ALGERIA: A CASE STUDY IN INCOMPLETE DEMOCRATIZATION

By

Allison Gowallis

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Chair, Thesis Committee

Date

Committee Member

Date

Committee Member

Date

Committee Member

Date

Committee Member

Date

Dean of Graduate Studies

Date
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Abstract

Algeria: A Case Study in Incomplete Democratization

Allison Gowallis

Algeria is currently a pseudo-democratic state that attempted democratization in the 1980s, but ultimately failed. This thesis investigates how initial democratization began and ended, and how current political characteristics prevent democracy from consolidating. The government gives precedence to elite economic interests over popular interests, an easy task considering the centralization of oil and gas wealth. Under current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the presidency has become the most powerful authority, escaping executive constraints, and the parliament and political parties are weak and unable to represent diverse interests. Algeria fails to meet all of Robert Dahl’s criteria of a democracy. Given the history of stagnated democratization, it is not likely that Algerians or the government will take initiative to further democratize any time soon.
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Introduction

The North African country of Algeria is currently in a pseudo-democratic state: it possesses the nominal institutions of a democracy, such as regular elections, separation of powers, and political pluralism, but these are not executed freely and fairly. This thesis argues that democratization in Algeria is incomplete because of its insincere transition, easily concentrated power in the executive branch as a result of its presidential system, and the centralization of oil wealth and maintenance of a coalition of clients that keeps the regime in business. Robert Dahl’s criteria for democracy are used to evaluate Algeria’s status. Notably, explanations that consider the negative effect of Islam on democracy do not speak to the case of Algeria, as it is a relatively secular state, and its prominent Islamic groups are very diverse in their ideology, with only the moderate groups receiving any popularity.

This thesis looks at the transitional period from 1988 to 1992 in order to locate its shortcomings in fostering a truly democratic opposition and creating effective pacts with all groups involved in the state. The institution of a presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary system in the new government became significant in 1992, as the military was able to exploit the notion of a single seat of authority and take over the government even before a new parliament could be elected. A civil war ensued between the military and Islamist groups until 1999. The second section of this thesis focuses on the civil war military government and how it managed to maintain a façade of democracy while still controlling the means of government. In 1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected to the presidency and remains the president as of 2013. The third section of this thesis focuses on the time period from 1999 until today and the perpetuation of Algeria’s pseudo-
democracy. Centralized control over the oil and gas industry in Algeria precludes the ability for most citizens to control the agenda of the government, as this is reserved for the regime and the ruling coalitions. Executive power is supreme at the expense of a truly representative parliament, fair elections, and an effective political party system (the ruling party coalition of the FLN-RND remains dominant in legislatures).

The prospects for deeper democratization in Algeria are concluded to be dim in the near future. Cooperation by the ruling elites for the sake of establishing a more representative, not a “delegative” democracy, is not likely, and protests by average citizens are either quashed by security forces or pacified by promises of more state assistance.
Literature Review

The body of literature consulted to frame this thesis includes the following topics: definitions and measurements of democracy; complete versus failed democratic transitions; presidential and parliamentary systems; and resource wealth, including its influence in the Middle East.

Defining and Measuring Democracy

Identifying the components of democracy is necessary to determine whether a state is indeed a democracy. Scholarly definitions of democracy have varying criteria: some scholars prefer a minimalist definition, while others prefer a maximalist definition which requires a polity to have a plethora of qualities in order to be considered a democracy. In the most basic sense, democracy is “rule by the people” (Rose 2009, 12). Schmitter and Karl (1991) say that a democracy is “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.” Schumpeter (1943) also has a minimalist definition that democracy is “free competition for a free vote” (271). Linz and Stepan (1996) discuss the concept of “Rechtsstaat,” or a state that is subject to rule of law, which is the ultimate goal of any polity. Bernhagen (2009) explains the benefits of using a minimalist definition of a democracy in order to define, and subsequently, measure the level of democracy in a country: a smaller definition “avoids the inevitable wrangling” of a larger definition, and avoids erroneous association of common features of democracy with causal factors from democracies.
Diamond (2008) offers minimalist and maximalist definitions. On the “thin” side, a polity is an “electoral democracy” if “a people can choose and replace their leaders in regular, free, and fair elections” (22). Even within basic electoral democracies, though, there is great variance in quality based on frequent alternations of power, human rights abuses, weak rule of law and court system, and uncompetitive electoral systems. On the “thick” side, a “liberal democracy” exists when there are free, fair, and regular elections, as well as other values such as genuine openness and competition in the electoral arena; due process of law; checks on the power of officials; and civilian control over the military and state security.

Dahl (1989) uses a scalar model of democratic processes, which allows observers to see the degree to which a state meets five criteria of democracy. The first criterion is effective participation with equal opportunity for citizens to express preferences; second is voting equality and an effective opportunity to determine political outcomes; third is “enlightened understanding,” or equal opportunity to learn about policy alternatives; fourth is citizen control of the government’s agenda; and fifth is all permanent adult residents are included in citizenship rights. This measure is appropriate for Algeria because its elections and legislative branch are strong indicators of a lack of an effective opportunity to determine political outcomes, as well as an inability to control what is on the government’s agenda. Further, this scale is broad enough to have the potential to include subcategories that fit maximalist definitions of democracy (such as a free media, connections between the electorate and governors, and civil and human rights) without absolutely mandating a maximalist definition. Thus, the benefits of a minimalist definition are maintained (Bernhagen 2009).
The Polity IV and Freedom House indexes are two of the most commonly used scales to measure democracy. Polity IV analyzes three “authority patterns” in a state: how governments are selected; the amount of influence political non-elites have over political elites; and the independence of the executive authority relative to other elements of the political system (Bernhagen 2009, 29). Polities are ranked on a scale of -10 to +10, with a -10 indicating a perfect autocracy, and a +10 indicating a perfect democracy. It is rare for states to fit into these absolute categories, and most states are in the middle of the scale and are considered “anocracies.” An anocracy “is characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity” (Monty 2011, 9); moreover, they combine authoritarian and democratic traits. Freedom House seeks to measure the levels of political rights and civil liberties, recognizing that a democracy includes more than just political freedoms. The political dimension includes the ability to vote freely, join political organizations, compete for office, and elect accountable representatives (Bernhagen 2009, 29). The civil liberties dimension includes freedom of association and expression, rule of law, and individual rights.

Transition and Consolidation

Shin (1994) notes a consensus in the literature that democratization in the “third wave” comes largely as a result of human motivation, specifically actions by the elites, coupled with reformed institutions. Welzel (2009) proposes a typology of democratization to categorize the four most common means of transition. They are responsive, enlightened, opportunistic, and imposed democratization. Opportunistic
democratization, the type that most reflects Algeria in 1988, is brought about by elites instead of the masses, and is often used to get in the good graces of the international community, all the while corrupting the new democracy. Stradiotto and Guo (2010) find that there are two modes of transition that involve incumbent elites, yet the “cooperative” mode results in higher levels of democracy (based on the Polity IV scale) and longer democratic life expectancy. Cooperative transitions involve the incumbents and the opposition in such a way that the incumbents are unable to skew the new government in their favor: the opposition provides a balance to incumbent desires. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also believe that democratization needs to proceed with caution, gradualism, and moderation, and must include “pacting” among elites. Elite pacts are especially important in places where the success of democracy is uncertain (Shin 1994, 163). Bunce (2003) studies democratic transition in post-communist states because these constitute the most successful recent transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. She notes the use of “pacting” wherein only a small group of incumbents and opposition members discuss the issues to be reformed; this is done to avoid too much destabilization in the new system.

Shin (1994) finds that in the post-Cold War era there are no absolute structural prerequisites for democratization, and it can form in any state with the tools to overcome political oppression. Democracy is no longer considered a “rare and delicate plant” that has to bloom in the perfect conditions. Diamond (2008) expresses the notion that democratization comes about when the norms of a whole society begin to change, not just the political institutions. People must intrinsically value democratic freedoms, not merely the potential superficial benefits to be gained (Ingelhart 2003). The concept of
“emancipative values” is significant to democratic transition: they include equality, tolerance, autonomy, and expression (Welzel 2009, 129). Populations with a strong consensus on the importance of these values tend to have higher levels of democracy, most likely because they want democracy for authentic reasons. Thus, transitions that do not consider mass values are likely to falter. Welzel (2009) writes that in recent democratization efforts it is the masses, not the elites who determine the success of democratic transitions. Democratization was most successful when “the masses were mobilized into democracy movements in such numbers…that state authorities could not suppress them easily” (Welzel 2009, 83). The study of Algeria’s transition will illustrate how elite-led efforts ultimately undermined the potential success of the whole process and the regime continues to prevent the masses from protesting.

Democratic transition is rarely described as a smooth linear process from authoritarianism directly to democracy. At any point in the process the regime can revert to authoritarianism, or form a hybrid regime. Fish and Wittenberg (2009) look at the factors behind failed democratization. In ten case studies of failed democratization, the executive branch was the main culprit behind democracy’s failure, followed closely by the military. It was found that “the chief executive has been the main perpetrator of democratization’s reversal” in recent years, and curbing its power is the key to fulfilling democratization (259). The military is also a perpetrator of reversing democratization “as [it] may intervene in politics and throw elected civilian leaders out of power” (258). The parliament is a key element in preventing an abuse of power by the executive or the military. The “Parliamentary Power Index” (PPI) is an index used to measure the power of the legislature relative to the executive branch; a score of 0 indicates a powerless
legislature, and a score of 1 indicates an all-powerful legislature (Fish and Wittenberg 2009, 260). The PPI is a meaningful independent variable in noting the likelihood of democratic success.

The relative strength of the executive and the legislature is a function of executive-legislative relations, which is determined in the transitional period. Transitional democracies must decide on a party system and the nature of executive-legislative relations, both of which will determine future representativeness (Lijphart 1996). In a party system, the choice is between single member districts and proportional representation. A presidential system divides the executive and the legislature into two separate branches, and two separate parties can dominate either branch. In a parliamentary system, the head of the government, the prime minister, is chosen by the dominant party in the parliament. Checks and balances are null here because the executive is intertwined with the parliament and he can be removed by a parliamentary vote. Lijphart (1996) finds that a proportional representative electoral system with a parliamentary system is the best for new democracies. This combination allows for minority representation, thereby guaranteeing the minority opposition parties a chance at representation, and discontinued domination by incumbent elites. Further, the parliamentary system is able to examine issues in more detail than a presidential system, thereby emphasizing an efficient and effective outcome over expediency. Gerring, Thacker, and Morleno (2009) find that parliamentary systems are “better” than presidential systems at producing human, economic, and political development (bureaucratic quality, government effectiveness, rule of law). The reason is that parliamentarism is like a “coordination device”: “the state is often conceptualized as a
solution to the multiple coordination problems that emanate from society” (354). This system integrates more views and makes it more difficult for a small group to pursue its agenda irrespective of the greater good.

It is commonly found in the literature that presidential systems hinder democracy more than parliamentary systems. Stradiotto and Guo (2010) found that ten years after an attempted transition to democracy a system of presidentialism – the presence of a strong executive and weak or nonexistent legislature – had a significant and negative effect on levels of democracy. Przeworski et al (1996) find that presidential systems are less durable at all levels of economic development, giving insight into its overall unsuitability to democracy. Presidential systems foster more conflict between the executive and legislative branches, which slows governing. However, between 1974 and 1990 a majority of democratizing countries chose a presidential system over a parliamentary system. In addition to the fact that perhaps each party was optimistic that it could fill the winner-takes-all seat, the military’s influence was present: “[presidentialism] reflects the continuing political role of the military, which appears to have a preference for presidential regimes, perhaps because such regimes offer a clearer hierarchy” (48).

Linz (1990) critiques the sense of power that accompanies a president, saying that even if he wins by a small margin, “the conviction that he possesses independent authority and a popular mandate is likely to imbue a president with a sense of power and mission” (57). The rigidity of the system, which includes fixed term limits, contributes to its weakness. Importantly, the position is only awarded to a single winner, increasing the stakes for victory. Additionally, Mainwaring (1993) finds that a multiparty system under presidentialism is more detrimental than a two-party system under presidentialism. The
chance for destabilizing executive-legislative deadlock is increased in this combination because there is a greater chance of ideological and polarizing parties, and there is a greater focus on interparty coalition building rather than cooperation with the executive.

When democratizing states fail to consolidate, they are often left in limbo in some sort of hybrid regime between democracy and non-democracy. Diamond (2008) describes this kind of regime as a “pseudo-democracy,” which is a system that has nominally erected all the relevant democratic institutions, but the people are largely unable to remove the current leader from power. This term is most relevant to Algeria because it describes the current status of Algeria: it is not purely authoritarian, as there is some political pluralism permitted, but the executive branch continues to find ways to maintain power, notably by controlling the parliament.

McFaul (2005) discusses post-communist transitions to democracy within states that had installed nascent democratic institutions, such as elections, but were not implemented to free democratic standards. In three post-communist states rulers were ousted by a unified opposition, with the help of non-governmental organizations, because of news of fraudulent elections: widely-held pro-democratic attitudes, though, were the key to completing the transition. Zinecker (2009) ties the consolidation of a democracy to the economy: “in order for a transition to complete its full cycle, political levers need to be established that guarantee the political participation of the lower classes by the redistribution of the economic factors of production in their favor” (303). As will be discussed below, oil rentier states typically preclude this qualification.
Linz and Stepan (1996) claim that a democracy becomes consolidated when it is “the only game in town,” meaning no other regime type is imaginable (14). They write that in order for a discussion of democratic consolidation to take place, democratic transition must be complete; it is not possible for a hybrid regime, a pseudo-democracy, or a liberalized nondemocratic regime to consolidate. In order to have completed the democratic transition, the polity must meet the seven institutional requirements that Dahl lists when he aims to measure democracy. For them, “a democracy in which a single leader enjoys,” or thinks he enjoys a “democratic’ legitimacy that allows him or her to ignore, dismiss, or alter other institutions” is not a democracy (16). In many of these hybrid regimes the three branches of government, while following election processes, are still “constrained by an interlocking set of ‘reserve domains,’ ‘military ‘prerogatives,’ or ‘authoritarian enclaves’” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 15).

