

**Can Highly Controlled Management Environments Change Sub-National Federal Grants
Management?**

by

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Ramsey. I honor each one of you for your unyielding belief in me and my ability to make this improbable dream come true.

ACRONYMS

CDBG	Community Development Block Grant
ED	U.S. Department of Education
FGMU	Federal Grant Management Unit
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GVI	Government of the Virgin Islands
Mdn	Median
NIH	National Institutes of Health
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
USVI	United States Virgin Islands
VIDE	Virgin Islands Department of Education
VIDH	Virgin Islands Department of Health

ABSTRACT**Can Highly Controlled Management Environments Change Sub-National Federal Grants Management?**

Valerie J. Richardson

This study examines grants management at the sub-national level. Specifically, the study sought to determine whether highly controlled management environments change sub-national federal grants management. Many previous studies have investigated the connection between policy implementation at the sub-national level and decision making, accountability, communications, risk taking, and transparency of information; however, there was limited research that connected these elements in the grantee's management environment to policy implementation. Overall, the study's findings underline prior theories that accountability, discretion, decision making, communication systems, and risk are key influences in policy implementation and program results. The results also offer evidence that the effective implementation of sub-national goals via grant awards is linked to the capacity of the sub-national grantees to manage, which is influenced by their management environment.

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Can Highly Controlled Management Environments Change Sub-National Federal Grants Management?

INTRODUCTION

Research Problem

It is projected that federal grant awards in fiscal year 2009 will reach approximately \$568 billion and fiscal year 2010 estimates are projected at approximately \$652 billion. Over the last decade (1999–2009) federal grant awards have increased from \$267,886 billion to \$567,823¹ billion and are projected to continue to increase in budget out years. Over this time span, annual awards reflect consistent but modest increases; however, over this same period, demand for determining results and accountability for grant investments has grown and continues to grow significantly. Quests for measurable evidence remain highly desirable for both lawmakers and stakeholders. Hunger for such information has led to varying approaches (e.g., Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), and the Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006) to assess results and assign accountability for the stewardship and results-oriented investment of taxpayer dollars.

The grant has been categorized as a policy tool used for implementation of national goals at the sub-national level and grant awards represent a significant portion of the federal budget. This study seeks to add to the literature on public policy multi-actor implementation and

¹ The Budget for Fiscal Year 2010, Historical Tables 12-3 – Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments by Function and Fund Group: 1940 - 2014

accountability as it relates to grants as a policy tool to address public problems. Specifically, the single case study will focus on sub-national government by investigating the impact of management environments on federal grants management.

Sub-national government is being defined in this study as other levels of government delivering publicly financed services and pursuing publicly authorized purposes via the tool of public action of the grant (Salamon 2002). A controlled management environment (also known as a centralized authoritative environment or bureaucratic elite system) for the purpose of this study is being defined as an environment in which there is one decision maker and where managers are not encouraged to take risks, make decisions, be creative, share information, or be held accountable for performance (professional or organizational).

The results of the literature review of grants management (which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two) reveal that most studies focus on the results of the program funded by federal grants rather than the tools of governments. Kettl (2005, viii) suggests government programs have become more complex and as a result ushered in intricate governmental administrative strategies, which has led to a “search for better performance and accountability.” The complexities of government mandate examining management from varying perspectives. Salamon (2002, 20) suggests that there are five criteria that can be used to evaluate policy tools or “collective actions aimed at responding to public problems” (effectiveness, efficiency, equity, political legitimacy, and manageability) and connects this theory to the policy tool of the grant.

Collins and Gerber (2006) conducted a study to examine the block grant as a primary means of implementing policy authority at the state level. They argue that “grant access is a function of both state-level institutional choices and the administrative capacity of local

governments” (2006, 613). Collins and Gerber used “counties as the aggregated unit of analysis” and data was collected from local governments in four states for a comparative analysis (2006, 621).

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted some key studies examining grant implementation and accountability which do examine management environments or local limitations; however, those studies leave the door open for further research to connect behavior and implementation. This void in prior studies is attempted to be filled via the goals of this study to both expand and generalize prior theories in the field of study of policy tools and program implementation. For instance, in the testimony (based on a comparative study) before the U.S. Senate Education Task Force Committee on the Budget in February 1998, the GAO examined flexibility and accountability via focusing on grant design and structure, but failed to fully explore human behavior of the implementers. The comparative study (GAO/GGD-98-137) examined flexibility and accountability via block grants by looking at grant program design, the achievement of national objectives, and performance relationships, and was highly focused on accountability. Additionally, this study examined “flexibility, accountability, and the level of government that is accountable for performance” (GAO/GGD-98-137, 19), but did not expand the current field of knowledge.

In 2004, the GAO also examined accountability for a dozen crucial federal grants awarded to the insular government of the American Samoa. An insular government can be a freely associated state, commonwealth, territory, or possession of the government of the United States. This study examined a U.S. territory which significantly depends on federal funding to

offer key government services via grants (GAO-05-41) and which has encountered a number of problems in the area of grants management.

The GAO conducted three specific studies and/or reports that identified similar financial management deficiencies in grants management in insular government areas: *Insular Areas Update* (GAO/GGD-96-184R), *U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability Challenges* (GAO-07-110), and *American Samoa: Accountability for Key Federal Grants Needs Improvement* (GAO-05-41). The GAO studies provided the most comprehensive literature for examining grants management from the perspective of the implementers versus the program. While the GAO studies may have limited generalizability, the results of this study do provide an opportunity for generalization among insular governments. The GAO studies generally focused on insular governments that included the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and more closely examined management of grants, whereas studies of states and local governments tended to focus most heavily on program outcomes. As most grants management studies have focused on program outcomes, and perhaps unintentionally neglected human behavior's role in implementation, this study seek to more fully understand its impact.

Grants Management Study Group Selection Criteria

While numerous groups, individuals, non-governmental organizations, and state and local governments receive federal grant dollars, the recipients most often cited for mismanagement of federal grant dollars have been insular governments. Based on GAO studies, the challenges that were most often cited were those that relate to accountability, management, and human behavior. For this reason, the study group selected was based on management of grants and human

behavior rather than outcomes of specific grant programs. Using prior GAO reports and testimonies, insular governments appeared to meet this criterion; in particular, the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI) fits this category. The lack of effective management of grant awards and implementation of grant programs in the GVI has been frequently cited in consent decrees, GAO studies, audit findings, and compliance agreements by major grantor agencies, oversight agencies, and federal audit agencies.

Of the five insular governments that received substantial federal grants and were noted for significant grants management challenges, the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) was selected based on the following criteria:

- a) geographic location (The USVI is the only one of the five not located in the Pacific),
- b) similar culture to the U.S.,
- c) mirrors the structure of the U.S. Government (three branches of government), and
- d) similar structure of the U.S. executive branch of government.

Numerous scholarly research efforts have noted a number of behavioral traits or variables that can impact policy and program implementation. Most notably identified were accountability, manageability, effectiveness, efficiency, risk taking, innovation, discretion, decision making, and legitimacy and political support. Management challenges in the GVI that have been identified by the GAO and other grantor agencies are consistent with many of those traits that draw on theoretical literature associated with highly controlled management environments and bureaucratic elite systems.

Behavior of implementers has emerged as a factor that impacts organizational effectiveness. Jreisat (2002) suggests that it is the human factor that dictates how organizations are managed. If in fact the human factor plays a role, assessing human behavior within the

context of a highly controlled management environment would be a valid assumption for this study. Along this same avenue of argument, Wilson (1989), in his book *Bureaucracy – Why Agencies Do What They Do*, offers that behaviors, beliefs, and cultures dictate why agencies do what they do, thereby lending additional credence to knowledge claims that there is a level of impact that human behavior may have on policy implementation.

Although Wilson (1989) and Jreisat (2002) suggest that human behavior plays a significant role in predicting why individuals and, cumulatively, organizations do what they do, their arguments fall short of drilling down into the many psychological complexities of human behavior that govern action. Icke Ajzen, a well-known behavioral theorist, who has studied predicting and understanding human behavior, argues that there are a number of variables that drive human behavior. Ajzen (1991, 179) states that “explaining human behavior can be approached at many levels, from concern with physiological processes at one extreme to concentration on social institutions at the other.” In attempting to study the impact human behavior may have on policy implementation it is important to consider some of the theories argued by Ajzen that are thought to determine behavior, such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) or Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB).

Ajzen (1985), argues that explaining why individuals do what they do is difficult, primarily because of the complexity of human behavior. Ajzen's arguments (1991) have long examined varying facets of human behavior. In 1975 Fishbein and Ajzen attempted to explain human behavior through the TRA. The Theory of Reasoned Action focuses on the intent of the individual to act. “Intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort

they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior” (Ajzen 1991, 181). Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory will be useful in examining grantee managers' willingness and demonstrated behavior as it relates to grants management.

In 1985 Ajzen expanded the concept of TRA and presented the TPB: “A central factor in the TPB is the individual’s intention to perform a given behavior” (Ajzen 1991, 181). The study of human behavior was further enlarged by Bagozzi to include a Theory of Self-Regulation (TSR). Bagozzi’s theory further expands the prior TRA and TPB to include the element of desire, as well as examining the influence of past behavior (Leone, Perugini, and Ercolani 1999).

Each of the theories, to some degree, considers factors such as attitudes, intentions (motivation), normative and subjective norms, control beliefs, and perception. The challenge in examining any of the theories of predicting and understanding human behavior and their potential impact on grant management is determining if any of the variables are controllable and would lend themselves to improving grant management. Although Wilson and Jreisat offer solid arguments as to why individuals and organizations do what they do—similar to Fishbein and Ajzen—others who have also studied behavior also put forth the argument that in addition to motivational factors, there are non-motivational factors such as the availability of requisite opportunities and resources (e.g., time, money, skills, cooperation of other) at play. These non-motivational factors may also contribute to further exploration of behaviors and may answer why grant managers may also intend to take action, but actually do not.

Study Group Background

The USVI is an unincorporated organized territory of the United States. As U.S. citizens, Virgin Islanders are entitled to the same constitutional protections and can vote in primary

elections, but are not allowed to vote in presidential general elections. Territories are partially self-governing areas without statehood. Territories that are organized generally do not have a constitution, and are established under the auspices of organic acts that are enacted by the United States Congress, as was the Virgin Islands. Under the organic act, the USVI is a limited self-government. The USVI has an executive, legislative, and judicial branch of government. The executive branch of government closely mirrors that of the United States (Figure 1).




Figure 1: GVI Organizational Chart

The Virgin Islands were purchased by the United States from Denmark in 1917 for \$25 million. There are four major islands—St. Thomas (Charlotte Amalie is the capital), St. Croix, Water Island, and St. John—and 50 smaller islands and islets. The territory (which is about 135 square miles) has two districts: St. Croix and St. Thomas/St. John. The USVI is 1,000 miles southeast of Miami and located between the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea (Figure 2).




Figure 2: USVI Location Map (GAO-07-119, 5)

The U. S. Congress-enacted organic legislation in 1936 (the Act of 1936) did not come with provisions of constitutional protection under the first ten amendments (known as the Bill of Rights), some of which are due process of law, equal protection of laws, and prohibition of slavery. The Revised Organic Act enacted in 1954 offered full protection under the Bill of Rights and also defined the powers of the local government. Until 1968, when the Elective Governor Act was passed, the Department of the Interior appointed Navy Admirals to govern the territory; today they have an elected governor. Similar to the District of Columbia, American Samoa, and Guam, the USVI has had a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives since 1972. While the U.S. Congress has authorized the USVI to adopt a local constitution, the USVI has not adopted a constitution thus far. In June 2008, the Fifth Constitutional Convention recently completed and submitted a draft proposed Constitution to the governor; however, it was rejected for submission to the U.S. Congress and the president based on failure to comply with the requirements of federal and local law. The territory is now determining how to proceed.

The official 2000 U.S. Census reported a population of 108,612 (Table 1); however, demographics have changed, and today, the USVI has a population of 120,000 and its core

languages are Spanish, English, and French. The indigenous people of the Virgin Islands are U.S. citizens, but they are not allowed to vote in presidential elections. The USVI is one of four insular governments for which the Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs has oversight. These four insular governments are American Samoa, USVI, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, each of which has had long-standing accountability issues that primarily centered on mismanagement of grant awards, lack of financial management internal controls, and reconciliation of local and federal funds.

Table 1. GVI 2000 U.S. Census Bureau Demographics²

Demographic and Economic Characteristics of American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, and USVI, 2000

	American Samoa	CNMI	Guam	Virgin Islands
Population	57,291	69,221	154,805	108,612
Percentage who were non- U.S. citizens or nationals	35.3	56.5	18.1	12.0
Median household income	\$18,219	\$22,898	\$39,317	\$24,704
Per capita income	\$4,357	\$9,151	\$12,722	\$13,139
Percentage of individuals in poverty	61.0	46.0	23.0	32.5
Economic base	Manufacturing (tuna processing)	Manufacturing (apparel), tourism	Military bases, tourism	Tourism, manufacturing (oil refining), business/financial services
Employment (percentage)				
Government	29.9	11.7	26.5	24.5

² Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Profile 2007 and GAO Analysis

Manufacturing	35.3	40.7	2.0	5.9
Tourism	3.7	13.6	18.0	15.8

In 2010, the USVI is projecting to receive approximately \$175.5 million in grant awards (Table 2). In fiscal year 2010, federal grants are estimated to increase by approximately \$1.2 million above fiscal year 2009 levels. Over the last few fiscal years, federal grant awards for the USVI have only slightly increased. The USVI continues to receive modest increases from year to year, even from some of the grantor agencies that continue to designate some USVI grant recipients as “high-risk” grantees.

Table 2. Major Grantor Agencies – FY 2010 Estimated Federal Grant Awards³

• <i>Department of Health and Human Services</i>	\$49.7
• <i>Department of Education</i>	\$35.7
• <i>Department of Transportation</i>	\$21.7
• <i>Department of Agriculture</i>	\$20.0
• <i>Department of Homeland Security</i>	\$14.5
• <i>Environmental Protection Agency</i>	\$13.6
• <i>Department of Labor</i>	\$6.3
• <i>Department of the Interior</i>	\$6.2
• <i>Department of Justice</i>	\$4.5
• <i>Department of Commerce</i>	\$2.3

³ Source: 2010 USVI Budget Book

The 2007 GAO report *U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability Challenges* (GAO-07-119) and a letter dated January 30, 2007 from the U.S. Department of Education's Office of the Inspector General cited a number of shortcomings in the management of programs. They included: a lack of timeliness of reconciliations, delays in drawing down of federal funds and timely payment of vendors, supplanting of federal funds, loss of federal inventory, failure to submit the single audit reports by the statutory deadlines and serious ongoing audit findings, ineffective internal controls, failure to ensure contract deliverables in accordance with vendor contracts, and numerous grant programs that consistently fail to reach national goals (GAO-07-119).

Studies conducted by Malcolm Goggin (1987) argue that the behaviors of the implementers and the style of those who shape the management environment impact the implementation of both policies and programs. Consistent management challenges of the GVI give the appearance that the management environment may be a contributing factor to the ineffective management of grant awards that is extensive throughout the government. As recently as January 2007, 6.4 percent (\$2.13 million) of the annual award of \$31 million in educational grants reverted back to the U.S. Treasury on at the beginning of the beginning of the 2006 fiscal year due to lack of use (Mannes 2006). Of the 50 states, Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the USVI—which all receive varying grant award amounts from the U.S. Department of Education—the USVI had the highest percentage returned to the U.S. Treasury. Annual grant awards in the Virgin Islands expire at the end of the funding year (September 30) if the award is made from a federal annual appropriation (one-year money). Similarly, no new obligations can be incurred during the five year expiration period; however, adjustments can be

made. At the end of the five year period, the award cancels. Recent history has shown that grant awards are not well monitored during the grant award period to ensure that the funds were being spent, resulting in a high percentage of award funds being returned to the federal government once the appropriation cancels.

Manageability or the ability to implement grants based on organizational management is extremely important in actualizing national goals. As the ability of the USVI to effectively manage federal grant dollars has been often cited as an ongoing problem by the Departments of the Interior and Education, assessing manageability and the ability to implement may bring about positive change in financial and grant management practices throughout the GVI. The Departments of the Interior and Education have both identified the inability of the GVI to account for how federal dollars are spent and inadequate adherence to specific grant requirements that dictate the timeframes for requesting and using funds as problematic (GAO-07-119).

Actual GVI grant awards between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 increased from \$129,310,423 to \$179,021,319—only to be decreased by nearly 50 percent or \$83,535,354 in fiscal year 2007. The GVI is estimating awards to remain close to fiscal year 2007 levels in fiscal year 2008 (\$76,733,327) and to significantly increase in 2009 to approximately \$174,376,652 and \$175,554,402 in fiscal year 2010.

Grant awards in the GVI have been inconsistent (Figure 3). Inconsistencies in grant awards can be attributed to a number of reasons. Reasons for the decreases could have been due to a decrease in the amount of grants being awarded to the USVI because of the type of the grant, poor grants management, or a combination of the two. One reason could be the fact that a great

number of grants, nearly 50 percent, are project grants. Project grants are awarded for a specific purpose and for a specific framework. In many cases project grants require a local match and over time, the percentage of the federal match decreases. In the case of the federal match, funding levels decrease or increase based on the percent of the match, thus explaining inconsistency in the grant award amounts from year to year. In other cases local funds may not be available to match the federal match; thus, the grant conditions are unmet, and the grant is no longer funded or offered. Finally, once grants have been identified as being mismanaged or unused, the grant award can be decreased or cancelled. One can conclude that the nearly 50 percent reduction in grant awards between fiscal years 2006 and 2007 was due to more than project grants maturing to accomplish intended purposes or matching local/federal levels.




Figure 3: GVI Grant Actuals, Estimated, and Projected Awards⁴

⁴ Source: USVI 2010 Budget Book

One of the goals of this study is to investigate if there are predictive factors present that would identify the likelihood of third-party (sub-national) grant recipient mismanagement. Such factors may be resident in elite bureaucratic structures and subsequently jeopardize the intergovernmental implementation of national goals at sub-national levels of government. The study will explore aspects often overlooked in past studies of multi-actor implementation and management by investigating grants management and human behavior.

Bureaucratic elite systems are considered as organizations and units that have a “concentration of all authority in one person’s hand and can be detrimental to the creation of leadership capabilities in organizations” (Heady 1996, 55). In a centralized authoritative environment (bureaucratic elite system), one individual generally makes the decision for all individuals within departments or agencies. As a result, managers who work in this type of controlled environment are not able to operate in an atmosphere that fosters decision making, innovation, creativity, or change. One-perspective environments have been cited as a management concern by both those in and outside of the USVI government and, more recently, validated in the GAO-07-119 report on U.S. insular areas.

The objective of the study is to contribute to the theories of implementation via the policy tool of the grant for achieving national goals. The study will examine third-party (sub-national) governance through the assessment of the behaviors of the street-level bureaucrat (grant managers) and management environments. Limited studies were found in the literature that fully addressed elements of human behavior in public policy multi-actor implementation and this study is designed to generate answers to some of those questions of human behavior’s implication in grants management. The significant contribution this research seeks to add to the

grant award process is early identification of the management attributes that should be present to enhance the stewardship of grant funds, and subsequently, more effective multi-actor implementation of national goals.

The study may prove enormously beneficial for the GVI by: 1) addressing some of the deficiencies cited by some grant-making agencies which have expressed disenfranchisement with grant management practices and 2) increasing or maintaining federal grant funds that represent 14 percent of the annual revenue stream (Figure 4). Further, the findings may provide support for pre-grant-making interventions for enhancing grant management via the identification of predictive factors for grants mismanagement via a third-party delivery model (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).




