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Title of Dissertation: A Critical Approach to Cultural Adaptations: A Case Study on the Localization of Norms of Authority and Gender Politics in TV Series Adaptations in Turkey

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ABSTRACT

Title of Document:	A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CULTURAL ADAPTATIONS: A CASE STUDY ON THE LOCALIZATION OF NORMS OF AUTHORITY AND GENDER POLITICS IN TV SERIES ADAPTATIONS IN TURKEY
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This dissertation examines cultural adaptations of transnational television series as a means to study how media globalization plays out at the local/national level. Through a critical perspective, the study investigates if and how cultural adaptations contribute to the maintenance of the politico-cultural status quo and discusses their potential for disrupting existing ideological formations by inspiring the audience to engage in critical self-reflections.

Focusing on contemporary localized versions of global television in Turkey, the study explores how cultural adaptations perpetuate existing relations of power, especially amidst intense socio-economic transformation. The study particularly scrutinizes the ways in which cultural adaptations of television dramas, one of the most popular TV genres in Turkey, affirm or challenge cultural norms of authority and gender.

Using multimodal critical discourse analysis as its analytical framework, the dissertation offers a comprehensive study comprising quantitative and qualitative data from cultural adaptations of six television series and compares them with their traveling other. By tracing the textual and narratological divergences between the remakes and their source texts, with a particular focus on dialog, camerawork, narrative structure, musical score, and mise-en-scene, it investigates how issues of power and gender are reconfigured and articulated idiosyncratically at the local level. Analysis of global television texts and the localization process enables the researcher not only to study the local particularities of cultural globalization in the making but also to reveal the global remaking of the local. The findings offer new insights into how culture, politics and media intersect in the construction of varying narratives of national identity, gender and power relations.

A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CULTURAL ADAPTATIONS: A CASE STUDY
ON THE LOCALIZATION OF NORMS OF AUTHORITY AND GENDER
POLITICS IN TV SERIES ADAPTATIONS IN TURKEY

By

Ibrahim Er

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Sema Ataoğlu Er, and son, Halil Emre Er, whose unwavering love, support, and encouragement have always enriched my soul and inspired me to keep my passions alive in this unique journey of my life.

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Introduction

This dissertation examines cross-cultural television format adaptations as a means to study how media globalization is experienced distinctively at the national level. In other words, it investigates how cultural adaptation mechanisms manifest themselves in the reproduction of formats in different national contexts; and how this globalization constructs varying narratives of national identity according to localized versions of the same narrative foundation. To this end, it studies six television format adaptations from Turkey: *Galip Derviş* (*Monk*), *Bizim Hikaye* (*Shameless*), *Bir Aile Hikayesi* (*This is Us*), *Sayın Bakanım* (*Yes, Minister*), *Kavak Yelleri* (*Dawson's Creek*) and *Mucize Doktor* (*Good Doctor/The Good Doctor*). By tracking and tracing patterns of textual and narratological divergences and similarities, both qualitatively and quantitatively, between the localized versions of the six formats and their traveling other, it explores the ways in which cultural discourses and identities are reconstructed, and relationships are redefined divergently during the adaptation process. In my analyses of these cultural remakes, I particularly focus on how their reformulated narratives affirm or challenge historically established cultural norms of authority and gender roles dominant in their new home.

What is Format?

In this dissertation, I use "format" to refer to individual television programs of any genre that producers around the world buy, or borrow, to remake their

local/national adaptations (Straubhaar, 2012).[1] Given their potential to generate high financial returns as already successful programs in at least one other national setting, these nomadic television programs travel across borders and through time with ease, severing their ties with their country of origin and culture. Their delocalized formulas become part of a global exchange network that producers from many cultures feed off of, albeit in varying degrees, to satisfy their national audience and maximize their profits.

Despite their global popularity and potential advantages, however, the cultural reproduction of television formats is never an easy and straightforward process because they are never readily accepted and remade as a replica of a purported original in the countries where they are replanted. The changing taste, needs, and expectations of viewers in each country, and the conditions of the local political dynamics, laws, rules, regulations, and industrial conventions impel producers to read and reinterpret the imported format through their domestic lenses and reformulate its formula so that they can gather the largest home audiences possible (Ricoeur, 1984; Straubhaar, 1991; Van Keulen, 2016). In doing so, they use the imported format as a general framework, a guide, or "a recipe," in Moran's (2008: 461; 2009) terms, to construct culturally-specific alternative and unique narratives of the same program, insofar as the format's formula allows. During this re-generative and transformative

[1] Derived from the Latin word "formatus (liber)," which means "shaped (book)," the term "format" was initially used in the printing industry to describe the form, shape and size of a book (Moran, 2004). However, with the advent of new media and new literacies in the last century, there has been a semantic extension and shift in its meaning. First in radio discourse, and more recently, in television discourse, "format" has come to describe a certain type of program with a set of predetermined and invariable elements that allow different producers around the world to remake and adapt the same program at different times, or simultaneously, for different viewer groups (Moran, 2004).

adaptation process, the format's plotline and its cultural references, characters and their identities, and the aesthetics of the program are reshaped and recreated based on the common characteristics of the home national culture, as prefigured by the producer.2

At the end of the adaptation process, each new cultural iteration that emerges as a product of the conversation between the complex and competing forces of cultural and economic globalization, on the one hand, and the particularities of local/national and regional histories, cultures, and people, on the other, features a distinctive design and discursive structure. Despite its evident intertextual connection and reference to one or more preceding works, the culturally-reshaped narrative constructs and represents its own set of cultural, social, and political problems and identities within its new national/cultural context and solves them in its own idiosyncratic ways. Vinicius Navarro (2012: 25) explains this re-genesis as follows:

> [W]hile we may say that all performances derive from a "template" defined a priori – an 'iterable model' – it is the actualization of that model that distinguishes each individual performance… By analogy, we can argue that [television] format adaptations, too, [are unique performances that] actualize an existing model and situate it in new contexts. And we can claim that even though the adaptation may derive from an original template, its cultural significance cannot be confined to this derivative status.

2 In today's globalizing world, the process of prefiguring the expectations, interests and tastes of a viewer group may be complicated at an unprecedented scale by complex, dynamic cultural forces and ideological fluidity and diversity at national, sub-national, supranational/geocultural, and cultural-linguistic levels. While I do recognize the existence of such complexities and contestations, I argue that television production today is still a predominantly national phenomenon characterized and manipulated by the dominant cultural knowledge that is taken for granted by the majority at the national level. Thus, the prefiguration is often rooted in the majority and its concurring opinions in a country (Moran, 2009).

Format adaptations, in this sense, are more than entertainment television. Their culturally refashioned narrative content and style are often a manifestation and result of political-economic, social, historical, and cultural conditions of the respective home country and, thus, open up a promising avenue for researchers to analyze cultural/national production, dissemination, and preservation of knowledge in the country. In them, we find everyday politics and discourses, social norms, values and praxis. They define cultural identities and relationships and hold power to relegate anything unconventional or "culturally unacceptable" to the margins. In short, they shape, and are shaped by, the material and discursive conditions of everyday life in each country, and thus beg scholarly inquiry.

Identified Research Gap and the Research Question

The theoretical overview of media globalization and adaptation since the early twentieth century, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 1, indicates a growing optimism about the effects of cultural remakes of television formats on the maintenance of cultural uniqueness. Given their culturally driven perspectives and idiosyncratic interpretations of stories and realities, as explained in the previous section, cultural remakes are often regarded as a response of national cultures to the homogenizing effects of once-fearful media imperialism. This optimism manifests itself in the celebratory writings of many media and globalization theorists such as Straubhaar (1991), Fabietti (1995), Appadurai (1996) and Waisbord & Jalfin (2009).

Although these empowering characteristics of cultural remakes are valid and important for the study of media globalization, the weighted emphasis on the positive aspects of cultural remakes in the literature also causes some of the pitfalls included

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in the adaptation process to go unnoticed. These include especially the reproduction

and perpetuation of certain prevailing discourses of discrimination, oppression and

inequality (e.g., gender roles, racist discriminations) for the sake of consolidating

national unity and the dominant culture, also known as the status quo. To address this

pitfall involved in cultural adaptations and the research gap in the study of formats,

this dissertation seeks to answer the following research question: Do culturally-

adapted formats contribute to the maintenance of the politico-cultural status quo of

the adapting country, or are they used to disrupt existing ideological, cultural, and

institutional formations by providing alternative perspectives and inspiring the

audience to engage in critical self-reflection?

The Rationale for Textual Analysis

In television studies (and film studies), one of the biggest concerns since the

1970s has been how much "the rich 'work-internal' organization apparently exhibited

by texts or films" can unveil "the evident 'work-external' interpretative processes of

actual readers, hearers, and viewers" (Bateman & Schmidt, 2012: 39). In other words,

how likely is it that analyzing a text can tell us about the social underpinnings behind

it and its reception by an audience? This question underlies the long-known criticism

against Neoformalists (Structuralist Film Semioticians) in film studies, whose focus is

mainly on the aesthetics/stylistics of films (form) "at the expense of broader cultural,

ideological, institutional issues [content]" (Chandler & Munday, 2011: 292). In other

words, Neoformalists attempt to reveal the systematic and scientific internal structure

of the form at the expense of content and its social implications. This separation is

also what makes the distinction between structuralist/normative film criticism and

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subjective/impressionist film criticism. My text-centric analysis of format adaptations, within this dichotomy, may also be vulnerable to the same criticism as Neoformalism; that is, why study the text, rather than the audience (the society) itself, in order to know about the social? It is, therefore, necessary to justify my approach to television and situate my work within the field of television and film studies.

In today's post-structuralist critical climate, it would be controversial and heretical to deny the involvement of the audience in the meaning-making process. As Stuart Hall (1973), the founding father of Cultural Studies, states, television is always encoded and laden with multiple meanings, which can only be decoded distinctively by an audience. It is this fluid, polysemic nature of television that often draws the academic attention towards the decoding process or the text-as-decoded, the premise of reception studies.

However, it is equally important to acknowledge that the polysemy found in television does not necessarily mean a free-ranging, limitless plurality; it is a structured polysemy (Hall, 1973; Butler, 2012). Television is not an all-in-one magic box; that is, it does not show us everything. The programs we watch are never a full repertoire of all possibilities. For example, it would be rare, if not unheard of, to see a TV show that tells the story of a gay couple in a country where the dominant culture and state regulations are strictly for heteronormativity – unless the marriage at issue is alienated and marginalized. Also, we often see minority groups and cultures and their discourses being otherized or silenced in favor of the dominant culture (Butler, 2012).

These indicate that what we watch on television is always a preselected collection and design of paradigmatic and syntagmatic choices of producers, in its

broader sense, who operate as cultural and political actors within the structures of their society and its governing institutions and regulations, including the national media industry. The choices they make have an effect on the audience reception. Their politico-culturally shaped designs prepare and promote certain ways of understanding realities by highlighting certain discourses while shadowing others. For instance, the musical score and lighting chosen for a particular scene or a zoom-in to a character's face at a certain moment of a narrative or the physical characteristics of an actor chosen to represent a character have the potential to trigger certain "preferred readings" (Hall, 1973: 9). This makes encoding a process as important as decoding, and it is, therefore, the aim of this dissertation to study the boundaries of television's polysemy and construction of national identities in countries as formulated and encoded by national media industries and producers.

In the case of cross-cultural format adaptations, the importance of the encoding process is elevated because the reformulation or cultural adaptation of the intended (preferred) readings in the remake becomes evident in the presence of a preceding source text that is already encoded with other alternative preferred readings. The reproducer's reformulation cannot be dissected in isolation from its cultural and ideological context because the social/culture almost always constitutes the basis for the relocalization of the format. The local producer, operating as a cross-cultural mediator in between the traveling other and the dominant culture in her/his country – whether or not she/he adheres to that discursive formation – reinterprets and transforms the text in the most appropriate way to her/his intended audience. Therefore, by working televisual productions backward toward their shooting script

and comparatively tracking the cross-cultural reproduction of intended meanings in the text-as-encoded, researchers access not only the semiotic (multimodal) work of a particular designer (producer). Instead, they can also access a myriad of local sociocultural, political, economic and industrial factors (expectations and obligations) that govern the media producer's paradigmatic and syntagmatic selections and decisions at the time of reproduction. For instance, to continue with a similar example as above, seeing a gay character in a format being changed into a straight character in an adaptation cannot simply be viewed as a personal choice of the reproducer but should be analyzed within the broader spectrum of the dominant cultural order in the country and its binding institutional obligations. Overall, in contrast to the Neoformalist approach, this research project's analysis of format adaptations does not aim to merely find out and describe the structure/system/language of format texts, but rather how they are culturally shaped in compliance with the dominant cultural and social expectations.[3]

Finally, it is important to note that transnational format texts can also serve as a detour for international researchers to access and study various aspects of regional (television) cultures that are inaccessible or hard-to-access otherwise (such as local industrial conventions, cultural "reception" of a foreign media text, and ideological state policies in a country). In other words, because local producers are bound to comply with such local standards and expectations to a great extent when reproducing

[3] This culture-centered aspect of television format adaptations also resonates with the principles of social semiotics and multimodality, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 4, in which culture and the social are always brought to forefront, as the affordances and meanings of modes always vary across cultures and groups. Looking at the cross-culturally divergent orchestration of modes in different versions of the same program through intercultural lenses brings light to the paradigmatic and syntagmatic construction of local discourses.

and localizing a foreign text, the reinterpreted format text becomes a visible and discursive manifestation of the local (social) values, state policies, industrial dynamics, viewer expectancies, and so on. By reverse-engineering these texts, researchers can have access to otherwise inaccessible discourses and knowledge(s).

Methodology

An important aspect of this case study is its multimodal approach to cultural adaptations. Multimodality asserts the idea that "meaning" at all times and in all communicative occurrences is always constructed and carried through the orchestration of multiple modes of communication rather than on the basis of a single mode (Bateman, 2008/2013; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). In television discourse, these modes may include, but are not limited to, the dialog (linguistic and paralinguistic elements), camera angles and movements, shot size, *mise-en-scene*, lighting, narrative structure (sequencing of the scenes), transitions, and musical score. Each of these modes of communication located in the visual, verbal and aural tracks of the program, and their paradigmatic and syntagmatic arrangement along the filmic timeline are what constitute a televisual narrative, and thus beg inquiry. Using "multimodal critical discourse analysis" (Machin, 2013), which will hereafter be referred to as MCDA, as my methodology, I explore the multimodal landscapes of the six format adaptations, and reverse engineer (Bordwell, 2005) their distinctive construction to shed light on their discursive anatomy. This allows me to study the various ways in which relocalization takes place and to conduct a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of the political and cultural discursive formations produced in the iterations. In other words, I comparatively analyze how various televisual modes

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and semiotic resources in the localized versions are re-orchestrated and reconfigured by the local producers and disclose culturally specific discourses that the culturally-shaped formats construct and disseminate in their new home.

Another important aspect of the study is the incorporation of both qualitative and quantitative data in the analysis because cultural adaptation in a localized text may not always reveal itself qualitatively to the naked eye but can be understood in numbers, as well, such as the number of times a particular gender or race is shown throughout an episode, or the amount of speech uttered by a specific character. In this quest, each divergent element becomes important because it may be shadowing (or indicating) a cultural discrepancy and/or highlighting a local discourse. In pursuit of these distinctive cultural patterns in the formats, I first analyze each show holistically and quantitatively to uncover any discursive formations hidden in the temporal structuring of the remakes. To collect, compile, compare and visualize these data from the series, I utilize digital analytical tools such as Multimodal Analysis Video™ and Microsoft Excel™, which I further explain in Chapter 4. These tools help me segment and annotate time-stamped data nodes composed of various narratological and stylistics elements scattered in the filmic, narrative, and symbolic layers of the audiovisual texts. Following this holistic and quantitative analysis, I focus on specific scenes and segments that show divergences in terms of gender roles and hierarchical relations. In my qualitative analysis of these micro units, I examine and exemplify the multimodal ways in which culturally-shaped discursive formations of power manifest themselves.

As an interdisciplinary research project, this dissertation makes significant contributions to the fields of media and global studies, and (multimodal) critical discourse studies. Although there is a growing body of literature leveling the intricacies of globalization particularly in relation to the media today, discussions and theories are often constrained by lack of a strong empirical foundation. As Colin Sparks (2007) indicates in his book *Globalization, Development, and the Mass Media*, the majority of the academic debates around globalization looks at the issue through abstract lenses. Similarly, Axford (1995), Cooper-Chen (2005), Jensen (2007), Mikos and Perrotta (2012), Turner (2010), and Van Keulen & Krijnen (2014) also point out the importance of empirical evidence for understanding the complex two-way relationship between the global and the local. My work, in this sense, is a significant contribution to fill this gap in the literature, as it provides substantial evidence illustrating how globalization happens idiosyncratically in the local and demonstrates that globalization is not a "one-way street" as once claimed by the theories of media imperialism. In illustrating this phenomenon, television format adaptations stand out as quintessential cross-cultural artifacts ubiquitously spread along the global/local continuum. As products of complex, multidirectional interactions across cultures, they epitomize not only the global remaking of the local but also the local particularities of cultural globalization in the making – i.e., the mutually co-dependent and transformative relationship between the local and the global.

Moreover, by taking a critical approach to the process of localization, as discussed earlier, the study opens up a new and innovative line of inquiry into the complexities of globalization. Many contemporary globalization theories today accentuate and celebrate localization as a process that reverses the homogenizing imperialist forces of globalization and maintains cultural diversity and inclusion.[4] In other words, they see it as a device that preserves the separation and uniqueness of cultural and historical conditions and identities. While acknowledging this positive outcome, this study provides an alternative and critical perspective on localization and localism by questioning its role and implications in the maintenance of the political and cultural status quo in countries. Basing it on solid data gathered from six localized texts, it shows how gender inequalities and power oppressions are perpetuated through localization.

Finally, the transnational aspect of this research approach also makes significant contributions to the field of multimodal critical discourse studies. MCDA is a powerful analytical tool/framework that extends the domain of the traditional (sociolinguistic) study of discourse in communication studies, i.e., critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA), to include whole fields of cultural and symbolic (semiotic) systems. It scrutinizes these overarching systems and their complex designs – regulated within each society or culture – in order to reach and analyze discourses hidden in the cracks of their multimodal borders. However, the literature on MCDA lacks cross-cultural studies. Doing a comparative MCDA will give researchers a

[4] See Straubhaar (1991), Fabietti (1995), Appadurai (1996), Hutcheon (2006), Waisbord & Jalfin (2009), Faubert (2010), and Cartmell (2012).

chance to comparatively examine what kind of semiotic resources of communication, specifically in television discourse, are deployed in different cultural settings, and how they are regulated divergently within each society. Knowing these divergent uses of semiotic resources will help readers understand how meaning-making mechanisms and discourses change in each society based on its sociopolitical, cultural, economic and institutional conditions, and help reveal their underlying logic(s). In other words, the analysis will redound to the benefit of society because it will reveal and illustrate how everyday discourses are reproduced on television, sometimes in "banal" ways as Billig (1995) argues, through the orchestration of a myriad of modes that we mostly overlook. Lastly, the inclusion of quantitative readings of the texts may also unveil some meaning-making devices, as well as cultural patterns and systematic interconnections, that can only be understood in numbers. This quantitative approach is crucial for MCDA because it allows a more precise, nuanced, and objective interpretation of the cultural processes and discourses at work.

In summary, analyzing how traveling narratives of global formats are reinterpreted and reproduced in different national settings and revealing the ways in which this re-generative localization process constructs and perpetuates existing cultural discourses of power and identity politics in the adapting countries, the dissertation seeks to show the continued and prevailing cultural power of television in different countries. It is significant to revisit this role of television because the post-structuralist climate of the last several decades and the reformist changes in global economies seem to have created an illusion that national media industries' representational power is no more fused into specific institutions and their ideological

systems of meaning-making. Their power is rather arguably shown to be dispersed

and diversified in the face of the alleged decreasing power of the nation-state. This

view of so-called democratization of the media has especially gained momentum

following the proliferation of television channels, TV networks, and many other

programming and distribution outlets around the world as a result of neoliberal

reforms since the 1990s. While recognizing this evident diversity and complexity in

terms of both the production and the reception of programs, the dissertation argues

and seeks to demonstrate that the media today is still a key factor in consolidating and

distributing dominant ideologies within countries. That is, it still holds power to

prescribe what is normal (acceptable, appropriate) and what is not, or what is right

and what is wrong, or what belongs to "us" and what does not in the sense of national

and group identities, all of which constitute the dominant (and sometimes

oppositional) cultural codes of a given society/viewer group.

Background on the Research Setting

To analyze how culture, politics and media intersect in format adaptations,

this dissertation uses the case of Turkey as its main site of research. Why do Turkey,

Turkish media and the specific format adaptations mentioned in the opening of the

chapter provide a compelling and unique case to study? To answer this question, one

must first begin with a brief historical overview of Turkey's ever-changing political,

social, economic and cultural landscapes on which the six formats are replanted. In

addition, one must also analyze Turkey's contemporary television culture and its

evolution since the 1980s – a time period marked by the neoliberal restructuring of

the political-economic and cultural landscapes of the country. This is what I seek to

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accomplish in the following sections briefly, which will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

Turkey, officially known as The Republic of Turkey, was founded by a group of nationalist revolutionaries led by Mustafa Kemal (later known as Ataturk, meaning "the father of Turks") in 1923 after the collapse of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, and the brief invasion of Anatolia by the European Allied Powers following the First World War. To create a unified and modernized/Westernized nation from the ruins of a multi-ethnic and -religious empire, the Kemalist founders undertook a nation-building project that idealized (an imagined) cultural homogeneity underpinned by a strong ethnic Turkish identity. However, this nationalization, despite its alleged modernizing aspects, which I detail in Chapter 3, came at the cost of various democratic rights and freedoms, particularly those related to minorities in the country. In other words, to consolidate the power of the new nation-state and maintain social unity, the Kemalist elite did not refrain from relegating cultural particularities and discrepancies to the margin, including languages and religions of minority groups.

The consolidation of the society also entailed the centralization and maintenance of the country's historically dominant cultural discourses such as the established gender roles, particularly those of women, and the long-standing cultures of statism and authoritarianism, both of which constitute the core of my analytical inquiry. The first one of these cultural discourses, gender roles, was essential for the new state because it was imagined to be a constituent of the traditional national identity and thus the new state's safeguard against assimilation during the

modernization process, which included a lot of Westernizing elements. On the other hand, having been subject to various oppressions in the patriarchal past of the new state, the modernization of women was also imperative. The clash of these two competing forces in the making of the new state created a discriminatory discourse, also known as "modern but modest women" (Elaman-Garner, 2015). This discourse constructed women as emancipated, on the one hand, thanks to various cosmetic improvements in their lives such as the prohibition of the veil, but also kept them unliberated in essence by enforcing them to stick to some traditional oppressive values such as motherhood and honor/*namus* – a concept that I discuss further in Chapter 3.

The second discursive formation that was deployed for the consolidation of the society was the enduring cultures of statism and authoritarianism. Having their roots in the Ottoman past of the Republic, the maintenance of these two cultures was also vital because they underpinned and legitimized the state's top-down/authoritarian and centralist position in the construction of the new modern nation-state. In other words, they allowed the state to impose its nationalist and modernist ideologies onto the multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. However, as in the case of gender roles, the continuation of these two cultures came with some drawbacks such as the rigid hierarchical boundaries that they reinforced within the state machinery as well as public institutions such as the education system and constabulary. The increased power asymmetries between different levels of hierarchies within and across these institutions, which still exist today, often pave the way for oppression and discrimination and therefore deserve attention.

This historical contextualization is essential for my research because, in my in-depth analyses throughout the dissertation, I draw connections between this broader context of Turkey's political-economic history and culture, and the adaptation of the six formats in particular. In addition, understanding the country's politico-historical and cultural context is also necessary because, without doing so, the study runs the risk of romanticizing and reproducing the Western orientalist imagination of Middle Eastern cultures due to its comparative nature of the six formats on their cross-cultural voyage from the Western world to Turkey. In this regard, the contextualization I provided above (and in more depth in chapter 3) is crucial to show that the primary goal here is to delve into and shed light on the domestic context of Turkey's political-economic, social, and cultural terrains, rather than to compare the Western and Eastern cultural values and discursive formations.

Finally, with regard to the six television format adaptations, in particular, I take them as my object of study because they offer epitomic scenes that illustrate how gender roles and norms of authority affect the construction of relations and identities during the cultural adaptation process. Using them as a point of access, I delve into the historical roots underlying these cultural dynamics and sensitivities and discuss how they reinforce inequalities within the society.

Outline of the Dissertation

I start this dissertation with a historical discussion of the long-standing tradition of adapting that stretches back over many centuries. In Chapter 1, I present how the concept of adaptation and the societal perceptions of it have changed over time, depending on the dynamics of each era. This historical overview also gives me a

chance to elaborate the contribution of my study to the broader field of adaptation studies.

In Chapter 2, I narrow the discussion of adaptations down to television and television formats. Looking at the evolution of this medium and format trade over the last century, I historically conceptualize the notion of format in more detail and explore the ways in which it became a popular business model over the years. In this chapter, I also delve into some of the global and local forces that play crucial roles in format trades and their implications in countries.

Chapter 3 concentrates on the histories of Turkey, Turkish media and the implications of format business in this particular national context. I start the chapter with a discussion of Turkish nationalism and some of its constituent elements starting with the inception of the Republic. As discussed earlier, this contextualization focusing on a single country and its histories is vital for the study because it establishes a historical, political and cultural groundwork for the analysis of the six television format adaptations. It also helps reveal some of the specific dynamics of the media culture in Turkey and its impact on programs and their content.

In Chapter 4, I present both a theoretical and practical overview of my research methodology: MCDA. Drawing on the theories of social semiotics, I discuss the meanings of mode, multimodality, and semiotic resources. I also explain how this methodological framework differs from the traditional (sociolinguistic) study of discourse (CDA). I conclude the chapter with a more step-by-step guide for conducting a MCDA and an overview of the digital tools I use in my research.

Following the discussion of the methodology, Chapters 5 and 6 present the analysis of the six television formats in terms of the reproduction of gender relations and the norms of authority, respectively. Chapter 5, in particular, includes the study of three format adaptations, *Monk/Galip Derviş*, *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye*, and *This us Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi*, which present ample data regarding how the enduring discriminatory discourse of gender norms affect the cultural adaptation of the remakes. Then, in Chapter 6, I examine four format adaptations, *Monk/Galip Derviş*, *Yes, Minister/Sayın Bakanım*, *Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri*, and *Good Doctor/The Good Doctor/Mucize Doktor*. The study of these format adaptations illustrates how the prevailing power dynamics is played out divergently in each culture.

In the Conclusion chapter, I synthesize my findings from the analysis of the six format adaptations with the historical and theoretical background that I present in earlier chapters. In the light of this final overview, I revisit my research question and discuss whether the cultural adaptation of television formats serves as a means to maintain the politico-cultural status quo in countries, or it disrupts existing ideological, cultural, and institutional formations by providing alternative perspectives. This discussion also allows me to reconsider the contributions of my study, as well as its limitations.

Chapter 1: Adaptations: An Old History, New Beginnings

A history of formats has to start with the search for similar practices of copying and reproducing ideas for shows, even without the term. Long before professionals started talking about "formats," formulas for programs, as well as newspapers and other kinds of media content, were either bought and faithfully copied, or at least borrowed, adapted and domesticated. Television format, in this sense, is the most recent stage of a very old history.

(Jérôme Bourdon, 2012, 113)

Adaptation in the sense of movement of texts and ideas among media and cultures is not new to our age. As Bourdon (2012) states in the epigraph, it started long before the dawn of television formats and goes back as far as humans and human cultures have interacted with each other. Hutcheon (2006) reminds us that the Romans borrowed ideas from the Greek theater and reimagined them in new ways. Similarly, in his discussion of transmedia storytelling, Bordwell (2009) highlights the fact that many of Shakespeare's plays, Homeric epics, and other classic stories inspired paintings and other works of art throughout the ages. According to Abu-Melhim (2013), Edgar Allan Poe was an admirer of Charles Dickens' works and is believed to have written his famous poem, The Raven, after reading Dickens' historical novel Barnaby Rudge, which includes Dickens' literary descriptions of his pet raven, Grip.

Throughout this long history of borrowings, almost every cross-cultural contact and every social and technological change have bred new possibilities and new beginnings for stories and ideas to flow among cultures and societies, which often brought along new debates and criticisms. For example, the increased use of writing in the Greek era and the relocation of ideas from people's memories to paper

concerned many, including Plato (1995: 275a, 79) who said that the invention would "introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who [learned] it" (Cartmell, 2012). Likewise, the arrival of the printing press and the proliferation of books in the fifteenth century met the ire of many religious authorities of the period who thought that the growing ubiquity of texts and ideas could lead to "sedition and debauchery" (Dağdelen, 2011). Similar debates in literature arose in the eighteenth century as a result of the increase in novelistic imitations and literary appropriation. Many literary critics of the time openly expressed their aversion to the growing predictability, repetitiveness and sameness in novels due to irrepressible borrowings, which eventually gave rise to the emergence of literary hierarchies and negative attitudes toward adaptations and appropriations (Brandtzæg, 2015).

It is important to acknowledge these earlier histories and debates about the flow of texts and ideas among cultures, societies, and mediums out of which adaptation studies has grown. However, this chapter focuses on a more recent period – twentieth and twenty-first centuries that have brought unprecedented changes in how, why and to what extent producers adapt stories and ideas. A major force behind these changes has been the revolutionary advancements in the technological landscape that started with the arrival of the moving image, radio, and television early in the twentieth century and continued with cable and satellite TV, the Internet and digitalization. Each of these emergent media opened up anew spaces in the ever-growing consumption landscape for producers of content to fill, and the growing competitiveness often urged them to search for innovative and creative ideas for their products. This technological transformation and expansion also had a direct – and

accelerating – effect on the movement of ideas and stories because many producers who followed the legacy of earlier traditions of adapting and reproducing drew upon existing literary and artistic works and reinterpreted them through new lenses. These included reproductions both within the same medium, such as cross-border remakes of existing radio programs, and across different media, including filmic adaptations of canonical novels.

In addition to technological developments, political and economic re-alignments have also played a significant role in the frenzied movement of texts. Especially the neoliberal turn of the 1980s that pressured many developing national economies such as Brazil, Turkey and South Korea to integrate with global capitalist markets reshaped and expanded the global media markets significantly. Widespread privatization, deregulation and reduction of trade barriers and tariffs in these countries gave rise to new commercial broadcasters that mostly focused on entertainment, sports and lifestyle programming in many developing countries leading to the multiplication of international windows for products (Havens, 2006). Moreover, the reduced trade barriers and tariffs also improved the popularity and availability of new communication technologies in homes around the world and increased the size and diversity of audiences. This global market expansion, and the ever-increasing competitive consumption landscape due to neoliberalization not only increased the need for program content in countries substantially and exponentially but also made the introduction of the unfamiliar and innovative via the media, especially in the entertainment sector—a business imperative as well as a cultural necessity for audiences (Er, 2016).

These technological and political-economic conditions made transnationalization of media the norm not the exception for many countries in early twenty-first century eventually leading to what is now called media globalization. The wave of globalization and global media networks opened the floodgates for stories and ideas to transcend their original boundaries of time and space extensively, expanding into new platforms and diverse territories around the world. Moreover, it triggered the transformation of centuries-old traditions of borrowing and adapting into a more explicit and large-scale mode of production and commodity exchange under the globally expanding capitalist system, which eventually led to the birth of global television formats.

As was the case in earlier periods of social change and technological breakthroughs, all of these developments in this era have also given way to a barrage of debates and criticisms among literary, philosophical, political and art circles, which remain alive and relevant today. Especially the unique characteristics of the new audio-visual media forms that have radically changed how people represent, communicate and adapt ideas and stories, as well as their commercialization and use on a global scale as a mass-market vehicle, have prompted critics to question the positive and negative implications of the change for world societies and cultures.

This chapter examines these debates around two axes: (1) cynicism and doubt that pervaded the intellectual culture throughout much of the twentieth century and led many scholars to see the developments as a threat to world societies (e.g., cultural imperialism and dependency theories), and (2) a subsequent wave of optimism that emerged in the 1980s as a result of positive developments in technological, economic,

social, political and cultural domains. While it is always best to exercise caution in making generalizations about the paradigmatic structure of a period as there can always be alternative views challenging the dominant paradigm of the time, the structurally dichotomous historical representation of the two axes (i.e. an earlier cynicism versus a new-found hopefulness) will help establish the groundwork for the study of television format adaptations in the following chapters and also address the gap in the adaptation literature that this study aims to fill.

The Era of Doubt and Cynicism: 1900s – 1970s

The dawn of the twentieth century came with a myriad of developments that changed the course of human history and culture markedly. Amongst them, the moving image, radio and television broadcasting triggered various societal changes and cultural modernization processes in many countries giving rise to new ways of experiencing everyday life and developing new complex relationships among peoples and cultures. Many of the implications were first witnessed in the public realm in the western world as a result of public screenings of observational short films such as Lumière Brothers' *Workers Living the Lumière Factory* (1894) and *The Arrival of a Train* (1896). Despite their lack of storytelling elements such as a narrative arc and character development, these unusual and aesthetically astonishing representations of reality at the time grabbed the attention of the public (Gunning, 1994) and initiated a desired trajectory towards technology-driven (western) modernity in societies. Together with the rise of radio and television later in the century, the changing media landscape ushered a new age of communication and planted the seeds of a more connected world.

However, as Cartmell (2012) accurately points out, new technologies and ideas throughout the ages have always been treated with suspicion, and this was the case at the turn of the twentieth century, too. Critics were concerned especially because of the increased interconnectedness among peoples and cultures through emerging technologies, such as radio and television, and the consequent movement of texts and ideas across different media forms such as the transatlantic voyages of various radio programs from the United States to western Europe and Australia. Many scholars and new schools of thought, such as the Frankfurt School5 in Germany, gained popularity during this period with their culturally pessimistic reflections on the intellectual and cultural degeneration of societies and the arts in general, which they heavily linked to the technological forces (the new media of the time) that served mainly for the spread of (American) popular culture, capitalism and Americanization (read: simplification, commodification and assimilation.) These critical approaches started a strand of doubt and cynicism among some traditionalists such as T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound towards technological and social changes and became the bedrock of their arguments and discussions ranging from politics to economics, literature to art (Draper, 1999: 11-12).

The technological breakthroughs also had a significant impact particularly on the field of literary adaptation studies as they initiated a new trend, among filmmakers, of reimagining and adapting existing canonical literary texts for the new media of the time, starting with the moving image in the form of silent short movies,

5 The official name of the Frankfurt School was the Institute for Social Research, and it was founded in 1923.

including *Cinderella* (1900), *Gulliver's Travels* (1902) *Alice in Wonderland* (1903),

Frankenstein (1910), and *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz* (1910) (Cartmell, 2012). This

western commercial enterprise led to an early wave of doubt and cynicism that

concentrated on the intersection of technology and literature. Despite the innovative

nature of earlier cinematic productions, many conservative literary critics at the time

such as Virginia Woolf (1926) confronted the idea of adapting decades- and

centuries-old canonical texts into a tawdry, "circus-like" spectacle, arguing that the

endeavor was nothing more than degrading the cultural and artistic value of literature.

Underlying their argument was that the filmic adaptations simplified both thought and

language of canonical works and manipulated the plot lines, characters, and settings

of the stories – albeit never being able to convey them as thoroughly and artfully as

their book versions. The critics were especially troubled by the fact that the early

films did not even intend to tell the adapted stories in their full length; rather used

their "peak moments" to construct minute-long cinematic narratives, relying on the

audience's *a-priori* knowledge of the stories to fill the gaps (Buchanan, 2012;

Gunning, 2004; 128). One of these critics, Charles E. Whittaker, outlined the rising

problem in *Harper's Weekly* in 1916 as follows (*Harper's Weekly*, April 29, 1916: p.

458):

> *The movie is not art, because it is not literature; it has no persistence,*
> *save for its illustration of daily news. The life of the best of the*
> *photodramas, on the word of Mr. Daniel Frohman, is two years. That*
> *art should perish so! If it is necessary to find a definition for the movie,*
> *it would seem to be unrelated to art of which it is not even the*
> *Cinderella. Myself, I regard it as the little cutey of the crafts.*

The earlier reactions to these cross-media flows of stories from pages to the

screen paved the way for the now controversial theory of fidelity criticism that came

to dominate the field of adaptation studies for much of the twentieth century and had a profound impact on the making and deepening of the discourse of cynicism and doubt. Predicated on the premise that the success of an adaptation should depend on how true it is to its informing source text (the so-called original), this theory became a convenient analytical tool for many traditionalist critics to make comparative value judgments about films and other adaptations against literature (Cartmell, 2012; Faubert, 2010; Hutcheon, 2006). However, rooted in the problematic ideas of "originality" and intrinsic "literary value," these medium-specific and hierarchical comparisons often made filmic adaptations the object of accusations of infidelity, betrayal, deformation, violation and desecration (Stam, 2000, Smith, 2009: 1). More often than not, they ended up picking holes in filmic adaptations and reinforcing the assumed supremacy and authority of the literature. This prevalent disposition found expression among the pioneers in this conservative vein in a tendency to describe the film as an "inferior form of cognition" (Newman, 1985: 129) and a "parasite" victimizing and simplifying literary works (Woolf, 1926: 309).

With the advent of radio and television broadcasting, the debates around adaptations took on a new dimension, extending beyond the initial area of concern (i.e. fidelity question) into societal, cultural and political questions at large. The main reason for the broadening of the debates was the ubiquitous nature of radio and television broadcasting as these new media emancipated the viewing experience from being a rare, extraordinary personal encounter in a public space to an everyday practice in the home. This shift was important because home is a more intimate and familiar setting in which the listening/viewing experience is incorporated into daily

activities. Moreover, the fast-growing popularity and availability of these media, first among the industrially advanced countries of the time such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Japan and Australia in the 1930s and 1940s, and later in many others in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia as a result of the (western) modernization process, led these radio and television broadcasts to reach wider audiences (Straubhaar, 2007). This technological diffusion and transnationalization resulted in an increase in the movement of media content both within and beyond national boundaries, which also accelerated and promoted the idea of reproduction (adaptation), turning it into a commercial practice and commodity to be bought and sold in the emerging global marketplace (Moran, 2013). Especially the rise of innovative program ideas such as quiz shows on radio in the United States after the 1930s and on television after the 1950s, which I discuss in further detail in the next chapter, attracted the interest of producers in the United Kingdom, Australia and other Western European countries and inspired them to reproduce those American shows for their national audiences (Moran, 2008). However, this commercial trend, which planted the seeds of the emerging media globalization, happened in a unidirectional manner for several decades, only including flows from the United States to other nations. While the number of consumers in the media landscape increased, the United States remained to be the major producer of programs and program ideas and held a monopoly on the market (Tunstall, 1977; 2008: 11). Given such American influence, what worried critics about the movement of texts and adaptations was not only about the medium-specific qualities of the new media forms and their so-called devastating effects on audiences'

perception and aesthetic appreciation of literary works but also the expansionist

tendencies (i.e., globalization) of American capitalism, consumerism and popular

culture via these technologies and cross-border adaptations.

Among those who criticized this technological transformation that had a direct

and significant impact on the scope and use of adaptations, the Frankfurt School was

one of the most prominent. Known as the birthplace of critical theory – a

philosophical perspective focusing on critiquing the changes in societies and

cultures,[6] this German school of thought became very critical of the new media of the

time, particularly television, and their transnationalization because their (American)

content arguably had "a specific function… of providing ideological legitimation of

the existing capitalist societies and of integrating individuals into the framework of its

social formation" (Kellner, 2005: 30). Many critics who adhered to the premises of

this institution or influenced by its theoretical orientation, pointed to the so-called

devastating effects of the excessive (re)production and cross-border marketing of

(American) media products, i.e., adaptations, for spreading a popular (low)

consumption culture that prioritized pleasure and joy. Theodor Adorno and Max

Horkheimer (1972), two prominent names working under the roof of the Frankfurt

School, coined the term "culture industries" to refer to the growing capitalist

mechanisms, which they argued served the commodification and exploitation of

cultural resources for the sake of capitalist gains. In his book on the ways in which

mass media integrate individuals into a capitalist consumerism, Herbert Marcuse

[6] It is also important that the Frankfurt School had a reputation as a Marxist school of thought, which is one of the reasons why the Cultural Industry hypothesis as a purely capitalist phenomenon was so influential for much of the last half of the 20th century.

(1964), another member of the Frankfurt School, describes television as "part of an apparatus of manipulation and social domination, [that produces] the thought and behavior needed for the social and cultural reproduction of contemporary capitalist societies" (Kellner, 2005: 33). Also, the notion of cultural standardization and homogenization was a further point of criticism and one which led directly to the cultural imperialism hypothesis, which I discuss in following pages.

It is essential to acknowledge that, from time to time, these negative voices coming from the Frankfurt School or other institutions with a similar viewpoint were challenged and contested by theorists such as Walter Benjamin (1969) who argued that the capitalist mass production, particularly the reproduction (adaptation) of artworks and the flow of ideas across societies, could in fact help dispel the aura or the *cult value* of objects. Another theorist, Marshall McLuhan (1964), coined the term "global village" to describe the impact of the new media and the transnational connections growing out of them on world societies, which was misunderstood by many who thought that he was promoting a collective identity shaped by Western ideals. However, McLuhan later clarified that he never meant the "global village" to be a mantra for those who believed in the chimera of fusion of cultures and succeeding ataraxia. To the contrary, "global village" was a harbinger of a more culturally diverse and heterogeneous future (Stearn, 1967). In other words, the transnationalization of the media landscape and the movement of texts across borders, McLuhan argued, signified a mutual opportunity for ideas to flow and compete rather than an isomorphism. Despite these more optimistic views of the changing media landscape and adaptations, however, the dominant discourse towards the movement

of texts continued to foreground the negative social implications of the global spread of Western ideas and ideologies through the media – a phenomenon also known as cultural globalization.

Further developments in the post-World War II era, including the launch of national television industries in many parts of the world which widened opportunities for cross-border information exchange and trade between countries, acted as a catalyst for the homogenization debate that had previously been hypothesized by the Frankfurt School. Especially in the early stages of globalization in the television industry (1940s–1970s) when production was still under the monopoly of a few rich and powerful nations, primarily the United States, countries with newly emerging media industries yet without adequate production capabilities had no choice but to import and consume American programs and/or program ideas (formats) to achieve modernity and (technological and economic) progress (Straubhaar, 1991; Havens, 2006). This unidirectional movement of programs and program ideas started the heyday of Marxist-inspired reductionist theories of media imperialism which anticipated and amplified that the penetration of Western influence into periphery countries under the cloak of modernization and progress would bring an end to indigenous or national cultures of the world and homogenize (Americanize) them for the sake of economic and technological progress (Moran, 2004; Straubhaar, 1991). Rooted in earlier imperialist histories of western colonialism going back to the 19th century and beyond, this latest form of imperialism in the form of western media dominance had a certain core of truth to it at the time. For instance, while over fifty countries from Latin America to Asia started their national broadcasting services in

the 1950s, most of them continued to heavily rely on American imports until the 1980s due to the lack of industrial infrastructure and human resources for production, which brought to mind the concepts of core and periphery countries as fixed and static categories (Straubhaar, 2007; Tunstall, 2008). For decades, the advocates of this structuralist and deterministic model including Guback (1969), Beltran (1978a; 1978b), Schiller (1969), Mattelart (1983), Nordenstreng & Varis (1974), Boyd-Barrett (1977), Hamelink (1983), Wallerstein (1973) pioneered the intellectual realm and heavily engaged in discussions regarding how the global flow of texts and ideas affected (periphery) societies and cultures negatively regardless of how they consumed them -- as is or remade. Considering this disproportionate distribution of resources and opportunities at the time, they interpreted the growing expansion of American media products as part of an imperialist ploy that aimed to spread Western influence and authority over non-Western societies. Beltran (1978a: 185) illustrates the situation at the time as follows:

> *"It is logical to expect a nation exerting economic and political influence over other countries to exert a cultural influence as well. When the influence is reciprocal with those of such countries, the case is one of balanced, legitimate and desirable intercultural exchange. But when the culture of a central and dominant country is unilaterally imposed over the peripheral countries it dominates at the expense of their cultural integrity, then the case is one of cultural imperialism. Evidently, this latter is much more frequent than the former."*

Overall, it is plausible to state that the language of criticism toward technological transformations and the transnational movement of text across and through them for the much of the twentieth century was rather sharp and negative. In the midst of the rapid technological changes, uneven power dynamics and global

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uncertainty and apocalyptic predictions about social and cultural collapse demarcated the boundaries of scholarly debates for decades.

A New Era, A New Perspective: From the 1980s to the Present

1980s has been a turning point in the history of globalization, as the decades-long dominant discourse of cultural imperialism eventually started to give its place to a fresh spring of optimism and hope under the changing conditions of the time. The complexities and nuances that surfaced in economic, cultural, and technological spheres of life with the further unfolding of the globalization process and its life-changing positive implications on world societies prompted many scholars to think that the new world order might not be as straightforward and pessimistic as the proponents of fidelity criticism and media imperialism theories once envisaged (Moran, 2004). Given this changing intellectual climate, many scholars took on a more optimistic if not celebratory tone in their reading of the growing interconnectedness among peoples and cultures as well as the specific issue of adapting and reproducing across media and cultures. Among these perspectives are "asymmetrical interdependence" (Straubhaar, 1991) and "hybridization" (Canclini, 1995), which I discuss below.

One of the factors behind this paradigmatic shift has been the acceleration of technological advancement since the 1980s and its rapid dissemination worldwide thanks to the integration of many countries into the new neoliberal global economy. This offered them a more open and free trading system through privatization, commercialization and deregulation (Straubhaar, 1991). Within this new open-market environment, technologies to which once only the West had access have now become

available for many other countries (Torre, 2012). Also, the regulatory framework has opened up through privatization of media sectors, enabling these newcomers to increase their production capacities and not only to consume what the emergent global culture has to offer to them but also contribute to the making of that culture and modernity at large (Torre, 2012). Looking at national media industries in this period, for instance, we see a pronounced preference for local/national programs and, more importantly, an apparent move towards a multi-directional model of program exchange and trades among countries (Straubhaar, 2007). As pointed out by various scholars such as Appadurai (1996) and Straubhaar (1991), this new situation has belied the earlier theories of media imperialism (homogenization, cultural industries, etc.), which viewed globalization through dichotomous and unidirectional lenses and saw it as a "one-way" street due in large part to the economic and technological dominance of the United States and a few other Western countries at the time.

It would be unrealistic, however, to argue that the growing multi-directionalism has led to an absolute equilibrium in the world, as countries in today's world possess varying degrees of power in producing and marketing their cultural particularities globally (Straubhaar, 1991). Straubhaar (1991: 39) defines this uneven path of progress countries are taking toward modernity and the complex interconnectivity between markets and cultures as "asymmetrical interdependence," meaning "the variety of possible relationships in which countries find themselves unequal but possessing variable degrees of power and initiative in politics, economics, and culture." However, what makes this asymmetrical interdependence more positive and appealing compared to earlier examples of relationships among

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cultures and markets is that it ensures and maximizes cultural diversity as much as possible. In other words, it allows cultures to create counter-narratives that challenge dominant discourses and offer alternative viewpoints even if they are subaltern or marginalized. As a matter of fact, it is more than evident than ever before that there is neither a single global (or American) culture that is external and superior to all other peripheral cultures (Smith, 1990) nor a "pure" national culture that has not been influenced by its interactions with other local or global ideas and practices (Buonanno, 2008: 110). In other words, cultures today are neither a product of an accomplished imperialist homogeneity nor that of an entirely balanced heterogeneity (Straubhaar, 2007: 5). They are, rather, "the product of [a novel and more complex level of] interaction, of exchanges, of influences coming in from elsewhere" (Fabietti, 1995: 21). Robertson (1995: 30) defines this complex relationship as "glocalization," which portrays "global" and "local" as equal terms that inform and transform each other continually and in complex ways (Chalaby, 2009). In a similar vein, Canclini (1995: xxv) foregrounds the notion of "hybridization" to articulate "…sociocultural processes in which discrete structures or practices, previously existing in separate form, are combined to generate new structures, objects, and practices."[7] In the context of globalization, this concept signifies how global forces such as a transnationally popular TV show and its material and discursive formations interact with existing local forces in a country including its historical, political, economic and cultural particularities and construct new "hybrid" forms of cultural expressions – that are

[7] Canclini (1995: xxv) notes, though, that those so-called discrete structures are also a product of previous hybridizations, i.e., not "pure points of origin."

neither pure global nor pure local (Straubhaar, 2007: 5). Given the intensity and frequency of such processes in the current information age, it would not be counterintuitive to argue that everything that is local now contains some trace of the global, and every global force is a result of complex relations and entanglements between local cultures. As Tracey (1985: 23) states, there are "flows within flows" that do not fit the idea of a unidirectional cultural dominance (Sparks, 2007). The line between global and local is blurred, which alleviates the fear of media imperialism that swayed the intellectual and political landscapes until the 1980s.

