that a state-wide vote would probably go dry. The League's bill, thus amended, passed both Houses, and the post-mortems were interesting.

The Baltimore Sun noted that the contest was on a "higher plane this year," and that "the Prohibitionists did well in having the bill passed." The League on the other hand did not feel they "did well," and were furious. The Methodist said that "the present temperance measure passed by the legislature is absolutely disowned by the Anti-Saloon League, but under its terms we shall fight, and fight to the last ditch." The Methodist went on to say that the people of Baltimore City, "which seems at this time not to be a portion of Maryland, will be educated." The League's Headquarters Committee "adopted agressive measures," and announced that "Reverend Dr. Thomas M. Hare, the alert and fearless Superintendent . . . is planning a campaign unparalledled in the liquor battles of this state."

The League could not begin its campaign until it repaired the damage done to its grass-roots organization by the passage of the amended bill. It denounced as false the story that Hare and Baltimore's Mayor Preston reached an agreement whereby only the wet
areas would vote. Oscar Henderson, President of the Montgomery County Anti-Saloon League, was furious at the way in which Dr. Hare handled the political maneuvering. Henderson wrote Alfred Shoemaker of the District of Columbia League that "there are a few needed reforms in the A. S. L. of Maryland," and that "Now I doubt the sincerity of the A. S. L.," and that "I shall with pleasure resign my position . . . if something is not done."³⁴ Hare blamed the confusion on the last-minute refusal of Baltimore County to be included in a "two-unit" amendment which was to allow the counties to vote as one unit, and Baltimore City as the second on the prohibition question.³⁵ All in all, the League felt that while the bill as passed was unsatisfactory, it was nonetheless a "distinct gain."

The combined forces of the Anti-Saloon League, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the Prohibition Party made preparations for the local option elections to take place in November, 1916. In Baltimore City, the W. C. T. U. organized the Home Defenders Association to assist in door-to-door campaigning, while the Committee of 100 (business and professional leaders) concentrated on the commercial area. The Baltimore Methodist wrote that "Dr. Hare, with his large corps of assistants has been 'instant in season and out of season'."³⁶ It went on to say that "he has the confidence of the temperance hosts." The League and its allies held public meetings, conducted open air services, and distributed tremendous quantities of literature. The temperance forces also did door-to-door canvassing, held "cottage prayer meetings," and
solicited monetary contributions. The *Methodist* exulted that "our women have been strenuous in the cause," with the W. C. T. U. and the League leading the way. The paper further exhorted the churches to use their pulpits the Sunday before election "in no uncertain manner." The League thus drew on all of its resources in an effort to gain the ultimate objective of a dry Maryland.

The Maryland League did not attain its objective, and probably did not believe it could under the amended rules. Of the eleven units which voted on the local option question, only three went dry. Frederick County voted dry by a margin of 6,156 to 5,305, Washington County by 5,470 to 4,996, and Havre de Grace by twenty-four votes. All of the other areas, including Prince George's County, Allegany County, Baltimore County, Annapolis, and Baltimore City voted not to have local option. Baltimore City voted wet by 73,156 to 29,352 or 71% of the vote. The *Sun* considered the margin a big surprise, because the drys seemed so well organized. The city clearly was not in favor of temperance legislation. However, the pickup of two counties in the dry column meant that there were now seventeen such jurisdictions entirely under local option, plus three more with only one or two wet towns. Only Allegany, Prince George's, and Baltimore Counties had any sizable territory still wet. The League took further solace in calculating that the November, 1916 elections closed 113 more saloons. It also noted that from 1907 to 1917, the number of liquor licenses in Baltimore City dropped from 2,411 to 1,193, due to the quadrupling of the license fees plus the increased scrutiny of the Liquor License Board by
the watchful eyes of the League. However, the Methodist commented that "too many rowdies, habitues of the crime-breeding saloons have been shooting up this old town since Virginia went dry and sent some of her worst products to Maryland." The paper went on to say that "the people are getting just what they voted for and must take their medicine," and expressed the hope that "the press of this great city before many moons will assist in a state-wide fight." Another element which the League hoped would someday help them was the Catholic Church.

The Catholic Church hierarchy, in the person of Cardinal Gibbons, consistently endorsed "temperance," but not abstinence, and also consistently endorsed high license fees as the best means of regulation. The American Issue and the Methodist repeatedly chided Gibbons for not taking a stronger stand against the liquor traffic. During the 1916 legislative session, the Methodist said Cardinal Gibbon's "voice is belated, and does not possess the 1916 temperance spirit." It went on to characterize his plea for the regulation of the liquor business in Baltimore as "impotent," and professed not to accuse him of insincerity, but merely as "too old to change." The Methodist later said that "if Cardinal Gibbons will take a strong stand, there would be a saloonless Baltimore." It also charged that "the only effective meetings... held in behalf of the liquor interests are conducted in Roman Catholic churches and halls." While Gibbons never did change his viewpoint, many individual priests actively aided the League in its work. The League made it a point to have at least one Catholic priest speak
at its Lyric meetings.

One of these priests, the Reverend Father Curran of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, speaking at the 1914 Get-Together Convention, drew on the theme that "Protestants and Catholics are drawing closer in the terrific struggle to overthrow the un-American saloon."\(^46\) This theme, characterizing the saloon as "un-American," supported one of the primary lines of thought which encouraged some Catholics to support the League. The theory, of the younger priests in particular, was that the sooner the inner-city foreign-born Catholics were weaned away from the saloon, the more quickly they would shed their "foreignness" and be assimilated into the mainstream of American society. Once assimilated, the foreign-born would remove themselves as an obvious target of nativistic Protestants, and thereby quell any resurgence of Anti-Catholicism.\(^47\) The League clearly believed that the Catholic opposition was concentrated in the inner city. The Methodist said that "outside of this city Catholic priests and their people are overwhelmingly for temperance."\(^48\) The primary example offered by the League for this statement was the successful 1915 local option campaign in St. Mary's County led by the Reverend Father Kelly.\(^49\) Despite the League's criticisms of the inner-city hierarchy, there is no evidence that the Maryland League embraced anti-Catholicism. Its comments seemed directed more at individuals than at dogma. The Baltimore Methodist, which usually followed the League line, seemed less tolerant on this point and occasionally indulged in editorial remarks which went beyond the League's philosophy. The League's pragmatic approach
worked to counter tendencies towards prejudice or bias. This pragmatism is especially evident in its work with the black population.

The key to the work among blacks was the church, especially the African Methodist Episcopal and the Baptists. They organized their memberships into "Law and Order" leagues aimed at eliminating the several vices afflicting the less-cultured members of their race. As a response to these actions, the Maryland Anti-Saloon League contemplated the establishment of a "colored department." This contemplation became a reality in the Fall of 1912 as the Reverend Mr. D. Dewitt Turpeau was appointed Superintendent of the newly-organized Colored Department. The Afro-American Ledger supported the League's efforts by stating that "the liquor traffic is doing immense harm to the colored people of this country." The paper denounced the harmful aspects seen in Baltimore, and said that the poorest people spent a large portion of their wages "to enrich the liquor interest as well as to bring about their own degradation." The League brought in Reverend Turpeau during the 1915 St. Mary's County local option struggle to counter the liquor interests' efforts to enlist the blacks. The narrow victory of the League was due entirely to the efforts of Turpeau and the aforementioned Father Kelly. St. Mary's County was one of the few jurisdictions in Maryland, outside of Baltimore City, which had both sizable black (48%) and Roman Catholic populations. The success of the State League in enlisting the cooperation of these two groups is a good illustration of its flexibility and practical
attitude in reaching beyond the limits of white evangelical Protestantism. Nonetheless, the Anti-Saloon League depended on these "evangelicals" for its on-going financial support.

