

Dwight Eisenhower's Leadership During the U-2 Affair

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Abstract

Most assessments of President Eisenhower's foreign policy concentrate on the idea of deterrence as illustrated by the "New Look" policy and the president's relationship with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Instead, this essay examines the most controversial event of his last year in office: the U-2 affair. It demonstrated the inconsistency of his detached and engaged styles of leadership. Eisenhower's approach led to a number of mistakes that cost him an opportunity to achieve his primary foreign policy goal of permanently improving America's relationship with the Soviet Union.

Assessing his presidency during a July 6, 1960 press conference Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed the belief that “my place in history will be decided by historians, and they will probably give consideration to these years and to the war years that they think they deserve, and then they will make a conclusion.”¹ On this point Eisenhower was correct. Despite an average approval rating of sixty-four percent, traditional historians tended to view him as “a good natured bumbler, who lacked the leadership qualities to be an effective president.”² This was expressed in Arthur M. Schlesinger’s 1962 poll of seventy-five experts who ranked Eisenhower as an average president at twenty-second out of the thirty-one men who had held the office. After a series of failed presidencies and with the availability of numerous new documents Eisenhower’s ranking improved to ninth in CSPAN’s 2000 poll of ninety historians and presidential experts.³

Since the early 1980s the “Eisenhower revisionists” have helped redefine how he is viewed. They developed new interpretations of almost every aspect of his presidency including his handling of Soviet-American relations. Eisenhower’s biographer Stephen E. Ambrose concluded that 1960 was the worst year of his administration because of the series of mistakes that Eisenhower made, especially in dealing with the Soviet Union and Cuba, because of his “fetish for secrecy” and misplaced trust in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).⁴ The most important single event of Eisenhower’s second term was the destruction of the U-2 reconnaissance plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers near Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960 because it ended any chance for an arms control agreement between Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the Paris summit two weeks later.

Neither school of Eisenhower historians has thoroughly examined the events of May 1960 in more than twenty years. Despite the contemporary importance of the U-2 incident it has become a lost chapter in Cold War history. A new assessment highlights both the strengths and deficiencies of Eisenhower's presidential leadership. His missteps established the contentious tone of Soviet-American relations that continued into the Kennedy administration.

The U-2 affair was never inevitable. It was the result of indecisiveness on the part of Eisenhower. That a man with such a wealth of experience in foreign policy could make such an egregious series of errors is surprising. He could have halted the reconnaissance program at any time prior to Powers's flight. The choice not to do so was the result of three major factors: (1) his advisors' continued insistence that the intelligence which it returned was too valuable; (2) his personal anti-Communist views; and (3) his inability to deny the CIA's requests.

It was not until after Khrushchev revealed the Soviet capture of Powers that the president began to exert his authority. He took responsibility for the flights because it would have been uncharacteristic of him to do otherwise. The summit's collapse was the result of both sides' refusal to compromise because neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev could afford to appear weak in the eyes of the world or of their domestic constituencies. Although he handled the first week of the controversy poorly, Eisenhower rebounded with determination in the latter part of May 1960. Perhaps he did not improve the condition of Soviet-American relations between 1953 and 1960, but they did not deteriorate much from the beginning of his administration.⁵

Chapter One Eisenhower's Leadership Style

Eisenhower's complicated leadership style played a crucial role in the U-2 affair. Some historians have suggested that he acquired the methods he used throughout his presidency in the military, especially as a part of his service in World War II.⁶ During the war Eisenhower wrote to his son John explaining that "the one quality that can be developed by studious reflection and practice is the leadership of man."⁷ Eisenhower honed his skills by observing Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, who brought Eisenhower to Washington to work in the War Planning Department after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to his biographer, Marshall tested promising officers by giving them a task with few instructions and assessing their performance.⁸ This style of leadership, which Eisenhower emulated, "was designed to make subordinates feel that they had a stake in their chief's success."⁹ The ideas that Eisenhower acquired while working with Marshall were important to the organization and operation of his presidency. In his memoirs Eisenhower described his own policy of delegation. He said that

although no staff council or cabinet attempted to make decisions for me, yet every subordinate was always expected within his own area of delegated authority, and within limits as established policy, to solve his own problems. Upon this I insisted; whenever I had to make a decision that properly belonged to a subordinate I admonished him once, but if he failed again it was time to begin looking for a replacement. This was a maxim of General George Marshall.¹⁰

By adopting Marshall's method Eisenhower was able to maintain greater control over government policy.

Beyond Eisenhower's penchant for delegation of authority, he also implemented Marshall's use of opposing viewpoints. Andrew Goodpaster, who

served as Eisenhower's staff secretary and defense liaison after 1954, explained that the president would attempt to discuss a situation with his senior staff and specialists to develop an area of common interest. This technique helped him define the positions that the administration would take. Goodpaster describes a man who "had great confidence in his powers of organizing, of delegating, of assuring that the people to whom these things were delegated did indeed work to carry out policies – policies that were set in broad guidelines, and were set after thorough deliberation and with his approval."¹¹ This policy of "selective delegation" is one of the six strategies of Eisenhower's leadership that Fred Greenstein described.¹²

Despite the system of delegation the final decisions always rested with the president. He said that whether the head of government "is weak or strong, thoughtful or impulsive, knowledgeable or ignorant, his is the basic responsibility and he must give the final word on every major question and that word must be respected."¹³ The failure of this method of delegation and decision making caused the majority of Eisenhower's problems during the U-2 affair. He allowed certain subordinates too much autonomy and it resulted in the downing of the reconnaissance flight and the collapse of the Paris summit.

Chapter Two The U-2 Before May 1960 and Trouble with the CIA

The U-2 affair was the climax of a long-established pattern in Eisenhower's foreign policy. His distrust of communists was at the heart of it all. Eisenhower expressed this view in his diary in 1949. He described meetings during World War II with President Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal who articulated the belief that the Soviets hated the United States and were out to destroy its form of

government. Eisenhower acknowledged his agreement with Forrestal's assessment that "the free world is under threat by the monolithic mass of communist imperialism."¹⁴ According to H.W. Brands, Eisenhower "could never quite free himself from his belief that the conflict with communism was the only one that mattered."¹⁵

The anti-communist sentiment expressed by Eisenhower helped establish the framework for the administration's policies on covert operations (covert ops). As Supreme Allied Commander during the war Eisenhower had come to realize the usefulness of such initiatives.¹⁶ He adopted a similar strategy during his earliest days as president through National Security Council (NSC) directives. In March 1954 the CIA acquired control of covert ops with the goal of attacking communism in hopes of discrediting and reducing the strength of its ideology particularly through the development of underground resistance and facilitating covert and guerrilla operations.¹⁷

As presented to the NSC in February 1955 the Killian Report, which was the result of a committee's examination of the United States' preparations for possible surprise missile attacks by the Soviet Union, called for increasing intelligence capacity to determine enemy intentions. It also suggested increasing retaliatory power and strengthening the country's defenses along with exploring the impacts of technology on manpower needs.¹⁸ Each of these ideas played a role in Eisenhower's approval of the U-2 project with the impression that the plane could fill intelligence gaps, expand his penchant for covert ops and provide a check on the moves of communist countries, especially the Soviet Union.

The U-2 project came to the president's attention in late November 1954 at a meeting with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott, CIA director Allen Dulles, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (JCS) Admiral Arthur Radford, Secretary of the Air Force General Nathan Twining, CIA deputy director Charles Cabell, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt and Staff Secretary Goodpaster. Eisenhower authorized the creation of thirty "special high performance aircraft" for \$35 million. Secretary Dulles believed some difficulties might arise but that "we could live through them."¹⁹ Stephen Ambrose observed that Eisenhower's immediate approval of the program was unusual.²⁰ Based on his penchant for covert ops and the number of high level advisors that favored funding the creation of the U-2, the president's approval of the project was a foregone conclusion. The trust he placed in his advisors' opinions would eventually prove to be detrimental to the program and his peace initiatives.

Although the administration initiated the U-2 program Eisenhower was simultaneously committed to reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. During his military career the president observed the dangers of modern warfare first-hand. He hoped to avoid future hostilities by negotiating an arms control agreement with the world's other superpower. This quickly became Eisenhower's top foreign policy goal.

