

Social Struggles of Early Rome
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
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Abstract

This thesis is a short history of the social struggles of the Roman nation from the beginning of the Monarchy until the times of Julius Caesar in the late Republic. Some of the topics enclosed concern with the establishment of the Republic after the Monarchy, the creation and explanation of the offices of the Republic, the process of the Conflict of the orders, the class conflict between the patricians and the plebeians, and the creation of the Roman constitution. Other topics look at the expansion of Rome across the Mediterranean world through conquest during the Italian, Punic, Macedonian, and Seleucid Wars and how these events shaped the Roman government and social relations between the patricians and plebeians, as well as how the two classes came together during these times of crisis. The latter part of the paper deals with the rise of the Gracchi and the Roman Revolution, and how these events shaped the late Republic and allowed the rise of political figures such as Sulla, Marius, and Caesar. The conclusion finishes with the wrap up of the paper, as well as giving the reader a few small glimpses into the events after the Gracchan revolution.

Introduction

Rome: the name of this ancient civilizations city inspires thoughts of grandeur, imperial might, military conquest, and tales of tragedy. To many, the Romans are remembered for their empire and the deeds of men like Julius Caesar, Augustus Caesar, Nero, Marcus Aurelius, Constantine and many others. The deeds of these men who ruled with an iron fist have survived the passage of time, but for all their accomplishments, none would have been greater than the accomplishments of their predecessors in the Roman Republic. The Republic is a time that, in the current era, is less often remembered even though historians have taken a much greater interest in the Republican principles than the empires, and that the majority of the modern nations have based their government systems on the Roman style of Republican government. Perhaps one of the greatest political experiments of its time, it was meant to allow the common citizen greater autonomy in the government, similar to democracy, yet the classes of ancient Rome could never have been further apart, as the patricians and plebeians fought each other socially to gain their place in the government. For over four centuries the social problems that originated in the Republic's foundation never truly disappeared, and would the decisions made by the patricians during the early Republic would come back during the late Republic to haunt them and inevitably cause the downfall of the Republic itself and the creation of a one man rule which, ironically, is what the Republic had been established to abolish in the first place.

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Chapter I

The Roman Monarchy

Ancient Rome was one of the mightiest civilizations to ever exist in human history and its legacy still survives to this very day in almost every country in the world today in some way. Yet Ancient Roman civilization was also one of the most deeply divided cultures in history with the distance and depravity between the social ranks of *patrician* and *plebeian* being greater than most minds of the modern age can comprehend. It is true that class divisions still persist in the countries of the modern world, but not to the same extent as those in ancient Roman society. The Roman historian Titus Livius stated that during his day and age when he wrote *Ab Urbe Condita*, “*no state was ever greater, none more righteous or richer in good examples, none ever was where avarice and luxury came into the social order so late... Of late, riches have brought in avarice, and excessive pleasures the longing to carry wantonness and licence to the point of ruin for oneself and of universal destruction*”.¹

By the time that Livy had started to write his *History of Rome: On the Founding of the City* in around 27 B.C.E. the corruption and greed of the *patrician* class, had, in part, led to the creation of the new Roman Empire under Octavian Augustus Caesar. But this monumental change in government style had its inceptions during the era of the mythical king Romulus in 753 B.C.E. as it was he who implemented the class system, a political ideology of the Etruscans and a standing legacy of Romulus’s Etruscan heritage. Over the next seven centuries, Rome would face multiple domestic and foreign crises, and these events would eventually shape the status of Rome across the Mediterranean as she expanded her borders and conquered all foes in her path. And although militarily strong, Rome was increasingly weakened internally by the civil strife which festered in her cities due to the greed and ambition of the nobility. Occasionally,

heroes like Marcus Furius Camillus, Marcus Manlius, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, the Gracchi brothers and others would rise and challenge the traditional Roman class system, and, while many forsook their campaigns against class struggle, others paid for it with their lives as martyrs.

With great events such as the Italic Wars across the Italian Peninsula, the Punic Wars, the Greek and Macedonian Wars and the Jugurthine Wars, Rome accumulated massive amounts of wealth that made the noble hierarchy richer, and the common folk poorer. And with this rose decade or century long social conflicts such as the Conflict of the Orders, which lasted until the *plebeians* were granted functional seats in the Roman Senate such as the People's tribune and eventually the seat of consul. With all that, the efforts of the great heroes like Marcus Junius Brutus led to the creation of the Roman Republic which was one of the greatest civil institutions of the ancient world. However, its failure to integrate the classes led to the civil strife that ended with the creation of an emperor, one man with all the power of the state in his hand, which, ironically, is what the Romans created the Republic for in the first place, to abolish the monarchy.

If one is to look back on how the social struggles and conflicts formed in the Roman Republic, one must delve into the period of the Roman Monarchy for answers. This period is highly controversial for many historians, as all written knowledge from the time, if any was produced at all, was eliminated by the fire during the Gallic Sack of Rome in 386 B.C.E. Therefore, the majority of early Roman lore was spread by word of mouth as it had been during the Monarchy. Livy mentions this in his writings, stating that the actual wording that he has recorded for speeches of the mythical rulers such as Romulus are most likely twisted through the passage of time from multiple individuals, and therefore cannot possibly be completely true, yet Livy attempts to justify this as the only way to scribe the knowledge of the ancient past.

Although the Roman Monarchy's true functions and history remain largely unknown, what is known is that the Roman Republic was formed due to the revolts of the people against their king Tarquin the Proud and exiling the king in order to establish a Republic and a new constitution. But Rome's classes were unified from the very beginning and it was natural that such events unfolded after Rome's inception under King Romulus (if he actually existed and if he did was most likely an Etruscan).² Livy states that after the mythical foundation of the city, Romulus created the Roman legions, and established one hundred prominent citizens as his personal counselors or senators. The prominent persons were labeled the patricians, and they were all nominated from the eldest of the original tribes. All other persons were labeled as plebeians or the “common” majority of the Roman state.³

The citizenry of Rome was allegedly composed of persons either labeled undesirables from tribes surrounding Rome within their originating tribe or those who wished to start life anew with the chance for nobility. In this sense, Romulus's Rome would have been an asylum, or in the Greek sense of the word *asylia* meaning the right of settlement, and a safe haven for all who wished greater for themselves. This is also observed at the Greek settlements of Cos and Cyrene, where the Oracle of Delphi laid out a decree of asylum for those protected by Apollo, and this gave all new arrivals the chance to become citizens by establishing a foothold in these cities. Plutarch mentions that an ancient asylum was created between the Capitoline Hill's peaks, therefore pointing to Rome's early origins.⁴ The asylum of Rome led to the creation of a widely differentiated population, and the creation of the nobility by Romulus was a leading factor in the future discontent in Rome's social classes as those who arrived after the creation of the Senate and patrician classes were labeled as plebeians, lest they were inaugurated as new nobility by a king such as during the war in which King Tullus Hostilius defeated the city of Alba Longa, and

destroyed the entire city thus transporting the entirety of its population to Rome, and added its wealthy classes to the Roman nobility. Another incident was where Rome subjugated the Sabines and in doing so appointed 100 new senators to the king's cabinet from the Sabine families in order to show that Rome was reasonable, and would give nobility from another conquered people who had been vanquished a second chance for greatness (the Sabines had already been in control of Rome vicariously through Numa Pompilius, who was Sabine by birth).⁵

Although Romulus is credited with the creation of Rome in 753 B.C.E. archaeological evidence points towards the settlement of the area far larger than is stated in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*.⁶ Within Romulus's reign, he created the *tribes*, the voting units of the *comitia curiata*. These three original tribes were the *Ramnes*, *Luceres*, and *Tities*. Of these three tribes each was further divided into ten *curiae* or councils, which formed the basis of the assembly.⁷ Tradition states that the *curia* was strictly patrician, but Mommsen disagrees with this and states that wealthy plebeian families were placed among the assembly. Although the original Roman government was a monarchy, the Roman king did allow his cabinet of ministers to advise him on many important matters. The Senate was the king's personal cabinet, and was a collection of the wisest heads of each of the one hundred patrician families or conscript fathers as they would later be labeled. These men met during the *comitia curiata*, and had the power to make laws which were ordained by the king (in reality, the king had absolute authority and could pass any legislation he pleased). The most important function of the early Roman senate was that of the election of a new king. After a king died, an *interrex* was established and was permitted five days reign, and if no king was chosen within this time period, then the *interrex* had to choose a successor. Only a patrician could be the *interrex*, and it was the duty of the Senate to choose the successor to its deceased king. The king did not have to be related by blood to the previous ruler.

The effectiveness of this has been debated and there were many loopholes for the king to bypass the Senate's opinions as Livy states that Tarquinius Priscus attained complete power after being appointed king by appointing another 100 cabinet members who were devoutly loyal to him (most likely through their appointment to the nobility) and Tarquinius was voted into the kingship. The reasoning behind Tarquin's senatorial appointments was mostly likely the fact that he was an Etruscan. The majority of the Roman Senate distrusted him due to his ethnic background, so he circumvented the problems of the Roman Senate by placing one hundred new "Fathers" of lesser families into his cabinet. Tarquin would eventually be one of Rome's greatest military kings, and was increasingly popular with the people of Rome.⁸

The ancient kings of Rome put in place many of the basic institutions that would later have profound influence on the daily life of every Roman during the Republican years. With Romulus it had been the creation of the Senate, Legions, and the class system. His successor, Numa Pompilius, instituted a new religious system and implemented the auguries into the civic life of every Roman citizen. This stage is controversial as Livy's account of Numa Pompilius contradicts archaeological evidence which shows that many of the institutions allegedly implemented under Pompilius's rule were Etruscan in origin.⁹ This in turn points to an early Etruscan development of the City of Rome. The auguries, pontificate, intercalation, and Egerian cult are all Etruscan institutions. This places a vexing question on the legitimacy of Rome's religious founding, and shows that Pompilius was not the "Founder" of Rome's religion, but instead a borrower of Etruscan customs. This would allow the Romans to place the story of their religious foundations with Pompilius, who reformed the Roman religion, but did not invent a unique theological practice. Regardless of the facts, the motives behind Pompilius's actions are

clear. He wished to pacify an aggressive and expanding state and lead it to a time of peace through religious piety and *metus deorum* (literally “fear of the gods”).¹⁰

The plebeians had little power in any aspect of their lives or in government affairs during the Roman Monarchy, and within the confines of the histories of the Roman Monarchy little is mentioned about the plebeian majority or their influence on events outside of their creation under Romulus. Of the seven legendary kings of Rome, none was more important to the people than Servius Tullius. Allegedly born to a slave mother and a slave himself, he was taken in by the royal family of Tarquinius Priscus after a “divine” event labeled Tullius as a possible successor to the throne. When he was made king, it was due to his marriage to the daughter of Tarquinius and the threat posed by the sons of Ancus Marcius who attempted to seize the throne by force. The Senate unanimously agreed to nominate Servius as the new king. Tullius, being of the lower class himself, was very open to the cries of public strife which continued to grow and fester within Rome, and took particular interest in the problems of the plebeians. The authenticity of Servius Tullius and his actual existence is almost certainly positive. In Ogilvie’s *A Commentary on Livy*, he states that Tullius is a name used by plebeian classes and also states that because of this no right minded historian during the Republican or Imperial eras of Rome would have dared to create a false king with plebeian background, as it would have caused an uproar amongst the populace of Rome.¹¹ His most important accomplishment was the institution of the Roman *census*. The census was an annual recording of the wealth and societal hierarchy of the Roman citizenry. The populace was required to approach the censor and give the details of their wealth, and then once all citizens had been recorded, the results and charts showing the accumulated wealth of the classes was placed in the public’s eye, and the class of wealth was graded in tiers for easier comprehension. With the census, Tullius would be able to help the Roman people

accordingly depending on the spread of wealth. An example would be in times of war, and the spoils brought back would be evenly spread according to the stature of one's wealth according to the census.¹²

Though Tullius is hailed for the creation of the Roman census, he was loathed by the patrician class at the time, and this eventually led to the loss of support surrounding the king, and the political coup in which Tarquinius Superbus took the throne and murdered Tullius. Tarquinius Superbus, or "Tarquin the Proud", had a reign dominated with absolute authority and the renewal of complete Etruscan rule over Roman society.¹³ Superbus's reign is generally regarded with the downfall of the Roman Monarchy according to Roman legend, yet it was under Superbus that many affluent structures were, at the same time, produced within the city of Rome, and the public benefited greatly from his public works. The two most influential for the plebeian population were the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus and the *cloaca maxima*, the great sewer system of Rome which was designed to halt the spread of malaria which was at the time thought to originate from contaminated water that stood after the annual flooding of the Tiber. Superbus acquired absolute control of the government and people through fear and force. Superbus also used the citizenry of Rome to his advantage, but at cost to their loyalty.¹⁴ Livy states this, as he claims that Superbus used the plebeians as slave laborers to create the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, and released them after its construction with little pay. The plebeian class had considerable contempt for their monarch, and to appease the populace, Tarquinius Superbus waged multiple wars in order to quell the anxieties of the people through wealth distribution.¹⁵

It is at this point during the reign of Tarquinius Superbus that one begins to see the downfall of the Roman Monarchy, and in Roman lore, it is the rape and death of Lucretia that invokes the rebellion against the king by Lucius Junius Brutus and Tarquinius Collatinus.¹⁶

According to myth, both vowed vengeance upon the family of the Tarquins, and brought Lucretia's dead body before the people of Rome to gain their support in an uprising against their king, and this story is widely held by the historians of the ancient world (Diodorus Siculus and Livy have very similar accounts on the fall of the Roman Monarchy). However, the story of Lucretia as the “best wife of all Romans” was a poorly disguised Roman use of Greek tradition and mythology. A more logical standpoint would be that the public support for Tarquinius Superbus had been minuscule from the very beginning of his reign. One can look back to Tarquinius Priscus, whose ascension to the throne had been untraditional, as had been Servius Tullius's ascension. The usurpation of the throne from the widely popular Servius Tullus by Tarquin would have been a shock to the plebeian class particularly with its bloody and unconventional nature and the fact that the plebeians loved Tullius which led to resentment of the Etruscan who took the throne. With Superbus's misuse of the citizenry for his massive public work projects and his hubristic nature, the public support throughout his reign would have been low. This is shown through Livy's work as he states that the plebeians have a contempt for the king. Diodorus Siculus also mentions that Superbus had been widely feared by the upper classes of Roman society due to the practice of “slaying the wealthy citizens among the Romans, advancing false charges against them in order to appropriate their possessions.”¹⁷ This would have led to the patrician classes rebelling against the king and throwing their support behind Brutus. Livy also mentions in the second book that the name of Tarquinius had proved to spread fear within the minds of the plebeian masses, and prompted him to ask his fellow consul Collatinus to rescind his name and leave his position in order to quell the public's fears.¹⁸ This statement would show that the Tarquins had proven too powerful during their reign and had widespread public contempt that grew after the inauguration of Tarquinius Priscus. Another

offense to the Roman people would have been the construction of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus itself. While it was an offering to the father of the Roman pantheon, its construction and design were not Roman, as Superbus pulled the majority of the artisans associated with the project from Etruria, leading to an overall Etruscan-styled building. Regardless, the revolt led by Junius Brutus would have garnered widely popular support. It was the people who followed Brutus and Collatinus and ousted the monarchy from the city, ending the illegal and nontraditional line of monarchs.¹⁹ The idea that Rome had a revolution to displace the monarchy as stated in the annals is debated by modern historians, with some believing that the monarchy actually evolved into the republic and the political position of *rex* was split into the executive branch of two consuls.²⁰

The hatred of monarchy would persevere through Rome's history, and both the plebeians and patricians of Rome would continue to fight a battle against all who would dare to be labeled as king. Indeed, it was under Junius Brutus that the people pledged an oath to protect their new found *libertas* at all costs and to oust any man who wish to possess the power of a monarch from the city of Rome, and this idea of thought would persist within Roman political thought until the end of the Roman Empire (emperors did not use the term *rex* within their official title, as the emperor was supposedly voted into office by his colleagues in the Senate for life).

According to Roman legend, the first three kings Romulus, Numa Pompilius, and Tullus Hostilius continually expanded Rome's borders through war and peace treaties with the neighboring tribes of the Veii, Sabines, Etruscans, Albans, amongst many others. This lead to a growing population within the Roman city, and a number of new *patrician* families being created after the envelopment of many of the surrounding tribes. Throughout this period, there are hardly any sources on social struggles outside of the overthrow of the Tarquinii family in Rome. This

chapter of Rome's history remains the least understood, as the majority of our information on this period comes from reliable archaeological finds rather than factual text based resources. Even Livy states that much of his work relied on hearsay and the facts from previous historians whose accounts on the Roman Monarchy also came from gossip and rumor.²¹

With the fall of the Roman Monarchy and the new government set up by Junius Brutus and his colleagues, the way was paved for the creation of the Roman Republic, yet also for the class struggles that would ensue in the years to come as the patrician led society of Rome would slowly succumb to the plights of the common man.

Chapter II

The Early Roman Republic, the Roman Constitution, and Twelve Tables

With the ousting of the Roman Monarchy which was allegedly tainted by the Tarquins, the patricians of Rome had to create a new form of improvisational government that would last until the Romans established a firm defense against the return of a monarchist government. This newly created government would be built to ensure that no man could hold too much power in order to name himself *rex*. The new Roman government was split into multiple higher and lower assemblies in order to create a system of checks and balances so that no assembly could become too powerful. The two higher assemblies, the Senate and *Concilium Plebis*, proposed legislation and the three lower assemblies would then approve of the laws in question, and these assemblies were the the *comitia curiata*, *comitia tributa*, and the *comitia centuriata*. Each of these assemblies was essential in the functioning of the state, and each formed an early form of checks-and-balances within the Roman Republic.

The Senate, although not the premier body in passing legislation for the state, was the body which controlled all foreign policy, monetary assets, and administration of the provinces of Italy. According to Livy, the Roman Senate was a council originally created as a group of advisors to the Roman King under Romulus, and, during the Republic, they were an advisory council to the consuls, though they had numerous more powers than in the Roman Kingdom. Polybius notes that if the Senate disliked the consul, then the consul would find it incredibly difficult to achieve his goals as the Senate would obstruct him in his efforts.²² Yet, it is stated by Festus that the Senate was a creation of the consul and all Senators were personally chosen by

the consul as it had been during the Roman Monarchy by the *rex*.²³ Though the choice of a senator could be personal, it was also established by government ranking, and the majority of Senators were pro-magistrates who had attained a praetorship. This would be changed after the Conflict of the Orders when the *plebiscitum Ovinium* of 312 B.C.E. placed the role of senatorial appointment to the Roman censorship, and Sulla would later reform the Senate by allowing those who had attained the rank of quaestor or aedile into the Senate.²⁴

The *concilium plebis* was run only by the plebeians. The history of this assembly is marked with civil strife and it would eventually become the most powerful assembly in terms of passing laws in the Roman Republic after the Conflict of the Orders. Its duties were the creation and ratification of all legislation for the common people of Rome. At its height, the Senate could not repeal any legislation from the *concilium plebis*, although laws made by the assembly for the common people did not apply to the aristocracy unless they were ratified by the Senate, and therefore would pertain to all Roman citizens. It also served to elect the *tribuni plebis* and the plebeian aediles.