Another reason behind the shift from a unidirectional and pessimistic view of globalization to a more decentralized and multi-directional model and a more positive approach to global flows of ideas and stories is the changing disposition towards epistemological assumptions regarding the agency of the reader/audience. Classical criticism in the earlier periods tended to attach more importance to the "writer" as the sole creator of meaning while seeing the reader as a mere consumer of the meaning (Barthes, 1977). In a similar vein, many non-Western societies that were predominantly exposed to Western productions within the earlier imperialist discourse were generally seen as passive agents victimized by Western imperialist exploitation. Conversely, with the rise of new postmodern theories of language and communication in the later decades of the twentieth century, the authority of the author has started to be questioned by many scholars such as Barthes (1977), Foucault (1979), Fiske (1987) and Bourdieu (1993). These scholars argued that no text is completed until a reader (or group of readers) reads/watches it and interprets based on his/her own understanding. On a similar vein, Bourdieu (1986) emphasized the

importance of economic as well as cultural and other symbolic "capitals/values" that individuals acquire and practice throughout their lives because those capitals have a significant effect on their actions, preferences, and perceptions within the particular social structures surrounding them (Straubhaar, 2007). Also among these scholars was Stuart Hall, who played a key role in the development of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies. Hall (1996), along with other prominent scholars such as Raymond Williams, Edward Thompson, and Richard Hoggart, whose work laid the foundation of the field of Cultural Studies, also put much emphasis on readers' agency in the meaning-making process and the ways their subjectivities affect their reception of knowledge. In other words, given the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious particularities and differences that each individual or groups of individuals bring to the social world, their reception of knowledge can also differ from each other in varying degrees (Hall, 1996).

Lastly, the developments in the political landscape have also had a significant impact on the paradigm shift concerning globalization. Especially the unraveling of complex identity politics and intensified nationalistic sentiments around the globe since the 1990s created a balancing nationalist ethos, also known as "nationalist populism," in the face of the growing interconnectedness among cultures and markets (Gusterson, 2017: 209). One of the ways this new wave of nationalism manifested itself in countries since then is the surge of political figures that place nationalist-populist rhetoric at the center of their political agenda. Among them we can list names from almost all regions and countries such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, Rodrigo Duterte of Philippines, Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand, Robert

Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Marine Le Pen of France, Donald Trump of the United States, and Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom (Noble & Ottmann, 2018). Unforeseen successes of many of these politicians and the social acceptance of their protectionist ideological perspectives even in countries known as the birthplace of neoliberal globalism (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom) exposed the revival of nation-states and nationalism against the cultural homogenization argument. The growing number of these examples in the past decade including the electoral wins by right-wing national-conservative parties such as the Law and Justice Party (Andrzej Duda) in Poland in 2015, the Republicans (Donald Trump) in the United States in 2016, the Social Liberal Party (Jail Bolsonaro) in Brazil in 2018, Fidesz (Viktor Orbán) in Hungary in 2018 and the Conservative Party (Boris Johnson) in the United Kingdom in 2019 is being furthered with the ongoing "Brexit" process for the UK to leave the European Union (Gusterson, 2017; Fielder, 2018) Predicated on nationalism, patriotism, racism, separatism and xenophobia, all of these examples illustrate the ongoing decentralization process sweeping around the world and mark the beginning of a new era (also known as post-Trump/post-Brexit era) which forces countries into a paradoxical position of protecting and promoting their nationalist agenda despite their ongoing keen interest in integrating with the global world.

Adaptation Redefined

All of these changes stemming from processes of globalization in economic, political, social, cultural and technological landscapes in the past several decades have changed approaches to adaptations as well. In the case of cross-cultural reproductions of global texts and products, adapting has come to be seen as a taken-

for-granted norm and practice as well as a cultural necessity to accommodate expected differences among cultures and provide people with culturally-sensitive services. In this regard, it is often regarded as a tool of decentralization and democratization that gives indigenous cultures, both at the national and subnational levels, a more prominent position and a stronger voice in knowledge production. In other words, rather than consuming a product that might be culturally, politically, socially, discursively and aesthetically foreign, social groups are now provided with an opportunity through remakes to reinterpret and recreate an existing text and generate alternative forms and counter-narratives that can challenge dominant and oppressive ways of thinking. With this understanding, new theories of adaptation, in contrast to the earlier literary theories that tended to see adaptations as mere imitations and simplifications, have taken on a more liberating and iconoclastic stance towards the practice of adapting and associated it with more positive and nuanced concepts such as intertextuality, hybridization, democratization, plurivocality and innovation.

The reconceptualization of the term first started with the expansion of adaptation studies as a field to move beyond the mere study of filmic adaptations of canonical literary works to include many other forms and alternative flows such as film to novel and film to video game adaptations (Cartmell, 2012; Leitch, 2007). This "democratization" of the field has been crucial and effective in redefining the concept of adaptation because the narrowly-focused traditional approaches that confined adaptations to films and assessed their value based on an uneven hierarchical relationship vis-a-vis historically advantaged and canonized literary texts always put

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the new media in an inferior position (Cartmell, 2012: 35; Hutcheon, 2006). The inclusion of alternative media forms and flows in the study of adaptations, in this regard, as well as the improving expressive capacities of new technologies have undermined the taken-for-granted superiority of literature and books. Moreover, it paved the way for the assessment of adaptations in a more liberating fashion and independent of their relationship with their informing or inspiring sources as much as possible.

In a similar vein, the "originality" question has also been problematized and deconstructed widely. Following the legacy of Walter Benjamin (1992: 90), who defined storytelling as "the art of repeating stories," many scholars started to see "any text [as] an intertext," in Barthes's (1981: 39) words, meaning that every text contains other texts within it at varying degrees. That is, ideas always come out of other ideas; texts are always built upon other texts. No matter which genre or form they may take, stories always depend on a larger intertextual network of cultural and social ideas that predate and feed the author's imagination. Among these scholars were Said (1983: 135) who stated that "…the writer thinks less of writing originally, and more of rewriting" and Derrida (1985: 158) who said "the desire to write is the desire to launch things that come back to you as much as possible." This new way of thinking put questions of originality and fidelity under increasing scrutiny as writing and producing started to be seen as an endless process of borrowing and recreation without a clear sign of origin.

This unorthodox approach to knowledge production includes the practice of direct adaptations of existing works as well because it is now widely admitted that

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even if a text is an explicit one-to-one reproduction of a previous text, it still includes

unique elements that reflect the culture, history and politics of its new home. In other

words, as Navarro (2012: 25) states, "even though the adaptation may derive from an

original template, its cultural significance cannot be confined to this derivative

status." It involves more than a simple imitation or a passive absorption of ideas.

Conditioned by the limitations and possibilities given by its new temporal and

cultural setting, every adaptation gains a new form and meaning. Adapting is, thus,

seen as a process of "recreation" (Hutcheon, 2006), "an act of re-vision" (Sanders

2006, 18) or "the art form of democracy… a freeing of a text from the confined

territory of its author and of its readers" (Cartmell, 2012: 37). Seen as "a derivation

that is not derivative, a work that is second but not secondary" (Hutcheon, 2006: 9),

adapting has turned into a vehicle for the manifestation of ways in which people and

cultures see things differently and live differently. As a result, the focus in adaptation

studies today is not on "film's inability to be faithful to its source" (Wells- Lassagne,

2007: 5); but on "people's *ability* to remake and refashion their identities in

empowering ways" through recreating and localizing the forces of globalization

(Morley, 2001: 427). Appadurai (1990: 295) explains this phenomenon as follows:

> *Most often, the homogenization argument subspeciates into either an*
> *argument about Americanization, or an argument about*
> *'commoditization', and very often the two arguments are closely linked.*
> *What these arguments fail to consider is that at least as rapidly as forces*
> *from various metropolises are brought into new societies they tend to*
> *become indigenized in one or other way: this is true of music and*
> *housing styles as much as it is true of science and terrorism, spectacles*
> *and constitutions.*

Another factor that helped to redefine the notion of adapting is the two-way

relationship between the local and the global. That is, when a text transcends the

national boundaries of its domestic market and gets reproduced and adapted in a different national setting, the process yields not only a culturally-tailored alternative text but also constitutes a counter-narrative and a new informing source text that is to influence future adaptations as well as the "original" version globally. This two-way relationship signifies the mutually co-dependent and transformative relationship between the local and the global. Straddled between these two forces, adaptations not only reveal the global remaking of the local but also represent the local particularities of cultural globalization in the making. They are processes and products of "cultural dialogue" (Faubert, 2010: 180).

All of these changes in attitudes towards flows of ideas and stories among media and cultures today indicate that there is a clear paradigmatic shift towards seeing adapting as an opportunity for democracy rather than a threat of imperialist intervention.

Contribution of the Study

Without doubt, this paradigmatic shift has been crucial for emancipating adaptation studies from the reductionist and totalizing approaches of fidelity and imperialism discourses and decentering it to correspond to the emerging complexities and nuances of economic and cultural globalization since the 1980s. The growing number of new theories that have been put forward to explain these complexities and nuances point to the ever-changing dynamic roles of people and nations in knowledge production and consumption and show how adapting is less of a threat for local or national cultures than an opportunity for them to realize their distinctive modernity

and contribute to the growing global culture. They have come to epitomize how globalization happens idiosyncratically in the local.

However, within this context of increasing optimism towards producers' and local media industries' ability to reimagine texts and stories through their cultural lenses, studies often fail to address the possibility that adapting may also serve to maintain the status quo in terms of power relations and related discursive formations in countries. In other words, there is a shortage of critical approaches to cultural adaptations that seek to understand not only the positive but also negative implications of remaking within countries today, particularly focusing on the ways in which adaptations deal with culturally specific hegemonic structures of gender, race and class inequalities and power relations. Therefore, the question I ask in this study is the following: do culturally-appropriated formats serve to recruit subjects into the politico-cultural status quo of the adapting country or are they used to disrupt existing ideological, cultural and institutional formations by providing alternative perspectives and inspiring the audience to engage in critical self-reflection?

Seeking an answer to this key question requires scholarly attention because, as stated in the Introduction, researchers, as members of their local community, also experience the same ideologically loaded televisual texts and thus have a social as well as professional responsibility to interrogate, resist and challenge dominant cultural knowledge. As such, this dissertation examines cross-cultural television format adaptations and offers a critical lens on these culturally-shaped remakes to analyze if and how they serve the continuation of dominant hegemonic formations in countries. Challenging the current paradigmatic zeitgeist of cultural relativism that

tends to foreground the ways adaptations give people and cultures the ability to experience globalization in idiosyncratic ways and refashion their identities and subjectivities divergently, the study aims to point to the danger of the evolution of cultural "adaptation" into a euphemism for consolidating the political and cultural status quo under the cloak of accommodating cultural differences. This critical approach to cross-cultural remakes also resonates with Moran's (2013: 17) cautionary note on the reproduction of national discourses through adaptations, which reads, "the kinds of mundane, taken-for-granted representations of the nation [and national discourses] that are found in particular incarnations of TV program formats serves as a means to reproduce the nation as a hegemonic form." Aiming to show the other side of the coin with regard to adaptations, this study puts cultural adaptations under a microscope to trace the manifestations of the reconstruction and perpetuation of power inequalities between different genders, ethnic groups, races, generations, social classes and political opinions in them, including the initial source text. Carried out in a comparative framework on different cultural versions of the same TV formats, this critical inquiry allows the researcher to ask such questions as: Are certain gender groups deleted or represented differently in a culturally informed work? Are certain characters in a remake assigned a higher status in terms of power compared to their transnational counterparts? Has the adapted narrative been modified to reflect and reinforce the dominant political ideology in the adapting country at the time? This dissertation will seek answers to these questions and many more through the analyses of the six TV format adaptations from Turkey, focusing on the divergences of verbal, visual, and aural elements between them and their informing source texts.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I gave an overview of the changing approaches to adaptations since the beginning of the twentieth century – an era of unprecedented rapid social and technological change around the world. Starting with the discourse of doubt and cynicism summarized in the concepts of cultural imperialism and cultural industries, which pervaded the academic and intellectual circles in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, I showed how adapting transformed from being an imperialist conceptual framework to a celebrated practice under the current conditions of neoliberal globalization. Building upon this transformation in approaches to the practice of adapting, I also elaborated on how this study contributes to the fields of adaptation studies and television studies. In the following chapter, I use this general overview as a foundation for a more detailed historical overview of flows of programs and program ideas around the globe through the radio and television in the post-war era and its effects on world societies, economies, and industries.

Chapter 2: Transnational Television and Format Adaptations

Since the late 1980s, the landscape of television has undergone a remarkable transformation in many parts of the world. Television channels and production capabilities proliferated across the globe as a result of the exponential advancement of communication technologies over the years, including cable and satellite television networks, digitalization and the Internet, and their rapid expansion to world markets and societies accelerated by the concurrent neoliberal restructuring of political, economic and cultural landscapes (Moran, 2008; 2013). These changes have also led to increased demands in the amount of programming necessary to cover the schedules of the new commercial media outlets and an exponential increase in the efforts of public and private broadcasters to learn how to produce globally distributed genres (telenovelas, sitcoms, crime dramas).

In the context of eroding national boundaries, new capitalist relations of production have been established, leading to remarkable growth in international trade, as well as production and consumption. This capitalist global market expansion has also meant an increase in competition for innovation amongst the new domestic and global players compelling them to monitor each other's work more closely and establish transnational business relationships and trade agreements to increase their revenues. As explained in the previous chapter, these developments, also referred to as the "communications revolution" (Oren & Shahaf, 2012), have opened the floodgates for media products to flow across borders in massive volumes and heralded the beginning of a new era in the world of television – the format age.

This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the contemporary age we live in today as the most recent stage of the longstanding legacy of adaptations. Similar to the discussion of adaptations presented in the previous chapter, this chapter will also start with an overview of the historical developments that led to the rise of formats in the radio and television industries over the years. Then it will examine the forces that propel media professionals to buy and reproduce formats so frequently, and how these new market dynamics affect the way producers adapt them. The chapter will conclude by reconceptualizing television formats in light of the background information provided in previous chapters and define their place in today's evolving global media market.

A New Kind of Adaptation: The Birth of Formats

The birth of formats as an industrial commodity can be traced back to the 1930s when various national radio services in the United States and the United Kingdom, and later in Australia and some other Western European and Latin American countries such as Luxembourg, Belgium, Mexico and Cuba, started to borrow and re-use transnational program ideas and know-how among each other for local production within their territories (Chalaby, 2009; Moran, 2008; 2013). This predominantly Anglo-American practice of format trade started off and continued for several decades as a unidirectional transfer of programs from the United States to the United Kingdom. One of the first known examples of this program exchange happened in 1936 when BBC Radio adapted the American talent show *Amateur Hour* that debuted on New York City's WHN Radio in 1934. Later, in 1940 an Australian station reproduced the show as well (Camporesi, 2000: 119-120). Other examples

include the adaptation of NBC's *Spelling Bee* and the first quiz show *Information Please* by BBC Radio in 1937 and 1941, respectively, and later in Japan and Australia (Camporesi, 2000: 121; Chalaby, 2016; Ishita, 2000). The cross-border trades among these economically advanced countries continued with another American comedy quiz show *It Pays to be Ignorant,* which aired on WOR and then CBS in the United States between 1942 and 1949. Seeing the long-running success of the show on the other side of the Atlantic, BBC Radio purchased the format rights of the show in 1946 and started to reproduce a version of it in the United Kingdom under a new name – *Ignorance is Bliss* (Buxton and Owen, 1972: 154-155; Chalaby, 2011). Only a year later, in 1947, BBC Radio added another American quiz show to its format archive when it adapted WOR Radio's *Twenty Questions* (Tunstall, 2008: 12; Chalaby, 2011). The transatlantic and transpacific voyages of these earlier radio formats planted the first seeds of a new global media age that was in the making - albeit rather restricted and unidirectional in scale initially.

With the introduction of regular television broadcasting in the Soviet Union (1945), the United Kingdom (1946) and the United States (1946) followed by others in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Australia/Oceania[8], the format business found itself a larger marketplace to increase its revenues (Moran, 2013; Straubhaar, 2007). Before long, in 1951 the first example of a television format adaptation claimed its place in the history of format trade when BBC Television purchased the format rights of the American game show *What's my Line?* and remade it for British audiences

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[8] Some of these prominent industries include France, Spain, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

(Chalaby, 2011; Moran, 2008; Tunstall, 2008). The success of this transatlantic television format adaptation inspired many other countries with developing media industries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, South Korea and Sweden to reproduce their versions of the format which offered them several advantages such as cheaper production costs and novelty. It was followed by another example in 1953 when *Romper Room,* a children's television program produced by a local television company in Baltimore, made its way to over a hundred television channels both within the United States and beyond, including Japan and Australia, for the same reasons of cost efficiency and novelty (Moran, 2008; 2009). These two shows became the forerunners of format trade on television.

Despite its remarkable entrance into the major media markets in the 1940s and early 1950s, the format trade in the following several decades until the late 1970s could not surmount its Anglo-American insularity and experienced a period of stagnation in its expansion into other "peripheral" world markets (Chalaby, 2011; 2016). The number of countries with regular television broadcasting continued to grow and reached fifty as early as the mid-1950s (with the addition of countries from Latin America, Asia and Europe) and Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Italy, France, Nigeria, Cameroon, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela started to produce their own domestic programs (telenovelas, historical dramas, gameshows, education shows, etc.) (Straubhaar, 2007; Moran, 2013; Chalaby, 2011, Havens, 2006). However, many of these developing industries still lacked the technical, financial and human resources necessary to produce sufficient numbers of original programs or format

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adaptations to fully satisfy their market needs for several decades (Straubhaar, 1991; 2007).

The lack of industrial capacity, coupled with the advent of recording technologies in advanced countries led these developing industries to turn to buying canned (finished) programs from overseas (Moran, 2008; 2013). Requiring no economic and/or technical burden of (re)production beyond subtitling or dubbing, these low-cost canned programs such as soap operas, telenovelas and movies filled the limited airtime of many television services substantially especially in the 1960s and the 1970s (Moran, 2007; 2008; 2013; Er, 2016).

Buying finished programs from another country, however, was not without challenges and constraints. Especially given the context of the new world environment that was being reshaped under the dominance of American and Western European political economic system in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Cold War, and amid growing concerns on the part of non-Western countries about the same (Western) power groups' domination of the media landscape and their ever-growing new forms of imperialist penetrations, imported programs were assumed by many newly emerging nation-states to pose a danger to their national sovereignty and identity. According to a *Business Week* report in 1962, American programs during these years constituted about 80 percent of the total volume of internationally traded programs while the remaining 20 percent came from the UK and some other emergent industries in Latin American countries and Japan (Havens, 2006). Other developments that played a role in the unilateral dominance of the United States were the founding of the Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA) that

represented nine major Hollywood studios, and of the Television Program Export

Association (TPEA) that aimed to boost international sales of American programs –

both in 1959 (Fineshriber, 1960; Gordon, 1960; as cited in Havens, 2006). While

Schiller (1969) and Wells (1972) described the American domination of the media

landscape as an absolute sway over other countries, others such as Katz and Wedell et

al. (1977) and Tunstall (1977) acted with more deliberation saying that some

countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Columbia imported only 10 to 39 percent of

their programming from outside.[9] However, despite the varying tone and intensity of

these arguments, the majority of scholars at the time agreed that the volume of

American media products available in the global media market was remarkably high

compared to domestic productions in individual countries.

Given the disproportionate sway of Western (American) influence as a major

threat for their national unity, many countries with smaller media industries in Asia,

the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Latin America adopted state-centric approaches

to media in this period and aimed to control the flow of foreign media, as well as

foreign investors, by implementing restrictive policies and regulatory frameworks

such as tariff barriers (Katz and Wedell et al., 1977; Straubhaar, 2007). For the newly

decolonized countries such as South Korea, India, Pakistan, Kuwait, Egypt, Algeria,

Nigeria and South Africa, as well as those which were never formally colonized but

were occupied by some imperial powers for a brief period such as Turkey, this

protectionist tendency was essential because the boundaries around these states still

[9] For more information about other countries' media import percentages, see Tapio Varis (1974.)

corresponded to and included diverse ethnic groups that characterized their colonial or imperial past.

These countries, driven by the need to consolidate different population groups into a homogeneous society in the midst of ever-growing fears of ethnic or religious separatism, considered media an appropriate tool for their nation-state projects. Also, for the post-colonial states, the former colonial powers often became supportive of these state-centric processes as they wanted to secure their own interests in the creation of the national media industries of these newly formed states. As a result, many of these nation-states assumed radio and television as potential instruments for (re)consolidating and reinforcing their weakened or reformulated national identities, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War. They played active roles in the establishment of their national media services and used them as a state apparatus to realize their political, cultural and educational agendas in the name of nation-building and education for many years (Chalaby, 2005; Straubhaar, 2007). In some other countries outside of the colonial context, on the other hand, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain the reason for the state involvement in the establishment of the media and its use as "a means of ideological expression and political mobilization" was "the forces of the *ancien régime* – the landholding aristocracy, the absolutist state, and the Catholic or Orthodox Church," which maintained their power until the mid 1970s (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 89-90). Lastly, as a general note, the close relationship between the state and the media in some countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela and Taiwan was also triggered by the fact that the private sector within their territories at the time did not have enough capital to support commercial media

yet, which led these governments to maintain statist economic development models (Straubhaar, 2007). This state monopoly of the financial sector allowed many governments to easily dominate the media landscape and apply restrictive measures and regulatory practices geared towards maintaining it as a national institution as much as possible (Chalaby, 2005; 2009; Straubhaar, 2007; Bourdon, 2012). Despite all these governmental efforts, however, due to the gap in their production capacities (for example Mexico, Brazil, pre-Castro Cuba, Spain, Turkey and Algeria) and the abundancy of American programs in the market, many governments still couldn't fully refrain from relying on Western program imports at varying degrees to fill their airtime, which led foreign viewers of American programs to outnumber US viewers (Seagrave, 1998, p. 38; Havens, 2006: 17; Straubhaar, 2007).

Another constraint of imported "canned" programs was their culturally unfamiliar content and style. Having been produced with the taste of another group of viewers in mind, many of these programs failed to meet the taste and expectations of home audiences adequately enough (Moran, 2013; Straubhaar, 1991). Different value and belief systems, institutional and political structures, and communication styles made it hard for foreign viewers to understand and identify with these programs, which led them to heavily suffer from what is known as "cultural discount" — a term used to explain the diminishing appeal of programs when they travel to a culturally dissonant region (Hoskins & McFadyen, 1991). In other words, despite their appeal as innovative and entertaining content, which Buonanno (2008: 115) describes as a viewer inclination toward "the foreign and exotic", imported programs often lacked

what Straubhaar (1991) called "cultural proximity." I explain these concepts in more detail when I discuss the factors that shape the format sector.

Overall, given the above-mentioned challenges, many foreign-dependent national media industries between the 1950s and 1970s were aware that they would not survive by constantly buying ready-made programs from overseas and that they soon would need to increase their production capacities and make their own programs. Besides, the growing size and profitability of the media market whetted these countries' appetite for increasing production and getting a share of the cake of advertising revenue. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Hong Kong, Israel, Egypt and Nigeria took the lead and by the 1970s were already producing sufficient numbers of programs to fill at least half of their airtime (especially primetime) (Tunstall, 1977; Straubhaar, 2007; Havens, 2006). More importantly, some of these industries even joined the export race in the international marketplace during these years and offered alternatives to American or Western programs as seen in the flow of programs from Argentina and Mexico to neighboring countries, from Egypt to the broader Arab world, and from India to several Asian and African markets (Tunstall, 1977; Straubhaar, 2007; Chalaby, 2011). However, it is essential to note that, despite these developments in the non-Western world, US exports still spearheaded the exports in the global media market by far and fetched premium prices due to the expansion of the broadcast time to 24 hours in many countries and the consequent rise in number of media products required to fill airtime (Miller et al. 2005; as cited in Straubhaar, 2007). United States and to a certain extent the United Kingdom continued to be the leading suppliers of programs especially for non-socialist countries (Varis, 1974).

Another factor behind the continued supremacy of the U.S. television exports was the perception of films and television, at the time, as platforms for only "entertainment and leisure" outside politics and advertising as "an area of commerce and trade" (Tunstall, 1977: 54). As a result of this conceptualization, many governments that had strict policies against foreign ownership of the press and television/radio stations within their national boundaries (for example Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, India, Italy, Pakistan and Nigeria) did not have much objection to the predominant American ownership of advertising agencies, which created massive market opportunities for American media products (Tunstall, 1977).

The Post-1980s Era: A New Beginning for Formats

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the 1980s became a pivotal moment in the history of media globalization and formats as a result of major changes in the political, economic and technological conditions in many parts of the world. From Eastern Europe to the Middle East to Global South and Latin America, many countries including South Korea, India, China, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Poland and the Czech Republic, who previously had had state-centric (or state-socialist) government models and applied restrictive practices such as tariff barriers to compete against foreign flows of products from major (predominantly Anglo-American) industries and foster the growth of national media industries had a paradigmatic shift in this decade and started to integrate with the global capitalist system (Straubhaar, 2007; Havens, 2006; Dale and Fabry, 2018; World Trade Organization, 2008). The new neoliberal economic model that promised growth and expansion through international trade and free market policies such as privatization

and deregulation of capital markets enabled technological innovations and know-how (such as cable and satellite channels) to break into many developing markets (e.g. Brazil, India, South Korea and Turkey) at an unprecedented scale and increased their domestic production capacities significantly (Machin & Leeuwen, 2007; Moran, 2008; 2013; Havens, 2006). Another factor that contributed to this capitalist shift was the discovery of innovative forms of financing with the growing importance of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the founding of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization that paved the way for the reduction of tariffs on trades (Machin & Leeuwen, 2007; Moran, 2008; 2013; Havens, 2006). Especially in comedy and drama genres and other primetime television programs (e.g. talk shows, news and sports programs), these countries – the new players of the neoliberal system – gave more weight to domestic productions than ever before, using foreign imports only as fillers to meet their extended airtime (Torre, 2012). After decades of Anglo-American dominance in the international media landscape, these developments heralded the beginning of a new era of cultural revival, resistance and reclamation. Tunstall (2008) grouped these newly emerging media centers (as alternatives to previous American monopoly over media) into four major regions: (1) Euro-America that includes South and North American countries as well as most of Europe; (2) China which has become a major media hub in Asia, followed by its neighbors (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong); (3) India, another new media capital holding sway over South Asia, together with its neighbors such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand; and finally (4) Arabic-language media that covers a massive geographical area from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. Even some countries outside of these major

media regions, such as Turkey, which extended its media exports (predominantly television dramas, also known as *dizi*) from the Middle East to Europe to Latin America in the past decade, have turned into significant exporters of television programs over the years (Tüzün, 2015).

Regionalization of the Media

In addition to the growing availability of technologies and know-how necessary for media production, the growing market demand for programs around the globe has also had an accelerating impact on the regionalization of the media. With the explosion of national/regional television channels within these newly emerging media regions as a result of the deregulation and privatization policies towards the end of the 1980s, as well as the consequent increased airtime of broadcasting, program exchanges among national media industries became a business imperative, which meant a new beginning for cross-border format trade. That is, to satisfy the increased market demand and accommodate intensified competition on both national and global scales, media professionals started to monitor their domestic and international competitors more closely, and cross-border program exchanges once again became unavoidable and even more desirable and profitable for the industry (Chalaby, 2016; Bourdon, 2012). However, this time, the exchange no longer had to be canned or unidirectional; formats were back on the market stage yet in a more global scale and more complicated ways, which I discuss below.

As in the first decades of format trade, one of the most popular format genres in this new era was game shows, which included the still-popular reality-TV formats *Survivor* (1992), *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?* (1999), *Big Brother* (1999) and *Pop*

Idol (2001) (Chalaby, 2011). Thanks to their novelty and cash generation capacity,

these formats became so popular among viewers and so profitable for producers and

the national industries around the world that each one of them has been adapted and

reproduced in tens of different countries in the years to follow. Observing this media

frenzy, Peter Bazalgette (2005) called these programs "super formats" – a concept he

coined to refer to "formats that 'break new ground' in terms of originality, world

domination and cash generation" (as cited in Chalaby, 2011: 298). Countries such as

the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France joined the United States in

exporting high volumes of formats to global markets (Chalaby, 2011), which

Bourdon (2012) named "Euro-American Convergence." Also, companies such as

Endemol, BBC International and Pearson Television, which were to dominate the

markets (as well as the format trade) for decades to come, were founded during these

years.

By early 2000s, formats became the *de facto* standard for national productions

as media industries around the globe continued to grow significantly including the

once so-called periphery countries such as India, South Korea and Turkey. Many of

these so-called modest media industries which could not meet the market demand

within their territories and had to depend on Western exports to a large extent a few

decades ago had now turned into major producers of media content as well as

exporters (and importers) of transnational TV formats and program ideas within and

beyond their regions. As a consequence, the United States became more of a "testing

ground" and a path to a wider reputation for many non-Western productions coming

from these smaller industries10 (Moran, 2013). Given this growing scale and complexity of format trades and the market size, creating legal protection for formats and owners' rights became a business imperative, which resulted in the foundation of a global non-profit organization, the Format Registration and Protection Association (FRAPA). With the arrival of this trade association, format trades were systematized and attained a legal ground.

Today, media products are independent of spatial fixity more than ever through processes of "deterritorialization" and "reterritorialization," which Canclini (1995: 229) defines, respectively, as "the loss of the 'natural' relation of culture to geographical and social territories," and subsequent "certain relative, partial territorial relocalizations of old and new symbolic productions." Looking back, Chalaby (2016) summarizes the long journey of formats in three stages: the decades between the 1940s and the 1970s as the "invention" period, in which few countries dominated the television landscape, which was followed by a period of "internationalization" until the 1990s, during which formats started to travel to more places and in different directions – albeit still predominantly to be found in economically advanced countries. Finally, Chalaby (2016) describes the current era from the 1990s to present day as the period of "globalization" for format business (and the media in general), as formats have made their way to almost every nook and corner of the world. Programs and program ideas in any genre today are often born with the potential and power to turn into formats and transcend beyond the boundaries of their intended reach with ease and travel across different levels of the consumption landscape from local to

10 For the case of Turkey, see Yeşil (2015) and Tüzün (2015).

national to geocultural and global in no time. Under these new circumstances, many producers today create programs taking into account not only the domestic audience taste and expectations but also the existing global trends elsewhere to increase their revenues (Chalaby, 2016).

Moreover, the growing popularity of formats in the global television sector since the 2000s has also triggered the rise of many independent production companies, also known as indies or super-indies (e.g. Endemol, ITV Studios, Fremantle, Banijay, Zodiak and All3Media) (Nylund, 2016). Contrary to conventional models of production, in which producers make programs with a specific country and possibly a specific broadcaster in mind, these companies operate on a global scale, produce program content without a pre-signed agreement and try to sell their products to as many broadcasters as possible. This shift in the focus of productions, their marketing and consumption from a national to transnational level marks the beginning of a new era in format trading that has paved the way for formats to travel at an unprecedented pace (Chalaby, 2016). For instance, the reality television singing competition *The Voice* reached tens of countries in only a few years after its creation by the Dutch-based super-indie Endemol in 2010.

Finally, the meaning of "format" has also changed significantly in the past several decades to include a myriad of familiar and new genres such as factual entertainment programs, late-night shows, TV dramas and comedies, mockumentaries, talent contest and panel shows (Moran, 2009; Chalaby, 2016). Fictional and scripted series have become more prominent compared to earlier periods (*TBI Scripted*, 2019). Contrary to earlier conceptualizations of formats merely

as gameshows or contests, today the term format can refer to any program that is reimagined and reproduced by another producer for a different group of viewers. Furthermore, the growing popularity and dissemination of formats across many nations have also resulted in the rise of different conceptual approaches to the concept of format. While some scholars such as Moran (2007) adopted a more production-oriented definition of formats, others such as Chalaby (2009) and Esser (2013) offered a more international border-crossing narrative to explain format trades, while others such as Larkey et al. (2016) and Er (2016) had a narrative/discourse-oriented approach.

Why Adapt Formats?

While the historical timeline of events since the early twentieth century around the world that has been covered so far articulates how formats have become the *sine qua non* of the global marketplace, it does not fully answer the question of "why adapt formats?" In other words, what makes formats so attractive to buyers and viewers?

One of the primary advantages of buying formats from a business standpoint is their tried and tested formulas and financial appeal (Ellis, 1982; Hutcheon, 2006; Moran, 2004; Straubhaar, 2012). Having been produced and aired in at least one another country, formats offer buyers a chance to look at a program's previous ratings and successes (as well as failures) in other territories and anticipate the potential future success of its reproduction in its new home (Chalaby, 2011). Thus, format trading is often seen as a profitable business strategy and a shortcut to success for producers and broadcasters in contrast to the practice of making "original" programs

from scratch which requires larger investments of both time and money while entailing higher risks of failure and more uncertain rewards (Moran, 2004).

In addition, business is grounded on risk-avoidance and cost savings as much as risk-taking and money, and formats sit at the nexus of this risk-benefit equation since the late 1990s (Hutcheon, 2006). The growing value of the global format market, which generates billions of dollars in revenue each year including both production and distribution costs in the global age (Chalaby, 2016), make it difficult for media professionals to overlook the financial benefits that formats have to offer. This tremendous market value is also multiplied by the constant expansion of formats to include different – fictional – genres such as comedy and drama series, telenovelas, and crime shows since the early 2000s. The global trends and contingent economic pressures on national markets that develop as a result of, to a large extent, uncontrollable global networks of economic, social and historical relations play a major role in local professionals' preference of formats over original programs (Hutcheon, 2006; Havens, 2006; Straubhaar, 2007; Waisbord, 2009).

Finally, another advantage of format trade from a cultural point of view is the room they provide for customization and cultural adaptation. As many scholars such as Silj, (1988), Blumler & Katz (1974), Bielby & Harrington (2002), Fiske (1987), Moran (2004; 2008), Spark (2007), and Straubhaar (1991; 2007; 2012) indicated in the last several decades, national viewers always prefer to watch programs that they can relate to both socially and culturally. Especially in the current era of amplified cultural self-awareness and identity politics, presenting a (foreign) text in its original form to a different viewer group with a different social and cultural orientation

becomes nothing more than "a commercial gamble" since it may contain culturally inappropriate content and may evoke negative reactions among the audience (Bielby & Harrington, 2002; Moran, 2007: 148). This is also where the "cultural discount" plays a role. As a result, major exporters of television programs, especially since the 2000s, sell more formats than canned programs to give cultural producers a chance to gauge the tastes and concerns of their society in the iteration and get a better chance of success and viewer satisfaction (Straubhaar, 2007).

Given these economic, cultural and industrial advantages, formats make a popular choice for producers and broadcasters in almost every country. Created in the midst of this tension between global and local forces, formats provide producers and broadcasters with the flexibility to both integrate with the global marketplace for innovative and profitable goods and take into account national and regional particularities to create "hybrid" narratives.

Global and Local Forces in Format Business

Despite these advantages, the reproduction of formats is not an easy and speedy process because it requires producers to consider and cope with various global and local forces whose effects are experienced and observed in every phase from production to broadcasting to reception. Notably, the large number of stakeholders from global to local and from official to public levels in this multifaceted business model puts producers in a position where they are expected to manage and maintain a

balance between global and local forces. This section examines these forces in detail, classifying them under three main categories: industrial, state and social.[11]

The Industry (Media Sector)

One of the most salient ways industrial forces manifest themselves in the process of reproducing a format is the duration of programs, which may diverge from one culture to another significantly as a result of varying programming and viewing habits. In some countries such as Turkey, the industrial conventions may force producers to create longer programs in duration. For instance, a drama series format that consists of 45-minute episodes in one country may need to be transformed into a much longer version with two-hour (akin to the length of a feature film) episodes in another country. One reason for this type of temporal divergence is considered to be profit-related. That is, the convention of having longer TV programs in some countries may be a result of some government regulations that enforce broadcasters to have a limited number of commercials to be shown within an hour during a broadcast. Governmental agencies usually establish this type of regulations to achieve fair competition among media broadcasters as well as to maintain the flow of ideas and the story within programs. Commercials, on the other hand, constitute the backbone and primary income source of broadcasters, and therefore that of production companies. This situation forces broadcasters in countries with this type of restrictive regulations to opt for longer programs to increase their revenues by incorporating

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[11] It is important to underscore the fact that most of these forces, in reality, intersect and overlap with each other. For instance, production is carried out based on state laws and social expectations, while social expectations are shaped by media productions and state ideologies. This categorization, however, is to help understand and illustrate the main movers and shakers, and the stakeholders of format sector in countries.

more TV commercials. In other countries, however, this mechanism may work the other way. That is, longer shows may be perceived as a barrier for soliciting the largest number of advertisers for different audiences. Therefore, producers may be more inclined toward shortening programs during adaptation to be able to attract more audiences, and thus more advertisers, to maximize their profits.

In cross-cultural format adaptations, these time-related strategies also frequently dovetail with customization mechanisms for achieving 'cultural proximity,' as the extended (or sometimes reduced) time can be used by producers for localization purposes (Larkey et al., 2016). Media industries often use "time" effectively and appropriately in order to maximize the adaptability of a format. For instance, when presenting a gay relationship in a show that is being reproduced in a heteronormative society, producers can add additional minutes to the storyline to both extend the duration of the show for financial yields as well as modify its plot so that it either foregrounds the inappropriateness of the relationship shown or present it in a more innocent way. In case where industrial conventions force producers to create shorter programs, on the other hand, producers may seize the opportunity to delete elements that they perceive as culturally dissonant and politically problematic. As Er (2016) and Larkey et al. (2016) have shown, there exists a relationship between the temporality of a format adaptation and the localization mechanism deployed during its reproduction.

Another means of industrial forces shaping the process of format adaptation is the "timing" of broadcasting. As Butler (2012) points out, television is a unique medium with its never-ending flow of broadcasting. In this never-ending flow, the

timing of each program, as well as what it precedes and follows, has a profound

impact on its perceived meaning and overall success rate. For instance, programs that

are aired during prime-time hours are generally viewed and accepted as more

important and/or more popular than other programs aired at other times, i.e., after

midnight. These industrial decisions regarding a program's airtime is based on a

number of factors such as the profit each program yields, state regulations regarding

programs timing based on the age-appropriateness of their content, viewing habits

and preferences of the target society, and the program schedule of other channels that

the channel competes with. Given these factors, a format that is aired in prime-time in

one country may be forced to turn into a midnight show in another one. An example

of this is the Turkish adaptation of the Quebec series *Un Gars Une Fille*, which was

made into a midnight show due to its allegedly inappropriate content for a

conservative Turkish society.

Third, relationships between producers and broadcasters within each

particular media industry may also have an effect on how formats are adapted. For

instance, broadcasters, whose programs are constantly regulated, monitored and

sanctioned by state agencies in many countries, may enforce certain standards and

requirements on producers regarding issues such as the portrayal of certain figures

(e.g. fathers, mothers, etc.) and the exclusion of certain content (e.g. a sex scene or a

political activity). These local dynamics within media industries create a chain

mechanism that affects the format adaptation process. Producers who have the most

immediate control over how formats are re-configured usually automatically feel

obliged to comply with state rules and regulations that are binding for broadcasters.

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They may thus pre-empt and anticipate the kinds of portrayals permitted and thus are expected to fulfill these regulations or customs automatically. This tendency on the part of producers also corresponds to the affirmative nature of format adaptations to the dominant cultural discourses mentioned in the previous chapter.

When reproducing a format, media industries also have the privilege of designing and reshaping program content (and eventually the society that watches it) in certain ways based on specific ideologies they adhere to. This ideological meaning-making can be achieved not only through the verbal language (e.g. the words/adjectives) they use to describe/narrate an event, but also through many other modes of communication such as the musical score, visual elements, lighting, mise-en-scene and transitions, which are also part of the story and within the technical capacity of producers. This "multimodal" nature of communication, especially salient in audio-visual texts, which I discuss in further detail in Chapter 4, provides producers with many tools for maneuver in reimagining and adapting a format for a new cultural context. In this regard, any localization/modification that is applied by producers to any mode of communication in a textual representation may have a substantial impact on the meaning created. For instance, even a five-second segment that cuts a scene into two may change how that scene is perceived because, as Bateman (2013: 60) says, "once the unity of [an] event is broken, space is opened up for considerable variation. [And] what can happen between segments is almost endless." In other words, even such a minor modification may affect how viewers interpret a narrative that sectionalizes events and stories at a larger scale.

On a global scale, the format industry also brings along its own conventions and requirements. As stated in the Introduction, formats are often seen as "recipes" that allow different producers to create their own versions of a story and thus contain some guidance and tips for reproduction (Moran, 2008). When a producer purchases a format, it comes with a guide book that is called a "Bible" (Chalaby, 2011; Moran, 2008). Although the content and length of format bibles may vary significantly from one format to another, from one genre to another, and/or from one time to another,[12] their main purpose is always to provide producers with as much detail as possible that might be of help to them during the reproduction process (e.g. its budget, scripts, set designs, graphics, previous rating data, marketing information, music, special effects and DVDs of the program broadcasts in other countries) (Chalaby, 2011; Moran, 2008). However, as much as they aim to help reproducers with the adaptation work, they also function as a binding force that lays out the format's unchangeable rules. As Chalaby (2011: 295) states, "local producers can be allowed to alter the 'flesh' of a format but can never touch the 'skeleton'." That is, the industry offers its own dynamics and contractual covenants to its workers (producers).

Another industrial force on the global level is the concept of "traveling producer," also known in the format sector as "consultant producer" or sometimes "flying producer" (Moran, 2007: 146; Chalaby, 2011: 295). Similar to the idea of a "format bible," when a format is purchased by a producer, an authorized person from the company that has created and owns the source format, is often sent to help the

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[12] Format bibles are dynamic texts because the data presented in them, such as the format's successes and failures in different countries, and the techniques that have been tried out thus far, are continuously updated for producers' information (Chalaby, 2011).

(re)producer with the pre-production and production of the format, especially in the initial stages, such as the production of the first few episodes (Moran, 2007). This practice is usually a two-way interaction between the two sides, as it facilitates negotiations between the traveling producer, who knows the format and its unchangeable rules better than the licensee, and the licensee, who is more knowledgeable about the local culture, and the dynamics of the local media industry (Moran, 2007). However, it is noteworthy to emphasize that since the creators of a format are its primary owners, they usually get the final word in these negotiations in most cases (Moran, 2007).

The Government

In the face of the globalizing and commercializing world, many countries with longstanding centralist and authoritarian political cultures have gradually lost their monopoly over the production and circulation of mass-mediated ideas and knowledge(s) within their territories in the last several decades and have come to act as gatekeepers of their (imagined) nation-states (Sparks, 2007; Straubhaar, 2007). In other words, having realized that it is almost impossible for them to maintain a closed (isolated) community that is given only national productions and state-monitored media (a model often defined as a "discursive closure" by the members of the Frankfurt School (Louw, 2001: 33)), these nation-states have instead started to monitor and filter the flow of global ideas that may threaten to undermine their imagined homogenized national identity and societal "anatomy" (structure), and synthesize those global ideas with local ingredients as much as possible (Machin & van Leeuwen, 2007). They often do this through designated state agencies whose

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mission is explicitly defined to regulate and monitor television (and other media) broadcasts within their national territories, and sanction broadcasters if their programs do not comply with the government's standardized regulations. Some examples of these state-run telecommunication regulatory agencies include the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH) in Hungary, Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) in Turkey, the Regulatory Authority of Post and Telecommunications (ARPT) in Algeria, and the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) in China. Although the institutional organization and regulations of these agencies and the degree of their interference in the media production and broadcasting are different, these regulatory agencies nonetheless operate under authoritarian regimes and as such tend to assume the role of a watchdog to make sure that what is being communicated via mass media is appropriate for people's values (based on governmentally recognized and reinforced dominant cultural order) and age groups and also serves to the best interest of the nation-state and its "assumed" homogeneity/unity.

Local adaptations of transnational TV series and other formats, in this regard, constitute a major concern for the above-mentioned state-centric and authoritarian regimes that tend to perceive foreign flows of ideas as a threat to their assumed national homogeneity because through the (fictional and non-fictional) narratives of these programs everyday politics are materialized, fictionalized and rendered into an entertaining popular language that shapes our everyday perceptions and expectations, which Wodak (2009) names "fictionalization of politics." As a result, in addition to industrial forces, these protectionist nation-states also play a crucial determining role

in how transnational format adaptations are reconfigured within each territory through various state agencies that are structured and act around the existing dominant ideologies. In response to these national control mechanisms, producers and broadcasters that do not want to come into conflict with the governing bodies and get sanctioned also choose formats that are most appropriate for adapting and often tailor them to their target audiences as meticulously as possible in compliance with the state's dominant ideologies.[13] Examples of this government influence on format adaptations is discussed further in the next chapter, where I explain the regulations that are enforced by the Turkish state agency RTÜK in particular.

The Society (Social Values and Cultural Proximity)

Society is another force that plays a determining role in the reproduction of transnational formats. One of the primary concepts used to explain the relationship between social dynamics and format adaptations is the notion of "cultural proximity," defined as the preference of television audiences for audiovisual narratives that "are close in cultural content and style to the audience's own culture," which include aspects such as "language, ethnic appearance, dress, style, humor, historical reference, and shared topical knowledge" (Straubhaar, 2007: 26; Larkey et al., 2016). To Straubhaar (1991) and many other scholars such as Silj (1988; 1992), Buonanno (2008), Moran (2004; 2008), audiences make this active choice in viewing culturally familiar texts because such texts in return give them a sense of cultural membership, identity (reinforcement) and identification, security and involvement. In other words,

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[13] Here, my intention is not to reduce television culture of a viewer group to a nation-state, nor to see and define it as a set of homogeneous, shared preferences and meanings; however, we cannot overlook the indoctrination of certain norms and values by the state, and the society itself, within each country.

culturally familiar texts allow people to relate themselves to the figures/characters they meet on screen, see familiar and recognizable places and situations of their own and listen to stories that sound similar to their own life stories (Moran, 2008). In return, this "enculturation" yields "a sense of community" among the people of a country, contributing to the construction and preservation of their assumed national, cultural and social identities perceived as necessary within a nation-state (Moran, 2004: 5).

However, this feeling of belonging and connectedness does not always correspond to the physical boundaries of nation-states. Geographically speaking, it can sometimes speak to (account for) communities that represent minority or local groups and sub-cultures at a sub-national level within a country while at other times it can describe larger groups that transcend national borders and constitute supranational "geocultural" regions such as the Arab world (Straubhaar, 1991; 2007). In other words, national boundaries per se may not always be sufficient to determine the parameters of cultural proximity expected to be found in media texts. Furthermore, non-geographical aspects of social life such as language and religion can also extend the concept of "cultural proximity" to groups that are geographically separated but culturally and linguistically connected with each other (e.g. Spanish-speaking countries on both sides of the Atlantic) which Straubhaar (1991; 2007) defines as "cultural-linguistic" relationships.

Straubhaar (2007) further details the logic and expectation of cultural proximity among sub-national, national, geocultural, cultural-linguistic regions by classifying the concept into four different levels, namely genre proximity, cultural

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shareability, value proximity, and thematic proximity. Genre proximity refers to structural features and styles of story-telling that are expected to be shared or at least understood and acknowledged among regions and cultures that media texts travel across whereas thematic proximity indicates common themes and issues that appeal to viewers in different regions such as the theme of moving from rural areas to cities. Cultural shareability and value proximities, on the other hand, indicate "common values, images, archetypes and themes" and "cultural values" respectively that minimize the effects of cultural discount. Each of these levels indicates the degree to which viewers feel familiar and identify with the content and form of a program and suffer less from cultural discount. In my analysis of the six TV format adaptations from Turkey, these levels of cultural proximity will serve as a basis for understanding and examining the localization process and help illuminate the divergences between the different versions of the show and the reasons behind them.