The Geneva summit of 1955 marked the president's first chance to advance his diplomatic agenda. In the meetings with leaders of the British, French and Soviet governments Eisenhower proposed his Open Skies plan. He hoped to institute a

program of mutual surveillance flights over the United States and the Soviet Union to assure both governments that neither side would initiate a surprise attack. Throughout the presentation Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin did not object to the possibility. Instead, he endorsed further study of the idea. This position angered Khrushchev who confronted Eisenhower during the informal cocktail hour and explained that he believed that president's plan "amounts to legalized espionage" and that the United States was trying to make fools of the Soviets.²¹

Eisenhower later explained that the decision to propose the Open Skies program occurred after a discussion with Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford and Nelson Rockefeller, who served as an advisor to Eisenhower at the conference. Despite knowing that the Soviets would reject the proposal Eisenhower made it in an effort to encourage more openness between the two societies.²² It has been described as "a flawed but sincere attempt by Eisenhower to reduce international tensions."²³ The U-2 flights were initiated in hopes of gathering more intelligence on the Soviets after Geneva.²⁴

The system put in place for the approval of individual U-2 flights showed Eisenhower's need to maintain control over the situation, but it also prepared him for the failure on May Day 1960. By allowing the CIA to plan and execute the surveillance missions the president failed to create avenues to check the agency's power and influence. In an effort to remedy this problem Eisenhower personally approved each mission after the Soviets protested the plane's initial invasions of the country's airspace in July 1956.²⁵ Eisenhower depended on Allen Dulles's men to

provide him with accurate information that would allow him to make informed decisions.

Before each mission the President met with the Dulles brothers, the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the JCS, Richard Bissell and Cabell from the CIA and Goodpaster. A plan would be presented which explained where the flight would occur, why it was necessary and when the weather would be able to support it. The president would often ask questions and make adjustments to the proposal. After some consideration he would approve a period of time during which the flight could take place.²⁶ At these meetings informal notes were kept but no word-for-word summaries of the discussions were recorded.²⁷ The only people within the White House who knew about this highly sensitive project before the May Day incident were the president, Goodpaster, Gordon Gray, who served as Eisenhower's advisor for national security affairs, and John Eisenhower, who began working as Goodpaster's aide in 1958.²⁸

By limiting the number of advisors involved in the decision-making process Eisenhower was setting himself up for eventual failure. He relied too heavily on the opinions of CIA agents who devised the objectives and a few close aides he trusted to provide objective analyses of the plans. Neither group approached these meetings impartially. Eisenhower should have permitted the NSC or a group of experts to discuss each mission's shortcomings and possible political ramifications before he approved it. He was dissuaded from doing this by his own self confidence.

Questions emerged about what Eisenhower considered when he had to approve a particular flight. Bissell believed that he was primarily influenced by the

“time dependent circumstances” such as diplomatic protests over previous flights rather than the plans themselves. Goodpaster provided the most decisive answer. He explained that the president weighed the importance of the information that might be gathered and how it would affect the administration’s plans along with the pressures of other groups who were trying to increase military programs. According to Goodpaster “of all the people in the room he [Eisenhower] had the greatest sense of what turmoil and turbulence was likely to be if we ever lost one of these.”²⁹ Because of the relationships he had developed with many European leaders as Supreme Allied Commander and the head of all NATO forces on the continent Eisenhower believed he knew how they would react to a plane’s destruction.

Eisenhower’s personal indifference caused him to make the most critical error of the entire U-2 program when he failed to stop the flights after he began to question their usefulness. This was the result of the previously mentioned advisory system and the president’s respect for the men it included. As early as November 1956 he began questioning the viability of continuing the U-2 flights and decided to halt them after meeting with Secretary Dulles regarding Russian protests on December 18.³⁰ The program was reinvigorated by mid-1958 when Bissell submitted a recommendation which was supported by Secretary Dulles and General Twining, who had taken over the chairmanship of the JCS from Admiral Radford in 1957, for one or two flights over the Far East. On August 20 a U-2 flew over China.³¹ During meetings with some of his top advisors Eisenhower described the decision to use the U-2 as unduly provocative and “one of the most soul searching questions to come before a president.”³² Eisenhower approved flights throughout 1959 based on continuing

recommendations from Secretary of State Christian Herter, who had replaced John Foster Dulles after his death, CIA director Allen Dulles and others.³³ According to Milton Eisenhower it was these people who pushed for the program's continuation and "the president's view was somewhat ambivalent at the time" causing him not to object.³⁴

As preparations for the Paris summit intensified Eisenhower became increasingly uneasy about continuing the flights. By February 1960 his primary concern was the maintenance of his reputation for honesty and the damage that might be done to it if a plane was lost.³⁵ During his years in public service Eisenhower's credibility was built on his positive attitude and the trust of the American people and world leaders. He relied on these perceptions to gain support for his initiatives. If they discovered that he was conducting a series of covert ops certain groups might withdraw their support. Eisenhower was particularly worried that Third World countries might switch their allegiance from the American to the Soviet bloc. Despite the president's apprehensions fifty-one flights occurred over the Soviet bloc, China and Southeast Asia between June 1956 and May 1960 including twenty-six over Russia.³⁶

There was an institutional, as well as personal, reason for Eisenhower's failure to stop the U-2 flights: his unwillingness to limit the power of the CIA. Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. was critical of his lack of attention to this issue explaining that "by nourishing and cherishing the CIA more than any president before Reagan had done, Eisenhower released a dangerous virus in American society and life."³⁷ While Schlesinger clearly exaggerated in describing the CIA as a "dangerous virus,"

he pointed out a missing link in the analysis of the U-2 affair, one that only Michael Beschloss has explained. According to Beschloss, the president was wary of the CIA because he realized “that the benefits of covert action – speed, flexibility, no need to plead for mass public support – were purchased at a cost of using a decision making process that made mishaps more likely.”³⁸

Eisenhower’s opinion of CIA director Dulles motivated his creation of an oversight apparatus. He once said of Dulles: “I’d rather have him as chief of intelligence than anyone else I can think of. In that business you need a strange kind of genius.”³⁹ Although he respected the director’s ability to interpret data Eisenhower remained wary of Dulles’s aptitude for running the agency. To alleviate his misgivings Eisenhower devised a number of avenues which allowed him to examine the CIA’s actions.

In a secret letter written in July 1954 the president acknowledged former air force general James Doolittle’s willingness to chair a “panel of consultants” which Eisenhower designated to “undertake a comprehensive study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, in particular those carried out under the terms of NSCD #5 of August 28, 1951 and NSC 5412 of March 15, 1954.” He requested that they examine various aspects of the CIA’s handling of covert ops with the goal of making recommendations “calculated to improve the conduct of these operations.” The analysis was to be completed by October 1, 1954, labeled top secret and given to the president who would “determine whether or not the report or any part thereof should have any further dissemination.”⁴⁰

The Doolittle Report was extremely critical of the way in which Allen Dulles ran the agency. In his discussion with the president on October 19 Doolittle suggested that the CIA had “ballooned out into a vast and sprawling organization manned by a large number of people, some of whom were of doubtful competence.” The report recommended completely reorganizing and shrinking the clandestine services section. It said “a small number of competent people can be more useful than a large number of incompetents.” Doolittle also criticized the family relationship between the Secretary of State and the CIA director suggesting that “it leads to protection of one by the other or influence of one by the other.”⁴¹ According to his diary, Eisenhower forwarded the report to Allen Dulles on October 22, 1954 with instructions not to disseminate it but to provide his thoughts on its conclusions and recommendation.⁴²

Eisenhower established the 5412 Committee to further scrutinize the CIA. In March 1955 NSC paper 5412/1 created a team known as the “Special Group.” Gordon Gray acted as its chairman. The panel’s other members included the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the Director of Central Intelligence. The committee’s job was to examine any plans for covert ops and approve them before the CIA acted.⁴³

In 1956 Eisenhower supplemented his oversight capabilities by creating the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. This group evolved from a recommendation made by the Hoover Commission which had formed a task force to examine the agency’s organization and methods of operation.⁴⁴ Eisenhower met with the Board’s members to enumerate its goals of examining the intelligence effort of the United States, making sure that the programs were

effectively and economically operated, and to be able to satisfy the president, Congress and the public of the value of U.S. intelligence. They were to report to the president semi-annually or whenever a special matter required his attention.⁴⁵

Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10656 retroactive to January 13, 1956 which officially created the Board to “conduct an objective review” of the CIA’s performance.⁴⁶ It provided the most thorough and long-lasting oversight of the agency of any group formed during the Eisenhower administration.

During a December 1958 meeting with the Board of Consultants Eisenhower expressed his concern about the Soviets’ ability to track the U-2 and whether the intelligence it obtained was worth the risk. They favored continuation of the program.⁴⁷ At the same time, they suggested that the president needed to overhaul the CIA and strip Allen Dulles of his control of covert ops.⁴⁸ According to Goodpaster, when these ideas were discussed with the CIA chief he threatened to resign.⁴⁹

There were other signs that encouraged caution on the continuation of the U-2 program. Tests performed in December 1958 concluded that Soviet fighters could not maintain the U-2’s altitude but within a few months they would be able to.⁵⁰ The report on these tests suggested that the Soviets were closing in on creating effective countermeasures for the spy plane. Continuing to send U-2s over Russian airspace for more than a year and a half after these tests showed a failure by the administration to reexamine their methods of intelligence gathering and implied a level of incompetence by both the president and his advisors.

