Governor Robert Dinwiddie and His Political Struggle to Defend Colonial Virginia

James R. Gallagher
HIST 631- Thesis
Spring Term, 2009
Salisbury University
Dr. Perreault, Advisor
Governor Robert Dinwiddie and His Political Struggle to Defend Colonial Virginia

JAMES R. GALLAGHER

This project for the M.A. degree in History has been approved for the History Department by

Melanie L. Perreault, Thesis Director

G. Ray Thompson, Second Reader

Melanie L. Perreault, Department Chair

Date 5/15/09
Abstract: Governor Robert Dinwiddie struggled against many internal and external forces to perform his duties in securing the colony’s borders against the intrusions of France and her Native American allies. Dinwiddie found himself bombarded by internal distractions and obstructions from other colonial governors, members of Virginia’s House of Burgesses, the colonial militia, beside those advances against Virginia in the Ohio River Valley. He was able to overcome these issues and govern the colony at a time when the entire frontier was ablaze with war. Robert Dinwiddie’s efforts as colonial governor during the French and Indian War proved his capabilities as a leader of men, and it was due much to these efforts that Virginia survived this conflict in the manner that it did.
Samuel Stalnaker was like many of his fellow German immigrants to the British North American colonies: he sought land and a fresh start for his family. After likely landing in Philadelphia, he migrated with a group of other German families into the frontier lands of present-day West Virginia and Virginia in 1732, where land was easy to possess. His life was similar to many other frontier settlers, one which included hacking out an existence, however perilous, in the thickly forested lands of the Blue Ridge Mountains. But this was not the only connection he shared with the other settlers; they had to prepare themselves for the ever-likely raid that would rain death and destruction upon their family if they were not prepared.

Samuel Stalnaker was not ignorant to the requirements of surviving on the frontier. He learned to communicate with many Native American tribes, particularly the Cherokee to the southwest. He probably conducted trade with the Cherokees, and did so as early as April, 1748. Like his neighbors, he very likely recognized that their living in such a remote area constituted a buffer zone of protection against Indian and French attacks on the eastern slope of the Shenandoah Valley.\(^1\) Thus, they had to make the best out of their situation. Stalnaker would provide well for his wife and their son Adam, acquiring numerous frontier-man skills, including those of an explorer, trapper, guide, and later, soldier. But this latter skill was forced upon him during the painful years 1754-1756.

---

Records are inconclusive, but Stalnaker and his family found themselves on the front lines of the war that had inflamed the Ohio Country, and eventually much of the world, in the 1750s. This war, known to Americans as the French and Indian War, caught the Stalnaker family in its deadly grip. They were likely kidnapped in the dark of the night from their unsecured home along the Holston River and Reedy Creek by a French-aided Shawnee war party. The circumstances surrounding their seizure are unknown, but in some manner Stalnaker was able to escape from the near-certain death that awaited him. Unfortunately, his wife and son did not. They were killed, collateral damage from the war that had engulfed everyday life along the Virginia Blue Ridge. The frontier was seeing “Ravages committed by . . . inhuman Foes” because this region was practically undefended, a literal freeway of traffic running between the French-held Fort Duquesne and the French-supplied and allied Shawnee and other Ohio Indians. These circumstances forced Samuel Stalnaker and many others like him to act, and they did so by taking an active role in the militia. They had to protect their home, their families, and their lives. Unfortunately, warnings had been flowing out of the Ohio region for many years from Indian agents and traders such as George Croghan. Croghan wrote from Aughwick that there were many “men to set out to harass the English,” especially along the Potomac. He also warned that the French were intent upon destroying the back settlements of the English colonies. The warning came unheeded by those who chose to live in the wilds of Virginia.

---

Samuel Stalnaker and his neighbors were likely wondering why their government had not protected them during this time. It was clear to these people that the frontier was not going to be defended enough that families could maintain their livelihoods on their farms. Perhaps they blamed the wealthy Tidewater planters, who were unconcerned with events so far away from their prosperous plantations. But a group of powerful men were emerging to recognize the importance of the frontier, and of this group, Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie had significant say over how to act.

The political scene in Williamsburg was not an environment where Governor Dinwiddie would find much success in protecting the likes of Stalnaker in 1754 or 1755. He faced a legislative body that responded to his requests for funds, soldiers and materiel with little more than scorn. His relations with other colonial governors had also proven to be less than positive. Dinwiddie was struggling to protect the colony he had been sworn to protect, and his career was faltering due to this. He found his exertions to protect, defend and extend His Majesty’s lands bogged down by various inter and intra-colonial squabbles that eventually spelled the death knell for his political career in North America. With his departure from the realm of Virginia politics, Dinwiddie assumed the mantle of the inept and bungling politician, which led incorrectly to the concept in the Revolutionary era of the poor colonial leader. Dinwiddie was more than an adequate leader for Virginia during the French and Indian War, but because he was not given the cooperation he desired and required to be successful, he was unable to protect Virginia’s interests, and those of men like Samuel Stalnaker, from the ravages of warfare.

Dinwiddie faced considerable obstacles during his tenure as governor of Virginia during the French and Indian War. One of them was the House of Burgesses and their belief that the governor was attempting to strip Virginians of their rights to representative government through
his efforts to seek an additional tax. Dinwiddie would find his initial efforts to defend the colony hindered due to continued mistrust. Another obstacle Dinwiddie faced was the rivalry of other colonial governors. Rather than working together in colonial unity to solve the collective problems of the colonies, some governors sought their chance to reap personal acclaim. Also making his duties difficult to carry out were the complex personalities of those who took their orders from him. Just when decisive action was sought, it always appeared that Dinwiddie was faced with some thorny issue that demanded his attention when he should have been focused on the primary concern. This was not always due to his failures, but rather oftentimes the natural course of events, or the actions of those around him. Finally, the most strenuous and grueling challenge Dinwiddie faced was the French presence throughout the Ohio Valley. These were the issues and obstacles that Robert Dinwiddie faced as he assumed his duties as Chief Executive of Virginia in 1752. They would help to define his legacy as governor of Virginia during an excruciatingly trying period of time.

In order to fully comprehend how his reign as governor for Virginia had come to an impasse, and how Virginia had become so vulnerable to attack, it is necessary to assess what events had occurred in the years leading up to 1755. Despite having prior experience in the British Colonies, having served as Collector of Customs and Surveyor General of Customs for the Southern District of America, sitting in Virginia from 1727 until 1743, and Inspector General of Customs in the Barbados between 1743 and 1749, he struggled out of the gate as Lieutenant Governor.\(^5\) By 1749, Dinwiddie had had enough and retired back to his home in Scotland with

the plans of going into businesses as trader. He had shown great “zeal in collecting revenue, his attention to business details...his emphasis on the royal prerogative, and the extensive scope of his interest and correspondence” clearly had impressed his superiors in the British Ministry. His ability to manage complicated issues and maneuver through the dense world that was Virginia politics were rewarded only two years later when he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of the Royal Colony of Virginia on July 4, 1751. He landed at Yorktown to begin his tenure on November 20, 1751. The years 1751-1755 were tense years that put an impressive amount of pressure upon Dinwiddie’s shoulders.

Virginia politics were becoming unsettled due to a continued rivalry between the French and English for empires that had transplanted to the lands of the Ohio River Valley. It would be these vast tracts of lands that Dinwiddie would attempt to defend for England. Virginia was no longer just a coastal colony, the frontier had moved well into the Shenandoah Valley and Blue Ridge Mountains by the 1750s. Families like those of the Stalnakers had taken up small farms, thanks to the excellent terms for these migrants. But the wealthy planters of the Tidewater were also concerned with the situation on the frontier.

These men, the influential figures of the colonial government, schemed about how to extend their and Virginia’s power into the hinterland of North America. These powerful men split into two groups, known today as the expansionists and the non-expansionists. The expansionists, as Marc Egnal argues, held a “bold imperial outlook” towards the Ohio Country, and established the Ohio Company to settle these lands. The majority of these members were from prominent families from the Northern Neck of Virginia, and held a very aggressive attitude.

---

6 Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie, 93.
7 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 600.
8 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 600.
towards the French, who were attempting to establish dominance in the Ohio region. Their counterparts, the non-expansionists, came from the counties south of the Rappahannock River, and viewed the lands to the southwest and west as being more significant. This group also established a land company, titled the Loyal Company.\(^\text{10}\) Into this atmosphere Governor Dinwiddie arrived, and each company quickly sought his favor since he had the political weight to benefit their respective interests.

Dinwiddie quickly sided with the Ohio Company and the added wealth that could come from doing so added to their likelihood of future wealth and additional power. In a letter to fellow Ohio Company shareholder Thomas Cresap in January 1752, Dinwiddie expounded on his views towards the Company: “I have the success and prosperity of the Ohio Company much at heart.”\(^\text{11}\) His siding with the expansionists so early in his administration was a questionable choice, for sure, as it pitted many powerful legislators against his personal and political interests in the years to come. This was not considered a conflict of interest at the time, but instead what historian Louis Knott Koontz labels a dual loyalty.\(^\text{12}\) However, it must be clear that Dinwiddie did have an economic incentive for removing the Ohio Valley from the grips of the French.

By rendering his services to the Ohio Company, Dinwiddie was also making it clear as to his views on the significance of the Ohio Country to the security of Virginia and the other colonies. The future lay to the west, and the Ohio region. This was the area where prosperity would come from. He clearly became engaged in the company because he saw that doing so supported his political duty of extending, controlling and protecting England’s dominions. By


1752, the French had left little doubt as to what it was they wanted in the Ohio region. The French intended to cordon the English colonies by constructing a ring of forts on their frontier, effectively sealing off the Ohio Valley to the English. This alarmed Dinwiddie considerably and forced him to act.

The actions that Dinwiddie undertook to secure English control over the region prove the political ideals of the man. Dinwiddie, contrary to many historians, was not incapable nor was he “burning with an inordinate desire” for wealth and riches because he already had this. In his previous positions within the British ministry he had opportunities to siphon funds from the government, yet no charges had been made against him. He had served in various posts where connections to finances would have made it very easy for him to pilfer from the government, including the post of Inspector-General, with his duties focused on examining the duties of the Collector of Customs for the Barbados Islands. It was here that he exposed to the government a vast amount of money that had been misappropriated by various officials. It is hard to conjure the notion of this man of principle going against the very code of honor he lived his life by. One known case was his investigation into the actions of Edward Lascelles and his brother Henry, as well as Arthur Upton, officers in the customs office of the Barbados Islands. This investigation resulted in charges of fraud, and proves the extent to which Dinwiddie carried out the duties of his position, whatever it may have been.

He was a stout defender of the interests of the King and professed to do whatever he could to further his power. Taken with this attitude to serve and his inclination to protect

---

15 Dinwiddie Recs, I, ix.
16 Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie. For a thorough understanding of this incident, see “Dinwiddie versus Lascelles,” 67-94.
Virginia, in 1753 he ordered a young George Washington to the Ohio Country to deliver a warning to the commander of a French force that they must stop constructing their forts and withdraw from the area immediately.\footnote{Fred Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War} (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 40-41.} Dinwiddie was not inclined to act more aggressively because he was embroiled in a confrontation with the elected body of Virginia, the House of Burgesses over what appeared to be a trifling matter, but in reality, was a definitive event in the governorship of Dinwiddie.

This confrontation that faced Dinwiddie was without dispute, his fault. Shortly after arrival in Williamsburg, he sought the advice of the Council of State as to requiring a small fee from those individuals seeking land patents on Virginia’s frontier in the form of a Spanish coin, called a \textit{pistole}. This fee would go directly into his pocket as a result of his placement of the seal of the governor on the patent. This fee was to be used only for patents larger than one hundred acres. To Dinwiddie and his advisors, there did not seem anything tyrannical or illegal about requesting such a fee. But to members of Virginia’s House of Burgesses, it smacked of illegal taxation.\footnote{Morton, \textit{Colonial Virginia}, 622. The issue of the pistole fee is one that in historical retrospect, was in the governor’s purview, but because the fee had not been demanded by past governor’s, the Burgesses saw this as an affront to their rights as citizens and tax-payers. Officially, Dinwiddie was correct to require the fee, but historians often point to this as a prerequisite to later clashes between colonial governors and assemblies on the road to Independence in the 1770s.} When the Burgesses met in the second session of the Assembly, which had been delayed until November 1, 1753, the governor had expected the primary concern of the body to be measures for defense against the French, but that would not be the case. A storm was about to explode in the Assembly.

On November 22, several petitions from frontier counties were received that described an unusual demand from the Secretary’s Office of a \textit{pistole} for every patent that was issued from the
office. According to the petitions, this came at the demand of the governor.\textsuperscript{19} The Burgesses then constituted a committee to prepare and send an address to Dinwiddie, asking him on whose authority did he require such a fee. Within one day, the governor blandly responded that the order of the fee was his, and he offered no real explanation as to the legality of the issue for the Burgesses.\textsuperscript{20} This attitude by Dinwiddie did not extinguish the problem, but instead further lit the fuse of the Assemblymen.

In reply to another inquiry of the Burgesses, Dinwiddie wrote that his right to request such a fee was “confirmed to him by unquestionable Authority,” the King, and was intended to improve the revenue of the King’s government.\textsuperscript{21} This did not resolve the issue, as Dinwiddie believed it should have. Instead, the fight grew even fiercer, as factions developed, some based on prior events.

The Burgesses, led by the reputable Richard Bland, decided to take an unusual step in confronting the governor over this issue. Unwilling to acquiesce to his authority, Bland helped to write a scathing rejoinder, calling the requirement of any fee, without consent of the Burgesses “an Infringement of the Rights of the People, and a Grievance highly to be complained of.”\textsuperscript{22} Dinwiddie argued that the lands did not belong to the people, they belonged to the King, thus it was not an “encroachment on the rights of the other.”\textsuperscript{23} Bland and his fellow legislators went even further in their denunciations of the governor after Dinwiddie refused to explain his actions and his rights as governor. They made it official when they declared:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{JHB}, 141.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{JHB}, 154.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{JHB}, 143.
\textsuperscript{23} Reply of Governor Dinwiddie to the House of Burgesses, December 4, 1753, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, I, 47.
\end{flushleft}
Resolved, That the said Demand is illegal and arbitrary, contrary to the Charters of this Colony, to his Majesty’s, and his Royal Predecessors Instructions to the several Governors, and the Express Order of his Majesty King William of Glorious Memory, in his Privy-Council, and manifestly tends to the subverting the Laws and Constitution of this Government.