Dr. Hare's fundraising efforts were never able to match the $50,000 apex reached by Anderson in 1913. However, the number for 1914 of $35,023 seemed quite satisfactory to the League workers. The year 1915 saw gross receipts of $26,777, and 1916 brought in $26,912. Even though the revenue levelled off, the State League seemed able to support itself as well as contribute to the national work. During this period, the Maryland League consistently paid more than the minimum required to the National League. In some cases, the excess was barely over the minimum, a situation probably provoked by the ineptitude or insensitivity of the national headquarters in its dealings with the state organization.

The Anti-Saloon League of America had at least two bitter disputes with the Maryland League during the Superintendency of Dr. Hare. The first occasion took place in the course of a report by the National League's Financial Secretary to the Board of Directors of the National League. Dr. Hare, by virtue of his being a State Superintendent, was a member of the Board. In his report, the Financial Secretary, Cherrington, chided the State Leagues for their recalcitrance in opening their churches and other facilities for field days and rallies in support of the financial campaigns of the national League. In response to Cherrington's report, the records of the meeting noted that:
On Tuesday, July 6, at the afternoon session of the Board of Directors, while the report of the Financial Secretary was under consideration and some criticisms were offered because that report did not show the collections made on pledges taken in the national League meetings, Dr. Hare, addressing the Board of Directors, said substantially: "The National League came into my state and held the greatest meeting ever held in the state in the Lyric Theater and took a large subscription, and we have never heard from it and it has never gotten on the books." 60

This faux pas, while very irritating, did not engender the rage resulting from the national League's pursuing the payment of an apparently-non-existent subscription. The Assistant Superintendent of the Maryland League, the Reverend Dr. Levister, in a letter to Cherrington, excoriated the national League's Financial Department for the harassment of Senator Jackson of Salisbury.61 Levister said that "I am indignant through and through at what I conceive to be an outrage; and if this is the method pursued by the men under your authority, I do not see how you can expect to have the cooperation of the state officials." Whatever Cherrington's explanation, it apparently did not completely mollify Dr. Hare. So long as Hare remained in Maryland, there were no meetings held there for the benefit of the national prohibition campaign.63 The national League, in fear of making a bad situation worse, did not try to force its way in. It would seem that it was unwise to annoy Dr. Hare.

William Anderson's assessment of Dr. Hare surfaced in a letter to Cherrington in 1917, regarding substitute speakers for a New York campaign. Anderson said "I would not consent for a minute for Tom Hare to come to the State of New York. He is a loud-
mouthed, slandering blatherskite, and after the kind of treatment that I had at his hands he cannot work in any state that I have anything to do with if I see him first." George Crabbe, Hare's successor as head of the Maryland League, had similar feelings. Crabbe, in a letter to the Indiana Superintendent, said that Reverend Hare was not known for his spirituality, and characterized Hare's appointment in 1924 as Superintendent of the Ohio League as "one of the dirtiest, crookedest deals that has ever been pulled." The Baltimore Methodist however, on the occasion of Dr. Hare's leaving Maryland, praised him saying "the Headquarters Committee here would gladly retain his services; ... we are loathe to part with him." Dr. Hare parted Maryland somewhat under a cloud. The joustings with the national leadership, and the crushing Baltimore City local option defeat took its toll on his health. Just before his leaving, he wildly charged that the liquor bosses stole the city election, and that "only about one-half the dry vote actually cast were recorded in our favor." Hare apparently suffered a nervous breakdown. The Reverend Dr. Levister reported somewhat delicately that "a temporary break in Dr. Hare's health makes it absolutely necessary for him to give up his work in Maryland and Delaware." Dr. Hare "retired" to his native Ohio, where he worked for the Ohio League in various capacities until 1925. Hare's comparatively short reign of three years resulted in some gains for the dry forces in Maryland. When he took over the League, about two-thirds of the area of Maryland and one-third of its pop-
ulation was in dry territory. When Hare left, 85% of the State's area, and 49% of its population was under local option. Although Dr. Hare did make statistical progress, the Maryland League again narrowly failed to gain its ultimate goal of statewide local option or prohibition. As 1917 began, the drive for national constitutional prohibition seemed to be gaining insurmountable support. It remained to be seen if Hare's successor could ride the national wave of sentiment and obtain similar success in Maryland.
CHAPTER 4 NOTES

1."Thomas Mefford Hare," Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, III, 1183.

2.Wicomico News (Salisbury, Md.), February 26, 1914, p. 4.


7.American Issue (Maryland edition), April 18, 1914, p. 3.


17.Baltimore Sun, February 24, 1916, p. 3.


24 Baltimore Sun, February 27, 1916, p. 8.
34 Letter from Oscar W. Henderson, dated March 9, 1916 (joint microfilm edition, District of Columbia Anti-Saloon League series, reel 1, frames 190-2).
36 Baltimore Methodist, November 2, 1916, p. 4.
37 Baltimore Methodist, November 2, 1916, p. 4.
38 American Issue (Maryland edition), July 17, 1915, p. 4.
39 Baltimore Sun, November 9, 1916, p. 2.
40 Baltimore Sun, November 8, 1916, p. 2.
42 Anti-Saloon League of America, Yearbook, 1917, pp. 142-3.
44 Baltimore Methodist, March 2, 1916, p. 3.

46 Baltimore Methodist, May 21, 1914, p. 6.


49 American Issue (Maryland edition), August 14, 1915, p. 3.

50 Courier (Salisbury, Md.), September 14, 1907, p. 3.

51 American Issue (Maryland edition), June 15, 1912, p. 5.

52 Anti-Saloon League of America, Proceedings of the Fifteenth National Convention, Columbus, Ohio, November 10-13, 1913, p. 344.


54 American Issue (Maryland edition), August 14, 1915, p. 3.


56 American Issue (Maryland edition), July 24, 1915, p. 5.


60 Minutes of the National Board of Directors of the Anti-Saloon League of America, (July 6, 1915) (joint microfilm edition, Ernest H. Cherrington series, reel 82, frame 297).


American Issue (Maryland edition), February 10, 1917, p. 3.


"Thomas Mefford Hare," Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, III, 1183.


Anti-Saloon League of America, Yearbook, 1917, p. 141.
George William Crabbe assumed the Superintendency of the Anti-Saloon League of Maryland on April 1, 1917, one month after Dr. Hare left for Ohio. Dr. J. F. Heisse, the League's President, served as interim Superintendent during March, 1917.

Crabbe, like Hare, was a native of Ohio. Also like Hare, his last previous position was that as Superintendent of the West Virginia Anti-Saloon League. Crabbe was a lawyer. Prior to his work in West Virginia, he served the Ohio League from 1907 to 1913. Crabbe seemed to have a different personality than that of either Anderson or Hare. The Methodist described his personality as "winsome," and noted that "He comes with a fine reputation." He was a hard worker, dedicated to the cause, whose correspondence rarely displays temper or flamboyancy. Perhaps Crabbe's different personality would allow him to succeed where Anderson and Hare failed. A lighter touch might be more effective in persuading the Maryland legislature to pass state-wide legislation, as well as to ratify a constitutional amendment for national prohibition.