The U-2 affair intensified Eisenhower’s distrust of Dulles and the agency. He expressed these feelings to some of his top aides. Gray and Goodpaster recalled “the

president's telling them in an unambiguous directive that henceforth *in no circumstances did he ever want to meet with the CIA alone*: so upset was he with the U-2 performance that he wanted to preclude any possibility that the agency would *privately* get his approval for anything (emphasis in the original).⁵¹

Despite his displeasure Eisenhower continued to be a man of inaction when it came to restraining and reforming the CIA. In its final report to the president in January 1961 the Board of Consultants called for a reassessment of covert action because it concluded that the money spent had not accomplished its objectives. Additionally it called for the firing of Allen Dulles.⁵² Whether Eisenhower's action on these numerous warnings about the condition and management of the agency could have prevented the downing of the May Day flight is impossible to determine. However, it is clear that he ignored his own instincts along with the advice of several competent groups in continuing to support the operations into 1960. Stephen Ambrose concluded that two factors allowed Allen Dulles to continue as the director of the CIA: Eisenhower was incapable of exerting his will over the bureaucracy in Washington as he had as Supreme Allied Commander during the war and the president's "high regard for John Foster Dulles undoubtedly play a major role in his retention of Allen Dulles."⁵³

Chapter Three Toward the Paris Summit and the May Day Flight

Historical analyses of the U-2 affair often focus on its impact on the failed summit. The question which is typically asked is why Eisenhower allowed the final flight two weeks prior to the powers convening in Paris. Both Beschloss and Ambrose have cited the role of outside groups influencing the president's decision including

the CIA, the JCS, State Department, Defense Department and scientific advisors.⁵⁴ Although their advice certainly factored into the determination made in April 1960 to permit one more flight there were deeper, more philosophical causes. Even though Eisenhower hoped the peace initiatives would succeed he was still an ardent anti-communist. He believed the president's primary job was to protect the United States through whatever methods he deemed necessary.

At first glance, Eisenhower seemed to be shedding his anti-communist views. In 1959 Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited the United States and hope for significant changes in the relationship between the two governments seemed to follow. Khrushchev expressed this in two communications he had with Eisenhower in November and December. Khrushchev viewed the earlier discussions at Camp David as "the beginning of a definite improvement in relations between our two countries, which, if we make the necessary further effort, will continue to improve in the future." In his New Year's greetings to the president Khrushchev reiterated suggestions that the efforts of 1959 might result in solving "the most important problem of our times – the general and complete disarmament and liberation of mankind from the burden of armament." As late as April 23, 1960, just days before the U-2 was shot down, Khrushchev believed the Paris meetings would "constitute a new and important contribution to the cause of improving the international situation and further strengthening relations between our two countries."⁵⁵

While the Soviet leader continued to express an optimistic outlook toward the upcoming talks, members of the American State Department were more pessimistic about the possibilities. During his testimony before the Foreign Relation Committee

in March 1960 Secretary of State Herter said that the most that could be expected from the Paris conference would be a continuation of the foreign ministers disarmament talks. He suggested that despite their talk the goal of international communists remained world enslavement.⁵⁶ Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon followed his boss's lead in a statement on April 20. He said that

Soviet power and determination to expand Communist influence throughout the world pose grave and continuing threats to peace. Despite constant talk of peaceful coexistence there is no evidence that Communist expansionist ambitions have altered in the slightest.

Dillon believed that Soviet diplomatic efforts were a tactic and that it was imperative for the United States to maintain its military strength to check the Soviets' capacity to unleash nuclear war.⁵⁷

These statements clearly reflected the beliefs of Eisenhower himself toward negotiations with the Soviets. Although he would not express it publicly at the time the president thought that

there's no possible way of winning in negotiations against a man or people of the attitudes and deportments of the Soviets, unless you show them every minute that you're ready to back up your convictions, your principles with force - - if you're compelled to do it.⁵⁸

Besides his general trepidation about negotiating with the Soviets, Eisenhower had a negative impression of Khrushchev. He described the premier as ruthless, shrewd, tough and coldly deliberate.⁵⁹ The president's concern must have increased because of the way the summit was arranged. According to John Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan committed the president to the meeting without his knowledge.⁶⁰ In several cables to Macmillan Eisenhower expressed his apprehension explaining that "a summit meeting based on nothing more than wishful thinking

would be a disaster. The world would interpret such a move as being a virtual surrender, while Soviet prestige would be enhanced.”⁶¹ He could not afford to display weakness in a conflict like the Cold War that was dominated by other countries’ perception of the opposing superpowers.

The assertions of Herter and Dillon influenced the Soviet outlook for the conference. In an April 25 speech at Baku, Khrushchev “betrayed a growing ambivalence toward the approaching summit” by accusing U.S. officials of obstructionism. However, he suggested that some American leaders, particularly the president, understood the need to relieve international tensions and announced his belief that relations between the East and West would be better in the meeting’s aftermath and his hope that they could take the first steps toward ending nuclear testing. The State Department interpreted Khrushchev’s remarks as blaming the Americans in advance for a failed summit and considered these views “pessimistic.”⁶²

The May Day flight occurred just as tensions on both sides were reaching their peak. It followed an April 9 flight which photographed both missile test sites and industrial areas near Semipalatinsk, Lake Balkhash and Tyura-Tam before crossing the Soviet border with Turkmenistan and landing in Iran.⁶³ The memorandum written by Goodpaster on April 25 indicated that “after checking with the President I informed Mr. Bissell that one additional operation may be undertaken, provided it is carried out *prior to May 1. No operation is to be carried out after May 1* (emphasis added).”⁶⁴ The dispute hinges on the CIA’s interpretation of this order allowing them to extend the deadline for the flight. In his memoirs Richard Bissell defended his choice of days based on Goodpaster’s approval notice. He said it

did not specifically authorize us to undertake a flight on May 1; it authorized us to fly a single mission anytime through May 1. It looks to have been a grave mistake to have given us the general authority to fly so close to the summit, but the decision was an explicit one on Eisenhower's part.

According to Bissell, the Eisenhower administration was too confident about the success of earlier U-2 flights because the Soviets were unable to shoot the planes down.⁶⁵ As he said, the Goodpaster memo did leave that final date open for a possible flight. However, it seems unlikely that Eisenhower expected it to occur at that point. If the White House wanted to be certain the flight took place before the beginning of May 1960 Goodpaster should not have included the final sentence prohibiting one *after* May 1.⁶⁶

The factors which led Eisenhower to make the fateful decision to authorize a final flight can never be determined with complete certainty, but he had established a pattern of being unable to refuse the CIA's requests and he obviously did not perceive any serious danger of losing the plane despite his own misgivings about the continuation of the program. Of equal importance to Eisenhower's unwillingness to prohibit the May Day flight was his slow reaction to the news that the plane was lost somewhere inside Soviet territory. Although the president was immediately informed of the situation by Goodpaster, he allowed the administration to issue a planned cover story before the details of the crash could be fully investigated. Ambrose attributes this inaction to a personal "fetish" about keeping the project a secret.⁶⁷

If President Eisenhower's inability to limit the power of the CIA and his penchant for allowing his advisors' recommendations to dictate his actions instead of listening to his instincts were the errors that led to the downing of the U-2 the most egregious mistake that occurred during the entire affair was the issuance of a cover

story. In a Cabinet meeting on May 26 he admitted that the administration should have waited before issuing it and that it was based on some mistaken assumptions.⁶⁸ Eisenhower would later write in his memoirs that “allowing myself to be persuaded on this score is my principal personal regret – except for the U-2 failure itself – regarding the whole affair. But our position was not helped by those who chose to carp and view with alarm when the moment called for national calm and perspective.”⁶⁹ Beschloss correctly pointed out that the president suffered from the same “ad hoc” system he had established to run the program.⁷⁰

On the morning of May 1, 1960 Francis Gary Powers took off from the American base in Peshawar, Pakistan. His mission was to fly almost 3,800 miles across the Soviet Union taking pictures of several ballistic missile test sites before landing at an airfield in Bodo, Norway. As he traversed the Ural Mountains a Soviet missile nearly destroyed Powers’s U-2 and caused it to crash near Sverdlovsk. He was captured by Russian farmers and turned over to Soviet intelligence officers who eventually transported him to Moscow.⁷¹

Once the prearranged response to the plane’s destruction proved futile Eisenhower adopted a more hands-on approach to the situation. After Khrushchev revealed the extent of the Soviets’ knowledge of the reconnaissance program Eisenhower was determined to take personal responsibility for his administration’s mistakes. Throughout the rest of the crisis he remained personally involved in each step of the decision-making process. This mind-set directly contradicted his previous stance.