O’Donnell (1994) uses the phrase “delegative democracy” to describe states that transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy, but only have the superficial structures of democracy in place, such as elections. They are “inherited from their authoritarian predecessors,” which “reinforces certain practices and conceptions about the proper exercise of political authority that lead in the direction of delegative, not representative democracy” (56). Unfortunately, they can be enduring, but are not truly representative. They will require a second transition down the road to acquire a consolidated democracy, but this second transition demands a “decisive coalition of broadly supported political leaders who take great care in creating and strengthening democratic political institutions” (56). Further, these systems emphasize the individualistic role of the
president, who will easily ignore pressure from political parties, the legislature, or popular demands.

The Middle East and Oil Wealth

Polities in the Middle East vary slightly in terms of regime types, however in general they are nondemocratic. Algeria is commonly considered part of the Middle East, and is therefore prone to similar governing trends. The scholarly focus of democracy in the Middle East is so popular nowadays because it is believed that “the absence of democracy is perceived to be the most significant obstacle to international peace and stability” (Cavatorta 2009, 322). Welzel (2009, 80) adds that democratization should not be studied in specific “cultural zones” or “civilizations,” as these are irrelevant categorizations. There is a body of literature that considers the impact of Islam on the lack of democracy in the Middle East. Some scholars find that Islam is “inherently undemocratic because it did not have to confront the European enlightenment,” and it demands submission, which undermines democratic freedoms (Cavatorta 2009, 327). However, it is usually difficult to prove that a belief in Islam deters the desires for political freedoms in a society. Political Islam follows various ideologies, ranging from ultra-conservative to pluralist. Additionally, the cultural practices of Islam do not preclude the ability to form a strong civil society, as this exists in varying degrees in many Arab states (Ibrahim 1998). Tessler (2002, 347) found that personal piety in Algeria had no influence on individual desire for democracy; moreover, there was no significant support for Islamic guidance in politics, precluding the notion that Islam is the reason for Algeria’s incomplete democratization. Arguments that Islam negatively affects
democratization are not pertinent to the case of Algeria because it has a relatively secular society and a diverse array of political parties representing diverse interests. El Badawi and Makdisi (2007) find that religious affiliation has no independent effect on dependent variables such as political stability or regime type, indicating that it is not necessarily the religion of a society that determines democracy, but the behaviors of the people and the institutions.

Further, El Badawi and Makdisi (2007) try to explain the “democratic deficit” in the Arab world using a combination of historical, economic, and social variables; however, they are unable to find an “Arab dummy” variable that is consistent throughout all Arab states, indicating there is nothing distinguishable about the Arab world that makes it especially susceptible to authoritarian regimes. The concept of “emancipative values” is separate from religious beliefs, but is relevant to democratization in the Middle East because in general these populations tend to have low appreciation for them, which correlates with lowest levels of democracy in the world (Welzel 2009, 135). Thus, furthering democracy in Algeria is not an impossible task, given the conclusions of the “third wave” that democratization can occur in any place, but the government and the citizens must have the willingness and capability to meet the criteria for consolidation.

There is a distinction between democratization and liberalization: democratization endows the people with a complete regime change, liberalization allows extra temporary rights. Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have often embarked on political liberalizations, which do not change the actual balance of power in the government, but maintain the status quo and create a façade of democracy (Cavatorta 2009). Ottaway
(2007) agrees that there are artificial reforms in the Middle East, initiated by the authoritarian regime itself. She refers to the implementation of political liberalization as the “king’s dilemma:” leaders manage reform in order to maintain authority, but create an illusion of real democratic change for a domestic and/or an international audience.

A topic in the literature specific to the Middle East and Algeria is the combination of oil wealth and authoritarian regimes. The abundance of oil, or any natural resource, is often referred to as a “resource curse,” meaning it is a “curse” for democracy when a country has “immobile natural resources that are easily brought under central control” (Welzel 2009, 76). Democracy is more likely to occur when resources of power are in the hands of a broad portion of the population, so the placement of the resources of power in the hands of a few is detrimental for democracy. Robinson et al (2006) find institutional quality to be directly linked to the curse or benefit of resources to a country: “low quality institutions invite bad policy choices since they allow politicians to engage in inefficient redistribution in order to influence the outcomes of election.” (465). Certain resource-rich governments are unaccountable to the general public and use the institutions to consolidate authority.

New socioeconomic classes in oil-exporting states have formed because of recent state-led privatization efforts, who in turn have become clients of the state (Cavatorta 2009). This new socioeconomic class is the economic elite, or the “client,” who receives “rent” from the state’s oil wealth in exchange for political support. The interaction between patrons and the state, according to King (2009), is what perpetuates the “new authoritarianism” of the Middle East. In “new authoritarian” systems in the Middle East
rulers implement superficial democratic institutions to give the illusion of democracy, but in fact undemocratic forces are the ones making policy and ruling the state. The political elites are able to co-opt wealthy and middle classes, creating de facto ruling coalitions: financial support is exchanged for political support. The ruling coalitions are an example of “inefficient redistribution” of resources to sway political outcomes (Robinson 2006). Ross (2001) conducts one of the first empirical tests of oil’s effect on democracy. He finds that oil wealth has a very significant, negative effect on democracy. There are three causal mechanisms behind the relationship: first is the “rentier effect,” which allows governments to spend money on relieving social pressures to reduce the chance of mass democratic demands; second, the “repression effect,” which allows the state to use more of its income towards large security apparatuses; and third, the “modernization effect,” which links economic development to social and cultural shifts that promote democratization. Specifically, he points out that Algeria has been affected by the “rentier effect.”

Tsui (2010) finds that the level of oil wealth tends to impede democracy: the trend towards democratization decreases up to 10% with higher levels of oil discoveries (100 billion barrels). He also cites the reason for less democracy as being the price to the incumbent of relinquishing power. Additionally, “healthy” democracies are more constrained in extracting rent and preventing entry to the oil industry.

Ross (2012) further explains the phenomenon of oil wealth and its relation to democratization. He finds that oil-rich states are able to avoid pressure to democratize by appearing efficient at spending taxpayer money relative to oil revenue. Governments can
easily conceal the amount of revenue it receives from oil to make the spending to revenue ratio appear larger than it is: the illusion of lower taxes and higher benefits will prevent democratic pressure from the masses. The total revenue is important to citizens because they feel the resource belongs to everyone, not just the government. Between 1980 and 2006 oil-producing autocracies were less than half as likely to democratize compared to non-oil producing autocracies. This finding supplements studies of the lack of democracy in the Middle East by offering a potentially explanatory variable for high oil-producing states like Algeria.

Notably, the perpetuation of “new authoritarianism” in the Middle East has been challenged by the Arab Spring, wherein states such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria protested non-democratic governments. Ward and Gleiditsch (2006) find that the probability a state will transform from an autocracy to a democracy increases as that state’s neighbors also transform. However, the cause of this phenomenon is unknown. Yet, a “diffusion model” can be useful in studying the Middle East because as a whole it is undemocratic, and geography may play a role. The idea of a “diffusion model” states that “the international context for a country is formed mainly by its web of relations, with neighboring countries in its own region” (Welzel 2009, 95). Interestingly, although several of Algeria’s neighbors faced governmental challenges, Algeria did not. For many of these states, the Arab Spring protests were the first meaningful efforts at democratization in recent times and Algeria already had its fateful experience in the late-1980s. Ross (2012) significantly found that the Arab Spring protesters were most successful in low oil-producing states, like Egypt and Libya, whereas high oil-producing
states were more successful at ameliorating citizens’ demands using oil revenue. This finding does not work in the favor of Algerian citizens.
Chadli’s Democracy

President Chadli Bendjedid was chosen as Algeria’s president by the Council of the Revolution in 1979 after the death of President Houari Boumediene (Tahi 1992). The short span in his presidency from 1985-1989 was one of the most critical in Algeria’s modern history. Chadli took serious measures to democratize the country: he liberalized the economy, revised the constitution, and installed the means for a popularly elected government in a country that never before had the opportunity to elect its government representatives. However, these breakthroughs were the work of Chadli and his elite faction, not the result of mass protests for more political freedom. The transition did not mark any real break with the incumbent regime, and did not embody mass-held democratic values. The lack of an organized opposition, specific mass pressure for democratization, coupled with the exclusion of the military from the new government and the transition process, facilitated the democratization’s ultimate breakdown.

Economic Reform

In the post-colonial era of Algeria, as well as other post-colonial states with nondemocratic leadership, the people have been willing to defer more political control to the government in exchange for the provision of subsidized goods. The tacit agreement that citizens will not protest the government and accept a non-participatory role is conditioned upon the “providential capacity” of the state (Sadiki 2000). Thus, it was no surprise that in the late-1980s protests spread as Chadli further reduced subsidies of food and reduced the role of socialism as part of his economic liberalization. Algerians had become disenchanted with the system of state socialism, which was responsible for an
underfunded agricultural sector, inefficient industrialization, and a corrupt bureaucracy (Takeyh 2003). The drop in the price of oil around 1985 was devastating to Algeria’s economy because oil comprised 98% of its export revenue (Tahi 1992). This major drop in revenue meant the government was even less able to respond to the needs of the population. Additionally, the quality of the agricultural sector and its ability to provide basic goods to society was insufficient, hindering the ability for Algeria to independently provide its own necessities.

Algeria was having trouble paying off its international debt and loans, amidst high unemployment rates and a growing income gap (Sadiki 2000). Consequently, Chadli embarked on IMF-type austerity measures without the actual IMF to back him up with financial compensation. As a result economic liberalization disadvantaged even more people than before, with higher unemployment and more concentration of wealth in hands of elite. This result, though, is typical in transitions from state-socialism to greater capitalism: measures benefit the private sector middle class at the expense of the poor (Roberts 2003). It has been a trend since the 1980s in Arab authoritarian states that open up the economy to deemphasize nationalization and cut social services that help the poor (King 2009). Significantly, as of the late-1980s Washington Consensus economic programs were gaining credibility in the developing world, as capitalism began to beat out communism as the dominant international economic system. The Washington Consensus refers to Washington DC-based neoliberal economic institutions – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – that emphasize free trade, tax reform, property rights, and deregulation of trade barriers to encourage greater economic development (Center for International Development 2003).
There is some debate on whether 1980s Arab economic problems (bread riots) preempted political liberalization. One view says the bread riots were on par with the Arab tradition of “intifadat,” spontaneous uprisings from below to challenge the leadership using street protests and light violence (Sadiki 2000). Another author says there is a possibility that Chadli’s cronies orchestrated the protests in order to delegitimize the National Liberation Front (FLN) and give more legitimacy to his impending political reforms (Roberts 2003). Both of these explanations have credence: economic reform was part of Chadli’s ultimate goal of political reform, but democratization was not mandated by the bread rioters. Importantly, the FLN was largely discredited by the economic situation before Chadli decided to liberalize; thus, it is necessary to see Chadli’s moves as a way to distance himself from the unpopular FLN. Chadli considered economic reform to be a new “ideological crusade” that cultivated a “utopian blueprint” for Algerian society (Roberts 2003, 88): he promoted a private sector middle class, an intelligentsia, and a class of technocrats. Framing economic reform as an “ideological crusade” gave morality to his presidency and helped boost his approval after the drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s, which facilitated his ability to push through his political reforms (Roberts 2003, 88).

Shin (1994) points out that a problem with the “third wave” of democratization is that there is a minority of people (usually elites) pushing for majority rule; yet the new constitution and laws protect the rich instead of the poor. It becomes legally difficult to make changes that improve the lives of the poor. In Algeria, Chadli and his small clique of reformers did just this, and protected economic elites as a way to advertise economic liberalization in line with the Washington Consensus. Chadli pushed for a specific group
of individuals – technocrats – to seize political power, not the poor urban masses, who were already disadvantaged by his economic liberalization and unable to pool resources to challenge him. Modernization consists of all the processes that “enhance the resources available to ordinary people,” which increases the masses’ ability to launch & sustain collective action, mount demands on state authorities (Welzel 2009, 81). The correlation between modernization and democratization is indirect, and modernization is not always an indicator that democratization will occur. Chadli’s goal of modernizing Algeria by increasing its private wealth did not necessarily pre-empt democratization.

**Political Reform**

In early October 1988 Algerians took to the streets of Algiers to protest the increasing prices of subsidized goods. Notably, the protests had more economic demands than political demands for democracy. Those who did call for political change were divided between calling for an “Islamic republic” and letting “the people make the laws,” with either technique hopefully securing better economic standards (Volpi 2003, 42). Some Islamist leaders even coordinated protests on Fridays after prayer. These street protests turned violent when security forces intervened and treated them as attempted coups, resulting in several deaths of protesters. The military then imposed a state of emergency and a curfew. In response, Chadli announced lower prices of retail goods and greater availability of subsidized goods (Volpi 2003, 39-43).

Significantly, the steps to liberalize the political system were taken nearly unilaterally by Chadli. He was interested in revealing the incompetency of the competing faction within the National Liberation Front (FLN), as well as bestowing more legitimacy on
himself and his new, controversial economic policies; political reform framed as a moral crusade gave Chadli the proper justification to embark on these reforms. On October 10, 1988 Chadli held a “crisis meeting” with Islamist leaders, including Dr. Abassi Madani and Sheikh Ali Belhadj of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front du Salut Islamique, or FIS) and Mahfoud Nahnah of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP). On the same day Chadli made the televised announcement that he was embarking on political reform because he felt political issues were at the heart of the economic troubles. In his address he called for revised institutions and “constitutional foundations” in order to progress to the “next stage.” (Volpi 2003, 43) Additionally, he stated that he would “eliminate the current monopoly of responsibility” and that he wanted institutions to “play their part in the control and monitoring of the state” (Volpi 2003, 43). Surprisingly, Chadli took responsibility for the state’s failures, and more or less promised political change that would hopefully assuage the people. The protests ceased the day after his announcement of reform, and the state of emergency ended on October 12 (Volpi 2003).