The *comitia curiata* was the premier assembly of the Early Republic. Owing its name to the thirty *curiae* of the Roman people during the Roman Monarchy, the Curiate Assembly consisted of the wealthiest men in Rome and was therefore abundantly aristocratic. The assembly was called upon for the elections of the promagistrate offices of Praetor, Censor, and Consul, and was the only body which could ratify the status of those elected to these positions.²⁵ In the early Republic, the Curiate Assembly's word had great meaning on the election process and ratification of any magistrate, but evidence in the Later Republic shows that tradition was held less highly, as many magistrates of the time would come to power through the word of the people that had elected the official, or demagoguery (Though Cicero states this, he does not

explain why. The loss of tradition and respect of the *Lex Curiata* could be due to the *Lex Licinia Sextia* in 367-366 B.C.E. which allowed the plebeians to attain the consulship.²⁶ Consequentially, all positions of Roman government during the Republic would be available to the plebeians, and since the *comitia curiata* was primarily aristocratic in its origins and functions, less value was held upon it by the plebeian magistrates in the Late Republic).²⁷

The *comitia centuriata* was an assembly brought to fruition by Servius Tullius. The name of this assembly was a direct link to the one hundred groups that civilians were placed under due to their stature in Rome. Purposes of the Centuriate Assembly were multifold, with judicial, legislative, and executive orders all being brought before them for judgement and ratification. It was also the only assembly that could legally declare war on a foreign nationality, and the assembly was also responsible for the ratification of the elections of consuls, praetors, and censors. Acceptance into the *comitia centuriata* was through military service rather than prestige and wealth. At the time of its inception, the assembly was based on the organization of the Roman Legions, as a century in a legion was a small unit of 100 men. This is of interest because Livy states that there were around 143 centuries in Rome during the reign of Servius Tullius, but this number could be exaggerated.²⁸ However, the *comitia centuriata* was not based solely on one hundred men, and positions of power were given to those who owned the most property. An example would be a legate in the Roman Army on the assembly who, although outnumbered by lower-ranked soldiers, would have a much larger influence than those soldiers due to the amount of land that he owned (Roman military prestige and rank were attained in this way, and this was transferred to the assembly). This assembly was almost inconsequential by the ending of the Republic, as the *concilium plebis* had gained monumental amounts of power in passing legislation (Cicero states this in *De Re Publica*).²⁹

The *comitia tributa* was a meeting of the original tribes of Rome from the Monarchy, and could be mixed with the patrician and plebeian populous. It is not a committee of the original aristocratic tribes. Since Theodor Mommsen, modern historians have argued that the *comitia tributa* was a meeting of the whole populous rather than the aristocracy. The functions of this assembly included the judicial affairs of the state as well as the passage of legislation and to consult one another on the electoral process.

The government was headed by the consulship, similar in power to the king, but the power was split between two individuals in order to prevent one from attempting to make himself king. The consul was the highest office within the regular line of Roman magistrates. They alone headed the meetings of the senatorial body, and they were endowed with the *imperium* to command Rome's legions. In the early Roman Republic, only patricians were allowed seats in the Senate, unless extraordinary circumstances called for otherwise, and only patricians could be consul. This would create tension between the aristocracy and the growing wealth of the upper plebeian classes in the centuries to come during the Conflict of the Orders. Though the consulship was the most powerful position of the Republic, over the many centuries since its inception in 509 the consulship would undergo many changes in order to relieve some of the arduous tasks allocated to this position. Other positions would be created in order to execute certain duties such as judicial and city planning and administration in order for the consul to command the legions in war, as Rome was almost constantly at war with its neighboring tribes and nations. (This would be changed by the *Plebiscitum Ovinium* in 312 B.C.E., which would allow all people to have the possibility of attaining seats in the Roman government).

Below the consuls were the offices of the praetors, a position that was not created until the Conflict of the Orders, where the praetors took over the duties of the consuls during the time period in which they were absent (in the early days of the Republic the praetors were the consuls). It consisted of those of the upper tiers of government who held *imperium*, *ius*, and *potestas*. A praetor could either be the commander of a legion of Rome or an elected magistrate who had risen through the ranks of Roman government. After the Second Punic War, additional praetors were added to the senatorial roster in order to govern newly acquired provinces.

The highest of the promagistrate positions was the dictator or *magister populi*. The dictator was an elected official only brought to power in times of great crisis for the Republic such as war, social issues that threatened the disruption of the state, or major agricultural issues. To be given the position of dictator, the Senate had to come to a consensus on one individual and at least one consul had to approve. The elected dictator was then granted *imperium* over all other magistrates, and was accompanied by twice the number of lictors to signify his position. In context, the dictator was an elected king, as he was given absolute power over all magistrates and the *populi Romanus* and could implement rulings such as immediate judicial judgment in presiding court cases, the authority to put anyone to death that he saw fit, and complete control of the citizen army. In order to counteract this immense power, the dictator was required to step down from his office after a six month term, could be elected as many times as was necessary (this was changed when Sulla attained the dictatorship and attempted to make himself a *dictator perpetuo*, although he stepped down only after only one year as dictator for life) and could potentially face charges on unpopular decisions made during his term. When the dictator was elected, he was required to elect a lieutenant labeled the *magister equitum* (master of the horse). The *magister equitum* was a secondary advisor to the dictator, and was also in charge of the

cavalry, as the dictator was in charge of the infantry. Mommsen states that it was in the Roman constitution that any legate or magistrate in charge of a body of infantry was prohibited from mounting a horse. Although the dictator had supreme power, the plebeian magistrates could still make his job potentially difficult via the People's Tribune.³⁰

The *tribunis plebis*, or People's Tribune, was a position gained by the plebeians after their first attempt at revolt against the growing power of the aristocracy. The tribune was the only plebeian position allowed to sit in the Senate chambers, and had to be held by a plebeian. The power of the tribune was enormous, as he could veto any motion or legislation that any magistrate proposed, even the consuls and dictator. The tribune did not have any *imperium*, but was the head figure that spoke for the *concilium plebis* and could only be elected through them. The tribunes were feared by the Senate for their power of veto over all matters, and the people feared that the Senate would attempt to eliminate the position or those that the Senate disliked that occupied the position. Therefore the choice was made to embody the tribune with the special privilege of sacrosanctity, and it was considered high treason to wrongly touch the tribune.

The Roman constitution was a set of unwritten laws that applied to the citizenry of Rome. During the Republic's inception the patricians were able to use this to their own personal gain by interpreting the laws in whichever way they saw fit, and likewise whichever way benefitted them the most since only the nobility was allowed to hold government seats during the Early Republic. The consequences of this were clearly shown in the early Republic when the plebeians attempted to secede from the state for the second time, and in consequence a board of ten elected officials, *Decemviri*, were placed in charge of the government in place of the Senate and consuls in order to inscribe the spoken laws of the constitution onto tablets which would then be placed in the Forum so that all could see the laws written in stone. After the dispersal of the *Decemviri*,

the XII Tables of Rome were given to the public. The XII Tables are a zenith in Early Republican folklore and mythology, because though they are widely mentioned by writers of the Late Republic such as Livy and Cicero, there is hardly any substantial evidence as to what information the tablets actually entailed and there are no extant copies of the XII Tables remaining. What was inscribed upon them can loosely be assumed due to changes in the constitutions laws over the centuries and through the mentioning of a few of the laws of the constitution by Cicero and Livy. The central points of the constitution of the XII Tables likely focused on justice, credit, land ownership, and governing of the family. Of creditors, the Early Republic was notorious for allocating credit to those who could not pay it back and were forced to enter a contract of servitude known as *nexum* until the debt had been repaid. It was in the XII Tables that the problems with *nexum* were addressed and identified as unlawful.³¹

Chapter III

The Conflict of the Orders

While much of Rome's history is well-documented by modern and ancient historians, a large blank period exists between the foundation of the Republic and the Gallic sack of Rome, and it is this period which is the most pivotal time of Roman history. In the last chapter, the functions of the assemblies and the different positions within the Roman government and their origins were explained, but the true details of these positions' origins are still a mystery, as no written records exist from before 323 B.C.E., and we can only rely on the fragmentary writings of the historians before Livy and Dionysus of Halicarnassus, and historically whom they relied on in their works, to produce accurate facts. It is widely debated by many scholars on just how much one should trust the information given to us by the ancient sources, but Kurt Raaflaub believes that the information given to us is more reliable than most give credit. The example he places on the significance of Roman sources obtained in the past is that before the complete analytic writing of Rome's history by Livy, most Romans were quite aware of their own family's history and significance in the building of the state. As much tradition was passed down orally, the importance of the verbal narrative was of high value when literacy was not a path all wished to pursue, albeit at the cost of precise retelling of the past.³²

Historians are faced with the problem of the lack of evidence during the time period of the Early Republic. It is detailed by Livy and others, but no clear source material from these

periods has been recovered by archaeologists, which begs the question: How much written source material was actually created during these times for the ancient scholars to utilize? Written records from ancient Rome are rare, but finding written records before the Gallic Sack of Rome has proven fruitless as of yet. It is mentioned by Livy that the records before this time were lost during the Gallic Sack, as the building containing the records was torched. This leaves Livy with only a few options for the facts of the period before this, oral sources, the *Annales Maximi*, and the XII Tables. The *Annales Maximi* were the chronological writings of the pontifex maximus and important events that occurred every year. Though the *annales* are mentioned multiple times by the ancient sources, it is still relatively unclear about the information they actually held. It is safe to conclude that these writings did hold significant historical events. Assuming that the *Annales* were filled with the events of the past, this would have been the premier source for Livy and Dionysius, yet is highly unlikely that the pontiffs would have elaborated on any topic further than the fact that it happened on a specific date during the reign of certain consuls. However, the noble families which had been present since the inception of the Roman Monarchy would most likely have kept their family history as fresh in their minds and pass the stories on of their ancestors, and this is one source that could be potentially reliable. The custom of *mos maiorum* ensured that the customs, names, and deeds of the ancestors were not forgotten, and played a major part in Roman religious and community life. The name and merit of one's family held high esteem within the Roman community; having a complete record of one's ancestors and their deeds could allow one to profit largely through name alone. This ensured a thorough detailing of a family's history in the oral tradition. This did not mean that complete attention to detail was told, exact years of events would certainly have been forgotten and the words and speeches of any individual cannot be provided word for word by anyone.³³

Perhaps the greatest inconvenience to the modern historian about the ancient texts is the placement of speeches within the text for which there are no known sources, and are most certainly fictitious in their nature and used to fill in the gaps or provide some form of entertainment to the reader. In the works of Livy and Dionysius are examples of this sort of “history”, such as the speeches given by Marcus Junius Brutus against the king after Lucretia’s death. Any Roman alive at the time of these event would not have remembered these speeches verbatim, if they or Junius Brutus existed at all. It has been proven that Roman historians were encouraged to place speeches within the text of their histories and they could be fictitious in nature as long as they held to the story and did not produce untrue facts. Given this liberty one would assume that the ancient historian could place whatever information he wanted in his works, yet there was a high emphasis amongst historians to detail all factual evidence that could be obtained before filling in the blank. Knowing all of this, how does one conclude that the facts from the ancient sources are reliable? The sad fact is that we cannot know for certain the events that transpired, and the appearance of evidence to the contrary is out of the question. Therefore we must use what has been left to us by the ancient scholars as best as we can and attempt to discern which material is fictitious and which is factual.

The period known as the Conflict of the Orders by modern historians lasted from the first *secessio* by the plebeians in 494 B.C.E. until the creation of the *lex Hortensia* in 284 B.C.E., and marks the period when Rome’s first great foreign and internal conflicts helped to shape its future and define it as a powerful sovereignty in the Mediterranean. Markedly, this period is the time in which Republic learned the most about itself and how its specific style of government worked through failure and concessions. But it is perhaps best not to summarize the Conflict of the Orders in a short paragraph, but to instead look at it through a linear narrative.

As previously mentioned, the period known as the Conflict of the Orders is generally accepted to have started around 494 B.C.E., and this was due to the patricians and their overwhelming power in Rome's political power, as well as the majority ownership of Rome's public estate. The nobility charged exorbitant prices for the use of their lands by the public and only the wealthy amongst the plebeians could afford to plow upon their soil.³⁴ The aristocracy passed laws that mainly benefitted themselves, and kept the plebeians from government power. Controversial laws (like the law that prevented intermarriage between patricians and plebeians) were also put into effect to further separate the social orders. The overwhelming aristocratic power during the republic's inception spread contempt and fear among the lower class or *proletarii*, and caused great concern over whether the government would indeed serve the people's best intentions.

The first major attempt at the reformation of the Roman state was in 486 B.C.E. when the aristocrat and Roman hero Spurius Cassius Viscellinus took his third consulship. Viscellinus had seen the corruption of the nobility and their hold on the majority of the Roman estate keeping for themselves and not distributing it amongst those in need. Viscellinus watched how they split that wealth and power among themselves after the conclusion of the war that had been recently won against the Hernici through which Rome acquired territory through a peace treaty which Livy states the Romans gained two thirds of public domain from the Hernicians. In his consulship Viscellinus proposed a law of agrarian reforms, in which he hoped to end civil strife by allotting land from the patrician aristocracy by stating that land was part of the public treasury and could be allotted to those most in need. Viscellinus did so with the greatest of patriotic intentions, relying on his fame to help carry the bill through the Senate. The Senate would not accept such a reform which must have seemed almost too radical in their eyes at the time. Instead the Senate

vetoed his law and accused Visellinus of high treason, accusing him of demagoguery and attempting to make himself king with public support and had him put to death. The idea of agrarian reform would be lost with Visellinus, and would not appear again until centuries later when the Gracchi brothers would push for legislation of similar attributes to be passed.³⁵

With the crises rising from the plebeians and patricians growing out of hand, an agreement was made around 453 B.C.E. that a temporary council of ten magistrates who “*might propose measures that should be advantageous to both sides and secure equal liberty*”³⁶. Their term of one year would have been acceptable to both parties, though it was only a temporary solution to the crisis at hand. As mentioned before it was only composed of the nobility, and they were in charge of formally writing the Roman constitution, which would eventually become the XII Tables of Rome. The first year of the Decemvirate was a resounding success for those in charge as the public mass adored them, and they bathed in the excess of public support. As their terms came to a close, the decision was made that the constitution that they had created was still lacking material, and it was announced that another term in office was needed in order to complete the constitution. This time a unified decision on the election of the officials in charge of the council did not occur and gave way to a chaotic contest for seats upon the decemvirate and this led to the public distrust of the assembly and this was particularly true of Appius Claudius who was known for his arrogance towards the plebeians. He is said to have appointed himself as the presiding magistrate during the second election. Appius surrounded himself with plebeian magistrates who acted as his political cronies and began a reign of terror similar to the later French Revolution in an attempt to consolidate his power. This was unlawful in Rome as offices of Roman government could not be held by the same person more than once in the sequence of a year and was seen by many as an attempt by Claudius to make himself king. Rome’s senate

reconvened and ordered troops into the city to clear the *decemvirs* from power, and the *decemviri* willingly gave up their seats in the face of a violent downfall. This story is widely suspect, and many historians agree that the family of the Claudii have been shown in a negative light by Roman annalists; this raises the question as to whether the violent reign of terror under Appius Claudius existed at all.³⁷

Following the restoration of the constitutional government in 451 B.C.E., the Roman Senate incorporated the final two tables into the XII Tables and placed them in the forum for the public. It was during this consular year that the Valerio-Horatian Laws were drawn and implemented. These laws gave the plebeians the right to convene in the *concilium plebis* and create their own legislation that could be applied to the Roman populous, but would only be applicable to the entirety of Roman citizens if also passed through the *comitia centuriata*. Of secondary importance was the creation of the sacrosanctity of the *tribunis plebis*. And thirdly the right of appeal was enacted to situations where a magistrate intentionally intervened in the affairs of the election of another magistrate who had no appeal was to be sentenced to death. It allowed the people to elect their tribune without outside interference from the aristocracy who would try to install their own puppets as the tribune of plebs.³⁸

The plebeians now had a large amount of power in the Senate and a legislative council of their own; yet it was the Senate that still controlled the majority of the government and public affairs. In particular, while the XII Tables restricted the judicial misgivings wrought by the magistrates and burgesses of the Republic, the consuls were still at the head of all judicial matters as well as all facets of the government. In fact the consuls held too much *imperium*, and that the powers of the office had to be reduced in order to establish equilibrium among the social classes. It is stated in an addendum to the Valerio-Horatian laws that quaestors be nominated and

elected by the people instead of being directly appointed by the consuls. The elected quaestor would not be of assistance to the consul in power, but to his successor. This was a move to remove some power from the consul, and it would be further consolidated in order to allow plebeians to run for the position in 420 B.C.E. The next significant step, according to Livy, is the procurement of the consulship for the plebeians. According to Livy in 445 B.C.E. the *tribunis plebis*, Gaius Canuleius, attempted to pass two major legislative acts in order to change the standing of the plebeians in Roman society. The first was a legislative act allowing the intermarriage between those of patrician and plebeian birth, and the second was an attempt to allow plebeians to run for the consulship. These major reforms would have undoubtedly been negatively viewed by the patrician senators who put forward a motion of their own to please the plebeians but would prevent them from obtaining the office of consul. The proposed motion stated that military tribunes would run the government in specified years instead of the consuls; it appears that this happened fifty-one times between the ratification of this legislation in 444 B.C.E. until its repeal in 367 B.C.E., when the legislation was repealed in order to make way for more progressive laws. Though Livy states that this law was put into effect by the nobility to stifle the efforts of the plebeians,³⁹ Mommsen states that it was passed out of direct need for more field commanders as Rome was engaged in multiple wars at the time and two consuls could not effectively engage on more than their respective fronts.⁴⁰ If this theory is to be proven, then the establishment of the praetorship in 367 B.C.E. qualifies as concrete evidence, as *praetors* were given consular military *imperium* which would allow for multiple armies to continue to be fielded at one time across a broad front. As Rome expanded its borders it needed more field armies, and in the beginning of the period of the military tribunate, only three existed but as the years went by and Rome expanded her borders, (i.e. the capture of the city of Fidenae in 426

B.C.E.) the number of tribunes was raised from three to four, and by 367 there were six military tribunes.⁴¹