Resolved, That whoever shall hereafter pay a Pistole, as a Fee to the Government, for the Use of the Seal to Patent for Lands, shall be deemed a Betrayer of the Rights and Privileges of the People.

Richard Bland was an exceptionally gifted writer and was a first-rate thinker of his day. His character was untainted. He was a man that no one, not even Governor Dinwiddie, could take lightly because of his skills as a politician and lawyer. In his pamphlet titled *Fragment on the Pistole Fee*, Bland argued that if the Burgesses did not fight this violation of English law, then “like a small spark if not extinguished in the beginning will soon gain ground and at last blaze out into an irresistible flame.” His participation in the affair guaranteed that every effort would be taken to halt the restriction of English principles.

By this point in the scandal Landon Carter had also joined the fray. Carter recognized the need for outside influence in order to protect what he saw as an infringement on the rights of all Virginians. This influence, Carter hoped, would come from the powerful merchants in London itself. He found it necessary to voice his disapproval of Dinwiddie’s efforts in a pamphlet that was published anonymously in London in early 1754, titled *A Letter from a Gentleman in Virginia, to the Merchants of Great Britain, Trading in that Colony*. Carter’s pamphlet was a

---

24 JHB, 154-155.
forceful defense of the legislature in dealing with the governor and how his actions had created nothing but controversy in the colony.\textsuperscript{27}

William Stith had a personal grudge against Dinwiddie, and he found his chance to grind his axe with the pistole issue. In July 1752, Stith sought the office of Councilor, commissary, and president of the College of William and Mary, but Dinwiddie refused to support him. Through much politicking and wrangling, Dinwiddie made many enemies in his treatment of this issue, seeing to it that his supporter, Reverend Thomas Dawson, was given the position. By April 1753, Stith had found it necessary to defend his record, and somehow found it viable to turn around and denigrate Dinwiddie's reputation, based solely on the handling of the pistole fee.\textsuperscript{28} Stith, Dinwiddie wrote, was "an evil spirit entered into a high priest, who was supported by the family of Randolphs."\textsuperscript{29} Dinwiddie now found himself facing an unhappy, extremely powerful political group in the Randolph family.

The issue of the fee was further becoming a quarrel between the Randolph family and Dinwiddie. The resolve to fight Dinwiddie was now evident. Thus, Dinwiddie should have tread carefully and discontinued his efforts to seek a fee for land patents, but he did not. Perhaps this was the Scotsman in him coming out. With the zeal of resistance so strong, Dinwiddie sought a person to blame, and that figure was William Stith, another member of the Randolph tree and cousins of Bland and Peyton Randolph.

The last member of the Randolph family to involve himself in the pistole fee scandal did so against his own judgment. Governor Dinwiddie had earlier called upon Peyton Randolph,

\textsuperscript{27} Jack P. Greene, "Landon Carter and the Pistole Fee Dispute," \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly}, Vol. 14, No. 4, (Jan., 1957), 66. Prior to the 1950s historians had credited Peyton Randolph with writing this document. The historian credited with this finding was A.P.C. Griffin.

\textsuperscript{28} Morton, \textit{Colonial Virginia}, 623, 624.

\textsuperscript{29} Dinwiddie to Charles Hanbury, May 10, 1754, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, I, 154.
who was serving as the attorney general for Virginia, at his Williamsburg home before he
decided to charge the fee. Dinwiddie inquired of the Attorney General whether he would support
Dinwiddie in his efforts in charging this fee. Ever the consummate lawyer and politician,
Randolph advised the governor that the House of Burgesses had to debate and then vote on any
measure involving taxation before such action could be passed on to the people of the colony.
Whether or not Dinwiddie was angered by this advice, one must question. In the end however, it
is clear that he did not heed Randolph’s counsel, choosing to push ahead with the fee without the
consent of the Burgesses.30

Peyton Randolph was once more called upon during the confrontation between the
Assembly and the governor, but this time it was the Burgesses who sought his services. The
Burgesses had decided that it was necessary to send an emissary to London, effectively
bypassing Dinwiddie, to argue their case to the Board of Trade, the governing body for the
colonies. The individual who was chosen at the close of the second session of the Assembly to
travel abroad was the attorney general, Peyton Randolph, cousin of the preeminent Richard
Bland, on December 15, 1753.31

Randolph had not sat on the sidelines during the struggle between burgesses and
governor. He had actively sided with the Burgesses, participating in the committee that drew up
the multiple addresses to Dinwiddie, so he very much had the interests of the wealthy Burgesses
in mind as he made his way across the Atlantic during the winter season. He had to have known
that upon his leaving Virginia without Dinwiddie’s permission, he would be relieved of his
official duties as attorney general of the colony of Virginia. Some argue that Dinwiddie removed
Randolph because he had been “wounded to the soul, personal revenge was his weapon” against

31 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 630.
the actions of his attorney general. This is not reflected in his letters; instead, there is a feeling of anger over a perceived violation of law. Dinwiddie was angered and disgusted with what he saw as the inappropriate behavior by the Burgesses, and on December 19, he prorogued the Assembly. In his message to the Burgesses proroguing them, he emphasized that “Next to the Service of my royal Master, my greatest Ambition will be to make this dom’n flourish.” His tone to these elected officials was very much that of frustration because they were more concerned with their rights, and not overly concerned about a true threat to their freedoms and lives. He declared that they had allowed themselves to be distracted from the true problem, “the designs of the French” by their own personal desires.

While Randolph was in England arguing the Burgesses’ case, Dinwiddie was furiously attempting to defend himself to his superiors and his powerful friends in London. In a letter to Jonathan Hanbury, a wealthy London merchant and colonial agent, dated March 12, 1754, Dinwiddie claimed that Peyton Randolph was behind the pistole fee controversy and hoped that the Lords of Trade would put him down. He was very honest with Governor Glen of South Carolina when he wrote “W’t Influence You may have over Y’r Assembly I know not, but I frankly tell You I have none over this here.” It is clear that Dinwiddie believed that he had little to no influence over the Assembly because of the pistole fee, but he was not about to compromise as the issue was now in the hands of his superiors in London. He would bide his time until he could vent his wrath on those he deemed to be disloyal.

33 *JHB*, 171.
34 *Dinwiddie Recs*, I, 48.
35 *JHB*, 171.
37 Dinwiddie to Gov. Glen, April 15, 1754, in *Dinwiddie Recs*, I, 128.
It must be clarified that the pistole fee was not a prerequisite to the American Independence movement, as some historians have attempted to claim. This was not where the movement began. It was instead an effort by an elite few to hold sway over the power of the colonial government. What did begin here was the notion in London that the colonials were stubborn, or incapable of handling their own affairs, including security. Dinwiddie was one of the first colonial agents to voice these sentiments, and he did so often in letters to Lord Halifax, the Board of Trade, Lord Holdernesse, and in his correspondence to Lord Loudon.38

Events along the frontier had made it absolutely necessary for Dinwiddie to call the House of Burgesses into session much earlier than he had previously planned, however. Washington had returned with a report on the French forces in the Ohio Valley, and had submitted his account of his encounters to the governor who had them printed for the Burgesses to consume, no doubt as proof that they had failed in their duties to protect Virginia.

On February 14, 1754, the third session of the Assembly was called to order in Williamsburg by Governor Dinwiddie. The immediate concern for the session, Dinwiddie stated in his opening remarks, was the French construction of a fort along the Ohio River and the presence of nearly 1,500 soldiers. The primary goal for this session was to pass a bill that would provide funds for raising an army and defending the frontier through the construction of a fort to counter the French threat. This session ended on February 23, 1754 with the signing of two bills by Dinwiddie: “For the Encouragement and Protection of the Settlers upon the Waters of the Mississippi”, and “An Act for the better Regulation of the Militia.”39 The fourth session would not be as smooth for either Dinwiddie or the Burgesses, as conditions on the frontier continued to

---

38 See Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, Secretary at War, July 24, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 244-246; Dinwiddie to Lords of Trade, March 12, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 98-99; Dinwiddie to the Lords of the Treasury, November, 15, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 402, are just some of the examples.

39 JHB, 185.
deteriorate. It should have been clear to the Burgesses that Dinwiddie was prepared to let bygones be, and do what was best for the colony, but the Burgesses were not prepared to allow this to occur. Dinwiddie tried to make this apparent to the Assembly in his Opening Address on August 22, 1754, saying “I desire all Annimosities may subside.” Based upon the urgency of the external threats to Virginia following Washington’s return, Dinwiddie was willing to move on, yet he was still very bitter. He wrote earlier in July to Pennsylvania governor James Hamilton that the colonial assemblies had unjustly assumed powers that were not rightfully theirs. Dinwiddie had hoped that the current state of affairs would mean more to the Burgesses than petty differences in taxes, and he stated as such to New York Governor James DeLancey in a letter dated July 31, 1754. Dinwiddie had “no doubt” that the Assembly would grant additional funds to defend the colony. Here one can see the hope in his letters, but can also observe that he was not actually seeing events in the same manner as his counterparts.

By the beginning of the third session of the Assembly, the Burgesses found themselves in a tenuous situation. They had promised Randolph that they would provide him with £2,500 from the treasury “to defray his expenses and as a reward for his trouble for taking so long a voyage,” but were facing a real threat of attack by the French in the Ohio. Dinwiddie was not pleased with the Burgesses’ actions at all. They had decided to pay Randolph this money without his permission, and they had clogged “a bill with many Things unconstitutional and derogatory to the Prerogatives to the Crown,” rather than raise money to protect the colony. He was also frustrated that the Burgesses had not reacted when he told them about the impending threat of the

40 JHB, 291-292.
41 Dinwiddie to Governor James Hamilton, July 24, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 256.
42 Dinwiddie to Governor James DeLancey, July 31, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 260.
43 JHB, 167-169.
44 Dinwiddie to the Lords of Trade, May 10, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 160-162.
French during the second session, and wrote to James Abercromby on May 10, 1754 “If our Ho. of Burgesses had granted the Mo. on my Applicat’n in Nov’r, it’s more than probable the Fort (Fort Necessity) w’d have been finish’d.” 45 He deftly switched the blame for any possible defeat to the Burgesses, writing “every Thing in my Power has been done with Spirit, Diligence and Dispatch.” 46 The bad news was not long in coming.

On August 22, 1754 Dinwiddie stated that the French “have unjustly, invaded His Majesty’s Lands on the Ohio River...they have committed the most violent hostile Act, by attacking our Forces...and killed many of our People.” 47 This was not simply referring to the conflict with Washington, but also to the destruction of George Croghan’s store along Lake Erie at Pickawillany in June, 1752. 48 In 1745, the House of Burgesses had granted nearly a third of a million acres of land in the Ohio region, directly resulting from the Treaty of Lancaster, to a group later constituted as the Ohio Company. 49

The Ohio Company began to press their interests in the west, intending to sell their lands at the confluence of the Alleghany and the Monongahela Rivers to settlers who shortly would be crossing the Appalachian Mountains. Because the Iroquois were losing influence over this region, this brought the English into conflict with the transplanted Indians, the Delaware and Shawnees. With the outbreak of King George’s War, those who had lived in the west quickly removed themselves east and to safety from French-led raids. But with the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, traders and settlers, mostly Pennsylvanians, came back to the region. One of these traders was George Croghan, who had established a trading post on the Upper Miami River

---

45 Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, May 10, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 157.
47 JHB, 189.
48 Anderson, Crucible of War, 28.
49 Anderson, Crucible of War, 23.
in an Indian town called Pickawillany. This poaching on what the French considered to be their territory brought a price upon Croghan’s head.\textsuperscript{50} The French were nervous about this perceived English effort to seize the Ohio Country and the alliances of the fur-trading Indians.

The Burgesses responded to his call for money by organizing and passing a bill titled “An Act for Raising Twenty Thousand Pounds for the Protection of His Majesty’s Subjects in this Colony, against the Insults and Encroachments of the French.” This was where the Burgesses tried to follow through on their promise to Randolph. Within this bill was a rider allocating the £2,500 due for his trip overseas. Dinwiddie saw this action coming. In a letter dated September 1, 1754 to James Abercromby, he stated “I can never prevail with myself to pass an Act so very inconsist’t with Parliamentary Proceedings... There is such a Party and Spirit of Opposition in the lower House.”\textsuperscript{51} Thus, his council rejected the bill that would have given Virginia the desperately needed money to fight a blossoming war with a major power. Clearly agitated, Dinwiddie called the Burgesses together one last time to disparage their legislative efforts. On September 4, moments before proroguing them, he stated “I find You are determined not to do w’t Y’r Duty to His M’y.”\textsuperscript{52} They had refused to provide subsistence to companies of soldiers sent by the King to defend their homes and families, and perhaps worst of all, shown themselves to be lacking as Englishmen.\textsuperscript{53} There was simply no purpose in keeping this group of men together any longer if they were set upon their present course of action, which meant tragic defeat at the hands of the “Popish” French.

This was now a fight to the political death, one that would strain relations between Governor and Assembly, and retard efforts to protect Virginia from French incursions into the

\textsuperscript{50} Anderson, Crucible of War, 23, 25.
\textsuperscript{51} Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, September 1, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 298-301.
\textsuperscript{52} Dinwiddie to General Assembly, September 4, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 302-303.
\textsuperscript{53} JHB, 205.
Ohio River Valley. But Dinwiddie was clearly sorry to see this affair take the turn that it had. He wrote to Abercromby in April “I am sorry the Affair makes so much Noise in the Coffee Houses; that must be owing to the unjust Advertis’m’t of the Att’o. Gen’ls that was in the News Paper.” This advertisement that Dinwiddie likely referred to was A Letter from a Gentleman in Virginia, to the Merchants of Great Britain, Trading to that Colony. It had caught the attention of many wealthy people in London and attacked the behavior of the governor. It was taking a toll on Dinwiddie. He felt that he was being pushed to the brink, and he found that his duty as governor was becoming troublesome and difficult. He was looking forward to having this nasty spat with the Burgesses ended.