Two days after Crabbe assumed office, President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the Sheppard-Barkley District of Columbia Prohibi-
tion Bill. This law provided that as of November 1, 1917, it would be illegal to sell alcoholic beverages in the District of Columbia. The Sheppard-Barkley measure had important ramifications for the work of the Maryland League, in conjunction with the stringent Virginia state-wide prohibition law. The cumulative effect of these two measures left Prince George's County, Maryland as the only conveniently-accessible wet area for District of Columbia residents. The Maryland League, afraid that Prince George's County would immediately become "wide-open" to lawlessness, pressed for a solution.

George Crabbe requested that Governor Emerson C. Harrington call an extra session of the Maryland General Assembly. Crabbe asked that the legislature consider the question of Prince George's County, as well as a law to prohibit the use of all grain in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for the duration of the World War. This second provision, sparked by the United States' declaration of war against the Central Powers in April, 1917, echoed a drive by the National League for similar legislation in the United States Congress. Governor Harrington agreed to call an extraordinary session of the Maryland General Assembly for June, 1917.

The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland prepared and presented a bill to the Legislature providing for prohibition in Prince George's County, effective November 1, 1917. Entitled the Blandford Bill, it would, in the League's words, "protect the county and the United States Government against the liquor traffic."

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels sent a letter to Governor Harrington requesting
passage of the bill. The legislature passed the bill and Governor Harrington signed it, marking the first enactment of a prohibition measure in Maryland history. All previous such legislation had required a local-option vote. Crabbe thereupon issued a call for a state-wide prohibition law, citing the Prince George's action as a precedent.

The Summer and Fall of 1917 was a time of feverish political work on the part of the League. Before the primary elections, Crabbe called on the counties to send men to the legislature "unbiased, unbought, and unafraid." Following the primary in September, Crabbe lamented that the choice often was between two rival machines. He warned however, "let it be understood now that the League expects to have in every county of the State, men on one ticket or the other that every clear-thinking man opposed to the liquor traffic, can support." The November 1, 1917, Baltimore Methodist gave over its editorial page to Mr. Crabbe so that he could present the League's program regarding the next session of the Legislature. Crabbe said that the Maryland League would call for the passage of a law stopping the transport of liquor from wet areas to dry, and for a "straight-out" State-wide "bone-dry" prohibition law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Crabbe remonstrated that "we are counting on the Church of Maryland to join us on November 6, and assist, regardless of party politics, to send real men to the next Legislature . . ." He also called for the ratification of the proposed Eighteenth Amendment for nationwide prohibition. Crabbe instructed the
temperance forces to "vote only for men you know are safe - take no chances." Following the elections, the Superintendent declared that the new General Assembly looked "promising," and that "the work seems to be going along in a satisfactory manner."  

The 1918 legislative session began with the League and its supporters in high spirits. The _Methodist_, speaking of Crabbe, wrote that "His associates, as well as the members of the Headquarters Committee, walk somewhat proudly ..." The National League brought in its biggest names to lobby the Maryland Assembly for passage of the Eighteenth Amendment for national constitutional prohibition. William Jennings Bryan spoke to a combined session of the Legislature. Also present were National Superintendent Purley Baker, Ernest H. Cherrington, Legislative Superintendent Ernest Dinwiddie, and the Chairman of the National Legislative Committee, Bishop James Cannon, Jr. The Maryland House of Delegates ratified the Eighteenth Amendment on February 8, 1918, by a vote of 58 to 36, and the Senate followed suit on February 13, by a vote of 18 to 7. Maryland was the sixth state to ratify the National Prohibition Amendment. This speedy ratification took place despite the Methodist's belief that all the secular newspapers in Baltimore were unfriendly to Prohibition. The Legislature also passed bone-dry laws for Somerset and Caroline Counties, and closed the saloons in the resort of Chesapeake Beach. Furthermore, the Navy Department ordered Annapolis dry, and the Federal Government, in connection with the war effort, established Prohibition in the Baltimore port areas of Highlandtown and Canton.
be running strong for prohibition legislation, the General Assembly again refused to pass a state-wide measure. The Methodist shrugged off this setback, stating that "Even if the Maryland Legislature cannot give us state-wide prohibition, why worry? We have secured the biggest thing." Crabbe knew why to worry. In his annual report for 1918, he noted that "the fight was not over," and that it would take years of "constant attention" for the temperance cause to prevail. As another writer put it, "Destiny waits upon the State Leagues more than upon any other human agency to determine whether the prohibition wave is to recede or is to sweep on and cover the earth."

Crabbe opened the year 1919 with a detailed summary of the Maryland League's program. He again stated that the matter of prime importance was the election of a legislature in which every member pledged to support prohibitory legislation. The Superintendent also recommended a "search and seizure" law, and in this connection supported the use of "secret service" men to ferret out wrongdoers. Although he commended the churches for responding as never before, he extended an offer to all "friends of prohibition" volunteering the League's organization to act as a clearinghouse for their efforts. The League continued to back away, however, from efforts by others to solicit its support for an independent political party. The League remained committed to the bi-partisan process, noting that the key to political success in Maryland was to take great interest in the primaries so that the better men are nominated, and not to wait until the general elections. The League also
adopted a clear-cut policy that it did not stand for regulation, but for prohibition, and it asked the editorial question of "the Constitution or the Bootlegger, Which?." This last question was the first shot of a campaign to bring Maryland in line with the other states in adopting state enforcement legislation for national Prohibition.

Albert C. Ritchie, elected Governor of Maryland in November, 1919, was an adamant opponent of Prohibition. The League wasted no time in attacking him. An article in the *Methodist* said that "Maryland's new Governor swore allegiance to the U.S. Constitution only because he was compelled to do so." It went on to say that "it is for the pulpit and pew to make the sentiment for law enforcement so strong that the wet politicians cannot fail to see the trend of modern thought." In the meantime, the League was hoping against hope that Prohibition would succeed without elaborate enforcement machinery. As of early 1920, with two years of Wartime Prohibition under its belt, the situation seemed surprisingly calm. A 1920 account noted that:

"Crime has been lessened in this and other States. In 1918, the arrests for drunkenness in Baltimore numbered 2,996. In 1919, there were only 624. When Prohibition came in there were in the Baltimore jail 835 persons. In 1919, the number was reduced to 447."  

Senator W. Cabell Bruce, an ardent foe of Prohibition, expected on the night of January 16, 1920 (the last day before national Prohibition), for the saloons to be crowded for a last fling before Prohibition settled "like a blight upon the entire joyous side of human existence." Bruce however, expressed amazement that "even Baltimore
was very tame." However, an indication that there was a vigorous opposition surfaced when Judge James F. Klecka of the People's Court announced his receipt of 100 letters advising the smashing of church property, and doing physical harm to League officials.

Amid this backdrop, the 1920 Maryland Legislature began its session. The League introduced the McBride Bill, "an act for prohibition of the liquor traffic and to provide for administration and enforcement of such prohibition." The McBride Bill failed to pass, but the League nonetheless considered the 1920 session a success. The League defeated numerous wet resolutions calling for, among other things, revocation of Maryland's ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, and one for "states' rights." The League also defeated Ritchie's attempt to get a 3½% "Beer Bill" passed, and beat back an effort to give Baltimore City more legislators due to its increased population.