The longest lasting change in consular procedures was the removal of the consular duties by the adjustment of the budget. This move was designed to remove the chance of plebeians from interfering with the budget of which the aristocracy owned the majority, and it also removed excess duties that could be a hindrance to the performance of the consuls. Some of these duties were placed under the position of the censor, a position not particularly sought after by the plebeians as it had little appeal due to its specific duties during the Early Republic, but it was used as a vessel to carry the prestigious *imperium* that the *equites* sought to keep only for themselves. It was for this reason that there were two censors placed in the Senate in 434 B.C.E. and the patricians would covet the censorship more over the years to come as the climax of one's political career in the *cursus honorum*. Though Livy states that from his sources the period was a climactic point in the Conflict of the Orders, modern historians state that the changes that took place in the Roman political system were in response to military needs: the removal of powers from the consul to the censor was designed to allow the consul to focus more on military matters, and the military tribunes were a direct result of Rome's military expanding with more borders and colonies to protect.⁴² As the years passed from 444 B.C.E. and the number of tribunes increased, the proportion of tribunes to consuls in power grew disproportionately. Between the years 444-427 B.C.E. the military tribunes held power five of the years in that time period, but between 405 B.C.E. and 367 B.C.E. the consular tribunes controlled the government almost every year. While meeting the military needs of Rome, the military tribunes also met the growth of administrative needs within the confines of the republican government. (This is again shown by the praetorship in the form of the praetor in charge of the judicial lawsuits in the city, which

was previously a constitutional duty of the consul. As a result, the aedileship was created to further lessen the social administrative responsibilities of the consuls by giving the aediles jurisdiction over the creation and implementation of public events, the administration of the marketplace, and the administration of building projects in Rome's social sphere.) All these changes allowed the consuls to continue to finitely focus their efforts on military matters and the protection of the state.⁴³

The period between 444 B.C.E. and 367 B.C.E. is marked with civil unrest according to Livy and Dionysius, and it is mentioned that ambitious men attempted to gain unlimited power through demagoguery. First mentioned is Spurius Maelius, an *equite* who, during a time of severe grain shortage, used his own funds to politically elevate himself by purchasing grain for the *populus*. Livy states that his plan was to acquire absolute power and overthrow the Republic, and it is here where our sources differ on how this situation was dealt with by the Romans.⁴⁴ We have two different accounts on how Maelius was dealt with. The first account comes from Livy stating that in order to deal with Maelius the Senate implemented a dictator in 439 B.C.E., and it was not he that dealt the killing blow, but rather his master of horse Gaius Servilius Ahala. Our other surviving account is from Cicero in his book *De Senectute* in which Maelius is defeated by Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, and Cincinnatus was made dictator specifically to deal with the grain shortages and with Maelius.⁴⁵ Even though the stories differ, both suggest that there was a major grain shortage in that year and the story is seen by many modern historians as etiological, with little evidence to support the facts, and many see the story as a way for Romans to justify the existence of familial names and the names of certain public works.⁴⁶

In this same period we see two of Rome's greatest cultural figures whom the aristocrats would set as examples of the embodiment of Roman ideals and thought. The noble Cincinnatus

who, after being exempt of all his family's wealth and power, was chosen for the dictatorship while tilling his fields in order to bring peace to Rome internally and externally. Upon succeeding in these endeavors, Cincinnatus retired from politics well before his six month term as dictator was up and was seen as a national hero. This grandiose story is more a political guideline for the patricians than for the plebs, as it was the same Cincinnatus who opposed the movements of the plebs for greater autonomy in the Senate, and therefore his actions only applied to the nobility. The second legendary figure is Marcus Furius Camillus, the "Second Founder of Rome", conqueror of Veii, victor over the Gauls, who was granted the dictatorship five times, and receiver of four triumphs which made Camillus one of the most celebrated figures in Roman history. It is widely debated whether Camillus accomplished these feats as is written by Livy and Plutarch, but if the tale of archaic Roman records and their destruction in 390 B.C.E. during the Gallic Sack of Rome is true, then the records of the time period after the sack of Rome in 390 B.C.E.⁴⁷ would have existed in Livy's time and would indeed have Camillus's name and deeds inscribed not only in the archival records but also in the pontiff records. Though Camillus is remembered primarily for his military exploits, it is his intervention in social affairs which earns him greater respect. Camillus was an advocate of plebeian rights throughout his career and many senators saw him as a threat to the existing orders. Many tried to have him arrested on the charges of attempting to install a tyranny, but his massive support by the plebeians, who saw him as Romulus reincarnated prevented any such actions from taking place. Alongside Camillus's fame was Marcus Manlius, the consul of the year 392, who held out in Rome's citadel against the Gauls. Livy states that when Rome was forced to pay the Gauls (a tradition which partly holds true, as the Gauls were most likely bribed to leave Rome) and the plebeians were forced to help the nobility pay these indemnities, it was Manlius who rose to the people's calls in order

ease their suffering. Labeled as one of the first of the *populares* in the Roman tradition Manlius used his own money to help free the plebeians from the new debt they had been plunged into by the patriciate, and was quickly accused of attempting to attain among the plebeians, and in 376 B.C.E. two of the consular tribunes (Gaius Licinius Stolo and Lucius Sextius Lateranus) began to push for greater rights among the plebeians in government, and over the next nine years the ideas that they proposed slowly formed into law. It was during Camillus's last dictatorship in 367 B.C.E. that three major laws were enacted. Labeled as the Licinio-Sextian laws after their creators, this set of laws stated three major changes for the plebeians, the first was that of debt installments, the second was that no person be able to own more than 300 acres of land, and the third was the abolition of the consular tribunes and the reestablishment of the consulship permanently, and that henceforth one consul could be a plebeian. Many historians mark this law as the end of the Conflict of the Orders, but note the key wording in this law, in that plebeians "could" be elected consul. It would not be until 342 B.C.E. when Lucius Genucius proposed an amendment to the Licinio-Sextian laws which stated that a plebeian must be one of the two consuls. By this point the social situation in Rome was beginning to fall into the background as Rome began to involve herself in large scale armed-conflicts against Samnium. Rome's politics now focused on her defense and expansion across Italia, but the social distress between the classes of the Conflicts of the Orders showed that Rome was weak internally, particularly by its aristocracy who believed that the government should be run by themselves. This would be used against them many for many centuries in the future by men of ambition and would lead to the destruction of the Republic.⁴⁸

Chapter IV

The Roman Military, the Expansion of Rome and Class Struggle

Rome's might was spread throughout the world of antiquity by its military and its continuous wars of aggression and defense in the name of the city. Since Rome's inception its military played an integral part in shaping the future of the Roman people. The Roman military was initially a copy of the Etruscan and Greek military style which focused primarily on the use of the phalanx, although Romans had a unique habit among the nations of the ancient world and tended to copy what they found to be most effective from their enemies and use it for themselves.⁴⁹ A primary example would be the *gladius*, or sword, for which the Romans would be so famous for, a weapon copied directly from the tribes of the peoples of Hispania. Roman ingenuity and a sense of duty to enact in war was directly responsible for their quick expansion across the Mediterranean. It was also due to the men at arms who defended their country and fought unquestionably against almost insurmountable odds at times. But how did Rome keep an almost undying loyalty within its armed ranks when the citizenry of the state was so unequal in almost all social aspects?

In Rome's early history, the Roman Monarchy employed only members of the three founding tribes into the military. According to the ancient sources, it was during the reign of Servius Tullius that the military was transformed after the implementation of the Roman census. It later became the duty of the Romans to enter military service, as this not only allowed the lower classes to find a new occupation, but also allowed them to rise to higher ranks of prestige within Roman society. The structure of the military was constructed from the Roman socio-economic model, with lower castes of individuals inhabiting the lower tiers, and the nobility within the higher tiers of the military. The opportunity to rise in the ranks due to one's own prowess on the battlefield and achievements in the field for the safety of improvement of the state gave the plebeians some reconciliation in the fact that they were now able to raise their families name to higher social orders. Although this is recorded in Livy's works, we cannot rely solely on the texts given to us as written records about the military before this time would most likely have dissipated or been completely destroyed during Rome's sack in 393 B.C.E. If one does try to trust the sources, then it is obvious that the military of Rome grew exponentially during the Roman Monarchy in both manpower and tactics.⁵⁰

If the stories of the Etruscan kings Tarquin and Tullius are true, then the adoption of Etruscan culture for the betterment of the state and the improvement of civil life led to the adoption of Etruscan military tactics. It is widely recognized that the Etruscans borrowed heavily from the Greeks, and Rome would have been influenced heavily by Greek hoplite warfare during this time. Based on archaeological finds from the surrounding tribes of Rome during the Kingdom, it is certain that Rome began to expand slowly by colonizing the areas of the Pontine Valley during the reign of Superbus as prescribed by Livy, which would lead to the assumption that Rome's military, though small when compared to many of the surrounding tribes and

notably against the Etruscans, made up for its size with tactics and superiority in armaments. Livy notes that the Sabines, Volscians, Albans, and Aequians were amongst the first tribes with which the Romans engaged in seasonal campaigns. Evidence at sites like Satricum and Caprificio di Cisterna show early Roman colonization into the Pontine Region southeast of Rome took place and allows the reader of Livy's works some factual knowledge on his military research. A major problem which rose within Rome throughout its history was the growing plebeian class. In order to prevent civil war within Rome's original territory since the nobility owned the majority of the land, the state waged a series of wars in order to gain new territory to colonize and to allow the prosperity of the growing middle and farming class to continue. Livy states that Rome's expansion was due to the increasing aggressiveness of the tribes surrounding its borders, and in order prevent further aggression, the state punished those aggressors by either colonizing part of their territory or eliminating them completely and incorporating their population into the Roman state and transforming their territory into Rome's.⁵¹

Rome's geographical position made her vulnerable to attacks from multiple fronts and it is made clear throughout roman history that Rome had to constantly fight to protect its borders against incursions from the peoples surrounding it. To the northwest the Etruscans across the Tiber River threatened the city-state of Rome by their sheer size and prominence amongst the tribes of northern Italy. To the east and northeast the tribes of the Aequi and Sabines, and to the south the tribes of the Volscii, Albanii, and Hernici. All posed threats to Rome and were at war with Rome at one point or another. If the mythological past of Rome's foundations has any credibility, then it was the Sabines and Albans with whom Rome first entered into conflict. According to the Roman legend of the Rape of the Sabine women, the Sabines immediately declared war upon Rome after the seizure of their women. This war may or may not have any

credibility, but the war with the Albans, who were among Rome's closest neighbors and according to Roman myth the direct lineage of the founders of their city. During Rome's monarchy, it is said that the Sabines, Albans, and Etruscans attained the crown, and each of these civilizations contributed in one way or another to Rome's military strength. By 509 B.C.E. the Romans had gained independence from the Etruscans and become an independent city-state in the form of an oligarchic republic. Until this point, Rome's military exploits had largely been confined to the vicinity of Latium, but now all the tribes surrounding Rome were potential enemies. In order to cope with the onset of enemies on all sides, the Romans created alliances with tribes like the Hernici in order to keep peace between these two factions, and also to rely on them in times of war. In the fifth century, Rome defended its borders against the Aequi and the Volsci in the South led by Coriolanus, and it was the Dictator Cincinnatus who prevailed against overwhelming odds in 458 B.C.E. against the Sabines and Aequi and again in 438 B.C.E. against Spurius Maelius.⁵²

It was during the fourth century B.C.E. that Rome began to expand its borders through acquisitioned conquest and started first with the subjugation of the people of Veii in Tuscany in 396 B.C.E. This was the first step in establishing a beachhead across the Tiber River to the northeast, allowing for further campaigns against the Etruscans in the future. Unbeknownst to the Romans, the Celts and Gauls of the northwest had been colonizing and marching south through the Apennine region and were quickly subduing the Etruscans as they marched towards Rome, ultimately sacking the city in 393 B.C.E. Widely heralded as the most humiliating incident of Rome's history, it was the turning point in Rome's foreign policy. After the entry of an enemy force into the city, the Servian walls were rebuilt, and Roman politicians focused on an aggressive expansionist strategy in order to secure the border territories surrounding the city not

only to put as much distance between an invading enemy and the city of Rome itself, but also to subdue the tribes that had risen against Rome after the Gallic retreat, and to pacify them and annex them into Rome itself. It is here that one sees that the social troubles for Rome began to build again in earnest, as multiple new peoples were either being incorporated into the state or wholly subjugated into a Roman client state, and with this came the want for citizenry of Rome, which the Romans held to greedily as it was their citizenry and laws that were tied to citizenship that kept the Republic together, and one of the few things that the plebeians did not wish to share with the outside world.

In order to secure its borders Rome began to establish colonies, but quickly found that colonization of a local people meant wanton resistance from localized resistance movements. In order to counter these movements, the Senate authorized the *Civis Romanus*, a practice that stated that all peoples of a territory colonized by Rome would be granted *Municipium*, and could enjoy all the legal rights and privileges that the citizens of Rome proper enjoyed. In its first stages, the *Civis Romanum* was only granted to a few minor border territories such as Tusculum in 381 B.C.E., but as Rome's influence in Italy grew over the next few centuries this practice would also extend to more peoples due to Rome's annexation of large territorial expanses. With the acquisition of frontier colonies came a wider base for military conscription, which would allow for the fielding of larger military forces across multiple fronts. With this knowledge, it is a wonder that any of the colonies would actually fall in line with Rome's projected goals, but it seems that the greater threat of the Celts helped to unify the peoples of Latium, as a coordinated and concerted group could easily dispatch an invading force rather than a single city-state. Another factor that kept the Latin cities under Rome was a treaty made between Rome and Carthage in 347 B.C.E. which stated that the Carthaginians would not harm any Roman colonies,

but it also stated that should any colony under Rome's yoke defect and proclaim itself independent, then the Phoenician state was given full privileges at Rome's consent to terrorize and ransack the city, but should they conquer it, the city was to be given to Rome. With these restrictions, even if a city wanted to rebel against Rome, it would almost certainly be defeated.⁵³

After the destruction of the capitol in 387 B.C.E., the Romans engaged in multiple disputes and armed conflicts with their localized neighbors over the next five decades (the Volsci, Hernici, Aequi, and Etruscans). After a series of protracted wars, the Romans finally annexed all territory within the region of the Pomptine Plains in 338 after the capitulation of the Volscian city of Antium on the Tyrrhenian Coast, and gave Rome a border with two new nationalities and adversaries, the Greeks in Campania situated around Neapolis and the Samnite Confederation in Samnium which consisted of the mountainous regions of the central southern Italian peninsula.. Both nationalities were considerable adversaries, as the Greeks were another nation great in strength, yet divided significantly due to their reliance on their city-state government system, and mainland Greece was becoming disconnected from Magna Graecia as war with Macedonia and Philip II was preoccupying the major city-states. Neapolis was on its own, yet it felt a greater threat from the Samnite Confederation than from Rome. Rome wanted to secure its frontier, and was initially discouraged from engaging in an open war with the Samnites, eventually signing a loose treaty with the Samnite Confederation in 353 B.C.E. Initial tensions between these two Latin nations began when the city of Capua called for aid from the Romans in order to stop their own countrymen and offered their Campanian territory to Rome. This led to an outburst by the Samnites, and another treaty was formed in 342 B.C.E. between the Samnites and Rome acknowledging that Rome now owned the territory surrounding Capua.

Four years later, with the annexation of the Volscian lands and Campania, the greatest southern frontier threat that remained was the Samnites.⁵⁴

It was the Greeks who initiated the war between Rome and Samnium, as Rome had its eyes on the prize of Neapolis, a formidable city situated in a defensible harbor bay. The Samnites knew that as well and proceeded to block any further Roman expansion by garrisoning the city preemptively. The Romans called for an act of war against Neapolis and began a long protracted siege against the city until negotiations were held in which the Romans offered Roman citizenship upon the public of Neapolis in return for the colonization of their territory, to which the Neapolitans agreed in 325 B.C.E. According to Livy, Roman successes were furthered by the acquisitions of Paestum and other territories in the Oscian lands during the same period, and the successes of Rome prompted the Lucanians, who were in control of a vast territory south of the Samnites, to form an alliance with Rome in order to withhold aggression from Rome and to allow free access to the pillaging of Tarentum which was at the time restricted by their alliance to Samnium and Samnium's alliance with Tarentum. This allowed the Romans to gain two fronts in the outbreak of war against Samnium. This would not be the easy war as the Romans had expected. The Romans, still using their phalanx tactics, allowed for themselves to be led into the interior of Samnium and decisively defeated at the Caudine Pass, a defeat so serious that the Samnites had planned that the Romans would sue for elongated peace in terms that shortened the Roman border to the boundaries of the original peace treaty between the two nations. The Roman generals accepted these terms, but the Roman Senate did not and forsook the armies who had been dishonored. Though momentarily paralyzed, the Romans regained their strength and assaulted Samnium once more, this time defeating the Samnites decisively and liberating their lost legions. The Roman army also changed its tactics in how it waged war with the creation of

the manipular legion, allowing for the strength of a phalanx, yet also extreme flexibility when needed such as in the mountainous terrain of Samnium. While the Romans advanced through Samnium proper, the Samnites began to assault the Campanian plains and conquered many cities before being defeated outside of Capua by Rome.

While the war with Samnium was raging in the south, hostilities were beginning to rise in the North once more. By the fourth century B.C.E., the Etruscans had faltered in power considerably, and when Rome entered into war with Samnium the Etruscans attacked the Roman frontier in Etruria at Sutrium. In response, the consul of 309, Quintus Fabius Rullianus attacked the Etruscan Frontier cities and marched straight into Etruria's interior. The Etruscans responded with a full force of arms but were sequentially and soundly defeated at the Vadimonian Lake at which point all Etruscan resistance was broken and a peace treaty signed immediately for the cessation of hostilities.