Figure 4: GVI FY 2010 Projected Revenue Streams

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Studies that Have Addressed the Problem

The central basis of this study is the investigation of the role human behavior plays in the administration of federal grants by third-party actors (grantees via the grant managers). Salamon (2002, 10) contends that the approach to the study of public administration has “experienced a paradigm shift” which has moved “away from the unit of analysis” of programs and agencies to the analysis of tools of action; therefore, this study was approached from Salamon’s premise of analyzing tools of action. In line with other studies that were conducted in the 1990s, that “argue that the field of public administration must be repositioned on new intellectual and practical foundations to avoid collapsing into a rubble of irrelevance” (Ingraham and Lynn 2004, 3), this study examines the grant as an indirect government tool of public action and focuses on the grantee and the grantor agency grants manager behavior.

In Ingraham and Lynn’s 2001 book, *Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical Research*, the authors acknowledge that the term governance does not have precise definitions and provide a number of examples of how this term has been used to define various network concepts in public-sector literature. Ingraham and Lynn (2001, 7) offer their definition of the term governance “as regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services.” Despite the varying uses of the term, the basic concept of governance proved to be very useful for the purposes of this study. The adoption of Ingraham and Lynn’s definition established a more expansive avenue for approaching the study. This theory opened the window to explore the administrative side of public management and to investigate “the behaviors and contributions of

governmental performance of actors performing in managerial roles,” as well as link those practices and behaviors to the relationship between authoritative decisions and governmental performance (2001, 7).

This study places emphasis on tools or techniques of public actions, specifically, the grant (formula grants, both categorical and block, and general purpose/project grants). Formula grants are those grants that are awarded based upon a formula dictated by a specific law. Formula grants can be either categorical, block, or earmark, each accompanied by specific parameters for restriction, discretion, and use. Generally, singular categorical grants offer the grant recipient the least amount of flexibility, whereas a block grant (which is generally a combination of categorical grants) often provides more latitude to the grant recipient.

The most commonly awarded grant is the project grant. The project grant is competitively offered. The project is awarded for a specific time frame and for a specific purpose. Project grants often require a local matching of funds to those being awarded by the grantor agency. Some project grants can be awarded in the form of a cooperative agreement. In these instances, the federal grantor agency provides direct assistance at the local level and is often closely involved in the performance of those activities associated with executing the program being funded via the grant.

Projected fiscal year 2010 federal grant awards will represent 14 percent of the overall GVI budget. The GVI receives approximately 137 grant awards annually. Approximately 50 percent of the grants are formula (categorical or block) grants and the remaining 50 percent are project grant/cooperative agreements. Fifteen of the fiscal year 2010 GVI project grants are projected to be cooperative agreements and seven, block grants. Block grants that offer the GVI

the most discretion represents 0.05 percent of total types of grants awarded and 17 percent of the overall dollar value. No individual grant award could be identified that was valued at less than \$5,000.

Ingraham and Lynn suggest that there are “a number of scholars that have emphasized the growing importance of collaborative relationships in the delivery of public goods and services” (2004, 9). They further suggest that there is “an associated shift in emphasis of the study of public management and governance,” and with this new emphasis, scholars have explored such areas as multi-actor implementation, socio-political governance, the hollow state, craftsmanship theory, hierarchical relationships, and the transformation of governance (Ingraham and Lynn 2004, 9). Scholars mentioned were Frederickson and Smith, Kettl, Milward, O’Toole, Kooiman, and Milward and Provan.

The challenge of approaching this study from the stand point of the grant tool is that there are fewer studies that examine the newer concept of the *unit of analysis* that investigates tools, networks, private-public partnerships, negotiation/persuasion or enablement skills that are comprised under the auspices of a new model of governance (Salamon 2002). Although not extensive, this shift has resulted in literature that emphasizes the importance of third-party (sub-national) governance in the delivery of government services. For instance, one of the study groups included in Frederickson and Frederickson’s book, *Measuring the Performance of the Hollow State*, were grantors at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) state that NIH was selected as a study group primarily due to the fact that the Institutes award numerous grants to third-party recipients.

Frederickson and Frederickson examined grants and third-party performance and implementation by attempting to answer three major questions: “1) how shall performance be measured when the tasks taken on by third parties are exploratory; 2) how can performance be understood when the means by which objectives are achieved are decidedly unclear; and, 3) how shall performance measurement be logically understood when it is evident that genuine performance almost always involves many years rather than a single year?” (2006, 95). Frederickson and Frederickson’s study of NIH in 2006 followed an earlier 2002 study of NIH by B. Radin that also examined implementation, performance, and accountability. Frederickson and Frederickson (2006, 13) approached their study by using an “iterative and accumulative process of field research.”

Frederickson and Frederickson offer that “each of the federal programs reviewed has unique and distinctly articulated vertical networks of third parties” (2006, 13). Similarly, Radin (2002) and Salamon (2002) concluded that there is no clear or completely shaped official definition of the tool of grants, as grants vary significantly in characteristics and administration. Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) generally arrived at the same conclusions.

Salamon insists that this murkiness contributes to the “central argument of the ‘new governance’ that has altered the nature of public management and the pattern of public problem solving in rather fundamental ways; thereby, resulting in conclusions that are only partly acknowledged in existing theories and approaches” in public administration and program implementation (2002, 9). The theory of new governance has shifted the paradigm of classical public administration from just examining the policy and outcome of programs implementation

to examining a wider range of variables that impact and influence implementation, such as networks and expanded span-of-control models.

Public administration's framework has been continually challenged as far back as 1973, when Pressman and Wildavsky argued, "because the implementability of a policy decision cannot be comprehensively considered during policy formulation, there will always be uncharted territory" (1973, 219). Subsequent studies have added additional criteria to the awarding of grants, such as ability of the grantee to manage and implement the grant. Salamon (2002) suggests that this reallocates the core attention from organizational operations to the actual players and actors responsible for administering grant programs. For instance, in 1998 the Government Accountability Office, formerly the General Accounting Office, conducted a study to examine design features of grant programs by studying flexibility, accountability, and performance information.

The literature review uncovered a wide plethora of studies on policy implementation. The review also discovered an equal number of assessments and studies on the value of past policy implementation research findings and recommendations which helped to narrow the scope. Governed by a broad umbrella of multi-actor implementation, the literature review focused on direct subtopics that have been found to contribute most to the implementation of public policy: accountability, multi-actor implementers and tools, human behavior (theories of reasoned action and planned behavior), communication, decision making, culture, creativity/innovation, discretion, risks, and new public management. The graphic below (Figure 5) maps the literature review to the study's central and sub-questions.




Figure 5: Central and Sub-Question Literature Map

Multi-Actor Implementation

The most cited study of multi-actor implementation was the ground-breaking classical single case study conducted by Pressman and Wildavsky in the 1970s. Since their study, there have been hundreds of studies that have followed, as well as studies that have assessed those studies. O'Toole's 1985 comprehensive assessment provided a road map for determining appropriate methodologies for investigating multi-actor implementation and human behavior. O'Toole (1985) reviewed the work of numerous scholars who have studied multi-actor implementation, which reads like a laundry list of some of the most highly-noted and regularly-cited scholars in the field at that time, such as Elmore (1996), Agranoff and Radin (1991),

Mueller (1984), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981), Ingram and Mann (1980), Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), Rein and Rabinovitz (1978), and Weatherley and Lipsky (1977). Many of those studies were the first to begin looking for variables in how national policies and goals are implemented at the sub-national level and who the actors involved in the implementation are.

As we entered the close of the 20th century, Caroline Dyer, from the School of Education at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom, conducted a case study using observations in 1999 to assess the implementation of educational policy in India. She examined the theory of backward mapping and challenged the negative impact on implementation due to lack of planning for all stages of implementation. The backward mapping theory argues that it is imperative to consider all stages of policy implementation, including examining the behavior of the street-level bureaucrat which occurs in the final stages. Dyer believes failure to take into consideration the impact of the behavior of the street-level implementer when policy is being implemented introduces a risk that the overall policy will be ineffectively implemented as designed. She concluded by asserting that “the need to plan implementation is transparent, and the backward mapping model can be a useful tool” (Dyer 1999, 60).

Application of the backward mapping theory supports prior knowledge claims that the behaviors of those involved in the final stages of policy implementation influence implementation of the policy (Dyer 1999). Dyer concludes that the theory of backward mapping provides an alternate avenue to investigate policy implementation. Examining the behaviors of the street-level bureaucrats once implementation is completed reverses the theory of examining implementation at the forward stages of policy design when the policy makers have not taken

into consideration how street-level bureaucrats' behaviors will impact implementation (Dyer 1999; Elmore 1980).

Elmore offers that “the analytic solution offered by backward mapping stresses the dispersal of control and concentrates on factors that can be influenced only indirectly by policymakers” (1980, 605). Elmore further suggests that “there are other factors” that ultimately impact the discretionary choices of the lower-level administrators (e.g., closeness to the problem or the recipient, or ability to immediately solve the problem) (1980, 605). O’Toole’s (1985) assessment of studies conducted during the decade of the late 1970s through the mid-1980s provided valuable information on implementation research successes and failures, as well as a rare identification of some of the earlier behavioral variables or other factors in policy implementation, such as the economy, goal clarity, and inadequate staff or resources (O’Toole 1985).

Elmore suggests that “backward mapping explicitly questions the assumption that policymakers ought to, or do, exercise the determinant influence over what happens in the implementation process” (1980, 604). Carrington (2005) concurs with this premise when he suggests that employees have to make decisions on a variety of tasks without the involvement of upper management. Elmore furthers this argument by suggesting that “the logic of backward mapping is that it begins not at the top of the implementation process but at the last possible stage, the point at which administrative actions intersect private choices” (1980, 604).

Approaching this study by examining behaviors of grant managers gives opportunity to explore implementation at the administrative action intersection between the street-level bureaucrat and the program recipient. Implementation capacity was frequently identified in many

forms, including organizational, managerial, and collaborative. Investigating complementary forms of cause and effect relationships would assess whether various predictive factors are resident and assess the capacity of third-party organizations to effectively manage federal grants, and subsequently achieve national goals.

Operating in narrow span-of-control models of yesterday does not allow for the discretion that is needed at the level of interaction with program recipients, nor does it provide a structure for accountability in the grants process. Bardach's 1989 craftsmanship theory suggests that the ability of agencies to work together collaboratively also impacts implementation and the value provided to the recipient. Bardach's craftsmanship theory is quite similar to Goldsmith and Egger's position that traditional and hierarchical models of governance no longer are sufficient for today's governing network (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).

The lens for researching actors who play a role in policy implementation has widened in the last ten years. To build a conceptual model of how services are delivered, Dawes and Eglene (2004) conducted a multi-national comparative case study of 12 collaborations in Canada, the United States, and Europe. Beginning with a clearly defined set of study propositions, Dawes and Eglene (2004) analyzed individual cases via a cross-case comparison, a methodology suggested by Agranoff and Radin over a decade earlier. The following year, their approach was validated by Jreisat (2005), who offered that gaining a global understanding of public administration, which uses a broader-angle perspective, is often better than comparative public administration.

The combined influence of various actors is thought to have considerable influence on both how government performs and its effectiveness (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000); thus,

understanding and identifying the relationships of the whole (principal and agent) is crucial for fully understanding multi-actor policy implementation. Salamon (1999) promotes the concept of network management when examining tools of government. He writes that grants are indirect tools of government action and, therefore, members of a system of actors that are a component of new governance.

Over the last three decades of implementation studies and studies to assess those studies, implementation research has progressed from looking at single case studies to investigating multiple nations, multiple actors, and multiple behaviors at each phase of policy implementation. From the 1980s through today, scholars have slowly inched forward in reaching a consensus that multiple strategies of inquiry using more mixed method approaches may yield the most benefit for public practitioners.

Human Behavior and the Street-Level Bureaucrat

The identification of variables that impact multi-actor policy implementation was begun in the early 1980s when Lipsky examined the behaviors of the street-level bureaucrats in implementing public policy. Lipsky (1980) approached the study of street-level bureaucrats by examining implementation from a bottom-up approach. His research methodology was to observe the “collective behavior of public service organizations” (1980, xi). Results of his study offered that managers do attempt to prevent the lower-level employee from engaging in any meaningful choices as far as work decisions. In doing so, Lipsky (1980) concluded that managers feel they are better able to obtain the results they are seeking by controlling the discretion or behavior of lower-level employees.

In environments where managers believe they must control the behavior of lower-level employees, employees become comfortable with giving over their decision power to authoritative figures (Heifetz 1994). The result of handing over this power is an organizational culture that incubates a highly controlled management environment in which lower-level managers and employees are no longer willing to make decisions or take risks.

More recently, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) approached the study of street-level bureaucrats by interviewing and gathering stories from 48 street-level workers over a span of three years. Maynard-Moody and Musheno joined the group of scholars that have come to agree that “street-level bureaucrats play an essential and somewhat paradoxical role in the public policy implementation process” (Ricucci 2005, 4,5).

In 2003, Hill conducted an exploratory study of street-level bureaucrats, outlining implementation literature and summarizing similarities. Hill’s contribution to the body of knowledge was to offer the importance of implementation when attempting to understand policy and to recognize that the implementer's understanding or lack thereof can have an effect on policy outcomes (H. C. Hill 2003).

Investigation of how grant managers perceive their role in the implementation of national goals could advance the literature in implementation and management environments by assessing one of the many factors influencing how important national goals are perceived to be implemented at the sub-national level. Two studies were conducted in 2003 to assess the impact of highly controlled environments on grants management from a bottom-up perspective: one by Maynard-Moody and Musheno and another by Heather C. Hill. Replicating some of their

elements of inquiry in this study may lead to further expansion of knowledge claims in third-party governance.

There was an overwhelming consensus in the literature that indicated establishing or pinpointing any one influence would be extremely difficult. Kettl observes that “implementation of public programs is an intricate dance” (2005, 46). In the 2001 study conducted by Levy, Alvesson, and Willmott, the authors argue that “while corporate political strategy literature has focused on the policy environment,” a “more critical perspective is the political nature of management’s relationship with other” players seeking organizational influence” (2001, 15).

Many scholars have agreed that varying contexts may present their own unique set of challenges and limitations. Most often identified as challenges were political, social, and cultural influences. Political influence was listed the most frequently as the core catalyst for reform and thereby a major influencer.

A number of the articles found in the *Oxford Handbook of Public Management* offered evidence that suggests that the link between the impact of organizational culture and new public management practices may be significant. Some studies have concluded that the correlation between management’s capacity to perform and their behavior is influenced by culture (Ferlie, Lynn, and Pollitt 2005). This correlation adds yet another dimension to the approach to the dissertation research for the final project—the link between management capacity, performance, and behavior. Jreisat claims that “the problem of why people behave the way they do is central to understanding a significant part of administration” (2002, 72). Jreisat further asserts that “comparative cultural studies of management are replete with variations and complexities” (2002, 5).

Much of the literature was consistent in concluding that the culture context of organizations plays a definable and important role in management behavior. Culture—whether political, social, economic, or organizational—continually surfaced throughout the literature review by scholars such as Deery and Williams (2006), Sopow (2006), Ravasi and Schultz (2006), and Jreisat (2005). Culture, however, will not be the central focus of this study.

Beyond political, social, economic, or organizational culture, many other studies have determined a myriad of influences that may impact the implementation of new public management practices. Sabatier reasons that the “manner in which governmental policies get formulated and implemented, as well as the effects of those actions on the world require an understanding of the behavior of major types of governmental institutions . . . to include the behaviors of those involved throughout the process” (1991, 147). Sabatier uses Ostrom’s Framework for Institutional Analysis (Figure 6) to establish a roadmap for dissecting policy decisions and implementation. Ostrom’s framework suggests that when trying to understand a complex system with a number of players, there are other variables that can, and do, influence the system as a whole. The theory behind Ostrom’s model is that frameworks and theories must always focus in on a subset of all variables operating in a complex system to avoid losing understanding of what is actually occurring (<http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news/page/print/11424.html>).




Figure 6: Ostrom's Framework for Institutional Analysis (Sabatier 1991)

Ostrom's model, as discussed by Sabatier (1991), further supports approaching this study through the examination of some of the most noted variables that may help in better understanding the grant as a tool of public action. Like others who have contributed to the review of research of multi-actor implementation, Sabatier (1991, 151) suggests that longitudinal studies, cross-sectional comparisons, and causality modeling can provide a "superb framework for thinking about the effects of individuals and institutions on governmental policy decisions."

Radin contributed to the discussion of intergovernmental relationships via focusing on the "realities of intergovernmental systems" (2000, 9). She addressed the contentious relationship between the policy makers and the implementers. She brought to the surface implementation challenges such as flexibility, accountability, and discretion. Radin's (2000) analysis ended with a list of suggested future research, one of which is to explore who the actual actors in policy implementation are. Radin's (2000) conclusions support the findings of other researchers that have studied the impact of human behavior on administration via examining decision making structures. Her examination of intergovernmental relationships also brought to the surface other factors such as accountability.

The research of Hood and Lodge (2004), as well as that of Goldsmith and Egger (2004), included examining the capacity, knowledge, and expertise of upper-level public servants. In this study, I attempt to argue that the diminished capacity for grants management is due to weak or lacking systems or behaviors of accountability, risk taking, creativity, decision making, and transparency within highly controlled management environments, all of which negatively alter the management of federal grants by third-party grants managers.

Bardach's 1998 review of interorganizational collaborative capacity (ICC) examined both dependent and independent variables and addressed why individuals or organizations "do one thing rather than another" (Bardach 1998, 44). Bardach's conclusion concurred with the theories of Wilson, Lipsky, and Ajzen. For these reasons, and due to the fact that hundreds of variables have been identified as they relate to policy implementation, this study will only investigate those that are associated most often with human behavior in a public administration management environment (e.g., decision making, communication, creativity, risk taking, and accountability).

Although criticized in recent years for lacking factors such as loops to provide feedback or lessons policy makers can learn from past mistakes; the rationale of the Hofferbert Model (depicted in figure 7) also suggests that there is a link between specific incidents in policy implementation and the policy output, one of which is elite behavior.




Figure 7: Hofferbert Model

To determine competency, bureaucracy, and public management reform, Hood and Lodge (2004) conducted a multinational comparative analysis, studying the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Jun contends that “to understand new international transformation we need to transcend conceptual orientations of rationalism, positivism, scientific research, and macro theory; because they cannot reflect changes that occur in emerging patterns of social interdependencies and interactions” (2000, 273).

Elite Bureaucratic Behavior

There appeared to be very few studies that directly examined how highly controlled management environments alter third-party federal grants management, yet much has been researched and studied to observe and explain *new* public governance with emphasis on third-party governance, accountability, and intergovernmental relationships (Posner 1998; Salamon

2002; Radin 2000, 2002, and 2006). Numerous studies have effectively argued that intergovernmental relations are complex; thus, it is imperative that the type or types of relationships in which grantors and grantees are engaged be considered and investigated.

From a grantor perspective, the marble-cake theory would be more effective in attempting to reach national goals via grantees. However, disconnects and deficiencies in GVI grant management is more indicative of a layer-cake relationship in which the actors are working independently and at times at odds with each other in achieving national goals. Continuing with this same proposition that a layer-cake relationship does exist, the connection between layer-cake theory and principal-agent theory begins to emerge. Although the GVI receives project, cooperative agreement, categorical, and block grants, most grant managers make no distinction in how they view their grant relationship with the federal government. In other words, those that manage block grants or those that manage categorical or project grants rarely change their overall perception of working independently of the national goals when managing grant programs at the local level.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1975) describe the grantor/grantee relationship as one of a donor-recipient. Krane offers that Pressman's "donor-recipient model of the grant-in-aid process is one that includes conflict, dependence, and power; each which are, inherently present in federalism" (1993, 186). Krane (1993) describes these elements as additional variables in the process of policy implementation. Whether one adopts the principal-agent theory or the donor-recipient theory, findings from the GAO-07-119 study are in agreement with the importance of interweaving accountability throughout the grant cycle to enhance grants management.

In *Governing by Network*, Goldsmith and Egger question whom grantees are accountable to after a grant has been awarded (2004, 122). They suggest that too much emphasis is placed on checking the box that compliance has been met, rather than addressing issues of trust, innovation, or risk aversion (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). Focusing on compliance only would constrict any avenue of inquiry that might be opened via investigating behavioral variables of the actors.