Prior to these protests, the FLN – consisting of mostly armed forces from Algeria’s War of Independence against France – was the government. In order for Bendjadiaid to fulfill his political ambitions he had to demote the influence of the FLN. He fired members of the FLN leadership, and the head of military security, who had repressed political dissidents and critics of the government (Tahi 1992). Roughly two weeks later on October 24 Chadli put forth his plans for political reform vis-à-vis a new constitution. The changes were put to a popular referendum in November (Tahi 1992). These political reforms were a strong reversal from prior political activity: a Prime Minister (PM) would be in charge of the government’s agenda; political parties would exist and be separate
from the state; there would be free local and national representation; and there would be a premiership responsible for “constitutional prerogatives” (Tahi 1992, 399). Chadli was re-elected as head of state on November 22, 1988 (Volpi 2003, 45). This was a seemingly positive step in the direction of democracy and allowing the people choose leaders.

Further, Chadli’s new constitutional proposals did not consult the military, hitherto the primary decision-making body in Algeria. The 1962 FLN Constitution explicitly stated that high positions in government should not be given to non-FLN individuals or groups (Bouandel 2003); at the time neither the army nor the FLN were illegitimate groups in the eyes of Algerian, as they were seen as Algeria’s savior from French colonialism. In 1976 the Algerian Constitution stated that the role of the military was political and ideological. In contrast, the new 1989 Constitution significantly diminished the authority of the military: it stated that the military needed to be more professional and less political, and its only function should be that of defending the state (Bouandel 2003). Seemingly, these new provisions were major blows to the military, which had always received popular legitimacy and had grown accustomed to being the supreme authority.

The Constitution was put to national referendum on February 23, 1989. It was approved with 73 percent of popular vote (Volpi 2003, 45). The 1989 Constitution provisions opened up politics to groups outside the FLN for the first time. A political party can be defined as “a central intermediate or intermediary structure between society and government” because it connects the people with the leaders (Morlino 2009, 202). There are several benefits of political parties: they integrate and mobilize the population, form policy, provide a framework for political issues, contest elections, provide necessary
opposition, and fill the parliament (Morrino 2009; Bouandel 2003). The previous president, Houari Boumedienne, had outlawed political parties and stated that a “plurality of parties…should be fought and destroyed,” exemplifying the lack of pluralism facing Algerians (Bouandel 2003, 5). In contrast, article 40 of the 1989 Constitution discussed the freedom of “associations of political character”: as a result, 14 new parties formed between 1989 and June 1990, and 36 formed between July 1990 and December 1991 (Volpi 2003, 47). Significantly, a “well-organized democratic opposition” present during the non-democratic transition will continue to have a major role later on (Morrino 2009, 208). However, they need time to develop platforms in order to be consolidated and consistent: the onslaught of democratic reform in Algeria did not provide political parties this privilege. Indeed, political parties were foreign to Algeria. Chadli Bendjedid rapidly forced this practice onto the people, as further evidence that he was acting opportunistically and not in the best interest of the citizens.

Chadli introduced a presidential system, rather than a parliamentary system. The presidency would be a separate entity from the legislature. The choice between the two systems is a necessary choice for a transitioning regime. This configuration of executive-legislative relations is prone to governing issues, such as a deadlock in policymaking, inefficiency, and the connotation that the presidency is a high-stakes position, which causes fierce competition over the seat (Przeworski et al 1996). Significantly, though, more than half of the new democracies in the “third wave” (of which Algeria was a part) chose presidential systems over parliamentary systems. Considering the context of the military’s assumed role in government, the presidential system was an especially dangerous choice to make. The institution of a presidential system “reflects the
continuing political role of the military, which appears to have a preference for presidential regimes, perhaps because such regimes offer a clearer hierarchy” (Przeworski et al 1996, 48). Because of the presumption that a single individual has just as much, if not more, authority than a legislative body, control over the presidency became even more coveted by the military. The presidential system was another way the nascent democracy was set up for failure, as the military would ultimately pervert the presidential system by maintaining the authority of the president at the expense of the parliament.
**Transition Process**

The democratic transition in Algeria was elite-led as opposed to mass-led. Chadli Bendjedid’s efforts to reform politics was part of the official “liberalization stage” of democratization in which “the transforming old elite tolerates some degree of oppositional activities, although they are still controlled” (Fink 2009, 1605). Unlike other democratic experiments happening in the same time period in the Soviet Union, Algeria did not have a naturally occurring or multifaceted opposition calling for democracy: the calls came from only one side of the regime. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, or Front Islamique du Salut) – the most popular new party with both moderate and radical elements – was a direct product of Chadli’s reform process, and therefore still tied to the authoritarian regime. This occurrence is consistent with the idea that democratization typically emerges from the top, but does not necessarily indicate long-lasting achievement (Welzel 2009).

The elites in an authoritarian regime often do not comprise a monolithic group, and thus splits can occur after critical events, such as a war or an economic crisis (Welzel 2009, 83). One bloc of the elite prefers the status quo, while the other prefers liberalization. For a successful transition to occur the pro-liberal bloc needs to remain dominant following the critical event that caused the internal schism. Chadli’s reforms from inside the government and downgrade of the FLN exemplified the split within the regime elite. In this case, economic hardships prompted Chadli to choose the pro-liberal side and he was successful in making it the dominant bloc that pushed through with liberal political changes. A key motivation, however, to appearing more pro-liberal is that
a leader often “aims to regain legitimacy by initiating a liberalization process.” (Welzel 2009, 83). The personal motivation behind Chadli’s decision to change the political scene supports the idea that political reform was not a guaranteed consequence of economic reform and mass protests, but an elite choice with implications for personal legitimacy.

Democratization is most likely to succeed when it includes cooperative pacts (Stradiotto 2010). Specifically, the cooperative pacts between the opposition and the incumbent elites must be led by the opposition, as it typically has a greater interest in democracy and stability in the new regime. The incumbent elite did not have a mass opposition with which to bargain: the dominant opposition party, the FIS, was fostered by the regime and allowed to operate despite constitutional restrictions denying legalization of religious-based associations. Because of its popular appeal the FIS was near-guaranteed electoral majorities in upcoming elections, but the victory certainly would not have marked a clean cut with the incumbents.

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)

The FIS released its official declaration of existence on March 10, 1989 (Ruedy 2005, 252). It is important to note that among the FIS objectives there was no explicit call for democracy and its accompanying institutions, further demonstrating the lack of a pro-democracy opposition inside the transition. Some of the main objectives of the group were: substituting imported ideologies for Islamic ones; preserving the Muslim umma; “tactical moderation”; collective action; and “encouraging the spirit of the initiative” (Ruedy 2005, 252). Its platform was vague and contained only general stances: promotion of a large private sector with social welfare, investments to eliminate poverty,
and values of Algerian self-sufficiency (Takeyh 2003). The FIS promoted conservative social ideals, such as a woman’s place in the home, segregated schools, and prohibition of alcohol (Ruedy 2005, 253). Nonetheless, as a political party competing with other Islamist parties (mainly Hamas and the Movement of the Islamic Resistance), the FIS was not intent on transforming Algerian sentiment against Western materialism, nor averting immoral behavior and installing sharia law: it is said that the real “target of its wrath” was the “thieves of the FLN,” towards whom the FIS was bitter because it installed “gun-toting illiterates” instead of Islamic ’ulama to run the state (Roberts 2003, 96).

The FIS was deemed an official party by Chadli in September 1989, despite an act that stated no parties would exist based on “religion, language, or regionalism.” (Ruedy 2005, 252). Chadli granted an exception to this rule not only with the FIS, but also with the Berbers’ Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), knowing they would have more popular appeal than his rival FLN. The FIS’s two primary leaders were Dr. Abassi Madani and Sheikh Ali Belhadj, who came from two distinct schools of thought. The FIS was divided into the “djazarist” camp and the “neo-Salafi” camp, which were moderate and traditional respectively. The “djazarist” camp emphasized nationalism, while the “neo-Salafi” camp emphasized radical Islamic views (Ruedy 2005, 251). Thus, the core of the FIS proposed a hybrid message, albeit it was still popularly received, in part because the leadership did not completely disown traditional Algerian nationalism. Madani was a founder of the FLN, and used these credentials to earn legitimacy in the FIS (Roberts 2003). Even Belhadj, who proclaimed “the FLN has betrayed us,” did not repudiate the idea of the FLN, but merely its inability to help the people (Roberts 2003,
110). The FIS had an advantage in the elections because of its grassroots connections, most likely those who had suffered under Chadli’s economic reforms that disadvantaged the large, poor class. One account states that the FIS had links to over 9,000 mosques (Ruedy 2005, 253). Interestingly, those who most adamantly supported the FIS were Arabic-educated and/or more radical Islamists who were unemployed or underemployed (Ruedy 2005). These supporters represented the cohort of Algerians who wanted to switch from French-educated elites of the FLN to Islamic and Arabic culture in Algerian politics.

_Election Results and Military Takeover_

Elections are the cornerstone of democracy, as they allow the people to freely and fairly choose leaders. The first real popular elections in Algeria were held in June 1990 for local councils. There was a 65 percent turnout rate (Ruedy 2005, 253). The FIS won control of 850 out of 1500 local councils, including the major centers of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine; all of Algiers’ and Constantine’s local councils were dominated by the FIS, and all but two in Oran were. (Ruedy 2005, 253; Volpi 2003, 48). The FLN had only won control over 480 out of 1500, showing its weakening influence. In the wilaya (state) councils the FIS won control over 32 out of 48, and the FLN only won control over 14. Notably, some secular parties withdrew from the elections, claiming that they were rigged (Ruedy 2005). In fact, these parties had not acquired the grassroots following the FIS had, as they were led by narrow personalities (Ruedy 2005, 251). Algerians voted for the FIS because they actually liked the FIS, not simply to oppose the FLN. Additionally, as of June 1990 there were still many Algerians who were negatively affected by the
economic liberalization and found inspiration in the FIS’s general message. Thus, the first real elections since the major constitutional changes seemed surprisingly authentic and free of fraud. However, the FIS was adamant about new national legislative elections in order to be consistent with all the changes in local and state politics.

In June 1991 the FLN congress attempted to gerrymander legislative borders as to give it an advantage in the upcoming first round of legislative elections (Volpi 2003). The FIS protested this move in Algiers, which prompted the army to take to the streets and arrest Madani and Belhadj (Volpi 2003). This incident showed that despite Chadli’s efforts to place power in the hands of the people, the military still had a decent amount of authority. Still, on December 26, 1991 the first round of parliamentary elections were held, and the FIS won 188 seats out of 430 in the National People’s Assembly (APN) (Volpi 2003, 51). It was imminent that the FIS would remain dominant in the second round in January 1992. Popular protests called for the continuation of the elections, despite official hesitation; a popular slogan called for “neither police state, not Islamic state, but a democratic state,” indicating the growing acclimation towards political freedoms (Volpi 2003, 53). The Secretary General of the FLN wanted to work with the FIS, as did the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) and PM Sid Ahmed Ghozali, recognizing that cancelling the elections would cease all democratic progress Algeria had made.

On January 11, 1992 Chadli stepped down from his position as president, using the excuse that his position would betray his democratic promises to Algerians (Volpi 2003). There is much speculation, though, that the military coerced Chadli’s resignation. Despite support for elections from the people and party elites, the democratic experiment was on
the verge of breakdown because of the military’s fear of losing power. The parliament was subsequently dissolved and the military was deployed as a “preventative measure” against possible protests (Volpi 2003, 55). Additionally, the Supreme Court named the High Security Council (HCS) as the legitimate authority, which then cancelled the second round of elections, nullifying the previous election results. On January 14 the HCS created the State High Commission (HCE) as a governing institution, which tried to appear legitimate and in accordance with constitutional rights and civil liberties. The HCS was composed of high administration members and three senior military members, while the HCE had a more heterogeneous makeup that could claim some jurisdiction in Islam and democracy (Volpi 2003, 62). The arbitrariness and haste with which the democratic process ended speaks to the powerlessness and incapacity of civilian politicians and parties acting as a democratic opposition.

Not surprisingly, riots had spread by early February, and there were several hundred deaths reported (Volpi 2003, 59). The interim leader of the FIS, Abdelkhader Hachani, was arrested in January 1992 following the election nullification. A state of emergency was imposed on February 9, 1992 (Volpi 2003) and the FIS was officially banned in March 1992 (Bouandel 2003). In addition to the HCS and HCE operating as undemocratic leaders, the state of emergency gave huge impunity to the ruling elite by declaring the situation in Algeria so threatening and dire. Further, the state of emergency removed the possibility of challenging the government and gave the military regime the right to impose undefined detention on anyone who disrupted public order (Volpi 2003). As of early 1992 over 10,000 FIS members were arrested and/or exiled to prison camps
as an increased amount of state funding went towards the army’s fight against Islamists rather than economic recovery and development plans (Volpi 2003, 62).

In literature on democratization the processes of transition and consolidation receive the most scrutiny because they are the two stages at which democratization is most likely to fail (Shin 1994). Moreover, transitions away from authoritarianism towards democracy do not occur linearly, and can result in any hybrid combination of authoritarianism and democracy. Democratic transition has been described as a “pinball machine” in that a noble effort can be made and transmitted to the public, and the initial effort could either remain in the public sphere, or it could tumble down (Shin 1994, 143). In Algeria, the “pinball” tumbled down into the hands of the military, undoing all the democratic progress of the previous three years. The new polity was no longer a transitional democracy, nor an FLN-led authoritarian regime, but rather a militaristic authoritarian regime that struggled to maintain the façade of democracy.

Significantly, regimes that are largely militaristic in nature – as opposed to single party or “personalistic” regime – and attempt to democratize have the least amount of success with the new democracy because the military is reluctant to cede authority, and it has the physical capacity to block placing power in the hands of the people (Stradiotto 2010). The Algerian military has consistently been afforded different political roles since independence, each with varying degrees of autonomy, and popular opinion rarely consulted. Under Boumediene, the army was guaranteed representation through senior commanders; under Chadli, until 1989, the army had to work through the FLN Central Committee procedures, but remained the dominant force in politics (Roberts 2003, 204).
However, from 1989-1991, the height of the democratic experiment, the army received a backstage role as Chadli tried to diminish its and the FLN’s authority relative to popular sovereignty. In 1989 the army withdrew its membership in the FLN Central Committee, positioning itself to be a truly autonomous body. The uncharacteristic downgrade of the army’s status as a result of popular direct elections surely threatened it and triggered it to restore authority to its hands. Chadli’s lofty goal of professionalizing the military was certainly not met with the military’s approval, perhaps a result of not including the military in pacts to create the new government and considering the amount of authority it had always had. One way to downplay the military’s role in politics is using democracy and a “governing process (perhaps spelled out in a written constitution) that [is] legitimate in the eyes of both key elites and the general public” (Kohn 1997, 144). Unfortunately, the military as a “key elite” did not view the new democratic governing system as legitimate.