Back in Samnium, war continued uninterrupted for twenty-two years with both sides achieving victories and suffering considerable losses. The final blow came in 304, when two consular armies struck the capitol of Samnium at Bovianum. It was at this point that the Samnites were soundly defeated and sued for a peace treaty with the Romans. Rome was surprisingly lenient in its terms, only asking for small tracts of territory from the border tribes. With Samnium defeated, Rome was now master of all central and southern Italy save the coastal territories of Magna Graecia, and it would be the Greeks who would provoke Rome into war once more. The Tarentines had been at peace with Rome since the closure of the Samnite Wars after signing a peace treaty in 303, and this peace lasted for 21 years until 282 B.C.E. when a Roman fleet anchored outside Tarentum was destroyed by the Tarentines due to an apparent breach of protocol that stated the Roman war ships could not pass the Lacinian Promontory. To

further upset the Romans, the Tarentines quickly assaulted the Roman colony at Thurii and completely overran the garrison stationed there. Curiously the Roman response was to attain peace at once, as it appears the Romans wanted an elongated peace with the Tarentines above all other options. At once the Romans proceeded with equitable peace terms, but were refused by the Tarentines. The Romans offered their terms twice, but were refused both times, and in response the Romans invaded Tarentum, to which the Tarentine citizenry responded by appealing for assistance from Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. Pyrrhus, a man bent on expanding his domain to the furthest corners of the Western world as Alexander had done in the East, could not deny such an offer. After quickly assembling his band of mercenaries, Pyrrhus landed in Italy and quickly marched towards the advancing Roman legions. Time was the enemy of Rome at this point, as the Romans needed to extirpate Pyrrhus's army as quickly as possible in order to prevent him from marching through Samnium and conjuring up bitter feelings towards Rome amongst the Samnites and bring about a full scale revolt. In 279 at the Battle of Heraclea, the two sides met and a great slaughter ensued, and it was the Romans who lost, but at a great cost for Pyrrhus who lost close to the same amount of soldiers as the Romans, hence the term "Pyrrhic Victory".⁵⁵

While costly, this victory allowed the whole of South-Central Italy to unify under Pyrrhus's banner against Rome. This incident shows the social mindset of the Italian peoples conquered by Rome, they would heavily consider rebelling at an instance should Rome lose a battle or two, and this tendency would lead to many rebellions down the line all the way until the great Social War of 90 B.C. when Rome eradicated many of her enemy tribes and annexed all territory directly to Roman control in all aspects. Pyrrhus wished to make peace with Rome, and Rome responded negatively, stating that it would not make peace so long as a foreign army

remained in Italy. At this point Pyrrhus attempted to retake Neapolis and Capua, and was again checked by the Romans in a long bloody battle. Pyrrhus then marched on Rome with the hope that the Etruscans would be able to lend assistance to his cause, but to no avail as the consular army in the north had defeated Etruria and was fast approaching Pyrrhus. To Rome's relief, Pyrrhus returned to Epirus after multiple uprisings took place there and left Tarentum to her own devices. The Romans quelled the Samnite uprisings and defeated the Lucanians and Bruttians in the South and the Umbrians in the North in order to effectively cut off any sort of alliance between the two halves of the Italian peninsula. With all these lands secure, Rome assaulted Tarentum with the aid of the Carthaginians and quickly took the city in 271 B.C.E.⁵⁶

Rome's victories had allowed her to gain sovereignty over her neighbors, and this in turn led to the allegiances of these tribes of Italy. Whether they would remain loyal to Rome in the future remained a question for the Romans, but the Roman military had proven that the will of Rome was indeed superior to their enemies, and the virtues and laws of the Republic would quickly become the envy of the tribes which Rome had subdued. With all of these victories, Rome had secured herself as master of the Italian Peninsula and could at last begin to look to herself and fix her interior social problems, but it was not to be so, as soon the Republic's greatest adversary in her entire existence would soon be at war with her: Carthage.

Chapter V

The First Punic War

As Rome had finally acquired all of the territories of peninsular Italy, Carthage, another Mediterranean power was beginning to take an interest in the conquest of the Italian Peninsula. Carthage was a Phoenician colony established during the period when Tyre was expanding its domain across North Africa and Numidia. Carthage was formally established close to the same time Rome was created in 753 B.C.E. Carthage became the single greatest seafaring merchant state in the Western Mediterranean, and had the finest navy in the entire Mediterranean Sea. Its borders were along the coastline of North Africa and southern Spain where the great city of Gades (modern Cadiz) was founded. In Spain the Carthaginians mined precious silver having

largest silver mines in the ancient world which gave them untold wealth. Their trade network extended all the way from the Levant to the coasts of the British Isles and the Ivory Coast of West Africa. Truly there was no greater adversary to Rome's rise to imperialism than Carthage.⁵⁷

Throughout the Early Republican period there is mention of Carthage and her pirates which scoured the Tyrrhenian Sea. Carthage had long hoped to secure the islands surrounding Western Italy, and had subdued Sardinia early on in Roman history around 493 B.C.E. Sicily was the grand prize that the Carthaginians so desperately sought, and had fought countless battles with the Greeks stationed there for control of the isle. During the Third Sicilian War between Carthage and Syracuse between 315 B.C.E. and 307 B.C.E., Carthage emerged victorious and annexed Messana and the surrounding territory of Northeastern Sicily. After Pyrrhus deserted his campaign in mainland Italy, he was sent for by the Syracusans in order to help regain the lost territory of Sicily from the Carthaginian contingent stationed there, as well as displacing the Mamertines, a group of mercenaries from Campania who had been hired during the Third Sicilian War by Agathocles and who held Messana after his death in 289 B.C.E. Pyrrhus arrived quickly and subdued the Carthaginian contingent across most of Sicily. This control was short, as he attempted to capture Lilybaeum, and failing to do so, he abandoned his campaign leaving Sicily to its own defenses, at which point the island was split into three pieces. The Western half, which included the Greek cities of Agrigentum, Gela, Panormus, and Silenus, was under Carthaginian control. The Southeastern portion of Sicily remained in the hands of Syracuse which was the strongest of the Greek city-states in Magna Graecia. In the Northeast the city of Messana and the surrounding territory belonged to the Mamertines. Though the Mamertines were from Italy, many of them preferred not to return home to Campania after its subjugation by Roman expansion in Italy. Over the next two decades the Mamertines expanded

their dominion over Sicily, and gained them notoriety amongst the Syracusans and their king Hiero II in 270 B.C.E.⁵⁸

Fearing a Mamertine attack on Syracuse, Hiero struck first in 270 B.C.E. and defeated the Mamertines in pitched battle at the Longanus River and over the next five years slowly closed in on Messana, besieging it in 265 B.C.E. The Mamertines were in a state of desperation and called upon the Carthaginians for aid, who obliged and sent their fleet to Messana which caused Hiero to withdrawal from the siege. With the siege relieved, the Mamertines now feared the Carthaginians and that they would annex Messana, and so appealed to Rome for assistance. Polybius states that “for a long time the Romans could not make up their minds...”⁵⁹ as the Romans clearly knew that any interference in Sicilian affairs would likely endanger their relations with Carthage, which outside the Carthaginian interference during the Siege of Tarentum had been mostly peaceful through treaties. Polybius states that the Romans also debated fighting on the side of a people “who had committed an identical offence...”⁶⁰ and that it would “be an act of injustice that would be very difficult to defend”⁶¹ for the Romans. Perhaps the largest deterrent from initiating any foreign war was just that, it was a foreign war and the Romans had no experience engaging in conflict outside of Italy. The Romans had grown accustomed to land based fighting on the peninsula; colonies had been spread across the peninsula which their citizens and legions were stationed. To send troops to Sicily was a foreign idea, as it would mean the end of localized warfare for Rome and the beginning of international warfare. If Carthage did not back down after Roman soldiers landed in Sicily, then an elongated war would take place, and the Romans had never fought against an adversary as formidable as Carthage let alone an adversary with absolute control of the seaways. This predicament meant that not only would it be difficult to land troops in Sicily, but that the Carthaginians could land

troops anywhere they wanted in Italy and could block trade routes and commit piracy among the Romans.⁶²

It is for these reasons that the Romans debated aiding the Mamertines, but it was Carthage itself that brought the Senate and *Plebiscitum* together as they saw the danger that Carthage posed. Its dominion over the whole of the Western Mediterranean was imposing and if Sicily were to fall to the Carthaginians, then what would prevent Carthage from invading Rhegium and Southeastern Italy? Would Carthage be content with just the subjugation of Sicily? Among the Roman consuls there was no question: Rome must defend the Mamertines in order to halt the spread of the Phoenicians. But the Roman Senate disagreed, and it was the *Plebiscitum* that intervened on behalf of the consuls, as they realized the potential of such a war and what victory would mean for Rome which came in the forms of wealth and land for private citizens. The public supported the consuls' decision and in 264 B.C.E. sent an expedition under consul Appius Claudius Caudex to Messana, and liberated the city from the Carthaginians, but it was not in the best interests of Carthage to commence in open war with Rome, and through pusillanimous tactics and offerings attempted to persuade the Romans to withdraw their forces. Their leading admiral was sent to a meeting amongst the Romans and Mamertines to discuss such a withdrawal, but was persuaded to withdrawal from Messana himself and was summarily executed for cowardice by the Carthaginians, and Carthaginian Senate declared war on Rome quickly afterwards.⁶³

It was at this point that Rome fought against both Carthage and Hiero II of Syracuse, and defeated them soundly outside Messana when the main Roman contingent forced a crossing, to the enemy's surprise, and succeeded in defeating both armies. The Romans quickly marched south and closed in on Syracuse, at which time Hiero II diverted his loyalty from Carthage to

Rome after seeing the might of the Roman legions and their defeats against Carthage's land forces. After this the Romans marched west and successfully besieged and captured Agrigentum in 261 B.C.E., which allowed the Roman to control the entirety of Sicily except for Heraclea. It was at this time that the Romans began to prosper in the art of naval warfare and built a large force of *triremes* and *quinquiremes* that were created from captured Carthaginian naval vessels. The Romans built a fleet large enough to combat the Carthaginian fleet and immediately set a small squadron to sail before the entirety of the fleet was completed of about 120 ships according to Livy, and in order to make up for the inadequacy of a trained marine force the Romans placed land based soldiers on their ships in order to board the enemy vessels and slay their crew. At the time the practice of naval warfare was to ram the enemy's ships and the Roman's, inexperienced as they were, added a boarding platform to their ships labeled the *corvus*, which would grapple the enemy ship and allow for safe boarding for the legionnaires. With these new devices, it led to Rome's first decisive naval victory at Mylae in 259 B.C.E.⁶⁴

The Romans, pleased by their advances in Sicily and at sea, proposed a swift end to the war by embarking a fleet to the Libyan shore and attacking Carthage directly and forcing her to surrender. In 255 B.C.E. the consular army led by Marcus Atilius Regulus sailed for Africa whereupon it encountered the Carthaginian fleet. Off the coast of the town of Ecnomus the Carthaginian fleet again was decisively defeated by the Romans and their unconventional boarding tactics. With the Carthaginian navy dispersed, the Romans gained a clear passage to the shoreline and unloaded 40,000 troops according to Polybius.⁶⁵ The Romans quickly ventured along the coast and captured many towns, and when they captured the town of Adys, the Carthaginian land forces engaged in pitched battle to relieve the town. The result was a decisive victory for Regulus, and after two disastrous defeats the Carthaginians attempted to sue for

peace. But the Romans demands were too high: the loss of all Sardinian and Sicilian territory and Carthage had to become a vassal state to Rome, and no Carthaginian could accept such inhospitable terms. And so the war commenced and Carthage employed foreign aid in order to ascertain a victory. This came in the form of Xanthippus of Sparta. A seasoned warrior, Xanthippus trained the weak Carthaginians into a formidable fighting force and led them against Regulus. In 254 the armies engaged again in pitched battle, and this time it was Regulus who suffered a disastrous defeat. After this, Rome would no longer actively engage in combat in Africa until the Scipionic invasion during the Second Punic War. With this defeat the commencement of hostilities again arose in Sicily. The Romans were out for vengeance and would gain this through the expulsion of the remaining Carthaginian land army from Sicily. In 250 an army under consul Lucius Caecilius Metellus achieved a victory by taking Panormus and in 248 the Romans began siege operations against the city of Lilybaeum.⁶⁶

In this war it has been proven that the efficiency of the Roman executive branch was a major hamper on the Roman military operations. The fact is that the consuls were had only one year terms and because of this every new consul was unseasoned in the art of controlling a consular army. This is further consolidated through Roman culture, which held glory on the field of battle in the highest esteem. In a time of war, it has been shown that every consul wanted to gain fame and eternal glory through military victories, and would often head into a battle without processing and evaluating the situation properly. Such was the case with Regulus and his hubristic approach towards the terms of peace in 253, and it was with many of the consuls throughout the Punic Wars, particularly in the Second Punic War. This was shown in the First Punic War when Publius Claudius was elected consul and decided that the Siege of Lilybaeum was not the deciding factor in winning the war in Sicily. Instead, he believed that the destruction

of the Carthaginian fleet at Drepana was of the utmost importance in order to prevent any further resupply of Lilybaeum. When Claudius assaulted the Carthaginians his force was defeated, and his cooperating consul Lucius Junius Pullus lost the majority of his fleet due to extreme weather conditions. By this point in the war the Romans had lost four fleets and the Senate was running out of coin in the treasury to fund the war effort, in particular the naval theatre. After this defeat a period of stagnation took place where the Romans could not dislodge the Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca from Drepana from 247 until 242 B.C.E. It was at this point that the Romans were able to accomplish a feat unequalled in history, in which the private citizenry donated its own money in order to build a new Roman fleet. This was brought about by a renewed public support of the war after the Senate had authorized public privateering of the Carthaginian coast which resulted in a resounding success among the citizenry of Rome and many ships were donated to the state. The consul Gaius Lucius Catalus led this force, and managed to secure a crushing defeat against the Carthaginians of the coast of Aegusa in 240. It was with this victory that peace was brought to the Western Mediterranean.⁶⁷

After 24 years of prolonged warfare, the island of Sicily was finally at peace. Hamilcar Barca was forced to withdraw from Sicily by orders of the Carthaginian Senate, and Sicily became a provincial territory of Rome. A peace treaty was signed between the two great nations which was particularly harsh for Carthage, demanding immense war reparations be paid to Rome and prevented any Carthaginian warships from entering trade zones in Roman territory. The war reparations were the most devastating for Carthage, for as its treasuries were slowly emptied into Rome's pockets, the army of Carthage was expecting to be paid for its services as Carthage's army was a mercenary army unlike Rome's citizen army. With no coin to pay the mercenaries, the former soldiers of Carthage rebelled and took up arms in what is known as the Mercenary

War of 240-238 B.C.E. in which Hamilcar Barca saved Carthage from destruction through his name which lent weight among the revolting mercenaries who were torn between the state and their loyalty to Hamilcar, and Hamilcar's talent in military endeavors.

So what was it that kept Rome together throughout one of its longest wars and by far one of its most costly wars in terms of manpower and cost? Even though Rome had prior experience fighting other major foreign nation-states such as Epirus and the Tarentines in Italy it had never fought a war off the Italian mainland, or sent mercenaries to the aid of foreign nations. While the Senate undoubtedly wanted to remain out of Sicilian affairs, it was evident to all the plebeians that a war on foreign soil, if victorious, would allow for the expansion of their lands, the implementation of new colonies for Roman citizens to start life anew, and a large influx of wealth not only from the subjected territory, but from Carthage itself. While the majority of Italy was still owned by the nobility, new colonies and territory would allow the lower and middle classes new farmland to settle outside of the new *colonia* that would be created. With these facts in mind, it is clear why the war was started in the first place: pure economic gain. But as the war dragged on, one would assume that popular support for the war would have dropped after the prolongation of the war for decades and the massive costs of the navy and outfitting of new armies after serious losses and defeats like those of Regulus. But Roman culture and ideals prevailed in the most desperate times of the First Punic War and they would not stop until Carthage had lost, and when a few victories offered a glimmer of hope and piracy against Carthage by private citizens was sanctioned, the people in turn gave to their government what it needed most and in turn soundly defeated the withering Carthaginian spirit.

After the defeat of the mercenary bands, Carthage looked to Hamilcar for strength and guidance. He requested that he be allowed to use the Carthaginian army under his command and

fight a protracted war along the coastline of northwest Africa, a request which was granted by the Senate of Carthage. But instead of heading to West Africa, he plunged his armies straight into the Iberian Peninsula. Hamilcar saw the potential in the conquest of this territory as it had an abundance of raw metal ore and silver. With this, not only could he pay his troops for their service, but he could also repay the war indemnity to Rome. His ulterior motives were much more sinister, as he had his son Hannibal Barca swear eternal vengeance against Rome, and the capture of Iberia would allow Carthage a second base of operations which it could use to conduct war against Rome should it occur.⁶⁸

While Hamilcar was fighting in Spain, Rome was fighting in Gaul and Illyria. Rome justified its involvement in Illyria after the death of a Roman envoy sent there, as well as to stop Illyrian piratical actions against Roman trade in the area. Lasting from 229-228 B.C.E., the results of the Illyrian Wars allowed for a Roman sphere of influence to develop in the region which would be vital during the Macedonian Wars. To Rome's north she engaged against the Gauls, who had marched into to Roman territory along with the Boii in 225 B.C.E. following the widespread belief that the Romans had no interest in peacefully subjugating these peoples, but instead intended on exterminating them altogether. As the Gauls marched into Italy, they also met with the Carthaginians in Iberia to create an alliance between the two, which would allow Carthage an opportunity later to use the Gallic nations in a war against Rome. As the Gauls advanced on Rome and won a small victory, they were decisively defeated at Telamon, and Rome marched forth into Cisalpine Gaul and defeated the Gauls and Celts who quickly sued for peace in turn. Rome's reasoning for an advance into Gaul was not just to subdue the Gauls, but to eradicate the threat of the Celtic presence in the north which had allied itself to Gaul, which had been a consistent threat against Rome's populace for centuries. With this victory, the

Romans expelled the Celts from the Po River Valley, allowing for new land settlement and a tighter border against Gaul. While this gave Rome absolute control of these lands and allowed for their citizenry to inhabit the region freely, the Roman government did not place any colonies in that region until 218 B.C.E. when it established colonies at Cremona and Placentia.

While Rome was securing its borders, the Carthaginians were securing borders in Spain under Hamilcar and Hannibal Barca. The Barcide expedition had done so well that the Romans began to fear their advances and sent emissaries to Hamilcar to assess his goals, to which he responded that he was only conquering Iberia in order to pay Rome's indemnities. The Romans could find no fault in this, but in 225 B.C.E. Rome concluded treaties with Saguntum and Hamilcar, placing the Greek city-state under Roman protection and restricting the Carthaginian movements to the south side of the Ebro River. For Hannibal, Hamilcar had gained all the means to conduct a war of vengeance against Rome, a new base of operations at Cartago Nova, limitless wealth in Iberia from the silver mines, friendship with the Gallic chieftains North of Rome, and an extremely able and experienced army loyal to the Barcide family. All Hannibal had to do was to initiate an offence towards Rome and gain the support of the Carthaginian Senate for war. At the time Hannibal took leadership of the Iberian army, Rome was beginning to become involved in a war against Macedonia and Philip V in 219 B.C.E. Hannibal needed to quickly subdue Saguntum in order to prevent the Romans from reinforcing the garrison there and invaded territory against tribes south of the River Ebro that was under Carthage's sphere of influence in order to initiate a war against Saguntum through legalized means. Livy and Polybius state that at this point the Saguntines knew that Hannibal had no intentions of making peace with Saguntum but would rather take the city by force of arms. Appeals were dispatched to Rome for aid but arrived too late as Hannibal had already besieged the city.

The results of Rome's rapid expansion and humiliation would not be forgotten by Carthage and over the next decade Rome would endure the greatest trial in her history as she attempted to survive a war on multiple fronts against many of the greatest nations of the ancient world.