The GAO suggests that there are opportunities to examine various actors in the grant life cycle, and thus, opportunities to enhance the likelihood of successfully implementing national goals at the sub-national level (Figure 8). To fully explore whether highly controlled management environments can alter grants management, the theory of principal-agent is being explored via investigating creativity, sharing or transparency of information, risk taking, decision making, and accountability as predictive factors of mismanaged grants.




Figure 8: GAO-06-1046 – Grants Management: Enhancing Performance Accountability Provisions Could Lead to Better Results

Sabatier points out that Hofferbert identified five relevant incidents: “1) historic-geographic conditions, 2) socio-economic composition, 3) mass political behavior, 4) governmental institutions, and 5) elite behavior” (1991, 151). Each incident contributes to public policy implementation conversion and policy outcome. Although Hofferbert’s theory argues that a number of politically relevant incidents impact policy output, this study placed its emphasis only on elite behavior and values which have been argued by some scholars to be a determining factor of organizational performance (Hage and Dewar, 1973).

Lipsky (1980) also investigated various variables that may affect implementation by exploring the role of street-level bureaucrats. He examined the effects of the lack of resources available to lower-level employees on their ability to perform their jobs. Lipsky (1980) also observed how employees related to clients and explored the issues of demand and supply and their effect on the delivery of services and implementation of public policies at the street-level. Lipsky’s assertion, which is built upon the Hofferbert model, adds yet another avenue to investigate within the context of the environment of the GVI street-level bureaucrat.

One of the few studies discovered that directly addresses the grant as a tool of action was the one conducted by Suzanne Leland and Julie Sulc (2002). Their study contributed to the understanding of the “implementation of performance-measurement in the grant-making process of non-profits” (2002, unpaginated electronic work). Leland and Sulc (2002) used a two-phase methodology. They began by using exploratory research rather than hypothesis testing in the first and last stages of the documentation process of the large grantor foundations under study. Leland and Sulc’s 2002 study revealed that a key factor in performance was tied to a culture of accountability found in the foundations. Based on the findings of Leland and Sulc (2002),

collecting data through elite interviews and document reviews is an appropriate methodology for investigating accountability structures and the effect of elite bureaucratic systems.

Degree of Management Control

There were a number of exploratory studies that explored managerial decision making grounded in Fishbein and Ajzen's TRA and TPB. Many focus on specific areas of decision making, such as communication structures, creativity, innovation, risk taking, and accountability; however, in most cases, each connects back to Fishbein and Ajzen's theories of reasoned action and planned behavior, which argue that intention to act is based upon a number of variables, including perception of the ability to take action.

Descriptive statistics and regression coefficients were used by Carpenter and Golden in 1997 to examine cause and effect relationships within managerial discretion. The key argument of their study was "perceived managerial discretion." Carpenter and Golden argue that "one's locus of control may affect the extent to which managers perceive themselves to have discretion in a variety of situations" (1997, 190).

Carpenter and Golden state that the "locus of control reflects individuals' generalized perception of the degree to which they control, or are controlled by their environment" (1997, 190). If grantees perceive that they are operating in an environment in which they are being controlled, their behaviors would most likely be influenced by that perception and their willingness to take action limited. On the other hand, if an individual perceives they have a higher degree of control within their environment; findings show that discretion may be exercised more willingly by that individual.

Carpenter and Golden (1997) suggest that in those instances when managers perceive they have limited discretion, they are less likely to take care of critical issues occurring within the organizations. Additionally, Carpenter and Golden (1997) suggest individuals are more likely to address issues of little importance in those cases where they perceive they have limited discretion. Basically, the authors determined “that when individuals do not consider themselves to have discretion, they will be less likely to act and will therefore be perceived as less powerful” (190). Carpenter and Golden’s study is supportive of examining the grantee’s perception of his or her degree of management control for making decisions in grants management and for comparing that with the grantor’s perception of the extent to which the behavior is being demonstrated.

Decision Latitude (Creativity/Innovation)

There have been a number of studies that have examined factors (variables) influencing creativity in managerial decision making. One such study is the one conducted by Ford and Gioia in 2000. Ford and Gioia’s study collected data from 51 upper-level managers by using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to examine factors that influence managerial decision making and creativity. Ford and Gioia purport “discretion has been proposed as a potent facilitator of creative action” (2006, 712).

Ford and Gioia also argue that “the managerial choices exerted over other organization members suggests that the managerial decision making domain is not only important in its own right, but also might be key to understanding creativity in other arenas of organizational action” (2000, 706). Similar to the findings of Fishbein and Ajzen, Ford and Gioia found an “individual’s creativity suggests that a personal interest in creation action is associated with

subsequent creative behavior” (2000, 711). Findings and theories of both studies suggest that the extent of grantees' willingness to be creative in managing grant programs may be linked to the level of interest the grantee may, or may not, have in the grant program they are responsible for managing.

Similar to the theoretical argument put forth via Tversky and Kahneman's prospect theory that managers are risk averse to making decisions with uncertain outcomes, Ford and Gioia argue that “in general, organizational actors tend to resort to familiar, scripted actions even in the face of considerable ambiguity” (2000, 711-712). Further, as with the TPB and TRA, Ford and Gioia believe that managers' expectations and their willingness to suggest creative options is linked to their perceived discretion to utilize resources or undertake certain actions (2000).

Risk

Jreisat's 2002 study of 63 senior Arab managers found that individuals who work in control-oriented systems lack participatory management, risk taking, creativity, and operate in organizations with weak internal politics; most of which are quite similar to the propositions of this study. Jreisat (2002) suggests that understanding behavioral perspectives is valuable. His 2002 methodology to study the human factor in administration was to conduct a comparative behavioral analysis. Jreisat's study focused on determining if a manager's fear of making a mistake or unwillingness to take risks can affect even the most effective business practices. Jreisat defines this type of environment as one that is an “authority system that is highly centralized” (Jreisat 2002, 73).

Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman developed the prospect theory, which examines decisions made when the alternatives involve risks when outcomes are

unknown. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) built upon the Tversky-Kahneman theory when exploring the behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) put forth that models that only rely on governance structures may be insufficient for explaining which variables actually influence managers' willingness to take risks. The researchers explored the differences between the level of risk a principal may be willing to engage and the level of risk an agent may be willing to engage. They concluded that monitoring and incentives interject a control mechanism that would influence the agent's (grantee's) risk behavior and performance; that would not necessarily occur without such a mechanism.

As with other studies of human behavior, the complexity of why individuals engage or disengage from various actions is plagued with a variety of variables yet to be researched. The extent to which managers are risk seeking or averse, while important, cannot be adequately examined without considering other human psychological variables noted to influence managerial behavioral.

Communication

Hierarchical communication channels are often not clearly defined between principals and agents, as key communication often comes from outside of the organizational structure. This murkiness of the locus of control and the flow of communication was studied by John Brewer of Wesleyan University in 1971 in his examination of communication structures in organizations. Brewer explored how information is shared based on an individual's expert qualifications and organizational authority structures and found "the degree and type of differentiation of hierarchical work roles importantly affect both the needs and opportunities for communication" (Brewer 1971, 475). In the donor-recipient relationship there is a high possibility that the donor's

expectation is that the recipient has the expertise necessary to effectively manage the grant; and thereby, the donor assumes that there is an effective hierarchy and flow of communication.

Sharmila Subramanian conducted a study in 2006 that examined communication in organizations. Subramanian argues that “communication (both formal and informal) is like blood to any living organization and is an indispensable function” (2006, 1). Subramanian (2006) examined various channels of communication, concluding that, without communication, organizations would run the risk of organizational chaos. Whether the channel of communication is formal or informal, numerous studies have recognized the importance of communication within organizations and its influence on organizational performance.

Preston also supports the argument of the importance of communication and argues “all succeed or fail on the basis of the quality of an organization's communication system” (1976, 6). Preston makes the point that “information must be communicated to employees before they can begin to perform the activities they are assigned to do” (1976, 6). In downward communication structures, the lack of information “poses a problem, for there is often a big difference between what employees *need* to know to do their jobs, and what employees *want* to know about their jobs” (Preston 1976, 6).

Accountability

The concept and definition of accountability is often challenged and is continually evolving. R. Mulgan defines it as a “complex and chameleon-like term” (2000, 555). For instance, the perception of how much federal control one should experience may be germane to the type of grant being managed. For those that receive block grants the expectation of accountability by the grantors and grantees may be low, as the grantee has somewhat more

leeway by way of the type of grant. Conversely, grantees that primarily handle categorical and/or project grants are accustomed to being given less discretion by the grantor agency regarding how the grant resources can be spent at the local level, since goals, purpose, and use are generally more narrowly delineated; thus, both parties would have a higher expectation and perception that grantees are being held legally and hierarchically accountable. The “key to unraveling the accountability conundrum is to understand the hierarchy of responsibility” (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 122). While the GAO report (GAO-06-1046) promotes designing grants so that they achieve results (a bit of forward mapping), GAO findings also recommend interweaving accountability throughout the entire grant life cycle.

Mulgan defines accountability as being “called into account to some authority for one’s action” (2000, 555). When accountability is not direct, it is often more difficult to hold individuals accountable. Often there is a compromise as it is challenging to find direct means to assess and hold accountable those actors in third-party delivery systems. The change in delivery mechanisms requires a much different delineation of responsibilities than those described by documents written in the past. Light laments that, as long as the delivery of public programs is provided by those other than the federal government, “the faithful execution of the laws will rely more on writing careful contracts, grants, and mandates” (1999, 8). How one might perceive being held accountable can vary based on the delivery mechanism, specifically when it comes to grants.

Similar to other studies that attempted to conclusively define the term accountability, in the GAO/T-GGD/HEHS-98-94 testimony, researchers purported that the lack of a consistent definition of the term accountability makes the study of determining accountability challenging.

The GAO offers that “accountability is an elusive concept whose meaning depends on the context” (1998, 9). When studying grantee accountability the waters become even more muddied, as the GAO suggest that “at a minimum, all grantees are accountable to the federal level for financial management and for using funds to support allowable activities; however, beyond that, what grant recipients are accountable for, or to the federal level varies from grant to grant” (1998, 9).

B. Radin (2002) introduces the concept of the role of accountability and varying actors when she offers that there are challenges in getting those who are responsible for program implementation (agents) to behave in a manner that results in the interest of the policy maker (principal). The theory of the principal-agent program further suggests that problems of agents’ aversion to risks, clashes among and between goals, lack of mutual support, and communication costs have implications on the costs to the principal actor for the implementation of the specific policy (Garson 2006). In this instance, the agents would be the grants managers and the grantor agencies the principals. The cost would be mismanagement of grant dollars and the negative impact on the implementation of national goals and programs.

The importance of the role that accountability plays in public policy implementation suggests that examining accountability structures of those involved in the implementation process was a suitable assumption for investigation under this study. In the book, *The Accountable Juggler*, Radin (2002) uses the Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick framework which concludes that there is a broader definition for accountability with multiple expectations. Romzek and Dubnick’s framework for accountability is based on relationships among the actors, which are often complex. Romzek and Dubnick, according to Radin (2002),

suggest that there are various types of accountability relationships in policy implementation: bureaucratic, professional, political, and legal; thus it will be important to incorporate accountability types that are most closely associated with street-level implementers.

Goodin, Radin, Posner, Kettl, and others have offered that accountability is an important attribute in the overall framework of implementation. Goodin (2003) agrees with Radin (2002) that there are different mechanism of accountability, but focuses only on hierarchical accountability, competition, and cooperative networking. Although no one would dispute that accountability is important, Kettl (2000) emphasizes that government is attempting to operate in a world that no longer exists and the transformation of governance has changed and strained the roles of all the players; therefore, one of the study's additional assumptions was that both professional and hierarchical accountability should be investigated.

Limits of the Study

There have been numerous studies conducted in the field of multi-actor implementation and accountability. Similarly, there were a myriad of studies that examined the impact of human behavior and the working environment of street-level bureaucrats. Many of the studies of public administration conducted post-1991 follow the field-study approach developed by Agranoff and Radin (Agranoff 2007), whose use has been deemed most helpful for the qualitative researcher. While the case study and comparative case study approach were widely accepted, this does present an added deficiency in the literature review, as a limited number of quantitative studies are available. In general, however, most methodologies were multi-case studies, observations via field studies, and document reviews. This limited methodology has been previously pointed out as a noteworthy shortcoming in the field of public policy implementation research.

Hill and Lynn (2003) identified three primary strategies of inquiry which are most often applied in public policy implementation research:

1) Adoption of historical, descriptive, and institutional orientation. Insights and conclusions are based on systematic reviews and assessment of official documents, including surveys of reform activity, interviews and other forms of field observation, and secondary research;

2) Identification of “best practices” through the collection of detailed case studies of actual management problems. The accumulation and perusal of detailed cases aims to reveal what works and what does not, congealing conclusions into principles and recipes for effective practices that resonate with the real world as practitioners understand it; and

3) Use of formal theories, models, methods, and data of the social and behavioral sciences to study governmental processes and to develop a body of empirical knowledge concerning what works and why (2003, 3-11).

There is a large amount of research that employed the above three strategies of inquiry; however, too few offered robust or scientifically research-based policy findings and recommendations. Much of the literature that exists today is in the form of articles that are based upon non-statistical approaches and little data analysis. The lack of robustness has surfaced as a deficiency in the literature. Of those researchers that went beyond case studies and observations,

most were apt to place emphases either on tight groups of connecting associations within a particular policy domain or on single-event studies.

The Government Accountability Office conducted a study to focus on state efforts toward national regulatory objectives. They approached their study through “reviewing literature on federalism, intergovernmental relations, preemption, and regulatory programs in a broad range of policy areas” (GAO-02-495, 4). This was followed by “examining programs and approaches that combined federal with state regulation or implementation” (GAO-02-495, 4). The study offered that, while they looked at grants, the GAO researchers “did not examine other forms of federal support. Nor did they review content or strategic approaches of the regulations and standards involved or the effectiveness of the programs as implemented” (GAO-02-495, 5). Primarily, this GAO study placed more emphasis on program implementation than the policy tool itself, although grants were reviewed as a part of the GAO study.

The lack of a broad variety of research on policy implementation and public management reform that ventures beyond strictly qualitative methodologies presents both opportunities to discover new knowledge as well as limitations in finding standardized knowledge in the field of study. Quite often articles that are available were ethnographical and based on experiences of long-term field observations with the researcher either as a participant or an external observer. The most common types of literature found, since the early to mid-1990s, were comparative case studies or exploratory studies with significant recommendations for future studies.

O'Toole assessed a comprehensive list of 100 studies and concluded that, although there was an impressive list of variables identified by the scholars, “almost no evidence or analysis of utilization in the field was produced” (1985, 181). However, Agranoff and Radin (1991) argue

that contrary to the stereotype of a less rigorous strategy of inquiry, case studies, and specifically multiple case study methodologies provide rich and in-depth data for *real-life* contexts. Similarly, Yin (2003 & 2004) continues to promote case studies as a viable methodology when conducting research, specifically in educational research.

The controversy over the lack of quantitative and qualitative studies in the field of public administration may be due to the fact that, when exploring public administration, the study is focused on behavior and human actions and thus is less countable. The study of public administration is subjective and based upon the researcher's interpretation of the events under study. Often the researcher does not know what he or she is looking for at the beginning of a qualitative study of public administration, whereas in conducting quantitative studies, the researcher has a clearer focus of what is to be studied.

Miles and Huberman (1994) state that quantitative data is more efficient and hypotheses better able to be tested; however, contextual details can be missed. Qualitative research, on the other hand, is designed to provide a more complete and detailed description of the project under study. Given the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative research, when examining the events that fall within the field of public administration, findings from a qualitative study may prove to be most useful to both practitioners and policy makers for enhancing program and policy implementation, as qualitative findings are thought to provide more details. One decade after O'Toole's 1985 assessment, another policy implementation researcher reviewed prior studies of implementation. Matland reviewed empirical studies conducted by notable scholars such as Goggin (1990), Van Horn (1987), McLaughlin (1987), Sabatier (1986), and O'Toole (1986). Matland's extensive review of policy implementation

literature concluded that most studies conducted during this period could be divided into two major categories: bottom-up or top-down implementation (1995).

In general, case studies have been the most favored methodology for the study of public administration topics, although single case studies have shifted to comparative or multi-case studies (Agranoff and Radin 1991). Similar to O'Toole (1985), Matland (1995) asserted that many of the studies that identified numerous variables present in the multi-actor policy implementation process was a significant improvement over the first generation implementation studies, in that many were generally exceptionally focused; however, a consensus for a call for more causal theory to affect practitioner behavior remains consistent. Even as comparative case studies are considered equally rigorous as quantitative studies, peer reviews still continue to conclude that the lack of studies that examine causal relationships remains a factor for those that believe that quantitative studies provide more precise analysis and measurement.

Peters and Savoie (1999) argue that when conducting national and global comparative studies, scholars have been primarily concerned with describing and comparing measures and their impact on accountability rather than devoting their attempts to pragmatically confirming asserted results or discovering causal relationships. Saetren (2005) takes a stance on the hotly debated issue of the current and future status of public policy implementation research by synthesizing both types of methodologies. Saetren (2005) conducted an extensive study to provide facts and eliminate myths about research that has been and continues to be conducted on public policy implementation. Saetren's summary of implementation research is duplicated in Table 3 below; he developed several helpful comparisons that summarized where research stands

today (2005, 571). His assessment adds to three prior efforts by O'Toole in 1986, Sinclair in 2001, and Hill & Hupe in 2002.

Of the research assessed by Saetren, 3 percent of the policy implementation research has examined administrative reform and 2 percent manpower, which leaves a significant void in articles available that contribute specifically to implementation actors. This shortcoming offers both advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage is there is no solid theory to build upon. The advantage, of course, is the opportunity to add or expand to the field of knowledge.

Table 3. Saetren's Facts and Myths about Implementation Research

Public Sector	Articles	Books & Chapters	PhD Dissertations	Total
Education	23%	22%	63%	38%
Health	24%	9%	7%	15%
Environment	12%	14%	4%	9%
Social	8%	9%	7%	8%
Economic	8%	15%	4%	8%
Civil/Human Rights	4%	6%	0%	3%
Criminal Justice	2%	2%	2%	2%
Administrative Reform	4%	4%	1%	3%
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishery	3%	4%	2%	3%
Energy	2%	1%	0%	1%
Manpower	2%	3%	1%	2%
Foreign/Military/Defense	1%	2%	1%	1%

Public Sector (N) = percent base	Articles	Books & Chapters	PhD Dissertations	Total
	(3,523)	(1,005)	(2,773)	(7,301)

While there were a myriad of articles and books that presented extensive analysis based on data gained from interviews, observations over time, or document review, less was found that used quantitative methods or tests of significance. The lack of quantitative methodologies to determine causal relationships were most often cited as a deficiency. Saetren (2005) offered a rationale for shortcomings in implementation research by suggesting that there may have been a decline in interest among public policy scholars. The debate on usefulness is attributed to the fact that the most chosen strategy of inquiry for studying this phenomenon has been empirical research via case studies. Over the decades, some have challenged qualitative methodology as yielding the direct applicability for behavioral change. As a consequence, arguments on the most effective approach to provide practitioners data to improve remain elusive, despite the overabundance of studies that have been conducted.

Recent research suggests that interrelationships are not accounted for “in most studies that purport to say something about public sector governance and management” (Hill and Lynn 2003; Heinrich, Lynn, and Hill 2004, 24). “The consequences may be that disparate research about public governance and management is under-conceptualized, insufficiently attentive to context, and possess weak validity; resulting in little value for practical use” (Hill 2004, 24). Studies that offer limited value to practitioners and/or policy makers would do very little to advance or improve the field of public administration.

There has been an ongoing debate on public policy implementation research. Some have wanted to reform the methodology, a few have wanted to terminate or discontinue it, and others were either comfortable with the status quo or skeptical about proceeding down another path (Lester and Goggin 1998). Despite the fact that groundbreaking studies (Derthich 1970; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) emerged during the early 1970s (termed first-generation), most were basically single case studies focusing on single authoritative decisions or locations (Goggin 1987), and void of the opportunity for applicability.