The effort of Baltimore City to secure a larger representation in the House of Delegates began in 1916. The Maryland League consistently opposed the effort. The Methodist, responding to the City's initial request to annex additional territory, said that there could be "No annexation without a dry Baltimore," and that Baltimore "must not receive greater power to thrust her liquor traffic upon helpless counties." The City however, did annex additional territory, and thereupon requested more legislators. At first, the League officially took a "hands off" stance, but went on to comment that before Baltimore gets more representatives, it
should prove it deserves it, and that "it has the same moral
standard as exists throughout the counties."26 In support of the
"moral" position, the Methodist acknowledged the cooperation of
the Baltimore Federation of Churches.27 In retaliation, the
Baltimore City legislative delegation instigated the formation of
a committee to investigate the state League. However, after con­
sidering several general accusations, the committee disbanded,
making no charges.28 The League's relief at this development soon
dissipated when Baltimore City's recalcitrance received high
official encouragement.

Maryland's Attorney-General Alexander Armstrong handed down
an opinion to the Baltimore Police force which set a precedent for
future State policy. Armstrong ruled that since Congress had not
conferred any authority to state officers to enforce the Volstead
Act (the National Prohibition law), that no state official owed a
duty to its enforcement.29 According to Armstrong, the State was
acting entirely within its rights to refuse to cooperate with the
Federal government. The League considered this position tantamount
to "nullification" and an affront to "law and order." Because of
this developing attitude, the Maryland League made a second effort
in 1920 to get the Legislature to act on an enforcement measure.

This second chance developed because of the passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution giving
women the right to vote. Governor Ritchie, who was also opposed
to women's suffrage, reluctantly called a special session of the
Legislature for September, 1920, to make provisions for registering
women for the Fall elections. The League felt this special session should also take action to suppress bootlegging, and take a definite stand for law and order. However, the League's Law and Order Bill failed to pass, the reason given that the special session was not called for that purpose. Therefore, in January, 1921, the League asked Governor Ritchie to call a special session for the express purpose of passing a Law and Order bill. Not too surprisingly, Ritchie declined to call the special session. The League then endorsed a call for a Law and Order League, stating that it "stands ready and willing to help . . . in every county of Maryland." Crabbe went on to say that the League blamed the continuing problems of non-observance of Prohibition on the fact that the old criminal classes left by the saloon still had a tendency to violate the law, and that this class continued to receive encouragement from the "wet" press. The Baltimore Sun in particular caught severe criticism, Crabbe asking sarcastically "Where was the Sun when 'Prohibition was put over in the dark'?" He further remarked that the paper was not an expert on advice in favor of Prohibition as it persistently discouraged the dry law's enforcement.

Crabbe believed that Baltimore was at the root of the enforcement problem. "Too often," he wrote, "members of the Legislature do not represent convictions of their own, nor are they there for the welfare of the State if it should conflict with the personal desires of the parasite who sent them there." Crabbe believed it was fortunate that the City did not yet have its
proportionate representation in the Legislature. He believed that if there was to be any change in the number of Baltimore City delegates, the number should decrease until the City learned to be responsive to the best interests of all. Crabbe again pinpointed what he considered the basic problem of the election process, the lack of interest in primary elections. He pointed out that the machines generally found it easy to nominate their slates, because "people interested in a righteous law are generally busy people, ... and have their own affairs to take care of." Crabbe felt however, that with the proper organization, and enough time, that the battle could be won.

The next battle took place during the 1922 Legislature. League supporters introduced the Funkhouse-Robb Bill in the House of Delegates. The American Issue headlined that "Baltimore Papers Lead Fight Against Law Enforcement Bill. Conspiracy to Suppress News; Can The People Be Mislead?" Apparently the people could, up to a point. The League's bill passed the House of Delegates. However, the Senate "wets" were strong enough to tack on an amendment to bring the bill to referendum, but not strong enough to defeat the bill outright. On the other hand, the House "drys" were strong enough to force rejection of the Senate amendment, but did not have sufficient strength to pass a bill with no strings attached. Thus, an impasse developed. The League felt that the Senate amendment was unconstitutional, and decided not to support it. The Senate's vote of 15 to 14 in favor of the amendment thereby had the effect of causing the dry House to kill the bill. The
Methodist lamented that "Every bill looking to moral legislation failed at Annapolis." The Maryland Court of Appeals later upheld the Maryland League's position that the referendum measure was illegal. However, this judgement was too late to help the League in 1922.

In response to the defeat of the League's bill in the 1922 Legislature, the League's Board of Directors passed a number of resolutions setting out the League's future program. The Board said that the "lawlessness was a call to patriotic Americans to defend the law of the land," and that "all citizens should vote only for those pledged to uphold the law." The Board also resolved again that "the prevailing lawlessness is a result of the wet city press, and that the League was against any more representation in the Legislature for Baltimore City. Exactly one year later, the Board of Trustees renewed its concerns, stating that "the lawlessness prevalent in our State is directly due to newspaper dereliction and to the truckling of the administrators to the baser elements." The Board also said that "the newspaper propaganda has made it necessary that we must soon start a new campaign to educate the people anew." In addition, it repeated "the need to secure at the next legislature a law enforcement code," and called upon women to register to vote in greater numbers. The Issue later drew a distinction among the newspapers, noting that the small town and county newspapers were for Prohibition and law and order. Although the League continued to work to elect the "proper" candidates, a trend towards a policy change
was developing. The League, perhaps discouraged at the ability of Governor Ritchie and his allies to continually frustrate their ambitions, began to speak more of "educating," and less of "electing."

The 1924 Maryland General Assembly opened with the League again offering a Prohibition enforcement bill for consideration. The American Issue called the Robb Bill "a step in the right direction." The League believed that the Bill did not have in it all that it should, but that in its effort to meet specific past objections, would challenge the good faith of the Liquor interests. The Issue remarked that the legislators either have to vote for it or stand for nullification of the law. The paper again attacked Governor Ritchie, accusing him of "passing the buck." Ritchie responded by charging that "Prohibition enforcement is only one instance of the encroachment of Federal power upon the functions of the State." Tony DiMarco, a Baltimore City member of the Temperance Committee, in an effort to harrass the League, introduced a bill to investigate it for alleged improprieties. The wets also managed to change the state constitution to now permit a referendum vote on the liquor question by the entire state. The League opposed this move on the grounds that "no good could come of a vote run by the 'wet gang' of Baltimore." However, the League bill again went down to defeat, this time not even passing the House of Delegates. Crabbe complained that "this same bunch which through deception and trickery defeated the law enforcement bill for Maryland at this session
are the ones who complain because Prohibition was put over on them." He bravely commented that "the Anti-Saloon League expects to keep the fight going," and took solace from the fact that the League secured improved local option bills for Montgomery and Frederick Counties. Crabbe believed that the failure to enact a state-wide law was not entirely due to a majority wet sentiment. He rationalized that Maryland was extremely jealous of her position in favor of local self-government, and many dry legislators refused to vote to enforce the law in Baltimore City.

Enforcing the law was also a problem outside of Baltimore City. Because most local option laws promulgated prior to Prohibition did not ban the manufacture of intoxicating beverages, the enforcement in the counties was almost entirely in the hands of federal authorities. The Board of Trustees of the Maryland League resolved at its annual meeting of April 24, 1924, to exert a political effort in selecting a congressional delegation for Washington favorable to maintenance of the Eighteenth Amendment. The League reasoned that if the State government could not be forced to comply with the law, then they would increasingly focus their effort at the federal level.