Chapter Four Cover Story

Like many of the factors that helped instigate the U-2 affair the creation of a cover story was part of a long-established pattern that Eisenhower neglected to change until it was too late but this one was by far the most costly. Beginning with the 1954 ouster of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman the CIA instituted cover stories as a standard operating procedure in all cases where their actions might eventually be discovered.⁷² This policy was adopted for the U-2 program from its inception and was based on Allen Dulles's personal assurances to the president that no one would ever be taken alive if one of the planes went down in hostile territory.⁷³ Later some of the most experienced CIA agents expressed severe criticism of this plan. Lyman Kirkpatrick, a veteran of two decades service in U.S. intelligence which included working as the agency's inspector general and executive director as well as Dulles's assistant at meetings of the Board of Consultants, believed that it was poorly considered because they had not accounted for the difficulty of destroying the film canister that could easily be found by any Soviets carefully searching the plane's wreckage.⁷⁴

A memo bearing the date of May 2, 1960 established the cover story explaining that a U-2 aircraft was on a weather mission originating in Adana, Turkey for the purpose of studying air turbulence. During the flight over Southeastern Turkey the pilot had reported problems with his oxygen system. When it did not land at Adana as planned a search was initiated of the Lake Van area.⁷⁵ This memo is a dubious source because the date is written in pencil and it is unsigned. It was probably written by either the CIA or the State Department.

The trouble began when different versions of the statement came from NASA and the State Department on May 5. The State Department's announcement suggested that because of the oxygen failure the pilot might have lost consciousness and the plane might have "accidentally violated Soviet airspace." A short time later NASA's press release followed the pre-planned story because they had not received orders countering it.⁷⁶ This version was featured on the front page of the *New York Times*.⁷⁷ The conflicting reports could have been averted if the State Department and NASA had communicated with each other. The State Department failed to notify NASA's spokesman and the administration's reaction appeared disorganized as a result.

Khrushchev made two speeches that radically changed the administration's approach to the situation. On May 5 he reported to the Supreme Soviet on "aggressive acts directed in the last few weeks by the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union." Khrushchev suggested that "imperialist forces" within the United States were trying to undermine the summit.⁷⁸ The State Department responded to Khrushchev's first statement with another declaration. They explained that U-2s were used to analyze the possible danger of a surprise attack by the Soviets. According to this account no one in Washington had given permission for this particular flight.⁷⁹

In an address on May 7 Khrushchev further impugned the integrity of the United States government with the revelation that the Soviets were holding Powers, who was providing the details of the U-2 program and the May Day flight to his captors.⁸⁰ Khrushchev had proved to the world that the statements made by the State Department and NASA were lies and brought into question Eisenhower's awareness of actions taken by his administration. The president had been warned of the capture

of Powers by the State Department which had learned of it via a Soviet diplomat at an Ethiopian reception on May 5, but Khrushchev's announcement of Powers's detention forced the president to make decisions that he never expected to face regarding his responsibility and how to proceed with summit preparations.⁸¹ In his memoirs Eisenhower admitted that he wanted to await Khrushchev's reaction before any press releases were delivered but he was advised to act.⁸² Once again Eisenhower showed an inability to ignore the advice of his top aides. Only after Khrushchev's speech on May 7 did Eisenhower begin to follow his own instincts. His detachment cost the president any hope of success at the Paris summit in achieving his top foreign policy goal of permanently improving relations with the Soviet Union.

Questions immediately developed about who authorized the cover story. This point was never fully settled. Milton Eisenhower, the president's brother and confidant, later suggested that it was issued automatically without the president's knowledge or approval.⁸³ Other documentation contradicts this interpretation. According to a State Department memo, which provided a chronological account of the events surrounding the incident, there was a meeting between members of the CIA, the Department of Defense, and Hugh Cummings of the State Department on May 1 where the decision was made to issue the NASA cover story with the approval of both Acting Secretary of State Dillon and Goodpaster. Since Goodpaster's acquiescence was required before the plan was implemented Eisenhower must have agreed to it. During a May 5 State Department-CIA meeting the State Department's release was drawn up in consultation with CIA director Dulles and Goodpaster. On the same day a meeting involving the president, Dulles, Dillon and Goodpaster

concluded that the president should not become involved with these statements.⁸⁴

Throughout the entire process the president knew exactly what the releases would say and he approved them through his intermediary.

Chapter Five Taking Responsibility

It is clear that Eisenhower was under a great deal of stress because of the problems with the U-2. Ann Whitman, his personal secretary, wrote that he expressed a desire to resign over the trouble on May 9, but he recovered his composure later that day.⁸⁵ Perhaps the calming effect was due to Eisenhower's determination to begin exerting his authority that day at the weekly NSC meeting. After examining the State Department's latest press statement which was scheduled to be released that afternoon the president revised it so it was "less defensive in tone." The NSC members were ordered to make no statements regarding the U-2 leaving any future speeches to the State Department. Regarding the summit, the President labeled it as "not a Sunday school picnic."⁸⁶

Secretary Herter exploited the opportunity that afternoon to explain the reasoning behind the U-2 program. The development of modern weapons by the Soviets created concern over surprise attacks which were enhanced by their rhetoric. On a number of occasions during the 1950s the Soviet Union threatened to use their ballistic missiles to interfere with United States foreign policy. The most well-known example occurred during the Formosa Straits crises of 1954 and 1958 when the Communist Chinese bombed their nationalist adversaries on the island of Taiwan. When Eisenhower announced plans to intervene on the side of the nationalists Khrushchev promised the Soviets would retaliate by launching their own missiles.

According to Herter's May 9 statement, after the rejection of his Open Skies proposal in 1955 Eisenhower issued directives to use all available means to gather intelligence because the administration believed it was their duty to maintain vigilance over Soviet programs. Herter made it clear that the recent incident should emphasize the importance of safeguards against possible Soviet aggressiveness. However, he continued to maintain the facade that "specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to presidential authorization."⁸⁷ The *New York Times* pointed out that Herter admitted that it was a mistake to allow the flight so close to the summit.⁸⁸

Eisenhower addressed the situation publicly for the first time on May 11. He reiterated Herter's explanation of the need for intelligence gathering and emphasized that the use of covert ops was a "distasteful but vital necessity." Eisenhower reassured the press that he did not believe the outlook for the summit had significantly changed as a result of the U-2 incident explaining that the real issues were still the condition of Germany, improving East-West relations and reducing the level of secrecy between the "open" and "closed" societies.⁸⁹ According to the *New York Times* report of the press conference the president "said he *assumed personal responsibility* (emphasis added) for the directives since the beginning of his administration on the gathering of information necessary to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense."⁹⁰ Although those were not Eisenhower's exact words, the reporter's interpretation became the accepted view of the event. Eisenhower had set in motion the destruction of the Paris summit.

Eisenhower's assumption of responsibility became one of the most controversial parts of the U-2 incident. The president's former aide and speechwriter Emmett John Hughes believed that Eisenhower had "automatically disqualified him as a statesman with whom Khrushchev could negotiate whether or not he wished to do so."⁹¹ One of the critics of Eisenhower's handling of the situation was the long-time columnist for the *New York Times* James Reston. Reston said that the president had "minimized" opportunities for the Republicans to describe themselves as the peace party in the November elections and that "there is still just a chance to save things at Paris but not if the president continues on his present theme." By "demanding the *right* to intrude into the Soviet Union the president has defied Khrushchev to stop him" and "put Khrushchev on the spot with the Stalinists who have always been against détente."⁹² Lyman Kirkpatrick, the veteran intelligence agent, wrote that Eisenhower's actions had "caused Khrushchev to lose face and take drastic action."⁹³

The president's defenders pointed out that it was against his character to shirk responsibility in similar situations. John Eisenhower said that his father "instinctively would rather take the responsibility for making an error in judgment than be accused of not knowing what was going on in his administration."⁹⁴ Milton Eisenhower explained that the president knew that if anyone else took the blame he would have to fire them and he refused to do that.⁹⁵ According to James Killian, Eisenhower's science and technology advisor, his actions were "an example of his integrity and courage."⁹⁶

Milton and John Eisenhower seem more accurate on this assessment.

Eisenhower had prepared a similar statement as the Supreme Commander during World War II. As the Allies began the D-Day invasion he wrote a press release in case it failed explaining that “my decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”⁹⁷ This established Eisenhower’s willingness to step up and accept responsibility for events under his oversight. Regardless of the exact reason why Eisenhower made the decision during the U-2 crisis it represented a shift in his approach to the whole affair. He followed his instincts and stopped allowing his subordinates to dictate the course of action. The alteration would prove costly.