After many months, the Board of Trade effectively agreed with both sides in the matter. In another letter to Abercromby dated October 23, 1754 Dinwiddie explained that the Board of Trade had officially ruled in his favor for many reasons. Dinwiddie argued that he had never sought a fee for lands less than one hundred acres, or for lands west of the Allegheny Mountains. He was also “much surpriz’d at the B’d of Trade’s Taciturnity, and not acting with more Spirit” for if they had been clearer in their intentions, none of this would have made it back to London to be settled. But Dinwiddie seemed to believe that the whole matter was now mostly in the past, especially since Speaker Robinson, another leader of the opposition, had begged his pardon for the “ill manners shewn” towards him by October.

The Pistole fee and the disruption in governing that occurred could be shown to connect to the later theory of no taxation without representation in a governing body, but not to the later

---

54 Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, April 26, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 137.
55 Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, April 26, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 137.
56 Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, October 23, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 373, 374, 376. Many historians have claimed that it was the reverse, or that it was a draw. Some argue that because of Bland’s written arguments the Board of Trade created strong restrictions on the governor’s power to levy fees for the performance of legal work.
development of the concept of independence. But both sides stood fast in their beliefs that the
other was misled in their notions, which led to stagnating government. Dinwiddie held to the
standard that he was carrying out matters that were in the best interest of king and country. He
was in the right when he claimed that the land was the King’s and that as an agent of the King,
he had the right to exact a fee for such lands, to be added to the King’s revenue. The Burgesses
repudiated this theory, stating that in colonial politics, as this was not England, no law (or fee)
could exacted from the citizens without first having their voice heard on the matter. The
Burgesses were following the Whig theory, prevalent in the Enlightenment that government was
a contract with the people, and if the people did not concur with a policy with which they had no
say, the government was in violation of the contract. This contrast in ideals was perhaps the
reason why the Board of Trade took so long in negotiating the complaints of the Burgesses and
the explanation of Dinwiddie. Looking back on the matter, both sides were correct, but it was an
event that was needless and wasteful, and the stubbornness of both sides would remain, but in
manifested form in later years.57

Personal conflicts of a few men had damaged the overall security of thousands of families. These families were now exposed to attack simply because politicians were unable or
unwilling to put aside personal vendettas or aspirations. The Pistole Fee and the Burgesses
refusal to set the issue aside for the moment had damaged Dinwiddie’s efforts to defend against
the French because he could not gain access to funds to do so. All of the blame should not lie at
the feet of the Burgesses, yes they were intractable in their belief in being treated as the equal of
all Englishmen, but Dinwiddie was also mulish. He had refused to take into consideration what

57 In hindsight, historians tend to lay the blame on Dinwiddie because the Virginians stood for representation,
rather than tyranny, as later historians would claim Dinwiddie’s actions represented. For some unique perspectives
on Dinwiddie, one can refer to Edmund Randolph’s *History of Virginia* for an extremely slanted history of this
event.
many politicians had or would have told him: the pistole fee was not a good idea to spring on Virginians. He rebuffed this advice and a relationship that had begun with high regard and positive results, and even a gift of £500 tobacco, had degenerated into a relationship full of mistrust, anger and miscommunication.\(^{58}\) The shadow of the pistole fee would not completely disappear until 1755, when Peyton Randolph returned to Virginia and made peace with Governor Dinwiddie.\(^{59}\) It would take some time before the past was forgotten, but nothing could get back the lost time Virginia had had to prepare and fortify its possessions, now vulnerable to attack. Dinwiddie had attempted to organize the colony to the threat of the French, and by doing so was showing that he was a strong provincial leader.

The situation on the Virginia frontier had grown dangerous over the course of two decades. As settlers poured into the fertile lands in the Susquehanna River Valley in Pennsylvania in the 1730s and 1740s, the tribes who inhabited these lands found themselves in conflict. The arrival of settlers in these areas forced Delaware and Shawnee Indians to move further west into the Ohio River Valley, out of reach of whites, but more importantly out of the reach of the powerful Iroquois Confederacy, based in New York and upper Pennsylvania. At the Treaty of Lancaster in 1744, representatives of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia negotiated with the Iroquois to guarantee their neutrality with dealing with these Indians. Historians have marked this treaty as being the high point of Iroquois influence in dealing with the English colonies.\(^{60}\)

The French were not about to allow the English to steal their territory. In 1749, the French governor the Comte de La Galissoniere, commissioned an expedition down into Ohio, in

---

\(^{58}\) Morton, *Colonial Virginia*, 605, 606.  
\(^{59}\) Morton, *Colonial Virginia*, 632.  
\(^{60}\) Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 23.
all a three thousand mile trip, to renew what the French considered an ancient claim on the territory, even going so far as to bury lead plates in the soil. On his arrival the leader of this expedition, Captain Pierre-Joseph de Celeron de Bainville, reported to the governor (now the marquis de La Jonquiere) that the once loyal Wyandots and Miamis were being weaned off of French goods for cheaper, more plentiful English wares. The only way to combat this was to construct forts in this area. Nothing came of this advice, however. But after three years of watching the Ohio Company make impressive gains, the French decided it was time for action, and definitive it was.

On June 21, 1752 a French led contingent of Chippewa and Ottawa warriors from Fort Detroit attacked the trading post and settlement at Pickawillany, and dispatched in a most gruesome manner the settlement’s headman Memeskia, who had acquired the sobriquet of “Old-Briton.” This raid made quite an impact on the Pennsylvanians, as it destroyed the largest English settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains, and quickly drove them east. The Virginians working on their settlement at the Forks did not withdraw, however. Instead, they continued to work throughout the winter on bringing more families up from Virginia to guarantee their company charter, and to counter their opponents within Virginia, the Loyal Company, who wanted to claim lands in present-day Kentucky and Tennessee. Because the Ohio Company had invited Robert Dinwiddie to join the company as a stockholder, they were better positioned to continue to make a profit off of their investment. He was now doubly concerned about the Ohio Valley falling under the sway of the French, and to prevent it from

---

doing so, sent a young, inexperienced surveyor from the Northern Neck region of Virginia to deliver a message to the French in 1754.  

George Washington had desperately desired public acclaim, so when Governor Robert Dinwiddie asked him to travel through wooded forests, Washington, with an eye of a surveyor, and dreams of gaining reputation, did so gladly. Washington’s expedition, though, was a failure and for obvious reasons. First, Dinwiddie did not order Washington to take any action other than to deliver his message to leave the Ohio because it rightfully belonged to the English and King George II. It was here that Washington did learn some insightful information: after consuming a plentiful amount of wine, the French leaders told him that “it was their absolute Design to take Possession of the Ohio, and by God they would do it.” Washington had also seen how the French used their wares to keep the Indians under their thumb, and how worried they were that the English would have them as allies. By arresting any English traders in the region, the French were guaranteeing themselves the monopoly on the very prosperous fur trade in the West. He also saw the extent of the fort building the French had done. He visited Fort Venango, knew about the state of Fort Le Boeuf, as well as Presque Isle, and recognized the value of a fort at the forks of the Monongohela, Allegheny and Ohio Rivers. He hurriedly returned with the news of his trip to Virginia, and after nearly drowning in icy waters, he returned in January.

The trip had proved ground-breaking for Dinwiddie, yet also extremely worrisome. Upon Washington’s arrival in Williamsburg on January 16, 1754 and explanation of his trip, he

---

62 On the surface this was a struggle between different factions of politicians over what was best for the colony, but the underlying conflict was one over land and the wealth that would come from it. This was how the Loyal and Ohio Companies saw each other, and Dinwiddie quickly joined the fray.
63 JGW, 13.
64 JGW, 15.
65 JGW, 18.
ordered the exhausted Washington to document his travails for distribution amongst the Burgesses and for consumption in London as well.

Dinwiddie now faced a dilemma: what to do about the French. He could send a ragtag company of Virginians under an experienced commander (whoever that would be) and create an international situation, he could wait some months for orders from London, or he could sit and wait for the French to act in an aggressive manner. These were serious times, and he decided to respond in a serious way.

His decision revealed the lack of military expertise he has been criticized for over the years, but he acted decisively. He ordered Washington back to the Forks with a new commission, that of Lieutenant Colonel, and two hundred men to construct a fort. Dinwiddie also dispatched military commissions to the Indian traders and agents of the Ohio Company already in the area, which interestingly, gave the Ohio Company's construction of a strong-house the official-backing of the colonial government. Dinwiddie took these serious measures because he had been ordered to by Lord Holderness, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, in a circular letter to all governors of the North American colonies to “repel Force by Force within the undoubted limits of His Majesty’s Dominions.” These directions were incredibly vague, but Holdernesse had provided special instructions for Virginia, explicitly defining acts of aggression as any attempts to build forts in the Ohio Valley, or attempts to prevent the erection of the forts which the Ohio Company had been given royal permission to erect since 1749. Dinwiddie did all of this during the Pistole fee controversy, and despite it.

---

66 Anderson, Crucible of War, 45.
He was taking the necessary steps to protect the colony amid the atmosphere of confusion and contempt with which the Burgesses held him and vice versa. In fact, Dinwiddie completed these actions before he called them into session, no doubt to make sure there was no dallying on their part when action was required. In this case, Dinwiddie’s actions paralleled those of the Crown. It made sense for him to act for many reasons: first, he had first-hand experience with how frustrating the colonial assemblies could be. Second, he saw the imminent threat of the French, and based upon his orders from the Duke of Cumberland, acted accordingly. Third, Dinwiddie was acting in his and his fellow shareholders’ best interests by taking action before waiting to involve the Burgesses. This was not a conflict of interest—the Crown’s and Dinwiddie’s pursuits, in this case, were analogous to each other. He would have also argued that his actions were in the best interests of the colony in general since many families were migrating to this region, rather than living in the Tidewater. He simply bypassed this intransigent group of politicians because it was necessary to the security of the Crown’s lands.

Dinwiddie was still dealing with the angry Burgesses over the pistole fee, so he knew that if he made all of the decisions and took all of the necessary steps toward securing the Ohio from the French, this would leave the Burgesses little to discuss. So on February 14, 1754 when he called the Assembly into emergency session, they found a fait accompli awaiting them. Washington was on his way with his small detachment of soldiers to construct the fort, but many Virginians, and even other colonies, were not interested in this supposed threat to their livelihoods. There were efforts to enlighten the residents of all the colonies, but especially New England, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia to the danger that was growing on their frontiers. One such example was a letter supposedly from a Messieur la Roche, a resident of Quebec writing to a French officer laying bare the French designs towards the English colonies in North
America. The desire to “make Room for good Catholics” struck fear into many of the Protestant English. But one of the advantages that the French had was the use of Indians, and that at a moment’s notice the French could command any number they so needed. But what likely alarmed Virginians was the mention of many true Catholics that would not fight against the French because they were their true friends, not the Protestant Virginians. This would strike fear into any frontier family. The image of innumerable blood-thirsty savages generating havoc on the Virginian frontier, and their neighbors, who were secretly Catholic, rising up to shoot them in the back while their wives and children were scalped or taken into captivity, was hard to conceive. But this form of propaganda was needed to motivate those closer to the seat of government, safely set in the Tidewater region, and not exposed to the uncertainties of the frontier.

The Burgesses were likely concerned that Dinwiddie may be trying to instigate a war with France in order to further his personal interests in the Ohio Company. The refusal of the Burgesses to provide Dinwiddie with no-strings attached money for the expedition he ordered to the forks prior to their meeting would support this theory. The Burgesses wanted strict oversight of the expenditures of the ten thousand pounds. This was one compromise that Dinwiddie swallowed and accepted.

Washington wrote to Dinwiddie on February 23, 1754 that he was having difficulties recruiting men for his company; in fact, he had not gathered fifty men. Washington wrote in April from Wills Creek with additional problems: the Ohio Company’s fort on the Forks had been seized by a French force of one thousand men with cannon and other implements of war on

---

70 Anderson, Crucible of War, 46.
71 Dinwiddie to Lord Fairfax, February 23, 1754, Dinwiddie Recs, I, 82.
April 18. Washington also informed Dinwiddie that the likelihood of Indian aid on the side of the English was not probable, in fact highly questionable in light of French might in the region.\(^2\)

That might was further viewed when the French began constructing the nearly impregnable Fort Duquesne on the site of the Ohio Company's stockade. The French would not leave anytime soon, unless the English were willing to force the issue.

The latter issue was something Dinwiddie was already working to improve. Before he had even received this letter from Washington, Dinwiddie was writing to the tribes of the southwest, the Cherokees and the Catawbas being two of them. Dinwiddie tried to explain that the Indians who were attacking these tribes were not Iroquois, but French-supplied Ohio Indians. Dinwiddie was desperately trying to lure these southern tribes into the struggle as allies of Virginia and Great Britain. If they were willing to fight, Dinwiddie could not promise protection of their homes, but he could at least provide them with the necessary tools of war. It is not difficult to understand why the tribes refused to participate.\(^3\) The difficulties for Dinwiddie continued to grow by late Spring 1754.

Dinwiddie now found himself faced with additional concerns that needed his immediate attention. That Spring he received a series of letters penned by Washington that complained of how measly the pay was for the soldiers who signed up for the service of their country. This was not to time to negotiate for pay raises, and it appears that Washington did not recognize that fact. Washington attempted to lay the blame solely on the shoulders of the Burgesses when he wrote on May 18, “were it as much in your power, as it is your inclination, we should be treated as

\(^2\) Washington to Dinwiddie, April 25, 1754, in Washington, George, *George Washington: Writings*, New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1997, 35, 37, hereafter cited as *GW*. Anderson also insinuates that when the Ohio Company capitulated at the Forks without even firing a short, the Iroquois leader Tanaghrisson was irate at the capitulation because it meant the end of his dominance over the local Indians, and the rise of the French-led Indians.