The Maryland League's dealings with federal authorities were not always agreeable. The first set-to with federal officials came following the appointment of Robert Crain, General Counsel for the United Brewers Association, as State Director for Maryland of the War Savings Funds. The Headquarters Committee of the League unanimously opposed his appointment. In October of 1918, the League
for the second time called for Crain's removal. Crain finally resigned in January, 1919, after the end of the war. The League also protested the politicization of the appointment process for federal Prohibition officials and agents. The League expressed indignation that Frank Kelly, "the boss of Baltimore," had the authority to recommend the state's Prohibition Director. This indignation turned to worry when Kelly appointed Edmund Budnitz as Director, a person considered a "wet," close to "Boss" Mahon of Baltimore. The Baltimore News editorialized that the Prohibition Office would be hard to administer because of Budnitz's "predilection." Crabbe nonetheless sent Budnitz a letter of welcome, and pledged the League's assistance in helping him carry out his duties. This welcome did not last long, as Crabbe labelled Budnitz's inactivity a disgrace. Budnitz responded to this charge by filing a $25,000 libel suit against Crabbe. The suit apparently failed to progress, as no further mention is made of it. The League continued to try to cooperate with the Federal officials, to the point of providing enforcement agents temporary desk space at the Baltimore office. Although Crabbe continued to believe it was a mistake to place these enforcement agents in a system where appointments had to receive political approval, he nonetheless felt that in spite of "the herculean task" facing them, the Federal officers did "their very best under the circumstances." The League did appreciate the federal help because without it there would have been very little Prohibition enforcement in Maryland.

Although the Maryland League appreciated and accepted what-
ever assistance it could get, the fact remains that the bedrock of its continuing support was in the churches. Crabbe, in one of his first statements upon arriving in Maryland, revealed his philosophy regarding the role of the church in the movement. Specifically addressing those churches which chose not to open their doors to the League, he said that "we urge upon them a deeper loyalty to any movement within their own churches which appeals to them more strongly than ours, having for its purpose the destruction of the liquor traffic." Crabbe saw the wisdom, as had Anderson, of seeking aid beyond the traditional loyalists. This outreach effort apparently did not bear significant fruit, at least not among Roman Catholics and Episcopalians. The American Issue continued to criticize Cardinal Gibbons, decrying his "temperance" protestations, noting his opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment, and recalling his statements in favor of light beer and wines. The Methodist grew increasingly acerbic, making vague warnings and attacks on the Catholic Church as anti-reform, and grasping for power. The Methodist also pointedly complained about members of the Protestant Episcopal Church sponsoring meetings against the Volstead Act, and calling for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. By and large, the League remained above personal name-calling and complaining. However, the Methodist in the early 1920s seemed increasingly unrestrained. When it was not targeting the less-zealous, the paper bragged about how essential it was to the Maryland League.

The League was very dependent on the churches. In 1920, it
announced that it received the largest contribution ever from the churches. But, as the 1920s wore on, the Presbyterian Church, and some elements of the Methodist Church began to throw roadblocks in the way of full cooperation by such devices as encouraging individual churches to put the League on a "budget plan," and making efforts to deny their ministers service credit for time spent working for the League. However, the Maryland League did not seem to suffer to the extent of other state Leagues as it managed to maintain its church financial support through the mid-1920s.

The Maryland League's financial situation during the early years of the Crabbe Superintendency could be best described as "stable." Crabbe's first full year showed total receipts of $33,759. In May of 1920, without publishing details, the League boasted that it had no debts, and no deficit. The report for the year 1920 revealed $42,241 in receipts, with the year 1921 showing $37,177 in income. The year 1922 saw $35,922 in revenue, the year 1923 brought in $34,156, and the year 1924 a total of $37,862. In contrast to the Anderson years, in which "special contributions" became the largest income category, the Crabbe organization relied very heavily on church subscriptions. It is obvious that the Maryland League, like many other state Leagues, "retrenched" or "settled in" after the enactment of national Prohibition, instead of expanding the fight to further develop sentiment. The Maryland League after 1920 seemed to turn inward, and essentially withdrew from financial cooperation with the national association.
The Anti-Saloon League of America, headquartered after 1908 in Westerville, Ohio, secured its operating funds from two basic sources. The first source was that of sending its own workers to speak at rallies in the various states and solicit "national" contributions. The second means of obtaining revenue came through "assessments," or "apportionments" placed on the state Leagues. The national association experienced great difficulty through the years in collecting sufficient funds through the state Leagues to support the desired national programs. An early formula assessed the state Leagues the salary of their superintendent, which the national League paid, plus 2½% of the state League's gross revenue. This plan, though generally adhered to, did not generate a large amount of money, as many state Leagues used accounting systems which understated their actual income. Subsequently, the national League, at a conference of League workers in Chicago in September, 1919, adopted what became known as the "Chicago Plan," whereby each state would assume the responsibility for holding rallies and collecting funds in their jurisdiction and would adopt a uniform accounting standard. The state League would turn over 40-60% of all income raised to the national League. This "decentralization" scheme was not a success as not enough state Leagues agreed to the plan. Seven key states refused to abide by the terms of this new scheme. Maryland was one of these seven states. The Maryland League continued to pay its 2½% under an earlier arrangement, until 1921. In early 1922, the national League, on the strength of the Maryland League's gross
receipts, placed an annual assessment on the Maryland League of $10,000. At the meeting of the National Committee on Financial Management on January 5, 1922, Crabbe agreed to this assessment, which amounted to about 25% of the Maryland League's income. This acceptance on the part of Crabbe did not receive approval back home. In the period covering 1922 through 1924, the Maryland League paid a total of $450 against the $30,000 due. Even allowing for income raised at National meetings held in Maryland during this period, the Maryland contribution was short $22,424 by July of 1924.

Naturally, the National Committee remonstrated with the Maryland League regarding its dereliction. The national League sent its own people to Maryland to "make dates" for fund-raising. In 1923, Crabbe wrote the Committee that "the assessment against Maryland has been considered by our Board beyond what we can pay." He continued that "the National Committee evidently has the feeling that because a few rich men are interested in the Maryland League that we can raise most any amount of money." Crabbe also mentioned his efforts to iron out this situation with Cherrington, and complained that the Delaware activities represented a $3,000 per year liability for Maryland. However, the Committee on Financial Management kept the Maryland League's assessment at $10,000 for 1924, an assessment against which the Maryland League paid nothing. The national League then lowered the assessment to $8,500 for 1925, with the Maryland League's cash obligation to be only $3,600, the remainder to be raised through nationally-sponsored meetings. Apparently, the Maryland League still
protested, because Francis Scott McBride, the General Superinten-
dent, came to Maryland in May, 1925, to seek a compromise with
the state League's Headquarters Committee. The resulting agree-
ment called for the Maryland League to pay the national associa-
tion $250 per month, or $3,000 per year. A letter from McBride
to Crabbe, dated February 11, 1926, indicates that the agreement
"took," and that the state League was again contributing in a
meaningful way to the national operations.