Chapter Six Preparation for Paris

In the aftermath of the reconnaissance plane’s destruction Eisenhower continued to prepare for the trip to Paris. Although he dismissed the plane’s importance to the summit, Eisenhower’s advisors believed Khrushchev would use it to manipulate the situation. In a meeting with the president on May 12 Vice President Richard Nixon explained that Khrushchev would force the issue and that the president ought to maintain ambiguity, but Eisenhower said he might allow the Soviet leader to talk as much as he wanted and suggest a private meeting between the two.⁹⁸

The Soviet protest on the U-2 provided a precursor to the hard-line view that Khrushchev would pursue at the conference. It called the intrusion a “flagrant violation of Soviet state boundaries” and said that the State Department’s press releases had admitted the aggression. They accused the United States of trying to

return to an earlier age of the Cold War in Soviet-American relations.⁹⁹ The U.S. response continued to justify the flights as defensive and claimed that the government intended to be fully engaged in Paris.¹⁰⁰

During his trip to Gorky Park to view the “U-2 wreckage” on May 11 Khrushchev held an impromptu news conference where he appeared to adopt a moderate view of events. He said the United States “have now probed us and we boxed the nose of the probers” and suggested that Eisenhower was merely the instrument of Allen Dulles in the incident because he had developed the U-2 scenario. Khrushchev suggested that the summit was not the correct forum in which to discuss the plane’s destruction and assured the press that he would not bring it up at that time, however, he remained non-committal about Eisenhower’s planned visit to the Soviet Union.¹⁰¹

After the Soviet leader’s statements, the U.S. intelligence community remained convinced of his commitment to the summit. The CIA believed that the Soviet premier would not attempt to exploit the incident because it would endanger his other priorities such as Berlin, disarmament and beginning negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty.¹⁰² In its intelligence briefing the agency concluded that the prospects for the conference’s success were not altered significantly by the plane’s destruction.

The advisor most capable of diagnosing Khrushchev’s state of mind was probably U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson who had served in that position since 1957. In a May 7 telegram to Secretary Herter he had expressed the opinion that Khrushchev thought revealing the downing of the U-2 would put him

in an advantageous position at the summit.¹⁰³ Before the American delegation left for Paris he told Herter that the Soviet leader would use the summit for propaganda rather than negotiation because Khrushchev realized that the Soviets would not achieve his goals regarding Berlin.¹⁰⁴ Throughout his time in Paris Thompson discussed his views with *New York Times*' foreign correspondent C.L. Sulzberger. Prior to the meeting's beginning Thompson prophesized that Khrushchev would escalate the Cold War again with sharp language which Eisenhower and French President Charles De Gaulle would not tolerate leading to the breakup of the summit.¹⁰⁵ Eisenhower was aware of most of his various advisory groups' observations prior to his arrival in Paris and he acted to keep as many avenues as possible open for the conference's success.

To minimize tensions at the conference Eisenhower decided to halt any future U-2 flights. He discussed the plan with Herter and Goodpaster following the Cabinet meeting on May 12 citing their provocative nature. Later, Eisenhower explained that he made the decision because of the plane's unreliability and the advances that were being made in satellite photographic technology.¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately the Administration did not notify the Soviets of this decision until the morning of the summit meeting which allowed Khrushchev to establish a stance from which he could not retreat.

Chapter Seven Summit Failure

Between his arrival in France and the end of May 1960 Eisenhower provided a great deal of leadership by maintaining a calm demeanor and thinking carefully before acting on any impulses. The president offered a realistic view of the summit's chances in the speech he delivered upon landing in Paris. He explained that

the issues that divide the free world from the Soviet bloc are grave and not subject to easy solution. But if goodwill exists on both sides, at least a beginning can be made. The West, I am sure, will meet Mr. Khrushchev half way in every honest effort in this direction. America will go every foot that safety and honor permit.¹⁰⁷

Following the belief that he expressed to his advisors that the U-2 was a “dead issue” Eisenhower did not mention it during his statement.

At a meeting on the morning of May 15 with Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates and Secretary Herter Eisenhower broached the idea of bilateral discussions with Khrushchev about the U-2. Herter informed the president that the State Department was examining new Soviet proposals.¹⁰⁸ Eisenhower received a memo on the Soviets’ position regarding Berlin. They were seeking a temporary, one to two year, treaty with Berlin, reductions of Western troops, preparation for it to become a “free city,” a plan that would turn West Berlin into a demilitarized zone without ties to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact powers, a prohibition against using the city for “subversive activity” or “hostile propaganda” and maintaining the present levels of access by both sides.¹⁰⁹ The Soviets made it clear that they expected major western concessions on the issue. However, by the end of the day the whole conference would change because of a declaration that Khrushchev handed the French president.

In the message the Soviets used the most inflammatory language employed to that point in the dispute. They said the reconnaissance flight program had “brutally trampled underfoot the generally accepted norms of international law and the noble principles of the Charter of the United Nations which bears, among others, the signature of the United States of America.” Khrushchev explained that the Soviet government could not negotiate with a government that maintained an espionage

policy. In order to bring the Soviets to the conference table the United States had to denounce the U-2 flights, prohibit the continuation of the policy and ensure punishment of the people responsible.¹¹⁰

It seems impossible to believe that Khrushchev did not realize he was dooming the summit when he issued this message. He defended the position in his memoirs explaining that the U-2 was a “time bomb” that had already predetermined the outcome of the conference because it tested Soviet prestige.¹¹¹ The more likely reason for this dramatic shift is that Eisenhower’s actions in taking responsibility for the flights served as a personal affront to Khrushchev and that he felt what Soviet historian Adam Ulam described as “considerable personal vindictiveness toward the President.”¹¹² This radical change in the Soviet outlook on the summit led Eisenhower to react with measured hostility.

After De Gaulle informed him of the meeting with Khrushchev, Eisenhower attended two conferences on the evening of May 15 to determine the United States’ course of action. During the discussion with Secretary Herter, Ambassador Thompson and former ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles Bohlen Eisenhower pointed out that the practice of espionage had been carried on throughout history and “it is up to the affronted country to defeat spies attempting to operate against them.” Eisenhower deemed Khrushchev’s demand that he denounce the practice unacceptable. They also discussed the possibility of the president’s making a statement regarding the administration’s decision to discontinue the overflights.¹¹³

When he met with Macmillan and De Gaulle later that evening Eisenhower told them he would be willing to acknowledge that “spying was illegal, distasteful

and wrong” if all four government leaders agreed on such a statement. However, he refused to pledge that he would not use such methods to protect the American people. He also expressed his readiness to halt U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. From his perspective Khrushchev’s message was designed as a piece of propaganda.¹¹⁴

The end of that day must have brought a great sense of frustration to Eisenhower. It was clear that he could not give Khrushchev the apology he sought without appearing weak to the majority of the world’s population. That would provide the Soviet leader with more than a piece of propaganda; it would give him an advantage in any future negotiations between the two men. He knew that the summit was likely to collapse leaving his top foreign policy goal of improving Soviet-American relations unfulfilled. In a final attempt to salvage the situation Eisenhower was extensively involved in the preparation of his opening statement for the May 16 summit session. He was determined to make sure Khrushchev understood that there would be no more overflights during his administration and that he was open to bilateral discussions.¹¹⁵

When the government leaders convened the next morning the conference collapsed after Khrushchev’s speech. He said that the United States’ espionage policy had resulted in the heightening of tensions and “it is clear that the declaration of such a policy, which can be pursued only when states are in a state of war, dooms the summit conference to complete failure in advance.” The demands suggested by Khrushchev’s communication of the previous day were made official along with a warning that “in the event of a repeated intrusion by American aircraft into the Soviet Union we shall shoot these planes down.”¹¹⁶

Eisenhower's ability to control his temper was his greatest moment of leadership throughout the crisis. Vernon Walters, the president's translator, later revealed that throughout Khrushchev's tirade Eisenhower's

face and neck were flushed and I could tell that he was extremely angry. I worked very closely with General Eisenhower for a number of years, yet I had never seen an outburst of temper from him. However, long experience had taught me the signs of anger on his part and they were all present here.¹¹⁷

Rather than exploding in anger he reiterated the justifications stated during his May 11 press conference and offered to open bilateral talks with the Soviets while the main conference continued. Finally, he attempted to assure the Soviet leader that "my words regarding suspension of flights meant not merely for the duration of the conference but for the entire duration of my office."¹¹⁸

The summit ended after only three hours of discussion. Despite British and French efforts at reconciliation the Soviet and American delegations refused to reconvene. Khrushchev later expressed "pride that we gave a rebuff then to the most powerful country in the world which refused to take the opinions of other countries into account." He also believed that Eisenhower wanted to issue the apology he demanded but was dissuaded by Secretary Herter proving that he did not control American foreign policy.¹¹⁹