Chapter VI

The Second and Third Punic Wars

It was at this time that the Senate was divided by the next course of action. Though it unanimously agreed that war should be waged, how it should be waged was the dividing question. Should the Romans keep the war localized to Spain and Hannibal only? Or should the Romans advance into Africa and Spain and commit to a total war and the destruction of Carthage

altogether? Would the public of Rome support such a war? H.H. Scullard states that “the sphere in which the People expressed their views to the nobility was in warfare...”⁶⁹ as it was warfare that benefited the plebeians most through gain of land and wealth accumulated via war spoils and slaves and it also would allow for the prosperity of victorious plebeian leaders to enter a life in politics. It was the *Plebiscitum* that had arranged the idea of adding an additional 1,000 talents of payment to the peace treaty at the end of the First Punic War, as superfluous coin meant additional commerce. And it was through these spoils of the First Punic War that the public pressed on for an aggressive policy against Carthage during the Second, and they expected massive victories, and armies returning to Rome laden with jewels, gold, and slaves. It was this hubristic attitude, added with the quest for glory by ambitious consuls that led to the devastating defeats of the Romans at the hands of Carthage and Hannibal during the Second Punic War.⁷⁰

Rome’s open declaration of war against all of Carthage gave Hannibal full support from the Carthaginian Senate, and he immediately set forth from Iberia into Gaul, in which the Gauls allowed safe passage according to the treaty brokered between Hamilcar and the local chieftains. The one of the consuls of 218 B.C.E., Publius Cornelius Scipio, advanced along the same route, except his objective was the relief of Iberia from Carthage. Hannibal circumvented Scipio’s movements around Masallia just narrowly missing an open engagement with Scipio’s forces, and embarked upon an arduous march across the Alps into Northern Italy, which was the least expected area of attack by Carthage according to the Romans. This famous march is remembered by its sheer brutality and boldness, and no Roman would have ever thought an army of 90,000 men with thousands of cavalry and hundreds of war elephants could possibly cross the treacherous precipices of the Alps. But Hannibal’s armies crossed the Cisalpine Alps with little hindrance outside of a few violent Gallic tribes. Even though he had successfully traversed the

precarious and narrow passages of the Alps, he had lost a large portion of his force with only 20,000 foot soldiers and 6,000 cavalry along with a meagre handful of 80 elephants remaining.⁷¹

When Hannibal made his way into the Upper Po Valley he took stock of his losses and he lost nearly two-thirds of his army in the crossing. In order to build upon his surprise, he immediately began to set his plan in motion. Hannibal's grandiose plan focused not on physically beating Rome through pitched battle, but instead relied on the idea that the tribes of Italy would rise up against Rome with Hannibal and support his army, breaking the spirit of the Roman people as the Romans had done to Carthage in the First Punic War. This included the Etruscans, Celts, Umbrians, Samnites, and the people of Magna Graecia. As for Rome, public support had pushed for the immediate transfer of Rome's legions to the enemy's homeland and supporting territories in Spain. This left only a few legions on the Italian Peninsula that consisted mainly of raw recruits. Scipio had been recalled at the last minute to Rome and was available when news reached the Senate of Hannibal's advance into Italy. Scipio hastily managed to scrape together an army to check Hannibal's advance near the river Trebia. Scipio wanted to engage Hannibal on the Trebia River, and waited for a second army commanded by Sempronius Longus, which had been stationed in Sicily, before engaging with Hannibal. Sempronius was eager to engage in conflict with Hannibal with Scipio, but Scipio decided it would be better to wait for their armies to rest. Sempronius disagreed and in an almost gluttonous move for glory engaged Hannibal directly without feeding his troops or allowing them any rest after a forced march. This was the result of blinded ambitiousness that was brought about during Sempronius's term of consul, which was almost up, and Sempronius would sacrifice everything in order to have his name inscribed in the annals. Scipio withheld his forces and watched as Sempronius moved his forces across the freezing Trebia River towards the enemy after Hannibal's Numidian cavalry taunted

them in a show of audacity. Hannibal knew that engaging the Romans directly with his foot infantry was suicide, as the Romans had superior arms and training to his mercenaries, so Hannibal had to rely on his superior cavalry to win the battle. As a result Hannibal decisively defeated Sempronius, and three-quarters of his 40,000 man force were massacred.⁷²

With this defeat Hannibal marched south into Italy, gaining allies among the Celts and Gauls along his path. In 217 B.C.E., the consular elections placed Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius in charge of the war's affairs, and they directed their army towards Hannibal, with the latter having few accredited exploits in things military and the lack of experience in generalship thereof. Livy wrote that Flaminius's family had been well liked by the people ever since their support of the *lex Hortensia* in 287 B.C.E., and even though he had little experience in military matters, Flaminius was well liked by the people who had grown tired of the nobility's incapable handling of the war effort, and therefore thought they could handle the war better themselves. The two consuls headed an army towards Lake Trasimene and it was here that Flaminius's flaws in military stratagem were exploited by Hannibal who completely massacred the Roman army under Flaminius's command, as well as the consul himself. With this second major defeat, the road was open for Hannibal to advance directly upon Rome, but instead Hannibal took his forces and moved south to gain more support amid the Italian peoples. As it was in any time of need in Roman Republican history, a dictator was appointed to help avert any further disaster. Quintus Fabius Maximus was nominated by the Senate to lead the Romans and defeat Hannibal. Fabius's actions were confusing to many, as he decided to pursue Hannibal across Italy, but not engage in pitched combat, and instead nip at the heels of his enemy. The stratagem Fabius was attempting to successfully carry out was to maneuver Hannibal's army to where Fabius and his generals found it immensely favorable to the Romans. The people of Rome

would not be content with this strategy as they preferred immediate action and the spoils of war were needed to placate the anxious public. The military too was dissatisfied with Fabius's tactics and disobeyed his orders and won a small skirmish against Hannibal's rear guard, and this was exploited in Rome by the public to show that Fabius was fearing nothing and Hannibal was weak. In response to the instability of the political situation on the home front, the Senate elevated the *magister equitum* to the level of the dictator and effectively created a co-dictatorship. Micinius Rufus was the co-dictator, and engaged Hannibal with a more aggressive military policy than Fabius, which resulted in a disastrous defeat by Hannibal at the end of the dictator's term.

By 216 B.C.E., the consuls of the previous year were in the field commanding their armies, and came to the conclusion that a forced interregnum must be established in order to place an *interrex* in charge in their absence as had been the way during the Monarchy and Early Republic. The Senate instead placed a dictator in charge of the electoral process, but this was rendered null by the consuls and augurs, and an *interrex* was installed for the electoral process. It was at this point that the patricians and plebeians debated heavily on who should be nominated for the candidacy of the consulship, as the people wanted their champion Terentius Varro over five different patrician candidates, as the Senate still remembered fondly the disaster that had been wrought by Flamininus. Varro won outright and quickly held elections for his patrician co-consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who was elected outright. With Varro in charge of a consular army, the Senate and people backed his aggressive policy towards Hannibal and disregarded the defensive "Fabian tactics". Varro set out at once to engage Hannibal in pitched battle with an army reportedly sized between 50-90,000 men against Hannibal's 40-50,000 man force. At the Battle of Cannae, Rome experienced the worst defeat in her history. When Varro arrived at

Cannae he wasted no time preparing for a battle, giving his troops little rest after a long march. Polybius and Livy both picture Varro as a general full of hubris and pompousness, and state that most of the blame for the loss at Cannae rests on his shoulders. Hannibal managed to pull a classical pincer movement on the greater Roman force, and after defeating the Roman cavalry, smashed into the rears of the legions and slaughtered all but 10,000 of the Romans. The carnage was so great that almost half of the Senate was eliminated as well as the consul Paullus. Varro managed to escape but was forced to accept all guilt for the disaster. This was truly Hannibal's finest hour, and the public of Rome now feared a march on the city more than ever. Hannibal refrained from this action, and instead offered moderate peace terms to the Romans. The Senate would not accept any form of peace and was willing to sacrifice every able-bodied man in Rome to secure victory. New armies were created, the a new senatorial election was held to fill the empty seats, and from this point forward the tactics of Fabius were used for the remainder of the land war in Italy.⁷³

The defeat at Cannae was not just Rome's greatest tragedy, but the eye opening point that showed how great the inconsistencies in her constitution and her people were. Even though Rome was strong militarily it was weak politically and socially. As mentioned before, the consequences of the political system and the failure of the consuls due to lack of sufficient military experience and the hunger for glory presented by the one year term in office was destructive for the Romans; yet the people of Rome could not see this as justification to adjust the duties of the consular office in a time of such dire peril. While the people feared Hannibal and a march on Rome, many of the southern cities joined Hannibal's cause in revolt against Rome's rule. The cities of Apulia, Bruttium, Campania, and Lucania all rebelled, and the Romans now had to subdue all of these cities once more. To add to the growing resistance

against Rome, the Macedonians under Philip V joined the side of Carthage after Cannae, starting the First Macedonian War with Rome in 215. In order to alleviate the pressure against Carthage and to capture territory in the Roman protectorate of Illyria, Philip V hoped to push the Romans out of that region and to assist Hannibal in Italy. Upon hearing of this the Romans united in an alliance with the Aetolian League of Greece, which allowed the Romans to keep most of their forces in the western Mediterranean and to assist the Greeks after the conclusion of the war against Hannibal.⁷⁴

All was not lost in Rome's theater of operations. In Spain major victories were being gained by the Romans in Spain against Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal. Publius Cornelius Scipio had been conducting operations in Iberia since 218 B.C.E. in order to deprive Hannibal of all resources from his silver mines in Cartago Nova and Saguntum as well as keeping the army of Hasdrubal in check and absent from the Italian theater of war. Rome's navy ruled the seas unmolested after a naval engagement in 217 B.C.E. and landlocked the Iberian forces. In 215 B.C.E. Hasdrubal was decisively defeated in Iberia, and in 211 B.C.E. Saguntum was liberated. After this loss, Carthage recalled Hasdrubal to Africa in order to quell the Numidian Syphax who had defected from Carthage. The Romans then controlled the loyalty of the Spaniards, if only for a short while for when Hasdrubal returned to Iberia, the loyalty of those tribes switched to Carthage once more and the Romans were destroyed and Publius Scipio was slain in 211 B.C.E. In response to his father's death, the young Publius Cornelius Scipio (later named Africanus) placed his name in the pool of generals for command of the armies in Spain. According to Livy, the people of Rome rejoiced in this vote and unanimously agreed that he should be sent, but after the decision had been made the people questioned whether they had done the right thing. Was it

right for them to send young Scipio to fight in the same theater where both his uncle and father had perished? ⁷⁵

The young Scipio was indeed the right choice, and he started by reforming the legions under his command by re-equipping and reforming them. In 209 B.C.E. Scipio advanced into Spain and conquered Cartago Nova, which gave the Romans access to silver and manpower in the region, as well as a naval base of operations. Hasdrubal managed to escape destruction, and marched east to connect with Hannibal in Italy and to march on Rome. The Romans intercepted Hasdrubal's plans and Claudius Nero marched his army north from Hannibal's encampment and ambushed Hasdrubal, whose army was destroyed and was himself killed in the battle in 207 B.C.E. From here on out the situation for Hannibal went downhill. In 207 B.C.E. a second Carthaginian force landed in Genoa under Mago and was defeated the following year, leaving the majority of the Italian populace free from Carthaginian rule outside of Hannibal's occupied territory in the south. By this point in the war Rome was beginning to feel the pressure of the monetary setbacks of raising constant armies, and swift action was needed to conclude the conflict. And so in 206 B.C.E. Scipio was elected as consul, one of the youngest in Roman history, and immediately called for an invasion of Africa. This was opposed by many, especially by Fabius who still recalled the failed aggressive strategies of Flaminus and Varro. When the Romans invaded Africa the Carthaginians suffered many minor defeats at the outset and wished to end the war themselves, blaming the outbreak of hostilities on Hannibal and his family, to which Scipio responded in kind with adequate terms of surrender. The immensely patriotic oligarchs in the Carthaginian Senate would not accept surrender and ordered Hannibal back to Carthage for its defense. In 201 B.C.E. Hannibal's forces met with Scipio's and the Battle of Zama ensued with a decisive Roman victory and the end of the Second Punic War. Scipio's

previous terms of surrender were forfeit and an immensely harsh treaty was put in place to restrict Carthage to Africa and would not allow her to engage in any conflict without Rome's consent. Once more, immense war reparations were demanded from Carthage and all Spanish territories were to be ceded to Rome immediately.⁷⁶

So what did the Second Punic War mean for Rome? Aside from being the closest thing to a major defeat for Rome in almost all of its history, it was the Second Punic War that united the entire population in arms against a terrifying common enemy in order to ensure the survival of the state. Never before had Romans been as united as in this perilous time when the very existence of the republic was at stake. The patricians and plebeians set aside their differences in the face of annihilation, and was shown how they agreed through the continued war effort, and they responded with the quick raising of new armies to fight Hannibal and the wars in Macedonia, Sicily, and Spain at the same time. Never before had Rome lost so much in men and material, yet never had they gained so much. It was at this point that Rome became a feared entity in the ancient political arena, and its deeds were heard as far East as Bithnyia, Bactria, and Pontus. Many historians mark this period as the beginning of Rome's empire, as she acquired territory in Iberia and had reduced Carthage to vassalage and Macedonia was an empty shell of her former greatness under Philip V, while ideas from across the Eastern Mediterranean flooded Rome's intellectual and philosophical designs in the form of Hellenism.⁷⁷ This allowed prosperity to grow for Romans in both patrician and plebeian classes for the next several decades as the spoils of war filled their coffers and new land was allotted to citizens as the foundations of new colonies became a widespread practice. Rome would never forget the terror caused by Hannibal and the fate of those who aided Hannibal was sealed. The Celts in northern Italy were driven out, the Bruttians were severely punished for allowing Hannibal to reside there in the

closing years of the war, and the Spanish were put under the direct control of the provincial governors of the two new Roman provinces in Iberia. This new accumulation of territory and wealth would not soon be forgotten, and every Roman citizen now strived for greater power. It is with this in mind that one can clearly see why the Romans pursued greater international interests after the conclusion of the Second Punic War.⁷⁸

With peace finally attained with Carthage, the Roman public now turned its eyes to other areas of the world, but Carthage always remained a threat to many even though they were now completely irrelevant in the eyes of the ancient world. A great many statesman wondered why the Romans did not just eliminate Carthage altogether at the close of the Second Punic War and raze it to the ground for all the troubles the Carthaginians had caused. Indeed, Cato the Elder ended every speech by saying that “Carthage must be destroyed!”⁷⁹ With no allies and no military authority to even defend itself, the neighboring territories of Numidia and Libya encroached heavily on Carthage’s territory over the next many decades. For years the Roman’s backed the encroachment and seizure of Carthaginian territory by her enemies and for years Carthage attempted to plead with Rome to allow her to defend her territory against the Numidians and Libyans, but to no avail. It was the nomadic kingdom of Massinissa that caused Carthage the most trouble, and she attempted to pay off Massinissa with funds and bribes, and even though he accepted them he still took more and more of Carthage’s territory illegally. Though Rome wanted nothing more than to grind Carthage into the dust, it needed solid founding behind any declaration of war, and it was for this reason that Rome refused to help Carthage and instead backed Massinissa, seeing that if one backed the wolf into a corner, it would have no choice but to fight back. And although Carthage was weak militarily, it was still

strong economically. By 151 B.C.E. the Carthaginians had paid off all war indemnities to Rome, giving Rome further reason to instigate trespasses against her.⁸⁰

In that same year, the Carthaginians decided that now was the time to strike, and it was here that the army of Carthage marched out to fight the Numidians and defend their land. What resulted was utter defeat for Carthage, who was required to make further payments to Numidia and to cede more territory. At Rome the war was seen by the Senate as a gross violation of the treaty between Rome and Carthage as Carthage had entered a war without Rome's consent, and sent an ultimatum the following year to Carthage, demanding payment for their transgressions. The Carthaginians knew they were in no state to fight a war against Rome and attempted to complete all demands of the ultimatum to the fullest by giving 300 hostages to Rome, allowing the Roman army access to their lands, and disarmament of the city. At this point the Roman consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus was asked by the envoys of Carthage if anything else was needed, to which he replied regrettably that the Senate had ordered him to raze the city. He stated that the people were not in danger, but had to settle on any territory they found within 10 miles from the site. It was abhorrent to the Carthaginians who had just complied with everything the Romans had demanded that Rome was still going to raze their city. In response to this the people of Carthage melted any remaining metal they could find and created as much armor and weapons as they could and barricaded everything that could be blocked. This was it, a final stand for Carthage who would attempt to hold out against Roman siege for as long as possible hoping that Roman would see the futility in their efforts and the courage of the Carthaginian people and desist in their efforts of war. In the beginning of the siege in 149 B.C.E. the Romans experienced many setbacks due to the unprepared state of their army to deal with a siege of this magnitude, and the relentless assaults made by the general Hasdrubal against the Romans in an effort to keep

them away from the walls of Carthage. Many Roman generals failed to take the city, and the only one that had accomplished any significant results was Scipio Aemilianus, who was tasked in 146 B.C.E. to complete the siege of Carthage. Instead of displaying reserved caution, Scipio inspired his men with continuously renewed vigorous assaults against the city, a great many of which were successful in breaching the city. At the end of 146 B.C.E. Scipio's men had completely cleared the surrounding plains around Carthage and blocked the harbor through a naval blockade, effectively cutting Carthage off from all help from the outside. During the winter season Scipio dug his troops in and let famine engulf the city and besieged the city with onagers and ballistae (types of ancient catapult) that launched disease ridden corpses into the streets in an attempt to spread pestilence and decrease the morale of the defenders further. The next spring the Romans entered the city through a final assault and caused the defender to retreat to the citadel where 55,000 men and women, according to Polybius, were surrounded and forced to surrender. Rome would give no mercy and enslaved the majority of the population and razed Carthage to the ground. With this the Punic Wars came to an end, and Rome now acquired herself the province of Africa and a base of operations to threaten Numidia and Libya, as well as new land to spread her peoples and allow them to prosper. And the site of Carthage would not be neglected as originally proposed, rather the Romans rebuilt the city in their vision and made it their premier city on the North African coast, and it would become one of the most prominent cities in Rome's empire.⁸¹

Chapter VII

The Macedonian, Seleucid, and Spanish Wars

By 216 B.C.E. many countries of the Ancient World had begun to have contempt of Rome which just 100 years earlier had been only a small city state. Now, she was the master of the Western Mediterranean Sea after the First Punic War and her power was felt in the East as her allies/enemies began to grow in Egypt and Greece. Polybius states that “*The affairs of Greece, Italy, and Libya being connected as a whole; for none of the leading statesman of the Greek cities made war or peace with each other...but were all fixing their eyes on Italy. Nor was it long before the...inhabitants of Asia were affected in the same way, for those who had quarrels with Attalus, Antiochus, or Ptolemy...fixed their eyes on the West, some sending embassies to Carthage, others to Rome.*”⁸² The ancient world was split in alliances between the two rising powers in the west, and this would determine the outcome of not just the Second Punic War, but the entire Mediterranean world.

Since the death of Alexander in 323 B.C.E. the region had been in turmoil as he had named no successor to his vast empire. In response, his generals quarreled and split the empire into multiple large “Successor” Kingdoms. The rulers of Alexander’s successor states were known as the *Diadochi*, and their incessant feuds between each other had led to their weakness by the time of the Second Punic War. In Egypt, Ptolemy II Philadelphus ruled and had seen a potential ally in Rome and had secured her trust through grain trade agreements, but decided to

remain neutral in the event of war. The Kingdom of the Seleucids was weakened from the loss of Pergamum, Cappadocia, Armenia, and Pontus in the west, and the loss of Bactria, the Indian territories, and southeastern Persia. But the new young king, Antiochus III, wished to grow his empire by any means, and therefore would take advantage should the opportunity present itself and extend his kingdom. The renewed state of Pergamum under Attalus attempted to remain neutral unless threatened by the larger Hellenistic states, in which case Pergamum would look for outside assistance for protection. But of the major Hellenistic factions it was in Macedonia that the closest threat to Rome loomed. King Philip V had refitted and revitalized the Macedonian army and had brought its power to a scale not seen since Alexander. With this, he hoped to reestablish Alexander's great empire by defeating the other Diadochi and quelling the rebellious and quarrelling Greek city-states.