Another useful concept in the discussion of cultural proximity is "discursive proximity" which Uribe-Jongbloed and Espinosa-Medina (2014) use to refer to discourses such as gender roles, identities and family relations that play a role in the movement and perception of media texts across cultures. As mentioned above, the more proximate discursive formations between the cultures are, the more easily media products can travel between countries without much modification. In addition, the notion of "aesthetic proximity" introduced by van Keulen (2016) points out to the stylistic elements of production such as the camerawork, sound, costumes and music that can affect the perception of media products across countries. According to van Keulen (2016), viewers are likely to find programs as "unusual, strange, or even

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disturbing" if the style of a global program does not meet the taste and expectations of the viewer group in its new home. She also argues that the rise of formats in the past several decades has also triggered the emergence of more universal aesthetic understandings among cultures.

Another aspect of social life other than the discussion of cultural proximity in discursive, aesthetic and thematic terms is the "size" and "characteristics" of the particular target viewer group, which acts as an important factor in determining how meaning is constructed in televisual productions and adaptations. In some instances, producers may, ideally, aim for a "whole" population within a large age range in a country. This type of programming, known as "broadcasting" (Butler, 2012: 154), requires producers to take "dominant cultural order" into consideration because, even though societies, and thus viewer groups, in a specific territory are always composed of various sub-groups that may conflict with each other culturally, politically, socioeconomically and/or based on many other demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender and religion), producers aim to appeal to the largest viewer group with a "standardized" homogeneity,[14] which usually reflects the beliefs and values of the dominant culture and powerful decision-makers. In other instances, producers may opt for a different style of programming named "narrowcasting" (Butler, 2012: 154), in which case they target at a narrower viewer group with a relatively more "down-to-earth" and real homogeneity. This differentiation between programs with different characteristics resulting from the size of their target viewer group directly affects how TV format adaptations are configured. For instance, while a format that is adapted for

[14] This can also be viewed as a "pseudo-homogeneity" among a large but mixed group of people.

"broadcasting" may require more tailoring since it appeals to the broader society, another program that is adapted for "narrowcasting" and specifically aimed at the youth market may presumably contain more non-local features, as the new generations today are usually born into a global world and may thus be more open to global ideas.

In sum, all of these global and local forces (the distinct dynamics of media industries in each country, varying state ideologies, and different social forces, expectations and cultural norms) have a profound impact on the way transnational television formats are configured and re-produced. Another outcome of these global and local forces is the emergence and development of regional media markets in the last several decades because, as discussed thus far, no societies readily and constantly accept media that does not accord with their own values, beliefs, history and culture. In the next chapter, I look at an example of this historical, industrial development around the world, particularly the case of Turkey and Turkish television. In this dissertation, I focus on six examples of TV format adaptations remade for Turkish television and analyze them in relation to the historical, political and socio-cultural developments since the founding of the Turkish Republic and the ways in which these developments inform the concepts of cultural and discursive proximities.

Revisiting the Concept of Adaptation in the Format Age

Given all the concepts and histories of adaptations and formats I have discussed so far, it is essential to conclude this chapter by revisiting and refining what a format adaptation means in today's world.

By now, it should be clear that it is misleading to define format adaptations as mere copycat imitations of pre-existing media products. There is always more than what meets the eye in a format adaptation because every cross-cultural iteration comes with its own baggage of social assumptions, historical climate and complexities, political discourses and cultural value systems. In other words, the particular national and/or temporal context where a format is replanted always determines the way the format is reproduced and tailored to the home culture. To acknowledge the importance of this baggage of national cultural knowledges, Aveyard, Jensen, and Moran (2016: 3) define formats as "an interconnected parcel of particular knowledges that are activated in the production, financing, marketing, broadcasting, circulation, and consumption of a TV programme." These knowledges constitute idiosyncratic, local particularities of the globalizing world forms and have a direct effect in format adaptations.

As a result, the study of formats should always include more than mere descriptions of textual divergences between the different versions of a TV program. It should take the format adaptation as an object of study – a cultural artifact – and analyze it comprehensively to access and delve into the broader socio-cultural context that manifests itself in various ways in the adaptation. Some of the divergences found can account for the efforts on the production side to delete unfamiliar or culturally dissonant elements that may cause cultural discount – such as the deletion or replacement of particular religious elements when a media product travels to a religiously different culture. However, not all divergences can be explained by this motive. Some divergences such as the different representation of cultural identities,

gender roles, norms of authority, and other national discourses can provide a critical

perspective on the dominant cultural knowledge, also known as the status quo.

Speaking of the importance of the cultural context, the next chapter focuses on

the particular case of Turkey and the historical development of Turkish television as a

regional television industry, whose past echoes with the development of television

industries and format trading in the globe. In this chapter, I explore some of the

institutional and industrial dynamics and socio-cultural discourses within the country

since its founding and elaborate on how these historical factors may have an effect on

the way transnational formats, including the six TV shows analyzed in this

dissertation, are chosen and re-configured for Turkish television.

Chapter 3: Television and Television Formats in Turkey

From the launch of the first state-run channel TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation in English) in 1968 to contemporary multi-channel broadcasting landscape, television in Turkey has always been under the influence of the dominant ideology of Turkish nationalism to varying degrees (Altın & Şen, 2018). Infused in almost all realms of life from politics to culture, this nationalist discourse and its constituent elements have dominated television programs of all genres to a great extent including news, sports, political debates, reality shows and television dramas (*dizi*).

The primary goal of this chapter is to explore the ways in which this prevailing nationalist discourse has shaped the evolution and ideological functioning of television in Turkey, with a particular focus on television dramas and cross-cultural adaptations of formats. To this end, the chapter first analyzes Turkish nationalism and traces back some of the historical forces behind it dating back to the late Ottoman era and the early years of the modern Turkish Republic. This historical account will help the reader understand some of the constituent elements of Turkish nationalism, such as the Turkish language, religious (Sunni-Islamic) feelings, established gender roles and family relations, and norms of authority, which were mobilized and formulated by the founding Kemalist revolutionaries towards the construction of the new nation-state in the early 1920s. Given their historical role as building blocks in the construction of the new nation-state identity, many of these cultural elements and discursive formations have gradually become an integral and almost unchanging component of the dominant social structure in the country,

defining power relations, family structures, gender roles, lifestyles, etc. (Mardin, 1991). That is, the preservation of these historically-rooted cultural elements and discursive formations are often deemed indispensable for the existence of the Turkish national identity so much so that this traditionalism preserves a cultural status quo of identity politics and power relations notwithstanding the changing political and social landscapes and the rise of competing visions of Turkish nationalism. In discussing this fossilized status quo and the forces behind it, the focus will be on two specific discursive fields: gender roles, particularly those attributed to women within the prevailing patriarchal system, on the one hand, and the cultures of authoritarianism and statism and the contingent established norms of authority, on the other. The significance of these two discursive fields stems from their taken-for-granted position and assumed importance within the context of Turkish nationalism. More importantly, they provide a basis for the legitimization and continuation of various power inequalities within the society based on persistent gender and other hierarchical relationships. Especially the reproduction and perpetuation of these discriminatory cultural formations of gender and power through processes of cultural adaptation, as in the case of transnational television formats, constitutes the main thrust of this dissertation.

After establishing this historical groundwork for Turkish nationalism, the chapter discusses and details the implications and impact of the predominant Turkish nationalist discourse on the evolution and shaping of radio and television broadcasting in Turkey in general. Starting with the launch of the first radio station in the early years of the Republic, which formed a basis for the future conceptualization

of television, this historical overview of Turkey's broadcasting landscape reveals the ways in which the media[15] have been instrumentalized and used in the building of the new nation-state and for the propagation and evolution of its official ideology. Because the media in Turkey within this context have always had close ties with the ruling structures and ideologies of the country, the emphasis in this section of the chapter will mostly be on the entrenched governing relationship between the media and the state, which includes the Kemalist regime and the succeeding governments of various ideological hues (yet mostly the branches of the same nationalist tree), as well as the historical extensions of the Kemalist ideology within the state bureaucracy (i.e., the alleged deep state) – primarily the military and other self-proclaimed guardians of the Kemalist order.

Finally, after laying out these historical processes and events around Turkish nationalism and broadcasting in general, the focus in the final section of the chapter will be on the evolution of television dramas in Turkey, with a particular focus on cross-cultural adaptations. As stated before, the relationship between Turkish nationalism and cross-cultural television formats is of particular interest to this study because cultural adaptation of transnational television formats is one of the most salient processes during which the forces of the Turkish nationalist discourse become most apparent and have a direct effect on the reconfiguration of the imported text through regulatory and cultural mechanisms. The discussion of these regulatory and

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[15] Media in Turkey developed as a double-headed (dual broadcasting) system (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a). While the press has always been privately-owned, broadcasting media was owned and operated by the state though only until the liberalization process of the 1980s. However, even after the launch of commercial radio and television in the 1990s, broadcasting continued to be under the yoke of authoritarian and statist regulatory policies because of the continued power of the state.

cultural mechanisms establishes the groundwork for the analyses of the six format adaptations at stake in the dissertation. In other words, it sheds light on how the dominance of the Turkish nationalist discourse on the country's media landscape enables the reproduction of existing cultural formations and fosters the maintenance of the fossilized status quo mentioned above despite the ongoing widespread neoliberal rhetoric and the alleged positive implications of globalization and digitalization.

The Origin and Meaning of Turkish Nationalism and Its Constituent Elements

Founded as the successor to the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the modern Turkish Republic was predicated on the logic of state survival and territorial integrity for which the Kemalist revolutionaries considered imperative the construction of a modernized, westernized and secularized nation-state underpinned by a strong and ethnically unitary Turkish national identity (Feroz, 1993; Göçek, 2008). A major driving force behind this republican nation-building project and the expected commitment to a single, homogeneous Turkish national identity was the fear that some outside forces, especially the West, and their allies inside the country had continued plans to divide the country by disrupting on its political, ethnic and religious fault lines inherited from the Ottoman times. (Kirişçi and Çarkoğlu, 2003). Dating back to the early 19th century when Greek, Serbian, Albanian and Arab independence movements culminated in the empire's dissolution, such fears of

partition[16] instilled an enduring discourse of state survival and anti-Western sentiment among the founding elites as well as in the collective memory of the society (Kirişçi and Çarkoğlu, 2003; Uzer, 2016). The fear of partition was further confirmed and strengthened in the eyes of the Kemalist regime and the majority of the public when some ethnically- and religiously-based rebellious activities started to transpire in the early years of the Republic, including the 1925 rebellion led by Sheikh Said, of Kurdish origin, which raged against the secular and strictly Turkish character of the new state (Olson, 1991). Within these discourses of fear and survival, Turkish nationalism was seen as the only way out for the new Republic and became its official ideology as well as a common-sense – a hegemonic view – among the majority of people (Göçek, 2008). While this nationalism took different forms that ranged from "official and left-wing versions of Kemalist nationalism to neo-conservative and neo-liberal nationalism as well as ultra-right, isolationist, [religious] and ethnicist national discourses" (Kadıoğlu & Keyman, 2011: xvii), many of these forms aligned with each other when it came to the maintenance of the ethnic Turkish character of the new state and the instrumentalization of religion, gender roles and national holidays for that purpose. Even at present time, the preservation of this nationalist ideology is generally equated with the preservation of the nation-state and its unity at both the state and societal level, which often comes at the cost of suppressing what is seen as deviant characteristics of the society such as diverse

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[16] In the literature (Evin, 2005: 7), this fear is also known as "Sèvres Syndrome," originating from the Treaty of Sèvres, which partitioned the territories of the Ottoman Empire among the European powers after the First World War.

languages and cultures of Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, and Arab minorities (Göçek, 2008).

In addition to maintaining the unity of society "on the home front," the Republican nation-building project also promised to modernize the country along Western lines as part of an effort to sever its historical ties with the Ottoman past and gain recognition as a new modern state "on the international front" (Kezer, 2015: 5). As Ahıska (2010: 75) puts it, the assumed task of the new state was "to both import Western standards of life as part of modernisation and discipline the corrupt and immoral tendencies of too much Westernness within nationalization." The sway of the state's modernizing agenda manifested itself most clearly during the top-down secularization and Westernization of the society as part of the nation-building project in the early years of the Republic (Kadıoğlu, 1996; Bayar, 2008). These reformist efforts included but were not limited to the adoption of a new Latin-script Turkish alphabet and the Western (Gregorian) calendar, introduction of European-style legal, civil, and dress codes, the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sultanate,[17] the elimination of Islam from public life, and granting women the right to vote and serve in the parliament (Kadıoğlu, 1996; Kezer, 2015). With these reforms, the Kemalist modernists aimed to transform and redefine values and institutions of the society in ways that would accommodate both modernity and tradition under a single "Turkish" identity (Gökalp, 2004). In other words, their goal was to mobilize the society to coalesce around the Republican Westernization project and construct a "modern"

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[17] Caliphate is the name given to a state that is under the leadership of a chief religious leader, *caliph*, while the Sultanate signifies the dynasty and lands under the Sultan's rule. In the Ottoman Empire, both of these powers were combined in one person, *The Sultan* (Karpat, 2001: 240).

secular society – but without losing their imagined "Turkish" identity and cultural self.

Straddled between these two competing poles of cultural conservatism and modernist progressivism, the Turkish nation-building project was predicated on specific public discursive fields, which provided the founding Kemalist regime and the various subsequent and alternative political branches of the same nationalist tree with various political and cultural instruments towards the implementation of the state's official ideology – Turkish nationalism. These included but were not limited to conceptualizations of womanhood, religion, language, education, and citizenship (Kandiyoti, 1987; Arat, 1989; Cizre, 1998; Turam, 2007; Bayar, 2008). Since the inception of the new state, the powers that be have used these instruments strategically to implement their unique understanding of Turkishness and Turkish nationalism.[18] As a result, many of these instruments have come to function as constituent elements of Turkish nationalism and become an integral part of everyday life in Turkey (Bayar, 2008; Elaman-Garner, 2015). In the remaining part of this first section, I look at some of these constituent elements individually (with a particular

[18] Given the multi-ethnic and multi-religious background of the society, the Kemalist formulation of the national identity as Sunni-Muslim, Turkish, and secular has always been a site of contestation (Kadıoğlu & Keyman, 2011). For Islamists, the secular characteristics of the Republic were the source of the problem, while for Kurds, it was Turkishness. Moreover, for many others, such as the Islamist-Kurdish groups or Christian-Armenians, the problem was intersectional. A recent example of the different ideological positions taken towards the definition of the Turkish national identity is the ascendance of political Islam over Kemalist secularism in the post-1990s era. The most prominent outcome of this dramatic transformation in the political arena, the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), adopted an ethnically inclusivist and pro-democratic rhetoric in its earlier reformist days (2002-2007) vis-à-vis the monotypic secularist nationalism of Kemalism. See Ruri (2012) for the implications of this shift in the political arena over television broadcasting. Another example is the ongoing Kurdish contestation of the hegemonic discourse of "Turkish" nationalism since the inception of the Republic (see Aslan, 2015).

focus on gender roles and norms of authority) and discuss their importance for the study of television format adaptations.

The first constituent element of Turkish nationalism, of particular interest in this study, is related to gender roles – more specifically, gender equality and women's empowerment that always played a vital role in the implementation and maintenance of the double-edged Republican nationalist movement (Kadıoğlu, 1996). On the one hand, women, from the early years of the Republic, were imagined to be the face of the country's modernization efforts (Kadıoğlu, 1996; Kezer, 2015). Paying special attention to the historically subordinate position of women in society since the Ottoman era, the Kemalist elite saw the "manipulation of women's public visibility" as a critical step toward modernization of the country and made it central to their nationalist agenda (Çınar, 2005: 59; Turam, 2007: 111). To this end, they facilitated women's emancipation from their traditional gender roles, as well as from the veil, which symbolized the newly-founded Republic's so called oriental roots (Göle, 2013). Similarly, women were encouraged to enter the public spheres via education and work (Kezer, 2015). To this end, women were granted new rights regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, and property ownership, as well as the right to elect and to be elected (Toprak, 1981: 288; Elaman-Garner, 2015).

However, many of these ostensibly emancipatory gender reforms were engineered exclusively by the male actors of the Kemalist elite and were specifically targeted towards women's public representation (Kandiyoti, 1987; Turam, 2007). In other words, the male "grantors" of these rights were not much concerned about women's actual liberation in their private lives. To the contrary, the Kemalist regime

and the dominant patriarchal social order continued to expect women to preserve their

traditionally defined gendered roles at home, such as motherhood, homemaking, and

bearer of family honor (Turam, 2007), because the preservation of these traditional

characteristics was seen vital for demarcating the boundaries of the Turkish identity

of the state. This double-edged approach to gender reforms, which objectified women

in pursuance of the modernization and nationalization project, created what is known

in the literature as the ideal of "modern but modest" women of Turkey (Elaman-

Garner, 2015), which would make her (and the nation) both similar to and different

from their western counterparts at the same time (Müftüler-Bac, 1999). This mission

attributed to women at home and its extensions in public life manifest themselves in

the form of etiquette, proper behavior, and attire in everyday life (Müftüler-Bac,

1999).

A special concept that plays a key role within this orthodox ideal of

womanhood in Turkey and thus deserves special attention is *namus*. In its narrow

sense, *namus* can be translated to English as "sexual purity" or "chastity," a term that

is generally defined as the norm of premarital virginity and post-marital monogamous

fidelity (Müftüler-Bac, 1999: 309; Ergun, 2015). However, when contextualized

within deep socio-cultural epistemologies of the Turkish society, the concept of

namus takes on a broader meaning, signifying women's honor, and often functions as

a key "control mechanism over female freedom" in all aspects of life (Müftüler Bac,

1999: 309). Influential to varying degrees, this control mechanism often transcends

sexual purity, and it can go as far as preventing females from living alone (especially

if she is a widow) or from merely going to the grocery store alone in certain enclaves.

Within this oppressive discourse, saving the female *namus* is often equated to saving

the honor of the family, the neighborhood, and the state. As Parla (2001: 74-75)

explains,

> *"Even the shedding of the veil, applauded as a bold stride toward the emancipation of the Turkish women, was not a pure act of liberation… Unveiled and yet pure, the new woman was to be 'modern' in appearance and intellect, but was still required to preserve the 'traditional' virtue of chastity and to affirm it constantly."*

Similarly, Müftüler-Bac (1999: 304-305) summarizes the oppressed status of

women in Turkey as follows:

> *"At first glance, Turkish legislation concerning gender roles seems egalitarian, especially for an Islamic country. In reality, Turkish legislation reflects conventional gender ideology where gender roles are constructed around "male breadwinner-female homemaker" roles (Duncan, 1996, p. 419). The utmost duty for Turkish women is to be good wives and mothers, basically because "the woman" is viewed as the mechanism for protecting the cultural boundaries that set the community apart from other societies (Bouhdiba, 1985; Moghadam, 1994). The fact that Turkey is a Muslim society increases the symbolic value of women as the differentiating element between West and non-West. In this manner, women become the guardians of tradition and collective identity."*

What this discussion of womanhood within the discourse of Turkish

nationalism shows us is that the traditionally established gender roles are being

continuously controlled and reproduced through various cultural mechanisms, such as

namus. As an integral part of Turkish nationalist discourse, these gender roles

perpetuate the existing status quo of identity politics and power relations.

Notwithstanding the ostensibly emancipatory reforms since the early years of the

Republic and the liberating effects of globalization in the past several decades, the

traditionalist aspects of Turkish modernity continue to affect women's lives

significantly as they impose various socially restrictive measures and regulations

regarding her stance at home as well as in public life. Likewise, when one considers

within the context of the media landscape, her emancipated but unliberated status as

outlined by the patriarchal system is also perpetuated through her TV representations

(Atakav, 2013; Erzurum, 2013). The persistence of this discriminatory gender

discourse, despite her "westernized," "modern" portrayal, becomes particularly

visible during the cultural adaptation of transnational television formats. The results

of the analyses of the three television format adaptations analyzed in Chapter 5 are

illuminating in this regard.

Another discursive field that has been a key component of the Turkish

nationalist discourse and thus of interest to this study is the long-standing cultures of

authoritarianism and statism. Characterized by the dominance of hierarchical and

bureaucratic relationships of power within and between socio-political structures,

among which the state and its institutional manifestations always sit at the top of the

pyramid, these top-down authoritarian and statist structures[19] were seen as another apt

device by the Kemalist elite for the modernization of the country along western lines

(Öktem, 2011). Given the country's difficult economic situation and the "limited

appeal of pro-western ideas to the uneducated rural and religious-oriented population"

[19] In the case of Turkey, the terms "government" and "state" signify two different entities in the political system. While the former refers to "the elected civilian authority," the latter represents "the entrenched bureaucratic, military, and judicial structures and institutions" that are seen as essential by the society to achieve and maintain harmony and unity among the nation (Yeşil, 2016: 9; Akman, 2004: 33). As a result, the state enjoys a dominant role in social and economic affairs overseeing civil society and institutions. Dating back to the Ottoman era, this privileged position of the state, known as statism, constitutes one of the six principles of Kemalism that became prevalent following the 1929 world economic crisis. As opposed to the relatively liberal atmosphere of the 1920s, the state in this period became more involved in the economy and established various state enterprises to maintain and accelerate economic development (Bayraktar & Bayraktar, 2017). This national-developmentalist economic model created a highly authoritarian culture that rested on established hierarchical relationships of power wherein the state was placed above elected civilian actors and civil society.

in the aftermath of the war, a bureaucratic top-down modernization seemed like the only way out for the Kemalist founders, as opposed to having a more slow-paced, civilian-led, and inclusive transformation of the society (Karabelias, 2009: 58). As a result, the modernization project focused more on the formation of institutions and government policies that would enable the modernization process and the preservation of this hierarchical/bureaucratic system than the actual transformation of the society into "people-as-sovereign" (Karabelias, 2009: 58).

When seen from the standpoint of the society, the culture of authoritarianism, despite its illiberal and anti-democratic basis, did not meet much objection among the majority of the people because of a long-standing "state tradition that [prioritized] the protection of the state over individual rights and freedoms" since the Ottoman era (Turam, 2007; Yeşil, 2016a: 9). This hegemonic tradition largely stemmed from the general belief among the people that "society, in its actual diversity, [was] incapable of regulating itself without the state's guardianship" (Akman, 2004: 33). In other words, the society needed a bureaucratic and hierarchical regulatory structure to maintain social order. Especially given the devastating experience of the First World War and the extreme conditions of invasion preceding the foundation of the Republic, these authoritarian and statist perspectives gained wider (mainstream) acceptance and popularity among the majority of the society (Jenkins, 2007: 341). Within this context, apart from specific issues and tensions around the oppressed identities and experiences of minority groups, mainly the Kurds, conformity to the authority and sovereignty of the Turkish state and its top-down statist structure has always been a priority since then. Demir & Eminoğlu (2018: 11) explains this situation as follows:

"…Turkish people have, historically, usually accepted state power without rising up against the power holders. Indeed, it is difficult to find a single historical example of domestic social unrest that did not have foreign support. This mainly resulted from a centuries-old state-centric ruling system."

Similarly, in his account of prevailing social attitudes and practices within the patriarchal structure of Turkish society, Jenkins (2001: 19) notes that "Turks do not have a tradition of tolerating pluralism on a social level … and almost invariably bow to authority rather than challenge."

A natural outcome of these widely-accepted authoritarian and statist cultures that have shaped everyday life substantially over the years and have become an integral part of dominant Turkish national identity is the rigid boundaries that they created between levels of social and organizational hierarchies and the assumed need to respect and defer to authority at all times.[20] According to Mardin (1990: 68), this social stratification of the society requires various fundamental skills on the part of the citizens, including status awareness, stratum awareness and stratum affiliation. By status awareness, Mardin (1990: 68) refers to the ongoing (continuous) detection of hierarchical differences and the skill to recognize one's (and others') hierarchical

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[20] According to Cotta (1976: 176), inequality of power (i.e., hierarchical relationships) is an essential component of any entity that aims to function as an organization because inequality precludes "disorder," to a certain extent, among members by regulating the decision-making mechanism. However, the distance of this inequality, or the *power distance,* socially accepted by the members of that community can vary culturally, which Hofstede (2001) explains through the concepts of "low" and "high" power distance cultures. According to Hofstede, in lower power distance cultures, the implications of inequality are at minimum; that is, both subordinates and superiors are still viewed more or less as independent individuals with equal rights despite the established hierarchical roles for convenience. On the other hand, in higher power distance cultures, such as the one in Turkey, there appears to be an existential hierarchy between the members of an organization or community, and this perception turns individuals with superior roles into "superior persons" that should be respected at all times. It is usually the privileged members of this second group that make the decisions and direct their subordinates by giving instant orders. As a result, any violation of this hierarchical structure in higher power distance cultures is more likely to result in organizational crisis, and even the collapse of the whole organizational functionality.

position. In contrast, by stratum awareness, he means the understanding of different strata in the social world and situating oneself and others according to those categories, which can include economic class differences, as well. Finally, stratum affiliation signifies the sense of belonging to a specific stratum, which may have different intersecting layers of (religious, educational, economic, racial, etc.) identities. It is the persistent reproduction of these social structures and relations within and across the state bureaucracy, including the police, military, the judiciary, as well as in everyday life that make up the norms of authority in the Turkish culture. Conformity to these norms (hierarchical structuring) often determines the extent to which an individual can have healthy relationships with other members of society.

Similar to the preservation of patriarchal gender roles in the interest of modernization and nationalization, the preservation of these rigid hierarchical boundaries of power and established norms of authority under the dominant Turkish nationalist discourse begs inquiry because they provide a basis for the legitimization and continuation of power inequalities within society and the state. Both in real life and through media representations, these inequalities rooted in established political, social, and bureaucratic hierarchies are reproduced continuously and perpetuated under the cloak of the long-standing cultures of authoritarianism and statism. Therefore, this dissertation takes this discursive field as another critical lens to understand how processes of cultural adaptation in the case of global television formats have an effect on the maintenance of undemocratic social and political structures.

Apart from the ideological movement of women's emancipation and the institutionalization of the cultures of authoritarianism and hierarchical bureaucracy, the Kemalist regime and the succeeding power structures including both the elected governments and the alleged deep state have also instrumentalized other discursive fields such as religion, language, and national holidays towards the construction of Turkish nationalism. Among these other cultural elements, religion has been of great importance since the early years of the Republic because, given the modernization rhetoric of the founding regime, which entailed severing the society's ties with its historical and cultural past, the idea of disestablishing the majority's religion (Sunni-Islam) posed a risk of resistance (Cizre, 1998). To prevent this from happening, the Kemalist elite came up with the Turkish model of laicism, which on the surface seemed to suggest the separation of religion and state affairs but in practice integrated the dominant religion (Sunni-Islam) "into the state machinery" (Turam, 2007: 6). This Turkish model of laicism enabled the state to control and manipulate prevailing religious sentiments to homogenize the country per its nationalist ideology. Similarly, the simplification and standardization of the Turkish language and the establishment of national holidays also aimed to create a homogenous set of values and norms for an idealized homogenous Turkish society (Bayar, 2008). While these other constituent elements of Turkish nationalism are also of importance in the construction of the Turkish nation-state, I do not dwell on them much, as they are beyond the scope of my analysis.

Since my aim is to introduce a critical perspective to studying cultural adaptations in the context of media globalization, I find it important to examine the

above-mentioned discriminatory cultural formations in Turkey and the long-standing

nationalist ethos under which they operate. Analysis of such formations and the

processes that perpetuate the political and cultural status quo enables me to study the

adverse effects of cultural adaptation of television formats. With this goal in mind,

the next section connects the topic of Turkish nationalist discourse to the evolution

and role of the media in Turkey, starting with radio broadcasting. This historical

discussion will reveal the Turkish case of the widely-observed close relationships

between nationalist movements and the media, which will then provide a basis for the

discussion of television formats and their cultural adaptation in particular.

The Evolution of Broadcasting in the Years of the Kemalist Single-Party State

Broadcasting in Turkey began under the sway of the modernizing and

nationalizing discourse in 1926 when the single-party regime of the founding

Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – hereafter CHP) entrusted the

rights of radio broadcasting to a private company, *Telsiz Telefon Türk Anonim Şirketi*

(TTTAŞ) for ten years (Ahıska, 2010).[21] In the following year, the company

established two radio stations: one in Istanbul (*Istanbul Radyosu*) in May 1927, and

then another one in Ankara (*Ankara Radyosu*) in November 1927 (Özsoy, 2001).

Although this ostensibly liberal move of the government made the initiative look like

a commercial enterprise on the surface, the fact that 70 percent of the company's

capital was bestowed by two state-owned organizations (*Türkiye İş Bankası* and

[21] Although there had been some experimental/amateur radio broadcasting in the early 1920s before
the foundation of the Republic, these were *ad hoc* projects (Ahıska, 2010: 68-69), and, therefore, they
are beyond the scope of this research.

Anadolu Ajansı) became an early indicator of the state's desire and ability to control broadcasting in the country towards its Republican interests (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a). As a matter of fact, starting with the 1930s, both radio stations, which had previously been characterized as a medium of entertainment, were forced by the Kemalist government to acquire a more "educational" role towards the construction of the modernized, Westernized, secular Turkish national identity, following growing critiques of the national elite leveling against the so-called aimless, trivial instrumentality of the two stations[22] (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a: 88; Ahıska, 2010: 135, Yeşil, 2016: 21). A striking example of this crackdown transpired in 1934 when the state banned the broadcasting of Turkish folk music in the two radio stations in Istanbul and Ankara for a year to allocate more time for western classical music as part of its modernization, Westernization project (Kocabaşoğlu, 2010; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a). This early interventionist approach of the state to broadcasting culminated in the CHP's takeover of radio broadcasting in 1936 in marking the beginning of "the period of state monopoly" in broadcasting (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a: 88).[23]

As a consequence, audiences were exposed to a higher number of programs focusing on western cultural life. In addition to the glorification of western classical

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[22] As Ahıska (2010: 73-75) further details this process, of the two radio stations, the one in Istanbul took the flak since its broadcasts had been tailored more towards "the undisciplined modern and cosmopolitan (and not national) culture of Istanbul." *Ankara Radyosu,* on the other hand, had had a relatively more "national" character due to its close contact with the founding regime, having been based in the capital of the new Republic, and its relatively more homogeneous audience group in the center of Anatolia. This difference between the two radio stations and the lack of regulatory clarity over the expected role of these radio stations disturbed the nationalist elite and led them to favor a more controlling environment for broadcasting (Ahıska, 2010: 73-74).

[23] Kejanlıoğlu (2001a) further divides this period into two as follows: (1) "the period of state monopoly" from 1936 to 1964; and (2) "the period of TRT's monopoly," from 1964 to the early 1990s." Given the continued control of the state over TRT from 1964 to the early 1990s, I combined the two terms under "the period of state monopoly."

music, listeners were also introduced to many western literary classics such as *Madame Butterfly*, *Tosca*, *Maria's Caprices*, *The Bourgeois Gentlemen*, and *Poet's Wedding* through radio dramas, as well as books, operas, and ballets from the Western world through other specialty programs in this period (Koç, 2012).

However, the double-edged Republican nation-building project manifested itself here, too. The westernizing orientation of the radio was counterbalanced with programs that aimed to construct and preserve a common set of beliefs and values needed in the making of a homogeneous Turkish national identity. These programs included "Our Elegant Turkish Language Hour" (*Güzel Türkçemiz Saati*), aiming to contribute to the simplification and standardization efforts of the Turkish language, "Mailbox" (*Posta Kutusu*), which helped families whose members had drifted away from each other during the years of war get reconnected, aiming to strengthen family/social ties, and "Children's Hour" (*Çocuk Saati*), which aired Turkish-traditional tales, stage plays, poems, and songs for children and could get attention of children of Turkish origin both within the country as well as neighboring countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece (Koç, 2012).

This early media history shaped under the Kemalist regime's ideologically-driven and authoritarian desire to control and mobilize broadcasting is crucial for understanding the functioning of television in Turkey because it established a narrow and illiberal foundation for the future of television broadcasting in the country. While this foundation was challenged and contested several times to be transformed and liberalized as a result of the changing political and cultural context both within the country and beyond its borders, there has always been a backlash against progress and

change. In the following section, I look at these dramatic moments in the history of the Republic and their reflections on and implications for the media.

Challenges to Democracy (1950-1980) and Their Implications on the Media

A major first step toward bringing democracy and a more liberal social order to the country was taken in 1946 when the Republic transitioned to a multi-party regime, allowing alternative political parties to emerge and challenge existing ideological formations. The center-right Democrat Party (hereafter DP), which emerged from within the CHP cadres that same year, was the first oppositional party in the history of the Republic to adopt populist and libertarian rhetoric and thus drew much interest in the public (Mardin, 1973). After losing the first multi-party general elections in 1946 under the shadow of electoral disputes and controversies, the DP won three consecutive elections in 1950, 1954 and 1957 and ruled the country on the premise of religious and economic liberalism (Feroz, 1993). Challenging the Kemalist CHP's repressive policies but preserving the official ideology of the state, the DP government implemented groundbreaking changes in social life (Mardin, 1973; Feroz, 1993). These included changing the language of *ezan* (the Islamic call for prayer), which had been adapted to Turkish during the single-party regime, back to Arabic – the official language of Islam; supporting farmers and agricultural businesses, and incentivizing foreign investment (Cizre, 1996).

This process of democratization and economic liberalization, however, introduced a set of new challenges. As opposed to the non-competitive political environment of the single-party era which had allowed the state to yoke together "the state apparatus" and "the party machine" and used the CHP as an instrument to

"control and steer the society," the new multi-party era produced tensions between

the authoritarian state bureaucracy and the so-called liberal DP (Zurcher, 2004: 221).

Especially, the DP's distrustful approach towards existing institutional order and

efforts to redesign it led to discontent among the Kemalist elite (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a;

2001b; Kocabaşoğlu, 2010; Zurcher, 2004: 221). Furthermore, the mobilization of the

radio as a political propaganda machine by the DP, within this context, to retain and

strengthen its populist rhetoric (e.g., increasing the number of religious programs in

the mid-1950s) and criticize the established order became a major source of tension

between the CHP and the DP (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a; 2001b). These unprecedented

challenges to the Kemalist order, coupled with the DP's growing restrictive policies[24]

in its third term, eventually paved the way for the coup of 1960 and the execution of

the DP's leader and prime minister, Adnan Menderes, together with two ministers

(Kejanlıoğlu, 2001b). After this failed experimentation with democracy, the so-called

guardians of the founding Kemalist ideology (re)gained the control of the state and

(re)exerted state authority over politics and the media (Mardin, 1973).

Following the relatively liberal atmosphere of the 1950s and the complications

it generated in terms of government-media relationships, the Kemalist military junta

set its eyes on finding a solution to the use of radio as a political tool (Kejanlıoğlu,

2001a). As a consequence, it inserted a provision into the new constitution of 1961

that delineated broadcast media as "autonomous public corporate bodies" to be

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[24] DP's restrictive policies became dominant in the mid-1950s when the party leader Adnan Menderes expelled critical voices from the party. This silencing was later extended to other institutions through a new law that gave the government the right to suspend and force civil servants with over 25 years of service to take early retirement, including university professors and judges (Zurcher, 2004). The DP also introduced other laws that increased government control of the media and banned non-electoral political meetings (Zurcher, 2004).

regulated by law and directed them to act on "principles of impartiality" (see the Article 121 of the Constitution of 1961). This article steered the post-coup civilian government of CHP (1961-1965) to enact, under the shadow of the military, a broadcasting law in 1963, which ordered the establishment of an autonomous public entity TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), as envisioned in the constitution of 1961 (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001b). TRT was tasked with launching new radio and television stations across the country, supplying news services, and creating educational, cultural, entertaining and promotional programs that would support the branding of Turkish national identity both domestically and internationally, but in an impartial manner (Turkish Radio and Television Act, 1963: Article 359, Item 2).[25]

Television broadcasting in Turkey, which constitutes the main focus of the chapter hereafter, began in 1968, with the launch of the first state-run channel bearing the same name as the said public entity, TRT (Yağcı, 2011).[26] Despite being a product of this so-called autonomous corporation, which had been constitutionally underpinned by the principle of impartiality, the channel could not exercise its constitutional rights in the absence of constitutional and legal guarantees (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a; 2001b). Having its roots planted on the legacy of the state's authoritarian political culture and under the continued sway of Turkish nationalism, the *de jure* autonomy of the channel could only be put into practice as long as it

[25] Despite TRT's authoritarian roots and policies in subsequent years, this development can be regarded as the first leg of "public broadcasting service" in the country (Emilov, 2017).
[26] In fact, TRT was preceded by another TV channel named *İTÜTV*, which started its broadcasting life in as early as 1952 from a station located at Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ). However, this channel, with its two-hour broadcast aired within a limited territory on a weekly basis, could not go beyond an experimental initiative (Serim, 2015).

served the continued construction of Turkish national identity (Şahin, 1981). This de facto control over television broadcasting gained a legal basis in 1971 when a military memorandum was issued to restore order again, and the short-lived, ostensible autonomy of TRT was abolished (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001b). Moreover, a new director-general with a military background was appointed as the head of TRT (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001b). With these changes, TRT revamped its programming policies in alignment with the vision of the Kemalist state, meaning its programs would "disseminate the official state ideology, shape national and cultural identity, and give audiences 'what was good and right for them'" (Yeşil, 2016: 39; Çankaya, 2003: 34). The following passage from the article 121 of the 1971 constitution (as cited in Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a) defining the expected mission of TRT is illuminating in this regard:

> *"Commitment to the unity of the State; to the national democratic, secular and social Republic which is based on respect for human rights; to general moral values; and to accuracy in news provision."*

While the military intervention in 1971 brought an ephemeral and seeming unity and peace to the country, the economic and political turmoil of the 1970s and the ensuing turbulent and chaotic developments in the society, which can also be seen in connection to the 1968 student movements in other countries, were indicative of the continued failure of the national-developmentalist and state-centric economic model at the time (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989). In the end, the country saw another coup d'état in 1980, which put the military junta back in power once again, yet with an almost completely new vision this time.

Neoliberalization and Its Implications on the Media

The 1980 coup signifies a turning point in Turkey's history because it led to a sweeping transformation in the country's political institutions, economic and social structures (Feroz, 1993). Plagued by a decade of endless economic and social unrest, labor and student strikes and anarchy on the streets, the military once again took control of the state in September 1980, not only to protect and restore Kemalist ideals but also to restructure the economic and political system of the country along neoliberal principles (Zurcher, 2004). For the military and the succeeding government ANAP – the Motherland Party, integration with the global order and moving to a free-market economy was the only way out of the economic and political quagmire (Zurcher, 2004).

The implications of this neoliberal shift on economic and political realms have been wide and far-reaching. Introduced under pressure from the European Community (now the EU), the IMF, the World Bank and the governments of developed countries, the new climate of deregulation and privatization of public services led multinational corporations to enter the Turkish market, resulting in an influx of foreign capital, technologies and culture (Çelenk, 2001; Algan, 2003; Zurcher, 2004). This economic transformation meant profit maximization and growth for many sectors, which had various positive effects on everyday life, such as a greater variety of goods and services at an affordable price (Zurcher, 2004).

In the political realm, on the other hand, various alternative ideologies and parties (such as pro-Islamists and Kurdish nationalists), which were previously marginalized and suppressed by the Kemalist regime found a relatively liberal

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environment to flourish (Cizre, 2003). Some even ruled the country, such as the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) in the 1990s, and the neoliberal and pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – AKP) since 2002 (Cizre, 2003). While the former was forced out of politics with another "post-modern" military coup[27] on February 28, 1997 (Zurcher, 2004), the unstoppable rise of right-wing populism and political Islam, and the historic victory of the AKP in 2002 elections following the 2001 world economic crisis eventually ended the power and monopoly of the Kemalist elite (Turam, 2007). Especially during its first term in office (2002-2007), the AKP's reformist and liberal orientation won praise worldwide, and the country soon started to be labeled as "Eurasia's Rising Tiger" (Yeşil, 2016: 1).

What is of greater importance in this period for this study is the implications of these political and economic developments on the country's media landscape. From the early 1990s, broadcasting in Turkey started to go through a de facto commercialization process following a statement by Turgut Özal, the President at the time and a key figure in the neoliberalization process, in which he declared that there was no regulatory law that would prevent broadcasting from other countries (Çatalbaş, 2000; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a). In other words, any entrepreneur could lease a channel in a foreign land and broadcast programs in Turkey via satellites. Taking this statement as a premise, Turgut Özal's son, Ahmet Özal, and his partner Cem Uzan founded a broadcasting company, *Magic Box Incorporated (MBI),* in Liechtenstein

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[27] It is regarded as a "postmodern" military coup because it forced out the government of the day without dissolving the parliament or suspending the constitution.

and leased a transponder in Germany to launch the first private channel in Turkey, Star 1 (Çaplı, 1994; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a; Yeşil, 2016a). This channel was soon followed by many other privately-owned national television channels such as Show TV, Flash TV and HBB, whose numbers quickly reached to sixteen by 1992 (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a; Yeşil, 2016). The launching of these private channels and their quick growth and popularity opened up a new vista of entertainment and information for the society, ending the 20 year-long monopoly of the state-owned TRT (Yağcı, 2011; Yanardağoğlu, 2014). Also, the number of households with at least one television set reached 92.6% by 1990 (WC Yok, TV Çok, 1990).[28] In search of new programs to fill airtime and meet the growing consumer demand, these commercial channels imported content from international markets including quiz shows, game shows, sports programs and television dramas (Yanardağoğlu, 2014), which I discuss in more detail in the next section.

Despite all these neoliberal transformations and the assumed softening of the Republican statist institutions, however, the historical legacy of state survival and nationalist discourse continued well into the post-1980 era (Cizre, 2003; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001a). Especially the possibility that the neoliberal orthodoxy of privatization and deregulation could open up room for criticism and inquiry of the country's national narrative and incite ethnic partition and/or Islamic reactionism led the state to retain

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[28] By 2017, this figure had reached 98% leading Turkey to have the second-highest number of TV viewers in the world after the United States (Türkiye dünyanın en çok TV izleyen ikinci ülkesi, 2017). It is also worthwhile to note that a recent study by RTÜK revealed that the use of alternative media devices (e.g. cell phones and computers) to watch TV had only a minimal impact on TV viewing habits, only causing the percentage of viewers using a traditional television set to drop from 98.6% in 2012 to 98.1% in 2018 (Televizyon İzleme Eğilimleri Araştırması, 2018: 111). As these data clearly show, television is still "the dominant source of information and entertainment" in Turkey (Yeşil, 2016: 5).

its authoritarian, statist and nationalist tendencies for self-protection – only this time concealed behind the cloak of neoliberalism (Cizre, 2003). In other words, the state blended the Republican traditions of its past with the needs of the new neoliberal age, which culminated in a hybrid model of governance – "authoritarian neoliberalism" (Yeşil, 2016: 12). In this new model, while the state seemed to have renounced its direct involvement in many aspects of economic and cultural spheres to facilitate private interests, it took up a new role of gatekeeping, that is regulating and closely monitoring these spheres and more generally knowledge production (Straubhaar, 2007: 69).

One of the realms where the state's gatekeeper role has manifested itself saliently is broadcast media. In the chaotic atmosphere created by the explosion of private television channels in the early 1990s without an existing regulatory framework, the Republic's statist and protectionist reflexes perceived an urgent need to control the media frenzy, which turned into a "legal conundrum" (Çaplı, 2001: 48-49; Çelenk, 2005: 179; Yeşil, 2016: 41). This perception was such that the National Security Council, which had been functioning as one of the guardians of the Republican ideology since the 1960 coup and gained even greater powers since the 1980 coup, even attempted to outlaw these private channels; however, it could not do so due to technical and procedural issues (Çaplı, 2001: 49). To solve the issue in a relatively legitimate way, the government passed a new broadcasting law in 1993 allowing private television channels to operate in the country but under the supervision of a regulatory state agency, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) (Çaplı, 2001). Consisting of nine MPs from different parties, this agency

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was entrusted with the mission of monitoring, regulating and sanctioning radio and television broadcasts in the country (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001b). While seemingly introducing a more democratic approach to media regulation in comparison to previous Kemalist cadres, RTÜK nonetheless served to maintain the status quo (Kaptan & Karanfil, 2013). That is, when it comes to the maintenance of traditional societal formations historically associated with the Turkish national identity, even different political parties can show striking similarities in their conduct. Yeşil (2016: 2) defines this seemingly liberal but essentially conservative media system as "a byproduct of the negotiations and tensions between longstanding authoritarian state forms and the country's experiences with globalization and neoliberalization in the post-1980 era."

The period since 2000 has seen only the heightening of this struggle between authoritarian culture and neoliberalism in the media sector. On the one hand, the landslide victory of the seemingly neoliberal and reformist AKP in 2002 paved the way for a new era. Taking advantage of the state's takeover of financially weak banks and their media assets through the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) following the 2001 economic crisis, the AKP had the opportunity to reshuffle the media ownership structures (Yeşil, 2016). Seeking ways to attract foreign investment and liberalize the economy, AKP started to auction off these media companies by the mid-2000s. During this period, many of the ideologically friendly media companies in the country (such as those owned by the Gulen community) started to grow thanks to the cheap credits they were provided via state-owned banks (Yeşil, 2016). As for the encouragement of foreign investment, however, the existing broadcasting law of

1993, which capped the foreign equity ownership of a media company at 25 percent, stood as a major obstacle. Aiming to overcome this obstacle, AKP passed a new broadcasting law in 2005, proposing to increase the equity ownership rights for foreign investors up to 100 percent while restricting them to have shares in only one national media company.

This proposed law, however, drew criticism from various nationalist actors including the Kemalist-nationalist CHP, and was vetoed by the then-president Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the grounds that it could "expose Turkey's cultural life, democracy, national interests, public order and safety to foreigners' influence" (Yeşil, 2016: 85; Yabancıya sınırsız medya yasası veto edildi, 2005; Yabancıya veto, 2005). This response clearly indicated the looming power of Turkish nationalism, and authoritarian and statist cultures. Caught between the competing neoliberal and nationalist forces, AKP had to revamp its proposed broadcasting bill in the following years to accommodate nationalist demands even though Abdullah Gül, the first prime minister of the AKP government, was elected Turkey's next president in the meantime. The strong influence of this continued nationalist discourse on the seemingly neoliberal and reformist AKP manifested itself most clearly in the formulation of the new broadcasting act in 2011 (The Law No. 6112), which shared more commonalities with previous laws than differences, as seen in the following regulations:

> *"Media services (1) shall not be contrary to the existence and independence of the State of the Republic of Turkey, the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the principles and reforms of Atatürk; (2) shall not be contrary to the national and moral values of the society, general morality and the principle of protection of family; and (3) shall ensure that the Turkish language is used in a*

proper, correct and intelligible way without undermining its characteristics and rules; shall not display coarse, slang and poor quality use of the language."

"The total direct foreign capital share in a media service provider shall not exceed fifty percent of the paid-in capital. If foreign real or legal persons hold shares in companies that are shareholders of media service providers and become indirect partner of the broadcasters, the chair, the deputy chair and the majority of the Board of Executives and the general director of the broadcasting enterprises have to be the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, and the majority of the votes in the general assemblies of broadcasting enterprises should belong to the real or legal persons having the Turkish citizenship."

What this latest and still legally binding regulatory framework shows us is that the media in Turkey is still used as an ideological instrument by the state to maintain and reinforce the Turkishness of the state, which perpetuates the status quo of identity politics and power relations discussed previously. To be more precise, having expressions such as "the national and moral values of the society," "general morality" and "protection of family" in a law regulating broadcasting can quickly turn into a status quo mechanism that enables the reproduction and perpetuation of hidden power inequalities within society such as the roles attributed to women within family.