After the meeting Eisenhower returned to the American embassy and met with his entire advisory staff. He described Khrushchev's demands as "completely intransigent and insulting to the United States" and concluded that they were "wholly unacceptable."¹²⁰ At the president's request Bohlen drafted a statement which Eisenhower delivered later that day condemning Khrushchev's behavior. Eisenhower concluded that the Soviet leader "came all the way from Moscow to Paris with the

sole intention of sabotaging this meeting on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested.”¹²¹

Several members of the Eisenhower administration and later analysts blamed Khrushchev for the conference’s failure. According to their interpretations Khrushchev was motivated by pressure from a number of different sources. Secretary Herter and former ambassador Bohlen suggested the Soviet premier was engaged in a fight for control of the communist world with Mao Zedong, the Chinese communist leader. In Paris Khrushchev reestablished a strong anti-imperialist stance to maintain his position as the dominate figure.¹²²

In his memoir Bohlen adopted a different explanation for Khrushchev’s actions during the summit. He believed that when the Soviets realized the western powers would not concede to their demand that control of Berlin be returned to the East German government they were determined to undermine the peace initiatives. Sergei Khrushchev added credence to this argument when he pointed out that the Camp David meeting between his father and Eisenhower had reduced the importance of the Berlin issue, but the U-2 incident reinvigorated the Soviets’ determination to achieve their goal.¹²³

Ambassador Thompson initially voiced the third theory of what motivated Khrushchev. He told C.L. Sulzberger that Khrushchev bowed to pressure from the Soviet military establishment. In 1969 Khrushchev told Dr. A. McGee Harvey, an American who was treating his daughter Yulia, that after Powers’s flight “I was no longer in full control. Those who felt that America had imperialist intentions and that military strength was the most important thing had the evidence they needed, and

when the U-2 incident occurred I no longer had the ability to overcome that feeling.”¹²⁴

The Eisenhower administration overlooked the most obvious reason for Khrushchev to torpedo the summit: he had been humiliated by the U-2 program since its inception. Khrushchev believed the July 1956 flights were an insult to national pride. Over the next four years he was disgraced by each flight over the Soviet Union. These feelings caused Khrushchev to manipulate the American government by withholding the news of Powers’s capture.

Before the summit convened, Khrushchev considered Eisenhower’s plan to abandon the conference for a trip to Portugal after only a week as another sign of disrespect. He did not understand why the president would leave a meeting with the world’s other superpower to visit a minor European ally. Eisenhower planned to place Vice President Nixon in charge of the American delegation. Khrushchev believed this was another personal insult because the leader of the Soviet Union would have to deal with the American president’s subordinate. He had also developed an antagonistic relationship with Nixon during the vice president’s trip to Moscow in 1959. These personal and national offences also caused Khrushchev to withdraw the invitation for Eisenhower’s planned trip to the Soviet Union.¹²⁵

The other significant debate to emerge from the failure at Paris was whether it would have succeeded if the U-2 incident had not occurred. Several historians, including Michael Beschloss and Blanche Wiesen Cook, concluded that both sides utilized the plane’s destruction as a pretext to end the talks.¹²⁶ This one incident was

not solely responsible for the conference's cancellation. Both sides' long-standing mistrust of each other was also crucial. In his memoirs Eisenhower explained that

communists embrace every kind of tactic to gain their fundamental objective, the domination of the Earth's people. Whatever may seem to them at any moment to be the most advantageous direction of advance needs no justification. They use force, the threat of force, economic pressure and penetration, deceit, distortion, propaganda, blackmail, bribery and lies to attain their ends, all with the sanction of their doctrine. The fairer their words the more suspect they are.¹²⁷

These beliefs can be attributed to the president's long experience in dealing with the Soviet Union under Stalin and Khrushchev dating back to his service in World War II. Although he honestly hoped for some advances during the summit, it seems unlikely that much could have been achieved with his underlying wariness of the Soviets.

The Soviet delegation also approached the meeting with trepidation. By 1960 Khrushchev had had five years of dealings with Eisenhower and developed his own impressions of the man. During both the Geneva and Paris conferences he expressed the belief that the Secretary of State, not the president, was running American foreign policy. The program of U-2 flights contributed to these feelings of apprehension by causing an erosion of confidence in the United States' willingness to negotiate in good faith. Ulam summed up the Russian perspective by suggesting that they "did not consider President Eisenhower to possess a firm grasp on the realities of the world situation or to be capable of initiating a new, bold line of policy."¹²⁸ With the negative perceptions that each side had of the other the chances for progress at Paris, with or without the U-2 incident, must be classified as remote at best.

Chapter Eight Post-Summit Leadership

Although Eisenhower departed for Lisbon on May 18 his leadership was crucial to the perception of events in America. Upon his return to the United States Eisenhower was besieged by criticism, particularly from the media and his political opponents. Among his harshest detractors was the *Washington Post's* columnist Drew Pearson who believed Eisenhower made numerous errors prior to and during the summit, that in delaying the conference until May 1960 he had “pretty much abdicated the leadership of the Western World to President De Gaulle.” According to Pearson, Eisenhower relied on his personal charm to gain an advantage at the negotiating table. The president did not prepare sufficiently for the meetings. Pearson argued that the administration “heterogeneous and undirected, did not know what it was doing before it went to Paris or after it arrived in Paris – and still doesn’t. In brief, you come to the conclusion that there is no boss.” According to Pearson, the summit’s failure had ended any hopes the Republicans had of winning the upcoming elections.¹²⁹

The Democrats took advantage of the situation to criticize Eisenhower’s handling of the U-2 and the summit. In Lewiston, Idaho Senator John F. Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, suggested that the leadership

appears palsied and sympathy, not respect, is the reluctant sentiment we elicit from our allies – sympathy for the president as a man of goodwill but dismay at the shocking lack in presidential directive as displayed in the U-2 incident. The maintenance of peace and the security of Berlin should not hang on the possibility of engine failure.¹³⁰

Adlai Stevenson supported Kennedy, arguing that “without our series of blunders” Khrushchev could not have made his “impossible and wild charges.” In his opinion

the administration had made negotiations with the Russians impossible until the new president took office.¹³¹ Despite the harsh comments by Kennedy and Stevenson some Democrats believed attacking Eisenhower was unproductive. The congressional hierarchy including Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, both from Texas, attempted to downplay the situation believing it was their patriotic duty to do so.¹³²

Although he was widely attacked by men looking for political gain, Eisenhower's stance in Paris was generally supported by the American people. A large crowd met the president's plane when it touched down at Andrews Air Force Base after his trip to Lisbon. Throughout the summer Eisenhower's approval rating hovered near sixty-six percent.¹³³ These positive reactions reflect the national belief that the president was justified in ordering the U-2 program to protect the country. It might also be a result of the negative perception of communists that had been built into the national mindset since World War II.

Another reason the public approved of Eisenhower's job performance was the leadership he displayed in a national address on May 25 where he discussed the U-2 and the summit. In preparation for the speech he met with Secretary Herter and Goodpaster and expressed determination "to be positive without being truculent and to give an explanation of events without being defensive." Although he wanted to leave the possibility of talks open he had learned from the Korean armistice that negotiations in general must be approached from a position of strength.¹³⁴ Neither side could claim victory in the war but the agreement legitimized the communist

government of North Korea and forced NATO forces to withdraw, thus, the Korean communists achieved a moral triumph.

During the address Eisenhower explained that the flight occurred, with his approval, on May Day because the information it was targeting might not be available later and “when a nation needs intelligence activity there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed.” He reiterated that as commander-in-chief he was responsible for approving programs to gather and evaluate military intelligence. From his perspective, the cover story was issued to protect the pilot, mission and intelligence processes. In conclusion Eisenhower laid out his policies for the future which included maintaining U.S. strength, continued relations with Soviet leaders and improving conditions throughout the world via the United Nations.¹³⁵ In presenting his case directly to the American people the president attempted to counter the accusations of the Democrats and the press that he was unaware of what was happening within the administration.