It is a tribute to the broadmindedness and dedication to the
Anti-Saloon League cause of both Crabbe and McBride that they were
able to reach a financial agreement. Scarcely one year earlier,
Crabbe participated in the hotly-contested struggle on behalf of
Ernest H. Cherrington to have Cherrington succeed Purley Baker as
General Superintendent of the national League. Baker died in
February, 1924, after an illness of several months. The three
candidates for the General Superintendency were McBride, head of
the Illinois League; Wayne Wheeler, the League's Counsel and
Legislative Superintendent; and Cherrington, the Director of
Publishing Interests, Editor of the American Issue, and a member
of every important National Committee. McBride and Wheeler had
reputations for being "hard-liners," emphasizing legislative
"coercion" as opposed to "educational" persuasion. Cherrington,
like Crabbe, believed the educational approach would be more
effective over the long term.

Crabbe's involvement in national League politics began with
a solicitation by Cherrington through Crabbe's brother Charles,
the Ohio Attorney-General. Cherrington obviously believed he had more general support throughout the Anti-Saloon League than either of his opponents. His worry was that the other two candidates might try to "rig" the election through the application of "special" rules. The holding of the election on short notice, in Indianapolis, with all members of the National Board present voting individually gave a distinct advantage to McBride and Wheeler whose total support lay in the Midwest. The McBride forces were able to "pack" the proceedings. Voting by States, Cherrington had a two-thirds majority, but in the total head count vote, he narrowly lost. Crabbe corresponded with nearly all of the state superintendents prior to the election in a futile effort to secure a majority for Cherrington. The bitterness of feeling at the tactics used by the McBride and Wheeler men came through in a Crabbe letter to Cherrington after the battle. Referring to the machinations of Assistant General Superintendent Rev. E. J. Moore, Crabbe wrote that "I am in favor of starting a campaign during the next two years either to abolish Moore's job or abolish him."

However, Crabbe and the other Marylanders involved in the struggle, including William F. Cochran, seemed to be the kind of people who forgave quickly. Also, McBride doubtless saw the necessity of quickly mending fences lest the Anti-Saloon movement be torn into two bitter factions. Numerous instances of correspondence appear, beginning in May of 1924, between McBride and the various Maryland leaders exchanging information and pleasantries. The reintroduction of Maryland into the
mainstream of national League affairs was part of McBride's program of rebuilding and strengthening the state league network which had been allowed to fall into disrepair. McBride recognized that the state leagues were essential to the survival of Prohibition. The Maryland League, although it maintained its finances better than most other state leagues, had other problems which probably no amount of money could solve.

The Maryland Prohibition situation during the 1920s was one of stalemate. It was no coincidence that the Maryland Legislature consistently divided nearly 50/50 on the basic Prohibition question. The Protestant churches, the business and professional men, and the rural inhabitants seemed solidly in agreement with the Anti-Saloon League. On the other hand, the professional politicians, the urban Catholic, Jewish, and Episcopalian churches, and city dwellers in general seemed solidly opposed. The League had the misfortune of having to confront a series of able, urbane politicians from Baltimore who reached political prominence immediately after World War I. Governors, House Speakers, and Senate Presidents amenable to League persuasion were no longer available during the 1920s. The mal-apportioned state legislature, holding on from an earlier era, was not sufficiently dry to counter intelligent, determined opposition.

Following the biennial defeat of the League's Prohibition bill in 1924, Crabbe decided to change the direction of the League's work. He stated in the American Issue that "the greatest need from the standpoint of law and order just now is educating the people of
this state as to the evils of the liquor traffic and the why of Prohibition." In his annual report to the State League, Crabbe said that "the educational campaign must be the paramount feature of the work." The Board of Trustees of the Maryland League agreed with Crabbe, and passed a resolution approving his "desire to undertake a more vigorous educational campaign." This "educational campaign," in comparison to the hurly-burly, headline-producing legislative work, was definitely low-profile, and largely removed the Maryland League from the public eye. The Maryland League did make one more effort, in the wake of Hoover's smashing Presidential victory in 1928, to secure a statewide enforcement law. This effort, like those previous, failed. Although the League lingered on, under various names until 1982, it never again had the influence or the power to impact upon current events which it had through 1924. The year 1924 therefore is the logical year at which to complete the study of the Maryland Anti-Saloon League as a viable pressure group. As far as Maryland was concerned at least, the national Anti-Saloon movement was too successful, too quickly. The national success out-stripped the Maryland League's effort to develop and expand temperance sentiment. The state Leagues, parochial in nature, suffered from a dearth of enlightened leadership, and generally showed little interest in "educating" the uncommitted. The Maryland League, though parochial, did have good leadership, and did show interest in spreading the word. The quick success of national Prohibition did not give the Maryland League sufficient time to develop the
sentiment before the battle lines hardened. The bullying and threats of Anderson and Hare in particular planted a crop of resentment which Crabbe was obliged to harvest.
CHAPTER 5 NOTES

1 Baltimore Methodist, February 15, 1917, pp. 4-5.


6 American Issue (Maryland edition), September 1, 1917, p. 1.

7 American Issue (Maryland edition), September 22, 1917, p. 2.

8 Baltimore Methodist, November 1, 1917, p. 3.


11 Baltimore Methodist, January 10, 1918, p. 4.

12 Baltimore Methodist, January 31, 1918, p. 5.

13 "Maryland", Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, IV, 1702.

14 Baltimore Methodist, March 14, 1918, p. 5.

15 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 10, 1919, p. 2.


17 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 10, 1919, p. 2.

18 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 3, 1919, p. 3.

19 American Issue (Maryland edition), August 2, 1919, p. 3; and September 6, 1919, p. 1.


32. *American Issue* (Maryland edition), May 21, 1921, p. 3.

33. *American Issue* (Maryland edition), August 20, 1921, p. 3.


38. Kirwin, p. 79.


41. *American Issue* (Maryland edition), May 27, 1922, p. 3.

42. *American Issue* (Maryland edition), May 26, 1923, p. 3.
43 American Issue (Maryland edition), August 18, 1923, p. 3.
44 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 12, 1924, p. 3.
45 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 19, 1924, p. 3.
46 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 19, 1924, p. 3.
47 American Issue (Maryland edition), January 26, 1924, p. 3.
48 American Issue (Maryland edition), February 23, 1924, p. 3.
50 American Issue (Maryland edition), May 3, 1924, p. 3.
51 Baltimore Methodist, February 13, 1917, p. 3.
52 American Issue (Maryland edition), September 27, 1919, p. 1.
53 American Issue (Maryland edition), July 30, 1921, p. 3.
54 American Issue (Maryland edition), October 1, 1921, p. 3.
55 Baltimore Methodist, January 5, 1922, p. 2.
56 American Issue (Maryland edition), June 21, 1924, p. 5.
57 Anti-Saloon League of America, Twenty-Second National Convention, p. 314.
60 American Issue (Maryland edition), June 28, 1919, p. 3.
61 Baltimore Methodist, January 2, 1919, p. 2; and March 4, 1920, p. 3; etc.
63 Baltimore Methodist, December 27, 1917, p. 8; and April 4, 1918, p. 3; and January 30, 1919, p. 3.


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Letter from William F. Cochran, dated May 13, 1924 (joint microfilm edition, F. Scott McBride series, reel 1, frame 680); and others.