In January 1993 the HCE renewed itself for five years in order to create “favorable conditions” for future democratic transitions (Volpi 2003, 65). The irony of this statement is immense: a regime renewing itself for democratic purposes without popular input is not democratic at all. Further, the HCE elected its own president, Liamine Zeroual, in January 1994 following the assassination of its original selection, Mohamed Boudiaf, perhaps by an inside source (Volpi 2003). This internal nomination helped discredit the HCE’s claims to democracy, as did its insincere “National Commission for Dialogue,” which intended to reconstruct political institutions (Volpi 2003, 66); however, the conversations excluded the FIS, the group that came closest to embodying a democratic opposition, thereby precluding genuine attempts at reinstating democracy in Algeria.
1990s Government

Algeria in the 1990s was in the midst of a brutal civil war involving the Islamists, the military and security forces, and in some cases, innocent civilians. It is within this era that the furthering of the 1989 democratic transition came to a halt, as the military reinstated itself as the de facto government and dismissed the constitutional, popularly-elected National People’s Assembly (APN) and local and state councils. The catalyst of the war was the pending electoral victory of the FIS in January 1992, which would have given this group legal-rational legitimacy, thereby discrediting the privilege of the military’s 30-year nationalist legitimacy. A significant outcome of this civil war was the regime’s perpetual mistrust and pigeonholing of all Islamists, which is demonstrated in its caution towards allowing certain Islamists seats in the government. Typically “when the military enjoys great prestige, possesses advanced bureaucratic skills, believes that its ability to fulfill its mission may be at risk, or comes to doubt the civilian leadership” it is willing to undermine civilian control over it (Kohn 1997, 141). In this case, it was unwilling to relinquish any government power to the civilian FIS because it was seen as a real threat to the military’s authority unable to lead Algeria as the army saw fit.

The Algerian civil war between the Islamists and the army lasted from 1992 until 1999. There were multiple Islamist groups involved in the war, with some more uncompromising than others: the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) – the armed wing of the FIS – was more open to negotiations during the war and actually called for a ceasefire in 1997 (Takeyh 2003); the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was a more radical, non-negotiable, and violent group, whose slogan stated, “Power is within the range of our Kalashnikovs” (Takeyh 2003, 69); the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),
also a radical and violent group, later evolved into a branch of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; and, finally, the GIA and the GSPC were radical in their aims for installing an “Islamic Utopia” and sharia principles in Algeria (Takeyh 2003). Anyone seen as supporting the Islamists to any degree were viewed by the military as targets; likewise, Death toll estimates revolve around the 100,000 mark, and include a substantial amount of innocent civilians as the targets of retribution attacks by both the Islamists and the military. Additionally, Algeria struggled economically, as the problems of unemployment and basic shortages of the late-1980s were exacerbated during the war (Takeyh 2003). Interestingly, France supported the regime in this war. In 1999 the war came to a formal end when President Abdelaziz Bouteflika took measures to create amnesty for the two groups (Rachid 2008). However, sporadic attacks and retaliation by the Islamists continued.

During the war the seat of the presidency and its accompanying authority had been perverted by the military at the expense of the representative parliament. The democratic transition had quickly stagnated within a matter of months, and was unable to constructively get back on its feet. Most problematic during this time was the fact that “military institutions diverge so far from the premises of democratic society” (Kohn 1997, 142). The value of the independence of the executive branch – encouraged by the presidential system – was the main impediment to democracy: there was no need to agree with a parliament to pass laws and policy. Przeworski’s (1996) finding that the military has a vested interest in a presidential system is evident in the political restrictions of the 1990s, as the military exploited the role of the presidency and diminished the role of the parliament and political and civil opposition. Even as elections eventually became
normalized again in the mid-1990s, Robert Dahl’s requirement of effective citizen participation with an equal opportunity to express preferences was not met.

Zeroual’s Regime Components

The military regime was divided on how to handle the protracted violence: on one side sat the “conciliateurs,” who preferred conciliation with the Islamists in order to cease the violence (Roberts 2003, 156). President Lamine Zeroual was part of this group because he believed in dialogue with all opposition groups, including the jailed FIS leaders. This group saw the reinstitution of the Islamists into the political process as a way for the HCE to gain legitimacy. According to the conciliateurs, renewed legitimacy would have helped the government explain decisions that might otherwise be met with popular dismay, such as the continuing downtrodden economy and potential acceptance of an IMF loan (Roberts 2003). On the other side sat the “eradicateurs,” the military officers who had an interest in the war’s continuation and wanted to prevent the Islamists from ever being a political force in Algeria. It was a group of defectors from the French army during the War of Independence. Because of their antithesis to popular support, only a handful of groups supported this military faction – the UGTA (the primary labor union), the Berber Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Ettihadi party of communists (Roberts 2003, 156). Notably, these three groups were opposed to democratization, and the eradicateurs did not need to adopt political liberalization to maintain their support base.

Significantly, eradicateurs had the upper hand in decision-making, and its proponents occupied the Prime Minister seat and the Interior Minister seat. Disregard for popular opinion – and Zeroual’s opinion – allowed them to continue the repression of Islamists
and the prevention of democracy. The eradicateurs were responsible for the nullification of the 1991 election results, the cancellation of the 1992 general elections, and Chadli Bendjadjid’s resignation (Roberts 2003). As of 1994, this group remained in the dominant position in the government, despite the fact that the president opposed much of its decisions. For example, Zeroual was an opponent of the military’s repression and violence against the Islamists, the removal of Chadli as president, and the assassination of former president Boudiaf (Roberts 2003). The fact that the military did not require consent of the executive demonstrates its supremacy over Zeroual, one of the few hopes for democracy in the military-led regime.

Zeroual understood that reconciling with the FIS and bringing it back into the political process would diminish the monopoly the military had over the state; according to Zeroual’s logic, reducing the prominence of the military in decision-making would allow the military to regain legitimacy, as it would be seen as a national protector and not a political force. To demonstrate this desire, Zeroual released two FIS leaders from jail in February 1994 and 107 Islamists in March 1994 (Roberts 2003, 152).

In most transitions to democracy where the political parties and civil society groups are the vehicles of change, it is necessary for opposition groups to come together in the name of their common objective (Cavatorta 2008). Once democracy is achieved, the initial opposition groups can once again go their separate ways and compete peacefully in the new democratic political institutions. Algeria did not have this advantage during initial democratization in 1989, as it was elite-led, and there were repercussions in the 1990s. Essentially the opposition was ineffective in truly pressuring the regime to reopen
the political system. The opposition was not united on a common goal of ousting the HCE, a prerequisite to successful democratization (McFaul 2005). The main political segments were internally divided on specific issues, and were unable to put aside their differences in the name of completed democratic transition. There were internal divisions within the Islamists, the socialists, the nationalists, and the military (Roberts 2003). Notably, though, the issue was never whether Algeria should be governed according to Islamic law: every party, including the FIS, was against the institution of an Islamic polity or legal system. Rather, the divisions were based on how to manage the war and return to democracy. The Berber Socialist Forces Front (FFS) wanted a return to the electoral process, but the Berber RCD did not want a sudden return; the Marxist Ettihadi party was against the FIS and Islamists, but the Trotskyist Workers’ party wanted the FIS to return to the process; the FLN opposed the regime, but the UGTA and National Organization of War Veterans (ONM) liked the regime (Roberts 2003, 165).

Zeroual’s calls for FIS readmission into politics during 1994 amplified the struggle within these segments. While Zeroual decided to focus on upcoming presidential elections in 1995, several political parties took it upon themselves to have a meeting in a neutral location – Rome – in November 1994 and work on a resolution to the conflict (Roberts 2003). Representatives from the FIS attended and made major concessions that would have made it easier for the regime, if willing, to negotiate with the group. The FIS promised to renounce violence, cease attacks on civilians, accept pluralism, recognize the sovereignty of the people, grant fundamental liberties to all people, and end militant religious proselytism (Roberts 2003, 173). Interestingly, Hamas decided to defect to the army’s side away from the opposition, but still attended the Rome meetings. At the end
of the conference the attendees signed the “Platform for a Peaceful Resolution of Algeria’s Crisis.” Ultimately, though, this show of pragmatism bore no fruit, as the military regime continued to rule as it pleased.

**1996 Constitution**

The 1989 Algerian Constitution was amended in 1996. President Zeroual proposed amendments to the existing 1989 Constitution, which passed through a popular referendum (Roberts 2003). A precondition for a democracy is a constitution, which contains the supreme law of the land and is not to be disregarded or disobeyed by any political authority or citizen (Roberts 2003). A constitution embodies a democracy’s need for rule of law, one of the “thick” qualifications for a democracy (Diamond 2008): a legal code is binding on, and equalizes, all citizens, regardless of position. Moreover, a constitution outlines the separation of powers that is necessary to understand executive-legislative relations and the behavior that is expected of each branch.

Constitutionalism was never a feature of North African politics (Roberts 2003, 208). Because of the inexperience of relying on a single document to rule the country, leaders often relied on “nationalist legitimacy,” which is evident in the Algerian Constitution, along with other typical aspects of outlining political roles. In the “new authoritarian” systems of the Middle East, leaders try to emphasize the decades-old struggle against colonizers to maintain their legitimacy. The 1996 Algerian Constitution makes several allusions to the “1st of November 1954 Revolution,” an event that occurred over 50 years ago yet is still written into the national consciousness to maintain the legitimacy of current leaders. For example, the Constitution says: “The State guarantees the respect of
the symbols of the Revolution, the memory of the ‘chouhada’ and the dignity of their
erightfuls, and the ‘moudjahidine’” (Constitution 1996, article 62). In an ironic statement
the Constitution also says that “Algeria associates itself with all the peoples fighting for
their political and economic liberation, for the right of self-determination and against any
racial discrimination” (Constitution 1996, article 27), even though its own people at the
time were fighting for political liberation from the military and violent Islamists.

Interestingly, Zeroual included measures in the new Constitution intended to limit
executive power. The first was the institution of term limits on the presidency. The new
rule was a maximum of two five-year terms (Roberts 2003, 187). Second, Zeroual
mandated a High State Court to try presidents in case of treason (Roberts 2003, 187).
This measure shows that the president is technically not immune from some degree of
punishment. Also, at the time of ratification the FLN had made a reversal of loyalty in
favor of the military regime (Roberts 2003, 187): this move has repercussions through
today as evidenced by the FLN’s overwhelming presence in government as a result of its
close relationship with the military. It nominated conservative, pro-military leaders to
head the party and was one of two political parties (the other being the National
Republican Alliance, or ANR, led by former-PM Redha Malek) to fully support the new
amendments (Volpi 2003; Roberts 2003). All other political parties, however, did not
acknowledge the intended curbs on executive power as such.

The most significant item of this new constitution was the advent of the Council of the
Nation (CN). This new legislative body served to make Algeria’s legislature a bicameral
one, but unlike the APN, the CN is not directly elected. Only two-thirds of its members
are indirectly elected: the two-thirds “are elected by means of indirect and secret suffrage
among and by the members of the People’s Communal Assemblies (APCs) and the People’s Wilaya Assemblies (APWs)” (Constitution 1996, article 101). The APCs are situated at the local level, and the APWs are situated at the provincial level; however, the executive of the province is appointed by the federal government. These legislative assemblies are popularly elected, and therefore the citizens have a small degree of input regarding who the CN members are. In total there are 7,000 members of this “electoral college” that chooses CN members. Members of the local APCs and APWs are directly elected every five years (Boubekeur 2011). The other one-third is directly chosen by the president: it “is designated by the President of the Republic among the national personalities and qualified persons in the scientific, cultural, professional, economic and social fields” (Constitution 1996, article 101). Members of the CN have limitless six-year terms, while APN members have limitless five-year terms; however, half of the CN members face “reelection” every three years (Constitution 1996, article 102).

Once a bill passes the APN, it needs 75% approval by the CN to become a law (Roberts 2003). Based on the minimum threshold for a bill to become a law, it is unlikely that a bill the president does not like will pass both chambers. The CN is known to be dominated by “regime place-men,” who are loyal to the president (Roberts 2003, 264). Thus, the body that is presumed to be most representative of the people – the APN – and most able to make legislation that benefits its constituencies is severely limited by an unrepresentative legislative body that exists to ensure executive interests prevail.

Since the 1989 transition Algeria has subscribed to a presidential rather than a parliamentary system, meaning the executive and legislative branches are distinct and often meet the challenge of making effective policy that considers all aspects of society.
A high degree of inter-branch consultation and coordination is not required as much in a presidential system as a parliamentary system (Gerring 2009). Typically the executive is the president; however, in Algeria there is also a prime minister (PM), whose official title is the “head of government” and who is responsible for nominating members of the government, such as ministers, to be confirmed by the president (Constitution 1996, article 79). Rather than the parliament being the sole source behind the ouster of the PM via a vote of no confidence, the president has a constitutionally-mandated say on the PM’s nomination and ouster. Thus, through the constitution the president has been able to use his authority to further extend executive power throughout the government, limiting the capacity of the parliament to decide who runs the government.
1990s Elections

The ability to elect representatives and governors is one of the most basic traits of a democracy. Based on the minimum definition of a democracy, a polity is a democracy if the citizens control the means to decide who governs (Rose 2009, 12). However, elections in Algeria have been described as a means to vote on choices, not on actual candidates (Roberts 2003, 192). Unfortunately, the people have long acknowledged that showing up to vote will not change policies in such a way that benefits the majority.