In the next and final section of this chapter, I concentrate on the evolution of television dramas in Turkey, with a particular focus on the importation of canned programs and formats within this genre since the early days of the medium. In discussing television formats in particular, I concentrate on the period since the early 1990s, during which formats gained significant popularity, and look at the evolution and actualization of this practice in Turkey at the intersection of the persistent nationalist, statist ethos and the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish media. This

discussion attempts to situate the practice of adapting television formats within this historical context.

Evolution and Role of Television Series (Dizi) in Turkey

First television series on TRT were broadcast in 1972 (Çankaya, 1987). In the absence of technical support and financial means, the first examples of this genre came from outside – mainly the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France – in the form of canned programs (Çankaya, 1987). Examples included *Mission Impossible* (U.S.), *Slim John* (U.K.), *Guten Tag* (Germany), and *Les Globe-trotters* (France) (Çankaya, 1987). The genre aroused so much interest among viewers during these years that many of them sent TRT letters expressing their wishes to see a different television drama series on each day and with prolonged episodes (Yağcı, 2011; "Hiç Olmazsa Her Gece Bir Dizi Film," 1975). In response to this demand, the percentage of television series within the whole broadcast time increased from 7.54% to 15.24% between 1972 and 1974 (Çankaya, 1987). As a result, top-rated Western series of the day such as *The Fugitive* (U.S), *Bonanza* (U.S.) and *Treasure Island* (U.K.) came to be shown on TRT, followed by *Little House on the Prairie* (U.S.), *Charlie's Angles* (U.S.), and *Dallas* (U.S.) (Çankaya, 1987).

Despite the appeal of these novel and affordable Western (mostly American) imports, the newly-emerging national television industry in Turkey also started to produce "homemade" series from 1974 onwards facilitated by filmmakers' migration to the more lucrative television sector (Yağcı, 2011; Yanardağoğlu, 2014; Kesirli-Unur, 2015). Mostly based on historically well-known and canonical Turkish literary works such as *Aşk-ı Memnu (Forbidden Love)* and *Sinekli Bakkal (The Clown and*

His Daughter), these domestic programs marked the beginning of culturally and aesthetically more relevant content for audiences (Kale, 2019). Similarly, it was also during these early years that television viewers met some of the earliest examples of television adaptations of Western programs, which mostly included film adaptations such as *Uzay Yolu (Star Trek)*, *Pembe Panter (The Pink Panther)*, and *Tatli Cadi (Bewitched)* (Yağcı, 2011).

Until the late 1980s, television dramas, be it dubbed versions or adaptations of Western series or original Turkish series, were exploited by the Turkish state to maintain and reinforce the Republican imagined national identity, which Çetin (2004: 2462) refers to as "the politicization of Turkish television dramas." Mostly aiming to educate the masses in line with the Kemalist ideals in the name of entertainment, these programs were manipulated and tailored as much as possible to reflect the "authenticity of Turkish values" (Öncü, 2000: 302). Öncü (2000: 302) describes this protectionist practice as follows:

> *"TRT maintained strict control over the soundtrack, anchoring all visual images –domestic or foreign – in correct and proper Turkish, as officially defined … all 'foreign' programmes were mediated through standardized Turkish, dubbed by voices of actors and actresses from the National State Theatre. So all screen characters conversed in the vocabulary, rhythms and narrative forms of 'correct and beautiful' Turkish, whether they be members of the Cosby family, or cowboys from the Wild West."*

These practices were legally premised on the TRT act of 1984 (Yağcı, 2011):

> *"Observing the public morals, and the national and spiritual values; complying with the fundamental views, objectives, and principles of the Turkish national education; foreclosing any content that is harmful to the physical and mental health of the society; and eliminating any broadcasts that aim to arouse and infuse the negative feelings of pessimism, despair, tumult, fright, and aggression are identified as the*

basic principles of broadcasting" (The Act of Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, January 1, 1984).

Starting in 1985, TRT began to work with independent production companies in Turkey, which boosted the number of domestic television dramas to such an extent that a different series was shown on each day of the week (Yağcı, 2011, Tüzün, 2016). Some of the most popular ones included *Küçük Ağa (Little Man)* (1984), *Kartallar Yüksekten Uçar (Eagles Fly High)* (1984), *Dokuzuncu Hariciye Koğuşu (Ninth External Ward)* (1986), *Çalıkuşu (The Wren)* (1986), and *Aliş ile Zeynep (Aliş and Zeynep)* (1985) (Çelenk, 2010: 20). The percentage of dramas within the whole broadcast time reached to 30 percent (Yağcı, 2011) which also included imported canned programs (mainly Mexican/Brazilian telenovelas and American soap operas) such as *Köle Isaura "Escrava Isaura,"* (Brazil), *Zenginler de Ağlar "Los Ricos También Lloran"* (Mexico), *Yalan Rüzgarı "The Young and the Restless"* (USA), *Dallas* (USA) (Geçer, 2015). Despite the growing range of programs available on TRT, however, the Turkish nationalist discourse and the authoritarian state tradition continued to prevail under the provisions of the above-mentioned law of 1984 (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001b). Aksoy & Robins (1997: 83) explains this homogenizing approach as follows:

> *"TRT's output was directed to an ideal, and idealized, people who were unified in their shared citizenship and national attachment. The broadcasting monopoly assumed a highly censorious attitude—which gave rise to practices of exclusion and open censorship—towards whatever it regarded as deviant in cultural tone or attitude. This stance has amounted to a purification of the cultural space: TRT has sought to rid the cultural environment of what it perceived as its peripheral, rural, sentimental, unruly, or disorderly elements. The 'real' Turkey, with all the complexities and diversity of its civil society and cultural identities, has been denied, or more correctly, disavowed, in the name of the 'official' cultural ideal."*

The biggest change in the history of television dramas in Turkey happened in the 1990s era. With the boom of private television channels, as explained in the previous section, the need for programs became ever more apparent due to the increased airtime of broadcasting in the country (Yağcı, 2011; Yanardağoğlu, 2014; Kesirli-Unur, 2015). This need gave rise to the birth of even more independent production companies, whose numbers reached from 101 to 300 between 1991 and 1993 (Çelenk, 1998: 79; Tüzün, 2015; 2016). Among their productions, television dramas rose to prominence, as they became an essential component of the new entertainment sector shaped under the capitalist neoliberal climate (Yağcı, 2011). This interest opened the floodgates for numerous domestic television dramas such as *Bizimkiler (Our People), Süper Baba (Super Dad), Kaygısızlar (The Carefrees), Çiçek Taksi (The Flower Taxi), Sıdıka (Sıdıka),* and *Çılgın Bediş (Crazy Bediş)* throughout the 1990s (Çelenk, 2010; Yanardağoğlu, 2014). Revolving around topics that are mostly apolitical and innocuous such as the modest communal living and family relationships, these cost-efficient dramas were a practical tool for reinforcing the Turkish nationalist discourse in compliance with the broadcasting law of 1984 (Yerli Yapımda Politika Korkusu, 1991, as cited in Yağcı, 2011). As Yanardağoğlu (2004: 55) states, citing Yağcı (2011), the plots of these domestic dramas had "'nationalistic and conservative' undertones, promoted 'family values' which refrained from questioning the status quo and were in line with the political climate."

That, however, was initially not the case with imported television programs, which continued to dominate the media landscape in this period. Especially between 1990 and 1993, the private media (and the society) enjoyed an "era of openness" due

to the lack of regulatory frameworks for overseas-based private television channels (Yeşil, 2016: 44). Taking advantage of this era, various private channels, particularly Star 1, aired imported programs, which even included erotic movies after midnight. This position led these channels, again Star 1 in particular, to describe themselves as "open-minded" channels given the censorious practices of the TRT in previous decades (Yeşil, 2016: 41).

Following the enactment of the new broadcasting law in 1993 and the foundation of RTÜK in 1994, however, restrictive measures began to re-surface (Çaplı, 2001; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001b). Under pressure from RTÜK, private channels were forced to facilitate and mediate the relationship between the nationalist-conservative order, on the one hand, and the global neoliberal economic policies on the other (Yağcı, 2011; Yeşil, 2016). Within this repressive context, private production companies and broadcasters came to see the idea of adapting successful foreign television formats as a practical solution to this challenge, as well as a profitable business strategy and a short-cut to achieving ratings success (Yağcı, 2011). As explained in the previous chapter, the tried-and-tested formulas of these foreign programs offered local producers a chance to lower the risk of failure and minimize their expenses while maximizing their revenues. Starting with the 1993 adaptation of the American film *Top Gun* for television (*Barışta Savaşanlar* in Turkish), this trend quickly evolved to include various other adaptations of mostly American series, such as *Dharma and Greg*, *Married with Children, The Jeffersons,*

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Dawson's Creek, Rich Man Poor Man, Shameless, Un Gars Une Fille, Desperate Housewives, Grey's Anatomy, and *This is Us*[29] (Yağcı, 2011; Kesirli-Unur, 2015).

All of these developments catalyzed the spectacular growth of the national television drama industry in Turkey since the late 1990s.[30] Between 2000 and 2007 only, 600 television dramas, including format adaptations, were produced domestically by more than one hundred private production companies and individual entrepreneurs, and by 2008, the market value of national television drama industry reached 1 billion TRY ($6.6 million) (Çetin, 2014; Tüzün, 2015; 2016; ISMMMO, 2010). By 2014, domestic television dramas comprised 60-65% of prime-time programming, pushing the market value of the sector up to $1.5 billion (Deloitte, 2014; Yanardağoğlu, 2014; Tüzün, 2015). The impact of this growth was also seen in the boom of casting agencies, particularly in Istanbul, whose numbers jumped from five to over a hundred within a decade, and the rise of the film/television music

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[29] Cross-cultural adaptations of foreign television programs in this period and later in Turkey have also included a significant number of reality TV formats such as *Who wants to be a Millionaire, The Voice,* and *Survivor.* Because they are beyond the scope of this chapter, I do not mention them here.

[30] Within this growth, the evolution of "original" Turkish television dramas, in particular, and their ever-growing popularity around the globe since the mid-2000s are topics of additional research, as they deserve exclusive and comprehensive attention. Therefore, I do not discuss them any further in this dissertation and instead limit this footnote to highlighting some of the research questions frequently addressed by scholars focusing on "original" Turkish television series. These include, for instance, how some television dramas in Turkey started to discuss once-taboo political themes, such as the historical actualities of the coups, and confront some of the dark chapters of the state's past, as in the examples of *Yeditepe Istanbul (Istanbul Seven Hills), Çemberimde Gül Oya (The Rose and the Thorn),* and *Hatırla Sevgili (Remember Darling)* (see Çetin, 2014). These series are also known as "period dramas" (Cetin, 2014). Another research question that has been explored mostly in recent years is related to the glorification of Neo-Ottomanism in television dramas, as in the examples of *Muhteşem Yüzyıl (The Magnificent Century), Bir Zamanlar Osmanlı: Kıyam (Once Upon a Time in the Ottoman Empire: Rebellion), Diriliş Ertuğrul (Resurrection: Ertuğrul),* and *Filinta (The Handsome)* (Kraidy & Al-Ghazzi, 2012; Çetin, 2014; Kraidy, 2019). Last but not least, the transnationalization of Turkish dramas first in the Middle East and then expanding into other parts of the world such as Asia and South America has also been of much interest to researchers in the field of media globalization (Yeşil, 2015; Tüzün, 2015; Alankuş & Yanardağoğlu, 2016).

sector, in which sales of soundtracks reached unprecedented levels (Yağcı, 2011). Furthermore, the tourism industry also found opportunities to generate new revenues by organizing tours to the places where famous television dramas were shot (Yağcı, 2011).

Despite this massive expansion of the sector and the promotion of private enterprise and competition (and the consequent diversity in programming), contemporary Turkish television dramas including cultural adaptations of foreign shows still serve to construct and maintain the historically-idealized Turkish national identity, which includes the discriminatory cultural formations of gender and power mentioned earlier (Şentürk, 2018). As Geçer (2015: 19) points out, for instance, the majority of Turkish television dramas still represent men as stern, prone to violence and macho, and women as relatively passive and submissive. Although there have been a small number of dramas that aimed to provide "alternative voices" and "critical understandings of various social issues including military coups, the murder of women, crime, and migration," such as *My Heart Won't Forget You, Behzat C.* (2010–2013), and *Lost City (Kayıp Şehir,* 2012–2013), the contribution of these dramas to "the making of a multivocal television culture" has been minimal (Çetin, 2014: 2478). In other words, the majority of television dramas in Turkey continue to function as endless reassertions of the existing status quo premised on inequality between genders, socio-economic classes and political affiliations.

In this chapter, I revealed some of the historical forces underpinning the production and circulation of undemocratic social and political structures through television dramas, which largely included the top-down nationalist rhetoric and statist

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practices of governments of various ideological hues since the inception of the

Republic. Before I conclude the chapter, it is important to note that the state cannot be

regarded as the sole responsible body behind this status quo despite its heavy

involvement. As I pointed out throughout the chapter, Turkish nationalist discourse

has gradually developed into common sense – i.e., a consensual hegemonic view with

a broad social basis of support – throughout the years (Jenkins, 2007: 341). In other

words, the top-down making of Turkish national identity and the subsequent efforts to

perpetuate that identity by adhering to its perceived constituent elements have

gradually turned into a discursive impasse of acceptance and compliance at the

societal level, which in return created a bottom-up force on the shaping of the media

and its programming. This bottom-up pressure over televisual productions, for

instance, is sometimes exerted by non-governmental organizations that claim to

enunciate the socially accepted and hegemonic "ideals" of the Turkish society for the

welfare of its members. From time to time, these organizations monitor media

productions and react to program content that they think is harmful to the well-being

of the society. A good example of this bottom-up mechanism appeared in a news

article published in *Milliyet*, a national daily, wherein nine non-governmental

organizations[31] made a joint declaration in 2016 to criticize the inappropriate nature

of content in television dramas:

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[31] These non-governmental organizations include BILSAM Center for Education, Culture and Social Research, KADEM Women and Democracy Foundation, MEMURSEN Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions, TEMAS Breastfeeding and Breastmilk Volunteer Association, Işık Women's Association, HİMYAÇ-DER Elders, Children and Women's Social Assistance and Solidarity Association, Solidarity (Birlik) Foundation, One Drop (Bir Damla) Association, and Malatya MAİKAD Businesswomen Association.

"The so-called emulations of modernism under the technological influence of the global world pose a serious threat over developing countries… Therefore, it is one of our critical duties to protect our core values as well as global moral values. In this regard, the use of the mass media that steer and corrupt people and thus have a profound impact on societies becomes a concern. The growing popularity of TV dramas, whose numbers have increased lately, has made the television the core of people's daily lives. Especially those TV series that aim at young generations shape the dreamworlds of our children who get wasted while seeking their personhood in virtual worlds." (Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarından Dizilere Tepki, 2016)

Similarly, in his discussion of the popular television drama series *Magnificent Century,* Çetin (2014) mentions how the way the drama's writers portrayed Suleiman the Magnificent enjoying his harem and alcohol caused outrage among the majority of viewers. As Çetin (2014: 2476) notes, after receiving many complaints, the drama's writers eventually had to revise "the plot and characters, particularly Suleiman, the Sultan's scenes with the harem being counterbalanced by scenes of his conquests and war speeches and his depiction as a ruler."

While the examples mentioned above were mostly expressed by pro-AKP organizations, conservative tendencies cannot be seen as exclusive to political Islam or right-wing ideologies. As stated before, especially when it comes to the maintenance of established values and norms, both the pro-Islamist and Kemalist ideologies can show striking similarities. The following news article summarizing the concerns of a Kemalist non-governmental organization, *Türk Eğitim-Sen,* about television programs such as television dramas and wedding TV shows illustrates this convergence of rival ideologies clearly:

"There is an abundance of television programs that cause the degeneration of social morals and conscience as much as an absence of educatory programs that would help to the development of social consciousness and national unity and solidarity… Programs that take

place in a house where men and women stay together in a contradictory nature to Turkish customs and traditions and deal in gossip and intrigue for the sake of winning the game defeat their purpose... We demand more meaningful programs that protect our culture and Turkishness and highlight the unity of our state."

In conclusion, it is essential to reiterate that both the omnipresent state and its interventionist approaches to shape the media landscape and the established social order and the hegemony of Turkishness rooted in the society always put television programs in Turkey under the yoke of top-down and bottom-up forces of Turkish nationalism. From live soccer broadcasts to reality TV shows, from television dramas to news bulletins, almost all programs reproduce this nationalist discourse whenever possible and to varying degrees. Sometimes, this reproduction happens very overtly, as in live broadcasts of national holiday celebrations and parades to arouse nationalist sentiments. At other times, it happens in more subtle ways, as in scripted fiction programs, which Billig (1995) designates with the term "banal nationalism," referring to the mundane and unobtrusive representations of nationalist discourses in the form of taken-for-granted cultural patterns, practices and knowledge.

From a political standpoint, this nationalist logic can be seen as a *sine qua non* for nation-states. After all, every nation-state instrumentalizes various official and banal national elements to maintain its internal cultural and political cohesion. However, what is of critical importance here is that these nationalist imperatives can also encompass the reproduction and maintenance of various power inequalities within societies (i.e., discriminatory status quo mechanisms), as is the case in Turkey. While the ever-growing multi-channel media landscape in the country and their integration with global media markets, as well as the proliferation of social media

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platforms do offer opportunities for contesting hegemonic forms, the majority of

programs continue to provide dominant cultural discourses, relegating alternative

voices to the margins. This continuation of dominant social structures manifests itself

most evidently in cultural adaptations of foreign shows, which constitutes the

rationale for undertaking this dissertation.

Chapter 4: Methodology: Multimodality

In analyzing cross-cultural television format adaptations, this dissertation aims to provide a comprehensive account of the ways in which specific discourses such as norms of authority and gender roles dominant within cultures are (re)constructed and represented through national television productions. To this end, I deploy a multimodal approach to the study of televisual texts because meaning-making in television can never be confined to the affordances of a single mode of representation such as the dialog, but rather be found at the intersection of multiple modes of representation including, but not limited to, the camerawork, set dressing, musical score and lighting (Bateman & Schmidt, 2012). Existing and operating in the filmic, narrative and symbolic layers of televisual texts, these various modes are orchestrated and engineered by producers to construct specific narratives, storylines, concepts and perspectives. It is thus only through a close analysis of these modes scattered the visual, verbal and sound tracks of television and the interplay between them that one can deeply unravel discourses embedded in texts and analyze them with a critical lens.

In line with this understanding, the first part of this methodology chapter focuses on the theoretical and historical background of multimodality and (1) presents an overview of social semiotics as a theoretical foundation for multimodal research; then (2) expands on the concept of "multimodality," which defines the domain of multimodal research; and (3) introduces MCDA as an analytical framework to analyze texts and discourses. Then, in the following part, the chapter illustrates how this analytical approach and framework can be employed particularly in the critical

analysis of television programs and relates it to the cross-cultural comparative study of TV format adaptations. Based on this specific research framework, it explores the use of MCDA in the field of television studies and the study of transnational media texts, including dimensions of power and hierarchy.

Social Semiotics, Multimodality, and Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis

Social Semiotic: The Theory

"If 'multimodality' names the field of work… 'social semiotics' names the theory with which that field is approached."
<div align="right">(Kress, 2012: 46)</div>

Multimodal research is generally regarded as "a field of application rather than a theory" (Jewitt, 2014: 2; Kress, 2010: 54; O'Halloran & Smith, 2011: 1). It provides researchers with a domain of inquiry to analyze how meanings and discourses are constructed in verbal and non-verbal communication and through a wide range of semiotic resources. However, this multimodal inquiry does require a theoretical basis for researchers to orient themselves in their approach to multimodal semiotic landscapes (O'Halloran & Smith, 2011). Social semiotics, in this regard, is seen as the primary theoretical basis that is mostly associated with multimodal research.

The term social semiotics was first introduced by (socio)linguist Michael Halliday (1978) in his book *Language as Social Semiotics*. As can be understood from the title of his book, he was primarily interested in the verbal language and its metafunctional meaning potentials within the social (though he did foresee the potential applicability of his theory, known as "systemic functional theory," to other

communicative artifacts such as arts, music, and image.) According to Halliday, every language consists of three metafunctions, which are, (1) ideational, "saying something about the state of events;" (2) interpersonal, "saying something about the state of social relations;" and (3) textual, "saying something about the organization of the structure as a message" (Kress, 2001: 34). Drawing on Peirce's social view of semiotics, Halliday (1978: 1) defined language as "a product of the social process." In the following sub-section, Halliday and his systemic functional theory are further explained and situated in relation to some other theories of language that also underscore the importance of the social in meaning-making.

- *The Significance of the Social*

Halliday's social semiotics provided a solid basis for multimodal research; however, he was not the only theorist at the time who was aware of the significance of the social on communication. A lot of other (socio)linguists such as John J. Gumperz (1982) and Dell Hymes (1964) also stressed the importance of the social for language and communication. However, their approaches to the relationship between the language system and the social had a slightly different focus than Halliday's, which Kress (2003) explains in three categories: correlation, choice, and critique. In this categorization, although all the works under these categories proclaim that it is the social that shapes the semiotic systems (including language), the way they read the role of the social and the agent (user of the system) diverges from each other slightly.

The studies in the first category, correlation, underscore the fact that "certain forms of linguistic behavior" are used in correlation with "certain aspects of social

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organization" (Kress, 2003: 33). For instance, language forms that one uses when speaking to a professor and those when speaking to a friend differ from each other significantly because the social environment and/or the social codes compel users of the system to adapt their style of communication. Sociolinguist Gumperz (1982) refers to this phenomenon as "code-switching." In this approach, the social is generally regarded as the primary force behind the construction of social codes, while the agent (user of the system) is seen as a competent implementer and executor of this social arrangement. In other words, the agent takes on a relatively passive role in his/her relation to the social dynamics. Hymes (1966) explains this social-oriented competency expected from the agent with the term "communicative competence."

According to Kress (2003), the most significant difference in the second category of studies, choice, is the role ascribed to the agent within the social. In contrast to the relatively passive role attributed to the agent in the correlational category, the agent, in this approach, is seen as actively selecting between a system of choices at his/her own discretion and to his/her best interest during a communication. The most prominent figure within this category, whose name, as discussed earlier, is widely associated with social semiotic multimodal analysis, is Michael Halliday. According to Halliday's (1978), "systemic functional theory," the agent constructs meanings by choosing between three strands of system of choices. The first of these strands is named ideational metafunction, which Mubenga (2009: 469) defines as the "content function of language," through which the external reality that is at issue is conceptualized and represented discursively. In other words, this is where narratives, or the diegesis in filmic terms, are formed (Bateman & Schmidt, 2012). By studying

this metafunction of language, one can ask questions about how external reality is conceptualized and represented by users of the system. The second strand is the interpersonal metafunction, which is the "participatory function of language" based on which one can know how the interactants are positioned to the constructed knowledge as well as how they relate to each other (Jewitt, 2014; Mubenga, 2009: 469). This level of meaning is usually studied in affect and audience studies. The final strand is known as textual metafunction, that is the text itself. In this level of study, one can delve into the text's organization in order to find out how meanings are constructed, and discourses are manifested within the text.

Finally, deriving from Halliday's agent-oriented approach to social semiotics, researchers in the third category, critique, argue that if the agent's (or system user) choice of semiotic resources in a text is motivated by his/her assessment of the social environment/context s/he finds himself/herself in and the social codes s/he adheres to within that environment/context, then one can, in theory at least, delve into the text in order to trace back the choices that have been made and unveil the sociocultural and political reasons behind the agent's subjective choices (Kress: 2001). In other words, in Kress's (2001: 34) words, "laying bare the choices revealed in the structures is to lay bare the structures of the environments in which the choice was made." In film studies, this type of analytical approach used to deconstruct texts is known as "reverse-engineering" (Bordwell, 2005: 250), or dècoupage (Butler, 2012: 311). By reversing the constructive process starting from the product, the text, towards the genesis, the creation and the creator of the text and the social environment, one can understand how societies and cultures, as well as producers' subjective actions within

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them, are shaped. Texts, within this context, are seen as a manifestation of social

orders, ideologies, beliefs, morals, power and many other social attributes as

experienced and interpreted by the individual (agent). In other words, "the forms

carry the histories of the social" (Kress, 2001: 37).

Multimodal research is predicated on this body of social-oriented theories in

general and social semiotics in particular. They show researchers how to study

multimodal texts from a social constructivist point of view. However, similar to the

divergent views on the force of the social, as explained above, multimodal analysts

also diverge from one another slightly in their approaches to multimodality, which are

further explained in the third section, namely "multimodal critical discourse

analysis." Before moving onto that, I now would like to open up the concept of

multimodality and the domain that it points to.

Multimodality: The Domain

Multimodality is a "domain of enquiry" that mainly extends Halliday's

systemic functional theory to include not only language (in its linguistic sense) but

also any other "semiotic resources" that are available for meaning-making in

communication (Jewitt, 2014; Kress, 2012: 38). These include any resources from the

arts (O'Toole, 1994) to images and visual design (Kress and Leeuwen, 1996), from

mathematical symbolism (O'Halloran, 2005) to music and sound (Leeuwen, 1999)

and many others (Bateman, 2008; Bateman & Schmidt, 2012; Chuang, 2006;

Mubenga, 2009) (O'Halloran et al., 2013; O'Halloran, 2014). Among these, verbal

language is considered as only one of the semiotic resources used for communication

and thus only as a partial bearer of meaning just like others (Kress, 2012).

Multimodality, within this context, should not be interpreted as an exclusivist view of communication sidelining language, but rather a reformative one reconceptualizing what we mean by language (Jewitt, 2014).

- *Core Concepts of Multimodality*

The expansion from linguistic-oriented language to multimodality requires not only the system but also its principles, properties and concepts to be reassessed and redefined. In the following pages, I look at them one by one.

a. *What is a mode?*

To understand what a mode is, it might be better to begin by asking what it is not. "Mode" is a concept that is frequently mistaken for sensory modalities (visual, aural, tactile, etc.) (Bateman, 2011). Although each of these sensory modalities indeed has their own distinctive characteristics and organization, which make them distinguishable from each other, they are in fact broader semiotic landscapes (strands of signs) that contain complex and unpredictable[32] sets of modes and various semiotic resources within each mode. For example, in a "visual" semiotic landscape, there may be a myriad of sets of modes (e.g., shape, gesture, lighting, composition, framing, angle, sequence, clothing, etc.) and their paradigmatic semiotic resources functioning in conjunction with each other (or separately) towards constructing a final joint (or conflicting) meaning. These visuals are also frequently accompanied by many

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[32] It is unpredictable because societies continuously produce new modes for communicating new meanings. This process has sped up, especially with the arrival of new technologies. It is unpredictable also because the usages of modes and their meanings may change from society to society. In this regard, one of the most crucial tasks of a social semiotician is to monitor these "semiotic changes" (Leeuwen, 2005: 26). To this end, they not only "inventorize semiotic resources and investigate how semiotic resources are used in specific contexts… but also contribute to the discovery and development of new semiotic resources and new ways of using existing semiotic resources" (Leeuwen, 2005: 26)

different sets of modes and their semiotic resources in other semiotic landscapes, such as intonation, rhythm, pitch level, music, melody and volume in the aural semiotic landscape; or texture and temperature in the tactile semiotic landscape. A mode, in this regard, can be any communicative entity with a set of "semiotic resources" (an action, a material substrate, or an artifact – traditionally known as a signifier) with a meaning potential (Jewitt, 2014). In other words, it refers to anything that offers a number of options for the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of organization for meaning-making (Bateman, 2011; Leeuwen, 2005). It is, therefore, only through critical analysis and empirical investigation of texts that we can have a fuller understanding of individual modes that are at play in a text, and the semiotic mechanisms by which they construct meanings (Bateman, 2008; 2011).

b. *Materiality, Affordances, and Semiotic Logic of Modes*

The materiality (physical properties) of a mode plays a decisive role in what it can afford (provide) for meaning-making, which Gibson (1979) calls the affordance (potential uses) of a given object (as cited in Leeuwen, 2005). As Bateman (2013: 52) states, "choice of material brings with it its own constraints [and resources] and makes its own 'communicative statements'." For instance, what music can contribute to meaning in an audio-visual text differs significantly from what the graphic design and lighting can contribute (Kress, 2003). Also, the semiotic logic of modes may change depending on their materiality. While spoken language, for instance, is based on the "semiotic logic of time," because words and sentences follow one another sequentially, images rely on the "semiotic logic of space," as their visual elements/modes are organized within a space simultaneously (Kress, 2014: 62).

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Although the text is where modes appear and operate, a sole focus on the text

itself does not tell us everything about modes because modes are made up of

paradigmatically and syntagmatically manipulable and controllable semiotic

resources[33] that are discursively shaped and deployed by groups of users or

communities as a tool to construct and communicate meanings (Bateman, 2011;

Jewitt, 2014; Leeuwen, 2005). In other words, modes are composed of various

semiotic resources that gain divergent and idiosyncratic meanings depending on

users' *a priori* knowledge (i.e., past uses) of that sign within a particular culture,

context, or discourse. Similarly, Jewitt (2014: 22) defines modes as "an outcome of

the cultural shaping of [semiotic materials]." For example, we can see this social

effect in the divergent meanings that colors take on across different cultures, contexts

and discourses. As another example, Bateman (2011) talks about the meaning of

"black screen" in television discourse, which usually connotes to a change of scene,

time, or place in film discourse. However, this semiotic resource may well be used

and interpreted differently in other contexts, discourses, or across cultures. This

fluidity of meaning, or polysemy, shows us that modes and semiotic resources are

always the products of "discourse interpretation, and not a property of [semiotic]

grammar," and it is always through the social (community) and socio-cultural context

that we can tell what is a mode and what is not in a text, as well as what semiotic

resources they operate and which meaning(s) they communicate (Bateman, 2011: 22).

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[33] It is important to stress that for a semiotic resource to become and function as a semiotic mode, it first has to possess a semiotic potential (i.e., a meaning potential) and provide a system of choices for the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of organization (Bateman, 2011; Leeuwen, 2005).

A mode and/or a semiotic resource that is functioning as a meaningful element in one culture or context may not be regarded as meaningful in another or may denote and connote totally different meanings.[34]

Also, the human factor comes into play when choosing between modes to represent an idea or a thing. People generally pick and choose the most apt mode for communicating their message because the "reach of each mode" varies depending on the situation/culture and the affordances of each mode, as well as the user's interpretation of all of them (Kress, 2014: 63). For instance, in a cafeteria where smoking is prohibited, having a visual image of a cigarette with a red line crossing over it can inform customers about the no-smoking law more efficiently than a page-long written note explaining the details of the law.

The act of choosing is also done among the semiotic potentials of a single mode. As Kress (2014: 62) states, "not all the potentials inherent in the materiality of a mode are used to become affordances of that mode in a particular culture." For instance, if we take human voice as one mode, not all languages deploy the material potential of tonality of human voice as a modal affordance (Kress, 2014). Even in between those languages that use tonality as a semiotic mode (e.g., Chinese and Thai), this affordance of human voice is used differently (Kress, 2014). These examples prove once again that modes and semiotic resources are culturally or socially shaped tools for communication (Kress, 2014). After all, "a mode is what a

[34] This polysemy may exclude some signs that have become almost universal in today's global world such as the traffic lights or the use of a skull to represent danger.

community takes to be a mode and demonstrates that in its practices; it is a matter of community and its representational needs." (Kress, 2014: 65).

d. *Modes in Coexistence*

Communication, especially in today's digital age, is always done at multiple levels and through multiple co-existing modes. Any texts – be it audio-visual, written, or spoken – are made up of various modes that are combined and orchestrated often artfully and meticulously by users to produce and convey overall meanings (Jewitt, 2014; Kress, 2004), which Kress & Bezemer (2015) define as "modal complexes". For instance, even in the case of a pure written document without any audio-visuals; the texture, color, size and shape of the paper of choice, as well as the production and presentation (context) of the document may have a significant impact on the overall meaning transmitted mainly through language per se, or vice versa (Bateman, 2013). Modes sometimes appear in "composite" forms, in which case the discourse semantics of each mode coexist but continue to operate independently from each other, and therefore, there may emerge a multiplication of meaning (Bateman, 2011; Bateman & Schmidt, 2012: 29; Er, 2016). An example of this can be the "no smoking" visual sign and the actual words "no smoking" on a sign. At other times, modes may form "hybridized" texts in which individual modes are built into a new hybrid semiotic form based on a newly constructed discourse semantics and, as a result, there emerges a more or less seamless interrelation of meanings (Bateman, 2011; Bateman & Schmidt, 2012: 29; Er, 2016). An example of this kind of modal complexes can be televisual texts in which musical score, dialog and various other audio-visual modes are merged into one organic whole so artfully that the viewer

processes the overall message and the overall meaning rather than the meanings of individual elements/modes. In fact, it is a challenge even for a critical eye to disassemble a whole televisual text into its individual elements and pay attention to only one single mode, say the musical score, ignoring others.

On the other hand, the coexistence of modes in texts does not necessarily mean that the overall meaning of a text is distributed across its constituent modes evenly (Jewitt, 2014). That is, the degree to which each mode contributes to the overall meaning, which Kress (2003: 36) calls the "functional load" of modes, may vary from one situation to another. While in some cases, visually oriented modes may carry the most of the meaning, as in the case of "no smoking" sign, in other cases such as the news, the actual meaning may be mostly constructed through verbal language while the visual images function as supplementary elements to the narrative, or in a film score, aural elements may prevail over other modes.[35]

Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis

- *Discourse*

Building upon the work of Michel Foucault (1977), Leeuwen (2005: 94) defines discourses as "socially constructed knowledges of some aspect of reality." They are our ideological and partial "knowledges" of this world. These knowledges (discourses) today are constructed and disseminated through "texts" of various sorts (genres) in all fields of life. Texts are where our everyday truths, beliefs and cultural values are socially or institutionally created. As a result, researchers need to scrutinize

[35] For sure, the functional load of visual elements and verbal elements in news articles and other texts (i.e., how much each mode has an effect on the construction of an overall meaning) is open to discussion.

the social construction of these cultural values and norms. Researchers have recently expanded CDA to MCDA (Machin, 2013), which I consider the appropriate approach to the research contained in this dissertation.

- *From Critical Discourse Analysis to Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis*

CDA is an analytical framework that aims to explore the relationship between texts and meanings/discourses that are socially constructed through these texts. CDA is not a method that provides researchers with systematic and explicit ways to "describe" discourse structures, but rather a critical and sometimes rebellious attitude that focuses on social issues such as racism, power, identity, ideology and social inequalities in many respects in the hope of constructing a more egalitarian world (Van Dijk, 2003). To this end, CDA puts under the microscope "the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of power and dominance in society (Van Dijk, 2003: 353). However, it is also crucial to understand that the main objective of CDA in this process is not to look for a scapegoat, as it is claimed that we all are active participants of this process whenever we interact with others in our social world both verbally and visually, both as a speaker and as a hearer. This idea also resonates with the theories of Gramsci (2012) and those of Althusser (2012), which draw our attention to the roles of political society and repressive state apparatuses (the police, army and courts), respectively, on the one hand, and civil society and ideological state apparatuses (e.g., media, school and family), respectively, on the other.

One of the primary challenges for CDA is how to access and analyze something cognitive, i.e., something that is in people's minds. CDA postulates that

discourse structures or mental models that are shaped by our subjective definitions of the social environment are materialized through the "language" we use and our communicative acts within a particular situation. This may include linguistic and paralinguistic elements that we employ in a communicative act, such as the words we choose, how we combine them to create sentences and express thoughts, how we articulate them, and how we look at other interlocutors. It may also include various contextual elements such as the constructed situation, the setting (time and space), and the social and institutional roles of the interlocutors. All of these communicative (linguistic) artifacts offer us traces and markers of subjective mental models that make our everyday discourses rooted in the societies and/or groups we associate ourselves with. As a result, in CDA, we scrutinize the material representations (forms) of mental models and discourses (i.e., the material language and any other communicative artifacts) to access, assess, analyze and change various cognitive structures and processes that shape our social world, such as power relations, structures of representation, and stereotypes. In CDA, researchers especially ask "why" it is the way it is and connect these system choices to larger ideological, sociocultural, political and economic reasons in societies at the macro level.

MCDA, by extension, is an analytical framework that extends the domain of the traditional (sociolinguistic) study of discourse in communication studies, i.e., CDA, to include whole fields of cultural and symbolic (semiotic) systems. It scrutinizes these overarching systems and their complex designs – regulated within each society or culture – in order to reach and analyze discourses hidden in the cracks of their multimodal borders. In doing so, it looks at the relationship between any

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"[semiotic] resources of communication" and "the way their uses are socially [and culturally] regulated" (Leeuwen, 2005: 93). Machin's (2013) analytical framework based on Leeuwen & Wodak's (1999) concept of "recontextualization" is illustrative:

According to this theory, when external realities and events are represented in multimodal texts, they are contextualized and interpreted in ways that are different from those in real world, and this interpretation is materialized through a myriad of semiotic modes. Machin (2013) explains this process of transformation in four categories and uses the example of war monuments to show how actualities are interpreted and subjectified within visual semiotic landscape: (1) deletion, a re-presentation cannot fully communicate all the dimensions of a social practice, in other words, some aspects of actual reality are always deleted, e.g., on war monuments we do not usually find much violence; (2) addition, through recontextualization, extra elements are added to the actual reality, e.g., on war monuments, classical forms of art are added in order to associate them with higher social ideals and sophisticated values; (3) substitution, elements of an actual reality can sometimes be substituted for some other elements, e.g., on war monuments, we do not usually see depictions of regular human beings but those with slightly bigger bodies; and finally, (4) evaluation, some sort of evaluation of the social practice is inserted during the reconceptualization, e.g., on war documents, figures are usually depicted with solid poses, impassive expressions and often taking a step forward in raising their hats.

As the examples show, MCDA provides us with a critical lens to look into the complexities of multimodal texts and analyze their organizational (textual) design to explore the individual semiotic modes that are in play in them and delve into the

discourses created through their idiosyncratic use and orchestration by people and societies. This is true even for iconic images such as photographs of actual events and objects. Even though iconic images stand as if they were direct representations of the world, any modes within their organization that can be paradigmatically and syntagmatically manipulated and configured (such as angle, lighting, background, framing, zooming, focus and the context in which it is presented) contribute significantly to the construction of certain discourses in the social realm (Machin, 2014). In fact, an artfully designed "iconic" image of an event may even gain a "symbolic" meaning in the social realm. We see this transformation especially in news photography after tragic incidents such as terrorist attacks. There may be hundreds of casualties, but only one or two of the victims' photographs are chosen and widely used in the newspapers, which are believed to depict the incident in a nutshell.

In conclusion, CDA and MCDA are two critical lenses that are linked to each other by a shared history and shared goals (Chouliaraki, 2014). However, while CDA focuses primarily on linguistic elements to reveal hidden discursive formations of power relations, dominance and inequalities within texts, MCDA explores a larger spectrum of linguistic, visual, cultural and symbolic semiotic resources, and what is beyond them. MCDA aims to approach every selection of system of choices critically and seriously because each mode and its interplay with other modes contribute to overall meanings, power relations, inequalities and "truths."

In this dissertation, I deploy MCDA as an analytical framework to critically read the aesthetic and narratological divergences between the Turkish adaptations of

the six shows and their source texts and study how the culturally reinterpreted multimodal reconfigurations of the shows contribute to the perpetuation of certain discourses within the Turkish society.

- *Three Different Approaches to MCDA*

Among multimodal analysts, the consensus is that meaning is not a product of semiotic systems per se, but that of their use and cultural shaping within the social realm. However, multimodal analysts do dispute with each other on how they should study the relationship between semiotic resources and their shaping in the social realm. Jewitt (2014) groups these disputes under three categories (perspectives), which I briefly explain in the following pages, as this will clarify the specific approach I use in this dissertation.

a. *Social Semiotic Approach to Multimodal Analysis*

The primary focus of study in this group is on "mapping how modal resources are used by people in a given community/social context, in other words, sign-making as a social process" (Jewitt, 2014: 33). They give less emphasis on the semiotic system itself than on the use of that system within the social, choices that sign-makers make during production, and their motivation at the macro (societal/cultural) levels, because this group of researchers, which includes names such as Gunther Kress, Theo Van Leeuwen, Carey Jewitt and David Machin, argue that semiotic systems are systems that are continuously shaped and constructed by the people and thus in a constant state of flux. Texts are seen as "the semiotic work of the designer" and analyzed for "patterns and changes in designers' use of resources (such as layout)" in order to access the discourses constructed and perpetuated through them (Jewitt,

2014: 38). The ultimate question asked by these researchers is "how these meaning potentials are selected and orchestrated to make meaning by people in particular contexts to realize specific social meaning" (Jewitt, 2014: 34).

b.   *Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) Approach to Multimodality*

Although the researchers aligned with this second perspective such as Kay O'Halloran, John Bateman, Karl-Heinrich Schmidt, Anthony Baldry and Len Unsworth also agree that semiotic systems are socially constructed systems that gain meanings in the discursive level, they see them as definable and identifiable systems. By analyzing discourses, they attempt to understand and describe the systems and their principles within a given society (Jewitt, 2014). As Jewitt (2014: 35) states, they aim to "produce a metatheory capable of theorizing semiotic resources, their functionality and meaning potential, and their integration in multimodal phenomena that are interpreted in the context of situation and culture." In other words, they focus both on the system and the system in use (discourse). As a result, in this group of researchers, we see more empirical research that searches for definitions of languages – such as the language of arts, or film language – and more attempts to build a corpus or "an inventory of semiotic [systems] available to designers…, mapping the choices available and those which are taken" (Jewitt, 2014: 38).36

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36 It may be argued that this group of researchers are relatively more empiricist and structuralist in their perspective to multimodality when compared to the previous group of researchers because this group tends to study the *discourse* as a means to define the system itself. The idea of empiricism can also be seen in some of the researchers' backgrounds in Mathematics (Kay O'Halloran) or Linguistics (Anthony Baldry).

In this third approach, the focus is on the action taken by users of semiotic systems and thus the context and situated interaction (Jewitt, 2014). In other words, this approach to multimodality asserts the idea that meaning-making can only be understood by focusing on each given interaction and by analyzing the modes (gestures, gaze, situational tools, etc.) each interactant deploys during that particular interaction. According to this view, modes cannot be understood and analyzed out of their context. In this sense, it can be regarded as an expanded version of the sociolinguistic analysis of "language." Some of the researchers that Jewitt (2014) names under this category are Rodney Jones, Sigrid Norris, Ron Scollon and Suzie Scollon.

- *My Position as a Researcher*

I position my research somewhere in between the first and the second perspectives to multimodality. In a recent article that I co-authored with Dr. Ed Larkey and Landry Digeon (2016), entitled "Measuring Transnationalism: Comparing TV Formats Using Digital Tools," we state that our research goal is to define a "televisual language" that can be used as an analytical tool or framework to conduct comparative cross-cultural analyses of televisual formats. In other words, similar to the researchers in the second group, we aim to define the semiotic system(s) used in television discourse and their principles. However, while doing so, the fact that a format adaptation is already linked to a source text in which the sets of semiotic resources used by previous producers are available to the subsequent producer leads us to look at the designer (producer) of the adaptation. We study how each producer

re-interprets the choices of previous producers when making their version of a program and attempt to define culturally specific systems based on the cultural divergences between the two. In other words, we attempt to define semiotic systems used by producers of TV formats and link them to the sociocultural, political and economic dynamics of each television industry.

- *Practical Issues: Challenges*

One of the primary challenges that comes to mind in multimodal analysis is how to transfer multimodal complexities of a text to an exhaustive and easy-to-read "transcription" for analysis. This challenge requires the scholar to reassess the scope and concept of "transcription" because, in multimodal analysis, it is no more "scripts," but visuals, sounds and textures that are under the microscope, and it is not always possible to accurately and fully represent all modalities in scripts (Bezemer & Mavers, 2011). It is also the composite nature of complexes of modes in the audiovisual text that reveals the current dilemma of depicting and constructing multimodal knowledge. In this regard, no visual conventions for specific complexes have been developed and are now only "additive" in nature. Therefore, the goal in multimodal analysis should be not only for transcripts but also transvisuals and transaudios.

However, the challenge is that, in contrast to transcripts, there are no specific guidelines or conventions in the literature yet on how to create or design transvisuals and transaudios. Researchers who are doing multimodal research usually find ways to agglomerate data from different modes in one document that fits their purpose. This may include graphic designs with hyperlinks, embedded visuals or audios that play

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when the cursor is moved over a picture. There is certainly no limit to innovation in this new academic endeavor. However, it requires broad technical expertise and, more importantly, interdisciplinary collaboration at the highest level.

To give an example, the following image (Figure 1) is a transcript that I combined with some transvisuals for the analysis of the pilot episode of *Monk* and *Galip Derviş*. My aim in this analysis was to visualize the interplay among the modes in the visual, verbal and sound tracks of a scene. The transvisual fit the purpose for the time; however, it also created some controversy among the listeners on how I defined the kind of musical cues (curiosity and climax). It is, therefore, always an advantage to include the actual modes of representation (the musical cues, in this case) in a transcript rather than their re-presentation through a different mode.

The Transcription of the American version (*Monk Season 1 Episode 1 – 00:16:35 – 00:17:44*)

1 *Female police officer:* What's he doing?
2 *Sharona:* I love this part. He does this Zen, Sherlock Holmes thing.
3 *(After walking around the room for a minute, Monk finds a clue near the window, and points at it.)*
4 *Captain Stottlemeyer:* What?
5 *Monk:* He used a drawstring to steady his shot. I've seen it before in the field manual for the Green Berets, Special Forces.
6 *Captain Stottlemeyer:* It's possible.
7 *Monk:* (Pointing at a stick lying on the floor) Captain, could you grab this? It'll just take a minute.
8 *(Captain Stottlemeyer takes the stick from the floor.)*
9 *Monk:* Hold this up like a rifle.
10 *Captain Stottlemeyer:* Right.
11 *(Captain Stottlemeyer holds the stick like a rifle standing next to the drawstring.)*
12 *Monk:* How tall are you?
13 *Captain Stottlemeyer:* Six foot.
14 *Monk:* No, really.
15 *Captain Stottlemeyer:* Five eleven.
16 *Monk:* Our guy was taller. Six three, maybe six four. Just like Santa Clara.

Figure 1 – A Transvisual Example from Monk/Galip Derviş Case Study

Another challenge in transferring multimodal complexities of a text to an object of study is the loss of meaning during the transfer. Two concepts that are crucial to consider on this matter are "transformation" and "transduction." Kress

(2003: 36) defines transformation as "the process which works on a structure and its elements [within] one mode," while transduction as "a process in which something which has been configured or shaped in one or more modes is reconfigured, reshaped according to the affordances of a quite different mode." From a constructionist standpoint, no representation can translate an already existing piece of data objectively and fully (Bezemer & Mavers, 2011); however, it is evident that, in the case of transduction, the loss of meaning may be a bigger concern because the affordances of a mode that are different from those of the initial mode may reconstruct meaning in different ways. Therefore, as mentioned above, in building representative tools to analyze multimodal texts, researchers should always opt for transformation as much as possible.

Finally, it is essential to consider the processes of *selecting* (what to include in a transvisual), *framing* (how to present and set out the selected data) and *highlighting* (which aspects of the selected data will be given prominence) (Bezemer & Mavers, 2011). These steps should always be considered by researchers on a case-by-case basis.

From Theory to Practice: A Guide for Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis

As noted earlier, CDA is not a method with a systematic step-by-step mechanism to follow; however, it is crucial to have some guidance for applicability and effectiveness of the analysis. Therefore, in this second part of this chapter, I

would like to include a general guide for implementing MCDA, particularly in the

study of format adaptation texts.[37]

Conceptualization

One of the first tasks in an analysis should be to define what one is looking for

and interested in analyzing. In fact, all the sections in my literature review thus far

aim to achieve this initial step in MCDA. To that end, I have attempted to

conceptualize, for example, what I mean by multimodality, a (semiotic) mode,

discourse, CDA and MCDA as my methodological basis, on the one hand, and

adaptations and television formats, as my object of study, on the other. This initial

step aims to demarcate the boundaries of MCDA.