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Chapter 6
THE MARYLAND ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE
AND THE SECONDARY LITERATURE,
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

There is a great deal of secondary literature which discusses the temperance and Prohibition movements that flourished between 1890 and 1930. Most of these studies deal with the broadest aspects of the reform movements as they affected the national scene. Even those works treating specific geographical areas discuss the work of all of the temperance organizations in general rather than focus on any particular one. In those monographs which deal with the Anti-Saloon League to any great extent, the overriding concern is with the national work, and the national implications. However, interspersed throughout the literature are statements regarding the policies and practices of the national organization as they related to the State Leagues, as well as a few comments regarding the actions of the State Leagues themselves. While some of these comments ring true in regard to the Maryland experience, there are a number of assertions which do not.

One of the foremost assumptions in the literature is that the Anti-Saloon League of America in Westerville, Ohio, was all-powerful, and exercised absolute control over the affairs of the individual State Leagues. The implication is repeatedly made that the
national created the state organizations, appointed their Superintendents, and set their salaries, and thereby exercised complete authority over their actions. While this attitude is not unanimous in the literature, it has very wide approval. The only outstanding dissident to this point of view is Peter H. Odegard's contemporary work, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League*, and even Odegard seems to give too much credence to national authority.

Taking the Maryland experience as a guide for the situation in other "non-missionary" states, it seems evident that the Anti-Saloon League of America had few practical means of exercising its theoretical authority over a recalcitrant state League. The Maryland League consistently exhibited fearless independence from national direction, whether in paying its financial assessments, adopting national League policies, or permitting the national League to come into the State and hold national meetings. The Maryland Anti-Saloon League for example, paid its financial assessments to the National only when and how it pleased. Numerous recriminations by Cherrington in his reports to the National Committees got nowhere. Finally, in 1925, we witness the spectacle of General Superintendent McBride coming to Maryland, hat in hand, to beg the state Board of Directors to accept a lowered assessment, a compromise in which the national League gave up two-thirds of the ground.

Another point which re-emphasizes the Maryland League's independence from national direction was its refusal to accept the
Chicago Plan of 1919. Still another example of its freedom was the Maryland League's refusal to comply with a national League directive in 1911 ordering the state Leagues to abandon the local and county Leagues, and instead rely on the network of local churches. While it is true Anderson and Hare utilized voter lists supplied by the local churches to apply pressure on state legislators, it remained a fact that the County Leagues continued to play a vital role. The Oscar Henderson episode during the Hare Superintendency in 1916 revealed the state League's continuing practice.

In summary, it seems that in situations where a state League was financially self-sufficient, and carrying out its work, the Anti-Saloon League of America had no effective way, short of tearing down the local organization, of making its demands stick. Truly-effective state Leagues were at such a premium, that they could get away with nearly anything they wished. Their manpower, their leadership, their resources, and their ability to carry on the local grass-roots agitation so vital to the national organization's well-being continually forced the national League to be realistic and not over-press its case. The Anti-Saloon League of America therefore, instead of calling all the shots, frequently had to go along and accept state actions.

Another generally-accepted premise of recent temperance literature is the theme that the prohibition struggle between 1890 and 1930 was primarily a contest of the middle class against the upper and lower classes and not a fight between rural and urban
elements, or between evangelical Protestants and Roman Catholics. 4
A study of the Maryland situation seems to contradict these recent studies in favor of the earlier country versus city thesis advanced by Andrew Sinclair in his Prohibition, the Era of Excess. 5
Sinclair, in his notes, acknowledges a great deal of reliance on Odegard for his (Sinclair's) information regarding the Anti-Saloon League. Odegard, in his account of the League, seemed inordinately fascinated by William H. Anderson's career in Maryland and New York, and devoted considerable space in his book to Anderson. Odegard consequently made substantial use of the Maryland edition of the American Issue, which may at least partially explain the similarity of conclusions between Sinclair and the present study.
James H. Timberlake (Prohibition and the Progressive Movement), Norman H. Clark (The Dry Years: Prohibition and Social Change in Washington), and Jack S. Blocker, Jr. (Retreat From Reform: the Prohibition Movement in the United States, 1890-1913) all having available a wider variety of material, and with different objects in mind, cite very few resources relating to either Anderson or Maryland.

The American Issue (Maryland edition), the Baltimore Methodist, the Baltimore Sun, and the various local newspapers in Maryland all consistently paint the same picture regarding the nature of the temperance/Prohibition struggles in the State. Whether the sources are "wet" editors, "wet" or "dry" politicians, League spokesmen, or political bosses, expressions of opinion on the Prohibition question are always made in terms of a County-City
confrontation. Odegard suggests, and Timberlake ignores, a variant explanation to that of class, for the presence of considerable support for Prohibition in many cities. It is Odegard's suggestion that much of the urban evangelical Protestant church-going population were actually upwardly-mobile immigrants from the rural areas. Odegard cites the World Survey of the Inter-Church Movement (American volume, p. 26) claim that 75% of those active in the urban Protestant churches were born in the country, and presumably retained some of their rural attitude. Insofar as Baltimore City is concerned, the 3 to 1 local option defeat in 1916, in the face of an intensive League campaign, underscores the point that the City was overwhelmingly against the idea of Prohibition. This opposition, whether the result of Baltimore's 46% Catholic population, the 34.1% with some sort of ethnic tie, the "wet" newspapers, or corrupt political bosses, was real and simply cannot be explained away in terms of class struggle. Baltimore City was not a "hell-hole" of crowded, festering tenements, like New York or Chicago. Its ratio of owned versus rented homes was .86 to 1, a higher number than that for any other city in Maryland with a population over 10,000! While it is true that in 1920 Baltimore City had 81.3% of the State's foreign-born population, this population constituted but 11.4% of the City's total. Thus, Baltimore City in 1920 was a relatively-low-density urban area with a largely-assimilated "native" population. It is true that the people who were the moving force behind the Maryland Anti-Saloon League, and its predecessor, the Maryland Tem-
perance Alliance, were "respectable" Baltimoreans. However, this fact is a very slender reed on which to base a theory of widespread middle-class city support for the temperance cause.

Another theory, primarily advanced by Timberlake is that the Anti-Saloon League did not generally coerce or threaten individual politicians at the "moment of truth" when they were about to cast a significant vote. Odegard and Sinclair disagree, as does the present study. The descriptions of the hand-to-hand legislative battles supplied by the American Issue (Maryland edition), the Baltimore Methodist, the Baltimore Sun and others bear witness to the Maryland League's ever-present concern that legislators would "forget" their solemn written pledge when it came time for them to do their duty.

The records of the legislative struggles from 1908 through 1924 are replete with examples of legislators going back on their pledges when put under duress by the Party leaders who would promise retribution for when the next item of legislation dear to the recalcitrant legislator's County came onto the Floor. Therefore, whenever a crucial temperance vote came up, the League lobbyists would flood the area, buttonholing anyone suspected of wavering. The lobbyists would "refresh their memories" on the spot with direct threats of electoral revenge.

The legislator's vote was all-important, the single act most counted-upon to carry forward the League's program. Denis William Brogan (Politics in America), Timberlake, and Odegard all describe in detail the "realist" policy of the Anti-Saloon League's not
worrying about how the representative acted outside the Chamber, but only about how he acted within. The Maryland Anti-Saloon League did worry, albeit with a twist from that previously described. The League in Maryland did not worry whether the "wet" would vote "dry" as pledged, as much as it worried about whether the "dry" would turn around and vote "wet."