1995 Presidential Election

As of 1995 the negotiations with the Islamists had reached a hiatus, the violence had not slowed, and renewals of democracy had not been taken seriously by the military government. The FIS had demanded that its primary leaders – Madani, Belhadj, and Hachani – be released from prison in order to continue the talks, yet the regime denied this demand. The standstill caused President Zeroual to call for early elections to be held in December, in large part to display his commitment to democratic practices despite the national conflict. Zeroual won reelection in December 1995 with 60% of the popular vote and an alleged 75% turnout rate (Volpi 2003, 75). The candidate from the Nahnah/Hamas party won 25%, while the RCD’s candidate, Said Sadi, won 10%. However, there were reports that the official figures were inflated: this accusation helped pave the way for Zeroual to hold parliamentary elections in 1997 and regain some legitimacy (Roberts 2003, 189).
1997 Parliamentary Elections

At the minimum, the 1996 Constitution reiterated parliamentary elections, granting some degree of popular representation. Notably, this was the first legislative election since December 1991, when the whole notion of democracy was dismantled by the military. The 1997 parliamentary elections were much different than the 1995 presidential elections. In the 1995 elections, there were four candidates, with the vote breakdown seemingly fairly distributed (Roberts 2003). However, in 1997 there was a much lower turnout rate, as the voters acknowledged they were ultimately voting for a powerless assembly. The authority vested in the executive, permitted by the presidential system, was able to preclude the existence of a strong legislature. Dahl’s criterion that citizens must have equal opportunities to effectively participate in government was not met in this parliamentary election. Given the newly established Council of the Nation (CN), even a diverse and representative National People’s Assembly (APN) was not likely to pass legislation favorable to the people and unfavorable to the regime. Additionally, Zeroual and his compatriots had recently established a party called National Rally for Democracy (RND) to ensure a presidential presence in the parliament (Volpi 2003). In many ways a government-created political party defeats the purpose of a party, as it is supposed to be “the central intermediate and intermediary structure between society and government,” not the actual government (Morlino 2009, 202). Additionally, an incumbent government-created party logically has the resources to preempt victory at the expense of other parties.
The elections for the APN were held in June 1997. The RND won 40% of the seats (Volpi 2003, 77). The creation of the RND has been the key to the executive remaining a force in parliament and preventing true popular sovereignty from existing. Altogether, though, there were nine other parties elected to the APN, the first time a plurality legislature went into effect (Roberts 2003, 192). The local elections were held in October 1997, for the APWs and the APCs (Roberts 2003, 192). Here, too, the RND won a large majority of the seats. However, the national elections were thought to be rigged. It is highly speculated that there was a pre-determined result, as well as fraud: all government officials voted in secret polls rather than public polling locations, and some polls were thought to have “corrected” votes (Roberts 2003, 195). Moreover, there was no monitoring of many polling places because they were “mobile,” making it simple for the government to allocate RND votes as it saw fit (Roberts 2003, 194).

Local and state elections were held in November 1997, and the RND won 55% of these seats as well (Volpi 2003, 75). Thus, the regime was able to manipulate the democratic institutions of political parties and elections to maintain authority outside of the presidency. The 1997 legislative elections were described as even less laissez-faire than the 1990 elections because the dominant faction in the regime aimed to return to the status quo ante 1989: a one-party government with significant military influence. The 1990s electoral process’s “formal pluralism [was] actually less democratic than formal monolithism” (Roberts 2003, 197).
1999 Presidential Election

In September 1998 President Zeroual announced early elections to be held April 15, 1999 (Bouandel 2003). Abdelaziz Bouteflika ran as a civilian candidate in 1999, officially unaffiliated with the regime but certainly supported by it. Initially, he was one of seven candidates, but six of them “abruptly” dropped out because of assumptions that the election results were pre-determined in Bouteflika’s favor (Rachid 2008). Certainly allegations of electoral fraud were not absent from this election either: it was claimed that some polling places only had ballots with Bouteflika’s name on them (Volpi 2003). Bouteflika ran unaffiliated with any political party; however, five out of seven candidates were unaffiliated with any party, showing the irrelevance of a formal party system in Algeria (Bouandel 2003). The RND and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) – which was formally called Hamas, but changed its name to comply with constitutional restrictions on religiously-affiliated parties – also backed Bouteflika. Further, the military pressured the FLN to back Bouteflika as well, causing the FLN to defy its own rules that its congress must formally nominate a candidate (Bouandel 2003). It was undoubtedly the support of the military that led to Bouteflika’s victory, as it had singlehandedly determined the electoral outcomes in elections since 1992. Therefore, Dahl’s requirement that citizens have the opportunity to participate in government was again not met.
The Bouteflika Years

The 1996 Constitution claims “The State takes its legitimacy and its raison d’être from the People’s will. Its motto is ‘By the People and for the People.’ It is exclusively for service of the people.” (Constitution 1996, article 11) However, Algeria displays the qualities of a “rentier state” that impede democracy, as well as a presidential system that does not rely on, or encourage the formation of, a parliament to check it. Other side effects of this presidential system are allegedly fraudulent elections and a weak political party system. Because of these two factors – rentier policies and presidentialism – Algeria has artificial, or pseudo-democratic, institutions with an emphasis on “authoritarian enclaves” and “military prerogatives” (Linz and Stepan 1996) that preclude a second transition to a more consolidated democracy (O’Donnell 1994).

Robert Dahl (1989) uses a five-part mechanism to measure the level of democracy (or “polyarchy”) in a country; each level allows for scalar variations to determine how democratic a country is. This scale adequately measures the level of democracy without being too burdened by inclusivity. Dahl’s criteria include: first, effective participation with equal opportunity to express preferences; second, voting equality by having an equal opportunity to determine outcomes; third, enlightened understanding and opportunity to learn about policy options; fourth, citizens’ control over the government’s agenda; and fifth, inclusion of all permanent adults as citizens. This chapter will demonstrate that Dahl’s scale most appropriately illustrates the shortcomings in Algeria in guaranteeing this constitutional stipulation; Dahl’s criteria outline the basic, yet meaningful, components of democracy that the Algerian government fails to meet. According to Freedom House, Algeria is ranked “Not Free” with a “Political Rights” score of six out of
a possible seven, with seven indicating the least political rights (Puddington 2013). Polity IV categorizes Algeria as an “open anocracy” with a score of +2 on a scale of -10 to +10, with +10 indicating a consolidated democracy (Monty 2011).

*Ending the Civil War*

Bouteflika entered the presidential office at a critical time when the main warring parties – the Islamists and the state security apparatus – were in a ceasefire, but the government’s relationship with society was still fragile. Often after a civil war the ruling regime faces a dilemma of choosing peace versus democratization (Jarstad 2008). Whereas peace will secure an end to the fighting, deeper democratization will ensure all parties have an opportunity to represent their interests in government. Bouteflika preferred peace while using a façade of democracy to try to further legitimize his government. He capitalized on the executive position

One of Bouteflika’s first missions as president was to end the civil war and attempt to reconcile the country’s various interests. In 1999 Bouteflika went through parliament to pass a Civil Concord Law (Habasch 2005). The new law granted arbitrary amnesty to Islamists who agreed to disarm and admitted to their crimes. The National People’s Assembly (APN) unanimously passed it, and as a result the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS, surrendered (albeit two armed groups, the GIA and the GSPC, continued to attack symbols of the state). The Civil Concord Law was also sent to the public for a referendum, where 98.6% approved the measure (Rachid 2008).

In 2005, Bouteflika took his next initiative, the “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation,” to the public for a referendum vote (Rachid 2008). Again, the public was
directly involved in a democratic way, but the measures included in the charter were never debated in the APN, allowing Bouteflika to boost executive authority at the expense of legislative authority. In terms of creating the government’s agenda, not simply approving it, the citizens had no influence. In February 2006 the government passed the “Decree Implementing the Charter for National Reconciliation,” yet with an interesting caveat attached: the cases of the disappeared were not to be discussed in such a way “to undermine the good reputation of [state] agents who honorably served the country or to tarnish the image of Algeria internationally” (Rachid 2008, 9). Further, Algerians were banned from using “speech, writing, or any other act” to harm the state institutions lest they pay a heavy monetary fine (Rachid 2008, 9). Nonetheless, Article 36 of the Constitution (1996) states “freedom of creed and opinion is inviolable.” The ability for the people to express preferences was denied. Clearly, Bouteflika had used undemocratic executive power to circumvent constitutional obligations to the legislature and the people.
The Political Economy: Fostering a “New Authoritarianism” in Algeria

“Rentier states” describe states whose governments have access to abundant resource wealth and rely on economic patronage to survive (King 2009, 29). “Rentier states” are common in states with abundant, exploitable natural resources (Bernhagen 2009, 117). Rentier states face an inherent problem in terms of democratization: “democratization is a response to popular aspirations summarized in the slogan ‘no taxation without representation,’ and rentier states can do without either” (Bernhagen 2009, 117). Ross (2001) explains the various side effects that accompany rentierism. The “taxation effect” means the government has sufficient revenue that it need not rely on taxes from the citizens, and therefore does not need to be accountable to its demands. The “spending effect” allows the government to spend more money on patronage, something of which Algeria is very guilty. The “repression effect” allows the government to put more money towards the security apparatus, which is often used to block popular protest.

There is currently a massive practice of elite co-opting in Algeria, meaning high government officials barter with elites to dually obtain votes and continue to control the means of manufacturing oil and gas (King 2009). Privatization practices, which began in the 1980s, created a new socioeconomic class: private business owners or contractors who purchased companies from the government in exchange for votes and financing. Although there is evidence of the advantage of a large private class for democratization (Bernhagen 2009), the private class in Algeria does not represent the interests of a broad middle class; rather, they are interested in benefitting financially from the government. The people overall do not control the government’s agenda: the agenda is determined by
economic interests tied to oil wealth. The business class is an unofficial part of the government and is no longer an independent civil society-type group that wants to pressure it. For the sake of economic stabilization, international financial institutions have advocated greater authority in the hands of the executive and technocrats in order to manage the economy (King 2009, 12). The act of economic co-opting has come to be known as a form of “new authoritarianism” in the Middle East, with the “old authoritarianism” being the immediate post-independent state-capitalist governments (King 2009, 31).

The Algerian regime trades control over various industries for political support and acquiescence. So, Dahl’s second criterion that the citizens must have an equal opportunity to express preferences is not met. The “rents” of the Algerian state circulate amongst whole classes, such as the military, public sector and ministerial officials, and a commercialized and loyal private sector. These become ruling coalitions, which “buttress [the regime’s] ability to govern” (King 2009, 7). Essentially, the policies made in conjunction with ruling coalitions also break the criterion that the citizenry must have an enlightened and equal opportunity to learn about policy options. Zinecker (2009) writes that in order to complete the democratic transition, the wealth must be redistributed in such a way that includes the lower classes. Clearly, average Algerian citizens are missing from this cohort that influences government behavior.

High oil and gas exports are one of the best ways for governments all over the world to protect themselves (because the rents produced are so great relative to other resources), lending credence to the “resource curse”: states that are well endowed with oil wealth
tend to avoid democratization because they rely on oil rents, not the population, to finance the bureaucracy, precluding the need to consult popular opinion (Cavatorta 2009). The Algerian government’s control over its natural gas industry gives it the financing to buy support from business classes. Presently, 97% of Algeria’s export revenue comes from oil and gas (Diamond 2008, 76). Algeria is ranked seventh in the world for the amount of natural gas it exports, and twentieth for the amount of crude oil it exports (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). Also, it is ranked eleventh in the world for the amount of proven natural gas reserves, indicating that it will continue to rely on gas exports for revenue during the foreseeable future.

The state-owned oil company Sonatrach is the key to the government’s monopoly of power (Entelis 1999). The company was nationalized in 1963, and was one of the only state-owned enterprises to withstand Chadli’s privatization. Further, there is overlap of bureaucrats and Sonatrach senior officials, where senior officials often become energy ministers (Entelis 1999). Additionally, the Algerian Constitution states that, “Equal access to functions and positions in the State is guaranteed to all citizens without any other conditions except those defined by the law” (Constitution 1996, article 51). Certainly, though, the citizens do not come close to controlling this aspect of the government, per Dahl’s criteria, as its roles are circulated within an opaque public sector. The benefit of the government controlling Sonatrach’s large revenues is two-fold: it supplies the government with the income to purchase support from the elite class, and it allows the government to convey the image of a savior of the average citizen. Both of these practices preclude full democracy: it prevents a legitimate political opposition from
emanating, and convinces the people that the status quo is acceptable and change is unnecessary (Ross 2012).

“Eudaemonic” legitimacy refers to the promise that the authorities will improve the people’s living standards, and is relied on in socialist post-colonial states, especially Arab ones (King 2009, 13). Algerians largely rely on state-subsidies because most of the wealth is in the hands of the government. In large part, Sonatrach is a relic of post-independence Algeria in that it provides the means to supply basic needs in a socialist manner. As long as the regime can – deceptively or not – relay the message that it is acting in the best interest of the citizens by distributing a significant proportion of the oil wealth, practices will likely not be challenged (Ross 2012). In the “new authoritarian” regimes, presidents support charitable organizations created by their wealthy patrons to maintain the illusion that the regime still assists the poor – usually the majority – and uses its oil wealth for good. Sonatrach’s official website heavily emphasizes its contributions to Algerian society, listing its dedication to Algerian sport, culture, history, and literature (Sonatrach 2013). Sonatrach uniquely intertwines social investment and profit-making. Its main objective of social responsibility is “improving the lives of the needy populations”; an example it lists is opening “solidarity restaurants” during Ramadan to feed the needy (Sonatrach 2013).
Algeria as a Hybrid Regime

Because Algeria has the minimum democratic institution, regular elections, it cannot be completely discounted as a purely authoritarian state. When looking at Dahl’s criteria for a democracy, Algeria meets some criteria (inclusion of all adults as citizens and universal suffrage) but not others (effective participation, enlightened understanding of policy options, and control over the government’s agenda). O’Donnell (1994) writes that a “delegative democracy” meets Dahl’s criteria for a polyarchy; although Algeria does not meet all of these criteria, it has other qualities of a “delegative democracy” that preclude its classification as a full democracy. The current political situation has been “inherited from [its] authoritarian predecessors,” (56) which promoted central authority over representativeness; and the political outlook “rest[s] on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations” (59). Further, O’Donnell (1994) requires presidential term limits in a “delegative democracy,” yet Algeria abolished these in 2008.