Prior to the Goggin study, O'Toole (1985) conducted a comprehensive assessment of policy recommendations on the topic of implementation based on hundreds of empirically-based studies conducted by numerous scholars during the late 1970s through the mid-1980s. Under this study, O'Toole also concluded that the literature available was lacking in agreement on successful implementation or the reasons for the lack thereof (O'Toole 1985).

Goggin (1987) believes that “while both first and second generation implementation research has added much to our knowledge of what implementation is and how and why it varies as it does; it has been much less helpful in differentiating among types of implementation outcomes or specifying the causal patterns associated with these outcomes” (1987, 329). Goggin’s assessment (1987) of first- and second-generation implementation studies was validated by subsequent assessments such as those conducted in the late 1990s. Both deLeon in 1997 and Heinrich and Lynn in 1999 investigated testable implementation hypotheses. deLeon determined that “models that offered a series of testable implementation hypotheses” were highly desirable (1997, 314).

Researchers conducting second-generation studies, such as those conducted by scholars like Mazmanian and Sabatier in 1989, were more likely to attempt to identify variables when studying implementation and promoted the idea that variables are important to the study of public policy. In 1998, Lester and Goggin investigated several of the assessments of the evolution of implementation research. The result of their assessment yielded a typology of implementation scholars: reformers, skeptics, testers, terminators and less-than-raving reviewers (1998).

In a fairly recent critique of policy implementation, Jun (2000) offered that there are limits of comparative administration. Similarly, when carrying out a comparative study, it is suggested by Jreisat (2005) that researchers would acquire much different and more helpful perspectives by focusing on a single country or a local administrative setting. Conversely, Jreisat observes that “although a great deal of comparative public administration data is available the accumulated ‘wisdom’ remains inadequate” (2005, xi). Nearly two decades earlier, in 1987, Malcolm Goggin adequately summed up these shortcomings as presenting challenges for researchers when reviewing public administration and implementation literature—inadequate for generalizability.

The difficulty in selecting the appropriate methodology for studying implementation, via levels of governance and accountability, may lie in the fact that there are a myriad of theories on how levels of government actually interact. The arrays of metaphors that have been assigned to intergovernmental relationships are both descriptive and paradoxical (Bidjerano 2004). Establishing whether the relationship is a layer-cake, marble-cake, water taps, bamboo, or picket

fence would very much guide how a researcher proceeds in developing meaningful propositions or hypotheses.

The lack of sufficient studies in this area introduces both disadvantages and advantages for investigating multi-actor policy implementation and grants administration for this study. One obvious disadvantage was the inability to use previous studies to follow or build upon previous strategies of inquiry. Conversely, the advantage was an opportunity to add or expand current streams of knowledge.

Many scholars such as Agranoff and Radin in 1991, Heinrich and Lynn in 1999, and deLeon in 1999 often found deficiencies in the methodology and the subsequent overall usefulness of the findings to public administration practitioners; however, none were in favor of dismissing earlier works in their entirety. More recent assessments of research methodologies (Yin 2003, 2004; Jreisat 2005) continue to be peppered with accusations of shortcomings in policy implementation studies due to a lack of quantitative methods and practitioner usefulness (Lester and Goggin 1998). Conclusions over the last sixteen years of scholarly assessments of prior implementation research has basically been not to throw the baby out with the bath water and continue to build upon what has been previously investigated. In summary, many scholars still bemoan there are shortcomings in implementation research; thus, research in this area continues to be necessary.

Importance of the Study

The results of the findings of this study could prove extremely valuable for stakeholders as they pertain to the use of taxpayer dollars and the quality of services provided to intended recipients of public programs. For those stakeholders who are concerned with how taxpayer

dollars are being invested, this study may be useful in establishing criteria for how, and to whom, grants are awarded. The findings of the study may also contribute to or expand the current body of knowledge of the impact of human behavior on third-party governance by providing an alternative element of analysis that adds an additional building block for moving closer to testable causal theories.

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this case study was to investigate third-party managerial behaviors and accountability systems that may contribute to the outcome of federal grant management. Goals of this study were to: 1) further improve the understanding of multi-actor implementation and accountability of implementers of sub-national goals, 2) further investigate tools of governance (grants) used to deliver federal programs at the sub-national level, and 3) ultimately, assist GVI managers in implementing federal programs more effectively. As a side benefit, the purpose of the study is to provide the territory with recommendations that will improve grants management throughout the GVI and reduce their continuous designation as high-risk grantees.

This qualitative study sought to explore factors that could alter grants management results during the post-award period through document analysis, surveys, and limited interviews with grants managers from cabinet departments and agencies within the USVI and USVI grantor agencies.

Research Questions

Although there are a myriad of variables that have been identified in previous studies that may alter the result of grant implementation at the sub-national level, this study sought

specifically to explore professional and hierarchical accountability structures, risk taking, creativity/innovation, decision making, and transparency of information or communication channels. Scholars of recent assessments of policy implementation research have concluded that there is still a void in studies that examine causal relationships and that allow practitioners to proactively alter performance. To address those shortcomings, questions of possible associations and relationships between specific variables were explored in this study. The below graphic (figure 9) depicts possible cause and effect.




Figure 9: Highly Controlled Management Environment C&E Diagram for Grants Management

An overwhelming consensus in the literature on public policy implementation suggests research methodologies should venture past case studies; therefore, it was envisioned that the study may be successful in adding to the body of knowledge in the field of public administration by attempting to identify measures of association, using data collected.

Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that researchers construct one or two central research questions and five to ten sub-questions. To investigate third-party governance and grants management the following questions were posed:

Central Questions:

1. Can a highly controlled management environment change the outcome of third-party federal grants management?

2. Can a highly controlled management environment in third-party systems alter the achievement of national goals?

Sub-Questions:

1. Do sub-national, highly controlled management environments with weak professional and hierarchical accountability structures alter the likelihood of effective grants management?
2. Do sub-national, highly controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information (closed communication channels) alter the likelihood of effective grants management?
3. Do grant managers that are discouraged from taking risk alter the likelihood of effective grants management?
4. Do grant managers that are discouraged from being creative/innovative alter the likelihood of effective grants management?
5. Do grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

The study assessed national goal implementation via federal grant awards issued to third-parties.

The intent of this study was to explore impediments that may prevent third-party recipients of federal grants from implementing grant programs designed to achieve national goals. Although the literature review revealed there were a number of impediments that could range from procedural methods to organizational climate, this study only investigated five: professional and hierarchical accountability structures, risk taking, creativity, decision making, and information transparency.

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study there are a few terms that are being defined for clarity: highly controlled management environment, street-level bureaucrat, and professional and hierarchical accountability.

1. *Highly Controlled Management Environment*: A work environment where there is one decision maker and managers are not encouraged to take risks, make decisions, be creative, share information, or be held accountable for performance (professional or organizational).
2. *Street-Level Bureaucrat*: Public servants that “interact with the service recipient and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public” products and services (Lipsky 1980, xi).
3. *Hierarchical and Professional Accountability*: Answerable for professional norms and standards. Managers within the chain of command having consequences for performance (Radin 2002).

Delimitations and Limitations

A delimitation of this study was that it was confined to a small number of grant managers based on the fact that the GVI is significantly small. The GVI has only approximately 12,000 employees. Typically, a limitation of qualitative studies is the risk of the findings being misinterpreted by others that read the study. An additional limitation of this study was that the risk of misinterpretation would be higher due to cultural differences between the study participants’ perceptions and those of mainland audiences. Although there may have been some

minor limitations to the study, the value of the study is still expected to prove extremely beneficial to the grant managers, grant recipients, and grant-making agencies.

Significance of the Proposed Study

The study of multi-actor implementation and human behaviors in management environments is important for a number of reasons. First, the study may well be able to fill an often cited deficiency in scholarly research that it does not employ many research methods beyond single case studies in the exploration of multi-actor implementation. Second, GVI senior managers may be able to alter practices that foster environments that tolerate the lack of risk taking, creativity, information sharing, decision making, or professional and hierarchical accountability for grants managers. Third, policies may be put into place that begin to eliminate elite bureaucratic systems within the GVI; thus, greatly increasing the opportunity for more discretion among grants managers and subsequently more effective implementation of national goals. Finally, the results of the study may be able to be used as pre-award criteria for awarding grants to third-party grantees.

METHODS

This chapter of the study presents the procedural methods used for conducting the case study. It starts with a short description of the overall research procedure and literature support for the approach. The first half of the chapter reveals the qualitative research strategy employed for data analysis and collection, along with a discussion of the role of the researcher. This section further includes a discussion of the actual data collection and analysis procedures. Strategies for validating findings, procedures of the design and visual model, and anticipated ethical issues are addressed, and are followed by the significance of the study. The second half of the chapter presents the conceptual framework, which puts forth the central premise of the study. It is followed by an outline of the statistical techniques used and a portrayal of the study population. The chapter ends with a narrative overview of the coding and recoding of the data process.

Research Procedures

Figure 10, constructed by Goggin in 1987, depicts the interrelationships among many variables occurring within an organization. Goggin's hypothesis offers that "implementation is a problem-solving activity that involves behaviors that have both administrative and political content" (Goggin 1987, 330). To examine the implementation of national goals at the state and territorial level (via a grant award), the study accepts Goggin's hypothesis, as well as the consensus of the literature that claims there are interrelationships among variables. Based on this premise, the study looked at internal factors of human behavior that have been studied by previous researchers like Jreisat (2002) and Goggin (1987), which have examined the

interrelationships between the environment, styles, capacity, will, skills, and attitudes of the implementers that ultimately lead to results (figure 10).




Figure 10. Programmatic Performance Schema – Goggin

As the behaviors of the implementers, as well as their implementation styles (influenced by other factors), are thought to contribute to program outcomes, this study attempted to build upon those assumptions. The primary objective of the study was to expand upon previous propositions by investigating organizational capacity via management, and the behaviors and styles within the management environment. Further, the study sought to investigate how the environment contributes to the implementation and management of federal grant programs.

Goggin's 1987 study concluded that the will, skill, and attitudes of those who are implementing the policy impact the successful or unsuccessful implementation of policy and

programs; thus, the secondary aim of the research was to attempt to explore why a number of national goals (funded via grant awards) appear to be difficult to achieve at the sub-national levels.

Qualitative Research Strategy

The design processes of research included data collection and data analysis. Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill argue “while administrative data are likely to become an important component of future public administration data sets, other data such as that from surveys and interviews continue to generate useful information for governance research” (2000, 255). Accepting this theory, internet surveys, in-person interviews and surveys, and telephone interviews were advantageous and eliminated relying solely on traditional mail questionnaires. Using a triangulated process provided a better opportunity for generating findings that could be well-validated and substantiated. Given the high risk factor of a low response from respondents, advantages of surveying on-site or via the Internet were two-fold: 1) reduced costs of traveling to the site more than once and numerous unsuccessful follow-ups, and 2) significantly increased rate of return.

Role of the Researcher

Prior knowledge, which was gained from working as a consultant/trainer for the GVI, exposed me to many of the USVI’s challenges and shortcomings in implementing grant programs designed to achieve national goals at the sub-national level. There was an underlying risk that prior knowledge could have unwittingly been interjected into the study findings. Although the risk of bias may have been a potential disadvantage, an advantage was that the

level of trust had already been established; the standing relationship helped to greatly diminish the risk of marginalization. The fact that trust had already been established precluded the need for a pilot study to establish participant-researcher respect and trust; therefore, a major advantage of the prior relationship was that the requirement to conduct a pilot study was eliminated.

Creswell (2003) suggested that prior knowledge gained through pre-existing relationships could be viewed as *backyard* research and diminish the validity of the findings. Although the pre-existing relationship may have appropriately addressed concerns of trust, it did not resolve the need to provide for precautionary steps to be integrated into the study that balanced challenges of pre-determined outcomes, as well as guarded against threats to validity. To evade biases, steps were taken to eliminate any threats to the validity of the data and avoid compromising the integrity of the findings by including provisions for peer and participant reviews and for objective feedback on the study findings. Identifying and guarding against risk of bias, prior to the study, proved to be advantageous.

Although there was a benefit in the pre-existing relationship, other ethical issues did arise. Specifically, there was uneasiness on the part of the GVI officials that my knowledge of recent grants management challenges might intimidate participants, who would be reluctant to be forthcoming. GVI officials also had concerns that participants may have associated this study with an on-going high-risk designated grant under review, and, as a result, again hesitate to respond openly. These concerns were quickly addressed and successfully resolved by providing clarification to GVI officials of the study's objective.

Data Collection Procedures

The strategy employed included a survey in a case study, limited in-person and phone interviews using a discussion guide, follow-ups via the telephone, and document analysis. The survey instrument/discussion guide was taken and adapted from the book *Taking the Measure of Work: A Guide to Validated Scales for Organizational Research and Diagnosis* by Dail L. Fields (2002). The survey instrument/discussion guide was further modified by using information gathered from preliminary discussions with grant managers pertaining to their daily work environment. The instrument is one that was designed to assess work control, developed by Dwyer and Ganster in 1991. The measuring instrument was structured to capture how employees view how much control they have in their working environment (Fields 2002). These aspects “include control over the variety of tasks performed, the order of task performance, the pace of tasks, task scheduling, and task procedures” (Fields 2002, 94). The Fields survey model served as the framework for both the actual survey instrument and the interview discussion guide that was used during the research.

By reason of the unique culture of GVI employees, the risk of a less than acceptable return rate of surveys either by electronic or traditional mail was anticipated, requiring numerous follow-ups. In anticipation of a less than acceptable rate, on-island interviews were conducted when necessary. Given the high-risk factor for inadequate participation from the participants, I approached collecting the data using three methods: on-site captive audience, electronic surveying using Survey Monkey, and on-site or telephone interviews.

An additional anticipated challenge was that there would be a fear of reprisal, as currently employed, politically-appointed participants (who are grant managers) may have been skeptical of being totally honest, as they may have feared retaliation as they served under the pleasure of

the governor. Conversely, past politically-appointed grant managers (now career employees) may have feared the denial of future politically-appointed opportunities if they were to share information that may have had negative implications for the government. To counter the fear of those that elected to participate, a letter of consent was offered to be signed by the participants. The letter informed the participants of their rights to anonymity, confidentiality, and the anticipated use of the data being collected (Appendix 7 & 8). Further, all participants were given the opportunity to decline to participate or withdraw from the study.

Accompanying the letter of request for access and approval (Appendix 5), GVI officials and targeted employees were also presented a summarized copy of the general principles of the American Sociological Association Code of Ethics that govern the conduct of social research. Specifically, ethical issues of professional competence; integrity; professional and scientific responsibility; respect for people's rights, dignity, and diversity; and social responsibility were conveyed. Those participating in the study via internet surveys were informed of their rights to participate in the initial question (Appendices 9 and 10).

Historically, GVI employees have had an extremely low record of return rate for surveys, mail, emails, and telephone calls—although such methods are more economical. For this reason, local document review, limited interviews, and one-third of the surveying took place at the worksite of the study participants. Privacy was not an issue. Study participants who had workable email addresses were initially sent invitations to participate via Survey Monkey, an Internet-based online survey tool. Participants whose email addresses were bounced from the system were sent the survey link via alternate email addresses provided. Internet surveys took approximately ten to fifteen minutes to complete. Similarly, in-person and telephone interviews

also took approximately ten to fifteen minutes and did not disrupt other employees at the worksite.

Study participants were selected based on their role in the grant management process. To make certain that the interviews remained within the timeframe, the discussion guide was used to ensure that: 1) all questions were asked of each participant and 2) the interview remained within the framework of the strategy of inquiry. To capture responses provided by study participants during in-person and telephone interviews, answers were handwritten on the discussion guide and simultaneously taped on a digital recorder with the verbal permission of the interviewee.

Permission to conduct the survey in the GVI was first approved verbally by the Office of the Governor and then delegated to the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for written approval (Appendix 5). In support of the study, the director of OMB distributed a letter of notification to potential study participants identified by OMB's Federal Grants Management Unit (FGMU) (sample letter is in Appendix 7). This notification letter was followed up with a hand-delivered letter of agreement to participate (Appendix 7).

Study participants were notified that they would be offered the opportunity to review the draft findings to validate the interpretation of the interviews and open-ended survey questions. To strengthen the credibility of the study, a statement was included in the letters of approval and agreement, informing the participants that the results of the research would not be altered in any way to favor a particular audience or insight or sway a specific action at either the federal or local level.

Participants were requested to sign a letter of agreement, upon which the signatures of the participant and researcher appeared (sample letters can be found in Appendices 5 through 8).

Both the GVI officials and participants were informed that they were entitled to ask questions, as well as request a copy of the final study report.

Grantee and sub-grantee representatives and contacts from agencies that were identified as awarding grants to the GVI were initially contacted by telephone or email and asked if they would like to take part in the study. Upon agreement, study participants were sent invitations to participate via Survey Monkey.

Overall, only 69 percent of the grantee population to be studied had functional email addresses. Of the 49 email invitations sent to participants, only 26 percent were completed online, three of which were 50 percent completed. One of the three was re-done. An additional eight direct email requests, containing the survey link, were forwarded, and 100 percent completed online by the participant. Of the eighteen participants completing the hardcopy survey in the captive audience environment, three had to be discarded because all questions were answered “not applicable.” Using the captive audience approach greatly increased the survey response rate.

Overall, 48 percent of the surveys were completed on hardcopy and manually entered into the Survey Monkey database. The remaining 52 percent were completed electronically by the participants. Four participants from the overall pool elected to participate via telephone interview. Follow-up interviews for those electronic surveys that were incomplete were completed by phone, but only when necessary, following the rule of thumb which recommends that surveys with more than three questions skipped be discarded.

Data Analysis Procedures

The key ethical issue that may have arisen was the protection of the anonymity of the participants, both past and current politically-appointed employees. Unlike the federal government, political appointees range from cabinet members down to secretaries and clerks. To help to diminish the study participants' fear of reprisal, each case was identified by case code, for instance: respondent case one, respondent case two, etc.

Both the approving officials and participants were made aware that all the data collected for the study would be kept until the study is published as a part of the dissertation requirement, and five years after. At such time, the raw data collected for the purpose of the study will be discarded by shredding to prevent the data from being unknowingly used by others for purposes not connected with the study. This statement was included in both the letter for request for access and in the participant's agreement to participate (Appendices 6 and 7, respectively). Finally, although the study was conducted by only one researcher, the issue of ownership was made clear to the GVI officials approving the study, as well as to the study participants.

Strategies for Validating Findings

Awareness of data sensitivity was critical in developing the survey instrument and during data collection. To diminish threats to validity, participants were offered a chance to review the findings and peer debriefers were used to review and challenge the findings of the study. Study participants were forwarded a copy of the preliminary findings and allowed to comment within a defined two-week time frame for input. Two participants declined to provide feedback; however, those that did provide input found that the findings were accurately presented. Additionally, three peer debriefers saw no indications of threats to validity. As no threats to validity surfaced,

the assumption was made that external validity was strong, and the findings of the study could be applicable to larger populations or settings, as well as able to be generalized.

Procedures of the Design and Visual Model

The type of case study design selected was a single case with embedded analysis, as there were different units of analysis to be considered. Creswell (2007) contends that the case study approach is the most suited for studying both programs and activities when conducting qualitative inquiry. The case study approach provided the best avenue for collecting data from multiple sources through interviews, observations, and documents (Creswell 2007). Unlike narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, and ethnography, which are generally suited for limited single sources (e.g., primarily interviews with documents or primarily observations and interviews), the case study was more appropriate. The case study lends itself more easily to developing in-depth descriptions and analysis of the research problem under study (2007). The case study was well matched for generating cross-case themes, especially when attempting to develop descriptions of the case under investigation, and subsequent possible themes emerging from the case.