Though Philip V was young when he took the throne, he was not a fool. He saw the rising power of Rome in the East and the threat that it presented to Macedon's western borders. Before the Second Punic War Rome had made its presence felt to the Macedonians and Greeks by establishing a protectorate in Illyria after destroying the pirates in the region and subjugating the queen and her country in which they resided. This provided two important strategic positions for Rome. The first was a buffer state which could hinder an attack from the East, and it secured the Adriatic for both Rome's traders and her fleets, which would be vital during the coming wars. With this in mind, and seeing the exponential growth of Rome's power after the First Punic War, Philip V sought allies that could help him defend and potentially expand into the West. In 218 B.C.E. Philip had received envoys from Carthage and Hannibal requesting for them to engage in a military alliance against the common enemy of Rome. In 217 B.C.E., Philip's war against the Aetolian states finally ended, and he also received dignitaries from Pharos in Illyria, the same

dignitaries that had subjected themselves to Rome during the Illyrian campaigns. Not only would Macedonia be able to rise in power, but also seize the province of Illyria. Philip made the decision that he wanted to engage the Romans on their own lands, and that the immediate seizure of the ports in Illyria was vital in order to pursue a full scale invasion across the Adriatic. The treaty between the states against Rome was formally signed in 215 B.C.E. after Philip had witnessed the resounding success of Hannibal at Cannae the year earlier.⁸³

Over the next two years Philip V raised his forces in order to mount a full scale invasion of Illyria and eventually Italy. In 213 B.C.E. Philip marched his Macedonian phalanx into Illyria and quickly overcame the port city of Lissus, establishing a coastal defense against Rome. In response to this, the Roman consul of 212 B.C.E., Laevinus, concluded a military alliance with the Aetolian League, Sparta, Athens, and later Attalus of Pergamum. The confines of the treaty stated that the Greeks would keep Philip V bogged down in Greece through localized uprisings, giving the Romans time to defeat the primary enemy Hannibal. This was done as the Romans could not afford to sustain fronts in Spain, Italy, Sicily, and the Balkans at the same time. Although the Romans would not commit land forces, a majority of their maritime forces would be directed in this theater in order to prevent any chance of Philip from linking with Hannibal in Italy. In return, should the Greek city-states require Rome's assistance in the future, she would readily accept.⁸⁴

Over the next seven years the Greek city states held the Macedonians at bay whilst Rome defeated Carthage. In 205 B.C.E. a peace treaty was signed between Philip and Rome, ending further hostilities. But Philip was wary of Rome's intentions after the defeat of Carthage and the strict impositions placed on Carthage after peace had been achieved. Philip saw how Rome had made Spain, Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia into her own personal provinces, and saw Rome as an

expansionist threat, just waiting for the opportunity to defeat the Macedonians and subdue them as well. Philip's endeavors in the West were over and he accepted Rome's terms on the borders between their protectorate of Illyria and Philip's kingdom. But Rome was not as Philip imagined. After decades of fighting and the loss of so many men against Hannibal, the Romans wanted peace for the moment. Any further wars might disrupt the internal affairs of the state and bring about the anger of the plebeians, whose land had suffered so under Hannibal. Any further declarations of war in the near future by Rome would have to be in strict defense of her territory or in violation of any alliances that she had acquired with the municipalities of the surrounding regions. With this in mind, Philip turned his eyes to the East in order to impose his rule across the Aegean which had been the playground of the Antigonids and Ptolemies for many years. In 203 B.C.E. Philip assaulted the territories of the city-states of the Aetolian League and broke a treaty he had concluded with them. The Aetolian League, still in alliance with Rome in order to defend against Philip's forces, called for Rome's aid, but she declined as the war against Hannibal was still raging and Rome could ill afford to send mass quantities of troops into Thessaly at this time. In 201 B.C.E. Philip attacked the Greek city-states directly and destroyed many of them while also attacking Pergamum, which had entered into an alliance with Rome many years before. It was now that the Romans decided to take action and used propaganda to allure the Roman citizenry into a formal declaration of war against Philip V. Livy states that the Roman senate created false assumptions about Philip wanting to destroy their ally Egypt, which would interrupt the flow of grain and ensure that the Romans would be put in a desperate bid for victuals, which led to the ultimate conclusion that Philip was not aiming his true sights at Egypt, but at Rome. Emboldened by their defeat of Hannibal and the treachery that Philip had inflicted upon them during the Second Punic War, the Romans united against Philip and in 200 B.C.E.

formally declared war once more against him. But what were Rome's ulterior motives for declaring war? Besides attacking her allies, Macedonia had done relatively little to provoke Rome, but it is at this point that one sees how the Punic Wars had affected Roman ideology and foreign policy. The term "imperialism" may be used to describe Rome's international relations. A war against Macedonia, if successful, would allow for Roman hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean and a base of operations to conduct further campaigns into Asia. The Senate looked to the East and saw the weakness of the *Diadochi* as they were split among themselves, each attempting to overpower the other, and Rome would take advantage of the situation as much as possible. Success in the region would also allow for the eradication of piracy, and would allow for the establishment of a Roman dominance on the Greek and Macedonian economies. If not for these reasons, then the simple fact was that the Romans now feared any powerful sovereignty that might potentially threaten her wellbeing and the existence of the Republic as Hannibal did would provoke Rome's population into open war in order to avert the same catastrophes as in the Second Punic War. The idea that Philip wanted to be another Alexander would have legitimately frightened many Romans, as Alexander had subdued his strongest opponents quickly and imposed his own Hellenistic ideals upon them.⁸⁵

When war broke out once more between the Romans and Macedonians it was Publius Sulpicius Galba, formally elected consul after his success in Greece during the First Macedonian War, who was placed in charge of the early war effort. The Romans would be quick to action and landed their forces in Illyria in 200 B.C.E., a year of no particular military significance in the war, but important as the Aetolian League and Athens allied themselves against Philip with Rome. Over the next two years, the powers did not act in any significant engagements, and it was during the consulship of Titus Quinctius Flamininus in 198 B.C.E. that Rome took affirmative

action against Macedon. It is stated that Flamininus was a capable general who had experience in the Punic Wars against Hannibal directly and that he was an admirer of Greek Hellenization. In order to further expand the war effort, Flamininus lured the Greeks with notions of Greek freedom and self-determination free from the shadow of tyranny that was Philip. Over the year Flamininus outmaneuvered Philip and by 197 B.C.E. forced Philip to accept battle at Cynoscephalae. The evenly matched armies met and this time the roman maniple outperformed the Macedonian phalanx and the Romans completely routed Philip's forces. With this rout, the Macedonian army was destroyed, and Macedonia was defenseless, so Philip looked for any way to bring peace at all costs. After the defeat, the terms imposed on Macedon by Rome were reasonable and a solid strategy. Rome knew that turning Macedonia into a province would only stretch her capabilities at the time, and it would look ill to many of the neighboring nations as they would purvey Rome as another state set for conquest. It would extend her armies when she still had few after the Punic Wars, and keeping Philip in power would most likely gain Rome an ally in the future, and would prevent the Balkan tribes in Thrace and Dacia from pouring into the Lower Balkans. In accordance with being allowed the continued possession of throne, Philip swore to refrain from haranguing the Aetolian and Greek city-States, to reduce his military capabilities, and to pay war indemnities to Rome of 1,000 talents. For Rome, it seemed as if peace in the region was now achieved, as Flaminius proclaimed that the Greek city-states were now free, and that they could flourish under their own laws and governments. Many Greeks saw Flaminius as a savior of Greece just as Alexander had been. But it was not in Greece's best interests that these political aims laid, but with Rome. Greece would remain fragmented, with each city-state attempting to gain power over the other, and each would remain loyal to Rome in the future.⁸⁶

Although Philip had been quelled, a new threat quickly arrived to fill the power gap left after Philip's defeat. Antiochus III had been busy resurrecting the Seleucid Empire and had directed successful military campaigns against the peoples of Bactria, the Hindu-Kush territories and the peoples of the Indus River Valley. In the West he had led his armies successfully against the Armenians, and during the Second Macedonian War Antiochus's forces had defeated the armies of Ptolemy, allowing the annexation of the Levant and cities in Asia Minor and Bithynia. By 196 B.C.E. Antiochus had set his eyes on the Dardanelles and Eastern Balkans. After being labelled Antiochus the Great, the king of Seleucia hardly took Rome as a serious threat after so many successes. In 186 B.C.E. Hannibal arrived in the court of Antiochus and attempted to give him counsel on how to deal with Rome, and suggested that Antiochus should ally himself with all of Rome's enemies including Ptolemy, Philip V and Carthage. After listening to his counsel, Antiochus dismissed Hannibal and decided to ally himself with the forces of the feuding Greeks and Aetolian League. Upon hearing this, the Romans declared war on Seleucia, and gave Philip permission to level all cities allied with Antiochus, and also gave extra incentive to Philip after revoking the indemnities owed to Rome. Against the forces of Rome and Macedon, Antiochus stood no chance and was soundly defeated at the battle of Thermopylae. Following the success at Thermopylae, the Romans sailed their fleet to the Aegean Sea in order to prevent any further landings by the powers of Asia in Greece.

After Rome defeated Philip V of Macedon in two wars, his successor Perseus initiated a third war in 170 B.C.E. The Romans swiftly defeated the armies of Perseus and after the climactic Battle of Pydna in 167 the Macedonian and Greek will to fight was broken. Since the middle of the Second Punic War, Rome had been at war with Macedon; this would be the final time. Rome disintegrated and transformed the region and its boundaries into a league of four

ruling Greek States which, along with Illyria, were all client states of Rome. With the defeat of Macedon and new trade initiated with Greece, the influx of Hellenism seeped into Roman culture. Cato the Elder, one of the first authors on the foundations of Rome's history was a staunch advocate against Hellenization and instead pushed for the belief that it was Rome's culture and beliefs that made her great, the *mos maiorum*: the way of the ancestors. New approaches to art, linguistics, philosophy, religion, and politics would be applied to the Roman way of life over many decades after the conclusion of the Punic and Macedonian Wars.

Although Philip had made his peace with the Romans, his successor Perseus saw the weakened state of Macedon after Philip and quickly engaged in expansionism, this being allowed by the defeat of the Seleucids by the Romans as well as the Aetolian league, which left a power vacuum. Much like Rome, the Greeks suffered from internal strife between the aristocratic oligarchs and the common people. Though Rome had been fortunate enough not to suffer from mass demagoguery, the Greek aristocracy squabbled over the right to rule the state and expand their own city-states in attempts to make a name for themselves. Perseus saw himself as a unifier and pledged his loyalty to the states that Rome had just vanquished, namely the Aetolians and Byzantines, and in doing so to create a collective of satrapies under her rule with which to engage in open war with Rome. Rome attempted to bide its time in the autumn of 171 B.C.E. by sending envoys to negotiate peace until the legions could arrive in Thessaly. It is mentioned here by Livy that the Roman army showed one of its least successful campaigns in terms of military strategy. According to Livy, the consul that year was completely inexperienced in warfare and marched aimlessly across Thessaly and Macedonia, not exactly knowing where to head. Due to the inexperience of Rome's commanders and high desertion rates, the Romans suffered continuous losses on which the Macedonians failed to capitalize. The failure of the Macedonians

to annihilate the Roman armies allowed the Roman commanders to fix the problem of desertion and laziness in the ranks of the legions. The Romans sent the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus to Macedonia to fix the problems of legions. Paullus was a man of virtue, a strict man of an older breed of Roman and incorruptible by wealth, he was well loved by the people and because of his successes in Spain he was nominated consul once more by the people of Rome. Paullus straightened the legions, and immediately set out to defeat the Macedonian contingent. In 167 B.C.E. the Romans engaged the Macedonians at Pydna, and Perseus was defeated completely. Rome then divided Macedonia into four city-states, an experiment on the part of the Romans in order to keep multiple factions at each other's throats to prevent the rise of a single powerful sovereignty. Rome also rendered all the Greek city-states incapable of further discourse. Neither of these experimental ideas would work, as in 148 B.C.E. the Greek city states rebelled under a pretender king of Macedonia, and Rome would put an end to the Greek question by formally making all of Greece and Macedonia a Roman province in 147 B.C.E.⁸⁷

In 154 B.C.E. the Romans once again were engaged in a war in Spain due to the mistreatment of the local populace. The major tribes that opposed Rome were the Lusitani, the Celtiberians, and the Arevacae. Over the next two years the Romans suffered multiple humiliating defeats at the hands of the Lusitanians and Celtiberians, and it was the Arevacae with whom Rome discussed obtaining peace since they had come to Rome with envoys proposing the idea after the victories of Marcus Claudius Marcellus in Spain the previous year. However, Rome would not allow for any peace and ordered Marcellus to continue campaigning in Spain. Marcellus personally believed that peace could not be attained through brute subjugation, but instead through the humane treatment of the peoples of Spain as Tiberius Gracchus had done

before. And so Marcellus concluded a secret peace treaty at Numantia with the Arevacae in 150 B.C.E. in order to conclude hostilities and gain honor for himself before his term was up.⁸⁸

In 149 B.C.E. the consul Lucius Lucullus was sent to Spain in order to end the ongoing hostilities with the Celtiberians and Lusitani. Lucullus wanted to conduct war against the Arevacae, and due to Marcellus's treaty such a course of action was rendered null, but it did not protect the neighboring towns of the Arevacae, which Lucullus entered and pillaged. His armies slew many and enslaved many more. This trespass caused many of the towns of Spain to close their gates to the Roman army in fear of the same injustice being dealt upon them. Later in the same year, Lucullus and Servius Sulpicius Galba attempted a joint attack on the Lusitani, and Galba enticed many tribes of the Lusitani to enter a peace agreement with his forces, only to find treachery on the part of Galba when he enslaved all 7,000 men who defected to the Roman's side. With these scandalous lies, it is no wonder that the Spaniards distrusted the Romans for many years to come and would continue to put up stubborn resistance. In 148 B.C.E. the outbreak of the Third Punic War and Fourth Macedonian War pulled most of Rome's accomplished commanders away from the Spanish front, and the war efforts in those provinces were again up to the praetors stationed there. During this time a Lusitanian named Viriathus, who had escaped the onslaught of Galba the year before, rose up with a guerilla army against the Roman governors and had a strong distrust against the Romans after the ventures of Lucullus and Galba. Over the year Viriathus laid out many well-planned ambushes against the Roman contingent in Spain, and dealt heavy blows upon them. In 145 B.C.E. Viriathus defeated the praetor Gaius Plautius and then marched into Hither Spain and defeated the praetor's army under Claudius Unimanus. After the defeats of the legions in Spain, the Roman public had become emphatically unenthusiastic with the campaigns, and the decision was made withhold the veteran

legions of the Macedonian and Carthaginian wars from engaging in the Spanish War, but instead to send two new armies under Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus. For the year of 143 B.C.E. Fabius kept his armies in check by not taking battle where it was offered and only engaging with the enemy where it best suited his troops to gain experience through piecemeal combat. In 142 B.C.E. the young praetor Quinctius took over command and led to the fall of these legions during the summer season. In the end it would be Viriathus's own people who betrayed and misled him to his defeat, and in 139 B.C.E. the Lusitanians were subjugated by Rome completely.⁸⁹

While the war against the Lusitanians was coming to a close, the war with the Numantines still raged, and for five years the Romans vainly attempted to subdue these peoples. By 137 B.C.E. Gaius Hostilius Mancinus was elected as consul and attempted to end the war in Numantia, but failed miserably as his army's morale plummeted from the prolongation of the war and through rumors of aid to the already strong Numantines by their allies to the south and west. Retreating from Numantia, the consular army was chased by the Numantians. It was here at this desperate time that the young Tiberius Gracchus, son of the same Tiberius Gracchus who had brought peace for the praetors in Spain many decades earlier, was serving under Mancinus and was chosen to come to speak with the Numantines in order to save the army from destruction due to his father's prestige among them. The Celtiberians were respectful to this request in the name of the Gracchi, but the Senate of Rome would not have peace and demanded the condemnation of all who had an involvement with the treaty, but Gracchus was spared the fate of Mancinus through his ties to the Scipii back at home. And so in 134 B.C.E. the hero of the siege of Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus, was elected for a second term as consul and immediately rushed to Spain with his legions to confront the Numantines and crush the city of Numantia. For eight

months Scipio besieged the city, causing famine and disease to fester within, until only a handful of residents remained to surrender, as most had committed suicide rather than be taken alive by the Romans, as they remembered Lucullus and Galba and the fate that awaited them: slavery. So ended the war in Spain in 133 B.C.E., and now Rome was blessed with the new province of Hither Spain, but how would she divide it among her subjects?

Chapter VIII

The Gracchi and the Roman Revolution

As the Punic Wars came to a close, the arrival of the “*novus homo*” or “new man” forever changed the political arena in Rome. The conflict of the orders had longed passed since the passage of the Licinio-Sextian and Hortensian Laws and a new series of families had risen in the ranks of the Senate. For Rome this meant the arrival of the common man and his jurisdiction and imperium over Rome’s affairs outside the plebeian assembly; it also meant that the patricians who had ruled the Senate since 509 B.C.E. had to share their power with those they saw as unworthy of the glory of the titles *consul*, *praetor*, and *aedile*. This allowed for the disintegration of the senatorial unity that had previously existed due to the patrician owned Senate, and the creation of competing political parties and a separation of orders within the Senate itself.