Similarly, a “pseudo-democracy” (Diamond 2008, 23) is a regime that has all the nominal institutions of a democracy but does not truly operate as a democracy. It has a multiparty system and regular elections, but it is nearly impossible for the people to vote incumbents out of power because of electoral fraud and heavy constraints on the opposition. The purpose of an election is for the people to choose a representative who they feel will best represent their interests in government: in pseudo-democracies elected officials are not given the authority they should receive based on electoral results.
Diamond offers a telling quote about the government in Algeria that illustrates its pseudo-democratic characteristics: “democracy has been subverted from within while its institutional shell of legitimacy has been superficially preserved.” (Diamond 2008, 64)

The following sections on the presidency, the parliament, elections, and political parties will demonstrate how a strong, central executive branch – a byproduct of the presidential system, plus its aforementioned control over oil wealth – has produced a pseudo-democracy: it nominally follows democratic institutions, but does not implement them to their full potential.

*A New Civilian Government?*

The military and security apparatus of Algeria has received nationalist legitimacy since 1962 by claiming to be the savior of Algeria from the French colonial authority. The military comprised the bulk of the FLN, and so the military has traditionally overlapped with politics. Chadli attempted to alter the role of the military to make it a professional, apolitical body vis-à-vis the new constitution; however this was disastrous for the democratization, and the military and security apparatus continues to play a role in influencing politics. The objective of getting true civilian control over the military is certainly challenging “when the military enjoys great prestige, [and] possesses advanced bureaucratic skills” (Kohn 1997, 141). However, in the case of Algeria the influence of the military on politics must be viewed as existing along a “continuum” rather than an absolute relationship (Kohn 1997). The military does not absolutely control the civilian presidency, but has influence over certain aspects of government in different degrees.
Bouteflika has chosen to de-emphasize the military’s political role. Most significantly, Bouteflika created a new position of “General Secretary” in the Ministry of Defense, to which he has appointed himself in order to mitigate direct authority of the military over defense affairs. This step seems to be in the direction of increased civilian control over the military. Although Bouteflika is known as the first civilian president, the formal exclusion of the military from the executive did not imply greater political roles for Algerian civilians. Dahl’s fourth criterion that citizens must have control over the agenda is not close to being fulfilled. Bouteflika reorganized the presidential cabinet and removed many of the military commanders who used to hold ministerial seats. One account claims that Bouteflika has intended to become an authoritarian president like Boumediene: because of this the army has been “jockeying for power” amongst their separate factions (Roberts 2003, 281). Nonetheless, Bouteflika also formed anti-corruption committees in order to officially limit the military’s control over him (King 2009).

However, Bouteflika’s attempts at reducing the military’s power are unfortunately countered by an increase in the power of security and intelligence forces. As Przeworski (1996) noted, there is great appeal of presidentialism to the security forces because it tends to include them in politics more than a parliamentary system does. The following is true of Algeria: “civilian control is, by its very nature, weak or nonexistent if the armed forces can use force or influence to turn a government out of power, or to dictate the character of a government or policy” (Kohn 1997, 146). Bouteflika actually kept three men in high positions who were responsible for the 1992 election nullification and repression during the war: Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mohammad Lamari;
Director of Intelligence and Security Major-General Mohammad Mediene; and Director of Counter-Espionage Major-General Smain Lamari (Roberts 2003). Notably, these military officers have merely spilled over into another realm of security and still have significant control over this policy instead of the civilian government. Without an overhaul of the internal policymakers from the civil war, it is unimaginable that real democratic change could actually take place.

Interestingly, one author says there is a “continuing structural weakness of the presidency” at the advantage of the security sector (Roberts 2003, 268). The Algerian Department of Intelligence and Security (Department du Renseignement et de la Securite, or DRS) is currently the force to be reckoned with regarding any political decision, not the parliament. Public officials often need the blessing of the DRS in order to be successful. The leader of the RCD party Said Sadi has said that the DRS is “at the heart of power, without constitutional oversight and with unlimited resources” (Rachid 2008, 13). While the DRS is not the actual military, it has overlapping members with the army and its influence still indicates a lack of control by the civilian president. Bouteflika himself actually has limited authority over the government’s pocketbook because the security apparatus controls the receipt and deployment of external revenues (King 2009). Therefore, although Bouteflika is the first civilian president in a state with strong overlap of the military and politics, the ability for other civilian citizens to dictate the government’s agenda is still not achieved.
A representative legislature is a necessary component and defining feature of a democracy. One of its main functions is to check the power of the executive branch. Its other main function is to let citizens control issues on the government’s agenda through local representatives. Significantly, one of the most common variables in failed democratization is a weak parliament because it is unable to properly check executive abuses of power (Fish and Wittenberg 2009). A “delegative democracy” does not fully institutionalize “those [factors] that pertain to the formation and representation of collective identities and interests” (O’Donnell 1994, 57). A representative parliament is one of these factors that lack complete institutionalization in Algeria at the behest of the president, who maintains the upper hand in this presidential system. Parliamentarism, as opposed to presidentialism, is capable of ensuring the coordination of different interests and views (Gerring 2009). This coordination is absent in the Algerian legislature because only the executive’s views need to be considered; the peril of this, of course, is that “quite often, when individuals or groups pursue their own agendas, the result is not what society as a whole would prefer” (Gerring 2009, 354). One study found that “presidentialism” is always negatively correlated with democratic presence and survival because the executive still has an incentive, and often the means, to diminish the capacity of the parliament and concentrate power in the executive branch (Stradiotto 2010).

Because of this institutional design, Algeria fails to meet Dahl’s requirement that in a democracy citizens must have enlightened opportunity to understand and decide on policies. Algerians are able to elect representatives, but the uncertain validity of the final
outcome and the conflation of the executive and legislative branches dampen the citizens’ ability to understand economic policy and voice policy ideas to which representatives must listen.

In Algeria, parliamentary lawmaking is ineffective, as in practice it is answerable only to the president and the military’s interests, not the people’s interests. Parliamentary seats are often used as a “stepping stone” to more meaningful positions in the executive branch, not because of the authority accompanied by a seat in parliament (Roberts 2003, 264). Thus, the parliament does not meet Dahl’s criteria that a democracy must grant citizen control over the government. Constitutionally, the parliament is granted several areas of legal jurisdiction through its committees, including: individual rights and family statuses, foreigners, tax rates, general public health, trade unions, and the transfer of property from the public to private sector (Constitution 1996, article122). However, according to the Parliamentary Power Index (PPI), Algeria’s bicameral legislature – the National People’s Assembly (APN) and the Council of the Nation (CN) – has a score of 0.25 (Fish and Kroenig 2009). This score is lower than the average score of failed democratizers, which is 0.42 (Fish and Wittenberg 2009). Moreover, only three parties were awarded most of the seats in the APN in the 2007 elections: the FLN received 136 seats; the RND received 61 seats; and the Movement for Society and Peace (MSP)/Hamas won 52 seats (European Forum 2012). All three of these parties are products of the national government. Nonetheless, the turnout rate for the 2007 parliamentary elections was 35.5%, and 46% in 2004 (European Forum 2012).

Dahl’s criteria that citizens must be able to understand and have the opportunity to learn about the government’s agenda and policy options is not met because their channel
to government decision-making – the parliament – is excluded from monitoring the bureaucracy, and in practice is not set up to effectively challenge the executive. The members of parliament (MPs) of the APN and the CN have no real mechanism for any oversight of ministers or other unelected officials, as bureaucrats are not accountable to the parliament for their actions, just to the president (Habasch 2005). Hearings for illegal activity are nearly nonexistent, showing the lack of rule of law and the powerlessness of the parliament to check official bureaucratic activities that ultimately affect citizens’ lives. Interestingly, though, the Algerian Constitution states that the elected assembly is the body in which “the control of the public authorities is exercised” (Constitution 1996, article 14).

In the May 2012 parliamentary elections the FLN emerged once again as the dominant party of the APN. Prior to the election, Bouteflika had increased the number of seats in the APN to 462 from 389 (Election Guide 2012). Twenty three new political parties had been legalized, and the new seats were added to theoretically allow space for new parties to fill the parliament (BBC 2012). The FLN won 220 seats out of 462; far behind in second place came the RND with 68 seats. The Green Algeria Alliance – a coalition of moderate Islamist parties, but including the government-mandated MSP/Hamas – came in third with 59 seats (Spencer 2012, May). There were seven more parties that comprised a minute proportion of APN seats (European Forum 2012). The FLN actually doubled its total seats as a result of this election (Spencer 2012, May). Overall, claims of electoral fraud were abundant, despite the presence of international observers. The most common complaint from observers within Algeria was that official levels of voter turnout did not correspond to observed levels of voter turnout (Spencer 2012, May). Officially,
the government had a list of 21 million registered voters, but denied EU requests to see the list, causing suspicion that the number of registered voters was inflated by the government and used to bolster the official vote tally in favor of the FLN (Spencer 2012, May). In pseudo-democracies, external observers often view the presence of elections in and of themselves as a sufficient indicator of democracy (Diamond 2008). Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claimed that the 2012 parliamentary elections were “a welcome step in Algeria’s progress toward democratic reform,” in part because of the “high number of women elected” (European Forum 2012).

Most journalistic reports of the elections described it as having “heavy abstention” and “total indifference” (Nossiter 2012). This is an indication that the general populace has failed to internalize the value of participation, perhaps because it knows the limits of voting. An Algerian political analyst, Lahouari Addi, doubted the official turnout rate of 42% was correct, and believed it to be closer to 20%, especially considering the government was officially estimating turnout before many precincts had even submitted results (Nossiter 2012). According to Addi, the huge victory for the FLN was incredibly disproportionate to the popular sentiment; he stated that “in a fair vote Islamists would have won” (Nossiter 2012). One leader within the Green Algeria Alliance, Abdallah Djaballah, called for a boycott of the APN altogether because his specific party – the Movement for National Reform – won much fewer votes than expected (Spencer 2012, May). Additionally, Abdoujerra Soltani of the MSP/Hamas – also a member of the Green Algeria Alliance – claimed that the results were “neither acceptable, logical, or reasonable” (Nossiter 2012). The Socialist Forces Front (FFS) declared that the regime
merely used the elections “not to find a solution to the crisis, but to consolidate power” (Nossiter 2012).

The general sentiment among the citizens is that the APN is a worthless entity controlled by the president and security forces. Average Algerians are generally turned off to the idea of voting in legislative elections because of its ineffectiveness and inconsistency with the people’s desires. One Algerian port worker said he did not bother voting, and asked a rhetorical question, “why would I vote, and for whom?” (Nossiter 2012). He added “nothing is going to change anyway.” This statement summarizes the attitude in Algeria regarding the powerlessness of the parliament and the apathy caused by a presidential monopoly of power. Diamond (2008) expresses the importance of not only adopting democratic institutions, but also adopting democratic attitudes and culture, when transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy. Certainly, Algerian citizens and opposition political parties are consistently let down by the ruling elites and have no faith in democratic values, such as popular representation in government and an effective opposition to the regime, which dissuades democratization.

The lack of representativeness in the CN is another obstacle to the parliament being able to truly curb the executive’s authority. The CN is a presidentially-created body that would not exist in a parliamentary system, in which one body comprises the executive and the legislature. Dependence on the federal government undoubtedly plays a role in CN decisions, where unelected local politicians choose two-thirds of the members, and the president chooses one-third: a loyal recipient of government funds is unlikely to betray the executive’s preferences in parliament. Additionally, half of the CN members
were up for “reelection” in December 2012 (half of the members face reelection every three years). There is no official data on these results, such as the party makeup of the chamber, illustrating the opaqueness of this body (Central Intelligence Agency 2013).

Algeria has some degree of federalism in which each wilaya, or province, contains an executive, legislature, and judiciary. In total there are 48 wilayas. Algeria does hold provincial and municipal elections to select representatives at the local and state levels. Democratically elected local government officials is a way to fulfill Dahl’s criteria of the people controlling the agenda of their government, as well as the right to fairly vote. However, the wilaya governments are largely pawns of the federal government and rely on the central government for funding. Additionally, they usually function as vehicles for carrying out federal policy, and have little choice in doing so because of their reliance on it for money. The wilaya governors are appointed by the central government; further, the wilaya legislatures are elected by the federal executive branch (Ruedy 2005). Altogether the citizens of a wilaya are unable to elect those politicians who have the authority to determine policies that will most directly impact their lives (policies on business, agricultural reforms, schools, and infrastructure). Municipalities are smaller entities within the wilayas that administer provincial policy at the more local level. They are slightly more removed from federal influence, but still experience the influence of dominant parties, as the FLN continues to dominate the ranks (Ruedy 2005).

The Presidency & Elections of 2004 and 2009

Linz (1990) writes that a presidential system wrongly encourages “the conviction that he possesses independent authority and a popular mandate is likely to imbue a president
with a sense of power and mission” (57). In Algeria, presidents can get away with holding on to and abusing this power for longer than they should. In this sense, Algeria fits the definition of a “delegative” democracy because these systems “rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit” (O’Donnell 1994, 59). Individualism on behalf of the president is also emphasized in these systems, and in Algeria, Bouteflika strives to make himself the symbol of the state. Further, the unlimited power of the presidency precludes consolidation of what democratic institutions do exist.

Elections are considered the first step in successful democratization: they determine who and what interests will obtain control of the government and how the state’s resources will be distributed (Robbins 2012). One way to determine if a democracy is consolidated – and therefore its institutions are accepted and utilized – is if its elections pass what Huntington calls the “two-turnover rule” (Shin 1994). According to this, if a government changes hands/parties of power consecutively twice without violent conflict erupting, then it is a consolidated democracy. It indicates the masses have adopted the value of peacefully accepting an opposition victory: it is the right to freely and fairly choose political leaders that is most important. Moreover, the idea that power changes hands twice shows that there is not one party or candidate holding power longer than it/he should; there are other political parties that differ from the predecessor and have opposing platforms that the people welcome.

Algeria has not yet met the two-turnover rule in its presidential elections. Chadli Bendjedid remained president until the military deposed him. In 1995 the Zeroual
presidency was maintained. In 1999 Bouteflika won the election as an unaffiliated candidate, but was supported by the military powers that unofficially ruled Algeria. He won again in 2004, then went through the APN to amend the Constitution so he could run in the 2009 election, which he also won. Presidential term limits have been abolished, strengthening the role of the president in an already undemocratic state. In each subsequent election after 1999 Bouteflika won a greater percentage of the vote than in the previous election. Importantly, Bouteflika is the unofficial head of the FLN-RND party coalition that dominates the parliament. Despite the large amount of political parties in Algeria, no opposition party since the 1992 coup has even come close to winning a presidential election. Thus, Algeria is still looking for its first turnover, the proximity of which is unknown.