The research design procedure for probing whether a highly controlled management environment changes third-party federal grants management consisted of multiple data collection forms: documentation, surveys, and interviews. The case study approach allowed for developing a potentially deeper understanding of the implementation of national goals at the sub-national level via the grant award as a policy tool. By identifying dependent and independent variables as factors that could influence a highly controlled management environment, a theoretical framework could be built as patterns and themes emerged. To strengthen credibility of the

themes and interpretations, the visual model depicted below in figure 11 was shared with research peers for feedback and comment.




Figure 11. Visual Model - Conceptual Model for Managers Working in a Highly Controlled Environment

Anticipated Ethical Issues

The risk that study participants may have felt some initial apprehension about participating in the study was correctly identified. Though the survey participants did not voice any concerns, there was minor apprehension expressed among some GVI officials that the findings of the study in some way would be provided to the federal grant-making agencies and have a negative impact on current and future grant awards. As with the study participants, government officials were guided to the principles and standards of social science research, in addition to the goals and objectives of the study. Reiterations of the conditions of the study were clarified and the concerns of the GVI Officials were put to rest.

Significance of the Study

The significant contribution this research sought to make to public policy implementation was to enhance the grant award process and thereby enhance stewardship of federal funds. The results of the study have the prospect of adding to the effectiveness of the grant as a policy tool by identifying (early) effective management attributes and behavioral characteristics that can be recommended to be resident in the potential grantee prior to grant awards. Elmore (1980, 604) suggests that backward mapping asks “what ability each unit has to affect the behavior that is the target of the policy; and what resources it would require to do so?” This study investigates that theory and also seeks to build upon previous theories that support the value of backward mapping modeling, whereas the challenges of implementation are considered during the last stage of implementation (Elmore 1980; Dyer 1999).

Conceptual Framework

The central premise and conceptual framework of the case study was to ascertain the impact of a management environment (unit of analysis) on the management of federal grants. Embedded units of analysis were the grantees, local oversight grant managers, and federal grantors. The triangulated inquiry included surveying the GVI grantees and federal grantors, interviews, and document analysis. Patton suggested that “studies that use only one method are more vulnerable to errors linked to a particular method than studies that use multiple methods in which different types of data provide cross-data validity checks” (2002, 556). Data collection techniques for this single case study were strengthened through the convergence of sources of evidence from documentation and from the inclusion of federal grantor responses to validate and corroborate grantee responses via case matching.

Document analysis was employed to add rigor and strength to the data collection process. GAO studies and local media documents were reviewed to compare to the responses from the grantees, sub-grantees, and federal grantor agencies as it pertains to grants management in the USVI. In addition to GAO reports and studies, documents from the GVI website and three local media sources—*The Daily News*, *St. Croix Avis*, and the online *St. Thomas Source*—were reviewed. Biases were considered in media sources, which were only used to collaborate and augment other sources.

Primary Dependent Variables

Early implementation and inter-organizational collaborative capacity theories offered by Bardach in 1998, Wilson in 1989, and Lipsky in 1980 reinforce the importance of addressing the basic questions of why individuals and organizations make one choice over another. Examining the reasoning of choice is often examined via both dependent and independent variables. To explore the core premise of this study—*can highly-controlled management environments change third-party federal grants management?*—several behavioral characteristics (dependent variables) were examined. The extent to which those behaviors would be engaged in by participants was explored via five attributes: not at all (1), just a little (2), moderate amount (3), quite a lot (4), and a great deal (5). Although numerous behavioral characteristics and attributes have been identified in public policy implementation literature over the last two to three decades, the five most frequently mentioned were selected and explored for the purposes of this study:

1. Degree of Management Control: In a 1997 study conducted by Mason Carpenter and Brian Golden, the authors concluded that action taken is directly connected to

an individual's perception of the level authority he or she has to act. Additionally, levels of perception of discretion can widely vary.

2. Decision Latitude (Creativity/Innovation): Ford and Gioia's study (2000) suggests that "in order to gain an understanding of how" creativity works within an organization, it is important to also understand the dynamics of managers' choice. Ford and Gioia also offer that creativity is the path through which alternative solutions and options are formed.
3. Risk: The level of risk a manager may take is relative. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia's behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking offers "that executive risk taking varies across, and within, different forms of monitoring; and those managers may exhibit risk-seeking as well as risk-averse behaviors" (1998, 133).
4. Accountability: In a GAO report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources in June of 1998, the author states "whether the national objectives involved are performance-related or fiscal; whether the grant funds a distinct "program" or contributes to the stream of funds supporting state and local activities; and whether it supports a single activity or diverse activities. In combination, these features are associated with differences in flexibility, accountability, and the level of government that is accountable for performance"⁵ (GAO/T-GGD/HEHS-98-94, 1, 2).
5. Information Sharing: Preston (1976) laments that the quality of communication systems can support or derail the achievement of organizational activities or

⁵ Also cited by B. Radin, *Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability Complexity and Democratic Value* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006).

goals. Communication activities are considered important indicators for getting the job done in organizations. Manev and Stevenson (2001, 193) argue centrality is measured by "outdegree" and centrality "is the most important network indicator of structural location at the individual level" where jobs are done. Manev and Stevenson describe outdegree as the "number of direct contacts that an individual initiates; and, therefore measures potential communication" activities and subsequently, job performance.

Independent Variables

Behavioral characteristics (dependent variables) were further investigated in relation to demographical data used as predictive (independent) variables:

- Number of years of experience managing grants at the local level
- Number of grants managed
- Dollar value of grants managed
- Number of years of experience managing grants at the federal level
- Percent of workday composed of grant management
- Responsible for delivering a grant program, or programs to the public
- Tracking system (automated, partially automated, manual)

Although this study acknowledges they are important variables, it is not exploring years of training, level of education, or employee development as independent variables. Levels of education attained are examined for population descriptive purposes only.

Statistical Techniques

A *univariate analysis* was conducted to produce a clearer picture of the population and to describe what the grants management population in the GVI looked like. Babbie, Halley, and Zaino offer that “when it comes to interval variables, measures of central tendency (mean) and dispersion (range, variance, and standard deviation) are appropriate” (2007, 223). Microsoft Excel, data analysis, and descriptive statistics functions were used to examine basic measures of central tendency and dispersion.

Babbie, Halley, and Zaino reasoned that “crosstabs are powerful tools because they allow us to determine whether there is an association between the two variables under consideration” (2007, 167). To explore, identify, and explain any relationship between characteristics (dependent variables) and demographical data (independent variables) a *bivariate analysis* was conducted using SPSS Version 14.0 and 15.0 for Windows SPSS statistical analysis software and Microsoft Excel. Cross-tabulation/chi square analyses were run using descriptive statistics in SPSS. Lambda analysis was further conducted in SPSS to determine the strength of relationships among the variables.

Population

To frame the study of the target population it was important to first place the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI) itself into context. While the study investigated a government, the Government of the Virgin Islands should not be viewed as comparable to the United States Government. In fact, as a government, the GVI is significantly smaller in comparison. The projected fiscal year 2010 general fund budget remains just slightly under one billion dollars (\$854 million), federal grants for fiscal year 2010 are estimated to be approximately \$175.5

million, and other revenue is projected at \$228.3 million. The overall fiscal year 2010 budget is estimated to be \$1.259 billion.⁶ The size of the government's workforce is approximately 12,000 employees, with seventy-one employees identified as grant managers or administrators either by title or function.

The GVI's staffing size and operating budget is comparable to a bureau within a federal department, like the U.S. Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office with 9,549, or a small city such as Louisville, Kentucky with an annual budget of \$812 million and 7,838 public employees. The small size of the GVI grant manager/administrator population (less than one hundred) negated the need for sampling.

The grant management population represented all fourteen departments and agencies within the GVI that receive grant awards and five representatives from federal grantor departments and agencies awarding grants to the USVI. At the grantee and sub-grantee levels, potential respondents were employees who were defined as having responsibilities for managing or administering federal grants. Respondents embodied all levels of management that were involved with grants management. No distinctions were made between levels of management. At the grantor level, respondents were those individuals identified as grantor agency representatives by the grantee/sub-grantee respondents or identified via grant program titles in the most recent USVI budget document.

Ninety-eight individuals were originally identified as potential study participants. Three had retired, two declined to participate, and twenty two were misidentified, thereby reducing the size of the initial population. The misidentification of those potential participants was due to the fact that their role in grants management was limited to tracking and entering the dollar amount

⁶ Source: USVI Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Book, page 83.

of the grant award into the financial management system only. This limited participation in grants management precluded those individuals from answering parts one through six of the survey instrument. With the elimination of the misidentified participants, the population was reduced from ninety-eight to seventy-one. Of the seventy-one individuals verified as actually being involved in grants management; fifty-six were directly involved in grants management, and fifteen engaged in grant oversight duties only.

Grantees and Sub-Grantees Population

Given the emergent nature of qualitative research, during the initial process of identifying the target population it was discovered that the projected study population was much higher than the twenty previously quoted by the USVI OMB. As a result of the expansion of the grantee population from twenty to seventy-one, the methodology shifted from elite interviews only to primarily electronic surveys. The error in identifying the population total can be attributed to the study participants initially being identified for the study because they held the official position classification title of grant manager.

Federal Grantor Agencies Population

The federal grantor agencies population was a bit more difficult to identify, even though the GVI estimated it would receive approximately \$174.4 million in federal grants in fiscal year 2009 and is projected to receive \$175.5 million in fiscal year 2010⁷ from a number of federal departments and agencies. Some of the sub-grantees, and a few of the grantees, listed their specific federal grantor entity representative or contact. Using the data included in the budget

⁷ Source: USVI Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Book

book, six federal grantor agencies were identified. One of the six departments declined to participate due to concerns about confidentiality of the data collected and the GVI's high-risk grantee status with that department, and another did not respond to the request. One department had two representatives.

Data Coding and Recoding

Respondents' input from the online statistical tool, Survey Monkey, was downloaded and directly exported as numeric values into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Data from the Excel spreadsheets were then copied into the SPSS Version 14.0 and 15.0 for Windows SPSS. Step one of preparing to enter the data (seventy-two variables, forty-three grantee cases, and fifteen grantor cases) into SPSS Data Editor began with the assignment of variable attributes, followed by data definition that involved assigning names to each variable, setting the data types (in this case, numeric), developing value labels (descriptors), data value, and setting levels of measurement (e.g., scale, ordinal, or nominal). Step two required minor editing and coding the data. The final step was to enter the raw data into the SPSS Data Editor.

RESULTS

Chapter Four puts forth the results of the analysis. This chapter includes: 1) a presentation of the survey response attributes, 2) discussion of missing data, 3) a summary of survey instrument/discussion guide characteristics, 4) a summary of population characteristics, and 5) a discussion of the both the univariate and bivariate analyses of the data collected.

Survey Response Rates

There were four approaches taken to collecting the data using a survey. The first and primary approach was electronic surveys. Fifty electronic survey invitations were sent to participants using Survey Monkey. Seven invitations were returned undeliverable. The breakdown of the response to the electronic invitations was 32.1 percent for grantees and sub-grantees, 55.5 percent for local oversight grant managers, and 100 percent for federal grantor agency representatives (see table 4.1).

The second approach to collecting survey data was to administer the surveys on-site. Surveys administered on-site generated a higher response rate (83.3 percent for grantees/sub-grantees and 100 percent for local oversight-grant managers). The third approach was through telephone interviews when necessary. Two individuals were contacted and yielded a 100 percent response rate.

The fourth, and final, approach used to increase the overall response rate was to hand-deliver surveys to those individuals that did not respond to the electronic invitations and emails; this approach generated zero responses (see table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Survey Response Rates

	Data Collection Method	Administered	Response #	Response %
<hr/>				
(6) Identified (1) Declined (1) No Response				
<hr/>				
Federal Grantor Agency Representatives	Electronic Survey	5	5	100%
<hr/>				
(56) Identified (3) Declined (2) Retired				
<hr/>				
Grantees/Sub-Grantees	Electronic Survey ⁸	28	9	32.1%
	In-Person Survey ⁹	18	15	83.3%
	Phone Survey ¹⁰	2	2	100%
<hr/>				
	Hand-Delivered ¹¹	11	0	0
<hr/>				
(17) Identified (2) Declined				
<hr/>				
Local Oversight Grant Managers	Electronic Survey	17	10	55.5%

⁸ Based on available email addresses

⁹ Individuals in this number are sub-grantees, not originally identified.

¹⁰ Follow-up from bounced e-survey

¹¹ Follow-up from bounced e-survey

Data Collection Method	Administered	Response #	Response %
In-Person Survey ¹²	4	4	100%
Phone Survey	2	2	100%

Missing Data

Two of the electronic surveys were missing 50 percent of the data and discarded. If the fear of reprisal for participating in the study was present, the uneasiness could not be detected in the response data, as none of the remaining surveys had more than three questions unanswered. As anticipated, the fact that there had been a change in administration (due to the 2007 elections) proved advantageous. Any suspicion of any misuse of the study's findings for political gain could not be ascertained; however, it should be noted that a small number of participants did decline to participate without explanation.

Survey Instrument/Discussion Guide Characteristics

The dual seven-part survey instrument/discussion guide was developed for both the grantee and grantor respondent and interviewee (Appendices 10 and 11). The preliminary seven-part, twenty-five page survey/discussion guide was pilot tested by several senior staff members of the Federal Grants Management Unit (FGMU) within OMB. The results of the pre-test revealed that the instrument was too long and at risk for not being completed. Additionally, a few of the questions were unclear and were streamlined for clarification. Although the survey instrument/discussion guide maintained the original seven parts, the survey

¹² Follow-up from bounced e-survey

instrument/discussion guide was revised and significantly reduced from twenty-five pages to ten pages for the grantee and reduced to eleven pages for the grantor respondents.

The length of the instrument was driven by: a) the requirement to establish a clear description of the study population (Part I), b) the need to fully explore the central questions of the study to determine: “*Can the management environment impact grants management?*” (Parts II through VI), and c) the necessity to determine and validate the management environment (Part VII). Fieldwork for collecting the data took place over a four-month period. Data was collected from grantees, sub-grantees, local oversight grant managers, and federal grantor agency representatives.

Part I of the grantee survey (Participant Demographics) contained eleven closed-end descriptive questions and one open-end question. Part I of the grantor agency survey contained seven closed-end questions. Using the Likert Scale, the attributes range was from 1 for “not at all,” the lowest value, to 5 “a great deal,” the highest value. Grantee respondents were presented with sixteen main questions and thirty-nine secondary questions in Parts II through VI. In mirrored sections (Parts II through Part VI), grantors were presented with the same questions with slight modifications. The grantor agency survey contained nineteen main questions and forty secondary questions.

Scholars such as Goldsmith and Egger (2004), Salamom (2002), Radin (2000, 2002, and 2006), Jreisat (2002), and Heifetz (1994) consistently identified five behavioral characteristics necessary for policy implementation: accountability, communication, risk taking, decision latitude, and innovation and creativity. Based on this literature, questions in Parts II through VI were generated based on the five major behavioral characteristics: 1) risk seeking or aversion, 2)

decision control, 3) information sharing (communications system), 4) accountability, and 5) decision latitude (innovation/creativity). This portion of the survey asked grantees/sub grantees to rank to what extent they would be willing to exercise their perceived authority to engage in each of the five behavioral characteristics and asked grantors to assess to what extent they perceived the behavior to be demonstrated by the grantee.

There were four main questions with one to ten secondary questions included in Part VII (General Grants Management) of the instrument. Part VII of the instrument examined the perception of the grantees and grantors to explore to what extent the five characteristics were indicative of a highly controlled management environment that may impact grants management.

Part I - Population Characteristics – Grantee Demographics

The demographical data in the frequency tables which follow revealed some interesting facts about the GVI grantee/sub-grantee population (referred to collectively as the grantee population). Grantee job responsibilities vary. An individual managing a grant can be a manager and non-manager and serving in a classified (career) or unclassified (politically appointed) position.

Grantees managing grants can be administrators, appointed by the governor, of a major grant program with a value of over \$2 million, requiring 100 percent of their time to manage, or program managers working within the Department of Health managing a driver safety program for teens valued at \$5,000 that may require less than 25 percent of their time to manage.

Typically, most grant managers function primarily as managers of organizational activities. Over half—65.1 percent—of the grantee population had six or more years of experience working with federal grants at the local level. Only 16.3 percent had less than one

year of experience (see table 4.2). Eighty-eight percent of the grantees manage grants with values of \$50,001 and above (see table 4.10).




Figure 12. Dollar Value of Grants Managed by Grantees

Table 4.2 Years of Experience Working with Federal Grants at the Local Level (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	Less than one year	One to five years	Six to ten years	More than ten years	N
How many years of experience do you have working with federal grants at the local level?	16.3%	18.6%	23.3%	41.8%	43

The number of years local grant managers had worked as a grant manager at the federal level varied from less than one year (55.8 percent) to more than ten years (16.3 percent), indicating that some of the local managers were, or are, familiar with federal grantor agency expectations for grants management (table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Years of Experience Working with Federal Grants at the Federal Level (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	Less than one year	One to five years	Six to ten years	More than ten years	None	N
How many years of experience do you have working as a grant manager at the federal level?	55.8%	4.7%	14.0%	16.3%	9.2%	43

Although studies (Langbein, 2006) have shown that education is not the only control factor when measuring employee discretion in job performance, participants were asked the level of education they had attained, as it was helpful in describing the study population. More than 69.7 percent of the population had earned a bachelor or master degree, or had engaged in post-graduate studies (see table 4.4); only 9.3 percent had no college.

Table 4.4 Level of Education Attained (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	High School	Some College	Bachelor Degree	Graduate Degree	Post Graduate	N
What level of education have you attained?	9.3%	21.0%	32.1%	32.1%	4.7%	43

The majority of the grants manager population (55.8 percent) managed one to five grants (see table 4.5). Only 27.9 percent managed more than ten grants (table 4.5) and generally had more than ten years of experience. Of those with less than one year of experience, 80 percent of the grants managed by this group had a dollar value under \$1,000 (see table 4.6), whereas 62.5 percent of the grants managed by those with ten or more years of experience were valued at \$5 million and above.

Table 4.5 Number of Grants Managed (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	One to Five	Six to Ten	Ten or more	N
How many grants do you manage?	55.8%	16.3%	27.9%	43

The percent of grantees that were actually responsible for the delivery of the programs that they manage was virtually split; 46.5 percent were responsible for delivering programs to the public and 53.5 percent were not (table 4.7). Grantees that spent 25 percent or less of their workday managing grants represented 30.2 percent; only 25.6 percent spent 76 to 100 percent of the workday engaged in grant management activities (table 4.8). Over half (53.5 percent) of GVI grantees were responsible for managing grant programs that totaled \$1 million or above, although only 30.2 percent of those grants were managed via a fully automated system (tables 4.9 and 4.10). Block grants are managed by 17.1 percent of the grantees, 31.7 percent of grantees manage categorical, 36.6 percent manage general purpose grants, and 29.3 percent manage all types of grants.

Table 4.6 Yrs. of Experience Working with Federal Grants in USVI * Value of the Grants You Manage (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

			What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?					Total
			Under \$1,000	\$50,001 to \$500,000	\$500,001 to \$1,000,000	\$1,000,001 to \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 and above	
How many years of experience do you have working with federal grants at the local level	Less than one year	Count % within What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	4 80.0%	3 30.0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	7 16.3%
	One to five years	Count % within What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	1 20.0%	1 10.0%	2 40.0%	2 28.6%	2 12.5%	8 18.6%
	Six to ten years	Count % within What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	0 .0%	2 20.0%	2 40.0%	2 28.6%	4 25.0%	10 23.3%
	More than 10 years	Count % within What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	0 .0%	4 40.0%	1 20.0%	3 42.9%	10 62.5%	18 41.9%

Table 4.7 Responsible for Delivering Grant Program (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	Yes	No	N
Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	46.5%	53.5%	43

Table 4.8 Percent of Workday Engaged in Grant Management Activities (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	25% or less	26% to 50%	51% to 75%	76% to 100%	N
What percent of your workday are you directly engaged in managing your grant or grants?	30.2%	23.3%	20.9%	25.6%	43

Table 4.9 Type or Types of Grants Managed (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	Block	Categorical	General Purpose	All	N
What type or types of grants do you manage?	17.1%	31.7%	36.6%	29.3%	43

Table 4.10 Dollar Value of Grants (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	Under \$1,000	\$50,001 to \$500,000	\$500,001 to \$1,000,000	\$1,000,001 to \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 and above	N
What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	11.6%	23.3%	11.6%	16.3%	37.2%	43

Table 4.11 Automated System Used for Tracking Grants (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	Fully Automated	Partially Automated	Fully Manually	N
How do you track grant expenditures and progress?	30.2%	55.8%	14.0%	43

When asked whether funds had been withdrawn, or federal management intervention had occurred due to improper management or other reasons; 25.6 percent responded yes, 37.2 percent indicated no, and 32.5 percent did not know (see table 4.12).