Selection of the Text and Sampling

The second step in multimodal format analysis is the selection of a text and

sampling. By selection of a text, I refer to choosing a particular televisual text or a

series of them (within a specific genre or across different genres) that can potentially

serve as a symptomatic case of cultural shaping of televisual texts. This selection can

be made based on various factors such as the personal interest of the researcher in a

particular TV format or a genre; the subject of study (for instance, if one is

particularly interested in studying how women (gender discourses) are represented on

TV in a country, it would be ideal to choose TV formats where a lot of female

characters are depicted or are deliberately left out of the text); the scope of

[37] As in most qualitative/ethnographic studies, the steps shown in this guide to MCDA are not solid
steps to be followed firmly. The researcher may go between the stages during the whole research
process depending on his/her findings and the direction of the analysis.

multimodal research (for instance, if one is particularly interested in the analysis of the mechanisms of the musical score in meaning-making, it would be more convenient to select a format adaptation that diverges significantly from its source text musically); and finally the countries/cultures of interest (both the country of source text and the adaptation). All these factors can help researchers in their selection of a format text or more for analysis.

Upon choosing the format(s) for further study, the next step is to determine which and how many episodes/seasons to take as a sample, which I call "sampling." However, I use "sampling," here, not in the statistical sense of selecting representative units from a larger data set to study in order to be able to make generalizations about the larger data set. What I mean by it, instead, is to pick an adequate amount of data that will provide an insight into the effects of the social and culture on the reshaping of the format. This amount may change depending on the scope of the research project. For instance, if one is interested in the transnational analysis of some of the episodic components of a format (i.e., particular elements of individual episodes such as the shot length), s/he can prefer to analyze the pilot episodes of ten different versions of a format in ten different countries in order to see how such episodic aesthetics may vary from culture to culture. If, in another case, one is concerned about the divergences in the serial development of a character (i.e., the narratological developments over many episodes/seasons,) the researcher may prefer to select one or more seasons of a single source format and one of its adaptation in another country for a more in-depth investigation of multimodal representations in the

two versions of a format over the course of a whole season or seasons (Larkey et al., 2016).

Coding, Collecting and Transvisualizing Multimodal Data

Collecting multimodal data is one of the most challenging phases of multimodal analysis for a number of reasons. First, even though modes in a televisual text are finite from an impressionist standpoint, the number of modes in a fraction of a segment may easily reach up to tens (e.g., lighting, transition, camera angle, camera movement, camera distance, musical cues, the dialog, coloring, picture size, framing, zooming, sequencing, gestures, dressing, background image, as well as sound effects such as reverb, echo and so on). Such complexity and multiplicity of modes in televisual texts may often overwhelm researchers in the initial stages. This challenge compels them to be selective at some level in terms of which modes/aspects of the text they will be addressing, analyzing, correlating and comparing. For instance, one may predominantly focus on camera movements and their interrelation with the narrative structure in a text. It may be preferable, in this sense, to start by creating an initial set of codes (categories) based on which the researcher will delve into the multimodal data. Having an initial coding system would help the researcher to know what (modes) s/he is looking for in the data from the beginning.[38]

The second difficulty is related to how (in what form) the selected modes (data) will be collected, transcribed and presented. As I indicated in the previous section of this chapter, recording and re-presenting a mode in an environment other

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[38] This initial coding system may always be updated as the researcher digs into the data.

than its actual existence requires a lot of transformation and transduction at changing

degrees (Kress, 2003). Especially, in the case of transduction, the accuracy of the

representation becomes of an issue, as the meaning of the mode is reconstructed by

means of different types of materiality and a different set of affordances. Although

the ideal method, in this sense, is to create a "multimodal" document (transcription,

transvisuals, and transaudios) to accurately represent the "multimodal" data in their

own materiality and affordances as much as possible, modes may not always be

represented as they are because of the lack of technical expertise or technologies. For

instance, when collecting visual data, it may not always be possible to make a record

of the image (or the motion picture) itself for technical constraints. Instead, the image

may have to be described verbally or by a limited number of screenshots in a

transcript, which I do in this dissertation. As another example, when working with

aural data such as a musical cue, the sound may have to be transduced to musical

notations instead of filing the actual sounds. However, this would require technical

expertise, which is the reason why I could not include the musical notes of the cues in

my analyses. All of these processes may lead the researcher to lose some of the

meanings during the analysis.

The process of recording and representation gets even more complicated when

putting together (collocating) and presenting different modes together (i.e.,

representing the interrelation between modes) in a single document

(transcription/transvisual/transaudio) depending on the temporal or spatial interplay

between them. The multimodal representation of the interplay between different

modes needs to be framed and presented in a reader-friendly way both for the analysis

phase and for the publication of the findings. This requires special (digital) interfaces

and technical capabilities, which can only be found in digital tools.

The Need for Digital Tools

Multimodal televisual texts today are constructed by use of advanced digital

tools such as Final Cut Pro™ and Adobe Premiere Pro™. These digital tools allow

producers to deploy and blend numerous semiotic modes seamlessly and artfully to

communicate their intended meanings. Therefore, the deconstruction and analysis of

these complex texts also require the use of digital tools of the same kind, or of equal

strength and capacity. These tools can be deployed to segment televisual texts, collect

both qualitative and quantitative data, create codes, find meaningful and informative

patterns and correlations between different texts or parts of a text, analyze and

visualize the data collected and/or the results found.

Some of the software programs that I have used thus far are Final Cut Pro™,

Adobe Premiere Pro™, Atlas.ti™, Multimodal Analysis™, ELAN™ and Microsoft

Excel™. A detailed analysis of each of these programs and their capabilities are

discussed by Larkey et al. (2016: 4) in Table 1 below.

FUNCTION → SOFTWARE ↓	EDITING	SEGMENTING	VIDEO CLIP PROCESSING CAPABILITY	VISUAL SCENE COMPARISON	EXPORT TEMPORAL DATA TO EXCEL CHARTS, GRAPHS, TABLES
FINAL CUT PRO	Multiple Clips	None	Multiple	Multiple	Not attempted
ADOBE PREMIERE PRO	Multiple Clips	Single Aspect (Modality)	Multiple	Dual	Export marked-segments through Media Export Function
ATLAS.TI		Multiple Aspects (Modalities)	Multiple	Multiple through Networking Function	Export Quotations, Codes, Groups
MULTIMODAL ANALYSIS VIDEO		Multiple Aspects (Modalities)	Single	Numerical Data only exported to Excel	All categories (Nodes, Library, Catalogues, exportable to Excel
MICROSOFT EXCEL		Charts, Tables, Graphs			

Table 1 – A Comparison of the Software Programs

Multimodal Analysis Video™ (MMA), a software program developed by a multimodal analyst, Kay O'Halloran and her team, is the most useful program of those that I listed above.[39] Although this program permits the analysis of only one single video at a time (for instance, one episode of a format), it allows the application of multiple categories of data collection for the same text (Larkey et al., 2016). Atlas.ti™ also permits the creation of personalized categories (codes) in the analysis of a text, but, in the MMA, the mapping of the data collected and its transportation to other analysis programs such as Microsoft Excel™ are much more organized and

[39] O'Halloran et al. (2013: 667) names her approach that ties multimodal research with digital technologies as "Multimodal Digital Semiotics." It promotes the use of computational techniques and knowledge to develop advanced software programs that are geared towards analyzing complex multimodal texts.

reader-friendly (Larkey et al., 2016). Therefore, I use Multimodal Analysis Video™ (MMA) as my primary digital tool for collecting data in this dissertation.

- *Multimodal Analysis Video*

Figure 2 – Creating Catalogs and Sub-catalogs

In the MMA, the researcher starts to gather data by, first, developing catalogs and sub-catalogs (i.e., codes) that are used to define and identify multimodal meanings at verbal, visual and aural, as well as narratological semiotic landscapes (see Figure 2 above). As stated above, these codes help the researcher know what (modes/semiotic resources) s/he is looking for in the text from the very beginning and also allow the organization of the collected data by categories. In my analysis of the six format adaptations, I looked at codes that play a role in the representation of gender roles and norms of authority, which include clothing, *mise-en-scene*, dialog, camerawork, musical score and narrative structure (sequencing). Next, using these catalogs and sub-catalogs, the researcher segments the video text with nodes, which are time-stamped annotations (see Figure 3 below). Segmenting a video clip on

various aspects that include, but are not limited to, camera work, lighting, scoring and dialog helps the researcher to disassemble each moment of the narrative structure into its various individual modes.

Figure 3 – Creating nodes

The fact that the nodes created are all time-stamped does not necessarily mean that this program is only good for quantitative (or temporal) data collection and analysis. The timestamp on each node corresponds to and locates the actual place of the segmented part in the overall narrative structure of the text. The location of each segment (node) enables the researcher to know which modes coexist in the text simultaneously and interplay with each other in a given moment. The researcher also has the option to color-code these nodes and add qualitative data related to each segment (node) in the narrative structure. This way, s/he can make both quantitative and qualitative connections between the different segments of a televisual text.

From a multimodal standpoint, it is noteworthy to mention that the (multimodal) interface of the program is suitable for working with all different

semiotic landscapes such as the verbal dialog (see the transcription window in the upper left side of Figure 3); the visual landscape (as shown in the film strip in Figure 3) and aural elements (in the sound strip in Figure 3). Moreover, the (limitless) user-generated strips at the bottom also allow the researcher to link and correlate all kinds of modes and semiotic resources with each other based on their individual contribution to the overall meaning and the meanings of other modes.

Figure 4 – Visualization of the Data in Diagrams

Finally, another beneficial feature of the MMA is the visualization of the collected data in diagrams generated automatically by the program itself based on the timestamp associated with each node (see Figure 4 above). However, the diagrams offered by the program itself may not always show what the researcher intends to show and/or see. As a matter of fact, in this dissertation, I did not use this function of

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the program in representing and visualizing my research data.[40] Instead, I used

Microsoft Excel™ to create various bar graphs to visualize my data. The program

offers a one-click export feature that transfers all the collected data to Microsoft

Excel™ with all its annotations. Once the data is in Excel, the possibilities for

analyzing and visualizing them are almost limitless, as is shown in the following two

figures.[41]

Figure 5 – Data Exported to the Microsoft Excel™

[40] Because I am not using this visualization function of the program in my analysis, the screenshot in
Figure 4 does not contain my research data. The screenshot, instead, visualizes some data from the
program's sample project of a short video clip.
[41] Further information about the program can be found here: http://multimodal-analysis.com/products/

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
Figure 6 – Creating Tables/Charts in Microsoft Excel™

However, despite the use of these digital tools and various visualization techniques, it is essential to acknowledge that transcriptions are never straightforward or unproblematic representations of the research data that one collects. As Bucholtz (2000: 1439) states, every transcription encompasses various "interpretive and representational decisions" that are influenced by the particular analytical interests and scholarly predisposition of the researcher. For instance, when transcribing a dialog, what one hears and includes in the transcription and how s/he represents it (e.g., standard versus non-standard spelling, written versus oral discourse) may have an effect on the perception of the text as well as the reliability and validity of the study.

This issue becomes even more critical in the case of multimodal studies because they deal with multiple systems of transcriptions (i.e., verbal, visual, and

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acoustic), which are all fairly standardized. Moreover, there is the issue of how these systems mix together to make the whole experience of the film/TV series. The three modes of communication taken together may often offer a qualitatively different experience when combined into an audiovisual text than as separate modes of communication.

The solution that Bucholtz (2000: 1453) suggests for researchers with regard to this problematic nature of transcriptions is to be "more aware of the complexity of the transcription process" and remember that there is always some subjectivity going into the transcription process. Therefore, what is needed on the part of the researcher is to be reflexive as much as possible in terms of the decisions s/he makes while collecting and transcribing the data, and to make those decisions clear to the reader.

In this regard, it is essential for me to make clear some of my analytical interests and scholarly predispositions that may have had an effect on the creation of the transcriptions given in Chapters 5 and 6. As mentioned in previous chapters, my goal in this dissertation is to examine the overall narrative structure of the six localized formats and shed light on their remaking in terms of the reproduction of the oppressive discourses of patriarchal gender norms and rigid hierarchical power prevalent in Turkey. This analytical interest requires me to focus on the big picture; that is, the combination of and the interplay between the visual, verbal and acoustic modes of communication than to conduct a more in-depth analysis of a single mode. Therefore, in transcribing and analyzing my data, especially the dialog, I do not dwell much on phonological details or issues such as standard versus non-standard spelling, but rather attempt to present the audiovisual data in its entirety as much as possible.

To this end, I supplement my transcriptions with various transvisual elements (e.g., screenshots and tables) in compliance with the multimodal nature of the texts under discussion.

This multimodal approach to transcriptions helps with the reliability and validity of the study, as, in most cases, I do not need to describe (and interpret) the visual components of the narrative and instead let the data speak for itself. This allows the reader to have a better understanding of the audiovisual content of the texts and the interplay between the different modes of representation. In addition, to increase the reliability and validity of the analysis, I also incorporate the temporal information of each scene in order for the reader to be able to go and watch the actual scenes at their discretion and bring their own interpretation of them. This, in particular, helps to overcome one of the deficiencies of the transcriptions: the lack of representation of the actual musical scores (audio files) due to technical limitations. That is, it allows the reader to compare my analytical findings regarding the musical scores with their own interpretation of the soundscape of the TV shows.

Exploring the Data

The final step in MCDA is to analyze the collected data for meaningful patterns from sociocultural, political, economic and industrial standpoints. In other words, the multimodal textual findings (divergences) are read against the social environment in which they have been created. However, the number of semantic, temporal and/or spatial combinations (connections/patterns) that the semiotic modes in a single text construct can be countless (O'Halloran et al., 2013). As explained above, Multimodal Analysis Video™ (MMA) software program overcomes this

challenge by filtering and organizing the data primarily by their temporal relationship to each other on the principle that "if two annotation units are 'not related' in time, then it does not make sense to consider these units in the pattern" (O'Halloran et al., 2013: 674). By doing so, the researcher can conduct a more detailed and manageable query of multimodal semiotic patterns in a text and a more in-depth analysis of meaning-making processes happening at a certain time of the televisual text. In other words, because every node (annotation) is time-stamped, the researcher can particularly look at modes that appear at the same moment within the text.

A second way to reduce the number of combinations to study down to a manageable level is to look for highly repeated patterns while ignoring less frequent patterns for feasibility purposes (O'Halloran et al., 2013). It is important to premise MCDA on highly repetitive patterns for the validity of the research because divergences that occur on a one-off basis (or less frequently) may not be sufficient enough to connect textual findings with sociocultural and political environment. They may be viewed as random, fallacious, or ad hoc outliers originating from the producer's individual artistic interpretation of the work. In case there is a highly repetitive pattern in the reproduction, such divergences should be delved into and analyzed culturally because the patterns may indicate the ways in which social discourses are reproduced and perpetuated in media texts. For instance, below (Figure 7) is a sum of the choices of camera angles/movements and postures that a producer may use during the reproduction of a format (Bateman & Schmidt, 2012: 9). In theory, these semiotic modes are polysemic elements in communication; that is, there cannot be a "fixed" meaning for a particular camera angle/movement or a posture

because they can all be used idiosyncratically by different producers (Bateman, 2013; Bordwell and Thompson 2008: 192). However, in the case of cross-cultural format adaptation research, if the textual divergences in camera works found between the two versions of the same text show some consistent pattern (for instance, if female characters in an adaptation are almost always shown in a high angle in contrast to its source text), the pattern may be serving for the perpetuation of a dominant discourse in the new host culture and thus begs further inquiry.[42]

Figure 7 – Camera angles/movements and "posture" in television and film studies.

What to Study in the Data?

Similar to CDA, MCDA also focuses on how social issues such as racism, power, identities (e.g., gender, nationality, motherhood, fatherhood), political ideologies, beliefs and social inequalities are embedded (reproduced) and perpetuated in multimodal texts in societies. In other words, the common goal of both analytical frameworks is to study the power relationships and functioning of socially and culturally constructed discourses and their manifestation and reproduction in texts.

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[42] This sort of symptomatic reading of televisual texts can further be explained by film analyst Bordwell's (1989) distinction between "film comprehension" and "film interpretation." By the former, "*film comprehension*," Bordwell (1989: 9) refers to meanings that are referential and explicit in a film text while by the latter, "*film interpretation,*" he refers to those that are implicit and subjective. MCDA, in this sense, is more inclined to study film comprehension rather than interpretation. This also explains its "textual" focus rather than "cognitive."

However, unlike CDA, the cues for discourses in MCDA are sought for and found not only in the linguistic and paralinguistic modes (e.g., words, syntax, intonation, tone of voice and gesture) but also in other semiotic modes such as the time length of a character shown in a scene, the seating arrangement of characters, shot length, mise-en-scene, montage (how scenes are combined), sequence, lighting and musical score.[43] In other words, any semiotic modes and resources that contribute to the formation of texts and their overall orchestration are regarded as potential elements that generate certain meanings and discourses.

The next two chapters use these methodological steps to analyze six television format adaptations to shed light on the ways in which they function to reproduce and perpetuate the two discriminatory discourses, namely gender roles and norms of authority, in the Turkish culture.

[43] The examples that I am giving are particularly from televisual texts, as my research predominantly focuses on television. Otherwise, the examples can be expanded to almost any text (e.g., website pages, traffic signs, music, etc.)

Chapter 5: Reproduction of Gender Paradigm in Television Format Adaptations

This chapter examines how the established patriarchal gender paradigm is reproduced and perpetuated through television format adaptations under the disguise of so-called attention to cultural differences. The study of the case of Turkey offers an opportunity to develop a critical perspective about the process of cultural adaptation in the context of media globalization because it reveals how adaptation can lead to the maintenance of a discriminatory cultural and political status quo. To that end, the chapter examines in detail three recent format adaptations from Turkey: *Galip Derviş* (*Monk*) (2013-2014), *Bizim Hikaye* (*Shameless*) (2017-2019), and *Bir Aile Hikayesi* (*This is Us*) (2019). Through a comprehensive analysis of visual, verbal and aural tracks as well as narrative structures of these shows in comparison with their transnational source texts, the chapter examines how the localized versions perpetuate unequal gender relations.

I begin this chapter with a summary of the plotlines of the formats in question and introduce their main characters. Then, focusing on relevant scenes and themes, I conduct a comparative analysis of each format adaptation separately to reveal how cultural adaptation turns into a process of reinforcing culturally prescribed gender norms and expectations in Turkish society. By tracing visual, verbal, aural and narratological divergences between the different versions, I show how the discriminatory discourses of womanhood, particularly that of *namus*, play a significant role in television programming and gets reinforced in the name of cultural adaptation.

It is also worthwhile to underscore at the outset that no cultural text (in this case, American and British versions of the formats analyzed here) should be regarded as value-free and unbiased. Every society has its own restrictive (and often unwritten) norms and expectations for preserving their culturally-specific social order and value systems, which are rooted in history, geography, religion or tradition. It is also true that many of these culturally-specific discourses in any country can have an impact on any creative process, including television programming. Therefore, the analyses I conduct in this and the following chapter should not be interpreted as taking the so-called original American/British shows as value-free or as approaching the gender and power relations represented therein as ideal. To the contrary, these cultural texts can be analyzed critically in terms of how they represent identities and/or reinforce certain gender discourses, not to mention race, ethnicity and class. For the purposes of this dissertation, my focus is on the Turkish case and the cultural adaptation process; therefore, I focus on the receiving end, the Turkish culture, in comparing these shows. In short, I undertake a comparative analysis of American/British and Turkish versions in order to track the adaptation process and shed light on the complexities it entails, not to elevate one culture over another.

The Three Format Adaptations: Plots and Characters

Monk (2002-2010) is an American comedy-crime series that features a brilliant detective named Adrian Monk as its protagonist. After having served in the homicide division of the police force for a number of years, Monk is temporarily suspended from his job due to a mental breakdown caused by the loss of his wife, Trudy, in a bombing incident. During the three subsequent years in which he detaches

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himself from society, some of his lifelong obsessions and phobias are aggravated and take over his life. Only after he starts getting some professional help from a nurse, named Sharona Fleming, is he able to go back to active duty as a private detective despite his obsessive-compulsive disorder, and he is frequently called in by his previous boss, Captain Stottlemeyer, to consult on inexplicable cases. It is during this continued but slow recovery period that viewers meet Monk and his extraordinary skills and compulsions that help him solve even the most mysterious cases.

The Turkish adaptation of this format, *Galip Derviş*44 (2013-2014), follows the American version closely in terms of the characters, narrative structure and locations; however, it diverges from it at particular moments due to culturally different interpretations of certain contentious issues such as religion, domesticity, sexuality, womanhood, femininity, taboos and social stratification. Various multimodal mechanisms are employed during the reproduction to tailor and re-tune the intended meaning in certain parts of the series where there is a need for increased cultural proximity.

Shameless (2004-2013) is a British comedy-drama series that tells the story of a poor, dysfunctional family of seven: Frank Gallagher (the layabout drunk father) and his six children – Fiona, Lip, Ian, Debbie, Carl and Liam in the order of oldest to youngest. The show also features Fiona's boyfriend Steve and the Gallaghers' next-door neighbors, Kev and Veronica Ball. The plotline generally centers around the everyday lives of Frank's children and their struggles to make it day to day with little

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44 The Turkish name is almost a direct translation, including the religious connotation of the name in English.

money while Frank wanders around drunk and gets involved in misadventures. The series was first adapted for the American market in 2011, which became one of the most successful American adaptations of a British show and played a key role in the global recognition of the format throughout the years. Based on the same characters (with the same names), the American version is currently airing its 10th season as of January 2020.45

The Turkish adaptation of the format, *Bizim Hikaye* (trans. *Our Story*), came in 2017 and lasted only two seasons airing its finale in 2019. Among the three formats studied here, this format adaptation had the most modifications, as its plot includes many topics considered as taboos in the Turkish culture such as sex outside marriage, homosexuality and alcohol consumption.

This is Us (2016-present) is an American comedy-drama series that follows the emotional lives of three siblings (Kate, Kevin and Randall) and their parents (Jack and Rebecca Pearson) who lost one of their triplets during birth and adopted Randall – a black boy who was born and abandoned at a fire station by his father on the same day. Narrated in different time frames, the "now" part of the series starts on the 36th birthday of the three siblings (also known as the Big Three), which happens to be the birthday of their father, too, and shows flashbacks to tell their parents' story. The storyline mainly revolves around the struggles of the Big Three as they enter their mid-thirties. Now an oversized woman, Kate stresses about her size and struggles to lose weight as she thinks it is what ruined her dream of marrying a man like her father

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45 Especially the first two seasons of the British and American versions are generally similar. It is, therefore, not easy to tell which version the Turkish producers took as a reference when reproducing the series. In my analysis of the Turkish adaptation, I generally take the American version as my reference because of the greater popularity of American shows in Turkey in general.

and becoming a mother like her mom. A charismatic and good-looking guy, Kevin, on the other hand, plays a male (and mostly shirtless) nanny on a hit television show called *The Manny* – a role and a job in which he feels trapped. Finally, a married man with two kids, Randall is a successful businessman; however, he feels hurt and resentful for having been abandoned at a fire station and tracks down his biological father, William, to alleviate his pain.

The Turkish version of the series, *Bir Aile Hikayesi* (2019), lasted for only two seasons with a total number of 18 episodes. While it follows the general storyline of the American format closely and has the same characters, the Turkish iteration diverges from its source text significantly when it comes particularly to Kate's relationship with her new boyfriend, Toby, whom she meets at a weight-loss support group, as well as Kevin's job and relationships with women.

In what follows, I focus on the pilot episode of each adaptation since pilot episodes of formats in general, as explained in Chapter 2, are almost always co-produced under the supervision of a consultant (flying) producer from the company that owns the format and the local producer, and therefore follow their source text more closely. This close connection between the format and its adaptation at the outset provides two advantages to the researcher: (1) it makes it easier to track the similarities and divergences between the shows; and, more importantly, (2) the divergences represent more meaningful outcomes since they mostly stem from cultural expectations, constraints and sensitivities rather than the more natural and expected evolution of the adaptation in later episodes and seasons as it starts creating its own plotline and characters.

In the *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation, the main female protagonist Hülya (Sharona in the original text) plays a central role in the "Turkification" of the format in terms of the representation of women because she works in a traditionally male-dominated field and spends most of her time with other male characters including Derviş (Monk in the original text) and Izzet Komiser (Captain Stottlemeyer in the original text). As in the American version, Hülya is a divorced woman with a young son and, from time to time, gets involved in romantic relationships with different men, which forces her, particularly in the Turkish case, to walk a fine line between protecting her *namus* and seeking her next life partner. As a result, the analysis of the reimagining of womanhood in *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation will center upon the "Hülya" character and examine the specific modifications made to the scenes where she is placed in culturally sensitive situations (Scenes A1, A2, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 30 — see Table 2).

The importance attributed to these scenes in *Galip Derviş* on the part of the producers manifests itself in the temporal structure of the narrative, as illustrated in Figure 8 below. The turquoise bars on top of the green bars indicate how much has been extended, expanded, or added in the Turkish adaptation of each scene. The red bars on top of the white bars, on the other hand, mark how much has been reduced or deleted in the Turkish adaptation of each scene. What is striking in this quantitative and holistic assessment of the narrative structure is that the proportion of the total increased time in the scenes I analyze in this section (0:04:41) to the total length of the same scenes (0:12:27) is 37.62%. That means more than one-third of the scenes

listed above were created from scratch by the Turkish producers. On the other hand, the proportion of the total increased time in all the other scenes (0:10:58) to the total length of the same scenes (1:18:13) is 14.02%. This smaller proportion indicates that the Turkish producers generally opted for maintaining almost the same scene length when remaking the other scenes.

This divergence, which indicates the greater importance given to the recreation of the scenes focusing on Hülya as opposed to those focusing on the other characters, becomes even more striking when the quantitative analysis is narrowed down to the scenes that exclusively revolve around Hülya (i.e., Scenes A1, A2, 16, 19, 22, 30 — see Table 2). In that case, while the proportion of the increased time to the total length in the scenes where Hülya is not the primary character remains at 14.10%, the proportion of the increased time to the total length in the scenes focusing exclusively on the Hülya character increases to 52.10%. That means more than half of the scenes revolving around Hülya were originated by the Turkish producers. In either case, the divergences indicate that the Turkish producers allocated significantly more time for the reimagining of the scenes where Hülya is the main character as opposed to those featuring other characters.

In terms of the segments deleted in the narrative structure, the data also show a meaningful pattern. When taken into consideration the scenes I analyze in this section, the temporal data indicate that only 0.21% (0:00:01) of the scenes focusing on the Sharona character in the American version (0:07:47) was deleted in the remaking of *Galip Derviş*. Whereas, the amount of deletion in the remaining scenes reaches up to 4.29% (0:03:01) in proportion to the total length of the same scenes

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(1:10:16). The analysis of the scenes that focus exclusively on Hülya, on the other hand, shows that only 0.46% (0:00:01) of the scenes (0:03:38) was deleted in the adaptation process, whereas the amount of deletion in the other scenes increases to 4.08% (0:03:02) in proportion to the total length of these scenes (1:14:25). That means, similar to the analysis of the extended and added times, the temporal divergences portraying the deletion of segments in the remake also show that the Turkish producers opted for allocating more time to the recreation of the scenes concerning the "Hülya" character. In the remaining parts of this section, I look at these scenes in more detail and delve into them to reveal how the "Hülya" character has been recreated in *Galip Derviş*.

Sc. #	MONK	Sc. #	GALIP DERVIŞ
1	Crime scene investigation (a dead female body)	1	Crime scene investigation (a dead female body)
2	Credits and titles	2	Credits and titles
3	Monk at the therapy session with his psychologist	3	Derviş at the therapy session with his psychologist
4	Assassination attempt & the murder of a security guard	4	Assassination attempt & the murder of a security guard
5	Calling on Monk	5	Calling on Derviş
6	Monk meets Captain Stottlemeyer and witnesses	6	Derviş meets Izzet Komiser and witnesses
7	Interviewing witnesses	7	Interviewing witnesses
8	Crime scene investigation	8	Crime scene investigation
N/A		A1	Hülya with her mother and son at home
9	Gathering evidence	9	Gathering evidence
10	Gathering evidence	10	Gathering evidence
11	Gathering evidence	11	Gathering evidence
12	Questioning witnesses, relatives, friends, and others	12	Questioning witnesses, relatives, friends, and others
13	The murder of a campaign worker	13	The murder of a campaign worker
14	Crime scene investigation	14	Crime scene investigation
15	Monk preparing food at home as he gets the recipe from Benjy	15	Derviş preparing food at home as he gets the recipe from Yusuf
N/A		A2	Hülya getting ready for her date at home as she talks to her son
16	Sharona on her date	16	Hülya on her date
17	Monk feels suspicious about something as he prepares food and watches TV at home	17	Derviş feels suspicious about something as he prepares food and watches TV at home
18	Monk joins Sharona and her date in the restaurant and ruins the night	18	Derviş joins Sharona and her date in the restaurant and ruins the night
19	Frustrated, Sharona quits the job	19	Frustrated, Hülya quits the job
20	Monk returns home depressed and thinks of the murder of his wife	20	Derviş returns home depressed and thinks of the murder of his wife
21	Captain Stottlemeyer discovers some of the connections that Monk has already pointed out	21	Izzet Komiser discovers some of the connections that Derviş has already pointed out
22	Having heard about Sharona's resignation and Monk's disappearance, Deputy Mayor visits Sharona at her home to persuade her to return and find Monk. She accepts his request on the condition that he owes her a big favor when the time comes.	22	Having heard about Hülya's resignation and Derviş's disappearance, Izzet Komiser visits Hülya at her home to persuade her to return and find Derviş. She accepts his request on the condition that he owes her a big favor when the time comes.
23	Sharona returns to her job and finds Monk	23	Hülya returns to her job and finds Derviş
24	Sharona and Monk at Monk's home discussing the case	24	Hülya and Derviş at Derviş's home discussing the case
25	Someone tries to kill Monk	25	Someone tries to kill Derviş

Sc. #	*MONK*	Sc. #	*GALIP DERVİŞ*
26	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects	26	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects
27	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects	27	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects
28	Monk finds the right suspect but causes him to escape accidentally because of his fear of heights.	28	Derviş finds the right suspect but causes him to escape accidentally because of his fear of heights.
29	Monk and Sharona at the site where Monk's wife was killed - Monk finally solves the case.	29	Derviş and Hülya at the site where Derviş's wife was killed - Derviş finally solves the case.
30	Sharona gives Deputy Mayor a visit at his home to ask him to pay back her favor by convincing Stottlemeyer to give Monk a chance.	30	Hülya gives Izzet Komiser a visit at his office to ask him to pay back her favor by giving Derviş a chance.
31	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive	31	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive
32	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive	32	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive
33	Compliments	33	Compliments
34	Monk at the therapy session with his psychologist	34	Derviş at the therapy session with his psychologist
35	Closing	35	Closing
36	Credits and titles	36	Credits and titles

Table 2 – The Narrative Structure of the Pilot Episode of *Monk/Galip Derviş*

Figure 8 – A Scene-by-Scene Distribution of the Extensions and Reductions in the Pilot Episode(s) of *Monk/Galip Derviş*

The first major modification concerning the character of the nurse comes to surface in the sequence where Sharona dates a random guy (Scene 16). The remaking of this sequence in Turkey entails extensive tailoring presumably because Hülya, as a divorced woman with a child, is expected to be more conscientious about her relationships with men so that she can safeguard her *namus* and dignity. One of the most noticeable ways the Turkish producers deal with this cultural sensitivity is that they modify the storyline by adding two scenes earlier in the narrative structure (see Scenes A1 and A2 in Table 2).

In the American version, Sharona goes on a date with a man in Scene 16 (0:33:40-0:34:21), which is revealed to the viewers only towards the end of Scene 15 (0:32:43-0:33:20). Upon hearing about her date, Monk tries to stop her from going out with the guy, saying that it is his chicken pot pie night and he needs her help. However, Sharona continues with her plan and goes out with the guy at her own will.

In the Turkish version, on the other hand, viewers learn about this date much earlier — in the first additional scene (Scene A1 — 0:23:40-0:25:40) following Scene 8. This additional scene opens with Hülya helping her son with his homework at home while Hülya's mother sets the table for dinner. In terms of the *mise-en-scene*, this opening segment (0:23:40-0:24:00) provides a traditional portrayal of a "responsible mother" who spends time with her son and carries out her motherly duties. It also offers a conventional representation of Turkish family life, amplifying that there is always home-made food on the table and they eat together as a family.

Through this additional scene, viewers are also shown that Hülya lives with her mother, Pervin, which highlights another (discriminatory) dimension of Turkish

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family life for divorced women. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the control mechanism of *namus* in Turkish culture often forces divorced women to go back to their family until they remarry. Failing to meet this expectation and living by themselves can often lead to misconceptions of their identity and lifestyle, especially if they are dating random guys. By adding Hülya's mother to the cast in the Turkish remake, in this regard, the producers managed to signify that Hülya is under the protection of her elders and avoids mistakes that could harm her and her family's dignity and *namus* thanks to her elders' support and advice.

As a matter of fact, when looked at the dialog in the next segment of the same scene (0:24:00-0:24:24), Pervin's very first dialog with Hülya turns out to be motherly advice about men in general. Talking particularly about the politician who was targeted in the assassination attempt earlier in the episode, she advises Hülya that she should not trust a man (referring to the politician) who has abandoned his wife to marry his assistant, 20-years his junior. As shown in the transcription below, the segment continues with her calling Hülya and Yusuf to the table, then sending Yusuf to wash his hands, and sharing her disparaging comments about Hülya's job in the police department, which in return gives Hülya a chance to rationalize her work with Derviş (0:24:24-0:24:58):

Pervin: My dear, a decent man does not abandon his beautiful wife to marry his assistant, 20-years his junior … Come on, time to eat {*beckoning the two with her hand*} … Hands, hands! Go wash your hands {*pointing at her grandson*}.
Hülya: How do you know?
Pervin: I read, my dear. I don't muck around the streets all day long like you two {*referring to Hülya and Derviş*}.
Hülya: Yes but, if we didn't "muck around" the streets like that, you wouldn't be able to sit at your home in peace, Mrs. Pervin.
Pervin: {*Chuckles*} Dear, you made believe you were a police officer. Look at me! You are a nurse. Oh, sorry, you "were" a nurse. Now you have become a "güllabici."

Hülya: Pardon me?
Anne: Güllabici, güllabici. In the past, people who took care of the insane were called "güllabici."

Figure 9 – Pervin calls the two to the table   Figure 10 – Pervin asks Yusuf to wash his hands

Given both the way this dialog between Hülya and her mother is constructed (including Pervin's authoritative body language – see Figures 9 and 10 – and verbal directives) as well as the *mise-en-scene* in which Pervin is placed at the head of the table (see Figure 10), it is clear that Pervin is portrayed as an authority over Hülya and Yusuf. This hierarchical family structure enables Hülya to be depicted as a more family-oriented character and still "her mother's daughter" accounting before her parent(s) despite being a grown-up woman. This reimagination of her character helps assuage conservative fears of a woman not under the control of or adhering to conservative values.

More importantly, in the final segment of the scene (0:24:58-0:25:40), Hülya's mother tells Hülya that she had a phone call with her aunt earlier in the day and that they talked about a guy who had seen Hülya at a family wedding. Despite Hülya's clear disinclination to talk about the topic, let alone going out with the guy, the mother insists that she should give him a chance and says, "what's the harm in going out for dinner for once? If you don't like him…" At that moment, Hülya's son returns to the room, which makes the women halt their conversation, with the

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addition of a comedic score in the background to imply the inappropriateness of such talks before her son.

Adding this nuanced segment to the storyline, the Turkish producers construct a whole new background to Hülya's upcoming date in Scene 16. As opposed to Sharona who seems eager to date the guy at her own will, Hülya is depicted as a "victim" who is roped into a family-arranged date. This new storyline changes the way Hülya's upcoming dating scene is perceived.

Furthermore, another scene is added in the Turkish version right before Hülya's date (Scene A2 — 0:40:48-0:41:30). This additional scene opens with Hülya putting on her makeup, as her son watches and talks to her. He tells her that she shines and looks beautiful. Upon hearing his comment, Hülya asks him to give her a kiss on the cheek. Then, Hülya's mother enters the room and looks at Hülya with an anxious face as she sits down. It is at this moment that a comedic musical cue starts playing in the background which amplifies the comedic element in the story created by Hülya's arranged date. When Hülya asks her mother what is wrong, she first acts as if all is well but then tells her that she hopes Derviş does not ruin her date this time. This segment (0:41:10-0:41:30) once again emphasizes the fact that the date is a family-arranged and approved one and safeguards Hülya against any misperceptions of her character on the part of the audience.

In the next four scenes (16, 17, 18 and 19), Sharona/Hülya appears in a fancy restaurant with her date. As they speak and try to get to know each other, Monk/Derviş arrives in the restaurant after feeling suspicious about something that he has seen on the news concerning the assassination attempt. After joining them

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uninvited, Monk soon catches and reveals some lies told by the said guy and ruins Sharona/Hülya's date. As Sharona/Hülya leaves the restaurant furiously, Monk/Derviş rushes behind her trying to talk to her and apologize. This is where major divergences start to transpire between the two versions of the show once again.

As the dialog in the American version of Scene 19 reveals (0:37:04-0:38:30), Sharona feels frustrated because she thinks that she has lost her chance of dating a good-looking guy because of Monk's inappropriate behavior. Showing full interest in the guy, Sharona tells Monk that "Everybody embellishes their resume. It is called human nature." Moreover, she adds, "Do you think I told him about Benji, or about that summer I spent dancing in Atlantic City?"[46] Eventually, she quits the job as she gets into a cab, and tells Monk that she is sending her sister over for her stuff. This final statement implies that she has spent some time in Monk's place, and maybe even stayed overnight.

In the Turkish version, Scene 19 (0:45:34-0:47:04) where Hülya quits her job is constructed around a different logic. Because Hülya goes on a date with the guy due to her mother's nag, her frustration is portrayed as stemming from her fear that her failed date could cause her mother and her aunt to restart nagging. In addition, the lines where Sharona mentions that she has not mentioned about her son and her previous dancing career, either, and that she would send her sister over for her stuff are omitted altogether presumably because they would harm Hülya's *namus* and dignity. Instead, Hülya mentions that her only goal in life is to give her son a better

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[46] It is revealed in Season 2 Episode 8, "Mr. Monk Meets the Playboy," that Sharona did some nude modeling under a pseudonym in Atlantic City when her son Benji was a year old. Monk finds it out when playboy Dexter Larsen of Sapphire Magazine threatens to publish Sharona's photos to keep Monk from investigating him further. This episode is not remade in the Turkish version.

future, which implies that it is why she accepted to meet the guy in the first place. As in the American version, she eventually quits the job with Derviş and leaves in a cab.

A second major twist to the storyline concerning the nurse character is made in Scenes 21 and 22 when Captain Stottlemeyer/Izzet Komiser finds out that Sharona/Hülya quit her job. In need of Monk's help, Captain Stottlemeyer, in the American version (0:40:03-0:42:40), asks the Deputy Mayor to talk to Sharona to convince her to go back to work as Monk cannot function without her help. The Deputy Mayor visits Sharona at her home and tells her that the city needs her help. Seeing his desperation, Sharona agrees to help but on one condition and adds: "OK, here is the deal. I'll find Monk and bring him back, and you'll owe me one." Upon the deputy mayor's response, "one what?", Sharona says, "Someday, there'll be a knock on your door. Whatever I say, whatever I want, you'll have to say yes." The vagueness in her words creates a gray zone in the viewers' minds about Sharona's intentions and personal boundaries.

In the Turkish version, Scene 22 (0:50:26-0:52:03) is reimagined in a way that alleviates the vagueness in the negotiation by having Izzet Komiser visit Hülya at her home instead of the Deputy Mayor. Portrayed as a close family friend, which the viewers understand upon seeing his intimate talk with Hülya's son when he opens the door and later with her mother, Izzet Komiser approaches Hülya as a "fatherly" figure. Drinking Turkish coffee all together including Hülya's mother, he passes on the Deputy Mayor's message about how much the city needs her help and asks her to go back to her job. Before Hülya can respond, her mother intervenes and advises her not to believe those words. Izzet Komiser adds that the Deputy Mayor has promised

to do anything for Hülya if she agrees to go back. While Hülya accepts the offer

eventually after some negotiation as in the American version, the fact that she makes

the deal with a family friend and under the supervision and support of her mother

helps the deal appear as a more unambiguous and work-related one.

Figure 11 – Sharona meets the Deputy Mayor   Figure 12 – Hülya meets Izzet Komiser

A contingent modification towards the end of the episode happens in Scene 30

when Monk/Derviş solves the murder case but cannot convey it to Captain

Stottlemeyer/Izzet Komiser because of a dispute between the two in Scene 28.

Having confidence in Monk's abilities and the judgment, Sharona, in the American

version (0:59:51-1:00:11), gives the Deputy Mayor a visit at his house in the evening

to ask him to pay back her favor by convincing Captain Stottlemeyer to give Monk

another chance. In this short scene, Sharona arrives at his house in the evening and

knocks on the door. Opening the door, the Deputy Mayor finds Sharona with a pink

hat with her hair tied on the two sides, presenting herself as a cutsie (See Figure 11).

After exchanging greetings, Sharona smiles at him in an alluring manner and asks if

she could come in in a very womanly manner. The scene ends as soon as the two

enter the house closing the door behind them, which leaves the viewer in the dark as

to how she convinces him to help.

In the Turkish version, on the other hand, since it was Izzet Komiser who had visited Hülya at her place earlier in the story to convey the Deputy Mayor's message, Hülya gives Izzet Komiser a visit to ask him to pay back her favor by giving Monk another chance. More importantly, she meets him at his office in the police station instead of his house and during daytime, which helps protect her *namus* and dignity (see Figure 12).

Shameless/Bizim Hikaye Adaptation

The second format adaptation, *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye,* offers a plethora of examples showing the impact of the existing patriarchal gender paradigm on the shaping of female characters, particularly Filiz (the Turkish counterpart of Fiona). By either adding/deleting scenes or changing the content and composition of the existing scenes, the Turkish producers transform the "Fiona" character substantially. The transformation starts as early as in the first scene. As opposed to the American and British versions which open with a party scene in a park where the Gallagher family and their neighbors, Kev and Veronica, are shown drinking and smoking with their friends, the Turkish adaptation starts with the second scene at the Elibols' house (the Turkish counterpart of the Gallaghers). While this change in the opening of the show has a bearing on almost all the characters and portray them as relatively more sober and responsible people as opposed to their American counterparts — except for Fikri (the Turkish counterpart of Frank – the father) who is shown lying on the floor drunk — the primary subject of this modification becomes the main female protagonist Filiz. Contrary to the American version in which Frank introduces all the characters focusing on their "unusual" personal traits and describes Fiona as "a raging psycho

bitch," the Turkish version weaves the plot around Filiz and has her introduce all the characters including the drunk father. This early twist in the series becomes an indicator of the importance attributed to Filiz as a character and the motivation on the part of the producers to transform her culturally vulnerable position from a "raging psycho bitch" into a responsible and caring "family girl." Through various changes across the episode (and the series), Filiz is turned into a nearly unrecognizable other character with regard to her role at home and her relationships outside – particularly with men. Therefore, the analysis of *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye* will focus on the "Filiz" character and particularly the scenes where she starts a love-relationship with Barış (Steve in the original text) (Scenes 7, 9A, 9, 10 and 11 — see Table 3 as well as Figure 13 for a scene-by-scene graphic comparison of the two narrative structures). However, before delving into these individual scenes, it is necessary to look at the temporal structure of the two narratives for comparison with the *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation.

As opposed to the adaptation of *Monk/Galip Derviş*, the quantitative and holistic analysis of the narrative structure in *Bizim Hikaye* does not show a significant divergence in terms of the importance given to the reimagining of the "Filiz" character. As illustrated in Figure 14 (color-coded in the same way as Figure 8), the proportion of the total increased time in the scenes focusing on Filiz (0:23:09) to the total length of these scenes (0:44:11) is 52.40%. That means more than half of the scenes focusing on Filiz were created from scratch in the Turkish adaptation. When looked at the other scenes, the proportion of the total increased time (0:34:45) to the total length of these scenes (0:59:27) shows a similar pattern: 58.45%. This similarity

in terms of the importance given to the reimagining of the scenes focusing on Filiz and those focusing on the other characters may have stemmed from the presence of various other controversial themes in the format such as the gay character Ian as well as the drinking/partying habits. In other words, the Turkish producers allocate a similar amount of extended and added time to reconstruct and tailor these various controversial themes scattered across the narrative structure to achieve cultural proximity.

When it comes to the proportion of the deleted segments, the scenes focusing on Filiz and those focusing on the other characters do not differ significantly, either. The data indicate that the proportion of the total duration of the deleted segments in the scenes focusing on Filiz (0:04:39) to the total length of the same scenes (0:25:41) is 18.11%. In the same vein, the proportion of the total duration of the deleted segments in the remaining scenes (0:06:20) to the total length of the same scenes (0:31:02) is 20.41%. This similarity again shows that the Turkish producers dwelled on the recreation of almost all the characters and storylines equally and opted for deleting various aspects of the format across the narrative structure due to cultural sensitivities and expectations.

Despite these parallelisms between the two versions in terms of the amount of additions, extensions and deletions, this chapter focuses particularly on the "Filiz" character and the scenes where she meets Barış (scenes listed above) since the construction of womanhood and sexuality constitutes the focal point of this chapter. Analyzing these scenes sheds light on how Filiz's dignity and *namus* were protected during the cultural adaptation process.

Scene #	*SHAMELESS*	Scene #	*BIZIM HIKAYE*
1	Party at the park		DELETED
2	Breakfast at home	2	Breakfast at home
		A1	Their neighbor, Tülay, visits
3	On their way to school	3	On their way to school
		A2	Filiz and Tülay tidy up the house
		A3	Filiz and Tülay go out
		A4	Fikri goes to his neighbor's café to drink
4	Fiona at work	4	Filiz at work
		A5	Filiz at work
		A6	Filiz asks her supervisor if she could get paid upfront
		A7	Filiz pays the bills
		A8	Filiz goes to school to talk to the Principal about her brother
5	Lip tutoring his friend	5	Rahmet tutoring his friend
6	Lip cleaning up in his room	6	Rahmet back to his room
7	Fiona and Veronica at the club	7	Filiz and Tülay going to a henna night
		A9	Filiz and Tülay returning home with Barış
8	Lip and Ian talking about Lip's discovery	8	Rahmet and Hikmet talking about Rahmet's discovery
9	Fiona and Veronica back at home with Steve	9	Filiz and Tülay back at home with Barış
10	Kev and Veronica returning home		DELETED
11	Fiona and Steve having sex		DELETED
		A10	The police find Fikri lying on the road drunk
12	The police bring Frank home	12	The police bring Fikri home
		A11	The Elibols having breakfast
13	Fiona working at a laundry		COMES LATER (i.e., 13)
14	Frank at Kev's bar		COMES LATER (i.e., 14)
15	Steve visits Fiona at home	15	Barış visits Filiz at home
16	Lip takes Ian to his tutoring session	16	Rahmet takes Hikmet to his tutoring session
		21	The father of the girl that Rahmet tutors reprimands his wife
17	Fiona and Veronica examine Lip's injury	17	Filiz and Tülay examine Rahmet's injury
18	A new washing machine arrives	18	A new washing machine arrives
19	Ian goes to Kev and Veronica's house to get ice		DELETED
20	They install the new washing machine	20	They install the new washing machine
		13	Filiz working at a laundry

Scene #	SHAMELESS	Scene #	BIZIM HIKAYE
21	The father of the girl that Lip tutors reprimands his wife		**COMES EARLIER (i.e., 21)**
22	Fiona calls Steve	22	Filiz calls Barış
		A12	Filiz continues work at the laundry
23	Ian working at the market	23	Hikmet working at the store
		A13	The Elibols having dinner
24	Fiona returns home	24	Filiz returns home
25	Fiona talking to Steve on the phone	25	Filiz talking to Barış on the phone
26	Fiona and Steve meet at the train station	26	Filiz and Barış meet on the bus
		28	Rahmet is helping the girl that he tutors with the house repair
		14	Fikri at Tufan's café
		A14	Fikri at Tufan's café
27	Fiona and Steve at the restaurant	27	Filiz and Barış at the restaurant
28	Lip is helping the girl that he tutors with the house repair		**COMES EARLIER (i.e., 28)**
29	Frank sees the new washing machine	29	Fikri sees the new washing machine
30	Ian working at the market	30	Hikmet working at the store
31	Fiona and Steve return home	31	Filiz and Barış return home
32	Fiona and Steve in the bed		**DELETED**
33	Lip and Ian talking in the van	33	Rahmet and Hikmet talking outside
		A15	Filiz calls Barış
34	The Gallaghers having breakfast	34	The Elibols having breakfast
		A16	A quarrel in front of the house with a guy that Fikri conned
		A17	Fikri sells the new washing machine.