The 2004 presidential election was considered to be the most competitive in Algeria since the legislative elections in 1990 and 1991 (Robbins 2012). Voter turnout rate was 58% of the electorate (Robbins 2012). The military, for the first time, did not officially endorse a candidate, a telling symbol that maybe the military would accept its lesser position in politics. Lieutenant Mohamed Lamari released a statement removing the army’s presence from the elections: “gone is the time when the military institutions… intervened in the political game” (Rachid 2008). Ironically, Lamari helped in the 1992 coup and elections cancellation, and was also an opponent of Islamists and Bouteflika’s reconciliation efforts (Rachid 2008). Interestingly, in the 2004 presidential election a large majority of the international observers came from the Arab League (63 observers) and the African Union (52 observers), representative of regions that are characteristically undemocratic (Volpi 2006). In contrast, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU), typically representative of advanced democracies, each sent only five observers, setting the observation mission up for failure to detect illegitimate practices (Volpi 2006). OSCE observers said the 2004 presidential election should be “an example for the Arab world,” illustrating the ignorance of observers to the deep-rooted election-fixing that happens there (Volpi 2006, 449). French president Jacques Chirac also said about the 2004 election, “I cannot see how, in all good faith, I could fault this electoral process” (Volpi 2006, 442).

A recent survey found that Algerians are discouraged from elections when the parties they vote for are not awarded adequate seats in government (Robbins 2012). This outcome met the researchers’ hypothesis that in a non-consolidated democracy support for democracy will decrease among voters who perceive the elections to be unfair and not free. Further, positive experience with democratic institutions will condition citizens for a more successful transition to a consolidated democracy. In 2002 Algerian voters across the board had equal levels of support for democracy in their country. Then, in the months following the 2004 presidential election, support for democracy in Algeria was inversely related to support for political Islam. Support for political Islam served as a proxy for candidate Taleb Ibrahimi, a moderate Islamist who was eliminated from candidacy based on superficial charges (Robbins 2012). In 2006, a follow-up survey indicated that Algerians who perceived a low quality of elections had lower support for democracy. Essentially, once Algerians experienced firsthand a negative experience with democracy, support for it decreased. This phenomenon has implications for its continuing transition: negative experiences certainly reduce the chance that Algerians will collectively adopt democratic ideals and see the benefits of democracy.
Algerian citizens do not view elections as a genuine way for political change, but as a way for politicians to advance their personal goals (Boubekeur 2011). Their attitude reflects the absence of Dahl’s rule of “effective participation,” which requires equal opportunity to express political preferences. An unpopular president, whose electoral victory is not attributable to the majority’s will, hinders citizens’ ability to express their preferences. In presidential elections, there is a slim chance that an opposition candidate will win.

The following quote is true of the situation in Algeria: “If the government of the day ‘manages’ elections by banning opposition parties, harassing critics, intimidating electors and falsifying the count of the vote, then the winners of the election will be chosen by the government rather than the electorate” (Rose 2009, 12). An un-free press and fraudulent polling practices are tactics that allow the regime, not the people, to choose the government. The regime has used, and continues to use, various tactics to ensure Bouteflika’s victory. These tactics highlight the pseudo-democratic quality of Algeria. When a candidate appears to have a significant amount of public support, the regime finds loopholes to prevent a turnover of authority. In a sense, this is the same measure the military took in January 1992, but to a less extreme extent. In a broader Arab context, this is an example of the “king’s dilemma”: heads of state are able to control which parties are allowed to represent the population, but continue to encourage nominal democratic/electoral practices (Ottaway 2007). Presidentialism magnifies this “dilemma.”

One major tactic is to eliminate viable opponents and replace them with opponents whose platforms nominally represent diverse segments of society, but are not popular
enough to win a plurality of votes. The three main segments of society are nationalist, Islamist, and democratic (Volpi 2006, 450). In 2004 the democratic segment was the FFS (Front of Socialist Forces), which is based in the Berber region of Kabylia; fortunately for regime elites the FFS withdrew from the elections because of suspicions of electoral fraud and an assumed loss. The Islamist segment was represented most favorably by Taleb Ibrahimi’s Wafa group, who was eliminated from the race because of charges by the Constitutional Court – the court that determines if actions are in line with constitutional mandates – that he did not receive enough official endorsements (Volpi 2006). Rather, it is suspected that he was eliminated because his popular support base was the largest among the Islamists and therefore a threat to the regime. Also, the regime has long seen Wafa as a cover for the FIS, which is banned from manifesting itself in any political form (Roberts 2003, 279). However, the Interior Minister has not officially banned Wafa, perhaps out of fear of a court case; instead, unofficial exclusion from elections is much easier (Roberts 2003, 277).

The regime promotes less popular politicians and parties to nominally represent societal segments without threatening the FLN/RND monopoly on government: the regime encourages the participation of Sadi Said from the democratic RCD; Abdallah Djaballah from the Islamist Movement for National Reform/Islah (now the head of the Justice and Development Front, JFD); and in 2004 Ali Benflis from the FLN. Permission for these groups into the political scene is not to say that they form a cohesive opposition to the regime, or even get along with the regime: Said and Djaballah have publicly cast doubt on the credibility of election results (Volpi 2006). Djaballah in 2004 doubted the 58% turnout rate, and announced that many polling stations recorded votes from
deceased voters (Volpi 2006, 447). Further, the platforms of the parties are different, and do not share a common goal of seriously reforming current regime practices, a precondition for successful democratization in post-communist states (McFaul, 2005).

The regime also tries to manipulate televised media to block multiple perspectives from reaching voters. Volpi (2006) admits that it is atypical for a transitioning polity to have “a population that is reliably informed of its options and all the political actors are included in a level playing field” (449), but it is especially harmful when the cleavages in society remain deep. In the 2004 elections the regime blocked a pro-Benflis London-based television station from airing in Algeria (Volpi 2006). Additionally, in 2004 the regime used state-controlled television channels to disproportionately air its messages in place of competitors’ messages, although Algerians’ access to satellite dishes and the internet is bound to make this tactic less effective. There is no clearer way to demonstrate the lack of Dahl’s criteria of enlightened understanding and the opportunity to learn about political options than the lack of a free press during election time. According to the 2007 Worldwide Press Freedom Index, Algeria ranked 123 out of 169 states, demonstrating the strong presence of the regime in the national media (European Forum 2012).

In November 2008 President Bouteflika proposed the elimination of presidential term limits (Boubekeur 2011). Bouteflika was able to pass the amendment abolishing term limits, an easy task considering his FLN/RND coalition was, and has been, the dominant coalition in parliament. This proposal was met with overwhelming parliamentary approval of both houses, something that most likely would not occur in a democracy that respects checks and balances of governmental branches. In the APN and the CN, 500 out
of 529 members voted for the amendment (BBC 2008). The new law was passed in order to, according to Bouteflika, deepen democracy, albeit opponents say it will only further destroy pluralism (BBC 2008). Presidential systems customarily prohibit a plethora of views from being represented in the government, and Algeria greatly represents this habit.

In April 2009 the incumbent Bouteflika won the presidential election – his third consecutive victory – in a landslide with 90.2% of the vote (European Forum 2012). This statistic is telling of growing injustices in the electoral system because in 1999 Bouteflika won only 70% of the vote running as the only practicable candidate. In an election with multiple candidates, a truly fair election will have a more realistic vote distribution than 90%. Also, the voter turnout rate was officially calculated at 74%, although this has not been independently verified, increasing the suspicion surrounding Algerian voter enthusiasm for Bouteflika (BBC 2009). In his campaign Bouteflika focused on the need to fight resurgent Islamist violence instead of relevant socioeconomic issues, another indication that his victory margin was most likely inflated (BBC 2009). Linz (1990) says that even with a small margin of victory the president feels entitled with disproportionate authority because he won the coveted seat; thus, it is easy to comprehend the sense of authority Bouteflika feels after winning by a huge majority. The second-place candidate was Louisa Hanoune, from the Trotskyist Workers’ Party, who received 4.2% of the vote (BBC 2009).

Regional organizations, such as the African Union and the Arab League, actually applauded the “freedom and transparency” of the 2009 presidential elections (European
Forum 2012). Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy gave “warm and friendly” congratulations to Algeria after the results were announced (European Forum 2012). Locally, presidential candidates also doubted official voter turnout figures originating from the Interior Ministry. The FFS said the 2009 presidential election was like a “tsunami of fraud” (BBC 2009). Also, the former head of Algeria’s human rights league found the election results to be “exaggerated” (BBC 2009). The results are in line with accusations from previous elections that fraud is present at the local level in polling stations. While most fraud is difficult to detect – or, actors are unwilling to detect it – there is anecdotal evidence that polling practices are unfair. It has been reported that polls are often monitored by the military or police forces rather than average citizens (Volpi 2006). Reportedly almost 90% of the media surrounding the election was not neutral, showing the control the regime has over journalism, especially broadcast media (Boubekeur 2011).

Active Politicians and Parties

A benefit of a parliamentary system is that it mandates strong political parties, as these are the main components of the legislature and executive, both living in the parliament (Gerring 2009). Political parties help fulfill Dahl’s requirement for effective citizen participation in government by acting as intermediaries between the people and the government (Morrino 2009, 212). Also, they structure relevant issues in a way translatable to the general public consistent with an official platform, allowing average citizens to join a preferable one as a means of participating in government. In Algeria most parties are free to exist and run in an election, bar those whose platforms are rooted
in religion, language, culture, and ethnicity. However, the FLN-RND coalition is able to suppress the emergence and ascendance of new parties, especially considering the non-necessity of a strong party system in a presidential system. In Algeria, the role of parties in facilitating the transition was nonexistent, and thus it is not surprising that parties today play a weak role. Small leftist, Islamist, and/or Berber parties are permitted to run in elections, but do not stand a chance in coming close to the same number of seats as the FLN or RND. Notably, when Bouteflika ran for president in 1999, he was not affiliated with any party, displaying the irrelevance of political parties even in Algeria’s recent history.

A feature that perpetuates “new authoritarianism” is the artificial electoral process in which opposition parties exist but are never bestowed with any real authority. Often, they are creations of the regime, and so their electoral victory merely reaffirms the ruling regime’s agenda. Those parties who truly strive to change the political status quo understand that they will never be elected, at least by a substantial portion of the vote. Additionally, political parties in Algeria are not strongly grounded in civil society because of almost 30 years (1962-1989) of one-party rule by the FLN, followed by eight years of direct military rule (1992-1999) (Bouandel 2003). The closed party list for parliamentary elections restricts the quality of individual candidates who can represent the party, and favors the bureaucrats who get to draw the list, defying the parties’ primary role of linking the people and the government (Bouandel 2003). The norm is to conform to the party’s leader because candidates are dependent on them for employment, and thus party candidates are easily deaf to the people’s demands.
Moreover, a significant factor behind the lack of influential political parties in Algeria is the state subsidy program (Bouandel 2003). Parties do not receive funds from private donors and citizens who wish to support the party and its platform; rather, parties are funded by state subsidies, and the larger the party (vis-à-vis its parliamentary seats), the greater the funding. This form of subsidization parallels the practice of rentierism. Hence, the FLN-RND coalition is able to dominate the APN without having the same proportion of support among the people. This occurrence is a function of the “new authoritarianism” that exists in Algeria: dominant parties become representatives of the large business interests that are clients of the regime. Essentially, the elite interests then become lawmakers, who can easily push through their self-serving interests while neglecting the people’s will. Therefore, the current party system, combined with subsidization programs, favors large parties, which are more susceptible to corruption as they become more hegemonic.

Further, parties in Algeria are largely based on identity or cultural spheres, which often do not overlap (Roberts 2003). A socialist, Berber party might have little in common with the Front for Justice and Development. Because of this, voters find most parties unappealing as they only pertain to specific interests. Although pluralism is allowed, it should be considered “pluralism without enfranchisement,” as the parties’ platforms are so distant from the electorate’s demands (Roberts 2003, 266). This phenomenon is referred to as “neutrality,” meaning the parties and civil society groups have no direct dependency upon each other, and parties typically act autonomously (Morlino 2009, 212). The disjointedness between the people and political parties
certainly inhibits the implementation of Dahl’s criteria that the people must have control over the government’s agenda.

Several party elites have been around for more than a decade, and they attempt to present political alternatives to the dominant FLN-RND coalition, even if only through their mere existence. Even during the civil war, various political forces worked together to settle the conflict and return to the democratization process, albeit their attempts were not successful. They continue to represent the various political nuances of Algerian political culture, despite the overall political management by the regime. One segment of society is the Islamist segment, which has a plurality of parties. Notably, ultra-conservative Islamist parties are not popular in Algeria. The Green Algeria Alliance (AVV) is the third most prominent party in the APN and consists of three moderate Islamist parties – Ennahda, the MSP, and Islah (Ryan 2012). These three parties formed the AVV prior to the May 2012 parliamentary elections in hopes of increasing their seats in the APN. Islah is thought to be more conservative than the others, and had to join the alliance to secure its chances of obtaining parliamentary seats. The Islamist movement in Algeria is not monolithic, and there are certainly subtle differences within each party, whether in the platform or in the personalities leading it.

Additionally, the AVV closely competed with the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), a social democratic, left-leaning opposition party around since 1963 but unable to operate in government (Ryan 2012). Notably, the FFS had previously boycotted the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections, and the 2009 presidential elections, because it perceived fraud (Ryan 2012). The Party of Algerian Renewal is also a liberal leftist party. The
Algerian Popular Movement has liberal democratic tendencies, but with only six seats in the parliament (European Forum 2012).

Other political segments are the nationalists, the cultural Berbers, and the leftists/communists. The nationalist segment consists mostly of the FLN and the RND, as they work in close cooperation with Bouteflika; the Algerian National Front also belongs to this category and holds only nine parliamentary seats (European Forum 2012). The RCD is the most prominent Berber party, yet it boycotted the 2012 elections in protest of a lack of Berber rights (European Forum 2012). The leftists/communists have been around since the 1990s as well, with the most prominent party being the Trotskyist Workers Party. The second place presidential candidate, Louisa Hanoune, is a member of this party, and she has also been around since the conflict of the 1990s. The Marxist parties have a history of splits amongst themselves into the Contemporary Algerian Front, Algerian Party for Socialism and Democracy, and the Ettahadi party (Taboulsi 2012).