Table 4.12 Funds Withdrawn (Grantee/Sub-Grantee)

Question	Yes	No	Unkno wn	Missing System	N
Has your grant program or programs ever had funds withdrawn or federal management intervention due to improper management or other reasons?	25.6%	37.2%	32.5%	4.7%	43

Grantor and Local Grant Oversight Manager Demographics

The following tables reflect the demographical data for the local oversight grant managers and federal grantor representatives. The individual populations of oversight managers and local and federal grantors were too small to generate any meaningful analysis separately; therefore, the two groups were combined as the oversight roles are similar. The top seven grantor agencies awarding grants ranging from nearly \$13 million to a little over \$50 million were selected and contacted to participate in the study. One did not respond and one declined to participate. The remaining four federal grantor agencies represented 64 percent of the total dollar value of all grants awarded. Four of the federal grantor representatives were each located in the Washington, DC area; one was located on the island of Puerto Rico. The ten local oversight managers were all on the island of St. Thomas and are responsible for the monitoring of and reporting on all federal grants, grantees, and sub-grantees receiving federal grant awards in the GVI.

These individuals are senior grant managers or public assistance officers. The combined groups are being collectively referenced as the grantor population.¹³

More than half of the grantor population (53.5 percent) spent 76 to 100 percent of their day engaged in grant oversight duties (see table 4.13). The years of experience working with the USVI grantee agencies and years of experience working as a grant manager at the federal level were proportionately represented. More than half (53.5 percent) had less than five years of experience working with USVI grantee agencies (table 4.14). Grantors with five years or less of federal experience represented 53.5 percent of the population, 6.7 percent possessed six to ten years, and 20 percent had more than ten years of experience (see table 4.15). Forty percent of the population managed one to six grants, 20 percent managed six to ten grants, and the remaining 40 percent managed more than ten (table 4.16). Nearly half (46.7 percent) managed or had oversight for all types of grants: block, categorical, and general purpose (table 4.16).

There were some interesting contrasts among the grantors and grantees. For example, 53.3 percent of the grantor respondents reported workdays 76 to 100 percent composed of grant management duties as compared to 25.6 percent for the grantee (see tables 4.8 and 4.13), indicating the grantee population spent less time managing grants than the grantor population. Similarly, 60 percent of the grantor respondents managed six or more grants, whereas 44.2 percent of the grantees managed six or more grants (see tables 4.5 and 4.16). Finally, 46.7 percent of the grantor respondent population's grant dollar value is \$5 million and above, as compared to 37.2 percent for the grantee

¹³ Based on available criteria for extracting manual entry data, Survey Monkey could not extract all local respondents.

population managing grants of comparable value (see tables 4.10 and 4.18). Finally, although the table reflects 60 percent of the grants are managed via an automated system, this percent may be higher or lower if federal representatives and local oversight managers were reflected separately (see tables 4.19).

Table 4.13 What percent of your job is comprised of grant(s) oversight duties? (Federal Grantor/Local Oversight)

Question	1% to 25%	26% to 50%	51% to 75%	76% to 100%	N
What percentage of your job is comprised of grant(s) oversight duties?	20.0%	6.7%	20.0%	53.3%	15

Table 4.14 How many years of experience do you have working with USVI grantee agencies? (Federal Grantor/Local Oversight)

Question	Less than 5 years	5 to 10 years	More than 10 years	N
How many years of experience do you have working with United States Virgin Islands Grantee Agencies?	53.3%	13.4%	33.3%	15

Table 4.15 How many years of experience do you have working as a grant manager at the federal level? (Federal Grantor/Local Oversight)

Question	Less than a year	1 to 5 years	6 to 10 years	More than 10 years	N/A	N
How many years of experience do you have working as a grant manager at the federal level?	13.3%	40.0%	6.7%	20.0%	20.0%	15

Table 4.16 How many grants do you manage or have oversight? (Federal Grantor/Local Oversight)

Question	1 to 6	6 to 10	10 or more	N
How many grants do you manage or have oversight?	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%	15

Table 4.17 What type or types of grants do you manage or have oversight? (Federal Grantor/Local Oversight)

Question	Block	Categorical	General Purpose	All	N
What types of grants do you manage or have oversight?	13.3%	20.0%	20.0%	46.7%	15

Table 4.18 What is the dollar value of the grants you manage or have oversight? (Federal Grantor/Local Oversight)

Question	Under \$1,000	\$5,001 to \$10,000	\$50,001 to \$500,000	\$500,001 to \$1,000,000	\$1,000,001 to \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 and above	N
What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	6.7%	6.7%	20.0%	6.7%	13.2%	46.7%	15

Table 4.19 Do you use an automated system to track grant expenditures and program progress? (Federal Grantor/Local Oversight)

Question	Yes	No	N
Do you use an automated system to track grant expenditures and program progress?	60.0%	40.0%	15

Survey Instrument Part II through VI: The Five Behavioral Attributes – Grantor/Local Grant Oversight

Part II – Decision Control Management (Grantor)

Part II (degree of management control) sought to establish to what extent grantors perceived GVI grantees to demonstrate management control. Respondents were asked to rank to what extent they believed management-level managers are required to request permission from the Office of the Governor (through their agency heads) to engage in various decision control management activities (see table 4.20).

Table 4.20 shows that 71.5 percent of the respondents felt management-level grantees are not at all or just a little required to request permission from the Office of the Governor through their agency heads to make day-to-day decisions and depicts a median score of (*Mdn=1 or not at all*). Of the remaining respondents, 7.1 percent did not know, 14.3 percent believed grantee managers were required to request permission a moderate amount, and only 7.1 percent believed the extent they were required to request permission was quite a bit.

Overall, grantors perceived grantees to demonstrate a high degree of management control as they perceived grantees be not at all to just a little required to first request permission. Similarly, table 4.20 implies that grantor respondents perceived management-level managers to be just a little required to request permission from their agency heads to engage in management control activities, also indicating a high degree of management control, as limited permission is required. Grantor respondents indicated that they viewed grantees to demonstrate a high degree of management control in daily management as it

was largely perceived that grantees were “not at all” required to request permission for making day-to-day management decisions.

Of the respondents, 57.2 percent believed grantee managers were not at all or just a little required to seek permission from the Office of the Governor to change non-statutory or mandated internal procedures or policies, 14.3 percent believed the extent to be a moderate amount, 14.2 percent believed the extent to be quite a bit, and 7.1 percent believed a great deal. Grantors’ perception of grantees demonstrating the ability to change non-statutory mandated internal procedures and policies or to implement new management initiatives was viewed as being slightly more restrictive than day-to-day decisions, as they perceived the extent to which grantees must request permission as just a little (*Mdn=2 or just a little*).

Of the grantor respondents, 21.4 percent believed the extent that management-level grantee managers are required to request permission from the Officer of the Governor through their agency heads to implement new management initiatives to be quite a bit, 42.9 percent thought not at all, 14.3 percent believed just a little and a moderate amount, and 7.1 percent did not know.

Table 4.20 Degree of Management Control (Grantor)

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe management-level grantee managers are required permission from the Office of the Governor through their agency heads to make day-to-day management decisions?	7.1%	50.1 %	21.4%	14.3%	7.1%	0.0%	1	15
To what extent do you believe management-level grantee managers are required to request permission from the Office of the Governor through their agency heads to change non-statutory or mandated internal procedures or policies?	14.3%	21.4 %	35.8%	14.3%	7.1%	7.1%	2	15
To what extent do you believe management-level grantee managers are required to request permission from the Office of the Governor through their agency heads to implement new management initiatives?	7.1%	42.9 %	14.3%	14.3%	21.4%	0.0%	2	15
To what extent do you believe management-level grantee managers are required to request permission from their agency heads to make day-to-day decisions?	7.1%	14.3 %	42.9%	28.6%	7.1%	0.0%	2	15

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe management-level grantee managers are required to request permission from their agency heads to implement new management initiatives?	7.1%	7.1%	14.3%	50.1%	21.4%	0.0%	3	15
To what extent do you believe non-management grantee managers are required to request permission from senior staff to make day-to-day management decisions?	14.3%	14.3 %	21.4%	28.6%	7.1%	14.3 %	2	15

Part III – Risk (Grantor)

Part III sought to establish to what extent grantors perceived that GVI grantees are willing to take risks. Approximately 21.4 to 28.6 percent of the respondents were unsure as to the level of risk grantees would be willing to take when managing grant programs (see table 4.21). Of the respondents, 35.8 percent perceived the extent to which grantees would be willing to alter internal administration procedures as a moderate amount and 28.6 percent believed just a little. When asked to what extent did the respondent believe grantees would be willing to increase or decrease hours that grant recipients could have access to the services or products provided through their grant programs, grantors believed 21.4 percent would not at all be willing, 14.3 percent just a little, 28.6 percent a moderate amount; and 7.1 percent a great deal. Grantors reported the extent they believed grantees would be willing to challenge the status quo of their grant program or programs if they believed the program to be ineffective as just a little, 28.6 percent; a moderate amount, 21.4 percent; not at all, 14.3 percent; and a great deal, 7.1 percent.

Grantors believed grantees would be less willing to report negative information about their grant programs to those that have the authority to decrease or eliminate funding. Of the grantors, 42.9 percent perceived the extent to be just a little, 14.3 percent not at all, and 7.1 percent quite a bit and just a little. Nearly fifty percent thought the extent grantees would be willing to recommend discontinuance of a grant program was either not at all (21.4 percent) or just a little (28.6 percent). Equal parts of respondents, 14.3 percent, believed a moderate amount or quite a little. Those who did not know the

extent to which grantees would be willing to recommend the discontinuance of a grant program not achieving its intended objectives or outcomes represented 21.4 percent of respondents.

Of the five risk attributes measured, which are shown in table 4.21, grantors perceived grantees to be least willing to increase or decrease hours that grant recipients could have access to the services or products provided through their grant programs (*Mdn=1 or not at all*). Grantors further perceived that grantees were only vaguely more willing to: a) alter internal grant administration procedures, b) challenge the status quo of their grant program or programs if they believed that the program or programs is/are ineffective, c) report negative information about their grant program or programs to those that have the authority to decrease or eliminate funding, or d) recommend that a grant program or programs be discontinued because the program is not achieving the intended objectives or outcomes (*Mdn=2 or just a little*). Taken as a whole, results indicated that the extent to which a grantee is willing to take a risk was perceived by the grantors as moderately above not at all.

Table 4.21 Risk, Questions 1 through 5 (Grantor)

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grantees are willing to alter internal administration procedures?	21.4%	7.1%	28.6%	35.8%	0.0%	7.1%	2	15
To what extent do you believe grantees are willing to increase or decrease hours that grant recipients can have access to the services or products provided through their grant program(s)?	28.6%	21.4%	14.3%	28.6%	0.0%	7.1%	1	15
To what extent do you believe grantees are willing to challenge the status quo of their grant program(s) if they believe that the program(s) is or are ineffective?	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%	21.4%	0.0%	7.1%	2	15
To what extent do you believe grantees are willing to report negative information about their grant program(s) to those that have the authority to decrease or eliminate funding?	28.6%	14.3%	42.9%	0.0%	7.1%	7.1%	2	15
To what extent do you believe grantees are willing to recommend that a grant program(s) be discontinued because it is not achieving its intended objectives or outcomes?	21.4%	21.4%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	2	15

Part IV – Accountability (Grantor)

Part IV of the survey explored to what extent grantors believed there is grants management accountability within the GVI departments and agencies. Of respondents, 35.7 percent believed the extent that grant managers are being held accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program or programs to be quite a bit, 28.6 percent just a little, 21.4 percent a moderate amount, and 14.3 percent did not know. When asked to what extent did grantor respondents believe grant managers are held accountable for the number of grant recipients that participate in the grant program, 35.8 percent believed a moderate amount. Just over a third (35.7 percent) of the grantors believed the extent to which the job performance of a grant manager is monitored to ensure that intended objectives and outcomes of the grant program(s) are reached to be quite a bit (21.4 percent) to a great deal (14.3 percent). See table 4.22.

There was little distinction between the extent grantor respondents believed the management of federal grants contributes to the overall performance evaluation of grant managers (14.3 percent – unknown, 21.4 percent – just a little, 28.6 percent – moderate amount, 28.6 percent – quite a bit, and 7.1 percent – great deal). See table 4.22.

A more distinguishable difference was reported for the extent grantor respondents believed grant managers are being held hierarchically accountable at the local level for the effective administration of their grant programs. Just under half, 42.9 percent, of the respondents believed grant managers are being held accountable at a moderate amount.

Of the ten accountability attributes which were assessed, when the grantee is managing within their chain of command, the grantors perceived the grantee's agencies

were more likely to hold grantees hierarchically accountable (e.g., following federal guidelines, regulations, and mandates) to federal agencies for the effective administration of grant programs (*Mdn=4 or quite a bit*). Grantors perceived grantees were least likely to be held politically accountable (*Mdn=2 or just a little*).

Largely, the descriptive statistics point toward grantors perceiving grantees to be held moderately accountable in all other areas (*Mdn=3*). See table 4.22. For instance, grantors perceived grantees to be held moderately accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program and the number of grant recipients that participate in grant programs. Grantors also perceived grantees as being moderately monitored when ensuring whether the intended objectives and outcomes of the grant program(s) are achieved. When asked to what extent they perceived grantees as being held accountable via the evaluation of the management of federal grants, being held accountable at the local level for the effective administration of their grant program(s), or being held professionally accountable by senior management, grantors again responded, “a moderate amount.”

Table 4.22 Accountability, Questions 1 through 8 (Grantor)

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grant managers are being held accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program(s)?	14.3%	0.0%	28.6%	21.4%	35.7%	0.0%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers are being held accountable for the number of grant recipients that participate in the grant program(s)?	14.3%	7.1%	14.3%	35.8%	21.4%	7.1%	3	15
To what extent do you believe the job performance of grant managers is monitored to ensure that the intended objectives and outcomes of the grant program(s) is/are reached?	14.3%	0.0%	21.4%	28.6%	21.4%	14.3%	3	15
To what extent do you believe that management of federal grants contributes to overall performance evaluations of the grant manager(s)?	14.3%	0.0%	21.4%	28.6%	28.6%	7.1%	3	15

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grant managers are being held hierarchically accountable at the local level for the effective administration of their grant program(s)?	14.3%	0.0%	7.1%	42.9%	28.6%	7.1%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers are being held hierarchically accountable to federal grantor agencies for the effective administration of their grant program(s)?	14.3%	0.0%	7.1%	28.6%	21.4%	28.6%	4	15
To what extent do you believe grantees' agencies are holding grant managers professionally accountable for the effective administration of grant program(s)?	14.3%	0.0%	7.1%	21.4%	35.7%	21.4%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers are being held professionally accountable by their senior management for the effective administration of grant program(s)?	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%	35.7%	14.3%	21.4%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers are being held legally accountable for the effective administration of their grant program(s)?	14.3%	7.1%	7.1%	28.6%	35.7%	7.2%	3	15

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grant managers are being held politically accountable for the effective administration of grant program(s)?	35.8%	0.0%	21.4%	21.4%	21.4%	0.0%	2	15

Part V – Decision Latitude (Grantor)

To determine to what extent grantees are perceived to be innovative and/or creative, questions that gauged decision latitude were explored (see table 4.23). Grantees were perceived by grantors as moderately demonstrating decision latitude for two-thirds of the nine traits assessed (*Mdn*=3). The extent grantors perceived grantees to demonstrate the remaining one-third of the decision latitude traits was “just a little” (*Mdn*=2).

Table 4.23 reveals that 78.6 percent of grantor respondents believed the extent grant managers have freedom to decide how to organize their workday as it relates to managing grant programs is moderate to a great deal, 14.3 percent did not know, and 7.1 percent believed just a little freedom is granted. Fifty percent believed grant managers have the freedom to improve or change local processes or procedural steps, change or establish standard operating procedures, or eliminate non-valued activities. Only 28.6 percent believed grant managers had a moderate amount or quite a bit of freedom to improve or change local processes or procedural steps, change or establish standard operating procedures, or eliminate non-valued activities.

Grantors believed grant managers have just a little (35.7 percent) or a moderate amount of (35.8 percent) freedom to adjust local management or administration policies outside those mandated as a condition of the award. About half (42.9 percent) believed grant managers have, or are able to control what happens on their jobs a moderate amount. At least fifty percent believed grant managers have, or are able to vary how they administer their grant program(s) at the local level a moderate amount; similarly, 42.9

percent believed grant managers have, or are able to choose the methods they wish to use in carrying out the administration of their grant program(s) relative to federal standards a moderate amount. Nearly 72 percent of the grantors believed grant managers have, or are able to create new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration a moderate amount. Finally, 43 percent of the grantor respondents believed management allows grantees a moderate amount of latitude to make most of their own decisions as they relate to managing federal grants (see table 4.23).

Respondents generally perceived grantees to be just a little willing to: a) improve or change local processes or procedural steps, change or establish standard operating procedures, or eliminate non-value activities; b) adjust local grant management or administration policies; or c) vary how they administer their grant program at the local level.

Table 4.23 Decision Latitude, Questions 1 through 9 (Grantor)

Question	Un- known	Not at all	Just a little	Moderat e amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grant managers have the freedom to decide how to organize their workday as it relates to managing the grant(s)?	14.3%	0.0%	7.1%	28.6%	28.6%	21.4%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers have the freedom to improve or change local processes or procedural steps, change or establish standard operating procedures, or eliminate non-valued activities?	21.4%	0.0%	50.0%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	2	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers have the freedom to adjust local management or administration policies outside those mandated as a condition of the award?	21.4%	7.1%	35.7%	35.8%	0.0%	0.0%	2	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers have, or are able to control what happens on their jobs?	21.4%	0.0%	7.1%	42.9%	14.3%	14.3%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers have, or are able to vary how they administer their grant program(s) at the local level?	14.3%	0.0%	28.6%	50.0%	0.0%	7.1%	2	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers are able to control the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients?	0.0%	21.4%	42.9%	21.4%	7.1%	7.1%	1	15

Question	Un-known	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grant managers have, or are able to choose the methods they wish to use in carrying out the administration of their grant program(s) as it relates to federal standards?	7.1%	0.0%	21.4%	42.9%	21.4%	7.2%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers have, or are able to create new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration?	7.1%	7.1%	7.1%	71.6%	0.0%	7.1%	3	15
To what extent do you believe management allows grantees to make most of their own decisions as it relates to managing federal grants?	14.3%	7.1%	21.4%	43.0%	7.1%	7.1%	3	15

Part VI – Information Sharing (Grantor)

The fifth, and final, behavioral characteristic that was examined was information sharing. Questions sought to establish to what extent grantors perceived the grantee to have a communication system favorable to managing grant programs. Grantors generally perceived the extent to which grant managers receive timely and/or pertinent information from local immediate executive-level management and federal managers as a moderate amount. Between 42.9 and 64.4 percent of grantor respondents believed the extent to which grantees receive both pertinent and timely local and federal information from local immediate supervisors, executive-level management, federal grantor agency managers, and co-workers as a moderate amount. A lesser percentage believed the extent to which grantees received inaccurate and incomplete information from local management or co-workers as moderate (21.5 percent to 35.7 percent). Fifty percent of the grantor respondents deemed inaccurate or incomplete federal information from federal grant manager less of a problem—21.4 percent did not know, and 21.5 percent cited a moderate amount. See table 4.24.