The Maryland General Assembly, with a tradition of "local self-government" carried to an extreme, had no Constitutional restraints on "special legislation." Therefore, the Legislative leadership was able to "buy off" County legislators whenever the dry sentiment appeared too strong. These tactics, emphasizing the trading of legislative favors, were probably the greatest obstacles, at least before 1920, to the passage of key League-sponsored legislation. The general proposition advanced by David Truman (The Governmental Process) that the League's well-developed organization would make it an effective threat against any political group which might ignore its demands did not hold sufficiently well in the case of Maryland. The afore-mentioned problem of "favor-trading," in conjunction with the nature and timing of the late summer primaries handicapped the Maryland League in its efforts to get out the vote against the "wrong" nominees. As a result, the League often ended up in the general elections having to make a choice between two machines, or making no selection at all. In addition, the fact that many state legislators did not serve more than one term anyway, meant that pledges often were not worth the paper they were written on. These conditions even-
ually caused the League to give up the legislative fight, and concentration instead on "education."

The Maryland League expended a great deal of effort, and a great deal of money between 1906 and 1924 trying to get its legislative program enacted into law. It also expended considerable resources, especially in the 1920s, helping local jurisdictions enforce what laws there were. According to Timberlake, the ideal pattern of League activity was spending 90% of the effort on "agitation" (education) with comparatively-small amounts on legislation and law enforcement. Under Anderson, Hare, and Crabbe, it seems that nearly the opposite took place. Even though "education" was a primary interest of Crabbe, the struggle to get an enforcement law passed obliged him to neglect it. Even though this neglect probably had no effect on the final outcome of the Prohibition era, it did prevent the League from making any meaningful forays towards expanding state sentiment.

By not expanding the temperance sentiment, the Maryland League increasingly had to rely on the support of the evangelical Protestant churches in finances, in politics, and in legislative lobbying. Odegard and Sinclair agree that this situation was the norm throughout the United States. In Maryland, the State League depended particularly on the good offices of the Methodist Church, and heavily counted on the services of the Baltimore Methodist. Two of the Maryland League's prominent officers served at one time or another as the editor of this regional Conference publica-
tion. The weekly Methodist from 1900 to 1922 was an invaluable supplement to the American Issue in spreading publicity about the League's work. However, Anderson did make a strenuous effort to broaden the appeal of the League beyond the Protestants. He solicited personal subscriptions from wealthy individuals, from people belonging to "unfriendly" churches, and from people belonging to no church at all, but who appreciated the League's work. Anderson's vision in this respect, later duplicated in New York, apparently was a unique phenomenon in the Anti-Saloon League. However, even Anderson always made it a point to follow the national line in emphasizing the religious character of the League. Anderson liberally sprinkled religious allusions throughout his political broadsides, as did his successors Hare and Crabbe.

The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland, from 1898 to 1924, in light of at least one current lobbying theory, was a success. Jeffrey Berry (Lobbying for the People . . . ) outlines four strategies of influence. These four strategies are (1) the law, (2) embarrassment and confrontation, (3) information, and (4) constituency influence and pressure. Berry notes that few groups are able to utilize all four of these strategies. However, the Maryland League did. Even so, few would call it a success based on its lasting achievements. The Anti-Saloon League of Maryland's failure to obtain any state Prohibition enforcement law, coupled with the collapse of the national League after 1930, doomed it to become a footnote in history.
CHAPTER 6 NOTES


3 Timberlake, p. 134.

4 Norman H. Clark, The Dry Years: Prohibition and Social Change in Washington (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1965), pp. 121-2; and Timberlake, p. 29; and Blocker, p. 9.

5 Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition, the Era of Excess (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 18-22, 96 ff.

6 Odegard, pp. 29-30.


11 Timberlake, pp. 140-2.

12 Odegard, p. 114; and Sinclair, p. 110.

13 Odegard, p. 113.


16 Odegard, p. 113.

18 Timberlake, p. 137.

19 Odegard, pp. 191-3; and Sinclair, p. 65.

20 In June, 1922, the Methodist moved to Washington, D.C., where it's name changed to the Washington Christian Advocate. With the move, the publication no longer focused on Baltimore area news, and dropped the current reporting of Maryland Anti-Saloon League news.

Chapter 7

SUMMARY

The Anti-Saloon League of America took control of the temperance movement in the United States in the early years of the twentieth century. Its "non-partisan" methods, utilizing a well-orchestrated grass-roots constituency, exploited the well-developed sentiment against the politically corrupt, socially corrosive aspects of the liquor traffic. This constituency often was able to elect and defeat state and federal legislators and officials on the sole question of their stand regarding the most visible aspect of the liquor traffic, the saloon. The League achieved great success in many areas, "drying up" vast expanses of territory through "local-option" and prohibition legislation. Eventually, in an effort to achieve a final solution to the drink problem, the League marshalled sufficient support in the United States Congress and the state legislatures to bring about the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

The role which the various state Leagues played in the success of the Anti-Saloon movement has received very little study. The Maryland Anti-Saloon League, as one of the more stable state units, is a suitable subject for examining the nature and operations of these affiliates as well as the degree and manner in which they
worked with the national organization.

The Maryland Anti-Saloon League emerged full-blown from the Maryland Temperance Alliance in 1898, and formally affiliated with the Anti-Saloon League of America in 1900. The national organization considered the Maryland unit a prize, and consistently steered promising talent such as Nicholson, Anderson, Hare, and Crabbe to the State for training for future League positions of greater responsibility. The Maryland League had the good fortune as well to have the extremely-sympathetic support of the Methodist Church organizations. The more than 1,300 geographically-dispersed congregations provided the League with instant armies for fund raising, lobbying, and political action. The cooperating churches rendered the League able to take on the entrenched Baltimore-based political organizations on an equal basis. However, the Maryland tradition of state-wide "local self-government," employing the wholesale trading of favors in the Legislature, enabled the "wet" urban political machines to neutralize the largely-"dry" County delegations to the extent that the League was never able to obtain a state-wide temperance measure.

The Maryland League, under able leadership, and enjoying a secure financial base, withstood various attempts by the Anti-Saloon League of America to force the state unit to bring its policies and procedures into conformity with national practice. These efforts by the national organization generally ended in failure, and the Maryland League conducted its affairs much as it saw fit. In its relationship with the national League, the Mary-
land Anti-Saloon League perhaps reflected the psychology of the state legislature by employing its own brand of "local self-government."

The Maryland experience clearly reveals through election results and legislative battles that the temperance reform movement, while led by middle and upper-class urban residents, obtained its basic strength from the population of the rural areas. The most consistent factor in the Maryland study is the intransigence of Baltimore City in the face of any and all versions of temperance reform. It seems that a coalition of urban wage earners, foreign-born residents, "intellectuals" of the press, and the well-financed liquor industry could be readily orchestrated by shrewd and intelligent political leaders. The urban environment, on the cutting edge of new ideas and technology, seems a more likely factor than either class or religion in developing an attitude opposed to social restraints, and resistant to moral arguments. The rural population, on the other hand, insulated by distance, and limited in their contacts, seemed more comfortable in holding onto traditional social and moral values. The most basic reason for the failure of the Anti-Saloon League of Maryland to achieve its aim of state-wide temperance was the evenly-balanced rural/urban population. Once the attitudes hardened, the best men, employing the best methods, could not alter the status quo. While the urban politicians could not destroy the League, neither could the League triumph over the politicians. This stalemate lasted until the League withdrew from the legislative arena in 1924. The Anti-
Saloon League of Maryland would henceforth focus its energies on "education."
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