Eisenhower also employed more subtle means of controlling the political fallout. This occurred through a number of meetings he attended after returning from the summit. After the conference’s failure the Soviets requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss what Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko described as “the question of aggressive acts by the air force of the United States of America against the Soviet Union creating a threat to universal peace.”¹³⁶ U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (U.N.) Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. managed to postpone it until May 26. During his meeting with the president, Lodge suggested emphasizing the suspension of further U-2 flights and American willingness to

negotiate on terms for mutual inspection. Eisenhower explained that his main goal was to defeat the Soviet draft resolution, which attempted to get the Security Council to censure the United States for illegally violating their airspace, through the support of other countries. From Eisenhower's viewpoint the major issue that the situation addressed was the question of open societies.¹³⁷

In his presentation to the U.N. Ambassador Lodge established a hard-line stance against the Soviet position. He said the Soviet Union had "deliberately seized on the U-2 incident, magnifying it out of all proportion and has used it as a pretext to abort the summit meeting to which so many had looked with hope for serious discussion of international problems." Accordingly, Lodge deemed the Soviet resolution to be "without foundation" and he pointed out that it would not solve the situation. He voted against it and the Soviets' effort failed.¹³⁸

In three meetings during the week after he returned from Europe Eisenhower set the administration's agenda for the future and continued to manage the fallout from the events in Paris. The NSC conference on May 24 was entirely devoted to the U-2 and the summit. The president explained that obtaining intelligence was a crucial element of maintaining American strength and its leadership position in the world. He claimed that the Soviets had determined to wreck the conference when Khrushchev delivered his statement to De Gaulle pre-translated into French on May 15. Regarding the upcoming congressional inquiry into the situation Eisenhower decided that administration officials should testify themselves rather than sending subordinates, but that they needed to maintain a certain level of secrecy such as describing other countries' involvement in the U-2 program. He hoped they would emphasize that "the

basic decisions respecting reconnaissance overflights of denied territory have been made by the president. However, the impression should not be given that the president has approved specific flights, precise missions or the timing of specific flights.”¹³⁹

Eisenhower controlled the outcome of each NSC meeting by approving the actions they decided to implement. The May 24 gathering followed the same procedure. Eisenhower ordered the State Department to advise America’s allies that any initiatives for further summits would have to come from the Soviets. The department was supposed to establish contingency plans for the Berlin situation and continue the test ban negotiations with time limitations. Meanwhile, the Pentagon should remain at the current level of military readiness and be alert for any aggressive actions taken by the Sino-Soviet bloc.¹⁴⁰

On the morning after his nationally televised address the president had breakfast with congressional leaders to establish parameters for the Senate’s investigation. Most significantly he expressed opposition to congressional oversight of the CIA due to the sensitivity of its operations and pledged the administration’s cooperation with an inquiry into the U-2 and the summit. He reiterated the latter point at the Cabinet meeting later that morning and reminded the members about the previously established limitations on their statements.¹⁴¹

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigated the U-2 incident at the end of the month. It released the report on “Events Relating to the Summit” on June 28. In his speech presenting the committee’s findings Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, was very critical of the administration’s handling of the

situation. He noted several mistakes it had made including continuing the flights beyond mid-April, issuing a cover story which was too specific, and the “serious error in judgment” that occurred when the May Day flight was permitted. Fulbright suggested that the lack of knowledge of the flight by most of the high-level officials showed the routine nature with which they viewed these operations. He described Eisenhower’s decision to take responsibility for the program as “the gravest mistake” and that it was “difficult to see how anyone could have been expected to act substantially differently from the way Chairman Khrushchev acted under the circumstances which confronted him in Paris.” According to Fulbright, the U-2 incident and the administration’s handling of it had caused the summit’s collapse. He argued that there should be better coordination and direction over government activities involving foreign affairs, that the president should remain aloof from covert ops and the U-2 flights should not be resumed.¹⁴² Congressional willingness to maintain the classified nature of most of the report’s testimony until the 1980s signaled a victory for the administration.

Chapter Nine Conclusion

Both sides viewed the encounter at Paris as a failure. Eisenhower was hoping to establish a starting point for further negotiations with the Russians. It was not until the Reagan administration initiated discussions with Mikhail Gorbachev that significant progress in Soviet-American relations were made. According to Khrushchev’s biographer William Taubman, Soviet diplomats considered the summit a disaster because it created a fissure between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, ruined Soviet-West German relations, alienated East German intellectuals and encouraged

East German leader Walter Ulbricht to continue plotting a confrontation over Berlin which occurred in 1962.¹⁴³

Historians' perceptions of Dwight Eisenhower's handling of the U-2 affair and the Paris summit have been almost exclusively negative. The historian Alonzo Hamby described the U-2 affair as "the most unnecessary crisis of the Eisenhower presidency and perhaps the worst-handled incident of espionage in American history," while John Lewis Gaddis wrote that the two events "suggest Eisenhower was no more prone at the end of his term than he had been at the beginning to give negotiations priority over other approaches to containment."¹⁴⁴ However, Michael Beschloss and Sergei Khrushchev provided the most accurate assessment of the events. They argued that the U-2 incident illustrated the way both governments misread each other and reacted poorly based on these miscalculations.¹⁴⁵

The U-2 incident was the most controversial event of Eisenhower's second term. It demonstrated both the passive and engaged aspects of his leadership style. The president initially allowed his advisors to overrule his instincts regarding the continuation of the reconnaissance program and issuing the cover story. After Khrushchev revealed the fate of Francis Gary Powers Eisenhower tried to minimize the political fallout from the administration's lies. Because of the U-2 incident Eisenhower never realized his highest foreign policy priority of improving the relationship between the Soviet and American governments. Instead he set the stage for increased Cold War tensions under President John F. Kennedy.

Notes

- ¹ President's News Conference, July 6, 1960 in *The Public Papers of the Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960-1961*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, 553
- ² Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency Eisenhower as Leader*, New York: Basic Books, 1982, vii, 92.
- ³ Schlesinger 1962 Presidential Greatness Poll in Gary M. Maranell "The Evaluation of Presidents: An Extension of the Schlesinger Polls," *The Journal of American History*, Volume 57, Number 1 (June 1970) 104-113, 105; CSPAN Survey of Presidential Leadership <http://www.americanpresidents.org/survey/historians/overall.asp>
- ⁴ Stephen E. Ambrose *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990, 497
- ⁵ Ambrose asserts that by the end of 1960 the Cold War was "more dangerous, more tension-packed than it had been at the beginning of the year," *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 498
- ⁶ This is the thesis of "Dwight Eisenhower and the Baggage of War" in H.W. Brands *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 185-200. Greenstein briefly discusses Eisenhower's view of the presidency as an extension of his previous experiences in *Hidden-Hand Presidency*, 11-13.
- ⁷ Ambrose, *Ike Soldier and President*, 573-574
- ⁸ From Eisenhower's address at the dedication of the George C. Marshall Research Library in Lexington, Virginia on May 23, 1964 in Forrest C. Pogue *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939-1942*, Vol. 2, New York: Viking Press, 1966, 337; Marshall's method of testing subordinates in Pogue, 337
- ⁹ Mark Perry *Partners in Command George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace*, New York: Penguin Press, 2007, 19, 21-24. This book provides a detailed discussion of the relationship between the two men focusing primarily on the war years.
- ¹⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower *Waging Peace 1956-1961: The White House Years*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965, 632
- ¹¹ Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Organizing the White House" in *The Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984, 63-87, 74, 77; Goodpaster's position was as "the President's staff assistant for all affairs that were connected with the international aspects of the government policy in action" dealing with the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the USIA, Goodpaster Oral History Interview, October 11, 1977, OH #378, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas, 72 (DDEL)
- ¹² Greenstein, *Hidden Hand Presidency*, 57-58; Eisenhower also employed strategies of hidden-hand leadership, public refusals to engage in personalities while privately basing his actions on analyses of people's character and the "instrumental use of language." These approaches allowed him to build strong public support despite the country's political and social divisions, which Greenstein describes as the sixth strategy of Eisenhower's leadership methodology.
- ¹³ Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 632-633
- ¹⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. Robert H. Ferrell, New York: Norton, 1981, 156-157, 160
- ¹⁵ Brands, *Cold Warriors*, 200
- ¹⁶ Eisenhower's use of covert ops during World War II is thoroughly documented in Stephen E. Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment*, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1999, 3-152
- ¹⁷ NSC Directive on Covert Operations in *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, eds. Douglas Keane and Michael Warner, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2007, 476-477 (FRUS)
- ¹⁸ James R. Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977 71; According to one history of the CIA, the Killian report "was the beginning of the triumph of technology and the eclipse of old-fashioned espionage at the CIA." Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes the History of the CIA*, New York: Doubleday, 2007, 112-113
- ¹⁹ Memocon November 24, 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President (Whitman File), Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 3, ACW Diary November 1954 (1), DDEL