Overall, grantors perceived the grantees' communication system as adequate. Specifically, the responses implied that the extent to which grantors perceive grantees receive both timely and pertinent information from immediate or executive-level local management, co-workers and federal grant managers; as well as have control over gaining access to sources of information necessary to manage grant programs as moderate. Respondents further believed grantees were slightly less likely to receive

inaccurate or incomplete federal information from their federal grant manager or co-workers (*Mdn=1 or not at all*) than from their immediate supervisor or management (*Mdn=2 or just a little*). See table 4.24.

Table 4.24 Information Sharing (Timely), Questions 1 through 10 (Grantor)

Question	Un- known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management?	7.1%	7.1%	7.1%	64.4%	0.0%	14.3%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive timely federal information from local immediate or executive-level management?	21.4%	0.0%	21.4%	42.9%	14.3%	0.0%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive timely basic information from co-workers?	7.1%	0.0%	21.5%	50.0%	14.3%	7.1%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive pertinent federal information from local immediate or executive-level management?	14.3%	0.0%	7.1%	50.0%	21.5%	7.1%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive pertinent basic information from their co-workers?	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%	50.0%	14.3%	7.1%	3	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive pertinent information from their federal managers that is also timely?	21.4%	0.0%	0.0%	50.1%	21.4%	7.1%	3	15

Question	Un-known	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive inaccurate or incomplete federal or local information from their immediate supervisor or management?	7.1%	0.0%	21.4%	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	2	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive inaccurate or incomplete federal information from their federal grant manager?	21.4%	7.1%	50.0%	21.5%	0.0%	0.0%	1	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers receive inaccurate or incomplete information from their co-workers?	14.3%	28.6%	21.4%	35.7%	0.0%	0.0%	1	15
To what extent do you believe grant managers have control over gaining access to sources of information they need to manage their grant program(s)?	35.7%	7.1%	42.9%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	3	15

Survey Instrument Part II through VI: The Five Behavioral Attributes – Grantees**Part II – Decision Control Management (Grantee)**

Part II (degree of management control) sought to establish to what extent grantees believed they have control to make management decisions when managing grant programs. Of the grantee respondents, 56.4 percent believed they were not at all or just a little required to first request permission from upper management to make day-to-day management decisions. Fifty percent believed the extent they are required to first request permission from upper management to change non-statutory or non-mandated internal procedures or policies and implement new management initiatives to be not at all to just a little (see table 4.25).

Table 4.25 also reveals that while 26.8 percent did not know to what extent commissioners, directors, and other agency heads are required to first request permission from the Office of the Governor to make day-to-day decisions for specific areas of control and assigned responsibility, 51.2 percent believed the extent to be not at all or just a little. Only 12.2 percent believed commissioners, directors, and agency heads were required to request permission from the Office of the Governor when making day-to-day decisions quite a bit to a great deal.

The percent of grantees that perceived assistant commissioners, deputy commissioners, and directors to first be required to request permission from their commissioners and directors was somewhat higher. Of respondents, 41.5 percent believed assistant commissioners, deputy commissioners, and directors are not at all or just a little required to request permission; 26.8 percent believed the extent assistant

commissioners, deputy commissioners, and directors are required to first request permission to be quite a bit (12.2 percent) to a great deal (14.6 percent).

Grantees perceived the extent of permission required from senior staff before making day-to-day decisions to fall between a moderate amount (29.3 percent) to a great deal (17.1 percent). Only 14.6 percent believed the extent permission is required to be not at all and 19.5 percent believed just a little. Nearly half of the grantee respondents believed the extent to which non-management staff is first required to request permission from senior staff to make day-to-day decisions to be quite a bit (17.1 percent) to a great deal (31.7 percent).

Grantees generally believed the extent they are required to first request permission from upper management to be “just a little” ($Mdn=2$), indicating that grantees believed that they are less likely to be required to request permission to make day-to-day decisions. Grantees further perceived the extent to which they are required to request permission from upper management to change non-statutory or non-mandated internal procedures or policies or implement new management initiatives as falling between just a little and a moderate amount ($Mdn=2.5$). Overall, grantees generally felt they have a high to moderate degree of management control to make decisions (table 4.25).

Table 4.25 Degree of Management Control, Questions 1 through 9 (Grantee)

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate Amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
Given your specific span-of-control area(s) and assigned responsibilities to what extent are you required to first request permission from upper management to make day-to-day management decisions?	0.0%	23.1%	33.3%	17.9%	10.3%	15.4%	2	43
Given your specific span-of-control area(s) and assigned responsibilities to what extent are you required to first request permission from upper management to change non-statutory or non-mandated internal procedures or policies?	0.0%	25.0%	25.0%	15.0%	15.0%	20.0%	2.5	43
Given your specific span-of-control area(s) and assigned responsibilities to what extent are you required to first request permission from upper management to implement new management initiatives?	0.0%	31.6%	18.4%	10.5%	18.4%	21.1%	2.5	43
To your knowledge, based on their specific span-of-control areas and assigned responsibilities, for making day-to-day decisions, to what extent are commissioners, directors, and other agency heads required to first request	26.8%	24.4%	26.8%	9.8%	4.9%	7.3%	1	43

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate Amoun t	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
permission from the Office of the Governor?								
To your knowledge, based on their specific span-of-control areas and assigned responsibilities, for making day-to-day decisions, to what extent are assistant commissioners, deputy commissioners, or deputy directors required to first request permission from commissioners, directors, and other agency heads?	19.5%	17.1%	24.4%	12.2%	12.2%	14.6%	2	43
To your knowledge, based on their specific span-of-control areas and assigned responsibilities, for making day-to-day decisions, to what extent are senior staff members required to first request permission from commissioners, directors, other agency heads, deputies, and assistants?	7.3%	14.6%	19.5%	29.3%	12.2%	17.1%	3	43
To your knowledge, based on their specific span-of-control areas and assigned responsibilities, for making day-to-day decisions, to what extent is non-management staff required to first request permission from senior staff?	4.9%	12.2%	14.6%	19.5%	17.1%	31.7%	3	43
To your knowledge, based on their specific span-of-control areas and	17.1%	17.1%	22.0%	17.1%	12.2%	14.5%	2	43

Question	Un- Known	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate Amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
assigned responsibilities, to implement new management initiatives, to what extent are commissioners, directors, and other agency heads required to request permission from the Office of the Governor?								
To your knowledge, based on their specific span-of-control areas and assigned responsibilities, to what extent are senior management required to request permission from commissioner, directors, and other agency heads?	12.2%	9.8%	17.1%	26.7%	17.1%	17.1%	3	43

Part III: Risk (Grantee)

Questions under Part III (risk) were formulated to establish to what extent respondents would be willing to take a risk in how they manage their grant program or programs.

Table 4.26 reveals that grantee respondents were not at all (22.5 percent) to just a little (25 percent) willing to alter internal grant administration procedures. Thirty percent responded that the extent they would be willing to alter internal grant administration procedures was moderate. Fifty percent or more of the grantees responded they were not at all or just a little willing to increase or decrease the hours the grant recipients can have access to the services or products provided through their grant programs (55 percent), to report negative information about their grant program(s) to those that have the authority to decrease or eliminate funding (51.3 percent), or to recommend a grant program(s) be discontinued because the program is not achieving its intended objectives or outcomes (50 percent). Forty percent of the grantees stated that they would be willing to challenge the status quo of a grant program if they believed the program to be ineffective.

Table 4.26 suggests that, overall, grantees perceived the extent to which they would be willing to alter internal grant administrative procedures or challenge the status quo of a grant program believed to be ineffective to be a moderate amount (*Mdn=3*). Grantees were somewhat less willing to increase or decrease the hours that grant recipients could have access to the services or products provided through their grant programs or to report negative information about a grant program to those that have the authority to decrease or eliminate funding (*Mdn=2 or just a little*). Willingness to

recommend that a grant program be discontinued because it was not achieving its intended objectives or outcomes was reported as slightly higher than just a little ($Mdn=2.5$). The median scale value for this attribute indicates that overall, grantees are generally not willing to take risks as it applies to managing their grant program or programs.

Table 4.26 Risk, Questions 1 through 5 (Grantee)

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
Within your direct span of control and assigned responsibilities, to what extent are you willing to alter internal grant administration procedures?	22.5%	25.0%	30.0%	10.0%	12.5%	3	43
Within your direct span of control and assigned responsibilities, to what extent are you willing to increase/decrease the hours that grant recipients can have access to the services or products provided through your grant program(s)?	35.0%	20.0%	17.5%	22.5%	5.0%	2	43
Within your direct span of control and assigned responsibilities, to what extent are you willing to challenge the status quo of your grant program(s) if you believe that the program(s) is or are ineffective?	20.0%	20.0%	25.0%	25.0%	10.0%	3	43
Within your direct span of control and assigned responsibilities, to what extent are you willing to report negative information about your grant program(s) to those that have the authority to decrease or eliminate funding?	28.2%	23.1%	28.1%	10.3%	10.3%	2	43

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
Within your direct span of control and assigned responsibilities, to what extent are you willing to recommend that a grant program(s) be discontinued because it is not achieving its intended objectives or outcomes?	35.0%	15.0%	25.0%	20.0%	5.0%	2.5	43

Part IV – Accountability (Grantee)

Nine questions were posed to ascertain to what extent grantee respondents perceived that they are held accountable for the management of their grant program or programs (see table 4.27). Less than half (43.6 percent) of the grantees believed that they are held quite a bit (15.4 percent) to a great deal (28.2 percent) accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program they administer. Conversely, 28.2 percent believed their performance is not at all or just a little monitored to ensure that the intended objectives and outcomes of the grant program or programs are reached. An even higher percent (52.7) believed the extent to which they are held accountable for the number of grant recipients that participate in grant program(s) that they administer is not at all or just a little.

Just over half (51.3 percent) believed the extent to which the management of federal grants contributes to their overall performance evaluation to be quite a bit to a great deal; likewise, fifty percent also believed that the extent that they are held hierarchically accountable at the local level for effective administration of grant programs to be quite a bit (35.8 percent) to a great deal (15.4 percent). Grantees generally believed that they are held accountable to some extent by the federal grantor agencies for the effective administration of grant programs: 30.8 percent believed a moderate amount, 25.6 percent believed quite a bit, and 25.6 percent believed a great deal.

The extent to which grantees believed that they were held professionally accountable by senior management varied: 20.5 percent believed not at all, 5.2 percent just a little, 25.6 percent a moderate amount, 28.2 percent quite a bit, and 20.5 percent a

great deal. The extent grantees believed they were held legally accountable also varied: 20.5 percent not at all, 10.3 percent just a little, 23 percent a moderate amount, 15.4 percent quite a bit, and 30.8 percent a great deal. Finally, a significant majority, 66.7 percent, believed they were not at all (46.2 percent) to just a little (20.5 percent) held politically accountable for how grant programs are administered and managed.

Table 4.27 suggest grantees generally perceived that they are more likely to be held accountable at the local level for the effective administration of their grant programs or to federal grantor agencies (*Mdn=4*) than they are held accountable for the number of grant recipients that participate in grant programs (*Mdn=2*). Grantees also perceived they are moderately held accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program or programs and they are monitored to ensure that the intended objectives and outcomes of the grant programs are reached (*Mdn=3*). Additionally, grantees perceived they are moderately held professionally and legally accountable by agencies for the effective administration of their grant program or programs (*Mdn=3*).

Overall, grantees believed the extent that the management of federal grants contributes to their overall performance evaluation is slightly above a moderate amount (*Mdn=3.5*). Generally, grantees reported the extent that they are held politically accountable for effective administration of their grant programs is just a little (*Mdn=2*).

Table 4.27 Accountability, Questions 1 through 9 (Grantee)

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent are you held accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program(s) you administer?	15.4%	7.7%	33.3%	15.4%	28.2%	3	43
To what extent are you held accountable for the number of grant recipients that participate in grant program(s) that you administer?	39.5%	13.2%	23.6%	18.4%	5.3%	2	43
To what extent is your performance monitored to ensure that the intended objectives and outcomes of the grant program(s) are reached?	20.5%	7.7%	30.8%	33.3%	7.7%	3	43
To what extent does your management of federal grants contribute to your overall performance evaluation?	20.5%	2.6%	25.6%	30.8%	20.5%	3.5	43
When managing within your chain of command (at your level and pay grade), to what extent are you held hierarchically accountable at the local level for the effective administration of your grant program(s); for instance following internal organizational standards, procedures, span of control, etc.?	10.3%	10.3%	28.2%	35.8%	15.4%	4	43
When managing within your chain of command (at your level and pay grade), to what extent are you held hierarchically accountable to federal grantor agencies for the effective administration of your grant program(s); for instance, following external	10.3%	7.7%	30.8%	25.6%	25.6%	4	43

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Mode- rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
federal guidelines, regulations, mandates, etc.?							
As it pertains to effective administration of your grant program(s), to what extent are you held professionally accountable by your senior management? For instance, being directly answerable for the administration of the grant program(s)?	20.5%	5.2%	25.6%	28.2%	20.5%	3	43
As it pertains to effective administration of your grant program(s), to what extent are you held legally accountable? Examples would be issues such as fraud, waste, supplanting of funds, co-mingling of local and federal funds, loss of property purchased with federal dollars, fines, and/or incarceration.	20.5%	10.3%	23.0%	15.4%	30.8%	3	43
As it pertains to effective administration of your grant program(s), to what extent are you held politically accountable? For instance, politically influenced or pressured in how a grant program(s) is administered locally.	46.2%	20.5%	17.9%	7.7%	7.7%	2	43

Part V – Decision Latitude (Grantee)

To determine to what extent grantees perceived themselves to be innovative and/or creative when managing grant programs, nine questions to gauge decision latitude were asked. See table 4.28. Of the grantees, 81.5 percent believed they have quite a bit (36.8 percent) to a great deal (44.7 percent) of freedom to decide how to organize their workday as it relates to managing the grant. A lesser extent of freedom was believed to be available for improving or changing local processes or procedural steps, changing or establishing standard operating procedures, or eliminating non-valued activities. Only 36.8 percent believed the extent of freedom to be a moderate amount, 18.4 percent believed not at all, 16 percent believed just a little, 13.2 percent quite a bit, and 15.6 percent a great deal.

Over half (55.6 percent) of the grantees believed they had no (36.2 percent) or little (19.4 percent) decision latitude to adjust local grant management or administrative policies outside those mandated as a condition of the grant award. Only 22.2 percent believed a moderate amount of decision latitude was available. A higher percentage of grantees believed they had a moderate amount (27 percent), quite a bit (27 percent) or a great deal (16.2 percent) of freedom to control what happened on their jobs. Nineteen percent believed they had just a little control and 10.8 percent believed they had none.

When questioned as to what extent they believed that they were able to vary how their grant programs are administered, 18.9 percent believed not at all, 21.6 percent just a little, 21.6 percent a moderate amount, 21.6 percent quite a bit, and 16.3 percent a great deal. When asked to what extent they are able to control the quality of services or

products delivered to program recipients, 36.8 percent believed a moderate amount, 26.1 percent believed not at all, 7.9 percent just a little, 21.1 percent quite a bit, and 7.9 percent a great deal. Grantee respondents believed the extent they are able to choose the methods they wish to use in carrying out the administration of the grant program as it relates to federal standards to be mixed. Slightly under a third (28.9 percent) believed a moderate amount. A similar percent (28.9) stated not at all, 13.2 percent stated just a little, 15.8 percent stated quite a bit, and 13.2 percent stated a great deal. Grantees also stated that they were less able to create new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration. Of the respondents, 39.4 percent stated not at all, 23.7 percent believed a moderate amount and from 10.5 to 13.2 percent of the grantees stated just a little, quite a bit, or a great deal.

Grantees further believed that the extent to which management allows them to make most of their own decisions relative to managing federal grants to be tempered. Twenty-one percent believed just a little, 28.9 percent believed a moderate amount, 23.7 percent believed quite a bit, 13.2 percent believed a great deal, and 13.2 percent believed not at all.

Table 4.28 reveals that grantees perceived they have a high degree of freedom to organize their workday as it relates to managing a grant ($Mdn=4$); yet, grantees perceived only a moderate amount of decision latitude is available to improve or change local processes or procedural steps, control what happens on the job, vary how they administer grant programs at the local level, improve the quality of services or products delivered or program recipients, choose the methods for carrying out the administration of grant

programs, or make most of their own decisions when managing federal grants (*Mdn=3*).

Grantees further perceived a lesser amount of decision latitude is available when creating new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration (*Mdn=2.5*) or adjusting local grant management or administration policies (*Mdn=2*).

Table 4.28 Decision Latitude, Questions 1 through 9 (Grantee)

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
To what extent do you have the freedom to decide how to organize your workday as it relates to managing the grant(s)?	5.3%	5.3%	7.9%	36.8%	44.7%	4	43
To what extent do you have the freedom to improve or change local processes or procedural steps, change or establish standard operating procedures, or eliminate non-value added activities?	18.4%	16.0%	36.8%	13.2%	15.6%	3	43
To what extent do you have the freedom to adjust local grant management or administration policies outside those mandates as a condition of the award? For instance, allowed to use local funds to acquire needed services while waiting for federal funds to be released.	36.2%	19.4%	22.2%	11.1%	11.1%	2	43
To what extent are you able to control what happens on your job?	10.8%	19.0%	27.0%	27.0%	16.2%	3	43
To what extent are you able to vary how you administer your grant program(s) at the local level?	18.9%	21.6	21.6%	21.6%	16.3%	3	43
To what extent are you able to control the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients?	26.3%	7.9%	36.8%	21.1%	7.9%	3	43
To what extent are you able to choose the methods you wish to use in carrying out the administration of your grant program(s) as it relates to federal standards?	28.9%	13.2%	28.9%	15.8%	13.2%	3	43
To what extent are you able to create new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration (e.g., how grant draw downs are	39.4%	10.5%	23.7%	13.2%	13.2%	2.5	43

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
processed)?							
To what extent does management allow you to make the most of your own decisions as it relates to managing federal grants?	13.2%	21.0%	28.9%	23.7%	13.2%	3	43

Part VI – Information Sharing (Grantee)

Table 4.29 reveals the extent to which grantees believed they received the information necessary for managing grant programs. About half (47.4 to 52.6 percent) of the grantees believed the extent to which they received timely basic and federal information from local immediate or executive-level management and co-workers to be a moderate amount. The receipt of pertinent information fell in the moderate amount range: 47.4 percent of the grantees believed the extent to which they received pertinent federal information from their executive-level management to be moderate, 23.7 percent believed quite a bit, and 21.1 percent believed just a little. Only 7.9 percent believed the extent to which they received pertinent federal information from executive-level management to be not at all.

Grantees reported the extent to which they received pertinent information from co-workers as mixed. For instance, 31.6 percent reported a moderate amount, 34.1 percent quite a bit, and 34.3 percent not at all to just a little. There was a slight increase when asked to what extent they believed that they received pertinent and timely information from their federal manager: 36.8 percent reported quite a bit, 31.7 percent reported a moderate amount, and 10.5 percent reported a great deal. Just over 20 percent reported the extent that they received pertinent information as just a little (10.5 percent) or not at all (10.5 percent).

Similar percentages of grantees felt that the extent to which they received accurate or complete federal or local information from their immediate supervisor or management was a moderate amount (34.3 percent) or quite a bit (36.8 percent). Only 2.6 percent of

the grantees stated a great deal, while 10.5 percent of the grantees stated not at all and 15.8 percent stated just a little. The percentages increased when grantees were asked to what extent they believed that they received accurate or complete information from their federal grant manager: 42.1 percent believed quite a bit and 15.8 percent a great deal. Those reporting the extent to which they received accurate or complete information as a moderate amount represented 28.9 percent of respondents. Only a small percent (7.9) believed just a little, with 5.3 to 7.9 percent believing not at all.