\(^3\) Dinwiddie to Catawbas, April 19, 1754, in *Dinwiddie Recs*, I, 131, Dinwiddie to Cherokee, April 19, 1754, in *Dinwiddie Recs*, I, 132.
gentlemen and officers, and not have annexed to the most trifling pay, that ever was given to English officers.\textsuperscript{74} Washington, much like the other gentlemen of Virginia, were more interested in their honor than salary, thus the perceived slight to his reputation was the inference that Washington was attempting to communicate to the governor. One must wonder what the governor thought as he read this.

He certainly reacted very strongly, as he should. With his letter to Washington of May 25 came a scathing reply to Washington and his men: “The Gent. Very well Knew the Terms on w’ch they were to serve” and that no other colonel of the militia had complained about his pay. Dinwiddie knew as well as anyone what a legal contract looked like, so his lack of sympathy for the men who signed was understandable. This affair has the air of a parent-child relationship, at least to the extent that the parent tells the child to grow up and deal with life’s challenges. As Dinwiddie surmised, these ill-timed complaints were unacceptable and reckless and had to be stamped out.\textsuperscript{75} As much as the governor would have wanted this affair to go away, it did not, as Washington had to struggle to preserve his dignity and honor as a gentleman. He wrote “I am much concernd that your Honour should seem to charge me with ingratitude for your generous, and my undeserved favours, for I assure you Honble Sir, nothing is a greater stranger to my Breast, or a Sin that my Soul more abhor’s than that black and detestable one Ingratitude.” He continued further, writing “I retain a true Sense of your kindesses, and want nothing but oppertunity to give testimony of my willingness to oblige as far as my Life or fortune will extend.”\textsuperscript{76} But Washington continued to show his displeasure, arguing that the officers

\textsuperscript{74} Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, May 18, 1754, in \textit{GWW}, 38-39.

\textsuperscript{75} Dinwiddie to Washington, May 25, 1754, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, I, 171, 172.

\textsuperscript{76} Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, May 29, 1754, in \textit{GWW}, 40.
participating in other expeditions earned more than he was, and begged Dinwiddie to allow him to serve as a volunteer, which would bring him more honor than serving as a paid officer.

After leaving Alexandria on April 2 having failed to meet his quota of two hundred men because he was only offering them a scant eightpence per day, the equivalent to one-third of a laborer's wage, Washington recognized at that point that the pay was hardly an incentive to serve in far-off lands against Indians and an overwhelming number of French. What this reveals about the early recruits for the Virginia regiments was that they were not of high quality, nor were they adequately supplied for what lay ahead. The blame for this can be laid at the feet of either Dinwiddie, who knew next to nothing about preparing for war measures and had no one to confide in, or the Burgesses, who were too cautious of allowing Virginia to be embroiled in a frontier war and had furnished inadequate funds for the expedition.

The path that Virginia was taking into what would become the French and Indian War was clearly the result of Dinwiddie's actions. The lack of preparation must solely lay at the feet of the Burgesses, however, who refused to grant any money unless the current state of affairs was desperate. They very much played 'politics for the moment' rather than what was best long-term for the colony. Dinwiddie actively sought out alliances and communications with his fellow governors, as well as relations with Indian tribes. The Burgesses, particularly those members of the Loyal Company, delayed his efforts, especially following the pistole dispute. This set Dinwiddie, Washington and the frontier of Virginia on a collision course with a French force near the Great Meadows in the Ohio Valley, which would result in a general war that would engulf France, England, the colonies, and many other European powers.

---

77 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 50.
The route that Washington took brought him directly into conflict with a detachment of French troops from Fort Duquesne on May 28, 1754. In this engagement it is clear that the Virginians surprised the French in their camp, thus it was a quick victory. But how the death of the Ensign de Jumonville came about is unclear, as accounts differ greatly. Some accounts claim Washington allowed the Half-King (Tanaghrisson) and his followers to kill the French despite their having surrendered. Other accounts claimed that Jumonville was a spy, and thus was legally executed. The French, particularly Governor Duquesne, believed that Washington had authorized Jumonville’s killing in some manner. This would prove to be an important event in later dealings between Washington and the French, as well. Washington wrote in his official account of the battle simply that Jumonville was one of the killed, and nothing else. Even in a letter to his brother, Washington did not clarify the circumstances surrounding the death, except to simply list him among the dead French.

Nevertheless, this killing had a significant impact on the relations between the French and the English in the region. This event changed the international relations between France and England, and Dinwiddie was determined to see Washington’s troops maintain their presence in the region. If the French needed galvanizing, this killing did it.

Virginia’s troops would not remain in the area for long, as events were to play out. Washington had made the mistake of being too aggressive and choosing to lead his small detachment of Virginians to seize Fort Duquesne. He had visions of glory, but as he led his men toward the fort, their march became a perilous one because of the death of the expedition’s

---

78 Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988), 68-70. See also Anderson’s Crucible of War, 53-59. Both are excellent sources of information, but Anderson truly portrays Washington as a naïve Virginian unaware as to the intentions of his Indian allies, and likely encouraged his beliefs that Indians were savage and unnecessary for future conflicts on the continent.
79 Washington to Dinwiddie, May 29, 1754, in GWW, 43.
80 Washington to John Augustine Washington, May 29, 1754, in GWW, 47.
horses. What had begun as a determined march on a soon-to-be defeated enemy on June 16, had collapsed into frustration and was bogged down. This was not the least of his worries, however.

Shortly after hearing about the defeat--some say massacre--of Jumonville’s force, Captain Contrecoeur, the commanding officer at the fort, had ordered the recently arrived Louis Coulon de Villiers, Jumonville’s older brother, to destroy Washington and his paltry force, now settled in at what the English called Fort Necessity. The French force consisted of six hundred French and about one hundred Indian allies. This force traveled lightly, and quickly gained ground on the Virginians.

What resulted from this impending clash needs little explanation. Washington returned to his fort, was surrounded, forced to capitulate or face certain death, and marched back to Virginia defeated. English officials back in London were not pleased by these results. The Duke of Newcastle first heard about Washington’s defeat from a London Evening Post article from September 3, 1754. Dinwiddie’s official dispatch did not arrive for another thirteen days, and the report was worse than previously thought.

Newcastle was upset, calling this defeat “Insults...we will not suffer.” Dinwiddie found himself facing an extremely difficult task: he now had to protect Virginia’s frontiers, and to do so he had to raise funds from obstinate Burgesses, prod his fellow governors to take action

---

81 Anderson, Crucible of War, 62. Anderson articulates very clearly what he considers actually happened to Jumonville. He theorizes that Tannaghrisson had murdered the ensign as a sign to his warriors that the French were no longer their father, and by killing him, this symbolized that action. In his journals, Washington tends to ignore any of this, perhaps, as Anderson writes, because he was stunned from his first official experience in battle. Francis Jennings also provides a thorough analysis of this situation. He however, does not clarify the meaning of the death-only that Tannaghrisson struck down Jumonville, while Washington looked on. Jennings also condemns the theory that the Indians were actually the protectors of the French, who were attempting to do so from Washington and his men. This is “preposterous,” according to Jennings.


83 Newcastle to Albemarle, September 5, 1754, in Clayton, “The Duke of Newcastle...American Origins of the Seven Years’ War,” 590, 591.
in conjunction with Virginia, and continue to govern his colony. These were not easy tasks that confronted Dinwiddie.

The Burgesses, it likely seemed to Dinwiddie, were intent upon turning Virginia over to the French, as their efforts to hamper Dinwiddie’s efforts to secure Virginia continued, though he never stated as such. He did maintain that there was a zealous “Spirit of Opposition” running rampant in the lower house of the Virginia Assembly, and complained about “obstinacy of American Assemblies.”84 The fourth session of the Burgesses was called in direct response to the catastrophe that was Washington’s defeat at Fort Necessity in July, and only met for a brief period of time in August and September 1754. Dinwiddie had requested a bill that would provide the governor with funds to raise and support colonial, as well as English soldiers in the defense of Virginia. The resulting legislation, entitled “An Act for raising the Sum of Twenty Thousand Pounds for the Protection of His Majesty’s Subjects in this Colony, against the Insults and Encroachments of the French” infuriated him. This was the Burgesses attempt to add a rider for the payment of Peyton Randolph £2,500. On the 4th of September, Dinwiddie refused to sign the bill at the behest of his Council because the rider was based on an illegal act. Randolph was sent not at the command of the governor, which was the only legal manner of sending a representative of the colony to London, but by the Burgesses. Thus, when the Burgesses attempted to compensate him upon his return, Dinwiddie found it to be his duty, and perhaps his chance for retribution, to veto it. On the next day the Burgesses were prorogued for the session.85

84 Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, September 1, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 300, Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, August 15, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 284.
85 JHB, 201, 202, 205.
The stress of watching his colony come to pieces had to be a painstaking experience for such an orderly man. In Dinwiddie’s mind he could not figure out why he was being met with such resistance. When he had refused to sign the bill containing Randolph’s payment, he saw this as unconstitutional. To him it appeared that the Virginians were willing to allow their homes to be sacked by the French just to spite him over a trifling fee. It appeared ludicrous to him. But the House of Burgesses was not the only group of people in the colonies that Dinwiddie was struggling with.

More than a few of Dinwiddie’s struggles involved his fellow colonial governors. These struggles ran the gamut of issues, but they coalesced around the effort to provide security for Virginia. Of course, ego played a large role in the relations between the titans of colonial politics, but for the most part, the best interests of the British realm were primary. These personal conflicts heavily retarded the general effort of expelling the French from the Ohio valley, once and for all.

The governor who contributed the greatest to the headaches for Dinwiddie was South Carolina governor James Glen. The differences between the two men can be traced to early in Dinwiddie’s term as Lieutenant Governor when South Carolina challenged Virginia’s right to conduct trade with the Cherokee Indians located on the frontier of that colony. The resulting “enmity” between the two governors would linger throughout the years, and limit the abilities of the two colonies to conduct operations against the French to the west. The first example of this comes from a letter that Dinwiddie wrote to the Lord of Trade in October 1754. Attempting to explain why Washington’s expedition had failed, Dinwiddie claimed it was due to the lack of

---

86 Dinwiddie to the Lords of Trade, May 19, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 162.
Indian support. These southern Indians, ostensibly Catawbas and Cherokees, had agreed that whenever Dinwiddie called upon their efforts, they would serve. Dinwiddie explained that because when he did call upon them, they answered, “the Gov’r of Carolina ordered them to rem’n at Home.” This indictment upon Governor Glen was direct and hardly flattering. Clearly, Dinwiddie was laying a heavy majority of the blame for the failure to seize the forks on Glen because of the absence of any Indian allies whatsoever.  

The animosity that Dinwiddie retained for Glen continued to be perpetuated by both men. Writing to his friend Abercromby two days before he wrote the Lords of Trade, Dinwiddie vented on what he considered to be a letter from Glen that had been written “in a very dictatorial Style and seems to find Fault with my Conduct on this Expedit’n.” Dinwiddie was more than a little perturbed to hear from his peer how he should have gone about conducting a military operation to the Ohio, after the fact. But Glen continued, insultingly, that “he desires me not to interfere w’th Catawbas and Cherokees, who are under the Protect’n of their Colony...he goes the Length to doubt his M’j’s Right to the Lands on the Ohio, and refuses any Supplies.”  This would have been inappropriate and perhaps treasonous, had Dinwiddie interpreted the letter correctly, particularly the section about doubting England’s claim to the Ohio. Nevertheless, these two political giants clearly found nothing in the other to appreciate, and would continue with their opposition to each other.

Dinwiddie was not averse to confrontation, and he took the time to do so in a letter to James Glen on the 25th of that same month. In response to the thought that Dinwiddie should have “represented the Injuries done by the Fr[ench] to the Gov’r of Canada,” he scoffed. This was a ridiculous notion, besides it went contrary to the orders he had received from Lord

---

88 Dinwiddie to Lords of Trade, October 25, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 364.
89 Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, Esq., October 23, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 375.
Holdernessse and the Duke of Newcastle and it was beyond his official powers to contest the English claims to these lands. Thus, Dinwiddie attempted to explain, he was simply doing his duty to his King and his Country. His position required him to carry out orders whether he thought them prudent or not, which he did. In essence, Dinwiddie took the high road throughout the majority of the letter, but delivered the coup de grace when he labeled Glen’s observations on Washington’s defeat as “ungenerous.” Governor Glen, Dinwiddie appeared to be inferring, seemed to enjoy the difficulties of the colony to his north, which was un-English of him.  

As to the problems of the Indians, Dinwiddie also took issue with Glen. Dinwiddie assured Glen that his repeated claims that the Indians in the Carolinas were not of his concern was “entirely wrong” because Dinwiddie was not attempting to poach them; instead, he was conducting these efforts due to instructions from the Home Government. Even if London had not ordered him to seek out Indian allies, Dinwiddie argued, such a “Time of so imin’t [a] Danger” would have required everyone to forget petty jealousies and personal ego and do what was best for their King. Glen’s ordering of the Catawbas and Cherokees to remain home when Dinwiddie needed them for the Ohio expedition was “a bad Step of You” because “His Majesty’s Serv’ce so much wanted it.” This political error not only cost the lives of Virginians, but because of Glen’s arrogance and refusal to coordinate efforts, it would now cost even more.