Table 3 – The Narrative Structure of the Pilot Episode of *Monk/Galip Derviş*

SHAMELESS	BIZIM HIKAYE	SHAMELESS	BIZIM HIKAYE
Frank Gallagher (father)	Fikri Elibol (father)	Carl	Fikret
Fiona	Filiz	Liam	Ismet
Lip	Rahmet	Kev Ball (Neighbor)	Tülay (Neighbor)
Ian	Hikmet	Veronica Ball (Neighbor)	Tufan (Neighbor)
Debbie	Kiraz	Steve (Fiona's boyfriend)	Barış (Filiz's boyfriend)

Table 4 – *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye* Characters

Figure 13 – A Graphic Comparison of the Narrative Structure of *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye*47

47 The green bars at the bottom of the graph show the sequencing of the scenes in *Shameless*. The white bars at the top are the corresponding scenes that were kept in the same order as in the original version. The color-coded bars linked to each other show the scenes that were reshuffled in the Turkish version while the yellow bars indicate the added scenes.

Figure 14 – A Scene-by-Scene Distribution of the Extensions and Reductions in the Pilot Episode(s) of *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye.*

One of the major modifications concerning the portrayal of Filiz happens in Scene 7 where she meets Barış, who later becomes her boyfriend. In the American version (0:09:03-0:11:15), Fiona meets Steve in a dance club. The scene opens with Fiona and Veronica dancing on the floor and Steve watching them from a distance. As they dance, a guy approaches Fiona pretending to dance with her. Fiona responds to him with a smile and says hi; however, the guy suddenly grabs Fiona's purse and starts running away. Having seen this, Steve tries to catch the guy but ends up falling and injuring himself. After failing to catch the guy, the three meet outside the club and start talking. Seeing the women's distress, Steve offers them to go inside for another drink; however, the bouncer at the door turns them back for not having stamps. Following a short quarrel with the guy, the women give up and walk away. Steve, on the other hand, waits next to the bouncer for a second and then punches him unexpectedly. The three run away.

In Scene 7 in *Bizim Hikaye* (0:24:42-0:28:34)*,* Filiz and Tülay go to a henna night instead – a special women-only event organized a day prior to a wedding in Turkish culture. As they walk on the street on their way to this event, Filiz tells Tülay that she does not want to arrive home late, which is a very common concern that many women in Turkey face in their daily lives. Tülay responds to Filiz's concern vehemently and tells her that she was able to obtain permission from her husband once in a blue moon, and she would not go back home without making the most of the night. The addition of Filiz's conscientious attitude and Tülay's nuanced explanatory response to the storyline saves their faces in the eyes of the audience, as

it reveals that they are both conscious of their responsibilities as women and that their night-out is happening within the knowledge of and approval from Tülay's husband.

In the next segment (0:24:56-0:27:25), as they cross the street, a car almost hits them. Shocked and angry, the two women start screaming at the driver, and soon Barış gets out of the car. Feeling extremely sorry, he apologizes, and it is where Filiz and Barış meet and exchange amorous glances accompanied by a soft musical cue in the background. Exploiting the situation, a snatcher, as in the American version, grabs Filiz's purse and starts running away. Seeing this, Barış immediately starts running after the guy and manages to get Filiz's purse back; however, he gets wounded in the hand in a knife fight with the snatcher. Upon returning the purse to Filiz, the chemistry between the two gets even stronger with the addition of more romantic guitar music in the background. This move of the two's first encounter from a dance club to a romantic (melodramatic) happenstance on the street enables producers to build their love story on a more culturally appropriate basis from the standpoint of Filiz. Moreover, Barış fulfills the role of "heroic masculinity" by acting in a chivalrous manner towards Filiz and her stolen purse, even "sacrificing" himself for her through his wound.

Then (0:27:25-0:28:34), Filiz sees his cut and suggests taking him to the hospital. Barış turns down her offer stating that he has a fear of hospitals. Upon hearing his excuse, Tülay starts talking about a family friend of hers who had the same fear and could not attend his pregnant wife's delivery. Accompanied by a comedic musical cue in the background, Tülay's such out-of-place remark becomes a turning point in the conversation and immediately shifts the tone from a romantic

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melodrama to comedic awkwardness. As the comedic cue continues in the background, Tülay asks Filiz if they still have the first aid kit that she once left at their house. Following Filiz's confirmation, Tülay tells, with an enthusiastic look and a happy smile on her face, that she can dress his wound at home. The comedic tone that is added to this particular moment of inviting Barış to home alleviates the culturally inappropriate nature of the event.

As Tülay plays the devil's advocate in the scene, Barış and Filiz, on the other hand, adopt a more culturally-centered position observing values and norms concerning male-female relationships. First, Barış rejects the idea by saying that his condition is not that bad and then goes to his car to get some tissues. As soon as he leaves, Filiz also firmly rejects the idea of taking him home with them. Assuming that they would take him to Tülay's house, she says that if Tufan sees them with the guy at their home, he would definitely shoot Tülay. Once Tülay clarifies that she has meant Filiz's house, Filiz rejects it even more firmly and says her father would stir up trouble if he sees him.[48] Despite Filiz's continued unwillingness, Tülay, as her elder, outtalks Filiz and rationalizes their act by saying that it is an emergency. Overall, similar to the example of Hülya's date in *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation, the modifications made to this scene and the addition of the segment where Tülay invites Barış to Filiz's house despite her disapproval construct a whole new background to Barış's upcoming visit to Filiz's house.

[48] The fact that Filiz's father is a drunk but nonetheless upholds these kinds of social conventions indicates the greater importance given to the *namus* and dignity of women in society vis-à-vis other social norms related to alcohol use and smoking.

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Moreover, prior to Scene 9, the Turkish producers also add an additional scene (Scene A9 — 0:28:35-0:28:56) in which we see Filiz and Tülay arriving at Filiz's house in Barış's car. As they get out of the car, Filiz once again expresses her hesitation to Tülay and says, "I still don't understand why we brought this guy here. People will gossip about it." In response, Tülay says, "Didn't you see the guy's hand? I need to dress the wound. Don't worry; I will send him on his way soon." Having no other choice, Filiz agrees as she walks into the house and hopes that her siblings are all asleep. This additional scene once again amplifies Filiz's conscientious character and lets her safeguard her *namus* and dignity in the eyes of the audience.

In the absence of these nuanced modifications and additions, the American version starts Scene 9 in a much more straightforward way. Following the three's escape from the bouncer in Scene 7, Scene 9 (0:12:39-0:14:34) opens with Veronica dressing Steve's wound on his head and Fiona joining them having washed Steve's shirt. As the three chat about the incident at the dance club, Fiona's siblings come downstairs and meet Steve. Without questioning about Steve and his wound, they all engage in a lively conversation about Veronica's old housekeeping job and try to get to know each other. Then, Kev arrives to check if Veronica has his keys and sees Veronica treating Steve. While his initial reaction sounds as if he was questioning what the women are doing with Steve, after hearing that Steve punched the bouncer at the club, his attitude immediately changes, and he shakes hand with Steve to congratulate. Then, he sits down and joins the conversation as Veronica continues to sit next to Steve and treats his wound. After a minute, Fiona sends her siblings to their rooms to sleep. As Kev and Veronica are about to leave, Kev jokes with Steve again

about his insane courage at the club. After the two leave, Fiona and Steve are finally left alone on the basement floor and end up having rough sex on the kitchen floor (Scenes 10 and 11 — 0:14:35-0:21:00).

The Turkish version modifies Scene 9 (0:29:43-0:34:09) substantially, too. After Filiz, Tülay and Barış enter the house, Filiz directly goes to the bathroom to get some cotton. Before she goes back to the room, she tidies her hair lengthily with romantic piano music in the background. The amplification of this segment with the addition of the romantic music gives the audience the impression that Barış's visit is more of a romantic melodrama than a scene leading to rough sex. Moreover, when Filiz goes to the kitchen to help Tülay to find the first aid kit, Tülay draws her aside and starts gossiping about how handsome the guy is and how deeply he looks at Filiz. Seeing Filiz's timid demeanor, Tülay tries to persuade her that the guy has a crush on her. Once again, this segment is accompanied by a romantic musical cue to amplify the romantic tone (within "appropriate" moral boundaries circumscribed in this dissertation) while playing down the sexual dimension in the scene.

More importantly, as Filiz returns to the room to talk to Barış, his two brothers Rahmet and Hikmet come out of their room. With a puzzled look on their face, first, Rahmet asks who the guy is, and then his younger Hikmet questions what the guy is doing in their house in the middle of the night. When Filiz tells them about the incident in response, their questioning attitude further transforms into a protective manner of their sister. Seeing the brothers' unpleasant attitude towards Barış in particular, Tülay takes Barış to the sofa and, looking at the two brothers acerbically, she stresses how badly the guy is injured.

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Figure 15 – Fiona's siblings meet Steve   Figure 16 – Filiz's siblings meet Barış

In this segment, the *mise-en-scene* reveals significant divergences between *Shameless* and *Bizim Hikaye*. As opposed to the American version in which Fiona's siblings sit on the couch and shake hands with the guy (see Figure 15), the Turkish brothers (now including their younger Fikret) (see Figure 16) stand on the side staring Barış in the face as Tülay dresses his wound. Their continued questioning looks standing on the side signify that they are not comfortable about this whole situation.

The narrative structure also shows significant divergences in Scene 9, particularly towards the end when Tufan arrives to check if Tülay has his keys. First of all, when Filiz sees Tufan at the door, she rushes back to the room and tries to hint Tülay by coughing. Her warning signifies once again the inappropriateness of the situation for the women from a cultural standpoint. As a matter of fact, when Tufan sees Tülay next to Barış, he asks what is going on in a rather scolding manner by using the slang word *lan* in Turkish. Also, in contrast to Veronica who introduces the guy to her husband and continues to dress the wound, Tülay immediately puts some distance between herself and Barış and then walks next to her husband under Tufan's heated gaze. Seeing the imminent tension between the two, Filiz jumps in and starts accounting for the situation in all its details to Tufan to prevent any misunderstanding and to safeguard Tülay. The addition of this short explanatory segment not only helps

cool down Tufan but also rationalizes the situation in the eyes of the audience once again. Having heard the background information, Tufan thanks Barış in a manly manner for saving the women's lives. However, despite that fact, Tufan's and the brothers' body language (see Figure 18) as opposed to that of their American counterparts (see Figure 17) implies that this whole situation needs to come to an end. Not wanting to make a big deal, Tülay tells Tufan that her job is done anyway, implying that she is ready to leave.

Figure 17 – Kev meets Steve   Figure 18 – Tufan meets Barış

Before Tufan and Tülay leave, there is another short comedic segment added presumably to soften up the awkwardness and inappropriateness of the situation. The "Tülay" character in the Turkish version plays a bonesetter who helps only women in the neighborhood due to her husband's repressive measures, which is revealed to the audience in the very first scene. Using this background of hers as a reference, the Turkish adaptation has Tülay tell Barış that he should find her if he has any muscle-related complaints in the future. However, Tufan soon interrupts Tülay by calling out her name in an authoritative manner. Having received her husband's message, Tülay cuts her talk immediately, and the two leave.

Finally, contrary to the American version, after Tülay and Tufan's departure, Filiz's siblings do not leave the room and continue to stare Barış in the face, implying

that he needs to leave. This modification towards the end of the scene is made

particularly to omit the sex scene in the American version because seeing Filiz having

premarital sex would degrade her personality significantly in the eyes of the audience.

As a result, before long, Barış receives the message that Filiz's brothers are trying to

give and leaves.

Overall, the reimagining of these two scenes on a substantially different basis

and the "comedification" and "romanticization" of certain segments to accommodate

cultural expectations and sensitivities clearly illustrate how the patriarchal gender

paradigm and the oppression of women manifest themselves in cultural adaptations

and play a role in the remaking process. While some of these modifications may be

argued to be stemming from religious and cultural value systems, that does not

eliminate the oppression of women (submissive roles) evident in these

representations.

This is Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi Adaptation

The third format adaptation also contains numerous modifications that target

female characters' representation from a cultural and social perspective. Among these

characters, Beste (the Turkish counterpart of Kate) constitutes the center point of the

analysis in this section because she is the main female protagonist and becomes

subject to major modifications in terms of her portrayal. Moreover, similar to Hülya's

case in the *Galip Derviş* adaptation, she has a date with a random guy in the pilot

episode who later becomes her boyfriend. In analyzing the cultural adaptation of this

character, I particularly focus on the final part of the episode where she and her date

come back home together from their romantic dinner and are later joined by her

brother, Kev/Berk (Scenes 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 — see Table 5 as well as Figure 19 for a scene-by-scene graphic comparison of the two narrative structures). As in the other two adaptations, the Turkish producers have made significant changes to these scenes in order to protect Beste's dignity and *namus* in the eyes of the audience.

With regard to the temporal structure of the two narratives, the proportion of the increased time in the scenes listed above (0:12:27) to the total length of these scenes (0:19:41) is 63.25%. That means the Turkish producers made almost two-thirds of the scenes revolving around the "Beste" character from scratch. However, as in the *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye* adaptation, the proportion of the increased time in the remaining scenes (0:40:40) to the total length of the same scenes (1:11:04) also shows a significant amount of addition and extension with a percentage of 57.22. In other words, the reconstruction of the scenes that focus on Beste does not necessarily deserve an extended level of attention in the remaking of *This is Us*.

What is more significant and interesting, however, is the proportions of the deleted segments. The temporal data illustrated in Figure 20 indicate that 23.86% (0:02:16) of the scenes centering upon the "Kate" character in the American version (0:09:30) was deleted in the remaking of *This is Us*. Whereas the amount of deletion in the remaining scenes remains at 8.02% (0:02:39) in proportion to the total length of these scenes (0:33:03). That means the Turkish producers opted for deleting a larger amount of the original content in the adaptation process when it comes to the scenes where Beste is the main figure, despite the fact that the storyline of the "Beste" character indicates an obvious extension and addition overall (63.25%).

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In the remaining pages of this section, I concentrate on the scenes I listed above and further analyze the reimagining of the "Beste" character.

Scene #	*THIS IS US*	Scene #	*BIR AILE HIKAYESI*
1	Jack and Rebecca celebrating Jack's birthday	1	Cem and Reyhan celebrating Cem's birthday
2	Introducing Kate and her weight problem	2	Introducing Beste and her weight problem
3	Introducing Randall and his being after a guy (his biological father)	3	Introducing Mahur and his being after a guy (his biological father)
4	Introducing Kevin and his celebrity life (with two women in the bed)	4	Introducing Berk and his celebrity life (at the gym with friends)
5	Jack and Rebecca's birthday celebration continued	5	Cem and Reyhan's birthday celebration continued
6	Randall reads the email about that the detective found the guy he was after and he looks at his picture.	6	Mahur reads the email about that the detective found the guy he was after and he looks at his picture.
7	Kate falls down and injures her ankle while checking her weight	7	Beste falls down and injures her ankle as while checking her weight
8	Rebecca feels her waters break.	9*	Berk talks to his friends at the gym
9	Kevin complains about his troubles in life to the two women in the bed	8*	Reyhan feels her waters break.
10	Upon hearing Kate's accident, Kevin comes home	10	Upon hearing Beste's accident, Berk comes home
11	Jack and Rebecca meet their doctor at the hospital	11	Cem and Reyhan meet their doctor at the hospital
12	Kevin in the studio (*The Manny*)	12	Berk in the studio (A chocolate commercial)
13	Randall and his wife at their kid's soccer game.	13	Mahur and his wife at their kid's swimming race.
14	Kate meets Toby at the fat person's support group.	14	Beste meets a guy (name unknown) on a dating app.
		A1	(Scene 14 Extended) Kate goes to a café to meet the guy. However, when the guy sees Kate from her behind, he leaves the place without being noticed. The owner of the café sees the whole scene.
15	The doctor talks to Jack and Rebecca about some complications	15	The doctor talks to Cem and Reyhan about some complications
		17	Berk has a quarrel in the studio with the producer and quits the job.
		A2	(Scene 14 Extended) The owner of the café, Erdem, sits next to Beste pretending that he is the guy she met online. Seeing he is not fat, Beste wants to reject him. Then, Erdem confesses that he is not the guy and tells her about the event. Eventually, he manages to convince her to have a date.
16	Randall goes to see his biological father	16a	Mahur goes to see his biological father.
		A3	Cem follows the doctors as they take Reyhan to the delivery room.
		16b	(Scene 16 Continued) Mahur goes to see his biological father.
17	Kevin has a quarrel in the studio with the producer and quits the job		**COMES EARLIER (i.e., 17)**
18	Rebecca giving birth	18	Reyhan giving birth
19	Randall brings his biological father home for dinner.	19	Mahur brings his biological father home for dinner.

Scene #	THIS IS US	Scene #	BIR AILE HIKAYESI
		24a	Cem is talking to the doctor after the operation and finds out about the loss of one child.
		A4	Mahur's family having dinner with his biological father
		A5	Feeling hot and bothered, Berk goes to a bar and drinks.
20	Kate is on her date with Toby.	20	Beste is on her date with Erdem.
		31	After the operation, Cem is shown having a conversation with his wife and letting her know about the loss of one of their babies.
		A6	Berk is still at the bar. His friend calls and lets him know that his quarrel in the studio has gone viral.
21	After their romantic dinner, Kate and Toby return home.	21	After their romantic dinner, Beste and Erdem return home.
		25a	Mahur is having a conversation with his father after dinner
22	Kate and Toby are watching TV and drinking wine at home. Then, Kevin joins them, meets Toby and breaks the news about the quarrel he had in the studio.	22	Erdem is using Beste's bathroom since he feels sick. When Berk comes home, he starts questioning why Beste is with a guy at home. Erdem feels forced to leave. Then, Berk breaks the news.
23	Kate, Kevin and Toby watching the video of the quarrel at the set		COMES LATER (i.e., 23)
24	Jack is talking to the doctor after the operation and finds out about the loss of one child. The doctor gives him some advice about life.		DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SCENES AND SCATTERED (i.e., 24a, 24b, 24c, and 24d)
25	Randall's biological father tells that he is very sick and about to die.	25b	Mahur's biological father tells that he is very sick and about to die.
		24b	The doctor asks Cem if they can have a word outside.
		23	Berk shows Beste the video of the quarrel he had at the set. Feeling depressed, Berk suggests ordering food.
		24c	The doctor talks to Cem about his own life story and gives him some advice about life.
26	Kevin, Kate and Toby continue to drink and talk about Kevin's incident and life in general.	26	Berk and Beste eat their food and talk about Beste's date and Berk's incident and life in general as they eat.
		24d	The doctor talks to Cem about his own life story and gives him some advice about life.
27	(Flashback) Jack meets the fire-fighter who has found Randall.		COMES LATER (i.e., 27)
28	Kate reminds Kevin of their father's life lesson and the fact that Jack and Rebecca are their parents is revealed to the audience.	28	Beste reminds Berk of their father's life lesson and the fact that Cem and Reyhan are their parents is revealed to the audience. Then they call their brother, Mahur, to congratulate his birthday, too.
29	It is revealed that Randall's biological father has accepted to sleep there, and Randall's wife brings him pajamas.	29	It is revealed that Mahur's biological father has accepted to sleep there, and Mahur brings him pajamas. Mahur talks to them on the phone.

Scene #	THIS IS US	Scene #	BIR AILE HIKAYESI
		27	(Flashback) Cem meets the Imam who has found Mahur.
30	Kevin has fallen asleep on the couch. Toby kisses Kate and takes her to the next room.		**DELETED**
31	After the operation, Jack is shown having a conversation with his wife and letting her know about the loss of one of their babies.		**COMES EARLIER (i.e., 31)**
32	Jack and Rebecca back at their home with their three babies	32	Cem and Reyhan back at their home with their three babies

Table 5 – The Narrative Structure of the Pilot Episode of *This is Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi*

Figure 19 – A Graphic Comparison of the Narrative Structures of *This is Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi*.49

49 The green bars at the bottom of the graph show the sequencing of the scenes in *This is Us*. The white bars at the top are the corresponding scenes that were kept in the same order as in the original version. The color-coded bars linked to each other show the scenes that were reshuffled in the Turkish version while the yellow bars indicate the added scenes.

Figure 20 – A Scene-by-Scene Distribution of the Extensions and Reductions in the Pilot Episode(s) of *This is Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi.*

In the American version, after a romantic dinner, Toby (Kate's date) accompanies Kate to her house (Scene 21 — 0:29-27-0:30:23). As Kate opens her front door, she expresses how much fun she had that night and thanks to him. This rather quick farewell surprises Toby, and the following conversation happens between the two before they enter the house together:

Toby: Wait, what? No, no, no. What, that's it?
Kate: What do you mean?
Toby: I mean, you're not gonna invite me in for a nightcap or a handy or something?
Kate: {*chuckles*} Cute!
Toby: I am, thank you! I did really have a nice time tonight.
{*They look at each other for a few seconds with romantic music in the background.*}
Kate: OK, you can come inside for a water.
Toby: {*chuckles*} Alright.
Kate: A water!
Toby: Uh-huh.
Kate: We have already had our six ounces of wine!
Toby: I know. 150 calories per six ounces.
Kate: Ooh. You keep counting calories and you're gonna really turn me on.
Toby: Yeah. You want to know how many, uh, calories are in a sausage?

In the Turkish version, Scene 21 (1:14:09-1:15:05) is significantly modified presumably because of the same cultural sensitivities regarding women's *namus*. To start with the *mise-en-scene*, in contrast to Kate in the American version, Beste thanks Erdem (her date) in the car before she even gets off the car. Erdem, in response, tells her that she is welcome and says good night; however, as he talks, he also squirms in pain. Having noticed it, Beste asks him if he is alright, and the conversation goes as follows:

Erdem: I don't know. I have some pain. You go ahead please, don't wait for me.
Beste: Come on, no way. Is it a stomachache?
Erdem: {*Looking embarrassed*} A little below that.
Beste: Gosh. Do you think you got food poisoning from the fish? You're sweating a storm.
Erdem: {*Looking in pain and desperate*} I'm very sorry. Would it be possible if I used your bathroom?

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As Erdem utters this last statement, a comedic musical cue starts in the background. Without waiting for Beste to answer his question, he rushes to get out of the car and says, "I promise. I will be done in five minutes. Believe me that I wouldn't want to enter your house under these conditions." Watching him in a daze, Beste first becomes speechless and then reluctantly tells him that he can use it. Caught in the middle, Beste anxiously adds that she lives with her brother. However, distracted by his unbearable pain, Erdem cannot even listen to her and asks her if she can act faster. Having no other choice, Beste rushes to open the door and the two enter the house. Overall, as in the other two adaptation examples, the Turkish producers once again find their way out of a culturally inappropriate situation by turning the scene into a comedy through modifications made to the storyline as well as the musical track.

Going back to the American version, the next scene (Scene 22 — 0:30:24-0:31:48) opens with Toby and Kate watching a documentary together at Kate's living room. Then, Toby asks her if she wants to "fool around." Kate first turns him down; however, upon seeing his disappointment, she clarifies that it is not that she does not want it but rather that it has been too long since it was even an option. Just as the conversation is about to turn into an emotional one, Toby interrupts her and leans in to kiss her. However, before he can even touch her, Kevin appears in the room drunk. Both shocked, Toby and Kate turn to him and Kate says, "Kevin, what the hell?" When Kevin asks Kate why she has not answered his calls, she tells him that she was on a date looking at Toby. Fully surprised, Kevin turns to Toby and says in an ecstatic tone: "This is… This is the funny fat guy from fat class?" After correcting that it is a

"support" group, Toby recognizes Kevin's face and asks if he is the "Manny" from

the show. Kevin first confirms it by saying "yes," but then corrects himself that "he

was" since he got fired earlier in the episode and breaks the news to Kate. In the

meantime, Toby tries to take selfies with Kevin and even asks him if he could take off

his shirt, which is how Kevin usually appears on screen as the Manny. Cut to Scene

23, which seems to be a later time in the night due to their drunk-looking faces, Kate,

Kevin (now shirtless!) and Toby are shown watching the video clip of the quarrel

Kevin had at the set.

The rest of the night, in Scene 26 (0:38:13-0:39:24), Kate, Kevin and Toby

appear once again drinking more beer and wine and talking about Kevin's loss of his

job. Seeing Kevin's desperate look, Kate tells him that he can try Broadway;

however, Kevin declines it by saying that he cannot sing. Then, Toby brings up the

idea of porn, which Kevin does not disregard and says, "yeah, maybe." As Toby

moves to get some more wine, Kevin and Kate start talking about their dad's story,

which leads to some flashback scenes from the past. When the storyline gets back to

Kate and Toby's scene (Scene 28 — 0:40:30-0:40:45), it is finally revealed that Jack

and Rebecca are Kate, Kevin, and Randall's parents.

In the Turkish version, Scene 22 (1:16:32-1:20:52) opens with Beste waiting

in the doorway for Erdem to get out of the bathroom. She looks anxious because she

does not want to get caught with him in the house. When Erdem comes out of the

bathroom, the two have a short conversation about his sickness, which quickly turns

into a farewell moment as Beste expects him to leave soon. This is also where a

romantic musical cue starts turning the scene into a rather melodramatic tone.

However, before he leaves, Erdem asks for a glass of water. As Beste goes to the

kitchen to get some, he starts looking around the room and sees her brother's game

console and says that he likes playing games, too. When Beste brings him the water,

the two start talking about the night, and Erdem expresses that it was a very nice

dinner. During this romantic conversation, the two still stand very close to the door,

which implies that Erdem does not intend to stay longer. Accompanied by continued

romantic music in the background, Erdem tells her that they should do it again and

asks her if she wants to meet again.

Figure 21 – Berk's blank look at Erdem   Figure 22 – Berk's dirty look at Erdem

As the two enjoy these extended moments of happiness and romantic joy,

Berk appears at the door. Upon seeing the two together, Berk asks Beste what she is

doing with a guy at home at such a late hour. Feeling uneasy, Beste quickly

introduces Erdem as a "friend," and Erdem says hi. However, Berk does not respond

to him verbally and gives him a blank look instead (see Figure 21). Sensing the

unhappiness of her brother, Beste jumps in and starts explaining that Erdem had to

get in the house since he was feeling sick and had to use the toilet. A moving musical

cue starts at this point to amplify the comedic awkwardness of the situation. Berk

looks as if he was not convinced and then questions why she looks so "stylish," which

Beste immediately rejects in a comedic manner. Next, Berk asks why she has not

picked up his calls since the morning. When Beste says that she was busy, Berk responds to her in a rather allusive manner by saying, "I can see it," implying her being with a guy. In order to lighten the mood, Erdem jumps in the conversation and tells that he heard that the two were twins. However, Berk once again prefers not to respond to Erdem's remark and instead gives him a dirty look (see Figure 22). Seeing that his effort does not do much help, Erdem finally says that he'd better go, which Berk again leaves unanswered and only steps aside to let him walk to the door. After Erdem's departure, Berk expresses his discontent about the situation one more time by asking Beste what the guy was doing at home with her at such a late hour. After the two sit down, Berk breaks the news about the incident at the set.

In the absence of Erdem, Scene 23 (1:26:46-1:28:39) opens with Berk showing Beste the video of the quarrel he had at the set. Feeling shocked, Beste asks how he could dare to have a quarrel with the owner of such a big advertising agency. Being aware of the challenges this incident can present to his acting career, Berk tries to rationalize the situation. To cheer up, he suggests ordering food (*tantuni*).

In Scene 26 (1:30:15-1:32:49), Berk and Beste are shown eating tantuni and feeling relaxed. However, because Beste is having weight problems, she expresses her regret for eating such a high-calorie food so late in the night after struggling so hard to eat very little during the dinner with Erdem. Being surprised to hear it, Berk says, "What dinner? Did you really go out for dinner with that guy?" Beste responds to his question self-assuredly this time and says, "Yes, I did. So what? I am a 35-year-old woman. Are you planning to keep me home forever?" The rest of the conversation goes as follows:

Berk: All right, dear, don't get mad at me. However, what was he doing at home?
Beste: I already told you! The kid had an upset stomach.
Berk: Come on, you call him a kid? He is at least in his mid-thirties. {*As he utters this statement, he moves his head in a gesture of discontent and gets up and goes to the kitchen*}
Beste: Look, I am going off my diet here to help you feel better, and this is how you thank me? Let me warn you. You got too accustomed to acting like a macho man {*referring to his bad behavior at the set*}.
Berk: Please, don't even remind me of it! I literally shot myself in the foot!

The fact that Beste protests against her brother's macho attitude in this scene can be explained with reference to the "emancipated but unliberated" position of women in Turkey (Kandiyoti, 1987). As explained in Chapter 3, women were granted considerable new rights related to marriage, education, employment and politics with the inception of the Republic in 1923. This ostensible empowerment of women created an impression that they gained equal rights and freedoms as men and could demand justice when needs be. However, these new conditions failed to go beyond male defined norms and has rarely yielded opportunities for a genuine contestation of socially constructed gender norms and expectations. In other words, they were granted the opportunity to contest cultural formations and speak up only within the prescribed lines defined by male authorities. Similarly, in the case of *This is Us,* Beste does challenge her brother's macho expectations but only after he exercises his authority over the situation and sends the guy away.

As in the American version, the scene continues with Beste reminding Berk of their father's story, which leads to a cut to a flashback of their father's talk with the doctor on the day they were born. This flashback scene reveals that Cem and Reyhan are the Big Three's parents.

Finally, the resolution (Scenes 29, 30, 31 and 32 — 0:40:53-0:43:11) in the American version contains a series of back-and-forth cuts between different scenes revealing the connections between Randall, Kate, Kevin and their parents. In one of these scenes (Scene 30 — 0:41:11-0:41:40), the audiences see that Kevin has fallen asleep on the couch and Kate is putting a blanket on him. When she turns back, Toby approaches her and gives her a kiss on the lips. Feeling surprised, Kate gives him a smile, and the two walk to another room holding hands — indicative of further sexual intercourse thereafter. The resolution in the Turkish version, on the other hand, only consists of Scenes 29, 27 and 32. It naturally excludes Scene 30 because Erdem has already left the house in Scene 22.

Overall, as in the other two television format adaptations, the modifications analyzed in the *This is Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi* adaptation have a significant impact on the way the main female protagonist is represented in the series. Either by changing the narrative structure of the episode or by amplifying the comedic tone, Beste as a character is recreated in ways that lead her to conform into the traditionally established submissive role under the influence of the patriarchal social order.

Discussion

Before I discuss what all these examples demonstrate from a critical standpoint, it may be useful to remember that modifications in television format adaptations are a natural outcome of the remaking process. Due to changing value structures, belief systems, and political and legal specificities, adapting a text to a new cultural environment inevitably entails various changes made to the new text in the hope of meeting the prefigured needs and expectations of the new target audience. As

explained in Chapters 2 and 3, some of these changes may also be legally or socially enforced by external factors such as state-imposed broadcasting regulations and/or dominant religious and cultural values.

That being said, however, these facts should not hinder researchers from taking critical perspectives on the social construction of power inequalities on the media, as in the case of the patriarchal gender paradigm in Turkish society. To give a specific example, in the final analysis of the *This is Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi* adaptation, omitting Scene 30 in which Toby kisses Kate on the lips and takes her to the next room can be an understandable move on the part of the Turkish producers because their target audience is a Muslim-majority audience and Islam strictly forbids premarital sex. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 3, censoring of premarital sex or intimacy is also legally enforced by the Turkish state on the grounds that it contradicts the national and moral values of the society. However, modifications that transcend such relatively uncontroversial cultural redlines as in the case of Berk's authoritative and patriarchal role over his sister and his negative behavior towards Erdem, which disallows him to spend even a short amount of time with the two siblings, cannot be accounted for simply on the grounds of cultural difference.

Thus, in light of all the examples I have discussed thus far and several others I could not include due to space limitations, I argue that the glorification of the patriarchal order prevailing in television format adaptations in Turkey cannot be seen as a one-off or an exceptional practice. On the contrary, changes made in all three format adaptations constitute a pattern and clearly indicate that there is a general effort on the part of the producers to make sure that female characters do not stray

away from traditional submissive roles. Fitting them into these traditional roles does nothing more than legitimizing and perpetuating the oppression of women in Turkish society.

With regard to the motive behind this traditionalist and discriminatory tendency in the media, it is crucial not to treat these practices as pertaining to the current political climate of increased Islamist influence under the leadership of AKP in Turkey. Instead, these practices should be accounted for in deference to the larger historical context stretching back to the early days of the Republic for a more comprehensive understanding.

As I discussed in Chapter 3, the media in Turkey has always been under the influence of a strong Turkish nationalism that has posited a blend of modernization and traditionalism towards the construction and preservation of a homogenized Turkish nation-state. The Republican Westernizing reforms, in this regard, were of great importance for the new state to sever its historical ties with the Ottoman past. However, this modernization/Westernization was not supposed to lead to the surrender of the Turkish national identity that was in the making. Straddled between these two competing ideologies, the founding Kemalist revolutionaries deployed and mobilized various cultural instruments such as the Muslim religion, the Turkish language, and traditional gender roles to preserve and consolidate the supposed homogeneity of the society.

Among these cultural instruments, the formation of gender roles, particularly those ascribed to women, was vital for the double-edged Republican project because of the critical role women played for both the modernization and homogenization of

the society. On the one hand, the empowerment of women in education and work-life, as well as their emancipation from the veil, offered the founders a means to show the "modern" aspect of the new Turkish nationalist discourse. This amplified narrative became a central part of the new national identity and has thereafter been represented and highlighted in all media platforms, including radio and television. Given this historical legacy, it is only natural to see that the female characters in all three format adaptations analyzed in this chapter are not transformed substantially into an Islamic character (such as wearing a headscarf) despite the evident Islamic background of the majority of the viewers. On the contrary, they are shown wearing Western-style clothing, engaging extensively in daily matters outside the home, and having premarital romantic relationships with men.

On the other hand, the so-called emancipation has never yielded a complete liberation for women in Turkey. Instead, it granted them an illusory freedom, the boundaries of which have continued to be defined and reasserted by the male members of the extant patriarchal society. Today, this illusory freedom continues to manifest itself in television programs of all genres in the ways women are represented. From television dramas to political discussion programs to entertainment programs, media representations of women continue to recreate and reinforce various taken-for-granted cultural norms oppressing women, such as *namus*. The findings presented in this chapter are of great significance for unveiling this masked discriminatory discourse. From Hülya's mom's efforts to persuade her daughter to date a guy to Berk's protectionist attitude towards his sister, all of the findings illustrate how women are still trapped in between modernity and traditionalism,

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progress and patriarchy in Turkey.

In the next chapter, I focus on another discriminatory discourse in Turkish society that is also often reproduced and perpetuated in television format adaptations in the name of accommodating cultural differences: *norms of authority*. Analyzing this discriminatory discourse and the decisive role it plays in television format adaptations, I further highlight the need for a critical perspective about the process of cultural adaptation.

Chapter 6: Reproduction of Norms of Authority in Television Format Adaptations

In cultural adaptations of television formats, norms of authority play a determinant role as much as established gender roles. This cultural mechanism manifests itself in the case of Turkey in the form of rigid boundaries established between levels of social and organizational hierarchies and the elevated assumed need to respect and defer to authority. Rooted in the authoritarian and statist traditions of the Republic, which I discussed in Chapter 3, this strong hierarchical cultural formation, also known as "high power distance culture" (Hofstede, 2001), affects the shape of interpersonal relationships in almost all kinds of institutions from the government down to the education system and medicine. The increased authority of people with superior positions often transforms them into "superior persons" in the eyes of their subordinates and subordinates into "inferiors" or "followers" in the eyes of their superiors. This structure brings about a discriminatory power discourse that manifests itself in forms of excessive deference and blind allegiance on the part of subordinates and vanity, dominance, and sometimes even violence on the part of superiors.

Seeking to reveal the implications of this authoritarian power discourse on television production in Turkey, this chapter focuses on four television format adaptations: (1) *Sayın Bakanım* (*Yes Minister*) (2004-2005), *Monk* (*Galip Derviş*) (2013-2014), *Kavak Yelleri* (*Dawson's Creek*) (2007-2011) and *Mucize Doktor* (*Good Doctor/The Good Doctor*) (2019). Comparatively analyzing each adaptation with its source text(s), I track and use textual and narratological divergences between them as

a lens to examine how the hierarchical relationships between superiors and subordinates both in the state machinery and everyday life are reshaped and foregrounded and highlighted as part of the adaptation process. Furthermore, I discuss how this tailoring reproduces and perpetuates the status quo of inequality, discrimination and top-down governance within the society and its institutions as a legacy of the state's authoritarian and statist political structure.

The Four Format Adaptations: Plots and Characters

Yes, Minister is a British political satire TV series that aired on BBC 2 between 1980 and 1984. It tells the story of Jim Hacker, a novice cabinet minister, and his team of civil servants, including the permanent secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby, the private secretary Bernard Wooley, cabinet secretary Sir Arnold Robinson, and finally his political advisor Frank Weisel. The plot generally revolves around the power struggle between Jim Hacker and Sir Humphrey Appleby. While the former represents an idealistic but administratively inexperienced politician that is eager to follow an "open government" policy, Sir Humphrey advocates for maintaining the status quo and deploys various stratagems to that end.

Sayın Bakanım (*Dear Minister*), the Turkish adaptation of *Yes, Minister*, was broadcast on ATV between 2004 to 2005. Closely following the plotline of its British counterpart, the series focuses on similar power struggles between the elected civilian authority and the deep-rooted state bureaucracy in Turkish politics. This inherent theme of clash between different levels of hierarchies in the state machinery presents quintessential examples to understand the divergent power structures between the two countries. Also, the timing of this adaptation criticizing the established state

bureaucracy is particularly meaningful given the AKP's sweeping electoral victory in 2002 against the longstanding Kemalist establishment and the quick optimism that it inspired among citizens in terms of the democratization of the country at the time.

The *Monk/Derviş* adaptation is included in this chapter again since its plotline contains a lot of elements portraying the hierarchical structure within the police force. This structure manifests itself most clearly in scenes where Monk, as the protagonist of the series, violates the hierarchical relationship between him and his superior Captain Stottlemeyer. In many of these scenes, Monk catches clues that others, including the Captain, have overlooked, which puts him in a more favorable and powerful position in the eyes of the viewer. The fact that a series based on such a hierarchically anomalous order is adapted into a higher power distance culture like Turkey certainly shows that its plot is not perceived by the producers as a violation of power relations in general. However, the difference between the low and high power distance cultures does come to the surface in the re-interpretation of particular moments where there is a direct interaction from a subordinate to a superior and a violation of existing power structures.

Another TV format that I focus on in this chapter is the American teen drama series *Dawson's Creek.* Aired on The WB between 1998 and 2003, the series tells the story of four teenagers (Dawson Leery, Joey Potter, Pacey Witter and Jen Lindley) as they move through adolescence. Its plotline generally revolves around the budding romantic relationship between the childhood friends Dawson and Joey, which is soon interrupted and complicated with the arrival of a new girl, Jen, to the town and the unexpected tryst between Joey and Pacey.

The Turkish adaptation, *Kavak Yelleri* (*Daydreaming*)*,* was broadcast on Kanal D between 2007 and 2011. Similar to the American version, the series focuses on the lives of four teenagers going through their adolescent years and the problems they face both at home and outside. The significance of this adaptation for the analysis is that it offers scenes portraying the hierarchical order prevalent in the education system in Turkey.

The final TV format that is under discussion is the South Korean drama series *Good Doctor* (2013). It tells the story of Park Shi-on, an autistic savant young doctor who manages to get a position at a university hospital as a resident after years of struggle and hardship. However, from the very beginning, he is not welcomed at the hospital due to his mental disorder affecting his interactions with people. He is accepted to the position only after his long-time family friend and mentor, Dr. Choi Woo-Suk, who is also the Director of the hospital, stands as a guarantor for him and promises that he would resign his position if Park fails. However, Dr. Shi-on has to go through serious hardship in his relationships with his colleagues and especially his boss, Dr. Do-han, who rejects his recruitment harshly.

The Turkish adaptation of the format, *Mucize Doktor (Miracle Doctor),* aired its first season in 2019 on Turkey's Fox TV. Similar to the Korean version, the series follows the early career of the autistic savant doctor Ali Vefa and tells the struggles he faces in the job he gets with the help of his lifelong family friend and mentor, Dr. Adil Erinç. The subordinate-superior relationships represented in the series, especially those between Dr. Ali and Dr. Ferman Eryiğit, an attending surgeon

overseeing several surgical residents, offer a plethora of examples reflecting the prevailing discriminatory hierarchical structures in the medical field in Turkey.

The South Korean format *Good Doctor* was also adapted to American television in 2017 with a similar title, *The Good Doctor,* and has aired its third season on ABC in 2020. The reason for including the American remake in this study is that it constitutes a more practical reference point for the comparative study of the hierarchical structures represented in the Turkish remake. While the comparison between the Korean original and the Turkish adaptation also yields some meaningful results, the fact that both countries have high power distance cultures makes it relatively more difficult to expose the established hierarchical structures represented in the series. On the other hand, having been produced in a country known as a low-power distance society, the American remake creates a more drastic and clearer antithesis to track the rigid hierarchical elements prevalent in the high-power distance culture of Turkey as well as South Korea.

Yes, Minister/Sayın Bakanım: Norms of Authority at the State Level

One domain of life where norms of authority are observed most clearly concerns the state machinery. Composed of rigidly defined channels of communication and control interconnecting the elected civilian authority (i.e., the government) and the entrenched bureaucratic elements of the state, this hierarchical structure comes with various norms and expectations that construct an almost taken-for-granted subordinate/superior discourse accepted widely.

However, the degree to which the normalized power asymmetries within this hierarchical structure are experienced and accentuated can vary from culture to

culture. As discussed in Chapter 3, in high-power distance cultures such as Turkey, for instance, deference to high state officials can be more pronounced and taken-for-granted as it is often equated with the respect expected to be shown towards the state. On the other hand, despite the existence of similar, if not identical, power asymmetries in low-power distance cultures such as the United Kingdom,[50] the actualization of power distance within the state machinery can be relatively less salient and therefore less likely to be questioned. To put it another way, while in both cases there is a certain amount of respect expected to be shown towards high state officials, in high-power distance cultures, this norm can sometimes turn into an existential (and rather discriminatory) hierarchy within the organization, transforming individuals with "superior roles" into "superior persons" to whom homage should be paid at all times.

Sayın Bakanım, the Turkish adaptation of the British political satire, *Yes, Minister,* is a quintessential example showing reflections of the above-mentioned discriminatory power discourse prevalent within the high-power distance culture of Turkish state machinery. Despite the relatively shorter length and lighter content of this format adaptation, as opposed to the other shows I discuss later in the chapter, its concentration on relationships between the fictional characters of a minister and his civil servants occupying some of the highest seats within the state machinery sets a reasonable starting point for my analysis of norms of authority.

The scenes that I focus on in this format adaptation are 2a, 2b and 4 (see Table 6 and Figure 23 below), in which Ergun Yurdakul (Jim Hacker in the original text), a

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[50] See Hofstede's Power Distance Index: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country/the-uk/

newly elected member of the parliament, waits for the Prime Minister to call and

offer him a minister post (Scene 2a). After a long wait, he finally receives the call and

is offered the position of Minister of Administrative Affairs (Scene 2b). In the next

scene (Scene 4), Mr. Yurdakul, together with his political advisor Mr. Atıl (Mr.

Weisel in the original text), arrive at the Ministry where a crowd of Ministry

employees greets him. The significance of these scenes is that they offer critical

moments of divergence from the British version in terms of the degree of deference

shown for superiors. The divergences represent and reinforce the discourse of

increased power asymmetries and inequality within the state machinery of Turkey.

In terms of the temporal data concerning the scenes under discussion, the

percentages of the two scenes in proportion to the overall length of the episode do not

offer a meaningful outcome (see Figure 24 below). To be more precise, Scene 2 in the

British version, for instance, takes 18.48% of the total story time while the same

scene (Scenes 2a and 2b) in the Turkish version takes a total of 15.75% of the total

length of the series. Similarly, Scene 4 in the British and Turkish versions take 2%

and 2.5% of the total length of the series, respectively.

On the other hand, what is striking from a quantitative standpoint, as

illustrated in Figure 24, is that both scenes (2 and 4) are extended and expanded

substantially in the Turkish adaptation. While the duration of Scene 2 in the British

version is 0:05:14, the total duration of the same scene (Scenes 2a and 2b) in the

Turkish adaptation is almost doubled and reaches 0:09:46. In a similar vein, the

duration of Scene 4 in the British version (0:00:34) is nearly tripled and becomes

0:01:33. While these extensions and expansions can be thought of merely an effort on

the part of the producers to create longer programs to maximize commercial profits,

as discussed in Chapter 2, the added content in these scenes reveals that this

transformation is also a process of making the text culturally relevant and proximate,

particularly in terms of the prevailing hierarchical structures.

Sc. #	*YES, MINISTER*	Sc. #	*SAYIN BAKANIM*
1	Introduction of the background story (the electoral victory)	1	Introduction of the background story (the electoral victory)
2	Jim Hacker waits for the newly elected Prime Minister to call and offer him a minister post. After a long wait, he receives the call.	2a	Ergun Yurdakul waits for the newly elected Prime Minister to call and offer him a minister post.
		8a	At the Ministry, Permanent Secretary Bayraktar and Cabinet Secretary Burhan talk about the next Minister.
		2b	After a long wait, Mr. Yurdakul finally receives the call.
3	Jim Hacker visits the Prime Minister to officially accept the offer.		**DELETED**
4	The welcoming ceremony at the Ministry of Administrative Affairs.	4	The welcoming ceremony at the Ministry of Administrative Affairs.
5	Jim Hacker walks to his new office.	5	Ergun Yurdakul walks to his new office.
6	Hacker's political advisor Mr. Weisel stays in the waiting room.	6	Yurdakul's political advisor Mr. Atıl stays in the waiting room.
7	Jim Hacker meets Permanent Secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby.	7	Ergun Yurdakul meets Permanent Secretary Samim Bayraktar.
8	Sir Humphrey Appleby and Cabinet Secretary Sir Arnold Robinson talk about the new Minister and his open government ideal.	8b	Samim Bayraktar and Cabinet Secretary Mr. Burhan talk about the new Minister and his open government ideal.
9	Sir Humphrey asks his assistant to let Mr. Weisel discover an invoice that they have been hiding from the Minister purposefully.	9	Samim Bayraktar asks his assistant to let Mr. Atıl discover an invoice that they have been hiding from the Minister purposefully.
10	Mr. Weisel tells the Minister about the document he has discovered (an invoice for 1000 computers imported from the USA). Hacker asks Appleby to cancel the contract, but he tells him that only the Treasury can make major policy changes. Determined to be true to his party's open government policy, the Minister insists that he shares this "unnecessary" transatlantic deal with his constituents. Having designed the whole stratagem, Appleby agrees but also persuades the Minister that they also need to circulate the speech to other departments for clearance and then send it to the press.	10	Mr. Atıl tells the Minister about the document he has discovered (an invoice for 1000 computers imported from the USA). Yurdakul asks Bayraktar to cancel the contract, but he tells him that the computers are already in use. Determined to be true to his party's open government policy, the Minister insists that he shares this "unnecessary" transatlantic deal with his constituents. Having designed the whole stratagem, Bayraktar agrees but also persuades the Minister that they also need to circulate the speech to other departments for clearance and then send it to the press.
11	The letter is sent to other departments.	11	The letter is sent to other departments.
12	When the PM sees Hacker's letter, he gets mad at him and calls him to his office, as the PM is about to sign an invaluable Anglo-American defense-trade agreement.	12	When the PM sees Yurdakul's letter, he gets mad at him and calls him to his office, as the PM is about to sign an invaluable Turkish-American defense-trade agreement.
13	Outside the PM's office, Jim Hacker waits anxiously. As he starts thinking of resigning, his private secretary tells him that they have failed to rescind the interdepartmental clearance procedure, and so the speech has not gone to the Press. Feeling relieved, the Minister asks how it happened. Sir Appleby admits that it was his "mistake" but, in return, gets praised.	13	Outside the PM's office, Yurdakul waits anxiously. As he starts thinking of resigning, his private secretary tells him that they have failed to rescind the interdepartmental clearance procedure, and so the speech has not gone to the Press. Feeling relieved, the Minister asks how it happened. Bayraktar admits that it was his "mistake" but, in return, gets praised.