With the arrival of plebeian families into the upper ranks of society and government, the gains made by the plebeians over the centuries of the Conflict of the Orders was rendered null

and void as the plebeian families who attained such high positions did exactly the same thing as the patricians had done during the Conflict of the Orders and attempted to prevent other families of plebeian status from rising and taking over. Though the Senate was now comprised of patricians and plebeians, those who occupied seats in government were all considered nobility. Even so, the patricians attempted to disconnect themselves from the new nobility through subtler means. The patricians were extremely proud of their pedigrees, and kept memorabilia of their ancestors to remind them of their great heritage. From wax effigies of their deceased predecessors to signet rings and special garments, the patricians attempted to distinguish themselves from their plebeian counterparts by show of ancestry while also flaunting special privileges given to them at public events and ceremonies. While the Conflict of the Orders had made the appearance of civic equality mandatory, the patricians manipulated the system to give an appearance of “separate but equal” terms. As Livy states one such incident was in 193 B.C.E. when consul Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus enacted a law separating the classes of the Senate within the theatre, aimed specifically at raising the status of the aristocratic nobles.⁹⁰ In the Senate, the censorship was attained primarily by the nobles, and was considered the penultimate position of the *cursus honorum*. The patricians jealously guarded the censorship through the rights of exclusion and the right of ejection, allowing for only themselves to occupy the office. This is clearly shown when in 184 B.C.E., according to Livy, Marcus Porcius Cato ran for the censorship. Livy states that “...on this occasion the nobility, as throughout his life, used their influence; and all the candidates except Lucius Flaccus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, had formed a combination to keep him from the office...”⁹¹

Familial ties often cemented positions within the government, as it is shown throughout the period between the Punic Wars and the Macedonian Wars that even though the plebeian

aristocracy was able to make major advances in the positions of the Roman government, it is clear that many of them had close ties to the patrician families in one sense or another. Whether through blood ties or being backed by a patrician family for their own goals, the plebeians who gained the consulships and censorships during this period were not aristocratic plebeian families. The aristocracy still held firm control over who gained entry, and often this process was hereditary, as the sons of the nobles followed their father's footsteps and held their titles with the highest esteem. But when it came to the family and the government, perhaps no greater era can be seen where specific families fought for control of the government through obtaining an overwhelming majority of the seats in the Senate. The Punic Wars are marked with consuls and praetors of the Scipii, Flaminii, and Fabii, all of whom were of noble ancestry. Families would send many of their sons into politics in order to establish a familial faction inside of the government which could pass laws with little opposition to the family's benefits. Yet this attempt to have specific families hold the majority of the seats in government led to a mutual distrust and hostility among the senators of rival clans. Of course, no man could sit in the same seat of power legally from one year to another and had to wait at least ten years before reelection to the same position (i.e., a consul could not run for consul again until 10 years had passed) as was stated under the *lex Genuciae* of 342 B.C.E. This law kept the families from obtaining prolonged complete control and saw that the rise and fall of families in power was consistent.

To consolidate their power further, the Senate tried to keep the number of new magistrates to a minimum. More magistrates were needed after the incorporation of Corsica, Sicily, Spain, and Sardinia in order to govern these provinces, but the aristocracy kept the bare minimum number of men required to govern these provinces in order to ensure that the noble families did not lose too much power to the growth in power and wealth of the provincial

governors. How would the Senate keep the men in control of the provinces under their control? Would they pledge allegiance to themselves and carve the newly formed empire of Rome as the *Diadochi* did after Alexander's death? These were important questions to the Roman people, as they had never had large tributaries of which they were in direct control. It was decided that the praetorship would be expanded and that the men in this office would be provincial governors. This meant that the person in charge was strictly Roman and held all allegiances to his family and the state of Rome which would prevent a governor of a province from conjuring wonton thoughts of secession against the state. What the Senate needed was stricter rules on the governors of foreign lands than the rules imposed on the men ruling the Italian provinces, but what was applied was a loosely enforced set of rules that allowed provincial governors to tax and mistreat their subjects heavily at their leisure. In the magistrate's province he was above the local laws, and did not have to answer for wrongs done on his part, and in doing so would aggravate the local population to rise against the Romans during the magistracies of his successors. The governor was a military commander and was given all *imperium* to do as he wished in his province in order to suppress any armed uprising. This would allow a provincial governor to acquire wealth by invading nearby tribes in his sphere of influence and make himself immensely rich. A governor could freely decide whether he should give Rome grain tax free or not. His power was almost completely sovereign from the state. The corruption of the Roman governors is clearly seen after the setup of the administrations of Hispania Ulterior and Hispania Interior. In 197 B.C.E. the Spanish tribes rose in rebellion against the governors who had abused the provinces with heavy taxes, and the commander of Hispania Ulterior was slain in combat. For the next two decades the people of Hispania would openly revolt against the Romans until the governorship of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (father of the Gracchi brothers) in 178 B.C.E,

when he openly accepted the culture of the Hispanic peoples and allowed certain peoples of those lands to partake in the Roman military and imposed many treaties with the local townships in order to secure loyalty amongst the Hispanics. Though Spain was secured as well as Sicily and Sardinia, Greece would be the most ambitious and difficult Roman province to secure.⁹²

With the culmination of all these events the Romans entered an era of peace and prosperity as the masters of the Mediterranean for many decades after the close of the Punic and Macedonian Wars. All the peoples of the Ancient Mediterranean turned their eyes on Rome, and both respected and feared the rapidly growing power in the West. But although it seemed to many other countries that Rome was a prosperous nation with few problems outside of its imperial domain, it was during the following decades of peace that Rome's flaws were shown within its government once more, as times of peace lead to the exploitation of states by the ruling class and the emergence of failing attributes within a government system. This would again lead the nation to split between the common populace and the noble aristocrats as a balance of power between the two would be sought on both sides. With the close of the Third Punic War, the government of Rome slowly became separated between two political factions, the *Optimates* and the *Populares*. In the Senate, these two parties created a divide which in turn caused political turmoil in the government. During the Punic Wars it was shown through the works of Polybius and Livy that the growing separation in the government was becoming increasingly mainstage, as families vied for power in order to dominate the Senate and have their family controlling the majority of the seats in the house. The political parties that dominated Roman politics during the 2nd century C.E. had differing opinions that created a mutual distrust and growing separation in the Senate chamber. While these parties were increasingly important during this time period, it is important to know that there was no centralized committee that held the parties together as in the

case of the United States of America where the Republican and Democratic parties are held together by respective committees. Instead men were labeled into either faction through their beliefs and political aims by the members of the opposing faction or by the populace themselves.⁹³

Those labeled as *Optimates* consisted of the nobility who believed in the old ways of the aristocracy; essentially they were traditionalists. They saw the growing rise in the power of the plebeians and saw this as an infringement on their noble rights. The idea was that the ways of the early republic emphasized tradition and that Romans should uphold traditions above all else and follow the *mos maiorum*. In pursuing these goals, *Optimates* strongly pushed for restrictions to be placed upon the powers of the *tribunis plebis* and the *concilium plebis*. In return, they would entail the power of the government to the patricians, and this would allow for the continuing prosperity of the nobility. The rise of the concern over the plebeians was due to the rise of plebeian generals who had entered the government through their popular backing after successful campaigns. Men like Cato the Elder confirmed these fears when he, as a plebeian, was *consul* and *censor*.

In response to the growth of the *Optimates*, another faction, the *Populares*, concerning the rights of the plebeians was established in order to bring equilibrium in the Senate. Its main concern was the prosperity of the plebeians and their rights in the government system. Some could say that the *Populares* were demagogues as they were nobles who sought the support of the majority to achieve their political aims, of which there were two major goals that they strove for: the subsidy of a grain dole and the relinquishment of the majority of Rome's lands from the hands of the Senatorial aristocracy to the plebeian majority. Traditionally, it was the *aediles* who were in charge of the grain supply, and it was the Senate which taxed the grain heavily and

owned all means of production of grain, which forced a large amount of the population to head to Rome in search of other means of employment outside of the agricultural sector. This led to a rapid growth in unemployment and increased poverty among Rome's lower citizenry.⁹⁴ Some secondary objectives of the *Populares* included the attempted expansion of Roman rights and citizenship to communities outside of Rome and Italy itself as well as the creation of new jobs in order to stop the rising dependence of Rome's economy on slaves as more slaves now poured into the nation than ever before with the conquest of Spain, Macedon, Greece, Carthage and the defeat of the Seleucids.

It is here that we enter the tumultuous period of civil destabilization and unrest in the Roman Republic. This stage would set in motion the imminent downfall of the Republic and bring forth the rise of the Imperial era. With the new province of Hither Spain in Rome's possession, the question that lingered was how to distribute the wealth of this new province amid Rome's citizenry. Tiberius Gracchus, the young noble who had fought during the Numantine Wars had seen with his own eyes how hard the men fought for Rome and what terrible conditions they endured. The repudiation of his treaty and the humiliation endured by the officers who had enforced it turned him against the majority of the old aristocracy, and the rise of slaves in Sicily and their impacts on the job market caused great civil unrest for Romans during this period, something that Tiberius Gracchus would have taken note. With all of this it is uncertain which factor turned Tiberius into the major reformer history knows him for, but most likely it was a combination of all the turmoil he had endured. It was rare for Roman nobles to engage in patriotic acts for the good of the plebeians, and to do so usually meted out harsh critiquing by the old aristocracy and rumors of political coup d'état by the nobles engaged in said noble acts as was seen earlier in the acts of Marcus Manlius in the fourth century. According to

Plutarch, when the Romans acquired Hither Spain, it was said that the land was assigned for the “poor and indigent of the citizens, on payment of a small rent to the public treasury.”⁹⁵ Plutarch states that the nobility took advantage of this situation and drove the impoverished citizenry away by enacting larger rents they could not afford and instead tending the land with their own newly acquired slaves from the Spanish wars. In response, laws were enacted forbidding any man from privately holding over 500 acres of land, but the nobility paid for their own rents by signing different names in their own signatures, and allowed them to acquire the majority of the land for themselves. Tiberius Gracchus saw this as a gross injustice, as many of the men who had settled in Spain were veterans who had shed blood for decades in that region, and whose rights were being abused by the patricians.⁹⁶

In 133 B.C.E. Tiberius Gracchus was elected as the *tribunis plebis* and immediately set forth to right the wrongs incurred amongst the Roman plebeians not only in Spain but in all of Rome’s territories. Gracchus set forth with heavy backing from many of the wealthiest and most influential families in the Senate in his endeavor to bring justice to the people of Rome, and immediately proposed a bill of agrarian reform. His bills stated that all Roman citizens should be allowed to own land, and that no citizen should be allowed to own over 300 acres of land privately, except to give an additional 150 to each allotted son. All land that exceeded the limit was to be claimed by the state and redistributed to the public in small parcels over time. This act was seen by many of the *populares* and plebeian citizenry as perhaps the noblest reform ever produced in Rome’s history, but to the minority opposition in the Senate, the agrarian reform was directly pointed at them and many feared it would bring about their financial ruin. In the Senate the opposition was heavily against the members supporting Tiberius, and many shouted to bring about the end of his term as tribune and claimed he was a demagogue attempting to seize

regal powers through tyrannical methods. This is the mythical viewpoint that has been passed down to us, but contemporary historians such as Scullard argue that the Senate may not have been as biased as it is in Plutarch's literature. Scullard notes that perhaps many of the Senate would have reinforced Tiberius's reforms, as it was natural for Roman laws to be proposed to the Senate before being brought to the *concilium plebis* as it could only affect the Senate if it was approved by the Senate. And it would have been wise for him to do so as many of his majority backers were influential senators. This would have meant two things, the first being that over half of the Senate agreed to the passing of such a law so that in turn it could be passed in the *Plebiscitum*, or that it was thrown down in the Senate and Tiberius attempted to pass the law in the *Plebiscitum* and still enforce the laws contained within upon all citizens illegally. In any case, when Tiberius attempted to pass the law in the *concilium plebis* it was vetoed by his fellow tribune Octavius.⁹⁷

When Octavius refused to pass the agrarian law during Tiberius's council session in 133 B.C.E., it was obvious to all that he was backing the Senate and their plight that they still had their own inviolable constitutional rights that dated back to the foundation of the Republic and that this law infringed heavily on those rights. According to tradition, Tiberius attempted to sway Octavius to his cause through empathetic motions and means that disrupted commerce and intercommunication within the state. Octavius remained vigilant to against all of Tiberius's plights and appeals, and in order to pass the agrarian reforms, the only way forward was to constitutionally remove Octavius from the tribunate by a collective vote in the *concilium plebis* by claiming that Octavius was hindering a law that benefitted the plebeians, and it was the will of the plebeians to have such a law passed. In doing so Octavius would be seen as corrupt, as the tribune was the voice of the plebeians. Plutarch states that even when threatened with this,

Octavius did not back down and the people removed him from office. This can be taken in many ways, but many see the resistance of Octavius as illegal bribery or threats by the Senate upon the tribune to resist Tiberius's law with the former being the most likely of the two since sacrosanctity was a tribunes right. To add weight against Tiberius's cause, his cousin Scipio Aemilianus was against this bill, and being the most influential family in the Senate at the time, would have liked to see the bill vetoed and put out of existence. With a loyal tribune put in place the bill was passed but not put in effect as the Senate had yet to ratify the constitutionality of the law as it pertained to them. So a special committee labeled the *triumviri agris judicandis adsignandis* was created between Tiberius, his younger brother Gaius, and Appius Claudius Pulcher who all agreed to put in motion the confines of the agrarian reforms. But one major obstacle still remained: where would the money come from to finance this law if the Senate was against it?⁹⁸

Traditionally the Senate was in charge of the treasury and, to add insult to injury, when Tiberius passed his law in the *concilium plebis*, the Senate offered to pay him the most minuscule sum possible in order to insult Tiberius and still seem as if they were abiding to the law. With his paltry sum, it would be impossible to set up any administrative efforts to enforce the agrarian laws. It was at this time that Attalus III of Pergamum died, and in his will, he bequeathed not only Pergamum's lands, but its entire treasury to the Roman people. It was here that Tiberius attempted to allocate funds by passing laws that allowed his administration to use these funds to enforce his agrarian reforms and that his administration would now disperse the new lands to the Roman people. It is evident that at this point by enacting these laws, Tiberius quickly lost any sympathy that he still had in the Senate, and was quickly labeled as a tyrant. At the end of his term his law remained in effect, but Tiberius decided against much counseling to run for a

second term. To many in the Patriciate this would have seemed frightening and that Tiberius sought nothing more than to become more powerful and overthrow the state by the use of demagoguery.⁹⁹

In response to this, the Senate made open accusations against Tiberius, which he openly denied to the people in the Forum. In most constitutional positions it was illegal to be reelected for a second term immediately after a first, but for the People's Tribune this was not the case, and it seemed as if Tiberius was to be the one to preside over the voting process, giving many the assumption that he would manipulate the votes to go his way. An emergency meeting took place in the Senate in which the *pontifex maximus* asked what they would do about the "tyrant", to which the consul Scaevola replied that he would not perform any illegal acts to hinder Tiberius, but would not allow Tiberius to perform illegal acts himself. At this point the *pontifex maximus* joined together a large group of senators and other *optimates* and marched down to the polling station where they murdered Tiberius and over three hundred of his followers and dumped them into the Tiber, claiming they had saved the Republic from tyranny. Although many might see this act as unjust, Tiberius had brought this upon himself by attempting to override the legislative practices of the executive branch by using demagoguery to obtain his power and stance in the community, which upset the aristocracy much more than the loss of their land. The lesson was not lost, and Gaius Gracchus would soon rise to power to attempt to finish what his brother had started with the agrarian reforms.

Gaius had grown up differently from his brother; he did not aspire to follow the political path his brother took when younger, but his mother Cornelia pushed him towards this path as he grew older. He had fought in Sardinia, and his political career officially started with his inauguration into the land reform administration that his brother had constructed. When Tiberius

was slain in the streets, the results for Gaius, according to Plutarch and Livy, state that he swore eternal vengeance against those who had perpetrated such acts. It would look ill though if he progressed into the *cursus honorum* strictly for this reason, and Gaius would have been wise to downplay vengeance and keep his intentions as discreet as possible. In 127 B.C.E. Gaius was elected to the quaestorship, According to the historian Henry C. Boren it was at this time that Gaius kept his real intentions hidden and attempted to sway the public and Senate to his words by being both firm but reasonable in his actions with subtle and eloquent rhetoric. As quaestor he was immediately sent to Sardinia under the consul Lucius Aurelius Orestes, most likely by the Senate to keep him away from public affairs back home and to be kept under the eye of the consul himself. It was here that Gaius used his family's influence in Sardinia to acquire desperately needed materials for the legions stationed there. It was at this time that Fulvius Flaccus was introduced to Gaius Gracchus. Flaccus was the second consul, and he was attempting to pass legislation that would allow all peoples of Italy to acquire Roman citizenship, and therefore a common cause to unite. If not that then at least the right of *provocatio*. The Senate would not see this proposal through and sent Flaccus to the aid of Massalia in the northwest, eliminating any chance that the law would be passed. If it had been passed at that time the Social War of 90 B.C.E. would have been averted altogether. In the meantime Gracchus, who had been stationed in Sardinia for over two years, returned to Rome in what many saw as an unlawful move by simply leaving his position and post behind him. Gracchus successfully defended his position and then pursued election into the tribunate which was the one position the Senate wished to see him not enter.¹⁰⁰

If ever there was a time that public voters overran the polling booths, it was now. With Gaius Gracchus's name on the ballot, unprecedented numbers of plebeians crowded the city.