With this in mind, the Virginian governor continued his letter with the following rejoinder:

I must and cannot shun observing [that] Y’r Let’r and Argum’ts w’d have been more proper from a Fr. Officer y’n fom one of His M’y’s Gov’rs. I have the hon’r, Satisfact’n, and Pleasure to assure You, y’t my Conduct on the whole of this Expedition was met with His M’y’s gracious Approbat’n, and y’t of his Ministers; I am sorry it had not rec’d y’t of Y’rs…I shall be glad, [if] all private Views may be laid Aside, or any particular Provincial Interest, w’n his M’y’s Service so earnestly calls for the action of our utmost

---

90 Dinwiddie to Governor James Glen, October 25, 1754, in *Dinwiddie Recs*, I, 377-378.
Endeavours and Strength to oppose the comon Enemy, and not to be so particular in scrutinizing the Conduct of Y’r neighbouring Gov’rs, without knowing the Purport of his Instruct’s, w’ch a Person of Y’r Sense and Pentrat’n well knows...

To show his willingness to work together, and forget the past, Dinwiddie ended his letter with a fact: according to his instructions, he was to help Glen and South Carolina construct a fort in the Cherokee territory and to repel the French invaders, if present. Interestingly, Dinwiddie closed this letter with a post script that read “In all public Affairs of Consequence, I always conduct myself with the Advice of the Council.” This reminder to end the back-room politicking on Glen’s part is consequential because it reveals, at least to some extent, that both men knew what the other was attempting to do-- destroy his opponent and seek prominence for themselves and their followers.

Glen and Dinwiddie were not able to solve their political differences. They continued to have disagreements, especially over the handling of Indian affairs. These men had very different philosophies when it came to the day-to-day dealings with Indians. Glen openly blamed Dinwiddie for Virginians enticing South Carolina Indians to conduct trade using presents, especially rum, something Carolinians were prevented from doing. These men also failed to work together even when the Ministry in London expressly ordered them to do so. The order that Dinwiddie had discussed briefly about constructing a fort in the Overhill Cherokee territory that was to be shared between Virginia and South Carolina, and Dinwiddie had received £10,000 to do so. But Dinwiddie did not want to spend all of it on one fort; instead he wanted to use it for

---

91 Dinwiddie to Governor James Glen, October 25, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 377-378.

35
actions in the Ohio. Thus, he ordered a token fort to be built which cost £1,000. Glen had wanted to construct a considerably larger fort that would cost upwards of £7,000.\textsuperscript{92}

Dinwiddie was not disobeying orders from London in doing this. His superiors, especially Cumberland, Halifax and Newcastle, saw how much more critical the Ohio region was. But they realized that they needed Indian allies, and the way to maintain and cultivate a relationship was by establishing a presence, which this fort did. But Dinwiddie decided, and one could argue rightfully, to siphon funds to the more pressing need, which the situation in the Ohio obviously was.

One must question the wisdom of this disagreement during a time of national security. Was it really in the best interests of their respective colonies to compete against each other for the support of the Indians? Of the two, if blame were to be assigned for the resulting consequences, it would have to be Glen because he was not looking at the bigger picture, and Dinwiddie was. But clearly, these two governors did not like each other, and in so doing greatly weakened the war effort.

Not all efforts between Dinwiddie and other colonial governors resulted in failure. Dinwiddie had an exceptional relationship with Maryland’s governor, Horatio Sharpe, and a tolerably respectable relationship with Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania and Governor DeLancey of New York. Without the efforts of these men, who led colonies with a considerable amount to lose in a war with France, Virginia would surely have been victimized even more than it had been. Credit must go to Dinwiddie for being able to cultivate these relations because they meant so much to Virginia. Plus, it helped that many of the colonial governors understood the

\textsuperscript{92} Harry M. Ward, "United or Die", 158; Dinwiddie to Governor James Glen, February 8, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 485.
difficulties that Dinwiddie faced, so they recognized what he dealt with daily, especially with the Burgesses.

Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton dealt with immense political struggles himself. His legislature was dominated by Quakers, who were largely pacifists and refused to take up arms in times of war. Hamilton's colony had just as much to lose as Virginia if the French were permitted to dominate the Ohio Valley, though it had never seen violence on the scale that Virginia had traditionally encountered. But that would change in this war because Pennsylvania was no longer dominated by Quakers; in fact, only their government was. Thus, if Pennsylvania chose not to act, its people would. But Hamilton struggled to get the Quakers to see this.

Dinwiddie showed considerable solidarity with his northern peer in a July 31, 1754 letter. Dinwiddie understood how troublesome legislatures could behave, especially when they began clogging intended legislation with riders. But Dinwiddie was also concerned. If Hamilton was unable to prepare Pennsylvania for the impending war with France, that would make Virginia even more vulnerable to attack. Dinwiddie was perturbed about the attitude of the Pennsylvanians. He viewed them as relaxed and unconcerned during what was a called "the time of danger." He was right to ascertain that their refusal or inability to react to any threat placed the responsibility on him.

It was one thing to not fight, but quite another to not provide resources to those who were willing to fight for you, as Dinwiddie and many Virginians were. Dinwiddie wrote to Lord Halifax, concerned about the behavior of many colonies. He wrote, "It's a monstrous Thing to think of the Supineness and Backwardness of our neighbouring Colonies in granting Supplies.

---

93 Dinwiddie to Governor James Hamilton, July 31, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, 1, 255-257.
94 Dinwiddie to Lord Halifax, July 31, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 251.
In July, Dinwiddie wrote two letters to important government officials denouncing the overall efforts of the other colonies. To Secretary at War Henry Fox, Dinwiddie claimed “our neighbouring Colonies are very backw’d; nay, have actually refus’d their Assist’ce. I know no Method to compel them to their Duty to the King...” The same day, July 24, 1754, Dinwiddie expressed similar sentiments to Lord Halifax: “I have wrote many Letters to the different Gov’ts, endeavoring to rouse them from their Lethargic Stupidity.” The likelihood that Virginia could not count on aid from these colonies continued to make life difficult for Dinwiddie and the colony. What he had recognized as deficiencies in communication was now leading to security problems for Dinwiddie. He was beginning to recognize the difficulties in dealing with intercolonial issues because each colony had its own interests in mind.

Dinwiddie’s relationship with Maryland’s governor Horatio Sharpe was probably the finest example of cooperative efforts to protect the Middle Atlantic colonies. There were frequent letters between the two governors, and open admiration showed in letters Dinwiddie authored. But like Pennsylvania, Maryland was wrought with internal divisions that limited Sharpe’s ability to defend the Ohio Valley, or even to protect its frontier. Likely even more unnerving to Dinwiddie was the realization that Maryland’s Assembly refused to provide any funds and a scant number of soldiers to defend the territory west of Fort Cumberland. At the least, there was a foundation for communication and cooperation at the executive levels that provided a basis for later efforts. This foundation did not ensure the safety of the lives and property of many Virginian families living in the no-man’s land that was the frontier. The peril

---

95 Dinwiddie to Lord Halifax, November 16, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 405, 406.
96 Dinwiddie to Secretary at War Henry Fox for Great Britain, July 24, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 244.
97 Dinwiddie to Lord Halifax, July 24, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 251.
98 Anderson, Crucible of War, 203.
of these families, and the failure to act on their behalf, was what caused the death of Samuel
Stalnaker’s wife and son, and what forced him to actively seek the destruction of his sworn
enemies, the French.

The frontier was in shambles, and Dinwiddie struggled to meet the exacting requirements
of protecting such a vast area with his limited resources. The effort to recruit Pennsylvania, a
traditionally pacifist colony, was exemplified in a letter from Virginian Benjamin Jones’ to his
relative John Jones in Pennsylvania. There was a need to take action, Jones wrote, because
“battle and murder are at our doors...our subsistence liable to be pillaged, not only by these
French invaders, but by a horrid, cruel and merciless band of savages with them.” Mr. Jones
went on to declare that if Pennsylvania’s government failed to protect them, they must take up
action on their own behalf, which sounded eerily similar to what was occurring in Virginia,
despite Dinwiddie’s best efforts.99

By September of that year, many citizens of Augusta County had gathered together to
protest their current situation to the Governor and the Burgesses. This petition was received by
the Burgesses during their emergency session after the defeat at Fort Necessity, and made it
explicitly clear as to why they believed it was necessary for them to abandon their homesteads
and in so doing, roll back the frontier many miles to the east. It made sense that if they did not
have the security necessary, they had to remove themselves. Governor Dinwiddie tried to comply
with this request by writing Colonel Washington on September 11, 1754 and ordering him to
send forty to fifty men to Augusta County “to protect our Frontiers from the Incursions of small
Parties of Indians, and I suppose, some French.” This letter does reveal some lack of sympathy
for the inhabitants of Augusta County. But one must infer the true sense of irritation with the

99 Benjamin Jones, A Letter from Benjamin Jones, in Alexandria in Virginia, to John Jones, in Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia: 1754, 4, 5-6.
county leaders. They had refused to provide Washington men in 1753, and now they were receiving their just desserts, in the governor’s eye, however painful that may have been for them. He would struggle the remainder of the year to provide the essential protection for the inhabitants of the frontier, but he would make a strong effort to do so.

Elsewhere in the colonies, the threat to the English had been recognized immediately, especially from the New England colonies and New York. The inabilities of the many colonial governors to unite their legislatures in the face of such impending doom caused considerable alarm amongst the ministers back in Whitehall. Efforts to bind the colonies together seemed necessary to many within Britain’s North American colonies, and Robert Dinwiddie was one of these individuals. Dinwiddie was very much interested in some form of cooperative effort by the colonies in the impending war with France and its Indian allies. He became more so after the humiliation that had occurred at the Forks, as did Lord Halifax and Lord Holdernesse, influential power brokers in London.\footnote{Alison Gilbert Olson, “The British Government and Colonial Union, 1754,”\textit{The William and Mary Quarterly}, Vol. 17, No. 1, (Jan., 1960), 25.}

The colonists took the initiative to meet, and did so in Albany on the New York frontier in June 1754, as the Ohio Valley became the primary front of military operations for what would be known as the Seven Years’ War. The primary purpose, as set by the Board of Trade, was to hold a general conference with the various Indian tribes, particularly the Iroquois. Virginia was very interested in a defensive union of the colonies, but Dinwiddie already had planned a conference with Indians from the south, whom he deemed more important to dealing with the French.\footnote{Timothy J. Shannon, \textit{Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754}, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 107.} Dinwiddie explained himself in a letter to the Board of Trade that “the Southern
Indians are more to be coulied than the five Nations, being ten times their Number." This was a unique argument for Dinwiddie to make, and it reveals some insight into his attitudes towards Indians. Rather than negotiate with the Ohio Indians, or their Iroquois cousins, whom Dinwiddie planned to take lands from (via the Ohio Company), he thought it prudent to utilize the Cherokee and Catawbas as allies, and had no interest in seizing their lands. He also made a telling comment about the impending failure of the Iroquois. He was right to state that the Southern Indians were more plentiful. The Iroquois had slowly been losing their population to warfare and disease, and in fact had been raiding southwards into the Cherokee and Catawbas to replenish their population.  

But generally speaking, Dinwiddie saw the need to have some form of general union between the colonies. Dinwiddie was the most progressive of the southern governors, but also very cautious. He recognized the difficulties in establishing any formal union within the colonies and how that could lead to further problems between the mother country and the colonies. After the outcome of the convention became public, Dinwiddie was concerned about allowing members of the Ministry to know his position, thus he told Pennsylvania governor James Hamilton that he did not want to comment on the Albany Plan “till I hear how it is received at Home.” He felt this way because it contained “new Positions...not before ventur’d on” which, for a politician whose position and power was based upon the will of another, made practical sense. This was very wise on his part as others who openly supported such a plan were vociferously shouted down by those within the colonial assemblies of Rhode Island, New York, and others.  

102 Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, March 12, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 98-99.  
104 Dinwiddie to Governor James Hamilton, July 31, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 257.
Jersey, and to a lesser extent, Maryland. Being the shrewd politician that he was, he recognized the value in holding his tongue on issues that were not fitting the overall political environment.

But he had advocated earlier in the year for reform in the manner of raising revenue that was independent of the colonial legislatures. He wrote to Virginia’s colonial agent in London, Jonathan Hanbury that a general poll tax was needed. This was a logical step to take, according to Dinwiddie, because the legislatures were refusing to act in Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. He believed a tax of 2s. 6d would have been sufficient to bring the colonials to recognize their general duties as Englishmen. He thought it prudent that Parliament invest in the governors the power to control colonial resources singularly, rather than allow the elected assemblies to do so. But he did not want a comprehensive union of all colonies. Instead, he saw more value in splitting the colonies into regions, northern and southern districts that would be able to coordinate military and Indian affairs. All of this took place in June when he sent the Board of Trade his plan for dividing the colonies.

But what came of the Albany Plan was not what Dinwiddie had hoped. Dinwiddie did not send anyone from the colony to represent Virginia, mostly because he had designated funds that would be needed for Albany for another conference at the same time being held at Winchester. He was wise to be extremely cautious when the results of the conference were

---

105 One such individual was Stephen Hopkins. He was a prominent member of the Rhode Island commission to the Albany Congress. He had to quickly publish a pamphlet titled *A True Representation of the Plan Formed at Albany* to save his reputation. In this document he distanced himself from the actions of the Congress, and when Rhode Island Assembly debated the plan, he chose not to speak in favor of the plan. There truly were repercussions for those who failed to think about the larger picture when it came to colonial and Mother Country connections. See Shannon, *The Albany Congress of 1754*, 214-215.


108 Shannon, *Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire*, 107. Shannon also argues that Virginia did not participate in the congress because it was attempting to court the Ohio Indians at the expense of the Iroquois-this
made public—he recognized how the plan had been constructed compared to London's instructions, and did not wish to put his neck on the line when he needed any and all resources from home to protect Virginia. He did recognize its extraordinary value, but prudently did not support it publicly. He also did not bother to submit the plan to the Virginia Assembly because of its provision for halting the western land claims of colonies with sea-to-sea grants, of which Virginia was one. Other colonies also rejected the plan, including Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut and Maryland.

The Albany Congress had failed to create a union of the colonies. But the Board of Trade, whose hand had been forced by the Duke of Cumberland, had by the Autumn of that year decided that rather than having the colonies defend themselves, as it was becoming more obvious to the Ministry was not possible, they would send one man to conduct the affairs of the colonies in the event of war: General Edward Braddock. The Albany Plan went far beyond anything that the Board had deemed necessary, especially the extensive legislative union that was called for. Nevertheless, the emergency that the colonies found themselves in late 1754 required unequivocal action and the Albany Plan was not the immediate remedy.