Table 6 – The Narrative Structure of the Pilot Episode of *Yes, Minister/Sayın Bakanım*

Figure 23 – A Graphic Comparison of the Narrative Structures of *Yes, Minister/Sayın Bakanım.*[51]

[51] The green bars at the bottom of the graph show the sequencing of the scenes in *Yes, Minister*. The white bars at the top are the corresponding scenes that were kept in the same order as in the original version. The color-coded bars linked to each other show the scenes that were reshuffled and distributed across the narrative structure in the Turkish version while the yellow bars indicate the added scenes.

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
Figure 24 – A Scene-by-Scene Distribution of the Extensions and Reductions in the Pilot Episode(s) of *Yes, Minister/Sayın Bakanım*[52]

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[52] The turquoise bars on top of the green bars indicate how much has been extended, expanded, or added in the Turkish adaptation of each scene. The red bars on top of the white bars, on the other hand, mark how much has been reduced or deleted in the Turkish adaptation of each scene.

The second scene of the British sitcom *Yes, Minister* opens with a segment

(0:01:03-0:01:21) in which Jim Hacker waits for the newly elected Prime Minister to

call and offer him a minister post. Seeing his impatience, his wife tells him that he

should relax and give the Prime Minister some time, as he just got back from the

Palace (see the dialog below).

Jim Hacker: I haven't had a call yet.
Wife: Who from?
Jim Hacker: Our new Prime Minister, of course. Who do you think?
Wife: What do you expect? The car's only just got back from the Palace. I saw it on the news.
Jim Hacker: Hmm, any moment now then.

Ergun Yurdakul: I haven't had a call yet.
Wife: Who from, my dear?
Ergun Yurdakul: Who can it be? Our Honorable Prime Minister.
Wife: My dear, he just got off the plane. Didn't you see it on the news?
Ergun Yurdakul: Is it so? Then, I am sure he is dialing my phone number at the moment.
Wife: My dear, he just arrived in the city. Give him some time. Let him go to his home, take a rest, change his clothes, use the toilet…
Ergun Yurdakul: {*gives her a dirty look*}
Wife: What?
Ergun Yurdakul: Nihan! How can you dare to use the word "toilet" when speaking of the spiritual personality of our honorable Prime Minister? You could have said "let him wash his hands" or "use the restroom."

As seen above, in adapting this segment (0:01:30-0:02:14), the producers add

several new lines to the dialog between Mr. Yurdakul and his wife. Apart from Mr.

Yurdakul's use of the honorific title of "honorable" to the name of Prime Minister to

show his respect, the most important divergence between the two versions is observed

when his wife uses the word "toilet" when speaking of the Prime Minister, which

leads Mr. Yurdakul to give her a dirty look (see Figures 25). Upon hearing his wife's

puzzled response, he then warns her more explicitly by saying that it is not

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appropriate to use the crass word "toilet" when speaking of the spiritual personality of

his honorable Prime Minister (see Figure 26).

Figure 25 –Yurdakul gives his wife a dirty look   Figure 26 –Yurdakul is criticizing his wife

Later in the same scene (0:11:54-0:12:30), the increased respect shown by Mr.

Yurdakul to the authority of the Prime Minister continues when the Prime Minister

gives him a call. This time, however, the divergence occurs more in the visual track

than in the verbal track.

Figure 27 – Mr. Hacker on the phone (I)   Figure 28 – Mr. Hacker on the phone (II)

Figure 29 – Mr. Yurdakul on the phone (I)   Figure 30 – Mr. Yurdakul on the phone (II)

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In both versions, Mr. Hacker/Mr. Yurdakul grabs the phone from his wife's hand with great excitement upon realizing that it is the Prime Minister calling him (see Figures 27 and 28 versus 29 and 30). However, in addition to this excitement and the trembling voices of both minister candidates, it is noteworthy that Mr. Yurdakul stands at attention as if he is standing before the Prime Minister and straightens his shirt's collar (Figure 29). This image creates the impression that he is ashamed not to be wearing a tie when talking to the Prime Minister, which is a general norm expected to be followed by state officials in Turkey as well as in many other countries, especially if they are around their superiors. This image of respect is reinforced further when Mr. Yurdakul holds and pulls down the bottom of his shirt for some time, pretending to be wearing a tie and jacket (Figure 30).

Offering a microscopic insight into the adaptation process, these two short segments exemplify how a narrative is extended and expanded during the cultural adaptation of a show and how this reimagining process has an impact on the overall temporal structure of the narrative. However, what is even more important is that it illustrates how this whole process of remaking and adapting can dovetail with the workings of cultural mechanisms that reproduce and reinforce the status quo within a society, including the established hierarchical formations and practices. Presumably stemming from an effort on the part of the producers to accurately represent the culturally specific power dynamics within the Turkish state machinery, these divergent visual and verbal elements become an indicator of the rigid boundaries established between superiors and subordinates in Turkish politics.

The reinforced and amplified hierarchical power discourse portrayed in Scene 2 manifests itself in a new context with different characters in Scene 4. Having officially accepted the position of Minister of Administrative Affairs, Mr. Hacker/Mr. Yurdakul, together with his political advisor Mr. Weisel/Mr. Atıl, arrives at the Ministry, where he is greeted by some civil servants. Representing the highest level of authority within the context of the Ministry he governs, Mr. Hacker/Mr. Yurdakul, this time, becomes the person to whom homage should be paid. However, the degree of this homage shows a significant divergence between the two shows.

| Figure 31 – Mr. Hacker's arrival at the Ministry (I) | Figure 32 – Mr. Hacker's arrival at the Ministry (II) | Figure 33 – Mr. Hacker's arrival at the Ministry (III) |

In the British version (0:06:54-0:07:28), as seen in Figures 31, 32 and 33, Jim Hacker is greeted by his new Principal Private Secretary Bernard Wooley and the Secretary's assistant by the side of the road in front of the Ministry. As Mr. Hacker prepares to get off the car, Mr. Wooley opens the car's door for him, which indicates his obvious deference for his new boss. Following a brief introduction of their positions, Mr. Wooley and his assistant lead Mr. Hacker to his new office. Also, right before entering to the building, Mr. Wooley steps aside and lets his Minister get inside first, which becomes another indicator of his respect for the authority of the Minister.

Figure 34 – Mr. Yurdakul's arrival (I)   Figure 35 – Mr. Yurdakul's arrival (II)

In the Turkish version of the same scene (0:13:07-0:14:17), viewers see a similar attitude by Mr. Yurdakul's new Principal Private Secretary Cömert Ayyıldız and the Secretary's assistant. As the Minister's official car approaches the building, Mr. Ayyıldız rushes to open the car's door for the Minister. After introducing themselves, the two lead the minister to the building with a similar courtesy. However, as they walk inside, a major divergence transpires between the two shows. While Jim Hacker makes a silent entry to his new office, Mr. Yurdakul is surprised by a big crowd of Ministry employees lined up at the entrance of the building waiting for his arrival. After shaking hands with a few of them, Mr. Yurdakul enters the building under the sustained applause of the crowd (see Figures 34 and 35).

Similar to the first two segments analyzed at the beginning, what this narratological divergence discloses is the glorification of the existing hierarchical structure within the Turkish state machinery to the extent that it creates a more flagrant discriminatory power discourse between subordinates and superiors. Despite the evident respect shown towards authority in both versions of the format, the amplified homage paid to the hierarchical power of the Minister by a larger group of employees and in the form of applauses in the Turkish version illustrates how a more privileged status is granted to high state officials in Turkey to the degree that they are

transformed into an almost heroic figure transcending the ascribed level of their position. This ongoing discourse can also be observed in today's political climate of Turkey in the way President Erdogan is represented through his 1150-room opulent presidential palace, numerous cars and planes.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the historic roots of this established hierarchical order that glorifies the authority of the state and the officials representing that authority can be found in the long-standing cultures of authoritarianism and statism prevalent in the country. Characterized by the top-down structures and practices that prioritize the state over its citizens since the early days of the Republic and even beyond into the Ottoman era, these cultures continue to perpetuate and normalize the accentuation of rigid boundaries between levels of organizational hierarchies within the state, regulating the subordinate-superior relationships.

However, what makes this historically pervasive power discourse a social problem worthy of scholarly attention is not only the rigid boundaries that it establishes within the state machinery. It is also the implications of this authoritarian discourse in everyday life that shape relationships in almost all realms of life from the police force to medicine, from education to family. In what follows, I look at various of these realms one by one, starting with the police force as portrayed in the *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation, to trace and unravel the effects of the prevailing statist and authoritarian cultures on everyday life, as they are reproduced and represented in television format adaptations.

The police force is a subsidiary institution of the state machinery in which hierarchies matter significantly. Similar to the government, its clearly defined channels of communication and control require its employees to act in accordance with a usually predetermined set of norms, especially when speaking to their superiors. However, despite the existence of similar formations in almost all cultures, the way the norms are constructed and actualized can change across different national settings. Being a comedy-crime series featuring a detective as its protagonist, the *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation offers critical examples depicting this unique actualization of hierarchies within the police force between the American and Turkish cultures, which differ from each other significantly in terms of the scale of power distance observed between different levels of the hierarchical structure.

The particular scenes I analyze in this format adaptation are 5 and 8 (see Table 7 below). In Scene 5, viewers see the Deputy Mayor paying a quick visit to Izzet Komiser (Captain Stottlemeyer in the original text), following the assassination attempt on a politician and the murder of one of his security guards, to tell him that the Mayor wants him to include Derviş (Monk) in the investigation. Feeling helpless at the request of the Mayor, Izzet Komiser agrees to call in Derviş to join the team. Later in Scene 8, Monk/Derviş, together with his assistant Sharona/Hülya, meets Izzet Komiser/Captain Stottlemeyer and his team at the crime scene and, using his extraordinary skills, manages to find some clues that others have overlooked earlier.

What makes both of these scenes worthy of study is the divergences observed in the way that the relationships between superiors and subordinates are portrayed.

Especially the visual, verbal and aural modifications made to the relationships, first, between the Deputy Mayor and Izzet Komiser in Scene 5, and then between Izzet Komiser and Derviş in Scene 8 illustrate the higher power distance constructed between the superiors and the subordinates in the Turkish version, as opposed to the relatively lower-power distance depicted in the American narrative.

The significance of these scenes also reveals itself when the extensions and additions in the Turkish version are analyzed quantitatively. As illustrated in Figure 36 below (color-coded in the same way as Figure 8), the proportion of the total increased time in the two scenes under discussion (0:02:47) to the total length of these scenes (0:05:58) is 46.65%. That means almost half of the total duration of the two scenes were extended or created from scratch in the Turkish adaptation. Whereas, the proportion of the total increased time (0:15:39) to the total length of the pilot episode (1:30:40) is 17.26%. That is to say, the amount of the additions and extensions made to the two scenes are significantly above the average of the total amount of additions and extensions made to the entire narrative structure.

Sc. #	MONK	Sc. #	GALIP DERVIŞ
1	Crime scene investigation (a dead female body)	1	Crime scene investigation (a dead female body)
2	Credits and titles	2	Credits and titles
3	Monk at the therapy session with his psychologist	3	Derviş at the therapy session with his psychologist
4	Assassination attempt & the murder of a security guard	4	Assassination attempt & the murder of a security guard
5	Calling on Monk	5	Calling on Derviş
6	Monk meets Captain Stottlemeyer and witnesses	6	Derviş meets Izzet Komiser and witnesses
7	Interviewing witnesses	7	Interviewing witnesses
8	Crime scene investigation	8	Crime scene investigation
N/A		A1	Hülya with her mother and son at home
9	Gathering evidence	9	Gathering evidence
10	Gathering evidence	10	Gathering evidence
11	Gathering evidence	11	Gathering evidence
12	Questioning witnesses, relatives, friends, and others	12	Questioning witnesses, relatives, friends, and others
13	The murder of a campaign worker	13	The murder of a campaign worker
14	Crime scene investigation	14	Crime scene investigation
15	Monk preparing food at home as he gets the recipe from Benjy	15	Derviş preparing food at home as he gets the recipe from Yusuf
N/A		A2	Hülya getting ready for her date at home as she talks to her son
16	Sharona on her date	16	Hülya on her date
17	Monk feels suspicious about something as he prepares food and watches TV at home	17	Derviş feels suspicious about something as he prepares food and watches TV at home
18	Monk joins Sharona and her date in the restaurant and ruins the night	18	Derviş joins Sharona and her date in the restaurant and ruins the night
19	Frustrated, Sharona quits the job	19	Frustrated, Hülya quits the job
20	Monk returns home depressed and thinks of the murder of his wife	20	Derviş returns home depressed and thinks of the murder of his wife
21	Captain Stottlemeyer discovers some of the connections that Monk has already pointed out	21	Izzet Komiser discovers some of the connections that Derviş has already pointed out
22	Having heard about Sharona's resignation and Monk's disappearance, Deputy Mayor visits Sharona at her home to persuade her to return and find Monk. She accepts his request on the condition that he owes her a big favor when the time comes.	22	Having heard about Hülya's resignation and Derviş's disappearance, Izzet Komiser visits Hülya at her home to persuade her to return and find Derviş. She accepts his request on the condition that he owes her a big favor when the time comes.
23	Sharona returns to her job and finds Monk	23	Hülya returns to her job and finds Derviş
24	Sharona and Monk at Monk's home discussing the case	24	Hülya and Derviş at Derviş's home discussing the case
25	Someone tries to kill Monk	25	Someone tries to kill Derviş

Sc. #	MONK	Sc. #	GALIP DERVIŞ
26	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects	26	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects
27	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects	27	Visiting & questioning witnesses and suspects
28	Monk finds the right suspect but causes him to escape accidentally because of his fear of height	28	Derviş finds the right suspect but causes him to escape accidentally because of his fear of height
29	Monk and Sharona at the site where Monk's wife was killed - Monk finally solves the case.	29	Derviş and Hülya at the site where Derviş's wife was killed - Derviş finally solves the case.
30	Sharona gives Deputy Mayor a visit at his home to ask him to pay back her favor by convincing Stottlemeyer to give Monk a chance.	30	Hülya gives Izzet Komiser a visit at his office to ask him to pay back her favor by giving Derviş a chance.
31	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive	31	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive
32	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive	32	Resolution of crime and revelation of motive
33	Compliments	33	Compliments
34	Monk at the therapy session with his psychologist	34	Derviş at the therapy session with his psychologist
35	Closing	35	Closing
36	Credits and titles	36	Credits and titles

Table 7 – The Narrative Structure of the Pilot Episode of *Monk/Galip Derviş*

Figure 36 – A Scene-by-Scene Distribution of the Extensions and Reductions in the Pilot Episode(s) of *Monk/Galip Derviş.*

| Figure 37 – The Deputy Mayor | Figure 38 – Captain Stottlemeyer |

The first segment under discussion in Scene 5 of *Monk* (0:10:43-0:11:08)

narrates the Deputy Mayor's unexpected visit to Captain Stottlemeyer (Figure 37).

Surprised by this visit, Captain greets him with a casual language, as seen in the first

line of the dialog below. However, upon hearing the passing of the bodyguard,

Captain senses the severity of the situation and sits on the window ledge, crossing his

arms (Figure 38). After listening to the Deputy Mayor's further remarks on the case

and the burden on the police, Captain finally explodes and yells at him, saying that he

is not an idiot and that he has already mobilized his whole team. The Deputy Mayor,

however, negates him and reveals that the Mayor wants him to include Monk in the

investigation, as well (see the transcriptions below).

Captain: Oh, Sheldon Burger, who let you off your leash?
Deputy Mayor: I just came from the hospital. Bodyguard didn't make it… Mayor is
on his way back from Sacramento… Look, I don't have to tell you, Captain. We're on
a bus to hell.
Captain: I understand.
Deputy Mayor: If we don't slam dunk this thing, it's gonna look like we're not trying.
Captain: I'm not an idiot, Sheldon. {*yells*}… I've got every available man on the
case.
Deputy Mayor: No, you don't. Mayor wants you to bring in your old friend.
Captain: Monk? {*befuddled*}

Izzet Komiser: Welcome, my Chief! Welcome. Please have my seat… How are **you**,
my Sir?

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Deputy Mayor: How can I be, Izzet? The President ordered my dear Mayor that the killer should be identified and arrested as soon as possible.
Izzet Komiser: Did we lose the bodyguard?
Tea server: Ah, did we? {*Izzet Komiser gives her a bad look for her improper attitude*}
Deputy Mayor: {*looking at Izzet Komiser*}Yes, at the hospital, unfortunately.
Izzet Komiser: May he rest in peace.
Tea server: May he rest in peace.
Izzet Komiser: Dear, stop it! {*looking at the tea server*}
Deputy Mayor: The Minister arrived in Istanbul hastily. He is currently in a meeting with the Mayor. We are on the bus to hell. At this moment, the killer is walking on these streets freely.
Izzet Komiser: My team is working on the case. I mobilized the whole department.
Deputy Mayor: Not enough! Our dear Mayor wants you to include your old friend in the investigation, too.
Izzet Komiser: What? Derviş?

A major divergence in the Turkish adaptation occurs at the beginning of the segment when the Deputy Mayor enters Izzet Komiser's room. As opposed to Captain Stottlemeyer's casual greeting and attitude, Izzet Komiser welcomes the Deputy Mayor with great respect and dignity, which manifests itself first and foremost in the visual track. As seen in Figures 39 and 40, Izzet Komiser offers the chief his own seat while he stands at attention next to the desk and buttons up his jacket, which signifies his deference for the Deputy Mayor's authority.

Figure 39 – Izzet Komiser buttons up his jacket   Figure 40 – Izzet Komiser offers his seat

Similarly, the way the dialog builds up in the segment gives significant clues regarding the increased power distance between the characters. As shown in the transcription above, Izzet Komiser uses an honorific form of language when speaking to the Deputy Mayor, such as the phrase "my Chief," which underscores the hierarchical relationship between the two. Moreover, he prefers to use the formal "you" pronoun when addressing the Deputy Mayor. This linguistic distinction, also known as the T/V distinction corresponding to *tu/vous* in French, is enforced in Turkish as well as in many other languages to determine and emphasize the social distance – the degrees of deference and intimacy – between speakers and hearers. While the singular you (T - *tu*, *sen*) describes familiarity and closeness, the plural you pronoun (V – *vous*, *siz*) describes formality. Izzet Komiser's preference for the formal you pronoun, in this regard, indicates the deference he feels toward the Deputy Mayor.

Figure 41 – Tea server   Figure 42 – Izzet Komiser's reaction

Another significant way the increased power asymmetries between superiors and subordinates manifest themselves in the Turkish adaptation is the difference seen in Izzet Komiser's attitude towards the Deputy Mayor and the tea server. Added as a new character to the Turkish adaptation, the tea server (Figure 41) represents a common theme seen in most public offices in Turkey. Often having no other main

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duties but serving tea to the employees of an office, these blue-collar workers are

often discriminated against and stereotyped as "chatterboxes" in the office. As a

matter of fact, the tea server added to the cast in *Galip Derviş* is also introduced to the

viewers for the first time in this scene and depicted as a "chatterbox" snooping into

all conversations. As a result, when she first intervenes in the conversation between

the Deputy Mayor and Izzet Komiser, Izzet Komiser gives her a bad look for her

supposed improper attitude (see Figure 42). When she repeats the same attitude in a

few seconds later, Izzet Komiser, this time, reprimands her verbally and sends her out

of the room with a quick hand movement (Figure 43). In both of these moments, it

becomes visible that Izzet Komiser shifts to a rather casual style on the grounds of his

superior position over the tea server and then quickly shifts back to his formal attitude

towards the Deputy Mayor.[53]

Figure 43 – Izzet Komiser's verbal reaction   Figure 44 – The lieutenant

It is also noteworthy that the lieutenant in the same scene is seen as standing

at attention throughout the whole segment presumably because he has two superiors

[53] From an intersectional perspective, the gender of the tea server may also be a critical factor in the shaping of the relationship between Izzet Komiser and the tea server. However, I do not get into that discussion here since the reproduction of gender regime in television format adaptations has already been discussed in Chapter 5. Also, it is common to see male tea server in both real and fictional life, as well. As a matter of fact, the Turkish remake of *Yes, Minister* features a male tea server who is added to the show as a new character and depicted in a very similar fashion as a chatterbox.

present in the room (see Figures 43 and 44). This image illuminates once again how the prevailing rigid boundaries between different levels of organizational hierarchies are reproduced during cultural adaptation processes.

The next scene I analyze (Scene 8) opens with Monk (Derviş) standing at a crime scene and investigating the surrounding area by using his idiosyncratic body movements under others' confused glances. After a while, Monk (Derviş) discovers a clue, a twisted drawstring, and turns to Captain Stottlemeyer (Izzet Komiser) to reveal the details of his discovery. He explains that it is often used in the Special Forces to steady shots, which the Chief and others immediately approve of. Looking at the height of the drawstring, Monk (Derviş) decides to run a quick experiment with the clue he has found, and asks Captain Stottlemeyer (Izzet Komiser) to grab a stick that lies on the floor and to hold it like a rifle, which violates, at least from a Turkish cultural standpoint, the power relation between the two. Although both Monk and Derviş use a polite form of language when making such a request (almost a command) from their chief, there appears to be an extra effort in the Turkish version to emphasize the anomaly in such a hierarchically upward request as a result of the culturally different reading of this segment.

First, the tailoring of the scene to Turkish television is done more overtly in the visual and verbal tracks. One of the most striking divergences in the verbal track of this conversation is the number of times Monk and Derviş use the word "Captain," and its Turkish equivalent "Chief."

Monk: Captain, could you grab this?
It'll just take a minute.
…
Monk: How tall are you?

…
Monk: No, really.

Galip Derviş: Just a second, Chief.
Could you grab this?
…
Galip Derviş: How tall are you, Chief?
…
Galip Derviş: Really, how tall are you, Chief?

As is seen in the transcriptions, Galip Derviş's frequent use of the word "Chief " at the end of each statement reminds the audience that he is talking to his boss whereas his questions seem to challenge and tarnish the chief 's superior position. This linguistic divergence in the number of times the characters use honorific forms of address can be understood more clearly if Galip Derviş's speech is analyzed in light of the superior – subordinate discourse in Turkish language. Turkish is a language that contains a lot of formulaic devices such as honorific forms of address. Depending on the discourse, these honorific forms of address are sometimes used so excursively that they do not contribute directly to the meaning at the sentence level, but at the discourse level.

What I mean by this is that their frequent use in consecutive utterances causes them to lose their primary meaning and function, which is to capture the attention of the addressee before starting a conversation. Instead, they turn into a signal word that continuously alerts listeners, and even the speaker himself/herself, about the hierarchical relationship between the interlocutors. This linguistic adjustment in the Turkish version of *Monk* constitutes a perfect example of the localization process at the linguistic level.

Figure 45 – Captain Stottlemeyer   Figure 46 – Izzet Komiser

Localization of this particular scene in terms of power relations becomes even more overt at the level of visual track when Monk (Derviş) asks Captain Stottlemeyer (Izzet Komiser) to grab the stick from the ground. While Captain Stottlemeyer does what Monk says and picks the stick from the ground by himself (Figure 45), Izzet Komiser, in the Turkish version, indirectly dismisses Derviş's culturally "inappropriate" request by asking the lieutenant standing on the side to grab the stick for him. More importantly, he does so with a quick hand move rather than verbally, which further highlights his authoritative stance over others (Figure 46). Furthermore, the Turkish lieutenant, besides grabbing the stick for his boss, also stands on the side throughout the whole scene and takes notes while Izzet Komiser talks. All these visual additions and adjustments highlight the hierarchical superiority of the chief in the Turkish context, as opposed to Captain Stottlemeyer's relatively "egalitarian" stance.

The last but not the least of localization examples occur at the level of scoring in this scene. During the time Monk (Derviş) investigates the surrounding area at the beginning of the scene, the viewer, in both versions, hears a similar musical cue that transmits the emotive state of suspense. Both cues aim to amplify the visually intended message by conforming to the mysterious and suspenseful movements of the

protagonist. When Monk (Derviş) discovers the clue and turns to Captain Stottlemeyer (Izzet Komiser) to explain his discovery, both cues arrive at their climax and then cease. With the subsequent musical silence in the narrative structure, Monk (Derviş) reveals the details of his discovery. However, the musical cue in the two versions diverge significantly when Monk (Derviş) asks Captain Stottlemeyer (Izzet Komiser) to grab the stick. In the American version, the whole conversation between Monk and Captain Stottlemeyer happens without a cue in the background whereas in the Turkish version, the viewer starts to hear a comedic musical cue at the very moment when Galip Derviş asks Izzet Komiser to grab the stick.

The continued musical proximity mediation in the sequence is especially needed in the Turkish version because, after Izzet Komiser holds the stick like a rifle, Galip Derviş uses him like an assistant (or figurant) and asks him questions about his height to make some insightful connections between the height of the drawstring and that of Izzet Komiser. Furthermore, Izzet Komiser is also ridiculed when Galip Derviş understands that the Captain lies about his height in his first answer.

Although the Turkish version follows the American version closely in this sequence, the amplified depictions of these moments as relatively more comedic situations with the help of comedic music in the Turkish version reveal one of the subliminal ways the local culture mediates any violations of power relations, and perpetuates the related ideologies within such narratives. In alignment with other linguistic and visual adjustments mentioned above, the comedic score mitigates the protagonist's violation of power relations, and induces Turkish viewers to perceive

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the sequence as more of a comic situation to be laughed at than a real violation of power relations to be taken seriously.

It is crucial to note here that this does not necessarily mean Monk, in the American version, seriously aims to challenge and tarnish Captain Stottlemeyer's authority, and that there is no humor at all. On the contrary, the American version also provides a sense of humor when Captain Stottlemeyer lies about his height. However, what is striking from a multimodal perspective is how meticulously the producers apply changes to all verbal, visual and musical tracks simultaneously, which re-orients the humor that exceeds the limits of existing power relations in Turkish culture.

In what follows I look at the implications of Turkey's high-power distance culture in the education system and analyze how that culture generates and increases power asymmetries between superiors and subordinates at school.

Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri: Norms of Authority in Education

Being a state-controlled institution and the subject of tight regulation and oversight, the education system in Turkey is another domain of life in which rigid boundaries between levels of organizational hierarchies prevail. Starting from the ministry level down to the schools, the traditional norm of showing deference for superiors plays a determinant role in the construction student-teacher and teacher-administrator relationships and manifests itself in the form of specific dress codes, grooming requirements, and professional attitudes such as punctuality. Representing the highest authority in the school setting, principals, in particular, assume primary

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responsibility for implementing these established norms and regulations and taking measures if necessary.

As a teen drama series featuring four high school students, *Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri* offers critical examples showing the divergent school cultures between the United States and Turkey. Especially the scenes A15, A18 and A42 that portray the relationship between the school principal and the two culturally deviant main characters, Efe and Mine, epitomize the increased power asymmetry between school officials and students (see Table 9 and Figure 47). Made totally from scratch, these scenes shed light on how the norms of authority and the hierarchical order prevalent in the society are reproduced and perpetuated during the adaptation of the format.

From a quantitative standpoint, what is most striking about this particular adaptation is the number of new scenes (and side stories) added to the remake. With a total number of 48 additional scenes, the Turkish producers make 70.20% (0:51:02) of the adaptation from scratch (see Figure 48, color-coded in the same way as Figure 8). Including the expansions and extension made to the preexisting scenes, the proportion of the total additional minutes (0:56:58) to the total length of the remake (1:12:42) reaches 78.36%. The proportion of the deleted and shrunk scenes (0:28:03) to the total length of the American version (0:43:47), on the other hand, is 64.07%. Given this peculiarity in terms of the amount of new content added to the remake, the temporal data of the three scenes under discussion (duration 0:04:18 – 5.91% of the total length of the remake) do not yield meaningful outcomes for the analysis.

However, as mentioned above, their culturally specific content offers critical insight

into the high power distance culture of the home country.

Dawson's Creek	Kavak Yelleri
Dawson (a film addict)	Deniz
Joey (best friends with Dawson since childhood)	Aslı
Pacey (best friends with Dawson and Aslı)	Efe
Mine (She moves into town and becomes friends with the three)	Jen

Table 8 – Comparison of Characters in *Dawson's Creek* and *Kavak Yelleri*

Sc. #	DAWSON'S CREEK	Sc. #	KAVAK YELLERI
1	In Dawson's room, Dawson and Joey talk about their relationship.		**DELETED**
		3a	Deniz, Aslı and Efe are talking about exams and life on a pier.
2	Credits and titles	2	Credits and titles
3	As Dawson, Joey and Pacey make an amateur movie on a pier, Jen arrives. Dawson develops a crush on her at first sight.		**DIVIDED INTO TWO SCENES and SCATTERED (i.e., 3a and 3b)**
		A1	Mine is arriving in town in her grandparents' car.
		3b	Deniz, Aslı and Efe see Mine arriving in her grandparents' house and Deniz develops a crush on her.
		A2	A local shopkeeper tries to convince Aslı's father to steal some ancient tiles from the town's mosque.
4	Dawson and Pacey go to Dawson's house and find Dawson's parents making out.		**DELETED**
		A3	Deniz, Aslı and Efe are studying in Deniz's room.
		A4	Aslı sees Mine having a quarrel on the phone.
		A5	When Efe arrives at home, he has a bitter quarrel with his father.
		A6	Deniz watches a movie with his parents.
5	Joey arrives home.	5	Aslı arrives home.
		A7	Aslı's father steals the tiles from the mosque.
		A8	The four teenagers are shown in their rooms in a series of shots.
		A9	Aslı has her breakfast & has a conversation with her mom about life.
		A10	Efe and Deniz talk about Efe's problems at home.
		A11	Aslı's sister tells her father that there are police outside the mosque.
		A12	Aslı and Deniz see the police and try to find out about the incident.
		A13	Efe has a tattoo to make himself ineligible to apply for the police academy.
		A14	Aslı's father leaves the house in panic.
6	Dawson and Pacey meet Tamara Jacobs, a beautiful middle-aged woman. Pacey develops a crush on her at first sight.	6	Efe runs into Gönül, a beautiful middle-aged woman, on the street and develops a crush on her immediately.
		A15	After getting a tattoo, Efe finally arrives at school.
		A16	Aslı's father goes to see his friend who would buy the tiles.
		A17	Seeing Deniz and Efe talk about Mine, Aslı gets frustrated.
		A18	The principal talks to Mine about the school culture in Turkey.
		A19	Mine and her grandma has a conversation about Mine's lifestyle.
		A20	Aslı's father forces the middleman to pay him the money.
		A21	Efe finds out that Gönül is their new teacher. Mine arrives in class.

Sc. #	*DAWSON'S CREEK*	Sc. #	*KAVAK YELLERI*
		A22	Aslı's father counts the money and leaves.
7	Dawson sees Jen sitting on the pier and joins her and later invites her to his room to show his studio.		**DELETED**
8	Dawson shows Jen his studio. After she leaves, Joey comes.		**DELETED**
9	Before leaving for school, Jen visits her sick grandpa.		**DELETED**
10	Jen's grandma serves her breakfast and tells Jen to do the prayer, which Jen rejects and eventually reveals that she is an atheist.		**DELETED**
11	Jen meets Dawson and finds out that they both have the same class.		**DELETED**
12	Pacey finds out that Tamara is his new English teacher.		**DELETED**
13	Jen and Joey sit next to each other in another class.		**DELETED**
14	Dawson has a conversation with the film professor about his class.		**DELETED**
15	Jen asks Joey if she and Dawson are into each other.		**DELETED**
16	Dawson, Joey and Jen talk in the school cafeteria.		**DELETED**
17	Pacey finds out that Tamara will go out to see a movie that night.		**DELETED**
18	Pacey tells Dawson about Tamara and that they should also go to the movie theater that night. He also tells Dawson to invite Jen.	18	Efe encourages Deniz to invite Mine to the movies and tells that Aslı would join them, too.
		A23	Aslı's father gives the money to his wife so that she can pay the rent.
		A24	Mine asks Deniz and Efe about their relationship with Aslı.
		A25	Deniz and Efe talk about Deniz's crush on Mine.
		A26	Two other guys mess with Aslı about Deniz's interest in Mine.
		A27	Deniz and Efe discuss about the movie night.
		20a	Mine quarrels with her grandma about their plan to see a movie.
19	Dawson invites Joey to the movie, too, thinking that Jen would feel weird going out with two guys.	19	Deniz invites Aslı to the movie, too, thinking that Mine would feel weird going out with two guys.
20	Jen tells her grandma about the movie night. Her grandma lets her go provided that she goes to the church on Sunday, which Jen declines.		**DIVIDED INTO TWO SCENES and SCATTERED (i.e., 20a and 20b)**
		A28	Mine's grandma tries to persuade her husband that they should let Mine go to the movie that night.
		20b	Mine's grandma finally lets Mine go to the movies provided that she wears a longer-length skirt to the school.
		A29	Efe has a bitter quarrel with his father after showing him his tattoo.
21	Dawson has a conversation with his father about sex and condoms.		**DELETED**
22	Joey's sister prepares and encourages her for the movie night.	22	Aslı's sister prepares and encourages her for the movie night.
		A30	Aslı, Efe and Deniz walk to Mine's house.
		A31	Aslı, Efe and Deniz get Mine from her house.

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Sc. #	DAWSON'S CREEK	Sc. #	KAVAK YELLERI
23	Dawson, Joey, Jen and Pacey walk to the movie theater.	23	Deniz, Aslı, Mine and Efe walk to the movie theater.
24	The movie night is ruined due to Dawson and Joey's quarrel over his crush on Jen.	24	The movie night is ruined due to Deniz and Aslı's quarrel over his crush on Mine.
25	Pacey finds out that Tamara is with another man in the theater and ends up in a fight with her date.		**DELETED**
26	Dawson yells at Joey for her hostile behavior towards Jen.	26	Deniz yells at Aslı for her hostile behavior towards Mine.
		A32	Aslı cries on the pier.
27	Dawson and Jen express their feelings to each other.	27	Deniz apologizes for what happened at the cinema.
28	Pacey sees Tamara on the pier & accuse her of playing with him.	28	In his dream, Efe sees Gönül on the pier & tells her about his love.
		A33	Aslı discovers the bag with the tiles in the house.
		A34	Efe and Deniz walk to Aslı's house to pick her up.
		A35	The middleman asks Aslı's father to bring the tiles.
		A36	Efe and Deniz catch Aslı with the bag in front of the police station and they take her to a secret place to find out more about the bag.
		A37	Aslı's father discovers that the bag is gone and panics.
		A38	Aslı tells the two guys about her discovery, and they decide to take the tiles back to the mosque at night.
		A39	Aslı's father goes to the school to check if Aslı is there.
		A40	Efe sees his brother as he takes some food to Deniz & Aslı.
		A41	Efe and Deniz try to reassure Aslı that they will resolve the issue.
		A42	Aslı's father visits the Principal in his office and asks where Aslı is.
		A43	Deniz's mother finds out that he has skipped the school.
		A44	Aslı's father meets the buyers and the middleman and tells the news.
		A45	Deniz's parent try to figure out where Deniz could be.
		A46	Deniz, Efe and Aslı leave their hiding place for the mosque.
		A47	Deniz's parents stop by Efe's parents' house to see if Deniz is there.
		A48	As Aslı and his friends try to break into the mosque, the police, including Efe's brother, catch them in the act.
29	Dawson finds Joey in his room & the two apologize from each other.		**DELETED**

Table 9 – The Narrative Structure of the Pilot Episode of *Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri*

Figure 47 – A Graphic Comparison of the Narrative Structures of *Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri.*

Figure 48 – A Scene-by-Scene Distribution of the Extensions and Reductions in the Pilot Episode(s) of *Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri*

The segment I analyze in Scene A15 (0:24:07-0:25:15) concerns the Efe (Pacey) character, who is generally depicted as a trouble maker in both versions of the show. The source of his problems in the Turkish remake, however, is discussed more in-depth and extended over his family life, including the conflicts he experiences with his father (Salih) over his future. Being a retired police officer himself and having managed to convince his elder son to become a police officer, Salih forces Efe to apply for the police academy (Scene A5; 0:10:22-0:12:17). When Efe says he has no interest in the job, Salih rebukes him harshly and even resorts to physical violence by hitting Efe on the head. Efe escapes this violent encounter only after his brother and mother step in and calm down Salih.

This earlier additional scene in the Turkish version, which can be seen as a manifestation of the high power distance culture in the family life, sets a background to a whole new side story related to Efe's career. In Scene A10 (0:17:44-0:18:54), Efe decides to have a tattoo, which he thinks would make him ineligible to apply for the police academy. So, he skips his morning classes and goes to see a friend of his who is a tattoo artist. In Scene 13 (0:22:06-0:22:27), viewers see him getting a tattoo in pain but still feeling happy for finding a way to escape from his father's will.

Figure 49 – The school principal (I)   Figure 50 – The school principal (II)

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Efe reappears at the school in Scene 15 (0:24:07-0:25:43), which is where the culturally specific power asymmetries in the education system of Turkey come into the picture. He first meets Deniz and Aslı in the school yard. Despite their curiosity about where he has been, Efe leaves their questions unanswered and, with the ringing of the school bell, he suggests to go inside. However, as they climb the stairs, the school principal comes out to check on the students and sees Efe. Knowing that he has skipped the morning classes, the principal calls him authoritatively and starts questioning his physical appearance and personal attitude (see Figures 49 and 50).

Efe: Hi youth! What's up?
Aslı: Speak of the devil and in he walks. Where have you been, Efe?
Efe: Your words cannot upset me, my dear. I am on cloud nine, today.
Deniz: He is being mysterious again.
Aslı: Exactly, tell us what's going on.
Efe: It is a surprise. I'll tell you later, my dear. Don't worry.
{*The school bell rings*}
Efe: Let's go inside!
{*As they climb the stairs, Efe sees the Principal*}
Efe: Oh my! I am screwed now. {*trying to hide behind Deniz and Aslı*}
Principal: Come, come, come over here! Look at yourself! What is this mess? Your shirt is not tucked in your pants! Your tie is half way your neck! Come on, tuck that in! {*looking at the other students*} Come on, don't idle around! {*looking at Efe again*} Efe! I haven't forgotten it. Go and get a tardy slip.
Efe: Sir, please forgive me this time. There is an exam today, and I studied for it all night long. I couldn't sleep. I can apologize to my teacher.
Efe: Look at that. The girl we saw yesterday.

As seen in the dialog above, a major point that the principal stresses in his talk with Efe is related to the dress code. Adhering to the traditional norms that dictate a relationship between people's attire and the degree of respect they show for their superiors, the principal remonstrates him for his messy appearance and orders him to tidy himself up. Especially his commanding gesture of holding his hands behind the back and authoritative communicative style during the interaction signify his

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authority over Efe. In response to the principal's scolding, Efe shifts to an apologetic mode and, similar to the cases of Ergun Yurdakul and Izzet Komiser in the previous two adaptations, he tries to button up his (denim) jacket in the face of the principal's authority (see Figures 51 and 52 below). Later on, the principal also directs Efe to get a tardy slip, from which he can escape only by catching the principal off guard as he turns his look at Mine's arrival at the school.

Figure 51 – Efe is trying to button up his jacket   Figure 52 – Efe buttons up his jacket

What is problematic here from an analytical standpoint is not the existence of a dress code nor the principal's directive for Efe to get a tardy slip. As a matter of fact, in many cultures today, public schools enforce specific dress codes in the name of providing a more "equal" school environment for their students and make use of tardy slips to track their students' attendance. What is of greater concern, however, is the underpinning discriminatory power discourse that is taken for granted and leveraged for the maintenance of these school regulations and, more importantly, its reproduction through television as part of a cultural adaptation process. Reproducing the rigid boundaries between agents at different levels of the education system, this power discourse becomes a reflection of the deeper authoritarian culture on an everyday scale and thus deserves attention.

Another scene that illustrates the same increased authority of the principal in the remake is Scene 18. This scene focuses on the Mine character, who was raised in Germany as part of a diasporic Turkish family. Growing up straddled between two cultures, she starts experiencing some conflicts with her parents and therefore is sent to Turkey to live with her grandparents in the hope that she can be culturally "corrected." Her new school life and the tense relationship she has with her grandparents at home and the principal at the school from the first day constitute the core of this side story.

Figure 53 – Mine and her grandma visit the principal   Figure 54 – Mine's polished nails

The first major element that stands out in the opening segment of the scene under discussion is the *mise-en-scene*. As seen in Figure 53 above, despite her older age, Mine's grandmother is shown standing up waiting for the principal to sit down first. Being a character representing a typical Turkish woman who embraces and embodies Turkish cultural norms and values, her behavior is read as a sign of her deference for the principal's authority and the institution he represents. She sits on the chair only after the principal signals her with a hand movement that she may sit. In the meanwhile, Mine is shown already sitting on her chair cross-legged, signifying her culturally dissonant character. The dialog between the three transpires as follows:

Principal: The young ones usually adapt to a new environment in a short span of time. Of course, that said, our dear student may get a little bored after living in a big city, especially coming from Germany. That may of course pose some challenges for her in her classes.

Grandma: Hopefully she works hard and catches up with her peers.

Principal: Ma'am, education does not only serve as a means of learning facts. As you know, Turkish kids in Germany are often raised without learning their language. Then, upon returning to their home country, they feel like a fish out of water – that is in terms of both morality and discipline. {*looking at Mine*} They act different in every respect, right?

Mine: I speak Turkish, and I understood everything you said.

Principal: Your pronunciation is indeed upright {*speaking sarcastically*}

{*As the camera shows Mine's polished nails (see Figure 54), the principal continues to speak with a stricter tone.*}

Principal: Mine, my dear, there are certain rules that you need to understand before going into a class. {*He takes out a bottle of acetone and some cotton for her to clean her polished nails*}.

As seen above, the focus of the conversation in the scene is the norms, rules and regulations that govern the school culture in Turkey. Having roots in the authoritarian past of the country, this strict context in the education system leaves students with almost no room for deviation from standards. However, as mentioned earlier, what is of concern from a critical standpoint is not the existence of such rules and regulations (as they can be seen as an outcome of divergent cultural understandings) but rather the hierarchical structures that such authoritarian context entails. In other words, the problem is the fact that the enforcement of such rules creates and legitimizes the need to have people with stronger authority over others for the sake of maintaining the established order, as well as the constant reproduction of that order through the media.

Figure 55 – Mine is back to the Principal's office (I)

Figure 56 – Mine is back to the Principal's office (II)

Figure 57 – Mine is back to the Principal's office (III)

The tension between the principal and Mine in the pilot episode culminates in the opening segment of another additional scene in the Turkish format (Scene A42 – 1:04:25-1:05:15) in which the principal is shown questioning Mine for her polished nails. Particularly the *mise-en-scene* in this segment shows significant divergence compared to Scene 18, as Mine no more sits in the chair but stands at attention before the principal sitting in his seat (see Figures 55, 56 and 57). This image reinforces the authority of the principal once again as well as Mine's conformity to it. Then, the camera cuts to a close-up shot of Mine's still polished nails, which reveals the reason why she is back to the principal's office. In the absence of Mine's grandmother, the principal starts talking to her in a more direct way and reminds her of the rules and expectations at the school:

Principal: I have two types of first aid kit. One has gauze and iodize tincture in it for students who fall in the yard and injure themselves, and the second one has, as you already know, acetone and cotton for those who disobey and fall into my room.
Mine: I am having difficulty in adapting to my new life. Don't come down on me.
Principal: If you are experiencing such difficulties, then try making friends.
Mine: Why you think I haven't. I did, and we were together all night long.
Principal: All night long? Very good, very good! {*speaking sarcastically*}So, tell me who those friends are that you spent the whole night with?
Mine: There is Aslı, as well as Efe and Deniz.
Principal: Does you grandma know about it?
Mine: Of course, she does.
Principal: How about your polished nails? Does she know about that, as well?
Mine: Hmm, OK, I am going to clean them. Please don't tell her.

What is significant in the conversation is that the principal uses his authority not only to enforce school rules and regulations but also Mine's friend relationships out-of-school and her family life. Although Mine initially attempts to confront his authority, she is obliged to conform when he implies that he would let her grandmother know about her polished nails.

| Figure 58 – Aslı's father visits the school principal (I) | Figure 59 – Aslı's father visits the school principal (II) | Figure 60 – Aslı's father visits the school principal (III) |

Their conversation is interrupted by the sudden arrival of Aslı's father in the room, looking for his daughter. What is important concerning this segment is that while the father is shown wearing a flat cap in the first frame (Figure 58), the later shots show him without a cap (Figure 59) and holding it next to his chest (Figure 60), which is a typical way of expressing one's respect for a superior in the Turkish culture.

Overall, even though these cultural elements added to the Turkish remake may seem to be trivial when looked at individually, their sum becomes significant in showing how the adaptation of television formats can turn into a means of maintaining the status quo in a country. This becomes a social problem worthy of scholarly attention especially if the maintained status quo entails increased power asymmetries between different levels of hierarchical structures and requires the majority to pay homage to a privileged few.

Good Doctor/Mucize Doktor: Norms of Authority in Medicine

The final domain of life I analyze in terms of the reproduction of norms of authority through cultural adaptations is the medical field, which has its own inherent hierarchies in the way a hospital is organized among the various professions (orderlies, nurses, physician assistants, physicians, chief doctors, etc.). Although this hierarchical structure differs from those in previously discussed domains of life, particularly the state and the police, in that relationships in a hospital setting are often anchored by the medical knowledge and competency of the doctors and other medical personnel and not by what is ultimately the instruments of state violence and coercion (army, police), the prevailing norms of authority in hospitals still play a crucial role in the way interpersonal relationships are shaped. As in the other cases I analyzed, however, these norms are always culturally specific and experienced at varying degrees in different national settings.

Mucize Doktor is a unique example for analyzing these culturally specific norms of authority in the medical field because as an adaptation coming out of two distinct sources from two different countries (namely, South Korea and the United States) with different levels of power distance, it shows how the power dynamics is played out differently in three different national settings.54 Especially the comparison of the Korean and Turkish versions against the American version reveals significant divergences in terms of the degree of power asymmetry depicted between superiors

54 Due to this unique construction of the Turkish adaptation, I conduct a three-way comparison between the Korean, American and Turkish versions. However, because of the more marked cultural differences between the Turkish and American cultures in terms of power structures, I take the American version as my primary reference. This applies to the organization of the tables and the figures, as well.

and subordinates. On the other hand, while the divergences between the Korean and Turkish versions also indicate the existence of culturally specific power formations, these differences take place at a more minimal level due to the similar high power distance culture dominant in the two countries.

The particular scenes I put under the microscope in this format adaptation are K11 and K12, which contain significant examples of the tense hierarchical relationship between Dr. Ferman (Dr. Do Han in the Korean version) and his fellow (and the protagonist) Dr. Ali (Dr. Shi-on in the Korean version). Indicative of the strong power asymmetry in Korean and Turkish cultures, these scenes stand out as parts in the narrative where the power dynamics is played out at the most explicit and extreme level between Dr. Ferman/Dr. Do-han and Dr. Ali/Dr. Shi-on.[55][56] (see Table 11 and Figure 61). Tailored to a low-power discourse culture, the American version, on the other hand, includes neither of these scenes. While the relationship between Dr. Melendez (Dr. Do Han) and Dr. Shaun (Dr. Shi-on) also gets tense form time to time in other scenes due to the nature of the story, the scale of tension remains far below those in the Korean and Turkish versions.