- ²⁰ Ambrose, *Ike's Spies*, 268
- ²¹ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, trans. Shirley Benson, University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, 155-156
- ²² General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Oral History Interview, Dulles Oral History Project, July 28, 1964, OH #14, DDEL, 43
- ²³ Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, 122
- ²⁴ Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 544; John S.D. Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1974, 270
- ²⁵ Years later ex-Soviet generals would dispute the claim that this flight passed over Moscow. They said that did not occur until the fifth flight, if at all. Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev*, 158
- ²⁶ General Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History Interview, Dulles Oral History Project, July 28, 1964, OH #14, DDEL 44-45; Richard M. Bissell Oral History Interview, June 5, 1967, Oral History Collection of Columbia University, 45-46 (found at DDEL as OH #168); Richard M. Bissell Oral History Interview, November 9, 1976, OH #382, DDEL, 11
- ²⁷ Andrew J. Goodpaster Oral History Interview, June 26, 1975, OH #378, DDEL, 15-16
- ²⁸ Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 271
- ²⁹ Bissell Oral History Interview, November 9, 1976, OH #382, DDEL, 10-11; Andrew J. Goodpaster Oral History Interview, October 11, 1977, OH #378, DDEL, 80
- ³⁰ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 434-435
- ³¹ Memo for the Record, August 15, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Matters (6), DDEL; for all dates and places of specific flights prior to May 1, 1960 see CIA Memo, August 19, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (17), DDEL
- ³² Memocon, February 12, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (8), DDEL; Memocon, February 8, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (13), DDEL
- ³³ Quote from Memo for the Record, February 12, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (8), DDEL; for example of recommendations see Memocon, July 8, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 12 Intelligence Matters (12), DDEL, which resulted in a flight over Russia on July 9, 1959
- ³⁴ Milton Eisenhower Oral History Interview, June 21, 1967, Oral History Collection of Columbia University, 16 (found at DDEL as OH #292)
- ³⁵ Memo for the Record, February 8, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (13), DDEL
- ³⁶ CIA Memo, August 19, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (17), DDEL; According to Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis the U-2 flights allowed the CIA to conclude with relative certainty that the Soviets were not implementing a crash program of ICBM construction. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 186-187
- ³⁷ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986, 397-398; His criticism is particularly directed at Eisenhower revisionists Stephen Ambrose and Robert Divine.
- ³⁸ Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair*, New York: Harper and Row, 1986, 367
- ³⁹ William Bragg Ewald, *Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days, 1951-1960*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1981, 266, 270-271
- ⁴⁰ Letter to James Doolittle, July 26, 1954 in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower The Presidency: The Middle Way*, Volume 15, eds. Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee, et al, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996, 1213-1214; NSC 5412 facilitated the placement of covert ops under the purview of the CIA. It can be found in *FRUS: The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, 622-625
- ⁴¹ Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, 108

- ⁴² Eisenhower, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 285; The Doolittle Report was never shown to even the top members of Dulles's staff. Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, 109
- ⁴³ Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 265; The U-2 remained outside the 5412 Committee's oversight duties. Ambrose describes the 5412 Committee in *Ike's Spies*, 240-241
- ⁴⁴ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, New York: New American Library, 1965, 241; purview of Hoover Commission task force discussed in letter from Eisenhower to James Doolittle, July 26, 1954 in *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower The Presidency: The Middle Way*, Volume 15, 1214
- ⁴⁵ Eisenhower, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 312
- ⁴⁶ Executive Order 10656, February 6, 1956, Records of the President (White House Central File), Official Files, Office National Industry Council, Box 929, 309 President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, DDEL
- ⁴⁷ Memocon, December 22, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (7), DDEL
- ⁴⁸ Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, 154
- ⁴⁹ Beschloss, *Mayday*, 133
- ⁵⁰ Memo regarding U-2 Vulnerability Tests, December 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (9), DDEL
- ⁵¹ Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 271
- ⁵² Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, 167
- ⁵³ Ambrose, *Ike's Spies*, 244
- ⁵⁴ Beschloss, *Mayday*, 370; Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 543; Alekandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali concluded that Eisenhower was motivated by concern over a resumption of the Berlin crisis in the event of a summit failure along with pressure from his advisors. Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War The Inside Story of an American Adversary*, New York: Norton, 2006, 260-261
- ⁵⁵ Letters from Khrushchev, November 30 and December 31, 1959 and April 23, 1960, Whitman File, International Series, Box 53, Khrushchev November 2, 1959 (1), DDEL
- ⁵⁶ *New York Times*, March 30, 1960, 1
- ⁵⁷ Statement by Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, April 20, 1960, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 13, Herter Christian A. May 1960 (3), DDEL
- ⁵⁸ General Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History Interview, Dulles Oral History Project, July 28, 1964, OH #14, DDEL, 50
- ⁵⁹ Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 557-558
- ⁶⁰ John S.D. Eisenhower Oral History Interview, March 10, 1972, OH #15, DDEL, 58-59
- ⁶¹ Cable to Macmillan, June 3, 1959, in Dwight D. Eisenhower *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower The Presidency: Keeping the Peace*, Volume 20, eds. Louis Galambos and Daun Van Eee, et. Al, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001, 1510-1511; Eisenhower continued to express apprehension about the summit in cables on July 22, 1959 and October 9, 1959, 1587, 1691-1692
- ⁶² State Department Memo to the President, May 6, 1960, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 13, Herter, Christian A. May 1960 (3), DDEL; James A. Richter, *Khrushchev's Double Bind International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, 130
- ⁶³ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev*, 365-366
- ⁶⁴ Memo for the Record, April 25, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (14), DDEL; The initial flight was supposed to occur before April 19 but poor weather made it impossible. Eisenhower left the choice of paths up to the CIA and Bissell decided on the southern route because they believed Soviet radars in the area were not as effective and the U-2 would be gone by the time it was detected. Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, 260-262
- ⁶⁵ Richard Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior from Yalta to the Bay of Pigs*, New Haven: Yale University, 1996, 125
- ⁶⁶ Fursenko and Naftali point out the "carelessly phrased" nature of the April 25 order, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, 262
- ⁶⁷ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 509
- ⁶⁸ Cabinet Meeting, May 26, 1960, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Cabinet Meeting May 26, 1960
- ⁶⁹ Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 558

- ⁷⁰ Beschloss, *Mayday*, 372
- ⁷¹ Powers's mission is roughly sketched out in chapter two of Beschloss, *Mayday*, 13-34
- ⁷² Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, 104
- ⁷³ John S.D. Eisenhower Oral History Interview, March 10, 1972, OH #15, DDEL, 117-118; Allen Dulles's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 31, 1960 in *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, Volume 12, 86th Congress, 2nd Session 1960, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, 290
- ⁷⁴ Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. *The Real CIA*, New York: Macmillan, 1968, 208
- ⁷⁵ White House Office, office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (14), DDEL
- ⁷⁶ State Department Statement, May 5, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 25, U-2 Incident [Vol. I] [May 1960] (3); NASA Statement, May 5, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 25, U-2 Incident [Vol. I] [May 1960] (1), DDEL
- ⁷⁷ *New York Times*, May 6, 1960, 1
- ⁷⁸ *New York Times*, May 6, 1960, 7
- ⁷⁹ State Department Statement, May 7, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 25, U-2 Incident [Vol. I] [May 1960] (2), DDEL
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- ⁸² Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 549
- ⁸³ Milton Eisenhower, *The President is Calling*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1974, 335; Milton S. Eisenhower Oral History Interview, November 6, 1975, OH #345, DDEL, 14
- ⁸⁴ State Department Memo on Chronological Account of Handling of U-2 Incident, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, U-2 Incident [Vol. II] [May-June 1960] (1), DDEL
- ⁸⁵ Ann Whitman's Diary, May 9, 1960, Whitman File, Whitman Diary Series, Box 11, ACW Diary May 1960, DDEL
- ⁸⁶ Memo NSC meeting May 9, 1960, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 12, 444th Meeting of the NSC May 9, 1960, DDEL
- ⁸⁷ Statement by Secretary of State Herter, May 9, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 25, U-2 Incident [Vol. I] [May 1960] (2), DDEL
- ⁸⁸ *New York Times*, May 10, 1960, 1
- ⁸⁹ Statement by the President, May 11, 1960, Whitman File, International Series, Box 13, Paris Summit Meeting May 1960 (3), DDEL
- ⁹⁰ *New York Times*, May 12, 1960, 1
- ⁹¹ Emmett John Hughes, *Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years*, New York: Atheneum, 1963, 303-304
- ⁹² *New York Times*, May 13, 1960, 30
- ⁹³ Kirkpatrick, *The Real CIA*, 201
- ⁹⁴ Eisenhower, *Strictly Confidential*, 271
- ⁹⁵ Milton S. Eisenhower, Oral History Interview, November 6, 1975, OH 345, DDEL, 15; Allen Dulles offered his resignation on May 7 and despite the endorsements of both John Eisenhower and Douglas Dillon the president refused to accept it. Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy the Life of Allen Dulles*, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994, 485-486, 488-489; John S.D. Eisenhower Oral History Interview, March 10, 1972, OH #15, DDEL, 122-123
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- ¹¹² Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973*, New York: Praeger, 1974, 633-634
- ¹¹³ Memocon, May 16, 1960 (meeting May 15 at 4:30 p.m.), Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 50, Staff Notes May 1960 (1), DDEL; *FRUS, 1958-1960; Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960; Germany; Austria*, Vol. IX, eds. David M. Baehler and Charles S. Sampson, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, 423-425
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Salisbury UNIVERSITY

Eisenhower and the U2 Affair

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**This project for the M.A. degree in History
has been approved for the
History Department by**



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