Even smaller efforts to court intercolonial relations failed. Dinwiddie's effort to hold a regional conference at Winchester in 1754 to deal with Indian chiefs did not have the effects that he had desired. Part of this had to do with the South Carolinian governor's refusal to attend personally and his advising the Cherokees and Creeks, whom he considered to fall under his official jurisdiction, not to attend either. Glen proposed a conference of his own, in Virginia,
with at least six colonies participating. This was to take place after the Albany Conference had concluded, and his plan was to deal with all Indians, both Iroquois and southern tribes, as a whole.\textsuperscript{113} His fear was that one "spark" in the northern colonies would envelope all tribes and they would "not be able to extinguish it..."\textsuperscript{114} The colonies that Glen wished to participate included South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and New York. This was likely Glen trying to step on the toes of Dinwiddie under the guise of protecting his colony. Dinwiddie did not allow Glen to stamp out his efforts at securing English dominions over Ohio Indians. Dinwiddie and Glen would face off in the following year, and this time it would decide the political future of one of these powerful officials.

In October and November, Dinwiddie did experience some bright spots in his dealings with the Burgesses. In his Opening Address he was not in the mood to negotiate or coddle the Burgesses; the situation on the frontier was desperate and action was desperately needed. His tone was acerbic:

\begin{quote}
I am in Hopes, that during your Short Recess, you have seriously considered the circumstances of your Affairs, and, in Course, the absolute Necessity of granting immediate, considerable, and Adequate Supplies: to enable me to put a Stop to their [French] injurious Designs, and to drive them from his Majesty's Lands upon the Ohio.\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

Clearly, Dinwiddie had had enough with the Burgesses holding the strings to the colonial purse as Virginia's defense collapsed around them. With his strongly worded message ringing in their ears, no doubt, the Burgesses went quickly to work. Within a month, the session had ended, and on a much more positive note this time. The Burgesses and governor had been able to finally come to terms on legislation that was less about their conflict and more about the well-

\textsuperscript{113} Ward, \textit{Unite or Die}, 158-159.
\textsuperscript{114} James Glen to—, August 15, 1754, in Ward, \textit{Unite or Die}, 159.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{JHB}, 222.
being of the colony. Perhaps they finally heard him when he said prior to this session of Assembly “I desire all Annimosities may subside.” Dinwiddie had made this statement to the Assembly back in August, but it was not until after the Burgesses had been prorogued that the realities of the current situation seemed to dawn on them as a whole. Dinwiddie had exerted his energy in ways that should have been unnecessary, and unfortunately, little it seemed had been accomplished because the circumstances continued to deteriorate around him militarily.

In his end-of-the-year transmission to the Board of Trade on the present state of the colony of Virginia, Dinwiddie made it clear where the threat came from. “The Fr...have erected many Fortresses on the Lands belong’g to to the Five Nat’s, who are actually under the Protect’n of G.B.” But that was not all: “They have, for the last seven years, robb’d our Subjects, trading with the Ind’s in our back Co’try, and sent their Persons Prisoners to Quebeck, all w’ch is a most notorious Infract’n.” But he could do little to stop this. He had approximately 480 men left at Wills Creek, and that was in early October. He was also without George Washington, who had decided to resign his commission as Colonel. Dinwiddie was desperately seeking assistance in governing Virginia through the troubled times.

The year 1754 was not a good year for Robert Dinwiddie as the colonial governor of Virginia. Virginia was in a fragile condition: it had a pathetic amount of war materiel, few trained soldiers prepared to conduct military expeditions, fewer officers to lead the soldiers, a vast border to defend, nearly zero Indian allies or scouts to rely on, and what likely seemed to Dinwiddie as an extremely apathetic attitude amongst the Burgesses and Virginia’s citizens.

---

116 Dinwiddie Address to the General Assembly, August 22, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 291-292.
117 Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, January, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 382.
118 Dinwiddie to Lords of Trade, September 23, 1754, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 327.
Unfortunately for Dinwiddie and Virginia, the year 1755 would not present itself any better than 1754 did.

The year started off slowly for Dinwiddie, but by March, events had found Virginia and Dinwiddie united in common purpose and the arrival of General Edward Braddock was the linchpin for this. His arrival in Virginia on February 19, 1755 and his subsequent, and near immediate meeting with Dinwiddie on February 23 revealed the extent of Dinwiddie’s influence and admiration the Ministers in London had for his skills. Dinwiddie was more than a little relieved at Braddock’s arrival: it meant that he no longer had to carry the full weight of war preparations for the colonies single-handedly (which seemed to him he had been doing since 1753). It would take only three more weeks for General’s troops to arrive from Ireland, and when they did land, Dinwiddie’s spirits and his hope for success would ease his stress.\(^{120}\)

Braddock conferred with Dinwiddie over the coming weeks as he prepared for the upcoming campaign season, and the upcoming conference of governors that Braddock was arranging in Annapolis, which would be diverted to Alexandria, in April. Beginning on the 23\(^{rd}\), these two men would discuss the actions of the colonies, and Braddock would concoct a plan of action, both militarily and politically, that would not win him any additional friends in North America. Dinwiddie was ever the loyal subject, yet he also held Braddock in high esteem.\(^{121}\) He personally saw to the general’s efforts to secure the frontier of any French soldiers, and it was in the interests of his King that the governor undertook a major letter writing campaign to organize supplies and queries to many well-connected men throughout the colonies to better provide for Braddock with his needs.

\(^{120}\) Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, February 24, 1755, in *Dinwiddie Recs*, I, 512.

\(^{121}\) Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, June 23, 1755, in *Dinwiddie Recs*, II, 73.
Dinwiddie began this campaign of words to Governor Glen, enlightening him of Braddock's arrival, and informing him that the supplies granted by Virginia were running thin, and added almost as an afterthought how "sorry our neighbouring Colonies are so backw'd in an Affair of so great Consequ'ce to the Nat'n and the British Dom'ns on this Cont't."122 This was one last jab at this governor, who had caused Dinwiddie so much irritation, and who would be relieved of his position by William Henry Lyttleton in 1756 with much effort by Dinwiddie himself.

Another letter was sent the same day to North Carolina governor Dobbs, informing him of Braddock's efforts to reform the Virginia units, and giving an analysis of his first impressions of the general.123 The next day another letter was sent to Pennsylvania governor Robert Hunter Morris inquiring about a shipment of flour that was needed for the Irish regiments when they arrived. Likely in an effort to have Morris abjure his Assembly, Dinwiddie informed him that Braddock was intending to seize the fort at the Forks of the Ohio, and that it was his duty as leader of the province to help Braddock drive the French from these lands. Though a brief letter, its tone was acerbic.124

Dinwiddie was now serving in some manner as Braddock's whip, prodding truculent governors and profit-seeking businessmen into conducting the true business of government. This included feeding the troops when they arrived, which they did during the second week of March. He dealt with minor irritants in providing Braddock's army with the necessary supplies, one including his own commissary. Surprisingly to Dinwiddie, Major John Carlyle was charging a commission for every item he purchased from businessmen, which he transferred to the army.

122 Dinwiddie to Governor James Glen, February 27, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 515.
123 Dinwiddie to Governor Arthur Dobbs, February 27, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 515.
124 Dinwiddie to Governor Robert Hunter Morris, February 28, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 516.
This flabbergasted the governor, and his letter to Carlyle shows "W'h I appointed You Comissary I never imagin'd You w'd have charg'd Comis's as You had a stand'g Salary."125 His very own military officers were milking the system for their own good. This was just a minor frustration for Dinwiddie as he prepared for the army to march on the Ohio. Dinwiddie now was enjoying his position alongside the general, likely because he was able to give his opinion freely, and because his opinion was regarded as something akin to fact.126 That cannot be said for all of the governors, as was proven at the conference held at Alexandria.

As he set out for the conference, Dinwiddie had to recognize that he was feeling very good about Great Britain's chances, and conversely his, in ridding the Ohio of the French. Only a few months earlier, he was writing that there was little chance for victory without support from the Parliament, and that at least two regiments were large enough a force to do complete the task.127 As he traveled up the Potomac that spring, he had to feel assured in these statements. He was involved in the planning for the upcoming military operations, and his personal judgments had been highly valued by London, especially those judgments that assessed the actions (or inactions) of other colonies. In more ways than one, he had influenced action by Great Britain in response to perceived French injuries.

On April 14, 1755 General Edward Braddock convened his council of war at Alexandria, Virginia. In attendance at this conference besides Braddock and Dinwiddie were Augustus Keppel, the commander-in-chief of British naval forces in North America, and governors of the primary colonies, including William Shirley of Massachusetts, James DeLancy of New York, Horatio Sharpe of Maryland, Robert Hunter Morris of Pennsylvania, and Arthur Dobbs of North

125 Dinwiddie to Major John Carlyle, July 9, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 97.
126 Dinwiddie to Lord Fairfax, March 17, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 527.
127 Dinwiddie to the Lords of the Treasury, November 16, 1754 in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 402; Report from Governor Dinwiddie on the Present State of Virginia, January 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 382.

48
Carolina, as well as William Johnson. Left out of this meeting deliberately was James Glen, whose attendance Dinwiddie had much influence over and preferred to politically isolate his nemesis. 

This conference had not a thing to do with strategy, but instead with another concern of the general: money. His army needed, and expected it, from the colonies that they were protecting. This was not a plea, it was a demand and it was not met with gratitude by any of the governors or their assemblies. According to the minutes taken from the council, Braddock wanted a “fund be established comfortable to his Instructions” which originated in October 1754. According to this fund, the colonies were assigned to raise money based upon a quota system. The governors agreed that they would do everything in their power to raise the funds necessary, but in order to fund his upcoming campaign, he would have to utilize his personal credit until the colonies or Home government could settle the bills of expense acquired in the process.

Dinwiddie and the other governors were in unanimous agreement on this issue. It was not the governors who refused to aid Braddock, but the assemblies of the colonies. In fact, the assemblies did raise money for Braddock to use, but they limited the funds to be used for what they determined, thus removing freedom of movement for the general to fight. The governors also recognized that despite his power, Braddock could not govern by decree over the colonies. This would breed contempt amongst the colonists, but he did not realize this. Ironically, the only money that was raised by the colonists and given to Braddock was in the amount of £6,000,

---

128 Ward, Unite or Die, 58, Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988, 147. This is another example of Dinwiddie’s influence amongst powerful governmental officials. His reputation back home was one of being an unreliable governor, though in recent years his reputation has been rehabilitated to some extent, especially his dealings with Native American tribes.

129 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 146. Ward argues in Unite or Die that the request for a common fund came at the request of the crown, and not at the urging of Braddock.
which was given by Glen’s South Carolina. The lack of money and other resources would weigh Braddock and his soldiers down, but there would be other obstacles in the way of the English army as it prepared for an assault on Fort Duquesne in the summer of 1755.

As Braddock marched his very impressive army westwards, with the aid of Colonel George Washington, who was invited to join the general’s entourage, Dinwiddie paced in Williamsburg. By June Dinwiddie was concerned that the speed of Braddock’s march was too slow, and even more concerned that he would not have enough supplies for such a long trek. He continued to serve Braddock’s and Great Britain’s interest in the most aggressive manner by pursuing deserters as well as profiteers, especially in Virginia. Dinwiddie also acted the part of the confident political official, and likely truly felt that way, as many did. Dinwiddie wrote to the Earl of Halifax that “the Gen’l will meet with no great Difficulty in retak’g the Fort they took from us last Sumer.” Of course, he had to state this publicly because he had advocated for two regiments of English soldiers to remove the French, which he received. If he had any doubts about the likelihood of English defeat, this would not be the time to say so.

One obstacle which Dinwiddie had already struggled with was the necessity of using Indians as scouts and soldiers for campaigns in the west. Dinwiddie had promised, perhaps naively, that he could supply the army with Cherokee and other southern tribes along the way to the Ohio, but the feud with Glen had become so that none actually arrived. Dinwiddie was so tired of dealing with Governor Glen that he longed to “hear of Mr. Littleton’s [sic] Arrival.” Glen, he wrote, was a very “wrong-headed Man” because he did not deal with Braddock in an

130 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 147.
131 Dinwiddie to General Edward Braddock, June 3, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 49.
132 Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, June 23, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 72.
appropriate manner.\textsuperscript{133} When news of Braddock's catastrophic defeat became known, Dinwiddie used all of his efforts to indict Glen for his refusal to send his Indians to help.\textsuperscript{134} Dinwiddie dammingly wrote after the news broke governor Arthur Dobbs "Mr. Glen appears to do every Thing in his Power to obstruct the Expedit'n. I cannot conceive his Conduct, as it appears quite contrary to the Int't of the Nation."\textsuperscript{135} Braddock's defeat also taught the Indians in the Ohio region that the British and their American cousins were incapable of defeating the French, and drove them further into France's corner.

Dinwiddie, however, was more alarmed at the realities of having a porous frontier that became extremely vulnerable after Braddock was defeated by the French and Indians on July 9. Dinwiddie received rumors, and then on the 11\textsuperscript{th} of July Dinwiddie received a letter from Colonel James Innes briefly telling of the defeat. Dinwiddie had previously ordered that patrollers be dispatched along the frontier to raise alarm in case of French and Indian incursions took place, but now he took it one step further and ordered the militia in the nine frontier counties to be called out and be prepared in case anything further occurred.\textsuperscript{136} Dinwiddie still held out some hope that the defeat was not true, but Innes' letter had given him "a sensible Concern for the melancholy disaster attend'g Gen'l Braddock and his Forces."\textsuperscript{137}

But the news was confirmed by many who were there to see it. Washington wrote of the defeat and how Braddock was killed on the 18\textsuperscript{th}. On the 25\textsuperscript{th} Dinwiddie wrote to confirm to Sir Thomas Robinson that indeed, the largest army ever assembled to that point in North America

\textsuperscript{133} Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, June 6, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 58. This behavior that Dinwiddie despised had to do with the Bills of Exchange that South Carolina was providing Braddock with to pay for the costs of the campaign. There was no possible way for Braddock to exchange these bills in the Ohio valley, thus Dinwiddie perceived an effort to disable or at least frustrate the campaign.