In terms of the temporal aspects of the narrative structure, what is noteworthy is the duration of the particular scenes under discussion in proportion to the overall duration of each episode. As illustrated in Figure 62, in both Korean and Turkish

[55] It is the content of these two scenes that show high amounts of power clashes in the Korean and Turkish versions and their absence in the American remake that led me to analyze the second episode of the format, instead of the pilot.
[56] In this format adaptation, there are also various other scenes that picture the changing power relations between Dr. Ferman and his other fellows as well as other side characters (e.g., A2, A4, 6 and A7 – see Table 11 below); however, I confine my analysis to the above-mentioned two scenes due to space constraints.

versions, the scenes K11 and K12 occupy 17.71% (0:11:19) and 10.29% (0:12:18) of

the total duration of each show (1:03:54 and 1:59:32), respectively. This lumping

together of such hierarchically marked content in only two scenes among the total 35

in the Korean version and the total 54 in the Turkish version indicates the increased

significance given to these scenes and the establishment of the hierarchical

relationship between the two characters. As said, the American remake allocates no

time for these scenes and, more importantly, portrays a slightly softer version of the

tension between Dr. Do-han and Dr. Shi-on in general.

Good Doctor	*The Good Doctor*	*Mucize Doktor*
Dr. Shi-on (Protagonist)	Dr. Shaun	Dr. Ali
Dr. Woo-seok (Shi-on's family friend, and the President of the hospital)	Dr. Glassman	Dr. Adil
Dr. Do-han (Shi-on's boss)	Dr. Melendez	Dr. Ferman
Dr. Yoon-seo (fellow)	Dr. Browne	Dr. Nazlı
Dr. Jin-wook (fellow)	Dr. Kalu	Dr. Demir
Dr. Hyun-tae (the vice president, who wants Dr. Shi-on to fail his job so that Dr. Woo-seok is forced to resign his position as his guarantor.)	Dr. Andrews	Dr. Tanju
Dr. Chae-kyung (the head of the hospital's planning board and also Dr. Do-han's fiancée; she is also a good friend of Dr. Glassman.)	Dr. Preston	Dr. Beriz
Dr. Yeo-won (Dr. Chae-kyung's step mother, and also the Chief Director of the hospital)	Dr. Aori	Dr. Kıvılcım

Table 10 – Comparison of Characters in *Good Doctor, The Good Doctor* and *Mucize Doktor*

Sc. #	GOOD DOCTOR / THE GOOD DOCTOR	Sc. #	MUCIZE DOKTOR
1	The episode starts with a brief recap of the first episode.		DELETED
2	Dr. Shaun gets ready for the day.		COMES LATER (i.e., 2)
3	Credits and titles	3	Credits and titles
		A1	Resolution of the final scene of episode 1
		A2	Dr. Ferman is shown doing a surgery. He asks where Dr. Nazlı is.
		A3	Dr. Adil comforts Dr. Ali about some of his failures in Episode 1.
		A4	Dr. Ferman puts Dr. Nazlı under probation for helping Dr. Ali.
		2	Dr. Adil offers Dr. Ali that he can stay with him.
		A5	Dr. Demir surprises Dr. Nazlı with a romantic breakfast.
4	Dr. Shaun joins Dr. Melendez and his fellows late. Then, they are called to the E.R. for an urgent case.		DELETED
5	In the ER, Dr. Melendez and his fellow doctors examine a middle-aged woman's CT scan. Dr. Shaun soon diagnoses that she has a malignant tumor and reveals it to the patient rather bluntly.	5	Dr. Ali arrives at the hospital late, as Dr. Ferman and his fellows examine a middle-aged woman's CT scan. Dr. Ali soon diagnoses that she has a malignant tumor and reveals it to her rather bluntly.
6	Outside the ER, Dr. Melendez warns Dr. Shaun that his honesty scares patients. He gives Dr. Shaun scut work for the day.	6a	DIVIDED INTO TWO SCENES (i.e., 6a and 6b) Outside the patient's room, Dr. Ferman warns Dr. Ali that his honesty scares patients. He sends Dr. Ali to the fellows' room.
K5	*Dr. Do-Han and his fellows, including Dr. Shi-on, visit a young kid. As the group leaves, Dr. Shi-on sees another young patient vomiting and feel suspicious and examines him, although it is Dr. Ko's patient. When Dr. Do-Han sees this, he calls Dr. Shi-on outside.*	K5	*As Dr. Ali walks to the fellows' room, he sees a little boy lying in his bed and vomiting, and feels suspicious and examines him.*
7	As Dr. Shaun orders unnecessary tests for minor cases.		COMES LATER (i.e., 7)
8	Dr. Glassman sees Dr. Shaun doing scut work and talks to him.		COMES LATER (i.e., 8)
9	Dr. Browne tells the middle-aged female patient that they will run a laparotomy to expose the tumor, and promises that she'll be alright.	9	Dr. Nazlı tells the middle-aged female patient that they will run a laparotomy to expose the tumor, and promises that she'll be alright.
10	Dr. Kalu warns Dr. Browne that she should not make promises.	10	Dr. Demir warns Dr. Nazlı that she should not make such promises.
11	Dr. Andrews complains Dr. Melendez about Dr. Shaun's unnecessary tests.		COMES LATER (i.e., 11)
12	As Dr. Shaun is about to order another significant test for a little girl with a tummy ache, Dr. Melendez shows up and stops him. He also assigns one of the nurses as Dr. Shaun's supervisor for the day.		DIVIDED INTO TWO SCENES AND SCATTERED (i.e., 12 a and 12b)
K6	*Dr. Do-Han reprimands Dr. Shi-on for examining another doctor's patient and then asks the nurse to call Dr. Ko.*	K6	*Dr. Ferman sees Dr. Ali examining the little boy & reprimands him.*
13	Dr. Glassman talks to Dr. Melendez about Dr. Shaun.		DELETED

Sc. #	*GOOD DOCTOR / THE GOOD DOCTOR*	Sc. #	*MUCIZE DOKTOR*
14	Dr. Shaun asks Dr. Browne why some people use sarcasm.		**COMES LATER (i.e., 14)**
15	Dr. Melendez and his fellow doctors start the surgery to remove the tumor.	15	Dr. Ferman and his fellow doctors start the surgery to remove the tumor. Upon discovering that the tumor is bigger than they expected, and not visible, Dr. Nazlı suggests that they remove the left kidney.
K10	*Still feeling suspicious, Dr. Shi-on goes back to the little kid's room. Upon finding out that Dr. Ko will arrive in two hours, Dr. Shi-on calls out for an urgent surgery.*	K10	*As Dr. Ferman and his team are in the O.R., Dr. Ali discovers that the kid has a high fever and calls out for an urgent surgery.*
16	Dr. Shaun continues to do scut work under the guidance of the nurse.		**DELETED**
17	The operation continues.	17	As Dr. Ferman and his team continue on the operation, the nurse interrupts them and tells that Dr. Ali is about to operate on the kid.
K11	*As Dr. Shi-on is about to start the operation, Dr. Do-Han rushes into the O.R. and takes over both operations after scolding Dr. Shi-on harshly.*	K11	*Dr. Ferman rushes into the other O.R. and takes over both operations after scolding Dr. Ali harshly.*
K12	*When Dr. Do-Han sees Dr. Shi-on outside the O.R., he reprimands him very harshly and punches at him.*	K12	*When Dr. Ferman sees Dr. Ali outside the O.R., he reprimands him very harshly. He can only be stopped by Dr. Beriz.*
		A6	Dr. Ferman and Dr. Beriz have a harsh conversation.
K16	*Dr. Yoon-Seo finds Dr. Shi-on outside the hospital and helps him.*	K16	*Dr. Nazlı finds Dr. Ali outside the hospital and tries to soothe him.*
K14	*Dr. Woon-Seok talks to Dr. Do-Han about Dr. Shi-on.*	K14	*Dr. Adil talks to Dr. Ferman about Dr. Ali.*
		A7	Dr. Demir and some other nurses talk about Dr. Ali.
		A8	Dr. Kıvılcım visits Dr. Tanju to report on Dr. Ali's operation.
		6b	As a result of his behavior, Dr. Ferman gives Dr. Ali the scut work for the rest of the day and assigns one of the nurses as his assistant.
		7	As he starts seeing patients in the clinic, Dr. Ali orders unnecessary tests for minor cases.
		A9	The nurse suggests Dr. Ali that he should do the scut work faster.
		8	Dr. Ali continues to carry out the scut work.
		12a	Dr. Ali orders a significant test for a little girl with a tummy ache.
		A10	Dr. Nazlı talks to Dr. Ferman about the woman with the tumor.
		11	Dr. Tanju complains Dr. Ferman about Dr. Ali's unnecessary tests.
		12b	As Dr. Ali is about to order another significant test for the little girl with a tummy ache, Dr. Ferman shows up and stops him. He also assigns the nurse as Dr. Ali's supervisor for the day.
		14	Dr. Ali asks Dr. Nazlı why some people use sarcasm.

Sc. #	*GOOD DOCTOR / THE GOOD DOCTOR*	Sc. #	*MUCIZE DOKTOR*
18	Dr. Shaun continues to carry out the scut work under the guidance of the nurse.	18	Dr. Ali continues to carry out the scut work under the guidance of the nurse.
19	Dr. Melendez discovers that the tumor is bigger than they expected and is not visible. He orders a biopsy.		**DELETED**
20	Dr. Melendez asks Dr. Shaun to meet him in the O.R.		**DELETED**
21	Dr. Melendez tells Dr. Shaun that he called him only to send him to the lab to expedite the biopsy results.		**DELETED**
22	Dr. Shaun manages to expedite the biopsy and gets the results.		**DELETED**
23	Ms. Preston has a conversation with Dr. Melendez reminding him that he is doing wrong by showing such hostility towards Dr. Shaun.		**DELETED**
24	Dr. Shaun gives Dr. Browne and Dr. Kula the idea that they can remove the patient's left kidney to access the tumor.		**DELETED**
25	Dr. Kula brings up the idea that he heard from Dr. Shaun as if it was his. Despite Dr. Browne's objection, Dr. Melendez likes the idea.		**DELETED**
26	Dr. Melendez and his team remove the left kidney of the patient.		**DELETED**
		A11	Dr. Beriz sadly reveals to Dr. Adil that Dr. Ali has already made several mistakes and he is getting close to getting fired.
		A12	Dr. Kıvılcım tells Dr. Beriz that Dr. Ali is likely to fail.
27	Dr. Glassman reveals Dr. Shaun that one of the patients that he sent home earlier in the day came to him with a complaint. He tells him to follow his instinct.	27	Dr. Adil reveals to Dr. Ali that one of the patients that he sent home earlier in the day came to him with a complaint. He tells him to follow his instinct.
28	Dr. Shaun follows his instinct and orders further tests for the little girl with the tummy ache that he sent home.		**DELETED**
29	Dr. Melendez and his team removes the kidney and sees the tumor.		**DELETED**
30	After looking at the test results of the little girl, Dr. Shaun discovers some abnormalities and rushes to her house.	30	Dr. Ali follows his instinct and goes to the lab to check the results of the tests that he previously ordered for the little girl with the tummy ache. Dr. Ali discovers some abnormalities and rushes to her house.
		A13	Dr. Demir offers Dr. Nazlı a dinner, which she declines since she promised Dr. Ali that she would help him find a new rental house.
31	Dr. Shaun arrives at the girl's house. They find out that she already vomited and passed out. They immediately take her to the hospital.	31a	**DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SCENES AND SCATTERED (i.e., 31a, 31b, and 31c)** Dr. Ali arrives at the girl's house and insists on seeing the girl. The father of the girl gets mad and calls the hospital to complain.

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Sc. #	*GOOD DOCTOR / THE GOOD DOCTOR*	Sc. #	*MUCIZE DOKTOR*
		A14	Upon hearing about the incident, Dr. Adil immediately calls Dr. Ali; however, he cannot reach him.
		31b	Dr. Ali manages to check on the girl and finds out that she has already vomited and passed out. They take her to the hospital.
		A15	Assuming that Dr. Ali has made another mistake and will probably be fired, Dr. Adil decides to write his resignation letter.
		31c	Dr. Ali and the family are on their way to the hospital.
32	Dr. Shaun arrives at the hospital giving the girl a cardiac massage.	32	Dr. Ali arrives at the hospital giving the girl a cardiac massage.
		A16	As Dr. Beriz tries to persuade Dr. Adil not to resign, the nurse lets them know that Dr. Ali has arrived at the hospital with the girl.
33	Dr. Melendez and his team manages to remove the tumor.		**DELETED**
34	After looking at the ultrasound results, Dr. Shaun orders the staff to prepare the O.R. for an urgent surgery.		**DELETED**
35	Just as Dr. Shaun is about to start the operation, Dr. Melendez arrives and asks him to leave the rest to him. Dr. Shaun joins the operation only after Dr. Andrew orders Dr. Melendez to let him in.	35	Just as Dr. Ali is about to start the operation, Dr. Ferman arrives and asks him to leave the rest to him. Dr. Ali joins the operation only after Dr. Tanju orders Dr. Ferman to let him in the team.
		A17	Dr. Tanju sees Dr. Adil and Dr. Beriz ad tells them that Dr. Ferman and Dr. Ali are now operating the girl. Dr. Adil decides not to resign.
		A18	Dr. Nazlı waits for Dr. Ali in the rental house
36	Dr. Kalu and Dr. Browne discuss about the surgery and who should get the credit.		**DELETED**
		39	The parents thank Dr. Ali for saving the daughter's life, as Dr. Ferman watches them from distance.
37	Dr. Glassman talks to Dr. Andrews and reveals him that he is aware Dr. Andrews is not really trying to help Dr. Shaun.	37	Dr. Adil talks to Dr. Tanju and reveals to him that he is aware Dr. Tanju is not really trying to help Dr. Ali.
38	Dr. Browne talks to the woman that was operated.		**DELETED**
39	With the encouragement of Dr. Glassman, Dr. Shaun visits the little girl's room and gets the credit for saving the her life.		**COMES EARLIER (i.e., 39)**
K29	*Dr. Shi-on is in Dr. Yoon-Seo's house for dinner.*	K29	*Dr. Ali finally shows up at Dr. Nazlı's house and asks her to show him the rental house. After seeing the place, he decides to rent it.*
		A19	*Dr. Ferman arrives home and goes directly to the bed after rejecting Dr. Beriz to talk about what happened at the hospital that day.*
K30	*Lying down in his bed, Dr. Shi-on thinks of his childhood.*	K30	*Lying down in his bed, Dr. Ali thinks of his childhood.*

Sc. #	*GOOD DOCTOR / THE GOOD DOCTOR*	Sc. #	*MUCIZE DOKTOR*
		A20	In his bedroom, Dr. Ferman has a mysterious conversation with an unknown character on the phone.

Table 11 – The Narrative Structure of the Pilot Episode of *Good Doctor, The Good Doctor* and *Mucize Doktor.*[57]

[57] As mentioned earlier, my primary reference of source text in constructing this Table was the American version of the format due to the more marked differences between the Turkish and American cultures. In addition, the Turkish remake borrowed a larger amount of content from the American version. I took the Korean version as my reference only for scenes that the Korean version had and the American version skipped.

Figure 61 – A Graphic Comparison of the Narrative Structures of *Good Doctor, The Good Doctor and Mucize Doktor*.

Figure 62 – A Scene-by-Scene Distribution of the Extensions and Reductions in the Pilot Episode(s) of *Good Doctor, The Good Doctor and Mucize Doktor*.

Scene K11 (0:19:08-0:27:35) in the Korean version represents the climax of

the case of a little kid whom Dr. Shi-on sees vomiting earlier in the episode (Scene

K5). Feeling suspicious of his condition, Dr. Shi-on decides to examine the kid;

however, he is immediately stopped and reprimanded by Dr. Do-han, as the kid is

under the care of another physician in the pediatrics department (Scene K6). Then, he

asks the nurse to reach out to the assigned pediatrician, Dr. Ko, and tell him to come

and check his patient. However, still feeling suspicious, Dr. Shi-on goes back to the

little kid's room later in Scene K10. Upon finding out that Dr. Ko will arrive in two

hours, Dr. Shi-on calls out for an urgent surgery. With the help of one of the nurses,

he takes the kid to one of the operating rooms next to the one where Dr. Do-han is

operating another patient.

Figure 63 – Dr. Do-han ceases the operation (I) Figure 64 – Dr. Do-han ceases the operation (II) Figure 65 – Dr. Do-han ceases the operation (III)

Scene K11 opens with the arrival of Dr. Do-han in the operating room

furiously to stop the procedure. His evident authority and anger and the imminent

tension between him and Dr. Shi-on is depicted in various ways at this moment. First,

in the aural track, the amplified sound of the automatic sliding door and the

subsequent silence creates a tense atmosphere. Then, the camerawork (see Figure 63)

starts zooming in on the face of Dr. Do-han as his body appears behind the automatic

slide door. The low angle of the camera in this moment helps amplify the amount of

power attributed to Dr. Do-han even further. This opening is then followed by a series of shots showing the nervous looks of the other doctors in the face of Dr. Do-han (Figures 64 and 65). Finally, his authority is clinched verbally when one of the male nurses cries out "professor!" with a terrified voice, which indicates the trouble they all are in now and starts the conversation.

Figure 66 – Dr. Do-han and Dr. Shi-on (I)   Figure 67 – Dr. Do-han and Dr. Shi-on (II)   Figure 68 – Dr. Do-han and Dr. Shi-on (III)

Nurse: Professor!
Do-han: Do you know what you just did? {*looking at Dr. Shi-on*}
Shi-on: It's septic shock. Septic shock – serious condition when an overwhelming infection leads to low blood pressure.
Do-han: Shut your mouth! Nurse Jo.
Nurse: Yes? {*with a terrified voice*}
Do-han: I will do it.
Nurse: What?
Do-han: Listen carefully. We will have two patients simultaneously undergoing surgery. Dr. Cha and Woo Il Gyu stay with Eun Ji. Dr. Han, Hong Gil Nam, Kim Seon Joo change your gown and gloves to take over Seong Ho. Hong Gil Nam, prepare the operating table ASAP, and Kim Seon Joo, go to the Anesthesia Department and bring a doctor who's off now. Dr. Han, quickly insert a central venous catheter and prepare for a laparotomy.
Nurse: I'll help here myself. I was in the operating room until 2 years ago, wasn't I?
Fellow: Nurse Jo.
Do-han: Then, please help out for today, Senior Nurse… Every time I switch between the OR, please help replace gowns and gloves as fast as possible.
Fellow: Got it.
Do-han: Surgery start!
Fellows: Yes! {*as a group*}
Shi-on: I will participate as well. I would like to participate!
Do-han: Get out, Park Si-on… I said get out of the operating room.
Shi-on: No, I will stay next to…
Do-han: I said GET OUT! {*yelling*}.

As seen in the dialog, Dr. Do-han's authoritarian dialog with his fellows and nurses, and especially his antagonistic attitude towards Dr. Shi-on, including his word choices (e.g., shut your mouth! Get out!) and scolding intonation (especially in the final line above), portray a rather rigid boundary between himself and the others. This powerful image of Dr. Do-han is supported by a tense musical score in the background as he speaks, and the continued close-up and low-angle camera shots.

Figure 69 - Dr. Do-han punches at Dr. Shi-on (I)

Figure 70 - Dr. Do-han punches at Dr. Shi-on (II)

Figure 71 - Dr. Do-han punches at Dr. Shi-on (III)

Later, in scene K12 (0:27:35-0:30:27), the tension between Dr. Do-han and Dr. Shi-on reaches its peak. As seen in Figures 69, 70 and 71, when Dr. Do-han sees Dr. Shi-on outside the OR after both operations are finalized successfully, he cannot hold his temper anymore and punches at Dr. Shi-on for his unauthorized call for an urgent surgery. He can only be stopped by Dr. Jin-wook, one of his fellows. Blazed with anger, Dr. Do-han says that he does not want to see Dr. Shi-on again and angrily kicks the medical cart next to him. These narratological details in the Korean show become indicative of the established power structures in the Korean culture.

Figure 72 – Dr. Melendez and Dr. Shaun (I)

Figure 73 – Dr. Melendez and Dr. Shaun (II)

Figure 74 – Dr. Melendez and Dr. Shaun (III)

In the American version, on the other hand, the relationship between Dr. Melendez and Dr. Shaun is toned down significantly from the very beginning. Even though there happens to be times where their relationship is stretched to its limits due to the inherent tension narrated in the Korean original, Dr. Melendez's reactions and objections to Dr. Shaun's recruitment are always portrayed at a moderate level. More importantly, in some scenes, he even shows some sympathy towards Dr. Shaun. A striking example of this happens in the final scene of the pilot episode (see Figures 72, 73 and 74). Unlike the Korean version, for instance, Dr. Melendez lets Dr. Shaun scrub into surgery despite his doubts about his social and emotional skills to interact appropriately. Following the same pattern, the American remake does not include any of the scenes under discussion presumably because of the extreme power asymmetry pictured.

Figure 75 – Dr. Ferman ceases the operation (I)

Figure 76 – Dr. Ferman ceases the operation (II)

Figure 77 – Dr. Ferman ceases the operation (III)

When it comes to *Mucize Doktor,* the most recent remake of the Korean original, the adaptation of the scenes K11 and K12 contains a high degree of tension

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and authoritarianism highlighting Dr. Ferman's power over others. In the initial scene

(K11 – 0:29:26-0:38:50), as in the Korean version, his high authority reveals itself

first and foremost in the way he enters into the operating room and stops the

operation. Accompanied by a tense musical score in the background, he scolds the

nurses and fellows for daring to perform an unauthorized operation and announces

that he will take care of both operations simultaneously. Not surprisingly, his harshest

reaction targets at Dr. Ali due to his evident doubts about his proficiency as a surgical

fellow. Leveraging his authority, he orders him to leave the operating room

immediately in a rather despotic manner. Once Dr. Ali expresses his wish to stay with

the kid, Dr. Ferman yells at him even loudly and banishes him. The close-up shots

showing Dr. Ferman's blistering face in these moments (see Figures 75, 76 and 77)

portray his absolute authority over others.

| Figure 78 – Dr. Ferman reprimands Dr. Ali (I) | Figure 79 – Dr. Ferman reprimands Dr. Ali (II) | Figure 80 – Dr. Ferman reprimands Dr. Ali (III) |

The Turkish adaptation of Scene K12 makes an interesting case because of its

divergences from both the Korean and American versions at varying degrees. First,

unlike the American version, the rigid boundary between Dr. Ferman and Dr. Ali

reveals itself in its most extreme form when Dr. Ferman starts reprimanding Dr. Ali

in the hallway following the operation for his irrational behavior. From the tense

musical score in the background to the configurations of the camera movements

revolving around the two characters to the harsh verbal language that Dr. Ferman

uses, the scene epitomizes the evident authority that Dr. Ferman assumes over Dr. Ali

and others. Despite the efforts of the other fellows and the nurse, he gives Dr. Ali a

very hard time by making him say that he does not belong to the hospital.

Ali: Dr. Ferman. If we hadn't taken him to the OR…
Dr. Ferman: Do you think this is child's play?
The fellow: Dr. Ferman. Dr. Ferman, please. {*holding him by the arm*}
Dr. Ferman: Is this a GAME?! {*to the nurse*} Let me go! Let me go! {*looking at Dr. Ali*} How can you dare to think you can operate on someone on your first day? We could have lost both patients! We will make everything crystal clear right now right here! You will repeat what I say, Ali! "I-am-not-a-surgeon!"
Dr. Nazlı: Dr. Ferman!
Dr. Ferman: REPEAT! {*yells*} "I-am-not-a-surgeon!" REPEAT IT, ALI!
{*Dr. Ali looks scared*}
Dr. Nazlı: Dr. Ferman!
Dr. Ferman: SAY IT! REPEAT!
Dr. Ali: I am not a surgeon.

The comparison of the Turkish adaptation with the Korean version, on the

other hand, reveals that the Turkish producers have slightly toned down the tension

between the two characters by not making Dr. Ferman go as far as punching at Dr.

Ali. This divergence is of significance in terms of showing how the actualization of

power structures can differ even between two countries with similar perceptions of

power relations. However, when one considers the big picture and the major

divergences between the two texts and the American version, it becomes evident that

television programs in high power distance cultures can show a higher degree of

tension in the case of power clashes between superiors and subordinates.

Discussion

The scenes I analyzed in this chapter illustrate how the adaptation of

television formats can involve modifications of culturally dissonant dialogues and

actions that may, otherwise, subvert existing cultural values such as hierarchical

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relationships between superiors and subordinates. Occurring in the visual, verbal and aural tracks of programs, many of these modifications become the means for producers to create a new version of a format shaped by their own understanding of the home culture. The newly-molded program gains a new form and meaning and becomes its own thing in its new home.

The significance of this cultural mechanism from an analytical standpoint, however, is that it can also provide an opportunity for the status quo of power asymmetries, discrimination, oppression and exploitation in societies to persist. In the case of Turkey, in particular, this status quo can be translated as the continuation of the longstanding cultures of authoritarianism and statism, which I discussed in Chapter 3. Ensuring compliance with predetermined structures of hierarchical and bureaucratic power within and between socio-political structures, these established cultures often play a significant role in the recreation of formats by legitimizing the cultural need to tailor formats based on the prevailing rigid boundaries between individuals at different levels of organizational structures. The higher the distance these cultures enforce between these levels, the more inequality and discrimination take place and are perpetuated.

The scenes analyzed are significant because they reveal the ways in which these discriminatory cultural formations are reproduced and disseminated through television format adaptations. From the excessive homage paid to the Minister in *Sayın Bakanım,* to Izzet Komiser's disdain to follow his subordinate's request and grab the stick lying on the floor in *Galip Derviş*, to the school principal's and the surgeon's authoritarian attitudes toward their subordinates in the last two formats, all

the examples indicate an ongoing and significant cultural mechanism at play in television format business. It is a mechanism that consolidates the political and cultural status quo in countries in the name of accommodating cultural differences.

This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mean that there is no room for contestation at all in television format adaptations. On the contrary, the movement of television formats across different national boundaries per se provides the means for exchanging new ideas and practices. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, if we take the example of *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation, for instance, the very fact that a format that is based on a story foregrounding a hierarchically anomalous order between a subordinate protagonist and a superior secondary character is adapted into a high power distance culture like Turkey serves as a means to offer new perspectives to viewers.

Moreover, the degree to which the authoritarian and statist cultures have an impact on the adaptation process may also vary depending on the characteristics of each format. For instance, when looking at the formats I analyzed in this chapter, it is plausible to argue that the farther one moves away from the state apparatus, the more flexible those hierarchies can be. That is, when the violation of hierarchical structures includes members of the state bureaucracy such as the police, legislation and the government, it may become easy and more expected to tailor them to the existing cultural formations. In other words, conformity can more easily become a norm for media producers because of the absolute authority of the state. On the other hand, when it comes to other institutions such as hospitals, or even family life, there may be more room for contestation. In education, for instance, despite the close relationship

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between the state and school systems, a lack of respect towards a teacher may not get as much reaction as a lack of respect towards your chief in the police force, as the latter directly represents the "authority" of the state. In the case of *Kavak Yelleri,* for instance, Mine's reactions and responses to the school principal can be regarded as an outcome of this formation.

Hekimoğlu, the Turkish adaptation of another American format, *Dr. House*, for instance, which I did not analyze in the chapter for space constraints, is another good example illustrating this flexibility in the medical field. Featuring an eccentric, misanthropic but genius physician, Dr. Gregory House, the series presents various scenes where Dr. House challenges the authority of his supervisors, including the Dean of Medicine Dr. Lisa Cuddy. The Turkish adaptation of this format follows the American version very closely, even including the hierarchical clashes between Dr. Ateş Hekimoğlu (Dr. House in the original text) and Dr. Ipek Tekin (Dr. Lisa Cuddy in the original text). The inclusion of these hierarchical clashes in this remake can again be seen as a manifestation of the relatively more open space for contestations in certain domains of life.

Another important point is that the findings presented in this chapter exclude any differences that may arise due to different readings of the texts by different readers. For instance, knowing that the format *Yes, Minister* is a political satire, some audiences may take the changes in the Turkish remake as an indicator of the producers' effort to criticize the increased power asymmetry in the Turkish state machinery. However, this is not always a guaranteed outcome. Taking the satire at the face value, many audiences may also perceive those trivial-looking divergences in the

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Turkish remake not seriously and accept them as the established norms that need to be adhered to.

Overall, while these exceptions or discrepancies can be read and studied as an alternative space that television format adaptations provide for contesting the status quo in societies, they do not change the fact that the adaptation process can also serve as a means to maintain the political and cultural status quo. Given the specific examples I discussed in this chapter and their meticulously remade content, a critical perspective about cultural adaptations is essential. In the next and last chapter of this dissertation, I discuss this overarching argument in more detail in the light of the theories and examples presented thus far.

Conclusion

In the last several decades, many theorists of media globalization such as Hutcheon (2006), Waisbord & Jalfin (2009), Faubert (2010), Navarro (2012), Cartmell (2012) and Coletta (2016) brought new perspectives on the study of cultural adaptations. Focusing on the role of local cultures in the remaking process, they emphasized that adaptations are not merely copycat imitations of previous works but rather "reactionary and progressive responses" of societies to media globalization (Waisbord & Jalfin, 2009: 58). Marked by this celebratory tone, their arguments constituted a response to many long-standing pessimistic views on the practice of adaptation, including the fidelity discourse of the early 20th century and the fear of cultural homogenization in the face of media globalization after the 1950s, which I discussed in Chapter 1. Foregrounding the fact that texts gain a new form and meaning as they work their way through different political landscapes and media cultures, these later scholars have argued that the growing transnational movement of texts, particularly television programs, and their adaptation and consumption by local communities are less of a threat for local or national cultures than an opportunity for peoples and nations to present their way of understanding life and persevere their cultural uniqueness.

Indeed, these scholars were right in their assertions. With the developments in the technological, economic and cultural spheres of life around the world in recent decades, which I explained in Chapter 1 and 2, societies have found a more liberating and viable space for constructing their versions of global stories informed and shaped

by the particularities of their dominant culture. Moreover, many of these nations, including, but not limited to, South Korea, India, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Colombia also started to contribute to media globalization significantly by exporting tens and hundreds of cultural products to their neighboring states and beyond every year.

However, as Morley (2001: 427) rightfully pointed out, in many of these celebratory writings on the evident revival of the local/national cultures, the emphasis has remained on the ways in which cultural adaptations allowed peoples to "remake and refashion their identities in empowering ways." This optimistic ethos created an almost uncritical acceptance of the cultural adaptation process in societies as well as in academia on the grounds of the evident need for accommodating cultural differences. As a result, various dominant and often taken-for-granted discourses of power and national identities, including established inequalities, have come to be continuously reproduced and disseminated at an unprecedented pace through cultural remakes of transnational texts.

Following Morley's (2001) cautionary note on this pitfall, this dissertation has aimed to contribute to the study of television formats by bringing a critical perspective on the cultural adaptation process. Using the textual and narratological divergences between specific formats and their cross-border iterations as a lens to shed light on the adaptation process, I sought patterns of cultural data that indicated historically and culturally established discourses of discrimination, oppression, and inequality, which I discuss further below. In studying these patterns in format adaptations, the key question I sought an answer for was the following: do culturally-

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appropriated formats serve to recruit subjects into the politico-cultural status quo of the adapting country or are they used to disrupt existing ideological, cultural and institutional formations by providing alternative perspectives and inspiring the audience to engage in critical self-reflection?

One of the challenges in answering this question was the complex nature of the television programs. Composed of various modes and semiotic resources simultaneously existing in the verbal, visual and aural tracks of the filmic medium (e.g., the camerawork, *mise-en-scene*, musical score and the dialog), the formats and their adaptations showed a wide array of divergences even in a short segment of a single scene. Also referred to as "multimodality," as explained in Chapter 4, this complex nature of the objects of study required the use of specific digital tools such as Multimodal Analysis Video™ and Microsoft Excel™ for deconstructing the scenes (i.e., segmenting, compiling and visualizing multimodal data). Thanks to these tools, I could reverse engineer each scene under discussion and explore their multimodal landscape for traces and markers of discriminatory cultural patterns.

The most crucial step in my study, however, has been the transformation of this whole research framework into a case study with a focus on a particular national setting, Turkey, and six particular format adaptations. This step was essential for the study because a mere analysis of textual and narratological divergences between a randomly selected format and its adaptation would not go beyond a descriptive analysis if it were not situated and analyzed against a historical and politico-cultural setting. In other words, the divergences discovered in the remakes could be analyzed critically and used to draw meaningful conclusions only by scrutinizing them in light

of deeper historical and politico-cultural factors that played a role in their reconstruction. In what follows, I revisit this particular national context and its historically established discriminatory discourses, which I discussed in Chapter 3, and synthesize them with the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6.

The Case of Turkey and the Six Format Adaptations

What makes television format adaptations in Turkey worthy of scholarly attention from a historical and cultural standpoint is the enduring influence of the Turkish nationalist discourse on television production since the early days of broadcasting in the country. While the sway of nationalism in cultural production is not specific to Turkey, the fact that it is very much entangled with conceptualizations of gender roles and authority figures nonetheless makes it a worthwhile topic to study.

In terms of the relationship between the prevailing gender norms and television format adaptations, what is of particular interest is the representation of women. As discussed in Chapter 3, women in Turkey have always played a major role in the construction of the new state's "modernized" national identity. Given their past oppression under the rigid patriarchal system of the Islamic Ottoman era, their emancipation from traditionally restrictive constraints such as the veil was seen as a key step toward the modernization of the society. Also, along the same lines, they were encouraged to enter the public spheres of education and workplace, which amplified their (and the nation's) new Western identity.

However, besides these westernizing reforms, certain traditional values rooted in the society's patriarchal past such as *namus* and motherhood were kept central to

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the nationalist agenda of the new state because they were imagined to demarcate the boundaries of the new national identity. In other words, these long-standing cultural elements were seen as building blocks of the traditional "Turkish" identity that needed to be safeguarded against a complete Westernization, albeit at the cost of maintaining and empowering the old oppressive patriarchal order surrounding women. Within this discriminatory discourse, while women could find a relatively more liberal space to dress more freely and fashionably, work outside, vote and get elected, their actions and attitudes continued to be policed and regulated by their male family members, partners and even employees and friends. More importantly, this oppressive discourse has transformed into a hegemonic form over time, leading many women to self-monitor themselves to protect their (and their family's) *namus* and fulfill their supposed primary duties at home.

The analysis of the three format adaptations in Chapter 5 is critical for the study of this enduring discriminatory gender discourse. All featuring female characters who get involved in intimate or personal relationships with a male character, the format adaptations offered ample opportunities to trace the ways in which the identities of those female characters have been reconstructed according to the Turkish gender discourse. Especially in the scenes where the female characters had to violate the prevailing social norms by dating a guy or letting him go inside their house, significant textual and narratological divergences were observed between the versions. These divergences indicated a strong pattern of portraying the Turkish female characters as more attentive to the social and cultural norms that restrict their behaviors and more submissive to the authority of their (mostly male) kin.

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A striking example of this cultural mechanism restricting women's freedom of choice and movement was observed in the localization of the American format, *Shameless*, which featured a rather extraordinary female character, Fiona, who smoked, drank and had intimate relationships (as well as sex) with different guys in almost all episodes. Constituting an apparent violation of the prevailing social norms, these features of her were deleted in the remaking of the Turkish adaptation completely, creating a totally new, more responsible and conscientious Filiz character.

In my analysis of this format adaptation, however, I did not concentrate on the aspects of smoking, drinking and sex because many of these culturally dissonant features also applied to the other male characters in the series. For instance, unlike the characters in the American version, none of the Turkish characters consumed alcohol nor smoked in the series, only excluding the father figure, whose drinking habit was problematized and thus made up the foundation of the story. Similarly, the scenes that showed any kind of nudity and/or sexual intercourse were omitted from the remake regardless of the characters involved in it. Given this overarching adaptation process, many of the divergences related to smoking, drinking and sex were considered as predictable and therefore not worthy of scholarly attention because they violated not only the cultural norms but also the Islamic norms of the majority of the society and the state's regulations concerning these societal sensitivities.

Of greater concern from a gender studies perspective, however, were the parts where meticulous modifications were made to reconstruct Filiz's relationships with her male kin and friends in everyday situations. Despite her modern and strong

appearance in life as a working woman, which reflected the "modern" aspect of the enduring discourse of "modern but modest women" of Turkey (Elaman-Garner, 2015), her relationships with other men – be it Barış or a neighbor or a random male customer in the restaurant where she works – were always constructed around demonstrations of conscience and modesty.

Overall, this established gender discourse that manifested itself repeatedly in the three format adaptations and many more, which I could not include in the study due to space limitations, deserves attention because it puts women in Turkey in a rather disadvantaged and vulnerable position vis-à-vis men. Despite the historical rhetoric of gender equality since the inception of the Republic, women's behaviors and choices are almost always policed and punished by their male oppressors as well as the society. More importantly, adhering to this cultural formation, many women in Turkey, including the fictional characters in the three format adaptations, often accept these norms as taken-for-granted and self-police their behaviors to safeguard their *namus* and dignity.

The second discriminatory cultural formation that I approached critically in my research was the prevailing norms of authority that foster rigid hierarchical boundaries between different levels of organizational structures in Turkey. Having their roots in the long-standing statist and authoritarian cultures of the Republic that glorify the authority of the state and state officials over citizens, these norms affect interpersonal relationships in almost all realms of life to such a degree that they often form a basis for inequalities, oppressions, and discriminations. More importantly, due to the society's traditional inclination to take this hierarchical structure for granted as

a core need to maintain the social order, which I discussed in Chapter 3, many of these discriminatory formations often go unnoticed and unquestioned. Especially when it comes to the homage paid to the high state officials such as the president and ministers as well as other subnational and local authorities such as governors, police commanders, and school principals, humility becomes the governing virtue of the majority in the society.

In the analysis of this prevalent high power distance discourse, the four television format adaptations examined in Chapter 6 have been illuminating. Mostly adapted from low power distance cultures such as the United Kingdom and the United States, the Turkish remakes displayed various textual and narratological modifications aimed to tailor the power dynamics in the source texts to Turkish power discourse. This localization process laid bare the increased power asymmetries and legitimized (widely accepted) inequalities dominant in the society and exemplified how these discourses are persistently reproduced and perpetuated through television programs.

The first format adaptation, *Yes, Minister/Sayın Bakanım*, was a unique example for the study because it gave me a chance to start my analysis at the highest level in the chain of hierarchies: the state machinery. Featuring a novice minister and his sly civil servants, both the British and Turkish versions included various scenes where deference to superiors came into prominence as an everyday practice in the series. However, the degree to which this deference was actualized and highlighted in the Turkish remake differed from the British version significantly.

This analysis was followed by the study of three other format adaptations, *Monk/Galip Derviş, Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri,* and *Good Doctor/The Good Doctor/Mucize Doktor,* each of which illustrated implications of the dominant high power distance discourse in a different domain of everyday life. Being a detective story, the *Monk/Galip Derviş* adaptation offered ample examples concerning the dominant hierarchical order within the police force. The multimodal divergences found in the comparative analysis of the two particular scenes that featured two subordinate-superior interactions (first, between Izzet Komiser and the Deputy Mayor, and then between Derviş and Izzet Komiser) indicated a clear sign of the increased power asymmetry between the characters. In the first scene analyzed, for example, Izzet Komiser stood out as a character paying much more attention to the hierarchical difference between himself and the Deputy Mayor. This divergence from the American version manifested itself in various forms, including the way he spoke to the Deputy Mayor as well as his body language and reverential attitude toward him (e.g., offering him his own seat).

The *Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri* adaptation, on the other hand, offered an insight into the hierarchical formation in the education system through various scenes set in the school environment. Among these scenes, especially those that contained interactions between the school principal and the two culturally deviant main characters, Mine and Efe, were epitomes showing the authority of the principal over students as well as their families.

Finally, in the *Good Doctor/The Good Doctor/Mucize Doktor* adaptation, the divergences between the three versions revealed how the power dynamics in the

medical field was played out differently in each culture. In the analysis of the

particular scenes that narrated the clash between the protagonist Dr. Shi-on/Dr. Ali

and his boss Dr. Do-han/Dr. Ferman, the Korean and Turkish versions stood out with

their hierarchically marked content, which went as far as physical violence in the

Korean version and explicit mobbing in the Turkish. On the flip side, the American

remake not only depicted the tension between the two characters at a much lower

scale in general but also deleted the above-mentioned scenes with harsh hierarchical

content altogether.

Format Adaptations: A Means to Status Quo or Progress?

Going back to my key research question regarding whether format adaptations

serve as a means to maintain the status quo or promote change and progress in

countries, the findings of this case study provide significant insights. Though the

focus on a single country is a serious drawback when it comes to generalizing results,

which I further discuss in the limitations section below, the stable patterns of

conformity to the existing dominant ideological, cultural, and institutional formations

found in all six format adaptations serve as examples of the relationship between

cultural adaptations and the status quo. From the reconstruction of the formats'

plotlines and characters to the reshaping of certain cultural references and stylistic

elements, almost all aspects of the adapted texts were heavily informed by the status

quo of gender and power norms.

To an extent, the tendency to favor the status quo in formats can be seen as an

anticipated and rational outcome of the cultural adaptation process because the idea of

"remaking" and marketing a global format in a new national setting, by its nature,

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entails aligning and harmonizing the text with the prevailing target culture. After all, as discussed in Chapter 2, format trade is a profit-oriented business, and television producers, who generally know what works and what does not work in their countries, design their productions in a way to reach the broadest audience possible. However, the critical question is what this tendency to favor the status quo entails and what types of status quo it maintains in countries. The issue is the reproduction of discourses of discrimination, oppression and inequality in the name of achieving "cultural proximity" (Straubhaar, 1991) and "discursive proximity" (Jongbloed and Espinosa-Medina, 2014). As stated in Chapter 1, it is the evolution of cultural adaptation into a euphemism for consolidating the political and cultural status quo under the cloak of accommodating cultural differences.

Despite these pitfalls that cultural adaptations entail, it is also essential to acknowledge that these findings do not necessarily eliminate the possibility that format adaptations can also disrupt existing ideological, cultural and institutional formations in different respects and levels by providing alternative perspectives. In other words, it is necessary to underscore that my key research question does not necessarily demand a mutually exclusive answer. After all, in today's globalized world, the innate ties that television formats establish with realities and knowledges transcending national boundaries always save room for multi-directional contestation of cultural norms and formations, which I discuss further in the limitations section below.

Contribution of the Study

Although globalization today is an axiomatic concept that is frequently used in almost all realms of life from politics to sports to the media, it is still a complex phenomenon that requires further explanation. Especially the intricacies and nuances that arise from the mutually co-dependent and transformative relationship between the local and global forces, which I discussed in Chapter 1, increase the importance of empirical studies shedding light on this complex process substantially. In this regard, this study, with its focus on the remaking of six particular television formats at the nexus of the global and local forces, has been a significant contribution to understanding the complexities of globalization in the media. Delving into the interplay between formats and the historical and cultural particularities of a specific country, the study empirically illustrated how globalization happens idiosyncratically in the local and reaffirmed the fact that globalization is not a "one-way street," as once claimed by the theories of media imperialism.

Another important contribution of the study, as discussed in the previous section, is the critical lens it offered to the cultural adaptation of television formats. Given the growing optimism and rhetoric around the increased production capacities of nations, especially in terms of knowledge production, domestic programs and cultural remakes have come to be hailed as a success story in the industry and academic circles. This development has, indeed, brought along some positive outcomes such that it allowed once-peripheral nations to not only reverse the homogenizing imperialist forces of globalization but also contribute to its making, albeit at varying degrees. However, this optimism has also set new challenges for

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change and progress because it has given nation-states a relatively freer space to reproduce and consolidate the politico-cultural status quo in their countries. Approaching this often-ignored aspect of cultural adaptations, the study has opened up a new line of inquiry for the study of the intricacies and nuances of media globalization.

A final contribution of the study has been its multimodal approach to the analysis of television formats. As discussed in Chapter 4, television texts are quintessential examples of multimodal meaning-making due to their inherent multimodal nature. Composed of various visual, verbal and aural modes that are merged into an organic whole, even a single scene can contain a wide array of meanings and discourses at the same time. More importantly, some of those meanings and discourses can be hidden in the temporal structuring of programs, such as the number of times a particular gender or race is shown throughout an episode. As a result, their analysis requires a comprehensive examination of those various modes and the interplay between them, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to unveil the hidden discourses in the multimodal cracks of these cultural texts. This research, in this regard, has made a major contribution to the field of television format studies by underscoring the importance of the multimodal approach in the critical discourse analysis of television programs.

Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research

One of the major limitations of the study is its focus on a single national setting. As stated earlier, I have preferred to narrow the framework of my research down to a single national setting because it gave me a chance to delve into the deep

historical and cultural particularities of the country and analyze how those

particularities played a role in the remaking of the six television formats discussed.

However, this country-based approach has also brought a disadvantage in terms of the

generalizability of the results. Because of the shifting dynamics of societies and their

media cultures, the conclusions I drew regarding the ways in which television format

adaptations contribute to the maintenance of the status quo in the context of Turkey

may not apply to all national settings. That is to say, producers in countries that have

a relatively more liberal media market such as the United States may undoubtedly use

television format adaptations as a means to offer audiences opportunities to begin to

question the society's dominant values.

In order to uncover these potential cross-cultural differences in terms of the

specific implications of television format adaptations experienced in each country and

to reach more generalizable conclusions, more research is needed that focuses on the

actualization of television formats in different national settings. This can include

international collaborative research projects in which researchers from different

countries can comparatively examine multiple adaptations of a particular television

format to discuss different localization strategies of global discourses. In doing so,

however, researchers should always take into account the historical and cultural

dynamics of their target society, as the discourses of discrimination, oppression and

equality that are perpetuated through adaptations can pertain to different issues such

as racism, class and religion depending on each national context.

On that note, another limitation of this study is its focus on two cultural

formations, that is, norms of gender and hierarchical relationships. Given the

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existence of many other societal complexities in Turkey, as in many other countries, such as the oppression of various (ethnic, religious, gender) minority groups, including but not limited to Kurds, Alevis and/or gays, television format adaptations in Turkey can be studied further to unveil the mechanisms that reinforce the reproduction of other discriminatory discourses.

The final limitation of the study is its predominant concentration on the forces of conformity, leaving aside other possible contestations that may be happening in format adaptations. As stated earlier, the question of whether cultural adaptations of formats reinforce the status quo or promote change may not require a mutually exclusive answer. While in one respect, be it gender roles, cultural adaptations can consolidate the existing formations of gender relations, in other respects, say politics, they may trigger contestation and change by inspiring the audience to engage in critical self-reflections. Therefore, for a better understanding of these intersectional complexities, more research is needed that focuses on the forces of both conformity and contestation in television format business.

Conclusion

This dissertation studied television formats that have "originated" in one country and then have been reproduced in another with a different cast and under different material conditions. The goal was to provide a critical lens on the cultural adaptation process to unravel if, and how, this complex cultural mechanism served as a means for the reproduction and perpetuation of certain discriminatory discourses in countries.

To analyze this multifaceted process that occurs at the intersection of culture, politics and media at both global and local levels, the dissertation used the case of Turkey as its main site of research. This country-based approach allowed the researcher to delve into the historical and cultural particularities of the country and reveal two particular discourses of discrimination that deserved attention: (1) gender roles and expectations, particularly those pertaining to women, and (2) norms of authority that create rigid boundaries between different levels of organizational structures. For the study of these two discourses, the dissertation focused on six television format adaptations from Turkey: *Monk/Galip Derviş*, *Shameless/Bizim Hikaye*, *This is Us/Bir Aile Hikayesi*, *Yes, Minister/Sayın Bakanım*, *Dawson's Creek/Kavak Yelleri*, and *Good Doctor/The Good Doctor/Mucize Doktor*. Analyzing each example comparatively with its source text(s), the researcher could trace various textual and narratological divergences between the versions and used them as a point of access to examine how the above-mentioned cultural discourses got reproduced and perpetuated during the cultural adaptation process.

Because the process of cultural adaptation cannot be confined to the affordances of a single mode such as dialog, the researcher used a multimodal approach as his methodology in analyzing the format adaptations. Also known as multimodal critical discourse analysis, this analytical framework allowed the researcher to track textual and narratological divergences in not only the verbal track but also the visual and aural tracks of the filmic medium including clothing, *mise-en-scene*, dialog, camerawork, musical score and narrative structure (sequencing).

All in all, the findings of this case study clearly showed that cultural adaptations of television formats in the discussion of media globalization are a topic that needs to be approached more critically. Especially given the ever-growing capacities of national industries in knowledge production, this critical eye on the cultural adaptation of media productions is imperative for the continuation of social change and progress for better.

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