According to Plutarch it was said that there were so many that they shouted the names of those they wished to see elected from within the buildings and on the roofs. Gracchus won the nomination and eventually the election and was placed first amongst the tribunes elected that year. Many social hardships needed to be addressed that year, particularly the grain shortage of 125 B.C.E. Rome relied on grain imports from three major producers: Africa, Sicily, and Spain. Of these, Sicily was the number one exporter of grain to Rome, with Africa and Egypt second. This year hit Rome hard as the grain crops in Africa had been decimated by locusts, therefore making the prices of bread rise exponentially. Many associate Rome with the idea of “bread and games” where the population was given free bread paid for by the state, but this was not a function of the state until the early Roman Empire. During the Republic bread prices fluctuated according to the markets supply and demand. What this meant for the Roman Senate was the public would often be pleased if grain prices were low, but if grain prices rose then the public would often blame those in power. In order to ebb the high prices demanded for bread by the merchants, Gaius Gracchus passed the *lex frumentaria* which set a standard, subsidized grain price that would allow for the purchase of bread below the actual market cost and prohibit the exploitation of the masses by the merchants trying to make an extra dollar on each purchase. However, his plan backfired as the prices of grain did not fall, and over the year the treasury paid for grain for the citizens of Rome and continuously sold it at a lower value which drained the state of funds. The second law pushed forth was the reenactment of the 129 B.C.E. agrarian reforms of Tiberius Gracchus. No doubt Gaius wanted to see his brother’s work through, and it entailed no significant differences to Tiberius’s agrarian reform, and reinstated the now defunct Agrarian Commission. At this point many would have seen Gaius as Tiberius’s legacy, but Tiberius did not attempt to pass any legislation without consulting the Senate for approval. Other

influential public bills which Gaius passed were the large scale construction of paved secondary public roads throughout the Italian Peninsula in order to effectively increase communication, travel, and national commerce. Another major reform was in the military which forbade men under seventeen from enlisting. The state was required to arm and supply the soldiers with weapons and armor, a process which had remained unchanged since the days of the Roman Monarchy. This legislation was immensely popular not only with the soldiers but the population as well as to afford a decent set of arms and armor was particularly expensive.¹⁰¹

Unfortunately for Gaius Gracchus, he was vexed by the Roman tradition of honor, and because of this would attempt to undermine the workings of the Senate in subtle ways. The first offense against the Senate was the passage of a law that strictly forbade all individuals who had been removed from an office of magistracy by public force to ever hold a government position again. This law was likely put through in order to allow the public to depose any they thought did not meet what they needed in a leader lawfully as had been during the case of Octavius with Tiberius, as this had been a highly contested point that the Senate saw as radical at the time.¹⁰² Gaius's proposal must have frightened the Senate and seemed almost revolutionary as the people could depose the entire Senate at their own whim with no fear of retaliation from the accused individuals. The Senate passed this law, and it was not until Gaius' second law against them that they began to oppose him directly. The Senate had presided over special courts that were assembled for cases concerning the death penalty, specifically for members of society who belonged to specific political factions. Gaius had seen the Senate's use of this power as abusive, particularly when used by the consul Pompilius to persecute and execute the remaining supporters of Tiberius after his death. Any who attempted to create inquisitor courts would be declared enemies of Rome and exiled permanently from the city, a fate which awaited Pompilius

after the passage of the law. Another law which undermined the political pettiness between the families in the Senate was the passage of the law which prevented the Senate from sending a consul to govern a province before the province was effectively “cleaned up” before his arrival. This allowed the consul to focus more on his duties and functions toward the state of affairs back in Rome and prevented the Senate from allowing to send their favorites to the provinces that allowed them the greatest benefits and sending those they disliked to the most problematic provinces where their efforts would be wasted on provincial management as had been the case of Fulvius Flaccus.¹⁰³

The Senate saw the great rise in power of Gaius Gracchus during his second tribunate. To combat this they elected Livius Drusus as consul. Drusus effectively undermined Gaius's attempts at legislative reform by denouncing his opponents proposed laws publicly with the backing of the Senate and then proposing a revised version of those laws with the Senate's backing that directly gave the Senate more power over the people. In one such case Gaius attempted to draw up the founding of two new civic colonies for the people according to his brother's agrarian reforms. The Senate disapproved and Livius proposed the foundations of twelve colonies of 3,000 men each. They were never founded and the primary purpose to undermine the efforts of Gaius was fulfilled. The Senate's opposition to Gaius Gracchus forced him to take extreme measures and he immediately took measures to protect himself. He moved from the Palatine Hill to the city suburbs where the people most loyal to him resided in order to garner a citadel for himself. The consul Fannius proclaimed an edict which barred all non-Roman citizens' entry to the city that year, and Gaius publicly denounced this act until a close friend of his was taken before him by the consul's lictors, to which Gaius did nothing. This proved to the Senate and people that his power was waning. According to Polybius, it was when

Gaius offended his fellow colleagues at a gladiatorial spectacle by forcibly removing their seats for the poor to partake in watching the games that many agreed he had gone too far. This cost him the third tribunate, as even though Gaius accumulated the majority of the votes, his colleagues tampered with the ballot and prevented Gaius from succeeding. To show their contempt of Gaius, the Senate elected Opimius as consul, and had him slowly dismantle all the legislation which Gaius had created over his two tribunates. According to the legend which Plutarch describes, a man named Antyllius who was a messenger of Opimius was murdered by members of the pro-Gracchan faction for disrespecting the people, and his death gave the Senate all the proof they needed to charge Gracchus with fermenting a tyranny through public support. Gaius's supporters had doomed him, and he quickly prepared to flee Rome while his supporters held back the mobs of the Senate who wished to see him brought to justice. The Senate wished for Gaius to surrender himself for trial but he fled and committed suicide rather than be dishonored by the Senate.¹⁰⁴

The efforts of the Gracchi put in motion a force which could not be stopped even though the Senate had thought it quelled. The use of the people through popular demagoguery in order to achieve political aims against the *optimates* was to lead to the complete destruction of the Republic at the hands of ambitious men not just of the political spectrum, but of the military variety as well, and the efforts of these aspiring men would create an abundance of the worst civic bloodshed in Rome's history.

Chapter IX

Conclusion

With the fall of the Gracchi, Rome was plunged into a state of inner turmoil that lasted until the *Pax Romana* under Augustus's Principate. After the deaths of the Gracchi, their land reforms bills were passed, but to the benefit of both parties involved so that in 121 B.C.E. all settlers were allowed to sell the farms allotted to them, which would allow the enormously rich to buy their land through force while seemingly giving the impression that they were giving the soldiery of Rome land for free, allowing the aristocracy to buy back their land after it was taken. To complement the agrarian laws, the expansion of Rome's colonial outposts is worthy of note, as the acquisition of Rome's provinces and the near complete subjugation of their provinces was almost complete by this point in time. In 125 B.C.E. the Romans had acquired Massilia and quickly established colonies across the southern Mediterranean frontier of Gaul, allowing for quick maritime access and trade, as well as lands for the veterans of the Spanish campaigns to settle and prosper in agriculture. In 118 B.C.E. a new agrarian law was passed by the Senate that erased the need for the agrarian commission and allowed the citizens of Rome to settle on land for a fixed rent rate to the state.¹⁰⁵ The third act of the post-Gracchan movement was the *lex Thoria* which completely abolished the rent. It also guaranteed the right of private land up to 300 acres, and made sure all lands obtained in colonies were granted tenure. After all the Gracchi had put Rome through and the increased resistance and hostility that was posed by the Senate, the results of the Gracchan land reforms still ended with the result of giving the plebeians secure land at their own expense. Perhaps they saw it as immensely patriotic if the Senate agreed to it and not just one man as had been the case with each of the Gracchi brothers, and would therefore annul them of their crimes against the Gracchi and their supporters. Or perhaps the *populares* faction had slowly taken control of the Senate within this short time span and allowed the passing of such laws.¹⁰⁶

In 111 B.C.E. Rome became entangled in a war against the Numidian king Jugurtha and a second war with the Cimbri and Teutones in 105 B.C.E. Two long and costly wars for Rome, they signaled the end of the manipular legion and the rise of the cohort, as well as the Marian Reforms which were passed by Gaius Marius in order to allow the quick draft of soldiers from all classes and for the general to pay the soldiers with gold from their campaigns. With this advent the soldiers of Rome became increasingly loyal to their legates rather than to the state, and it was with this advantage that Marius returned to Rome and had himself made consul numerous times. To add to Rome's growing problems was the increase in the number of slave revolts. Rome had become a haven for slavery particularly after the destruction of Carthage and the fall of the Celtiberian nations. The slaves of Sicily had become so numerous that in 104 B.C.E. they revolted against the state and took up arms against Rome and brought about the deaths of over 100,000 Romans by the time the revolt was suppressed. This was only the first of many slave revolts with which the Romans would have to deal.

In 91 B.C.E. the tribune Livius Drusus the Younger attempted to pass the same law that Fulvius Flaccus had attempted to pass during the time of the Gracchi. His legislation attempted to bring about widespread Italian citizenship for all the tribes of Italy who had been Rome's allies for the longest timespan. Of course the idea was disposed of as it had been before as the Roman plebeians held on to their closely guarded Roman rights above all else, and the Senate had no interest in passing such a law as nothing about it fulfilled their interests. In reality, it was the Roman Senate and the pettiness among its aristocratic families that withheld the passage of this bill and its failure of passage resulted in the Italian Social War of 90 B.C.E. Many of the tribes, the Samnites, Lucanians, and Apulians, the Picenes and Vesti, along with the Marsi, Paeligni, and Marrucini, who had been loyal to Rome for centuries revolted against her. After a

war that lasted two years the Latins, Etruscans, and Campanians all achieved victory over the rebelling tribes. In the same year that the war started the statesman Lucius Julius Caesar passed the *lex Julia* in order to allow all Italians still loyal to Rome to become citizens. As the war came to an end the Senate would eventually pass laws that conferred citizenship to all Italian tribes other laws such as the *lex Pompeia* which granted Roman citizenship to all men within the territories of Cisalpine Gaul. The price of this war was immense on the public relations. Intercity commerce halted, familial ties were broken across Italy, and grain prices soared to unimaginable heights with the loss of port cities and grain producing farmers. Citizens everywhere amassed excessive debt to creditors in order to pay for the exorbitant prices of food and goods, so much so that men attempted to bring back the law of the 4th Century B.C.E. that prohibited all interest. Of course this law never came to fruition as the creditors would have lost all their wealth. In retrospect, the Social War also filled the census with a roster of over half a million new citizens. It is from this point that the downfall of the Roman Republic takes place at the hands of men like Marius, Cornelius Sulla, Gnaeus Pompey Magnus, Gaius Julius Caesar, and Octavian Caesar. The ambition of these men would change the Roman Republic into the government ruled by a single man once more and change the Western world forever.

From 509 B.C.E. until 27 B.C.E. the Republic of Rome would stand against all enemies abroad but could not defend against the internal strife which brought it to its end. It was doomed from the start as the rich aristocracy leftover from the Roman Monarchy sought to establish themselves as the masters of Rome and left the poor completely out of politics. The result was civil chaos which erupted only decades after the foundation of the Roman Republic and the few gains the plebeians made were minor at best. For over a century during the Conflict of the Orders Rome's citizenry saw no significant concentrated effort to better their state, and the constant

struggle between rich and poor nearly erupted into civil war. The few men who attempted to better the plebeians were labeled would-be tyrants and disposed of by the rich landowners. Rome's problems never truly faded from the public view and would haunt the Republic until its final years and would continue to plague the Roman Empire.

It was during the troubled beginning of Rome's Republic when the constitution was not formally written in stone and the rich oligarchs held all the land that the ruinous path to the Republic's end was set. It was a doomed endeavor from the start, and though a radically new government for its time, the past and glory of the Roman Monarchy and the aristocratic tribes created under Romulus could not be forgotten. The *mos maiorum* and its effects on the nobility allowed for a mindset where the nobles would be stubborn and foolish to relinquish any power to the plebeians and the grandest positions in the Senate were reserved for the aristocracy by law. It is understandable then that the laws created by such an assembly would only pertain to those on the assembly itself and consequentially those outside of the assembly wished to ascertain and finally obtain those positions for themselves regardless of wealth or background. Sadly the latter can have more said for it than the former, but the plebeians made great gains in the Senate during the era of the Conflict of the Orders, and this period was the closest Rome came to civil war before the period of Caesar. If this shows anything it is that the aristocrats knew the boundaries of their *imperium* over the state and the people's voice held sway over the most ambitious aristocrat's motives or ideas. Concessions were made, the people's tribune was installed, and the XII Tables were placed in the forum for all to read and interpret the law themselves. Still the strife between the two classes cannot be ignored, and one may wonder how fast Rome could have expanded during this time had the aristocracy given more concessions to the plebeians during this period. Though Rome was a small state during the early republic, she asserted her

dominance over her enemies through countless tribal wars with the Volscii, Etruscans, and Samnites during this period. The advent of the Samnite Wars allowed Rome to finally expand beyond the region of Latium and into Campania and Samnium itself. Though these territories were not officially annexed by Rome, the Senate authorized the construction of colonies in these territories in order to allow the common people other places to reside and seek their fortunes as well as to allow the nobility to acquire new land for its agricultural endeavors. The downside of the acquisition of Samnium was the dangerously close border with the Tarentines and Greek city-states. When the Tarentines felt sufficiently threatened by Rome, they called upon Pyrrhus of Epirus for assistance.

With the arrival of Pyrrhus in Italy the Romans at last put aside the majority of their differences in order to defend their state from a common enemy and the era of the Pyrrhic Wars led Rome into the international fray. When the Mamertines took hold of Messana and called for Rome's aid against Carthage and Syracuse, the decision to engage in a foreign war was not taken lightly by the Senate, and the common people saw the opportunity to expand their wealth by destroying rich international enemies and plundering their cities. Rome was woefully unprepared for the ensuing struggle against Carthage, but did not relent and continued to combat the Carthaginians on land and sea despite suffering major naval defeats and land defeats in Africa. The Roman idea of never attaining peace until victory was achieved over their enemy is a hard concept for the modern mind to grasp. Even more so when one realizes that if any other nation had been in the same type of war with Carthage their public would have grown quickly tired after the decades of war that ensued and quickly arranged a peace agreement. The unbelievable idea that Rome's own citizens donated money to the government in order to reconstitute the navy is a miracle that allowed the Romans a final victory over Carthage, which sued for peace soon

after. Although Rome's terms were particularly harsh for Carthage, the large war indemnity placed on her allowed the Romans to supply their citizens with the needed supplies and compensation lost due to the war effort. Bread and pay for military aid and service were given and the Carthaginians had to quickly find new sources of wealth before they ran dry due to the ongoing Mercenary War.

Hamilcar Barca, the brilliant general who kept Lilybaeum out of Rome's hands for years and held out in Sicily alone defeated the rebellious mercenaries and went on his conquest in Spain in order to pay off Rome. This was done in order to raise a new army that would invade Rome under his son Hannibal and would bring Rome and her people to their knees by propagating revolts by the surrounding allies across Italy who had fought for Rome during the First Punic War. Hamilcar's son Hannibal rampaged across Italy spreading rebellion and discontent for Rome wherever possible while defeating Rome's armies in battle after battle, with Rome suffering the worst defeats in her history. Rome's inefficient political structure did not allow for experienced generals to command the army for more than one year, and this led to personal ambition and hubris among the consuls who sought to defeat Hannibal their own way. And yet, as though all hope would seem lost to any other country under similar circumstances, the Romans still managed to raise forces and fight Hannibal and the Macedonians at once, and after the Romans gained successes in Spain, Macedonia, Illyria, Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia and Hannibal was recalled from Italy and defeated at Zama that the Romans again triumphed, this time ensuring that their hated rival would never rise again to challenge them. The public of Rome was wild with wealth and the successes of the army, and the new provinces in Spain and Sicily allowed room for the Roman citizenry to establish new beginnings and potentially rise from poverty. Hellenism and philosophy spread rampantly across the Roman world after the

defeat of Macedonia, and the continued wars in Greece and Macedon further allowed the influx of Hellenistic ideas to influence the Roman arts, philosophy, science, and other endeavors. When Macedonia was finally vanquished along with Spain and Carthage, Rome acquired three new provinces. In southern Gaul the province of Massalia was created, and the men of Rome's legions were allowed to buy land there. The problem with land vexed Rome's internal stabilization within her political ranks. For centuries the plebeians had fought the Senate to gain inalienable rights towards land ownership and agrarian reforms, but to no avail. Though the Punic Wars and Macedonian Wars unified the Roman people against a common enemy, it halted the effects of internal disorganization only temporarily until peace once more reigned supreme across Rome's territories. The higher positions in government still remained in the hands of the nobility and it was not until after the Second Punic War that the plebeians were able to secure seats in the consulship and praetorship. Cato the Elder was among the first to achieve this goal, as well as the censorship which was the most highly sought prize in the *cursus honorum* for the aristocracy. Corruption ran higher as Rome expanded her territories. The provincial praetors farmed taxes at extortionist rates, so much that revolts against them took place as in Spain. Mistreatment and lack of cultural appreciation led to further discourse and discontent among the local populations and in Rome the growing problem of the unemployed flourished as fresh slaves from Carthage, Spain, and Macedonia took the workplaces in the agricultural sector under the noble aristocracy. Industry in Rome was sorely lacking, as more effort was placed in local commerce and agriculture in order to please the masses for the time being than fixing the problem in the long term by creating new employment opportunities. The prices of bread were always a problem for the state, as it would make or break the consul of that year insofar as whether he could bring the people bread at affordable prices or not.

Rome attempted to relieve some civil distress by placing citizens in its new colonies. Many of the colonies established held no significant value after the defeat of Rome's enemies, and slowly withered into dust as the poor fled back to the crowded cities of Italy in search of new opportunities. When Tiberius Gracchus came into the political spotlight, he saw the corruption of Rome's wealthy aristocracy firsthand. The wealthy bought the land offered to the poor after the end of the wars in Spain and Macedonia, and the people who rented the land of the nobles could not afford the extremely high rent placed on their living quarters. Others had their land bought out from under them in order for the nobility to expand their farms. The Gracchi were the first to successfully pass real land reforms in Roman history, albeit at the cost of their lives. The Roman Senate still attempted to hold onto their wealth as long as possible and the problems that persisted before the Gracchi continued after their deaths, notably high unemployment due to slavery and the acquisition of all the lands by the nobility. This problem lasted until the end of the Western Empire in 476 C.E. Men such as Julius and Augustus Caesar attempted to calm the public nerve particularly by establishing a state-owned grain trade that entitled the citizens of Rome to free bread, a notion that had come about during the Republic under the Gracchi but was never fully realized as the state attempted to sell the bread at lower prices than the grain cost, therefore losing capital from the treasury every year. The problem of Rome's provinces would never fully be fixed, and the cultural conversion that should have taken place by the Latins instead reversed itself and the Romans slowly lost their own cultural identity to the cultures of the barbarians in the north and the Hellenization in the East. In time, when the Empire split, Byzantium survived the collapse of the Western Empire, the Eastern Empire forsook the Latin language altogether in favor of Greek. The military of ancient Rome, the most powerful the world had seen since Alexander, was the foundation of the Republic's undoing after the reforms

of Gaius Marius, allowing ambitious men such as Sulla and Caesar to climb the political ladder unchecked by all with the backing of ferociously loyal troops who relied on their generals solely for their income. This would continue on into the empire as generals would be proclaimed emperor by their own legions, particularly in the Year of the Four Emperors, under Galba, Vitellius, Otho, and Vespasian. As the waning years of the Republic dawned, the greed and ambition of Rome's elite had sealed the fate of the Republic after the dictatorship and bloody civil war under Sulla. So it was that in the grandest years of Rome's history when she had reached the near peak of cultural dominance in the Western world and was reaching the crescent of her military might that the internal civil war brought on by the First and Second Triumvirates destroyed the Republic. Julius Caesar's office of *dictator perpetuo* abolished all the power of the consulship and the Senate was under his direct authority in fear of his military prestige and might. To further consolidate power, Augustus, though less grand in pomp than Julius Caesar, created his own personal military guard which allowed him to rule from behind the scenes with an iron fist.

Many remember Rome for its grand empire, the territories stretching from Britain to Mesopotamia, from the Bosphorus to the Pillars of Hercules. The might and prestige and fantastic tales of the empire and its emperors inspire multiple tales of wealth, power, deceit, fanaticism, insanity, coercion, bribery, murder and more. But it was during the Roman Republic that Rome saw her grandest and most trying struggles, where the noblest acts were performed by men elected to their positions by the people, for the people. And while the nobility and the poor did not always agree, their strength and fortitude against the incalculable hordes of enemies they fought and defeated laid the foundations of Rome's greatness. And though Rome had an imperfect system of government, the world was amazed that the Republican experiment in Rome

succeeded amidst so much civil discourse while the rest of the ancient world's oligarchies (even though Rome was technically an oligarchy as the majority of the state was owned by the aristocrats) and monarchies faltered.¹⁰⁷ The democracies of Greece had failed; the successor kingdoms of Alexander had failed; and the barbarian federations in the north had failed. Carthage had failed militarily to amass a citizen army; Macedonia had failed to unite the Greek nations under a common cause; the Seleucids had failed to capitalize on their successes; and the Romans came out on top as the overall victors in every major war the Republic fought. It is small wonder that the majority of the modern world now follow the examples of the Roman Republic. The lessons left to us by historians such as Livy, Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, Sallust and many others allow us to establish republics across the globe, and to enhance the Roman style to fit the modern world's needs. The problems that faced Rome's public have for the majority been solved, yet the struggle between the rich and poor remains in many nations which seek economic and social equality in a growing industrial and interconnected world.¹⁰⁸

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