\textsuperscript{134} Dinwiddie to Governor James Glen, July 28, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 125.

\textsuperscript{135} Dinwiddie to Governor Arthur Dobbs, July 23, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 112.

\textsuperscript{136} Dinwiddie to Governor Horatio Sharpe, June 18, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 75, Dinwiddie to Colonel James Innes, July 14, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 98.

\textsuperscript{137} Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, July 14, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 99.
had been defeated in a rout. As alarming as this was, Dinwiddie hinted at the possibility that the ranking officer, Colonel Thomas Dunbar was actually thinking about sending his men east and into winter quarters in July. As ridiculous as this was, it would have even graver effects on the frontier if it were acted upon. Washington decried the conditions on the frontier in his account to Dinwiddie: "I Tremble at the consequences that this defeat may have upon our back settlers." Indeed, this statement foreshadowed what would take place, and it would leave Dinwiddie struggling to maintain order on the frontier.138 Dinwiddie now undertook another effort, simultaneous to many others: keep Dunbar from abandoning the frontier to the French.

Dinwiddie found out about this possibility in the same letter from Washington, who had written from Fort Cumberland, along the Maryland frontier. He wrote "Colo. Dunbar, who commands at present, intends so soon as his Men are recruited at this place, to continue his March to Philia into Winter Quarter's; so that there will be no Men left here unless it is the poor remains of the Virginia Troops; who now are, & will be too small to guard our Frontiers."139

This was horrifying news for the governor. At the beginning of July, Dinwiddie had begun receiving reports of chaos up and down the Virginia frontier from Indian and French raiding parties. Now, if Dunbar made this decision, settlers would recognize their vulnerability, and would abandon their farmsteads and flood back into the Tidewater region. He had to endeavor to change Dunbar’s mind, which he attempted to do.

Dinwiddie addressed his serious concerns to Dunbar in a letter dated July 26 in which he pleaded with him to reconsider removing east. He implored the colonel "Dear Colo., is there no Method left to retrieve the Dishon'r done to the British Arms? As You now Com'd all the Forces y't rem'n, are You not able after a proper Refreshm't of Y'r Men, to make a second

138 George Washington to Governor Robert Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, in GWW, 59.
139 Washington to Governor Robert Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, in GWW, 59.
Attempt to recover the Loss we have Sustain’d?" He reinforced this effort with a more logical approach—the focus on war materiel and his ability to wage war on the French. Dinwiddie emphasized that despite losing the artillery train, he could reinforce him with at least four hundred Virginians, and Colonel Innes still had a large supply of flour. He recorded that there were approximately eight or nine thousand barrels of pork and beef in the military stores at Alexandria, which would be his immediately. And to supplement the artillery, Dinwiddie explained that he had four twelve-pound guns at Winchester and he could have all of the guns from Fort Cumberland. He then reminded him that he had well near four months left of the good campaigning weather to complete the destruction of the French force, which was plenty of time to return with a replenished fighting force.

Dinwiddie then wrapped up his effort with a return to supplication:

W’t a fine Field for Hon’r will Colo. Dunbar have to confirm and establish his Character as a brave Officer, and w’t will he have in View to retrieve the Loss we sustained the 9th of y’s Mo.! Recover the Train of Artillery and the Hon’r of the British Forces. If You cannot attack their Fortin form You may be able to besiege them, and by prevent’g any Supplies of Provis’s starve them out; for I cannot see where they can be supplied.\[140\\]

This appeal to honor and glory might have worked on some other officer not nearly as unsure of his position as Dunbar was. Dinwiddie continued to question those around Dunbar what the situation actually was. Two days after writing to Dunbar, he wrote to Captain Robert Orme, one of the surviving, though wounded, aide-de-camps of Braddock, if it was not possible to attack a second time and at least retrieve the huge loss of materiel sustained.\[141\\]

The same day he wrote Washington, desperately hunting for a way to have the forces return to the forks and “doing someth’g the other Side of the Mount’s before the Winter Mo’s.”

\[140\\] Dinwiddie to Colonel Thomas Dunbar, July 26, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 118-119.
\[141\\] Dinwiddie to Captain Robert Orme, July 28, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 120.
Dinwiddie again tried to put the situation logically, that after seeing the British forces collapse, many of the French and Indians would simply return to Montreal, and the remaining forces would not be prepared for another attack. This was an extremely well-founded theory, but unfortunately, the only officer capable of making this decision, Orme, had done so. But Dinwiddie had not accepted this as fact. He wrapped this letter to Washington with a firm statement, perhaps written in a state of denial, when he wrote, "Colo. Dunbar will not march into Winter Q’rs in the Middle of Summer and leave the Frontiers of his Majesty’s Colonies open with’t proper Fortificat’s and expos’d to the Invasions of the Enemy."142

By August 7 Dinwiddie was in full acceptance of the decision to retreat from the frontier, though he was not at all pleased by it. He wrote to his friend James Abercromby that Dunbar’s decision “Surprizes all of our People,” which would surely include himself. Now Dinwiddie found that he was back in the position of being held responsible for the incursions that were daily, it seemed, occurring along the frontier.143 The frontier would now be where he placed much of his attention in the remaining years of his administration.

Prior to Braddock’s defeat and Dunbar’s retreat, Dinwiddie had been receiving reports of unrest along the Blue Ridge settlements. As early as July 8, one day before the battle along the Monongahela, an account arrived upon the governor’s desk that revealed a raid of approximately one hundred and fifty French and Indians had occurred in Frederick and Hampshire counties, killing nine entire families and carrying away an unknown number of prisoners, while destroying or stealing the families’ portable property.144

---

142 Dinwiddie to Colonel George Washington, July 28, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 123.
143 Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, August 7, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 144.
144 Dinwiddie to Governor Arthur Dobbs, July 8, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 90.
Dinwiddie quickly responded to this with a letter to Captain Charles Lewis ordering him to Augusta County to protect against the “barbarous Murders” that had been “comitted on Holston’s River w’ch has greatly intimidated the Settlers.” These murders that Dinwiddie wrote about could very well have included Samuel Stalnaker’s family. Dinwiddie ordered Lewis to raise a company of fifty rangers to protect this area of Virginia. The news that he had received worried Dinwiddie, perhaps because it foreshadowed future events to follow, but sensible to the vulnerability of the settlers, he ordered his militia officers to be diligent in their commands and to be on guard against the “barbarous murderers.” The last thing that the governor needed was a tidal wave of terrified settlers streaming eastwards, creating panic as they flooded towards Williamsburg.

As Dinwiddie ordered his Virginia regiment into Augusta County, his officers informed him of their doubts to raise enough soldiers to combat the ravaging forces. This infuriated the governor to the extent that he was less than polite in his dealings with the county leaders. How, he wondered, was it that small parties of “Banditti” could succeed in their barbarities, while the people of Augusta County sat there and did not organize themselves to protect their homes and their families? This pondering was meant to provide the people of the county with a backbone, but it did not work. On the same day that he wrote Augusta County militia Colonel Stewart, he wrote Colonel James Patton, fearing what the impact of panic of these settlers would be on the other parts of the frontier. Dinwiddie insinuated that if these people had been led accordingly, they would overcome all possible threats and fight like Englishmen. What he found out about this time was that fighting like Englishmen was not enough, since the largest

145 Dinwiddie to Captain Charles Lewis, July 8, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 91.
146 Dinwiddie to Lieutenant William Wright, July 8, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 92.
147 Dinwiddie to Colonel David Stewart, July 16, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 100.
English army ever assembled in the colonies was now scurrying back over the Alleghenies towards Philadelphia!

When word of the catastrophe of Braddock's defeat leaked back to Williamsburg, Dinwiddie took all precautions necessary to further protect the frontier as well as possible. In the same letter to Colonel Innes in which he acknowledged receipt of the news, Dinwiddie informed him that he had ordered that the militia in the frontier counties be called out, organized and to prepare for any and all contingency plans. Dinwiddie was now going to have to somehow find a plug to stop the flood that had given way on the frontier.

Dinwiddie continued fretting over the conditions on the frontier. He was not one to be reactive to the next disaster, so he began ordering blank commissions to be issued to men of the many respective counties. He was also concerned with the state of arms in the counties. He pressed the leaders of each county to provide him with a detailed list of the amount of arms, shot, and gun powder their armories held, as well as queried them on their financial capabilities to purchase more, if necessary. As commander-in-chief of the Virginia Militia, Dinwiddie was strongly taking a position of preparation in what he expected to be a long summer. But he was encountering problems at nearly every turn.

Augusta County was providing more than its share of headaches for the governor. In a letter to Colonel William Byrd, he used language that clearly conveyed his irritation with the settlers of the county. Writing Byrd, that the people of Augusta County “complain” of not having any officers for their militia, Dinwiddie asked him to fill the commissions with those most worthy. He showed his agitation after declaring that he would do everything he could to protect them, by stating “but I observe if they had put the Act of Assembly in force they w’d now

---

149 Dinwiddie to Colonel James Innes, July 14, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 98.
150 Dinwiddie to Benjamin Robinson, July 18, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 106.
have been properly Arm'd.”151 This was his method of saying that had they taken action when he and the Assembly ordered all of the frontier counties, they would not find themselves in such a perilous position. Dinwiddie was not done thrashing Augusta County. Dinwiddie, perhaps tired of hearing of the difficulties of one county, wrote:

If the Militia w’d only in small Numb’s appear with proper Spirit, the Banditti of Ind’s w’d not face them; but it appears to me y’t the inhabit’ts of Augusta have been seiz’d with a Pannick in allowing a few Ind’s to bully all y’t Co’ty. A small Resolut’n w’d have defeated their Designs.”152

This last statement not only proves his frustration with the settlers’ inabilities to deal with small raiding parties, but also his lack of comprehension as to the importance of keeping up the morale of the frontier. Dinwiddie can be excused, however, for stating this in such a manner because he had tried to warn the residents to the impending danger.

On his word, Dinwiddie took more precautions for the security of the frontier. On July 23, he began writing a string of letters to neighboring governors, other significant political figures within the Ministry. He wrote to inform them of the troubles being experienced on the frontier, and his intentions as to how to quell the fear amongst Virginians. This included reinforcements for Fort Cumberland, in Maryland. He also confirmed to his superiors in London the inefficiency and inabilities of the militia to be of any worth in securing protection along the frontiers, especially from Indians. Dinwiddie also made it quite clear as to who he wished Virginians would act more like: New Englanders. He wrote to the Earl of Halifax that he sincerely wished that Virginians “had such martial Spirits as those in N. Engl’d,” and could

151 Dinwiddie to Colonel William Byrd, July 22, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 110.
152 Dinwiddie to Colonel William Byrd, July 22, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 110.
somehow overcome their "lethargic Indolence."\textsuperscript{153} There was another reason why Virginia posed such a difficulty in raising forces and money to protect the frontier; Virginia had other people to fret over.

These individuals that many Virginians feared were the African slaves in their midst. The Virginians' fear of a slave uprising was more of a threat to the residents of the Tidewater region of Virginia than to any other part of the colony. Numbers of total slaves in Virginia in the 1750s are not available, but in 1745 the population was approximately 85,300. In 1760 the population had grown to nearly 130,900. When compared to the white population in 1745 (148,300) and 1760 (196,300) it becomes clear why whites were fearful. Black slaves made up somewhere between 37\% and 40\% of the total population of Virginia during Governor Dinwiddie's tenure.\textsuperscript{154} With these numbers facing him, Dinwiddie had to bow to the political pressure bearing down on him, especially from those prominent and politically connected slave-owning Tidewater families. This was powerful reason enough for Dinwiddie to recognize. He had to state as much when he wrote to the Earl of Halifax that he must leave a proper No. in each Co'ty tp protect it from the Combinations of the Negro Slaves, who have been very audacious on the Defeat on the Ohio. We have too many here, but I hope we shall be able to defeat the Designs of our Enemies and keep these Slaves in proper Subject'n.\textsuperscript{155} The fear of a slave revolt was a major factor in Dinwiddie being unable or unwilling to send any additional forces to the frontier region. This added a psychological element to the wealthy that many on the frontier would not

\textsuperscript{153} See Dinwiddie to Governor Arthur Dobbs, July 23, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 111; Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, July 23, 1755 in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 112; and Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, July 23, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 113-114.


\textsuperscript{155} Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, July 23, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 114.
have identified with. Their fear was due to the Indians, and it would not have been a surprise if
Samuel Stanaker had reacted to Virginia’s incapacity to protect them simply because politicians
were afraid of the very tool the wealthy used to remain prosperous and powerful, slaves. By far
the largest population of slaves at this time was in the Tidewater and not in the west. This had to
have added the element, at least from the perspective of the frontier family like Stalnaker’s, of an
us-versus-them attitude.