One popular contemporary politician is Taleb Ibrahimi, a moderate Islamist whose family has well-known roots in Algeria (Roberts 2003). He was deliberately prevented from having a fair opportunity to run in the 2004 presidential election. According to electoral rules he was eliminated from the 2004 campaign for not collecting enough signatures to claim candidacy (Robbins 2012). The actual signature tally is debatable, though. The regime is thought to hold a grudge against him because although he is a former-FLN member, and he formed a “committee of solidarity” with FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj (Roberts 2003, 277). Additionally, he received support from FIS
members in the 1999 presidential election, perceived by the regime as being guilty by association. The legacy of the rivalry between Islamists and the military is evident in the regime’s treatment of Ibrahimi, as it sees in him a real threat to their continuing authority. Just as it prevented the FIS from completing its inevitable control of the government, it also seeks to prevent Ibrahimi

A second relevant politician is Abdallah Djaballah, another moderate Islamist. Djaballah formed the new Justice and Development Front (JFD) in summer 2011, and left the Islah/Reform party. However, Djaballah exemplifies an exception to elite stabilization within the parties. Those in Islah do not believe his party has a chance to swing voters from Islah. Ennahda in Algeria has said that it would not rule out a coalition with the JFD in the parliament (Amine 2011). His intention with the JFD is to “campaign for a democratic and social Algeria” (Amine 2011). Like Said, he has spoken out against electoral fraud. Nonetheless, the frequent change in the number of parties and unclear coalitions shows a lack of effective parties and partisan competition.

A third contemporary politician is Said Sadi. He was relevant during Chadli’s era, revealing the age of Algerian politicians in general. His Berber Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) party was legalized as part of Chadli’s liberalizations, despite its ethnic roots. He has consistently and publicly complained about the corruption and fraud in elections since at least 1999.

The Arab Spring & Democratic Prospects for Algeria

In early 2011 Algerians took to the streets of Algiers to protest high unemployment, high food costs, and a housing shortage. The protests illustrated that the “eudaemonic
legitimacy” supposedly inherent in the regime could only reach so far before being challenged. There were reportedly over 11,000 protests in 2011 representing all demographics, rather than one specific political motive (Spencer 2012, May). Popular grievances largely mirrored the grievances of Algeria’s neighbors, such as Tunisia; supposedly some Algerians had participated in self-immolations just as Tunisian protesters had done (Spencer 2012, May). However, the security apparatus in Algeria was sure to prevent large-scale protests from fully forming (Spencer 2012, July). Intelligence forces monitored the demonstrations to ensure they did not grow too large. Although no Algerians were reportedly killed, there was reported violence by security forces. Sporadic protests also popped up in 2012 with similar demands of deficient social services, unemployment, and housing (Spencer 2012, July). Currently, young Algerians are outspoken about the lack of political change within the last decade; one journalist referred to it as a “shock” that the Algerian youth are so loud, and yet no meaningful reforms occur (Walt 2013). This outspokenness is one of the key differences between Algeria and its Arab Spring neighbors, Tunisia and Libya: their protesters were afraid to reveal their feelings to journalists, while in Algeria there is enough of a façade of democracy that free speech is allowed, but pointless.

The ineffectiveness of the protests is a function of the central control of oil wealth by the government, which has critical side effects. One is the “repression effect,” which allows the state to put more funding towards a strong security apparatus (Ross 2001). In these protests, the strength of the security apparatus was a detriment to the protest effort. Perhaps more importantly is the “group formation effect,” the ability for the regime to prevent independent social groups from forming (Ross 2001). With civil society being a
key element of democratization, the chances of democratization are even less likely in states dependent on oil resources. This restriction is most visible in Algeria’s official ban on public protests in and around Algiers (Human Rights Watch 2012). This ban is in defiance of charters Algeria has ratified, such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Human Rights Watch 2012).

Additionally, on February 24, 2011 Bouteflika decided to rescind the “state of emergency,” in effect since the 1992 coup (Human Rights Watch 2012). In April 2011 Bouteflika announced possible constitutional amendments regarding the re-imposition of presidential term limits and laws on political parties and associations, yet these proposals have not come to fruition (Boubekeur 2011). Bouteflika tried to assemble some “eudaemonic legitimacy” in response to the Arab Spring protests by promising more subsidies towards socioeconomic needs (Spencer 2012, July). By appearing as a savior of the people Bouteflika has tried to achieve the high popular esteem Boumediene had; but modern circumstances of an unpredictable oil and gas market and severe socioeconomic and political deficiencies, juxtaposed with democratic protests and political upheavals in Arab neighbors, signify that the state is no longer the all-purpose solution for Algerians.

Delegative democracies require a second transition to further the consolidation of democratic institutions. This option is not feasible for Algeria at the moment. Successful transitions from delegative democracies to consolidated democracies have historically included a “decisive coalition of broadly supported political leaders who take great care in creating and strengthening democratic political institutions” (O’Donnell 1994, 56).
Currently, Algeria lacks this qualification. The regime has no intentions of creating meaningful political change that would place more power in the hands of the people. It is even reported that Bouteflika, aged 75 and ailing, intends to run again for president in 2014 (Walt 2013).

If more democratic rights were granted now, elites – the military, the security apparatus, and Bouteflika’s political cronies – would certainly continue to play a role in the new political system, as this is typically the case in transitions. The factor that would determine how truly democratic the new regime would be is the extent to which the incumbent elites relinquish negotiating power to the opposition forces – or, the several political parties who are often snubbed in the elections yet popularly supported, namely Islamists like Ibrahimi and Djaballah. If the incumbent elites maintain the upper hand in negotiating a new system, the democracy is likely to fail and an exploitable presidential system will remain (Stradiotto 2010). However, if the opposition has at least an equal say in the new system, the democracy is much more likely to deepen and live longer because the opposition would be sure to modify laws to make the government more representative of the people’s interests.

Volpi (2006) says that the most feasible hope is that Algeria will evolve into a more “sophisticated pseudo-democracy” in which the three dominant societal segments – nationalists, Islamists, and democrats – resolve their tensions and the military takes a true backseat to politics. It is worth considering the effect of lapsed time on Algerian democratization, as veterans of the War of Independence – many of whom participated in the 1992 coup – will begin to die off, and generational differences will set in (Quandt
2002). For instance, if the outspokenness of Algerian youths persists, coupled with generational changes in the regime, a delayed Algerian Spring might occur. The military and the FLN have long held traditional legitimacy in Algeria because of their role in the liberation from France; the Constitution, though, contains ample rhetoric surrounding national liberation and the importance of that War. Additionally, the memory of the 1990s civil war would need to fade as well, as this would erase the demonization of the military and the Islamists. Perhaps the outspokenness of Algerian youth could become the norm, coupled with a dying generation of military strongmen, creating more pressure for democratic change. Nonetheless, the centralization of the oil and gas industry, with its ability to prop up a ruling regime and provide income to many members of society, will most likely continue to be the key obstacle to democratization.
Conclusion

This thesis found that Algeria’s current pseudo-democratic state is attributable to several factors. First, its initial democratic transition was rapid and did not include an independent, democratic opposition; also, the military was excluded, showing that pacts were not used. Second, the civil war in the 1990s stagnated the democratization and the military regime maintained a façade of democracy through disingenuous elections. Presidentialism, rather than parliamentarism, made it easy for the army to exploit authority. The army was, and is, reluctant to cede all power to civilians. Third, current executive authority is disproportionate to the authority of a legislature, which inhibits the growth of representative democracy. Additionally, the centralization of oil wealth, Algeria’s top source of revenue, allows the ruling regime to hold power at the expense of average citizens. Moreover, explanations that consider the hindrance of Islam on democracy are not supported by the case of Algeria because it has a strongly nationalist tradition, and its modern Islamist parties must have moderate ideology in order to get any votes.

Algeria was one of the first Arab countries to attempt real democratic reform when it ratified a new, democratic constitution in 1989. However, this transition from authoritarianism to democracy had ample shortfalls: democratic norms and values had not been instilled throughout society (average civilians and the elites); it was elite-led without a prominent opposition pressuring the regime to democratize; and the military was not guaranteed any spot in the new system or the transition process itself. The FLN elites certainly experienced a split, as is typical surrounding institutional transitions, and the more liberal side prevailed for the time being. Chadli was intent on pushing political
reform along with his economic reforms in order to increase his own legitimacy at the expense of the FLN. As part of this process Chadli approved political pluralism, a new concept to Algeria after being under one-party FLN rule since 1962. Interestingly, the protests that took place in the late-1980s did not specifically mandate democracy, but rather had economic demands. He approved the legality of over 30 political parties, and co-opted the existence of the FIS, even though its religious quality defied the constitution. Additionally, the FIS was considered to be part of the liberalizing elite, not an independent opposition group, indicating that the ensuing changes in the government and the imminent FIS victory in the parliament did not necessarily mark a distinct break with the former authoritarian system.

The prevalence of the pro-democratic faction in the elite implied that some of the military interests would be sure to suffer a loss of authority as a result of new political pluralism. The military was demoted to having an apolitical role vis-à-vis the 1989 Constitution, something to which it was unaccustomed. As a result, the military took advantage of its access to the means of force and traditional influence in politics to hijack the democratic experiment. Unsurprisingly, democratizing regimes that previously gave the military a role in government are the least likely to have a successful democracy in the future (Stradiotto 2010; Fish and Wittenberg 2009). The civil war that ensued between various Islamist groups and the security forces officially lasted seven years, 1992 until 1999, with some residual violence throughout the next decade. Along with the death of thousands of Algerians came the death of the initial zeal of democratization.
The initial democratic reforms in 1989 included a presidential system, rather than a parliamentary system. The seat of the presidency acted as a single point of authority to be exploited during the civil war. Had a parliamentary system been in place, which would not have had a separate executive with distinct powers, the military might have found it more difficult to assume the whole seat of the government. Typically, though, states with former military regimes prefer presidential systems over parliamentary systems because they imply a sense of political hierarchy (Przeworski 1996). However, the military government in the 1990s under President Zeroual attempted to relay some sense of normalcy by continuing elections, a presidential one in 1995 and a parliamentary one in 1997, albeit a government-created political party (the RND) won the majority of seats. Zeroual called for presidential elections in 1999, which current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika won unopposed.

Presidentialism combined with the centralization of oil wealth in the executive branch has become unsettling in terms of promising democratic progress. Using Dahl’s criteria to measure the current levels of democracy, Algeria falls short and can be classified as a pseudo-democracy, or more specifically, a “delegative” democracy. Centralization of oil and gas wealth facilitates a strong reliance on ruling coalitions rather than popular sovereignty, precluding the ability for the people to meet Dahl’s criteria for controlling the government’s agenda. “Rentier” practices are used, precluding the need for the government to listen to the demands of the people and only consider the interests of those to whom it pays “rent”: the tradeoff is positions in the government for political support. Further, there remains some influence by Algeria’s security apparatus in the bureaucracy, although Bouteflika has tried to mitigate its authority in the Ministry of Defense.
The authority attached to the presidency has become highly exacerbated and coveted, and able to prevent the consolidation of democratic institutions, such as a representative parliament, with the ability to constrain the executive, and fair electoral practices. Algerians do not possess the means to effectively participate or form enlightened opinions about policy options because of restrictions on the parliament and elections. Parliamentary seats are sometimes considered stepping-stones to higher positions in the executive branch. Its “parliamentary power index” is on par with Saudi Arabia’s, a theological monarchy, indicating the parliament’s weakness relative to the executive. Also, the second chamber of the legislature, the Council of the Nation, is indirectly elected and has the ability to prevent bills in the APN from becoming laws, at it basically represents the president’s interests. Significantly, opposition parties of all ideologies have accused the regime of committing fraud and have either boycotted elections, or spoken out about unfair polling practices.

It should be noted, though, that scholarship considering the negative effect of Islam on the growth of democracy does not apply to the case of Algeria. Personal piety is not found to have any effect on Algerians’ preference for democracy (Tessler 2002). Also, Algeria since independence has been governed by a secular nationalist force, the FLN, showing that a lot of allegiance within the population lies in nationalist ideology as opposed to political Islamic ideology. The original Islamist party, the FIS, was willing to work within the confines of the democratic government, and was supported by a majority of the population. While the FIS has since been outlawed, several other moderate Islamist parties exist that are able to secure some seats in the parliament, although not as many as
the nationalist parties (this may be attributed to suspicions of electoral fraud on behalf of the ruling regime).

Additionally, Algeria has developed a diverse political party system that represents secular and moderate religious interests. Nationalist, Islamist, socialist/social democratic, and communist groups are all present. However, the president elevates parties that represent these various interests yet are loyal to the presidency or are government-created as a way to further maintain control over the government. True pluralism is undermined. Also, the political parties are not united in their desire for more democratic consolidation, and sometimes do not offer comprehensive platforms for average Algerians to follow.

“Delegative” democracies can be both enduring and unrepresentative, but they require a second transition to consolidate democratic institutions. Transitioning is typically troublesome because delegative democracies originate from authoritarian regimes, and therefore possess some of those qualities. This transition requires the participation of the people and the ruling elites; given the current privilege of ruling coalitions in the government, Algeria is unlikely to advance to a consolidated democracy. The reliance on oil wealth for revenue has side effects that are bad for democracy, which include an emphasis on the buildup of the security apparatus (“repression effect) and the prevention and exercise of social groups (“group-formation effect”). Acting together, the state was able to physically quash the 2011 protests for more economic provisions, and quell the demands by promising more of these provisions, allocated by oil revenue. Advancing Algeria past the pseudo-democratic state to a consolidated democracy will be postponed indefinitely.
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Curriculum Vita

Allison Gowallis

**Permanent Address**: 108 Cinnamon Tree Drive, Abingdon, Maryland 21009

**Program of Study**: Social Science

**Degree and Date to be Conferred**: Master of Science, May 2013

**Secondary Education**: Bel Air High School, Bel Air, Maryland, 2006

**Collegiate Institutions**:

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<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>B.A. Political Science</td>
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<td>University of Maryland College Park</td>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Graduate Certificate</td>
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<td>in Terrorism Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Towson University</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>M.S. Social Science</td>
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