The news of Braddock’s defeat had the very effect that Dinwiddie had tried to protect
against: chaos. Dinwiddie desperately tired to quell this feeling. He called the Burgesses into
session on August 5, rather than in October, due to the present state of affairs. He put four
requests in front of this session, and they were: better militia law; a price on the scalps of enemy
Indians; more money for conducting the war; and construct a guard room to protect
Williamsburg’s city magazine. 156

Within three days, the Burgesses had found a method to raise £40,000, through a series of
new taxes on all items imported into the colony, except Madeira, run, molasses, salt and
provisions. 157 This met Dinwiddie’s call for financial support, and the legislature continued with
conducting its business in an efficient manner. By the end of August, the Burgesses had supplied
the governor with the legislation he had asked for, and on August 23, 1755 Dinwiddie signed the
following bills into Virginia’s law books:

1. An Act for raising the Sum of Forty Thousand Pounds...
2. An Act for the better Regulation and Training of the Militia
3. An Act for amending an Act, intitled, An Act for making Provision against Invasions and
Insurrections
4. An Act for preventing and repelling the hostile Incursions of the Indians, at Enmity with
the Inhabitants of this Colony. 158

156 JHB, 298.
157 JHB, 302.
158 JHB, 314.
Upon proroguing of the Assembly, Dinwiddie’s spirits had been raised by the attitudes of the Burgesses. He showed his appreciation towards the Burgesses by complimenting them on showing “a martial spirit” in working hard throughout the session.\textsuperscript{159}

But this did not solve the problems of a major deficiency in military supplies. Dinwiddie inquired of Admiral Boscawen while the Burgesses were in session whether or not he could supply Virginia with 400 small arms weapons, powder, lead, or bombs from stores his forces may have seized from the French. In order to not sound like a sniveling colonial mouse, he explained that all of his weapons had been given to New York and New Jersey for the operations in the north against Crown Point and Fort Niagara.\textsuperscript{160} By the end of August Dinwiddie had raised seven companies of rangers to protect the frontier, but the small parties of Indians continued to instill fear there. By this time, Dinwiddie was reserving blame for the frontier on Colonel Dunbar, who had left the area “destitute” of any professional assistance.\textsuperscript{161} But he promised his superiors that he would continue to do his best to defend His Majesty’s lands.

By November of that year, Dinwiddie found himself in a slightly better situation than he was in August. Admiral Boscawen managed to provide Virginia with 500 barrels of gunpowder and 400 small arms in order to further protect against raids. This came at a perfect time for Virginia, as the magazine was empty of these needed items. There were approximately 1,200 soldiers stationed at Fort Cumberland and Winchester, which provided a stabilizing force on the frontier.\textsuperscript{162} This force included Colonel George Washington’s Virginia Regiment, which had been constituted by Dinwiddie after the defeat of Braddock that summer. But this was only a

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{JHB}, 319.
\textsuperscript{160} Dinwiddie to Admiral Boscawen, August 18, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 160.
\textsuperscript{161} Dinwiddie to Secretary of War Henry Fox, August 20, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 164.
\textsuperscript{162} Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, November 17, 1755, in \textit{Dinwiddie Recs}, II, 268.
token force, and they would continue to struggle well into 1757 with a lack of supplies, men and even appreciation by those whom they were defending.

Dinwiddie reported to the Lords of Trade that the frontier was susceptible to attack, but with the news that the Cherokee had gone to war with the Shawnee and French, the future was looking better. Dinwiddie, however, wanted to make sure that the Cherokee remained active in the war against the French, so he took it upon himself to provide them with ammunition. Indian allies had always been an important aspect of this war, and now Virginia had a powerful ally, though it was questionable as to how determined the ally was to fight. In hindsight, the Cherokee and Catawbas did not help Virginia that much, and wisely stayed out of the Ohio Valley.

Virginia and its governor, Robert Dinwiddie, were beginning to feel the strain of bearing the weight of supporting, financing and fighting a war against unseen French and Indian attackers. Events would not make Dinwiddie's duties any easier. As he grew ill and weakened by the many strenuous tasks facing him, he found himself desiring a return home to Scotland. Events in 1756 and 1757 would not improve all that much, despite his best efforts. What changed was the focus of the war; it moved north into New York and New England, and Virginia became a secondary theatre of war, though this did not make losing one's family any easier to bear for Virginians along the Holston River in the Alleghenies. In fact, by June of 1756, the frontier had been rolled back nearly 150 miles east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Raids on the frontier continued until the war ended in North America in September 1760 when Governor General Vaudreuil surrendered Canada to Great Britain.

---

163 Dinwiddie to the Lords of Trade, November 15, 1755, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 292.
164 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 192.
165 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 406.
The closing chapter to the career of Robert Dinwiddie as governor of Virginia came after he had landed safely back in Great Britain. With his efforts, Virginia had made it through the war with relatively little disturbance after 1755 compared to New England, New York and even Pennsylvania. But as he was leaving, trouble still brewed on the frontier. That April, events on the frontier showed just how weak Virginia still was. Previously, Virginia’s policy on the frontier was to construct a series of forts approximately twenty miles apart. This policy resulted in the construction of Fort Seybert, and the events that played out involving it showed that despite expending a vast amount of materiel, resources and manpower, Virginia was still exposed to attacks.

In spring 1758, Shawnee Indians loyal to the French were still making raids along the branches of the Potomac River, in present-day West Virginia. This was one of the forts constructed under the directions of Governor Dinwiddie and the Assembly under their plans to protect the frontier, but March had passed, and the fort and the people around it, were about to discover how at risk they still were to the ravages of Indian raids. The efforts of Dinwiddie to protect these settlers would still fall tragically short.

Early in the morning of April 28, 1758, Colonel Dyer and his sister were outside the palisade fort conducting business when they came upon a Shawnee party of between 40 and 50 warriors. Dyer and his sister quickly turned themselves back towards the fort and were seized as they attempted to gain entrance.166 The commander of the log circular stockade, thirty yards in diameter, with walls of twelve feet, Captain Seybert knew that the situation his garrison found

---

themselves in was poor. With little ammunition to defend themselves, Seybert decided it was best to negotiate with the besiegers, rather than open fire immediately on the Shawnee force. He appeared to be successful in his bribing of the Indians, for when he returned to the fort, the gates were opened and the Indians were allowed in.

The arrangement that Captain Seybert had made with the leaders of the Indian force was to permit them to seize any and all articles of value, including money, which was quickly done. However, this was not the end of the matter. Within moments of the valuables being handed over, the Indians unleashed a war whoop, and proceeded to scalp perhaps as many as ten of the thirty inhabitants. One of the first to be cut down was Captain Seybert himself, he who had made the decision, against the feelings of many in the fort, to submit to the Shawnee raiding party. The remaining survivors, perhaps around twenty were in shock from the bloodletting and gross amounts of savagery. They were bound and taken outside the fort. Shortly, they would be forced into captivity, and into the clutches of a people who had violated the European principles of warfare. These principles held no sway in colonial frontier warfare-and they would be forced to recognize this when the fort was torched, leaving only a skeleton of their previous lives inside it.

This was life on the frontier in all its horrors and brutalities. This was what families like the Stalnakers, Seyberts and Dyers accepted daily by living in such an environment. At any time their lives or their family’s could be taken, whether it was from famine, disease or an Indian}

---

168 Myers, History of West Virginia, 195-196.
169 Alexander Scott Withers, ed. Rueben Gold Thwaites, “Fort Seybert Massacre,” in Chronicles of Border Warfare, 1895. http://wvculture.org/history/settlement/fortseybert02.html Talbot stipulates that there may have been as many as sixty inhabitants at the time of the attack.
170 Withers, “Fort Seybert Massacre.”
raiding party. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of colonial officials like Robert Dinwiddie, little could be done to provide adequate security. The frontier was simply too vast, too sparsely populated, and too far away from Williamsburg to remain a significant factor in the minds of colonial legislators.

Robert Dinwiddie had done everything in his power as colonial governor to protect and defend Virginia from external security threats. As he boarded the ship to take him back to Great Britain on January 12, 1758 he had to be appreciative of the prospect of retirement away from the politics of Virginia. Despite having to endure hardship, misunderstanding, jealousy, and competition for nearly six years, and thus was exhausted when he sought Prime Minister William’s acceptance of his resignation in 1757, he was leaving under his own volition. The Virginia that he left was very much different from the colony he had been selected to govern in 1752. The Virginia that he parted ways with was better suited to fight raids along the frontier, though not to the extent that was needed. He had led Virginia to the realization that its future claims more significant in the Ohio Valley, and not the lands of present-day Tennessee and Kentucky.

Virginia had shown a remarkable ability to hold its own against an aggressive French and Indian effort to roll back the western frontiers, though with noticeable losses that were not the sole fault of the governor. With limited military experience, Dinwiddie did make some errors in judgment, such as the decision to construct a chain of forts along the frontier without enough trained soldiers to garrison these strongholds. But he had recognized the military value of the southern Indians as allies and the significance of the Ohio valley to the British Empire. Dinwiddie did err in his decision to enforce a fee on land grants early in his tenure, which

---

171 Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie, 395.
alienated many in the Burgesses. Dinwiddie saw the benefit of inter-colonial relations and how
the colonists, if given the backing of the British government, could support and protect
themselves from Indian attacks. Dinwiddie should gain more recognition as a man who saw
Virginia through some of the worst conditions the colony had every experienced, not the
opposite.

Some historians have attempted to detract from the efforts of Dinwiddie’s time as
governor. Edmund Randolph wrote that following the defeat of Braddock’s army, “that defense,
though in this case tardy from the inattention of the governor” was a secondary element to the
politics of the time.172 The argument that he failed to act in defense of the colony was not true.
Dinwiddie acted as early as December 1751 when he had requested Conrad Weiser to the
Logstown Conference to negotiate with the Ohio Indians.173 Dinwiddie could only do what the
Assembly would grant him money to do; thus, blame cannot solely be directed towards him.
One must remember it was Dinwiddie who communicated with the Ministry in London as to the
French designs on the Ohio.

Another argument against Dinwiddie was his supposed ill-treatment towards Washington
in the early events of the war, and later in the 1750s, as Dinwiddie’s tenure came to a close.
These arguments are easily defeated because it was Washington who wrote to his commander
(Dinwiddie) to complain about his level of pay. It was Washington who made such a fiasco out
of this ordeal that he refused to serve until he was given the honor of serving as an aide-de-camp
to Braddock. Washington refused to come back into the service of his colony until he had
attained the rank of colonel--this was not Dinwiddie’s doings, but the Assembly. Dinwiddie was

172 Edmund Randolph, History of Virginia, 165-166.
173 Dinwiddie to Conrad Wieser, December 12, 1751, in Dinwiddie Recs, I, 6.
simply trying to maintain some semblance of a military force before Braddock arrived, and afterwards as well.

Dinwiddie was also limited as to what achievements he could aspire to as commander of the Virginia militia. He could not order the militia out of the colony—that had to come at the permission of the Assembly. He could not raise funds on his own—again, that came at the instigation of the Assembly, notably the Burgesses. In times of war, a strong executive officer was needed to manage the country (or colony) and Dinwiddie recognized this. Unfortunately, the Virginia House of Burgesses refused to assent to this, as they perceived a tyrannical threat upon their liberties as Englishmen.

Dinwiddie was rightfully exasperated with this behavior, often writing to his friend James Abercromby, or his superiors in London, whether it was the Earl of Halifax, William Pitt, the Lords of Trade or Henry Fox, complaining of the stubbornness of the Burgesses and their refusal to assent to his commands. One should not have expected a politically weakened governor to defend a colony that, through its actions, acted as if it was indifferent to its own security.

Robert Dinwiddie was not the weak, incompetent, avaricious politician that colonial historians have labeled him. He was not inordinately selfish or duplicitous. He was earnest in his desire to serve his king and his country. He simply did the best that he had to work with—no thanks to an obstinate Burgesses and intractable Tidewater population. Had he been able to quickly overcome his blunder with the pistole fee, or had the Burgesses been willing to let the past be, Virginia would have been more of a stalwart in its preparations for the war that erupted on its borders. Instead, Dinwiddie and the Burgesses skirmished until the very end, the Burgesses ever-watchful of an infringement upon their rights as legislators and representatives of

174 Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie, 395. Koontz also takes issue with this assumption. He was not, he argues, a "persona non grata in Virginia."
the people. He was not seeking to reduce their status in the English government, nor was he trying to enhance his reputation, he was attempting to follow the commands of the senior members of the government in Whitehall.

In determining his legacy as governor during what one historian labeled "a world war," credence must be given to those who commented upon his retirement from Virginia politics in 1758 and played a role in the events that surrounded his administration. Those who wrestled with him in the political arena, the time for them to "come forward with the unvarnished truth," as Louis Knott Koontz so tactfully explained, was now. But they did not criticize him or his policies. Instead they published an address that read:

We...beg leave to return your honor our unfeigned acknowledgments for the great care and assiduity with which you have transacted the public affairs during your administration in this colony...Permit us, sir, in a more particular manner, to return your honor our thanks for the kind regard you have shown to the interest and welfare of this city [Williamsburg]...and at the same time to assure you that we do, with the greatest sincerity, wish your honor and family an agreeable voyage to England, and that you may there enjoy every felicity which reason can suggest or your prudence require. Thus, it appeared that there were truly no hard feelings, at least from the colony as an entity towards Dinwiddie. Others wrote that Dinwiddie’s retirement was a loss for the colony, and hoped that the new governor Francis Fauquier would make up the loss, as John Blair, then president of the Virginia council wrote. On Dinwiddie’s part, he felt a deep affinity to the colony even after he returned to Scotland, serving the interests of Virginia for nearly a decade.

---

175 Anderson, Crucible of War, Introduction, xxi.
176 Address of the Corporation of Williamsburg to Robert Dinwiddie, January, 1758, in Dinwiddie Recs, II, 724-725.
177 John Blair to the Lords of Trade, June 20, 1758, in Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie, 398.

67
until his death in 1770.178 This shows not only his loyalties, but his appreciation for the general population of the colony.

Robert Dinwiddie was a resilient leader who provided Virginia with the leadership it desperately needed to survive the ravages of the French and Indian War. He supervised the creation of the Virginia Regiment, a military force independent of the British Army, and a chain of forts throughout the frontier of the colony, which was not adequately funded or manned. He had established positive relations with the southern Indians, as well as maintained open communications with the other colonial governors, though this did not always mean success would follow. He did very well with what he had to work with and even improved Virginia’s standing amongst the colonies. Robert Dinwiddie simply worked with what he had available. This was not what the Stalnakers or Dyers or even the Seyberts wanted to hear, but had he had more cooperation from the wealthy Tidewater politicians, Dinwiddie would have been able to defend them and Virginia better.

178 Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie, 396.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


LaRoche, M. de. *A Letter from Quebec, in Canada, to M. L’Maine, a French Officer*. Boston, 1754.


Secondary Sources