Percentages shifted downward when grantees were asked to what extent they believed they received accurate or complete information from their co-workers: 37.9 percent stated a moderate amount, 29.7 percent stated quite a bit, 21.6 percent believed just a little, and only 10.8 percent believed not at all. No one reported a great deal.

Access to information was reported as moderate to quite a bit. When grantees were asked to what extent they believed that they have control over gaining access to sources of information they needed to manage their grant programs, 10.5 percent cited not at all, 10.8 percent cited just a little, 34.2 percent cited a moderate amount, 28.7 percent cited quite a bit, and 15.8 percent cited a great deal.

Table 4.29 shows that, generally, grantees perceived the extent to which they receive timely and pertinent basic and federal information for grant programs from local immediate or executive-level management and co-workers as moderate ($Mdn=3$). Grantees also perceived the extent to which they have access to sources of information pertaining to their grant programs as moderate ($Mdn=3$). Grantees generally perceived that they received a low amount of inaccurate or incomplete information from federal

grant managers quite a bit (*Mdn=4*), whereas grantees also perceived they received a moderate amount of inaccurate or incomplete information from both local immediate supervisors and management and co-workers (*Mdn=3*).

Overall, the extent to which grantees perceived they received information from all sources that was timely, pertinent, accurate, and complete was a moderate amount to quite a bit.

Table 4.29 Information Sharing, Questions 1 through 9 (Grantee)

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate Amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management?	5.3%	18.4%	52.6%	21.1%	2.6%	3	43
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive timely federal information from local immediate or executive-level management?	5.3%	15.8%	47.4%	28.9%	2.6%	3	43
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from co-workers?	5.3%	15.8%	47.4%	28.9%	2.6%	3	43
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive pertinent federal information or executive-level management?	7.9%	21.1%	47.3%	23.7%	0.0%	3	43
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive pertinent basic information from your co-workers?	13.2%	21.1%	31.6%	34.1%	0.0%	3	43
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive pertinent information from your federal grant manager that is also timely?	10.5%	10.5%	31.7%	36.8%	10.5%	3	43
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive accurate or complete federal or local	10.5%	15.8%	34.3%	36.8%	2.6%	3	43

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate Amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Median	N
information from your immediate supervisor or management?							
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive accurate or complete federal information from your federal grant manager?	5.3%	7.9%	28.9%	42.1%	15.8%	4	43
As it pertains to your grant program(s), to what extent do you believe you receive accurate or complete information from your co-workers?	10.8%	21.6%	37.9%	29.7%	0.0%	3	43
To what extent do you believe you have control over gaining access to the source(s) of information (i.e., primary or secondary data) you need to manage your grant program(s)?	10.5%	10.8%	34.2%	28.7%	15.8%	3	43

Grantor/Grantee Case Matching – Part II through VI

To eliminate any bias due to self-certification by the grantees, responses from the grantees and grantors were matched for further examining the extent to which behaviors of decision making, risk taking, accountability, innovation and creativity, and information sharing were demonstrated. Tables 4.20 and 4.29 depict the extent to which grantors perceived, and grantees believed, the behaviors were demonstrated.

Decision Control

A higher percent (71.5) of grantors believed grant managers were less likely to be required to request permission to make day-to-day decisions pertaining to managing grant programs; only 56.4 percent of grantees believed the extent to be not at all or just a little. Fifty to 57.2 percent of grantors and grantees were in accord that grant managers do possess an adequate degree of management control when making changes to non-statutory or non-mandated internal procedures and policies or implementing new management initiatives. Respondents from both groups believed the extent of permission required for making decisions when managing grants to be not at all or just a little, indicating that both groups believed grant managers do have some level of decision control.

In summary, more than 50 percent of both grantors and grantees believed grantees are not required to request permission prior to making decisions when managing grants. A higher percent believed less permission is required for making day-to-day decisions than is required for changing non-statutory or non-mandated internal procedures and

policies, or for implementing new management initiatives. See tables 4.20 on page 111 and 4.25 on page 131.

Risk

Grantees viewed themselves as less likely to take risks as it pertained to managing grants than did grantors (tables 4.21 and 4.26). Specifically, 47.5 percent of the grantees reported they were not at all or just a little willing to alter internal grant administration procedures; only 35.7 percent of the grantors believed grantees were not at all or just a little willing to alter internal administrative procedures. Similarly, 35.7 percent of grantors believed the extent grantees would be willing to increase or decrease hours to be not at all or just a little, as compared to 55 percent of the grantees stating that the extent they would be willing to increase or decrease the hours that grant recipients can have access to the services or products provided through their grant programs as not at all or just a little. This indicated grantors had a higher perceived opinion that grantees would engage in more risk taking behaviors than did the grantees. See tables 4.21 on page 115 and 4.26 on page 136.

Tables 4.21 and 4.26 also revealed that grantees and grantors were closer in accord as to the extent grant managers would be willing to challenge the status quo of their grant programs if they believed that the program or programs were ineffective. On the part of grantors, 42.9 percent believed the extent grant managers would be willing to challenge the status quo of their grant program or programs if they believed that the program or programs were ineffective to be not at all to just a little, while 40 percent of the grantees believed the extent to be not at all to just a little.

When grantors were asked to what extent did they believe grantees would be willing to report negative information about their grant programs to those that have the authority to decrease or eliminate funding, grantors believed only 14.2 percent of the grant managers would report negative information quite a bit or a great deal, versus 20.6 percent of the grantee respondents stating that they would be quite a bit to a great deal willing to report negative information.

Lastly, tables 4.21 and 4.26 reflect that only 14.3 percent of the grantors believed grantees would be quite a bit or a great deal willing to recommend that a program or programs be discontinued for not achieving intended objectives and outcomes. Similarly, a low percent of grantees (25 percent) indicated the extent they would be willing to recommend that a program or programs be discontinued as quite a bit or a great deal.

In general, approximately 14 percent to less than half of the grantor and grantee respondents believed that grantees were willing to take risks. Consistently, grantees believed they were more willing to take risk than the grantor respondents believed they were. Grantees and grantors were more in agreement on the level of risks that grantees would be willing to take when making changes to grant program management than on their level of willingness to report negative information, ineffectiveness of a grant program, or suggest discontinuance of a program. Overall, both respondent groups did not perceive the extent of willingness to take a risk when managing grant programs to be significantly great.

Accountability

Tables 4.22 and 4.27 indicate that there were some discrepancies between the extent to which grantees and grantors believed grant managers are held accountable. There was a 7.9 percent difference between the extent grantors and grantees perceived grant managers are held accountable for reaching the goals and objective of grant programs: 35.7 percent of the grantors perceived the extent to be quite a bit, while 15.4 percent of grantees perceived the extent to be quite a bit and 28.2 percent perceived it to be a great deal.

Of grantors, 28.5 percent believed the extent to which grantees are held accountable for the number of grant recipients that participate in the grant program to be quite a bit to a great deal; however, 23.7 percent of grantees believed the extent to which they were held accountable for the number of grant recipients that participate in the grant program to be quite a bit to a great deal.

Grantor and grantee respondents were closer in agreement as to the extent to which a grant manager's performance is monitored to ensure that the intended objectives and outcomes of the grant program are reached; 41 percent of the grantees believed quite a bit to a great deal and 35.7 percent of the grantors believed quite a bit to a great deal.

More than fifty percent of the grantees believed the extent for which their management of federal grants contributes to their overall performance evaluation and the extent they are held hierarchically accountable at the local level for effective administration of their grant program to be quite a bit to a great deal (51.3 percent and 51.2 percent, respectively), versus 35.7 percent of the grantor respondents citing quite a

bit (28.6 percent) to a great deal (7.1 percent). When asked to what extent grantees are held hierarchically accountable to federal grantor agencies for the effective administration of their grant programs, slightly over 50 percent of both the grantees and grantors believed the extent to be quite a bit to a great deal. See tables 4.22 on page 118 and 4.27 on page 140.

The percentage of grantor respondents that believed grantees were held quite a bit to a great deal professionally accountable by their senior management increased to 57.1 percent; whereas the percent of grantees that believed they were held quite a bit to a great deal professionally accountable remained around the 50 percent range (48.7 percent).

Similar percentages of both groups of respondents believed the extent grant managers are held legally accountable to be quite a bit to a great deal, with grantors believing 42.9 percent and grantees believing 46.2 percent. The extent to which grantees believed grant managers were held politically accountable significantly shifted to not at all or just a little (66.7 percent), while only 21.4 percent of grantors reported not at all or just a little. See table 4.22 on page 118 and table 4.27 on page 140.

Primarily, grantors and grantees believed grant managers are held accountable to some degree. However, the areas in which both groups believed grant managers were held most accountable were professionally and in the administration of the grant program. Both groups believed grant managers were less likely to be held accountable for reaching the goals of the grant program or for the number of grant recipients participating in the grant program or to have individual performance monitored to ensure the intended objectives and outcome of the program are reached, both locally and at the federal level.

However, both the grantors and grantees believed they are held more accountable by the federal grantor agencies than by local management. Grantors and grantees believed grant managers were less likely to be held politically accountable for program management.

Decision Latitude

There were significant differences between the grantor and grantee respondents as to the percent that perceived grant managers to have decision latitude (tables 4.23 and 4.28). A large portion (81.5 percent) of the grantees believed the extent to which they have the freedom to decide how to organize their workday as it relates to managing grants to be quite a bit to a great deal, whereas only 50 percent of the grantor respondents believed this freedom to be quite a bit to a great deal.

Percentages decreased when respondents were asked to what extent grant managers possessed the freedom to improve or change local processes or procedural steps, change or establish standard operating procedures, or eliminate non-value added activities. Fifty percent of the grantor respondents believed the extent to be just a little, whereas only 16 percent of the grantee believed the extent to be just a little. About a third (36.8 percent) of grantees believed the extent to which grant managers can change local processes or procedural steps, change or establish standard operating procedures, or eliminate non-value added activities to be a moderate amount, compared to 14.3 percent for grantors.

More than half (55.6 percent) of the grantees believed the extent of freedom they have to adjust local grant management or administration policies outside the mandates as a condition of the grant award to be not at all (36.2 percent) or just a little (19.4 percent).

As for grantors, 35.7 percent believed the extent of freedom grant managers have to adjust local grant management or administration policies to be just a little and 7.1 percent believed the extent to be not at all.

The portion of the grantor respondents who believed the extent to which grant managers have or are able to control what happens on their jobs to be a moderate amount was 42.9 percent. A lower percent (27 percent) of grantees believed the extent that they have control over what happens on their jobs to be a moderate amount.

There was a vast difference between the grantees' and grantors' perceptions of freedom to vary how grant programs are administered at the local level, controlling the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients, choosing the method to carry out the administration of grant programs relative to federal standards, and creating new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration. Grantees generally believed they had less freedom, with 40.5 percent responding they had no or just a little freedom to vary how they administer grant programs, 21.6 percent a moderate amount, 21.6 percent quite a bit, and 16.3 percent a great deal. On the other hand, 50 percent of the grantors believed the extent of freedom to vary how grant programs are administered to be a moderate amount, 7.1 percent a great deal, 28.6 percent just a little, and 14.3 percent did not know.

Only 7.9 percent of the grantees believed they have a great deal of freedom to control quality; 36.8 percent cited a moderate amount. As for choosing the methods they wish to use in carrying out the administration of their grant programs relative to federal standards, 28.9 percent of grantees believed they had a moderate amount of freedom,

versus 42.9 percent of the grantor respondents believing grant managers had a moderate amount of freedom to choose the methods they wish to use to carry grant administration and 21.4 percent for improving quality.

There was a noticeable difference between the perceptions of grantors and grantees as to the extent grant managers are able to choose the methods they wish to use in carrying out the administration of their grant program or programs relative to federal standards: 28.9 percent of grantee believed the extent to be a moderate amount, 15.8 percent quite a bit, 13.2 percent a great deal, 13.2 percent just a little, and 28.9 percent not at all. As for grantors, 42.9 percent perceived the extent grant managers are able to choose the methods they would like to use in grant administration to be a moderate amount, 21.4 percent quite a bit, 7.2 percent a great deal, 21.4 percent, and 7.1 percent did not know.

Only 28.9 percent of the grantees believed they had a moderate amount of freedom to create new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration as compared to 71.6 percent of the grantor respondents that believed grant managers have a moderate amount of freedom to create new methodologies for improving current workflows for administering grant programs.

Forty three percent of the grantor respondents believed the extent management allows grantees to make most of their own decisions as they relate to managing federal grants to be a moderate amount. Only 28.9 percent of the grantee respondents believed the extent to be a moderate amount, 23.7 percent quite a bit, 13.2 percent a great deal, 21 percent just a little, and 13.2 percent not at all.

Overall, both groups perceived the grantee to have a moderate amount of freedom to decide how to manage grant programs; however, more often than not, the grantor respondents believed the grantees had more decision latitude than the grantees themselves believed they possessed. With the exception of the amount of freedom the grantee respondents perceived they had to decide how they organized their workday, the grantee respondents believed they possessed little decision latitude to manage grant programs. Generally, 35.7 to 50 percent of the grantor respondents perceived the amount of freedom to be moderate, whereas only 16 to 50 percent of the grantee respondents believed the degree of freedom to be a moderate amount.

Information Sharing

A high percentage of the grantor respondents believed information is shared a moderate amount (tables 4.24 and 4.29) between local immediate or executive-level management, co-workers, grant managers, and grantees. Specifically, 64.4 percent of the grantors believed grant managers received timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management and 42.9 percent believed grant managers received timely federal information from local immediate or executive-level management. Fewer grantee respondents (52.6 percent) believed the extent to which they received timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management to be a moderate amount.

Fifty percent of the grantors believed grant managers receive pertinent federal information from immediate or executive-level management, pertinent basic information from co-workers, and pertinent and timely information from federal managers a

moderate amount. Similarly, 47.3 percent of the grantees believed they received pertinent federal information from executive-level management a moderate amount. From co-workers, 31.6 percent believed they received pertinent basic information a moderate amount and 31.7 percent believed they received pertinent information from their federal grant managers that was also timely a moderate amount.

Just over 70 percent of grantees believed the extent they receive accurate or complete federal or local information from immediate supervisors or management and federal grant managers to be a moderate amount to quite a bit. Similarly, 67.6 percent of grantees also believed the extent to which they received accurate or complete from their co-workers to be a moderate amount to quite a bit.

Grantors believed the extent to which grantees received accurate and complete information to be a lesser amount. For instance, 28.6 percent of grantors believed the extent to which grantees received inaccurate or incomplete information from their immediate supervisor or management to be either a moderate amount and quite a bit; however, 50 percent of the grantors believed the extent to which grantees received inaccurate or incomplete information from federal grant managers to be only just a little. Fifty percent of the grantors also believed the extent to which grantees received inaccurate or incomplete information from co-workers to be not at all or just a little.

The extent to which grantor respondents believed grant managers have control over gaining access to sources of information they need to manage their grant programs was limited. Though 42.9 percent of grantors believed just a little, only 10.8 percent of the grantee respondents believed just a little. As for the remaining respondents, 14.3

percent of grantors and 34.2 percent of grantees believed a moderate amount, 7.1 percent of grantors and 10.5 percent of grantees believed not at all, and 35.7 percent of the grantors did not know.

For the most part, grantors and grantees perceived the extent to which grantees receive information from local immediate or executive-level management and co-workers as a moderate amount, although there was a clear difference between the perceptions of the grantor and grantee respondents as to the overall strength of the communication system. Nearly half of the grantors and grantees believed the extent that grantees received pertinent federal information to be a moderate amount. A higher percentage of the grantor respondents (50 percent) believed the extent that grantees received information from federal grant managers to be a moderate amount than did the grantee respondents (31.7 percent). Grantor and grantee respondents had a vastly different perspective of the extent to which they received accurate and complete information. Generally, a higher percentage of the grantee respondents believed they received accurate and complete information than did the grantor respondents. Finally, both groups believed access to information is somewhat limited.

Part VII – General Grants Management Perception Comparisons

Based on the literature review, a highly controlled management environment is defined as one that limits decision making and risk taking, lacks effective communication and accountability systems, and discourages innovation and creativity. To fully explore the central and sub-questions of the study it was necessary to ascertain the perceived extent of having, or not having, the ability to make decisions and take risks, effective

communication, accountability, and innovation and creative opportunities at the sub-national level. Respondents were asked to what extent the presence, or lack thereof, of the five major behavioral attributes in the management environment has on grants management. Tables 4.30 and 4.31 compared the grantors' and grantees' perceptions of the impact of the five major attributes in a grants management environment.

Tables 4.30 and 4.31 reveal that approximately 71 percent of grantors and grantees believed the extent that grants management is impacted by a front-line manager having direct access to information from a grantor to be quite a bit to a great deal.

Additionally, 73.6 percent of grantees surveyed believed the extent grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having clear, accurate, and timely information from direct local supervisors or executive officials to be quite a bit to a great deal, whereas only 57.1 percent of the grantors believed the extent to be quite a bit to a great deal.

Grantee respondents also believed the extent grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having clear, accurate, and timely information from co-workers to be quite a bit to a great deal (68.4 percent); however, only 42.8 percent of the grantors believed information from co-workers impacts grants management quite a bit to a great deal.

Fifty to 55.3 percent of the grantor and grantee respondents believed the extent to which grant managers have direct span-of-control authority to implement new policies or procedures for administering a grant program or programs is quite a bit to a great deal impactful. When asked to what extent grants management is impacted by a front-line

grant manager having the ability to change administrative procedures, processes, or policies without seeking approval from local immediate or executive-level management, the percentages varied. Of grantors, 28.6 percent felt just a little, 21.4 percent a moderate amount, 14.3 percent quite a bit, 14.4 percent a great deal, 7.1 percent not at all, and 14.3 percent did not know. When grantees were asked the same questions, percentages also varied: 31.6 percent of the grantees believed the impact to be quite a bit, 13.2 percent a great deal, 26.3 percent a moderate amount, 10.5 percent just a little, and 18.4 percent not at all.

There was a noticeable difference between the perceptions of grantors and grantees as to the extent grants management is impacted by a front-line manager having the ability to externally share the status of a grant program that is believed to be ineffective. Though 35.7 percent of the grantors believed a moderate amount, only 18.4 percent of the grantees believed the impact to be a moderate amount. Similarly, 31.6 percent of the grantees believed the extent grants management is impacted by a front-line manager having the ability to externally share the status of a grant program that is believed to be ineffective to be a quite a bit versus 21.5 percent of the grantors believing the impact would be quite a bit.

A lower percentage of grantors (14.3 percent) believed that the impact on grants management by a front-line grant manager having the ability to create new methodologies for improving current workflows without immediate or executive-level local management approval to be only a moderate amount. On the other hand, 44.7 seven

percent of grantees believed the impact would be quite a bit versus 35.7 percent of grantor respondents.

Of grantees, 43.2 percent believed the extent grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having control over what happens to him or her on the job or freedom to decide how to organize his or her workday to be quite a bit. Fifty percent of the grantors believed the extent grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having freedom to decide how to organize his or her workday to be quite a bit; 28.6 percent cited a great deal. Just under half (47.4 percent) of the grantees believed the extent to which freedom to decide how to organize the workday impacts grants management to be quite a bit and 26.3 percent a great deal. The percent of grantors that believed the extent of having control over what happens to him or her on the job impacts grants management was mixed: 21.4 percent felt just a little, 28.6 percent a moderate amount, 28.6 percent quite a bit, and 14.3 percent a great deal.

The range of percentages was much more varied for the extent both grantors and grantees believed grant management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having local political influence or pressure over administering a grant program. Both grantees and grantors generally believed the impact to be just a little to a moderate amount.

Grantor and grantee respondents were much more in accord when asked questions pertaining to the impact of grant managers being held accountable for the management of grant programs. The majority (50 to 84.2 percent) of the respondents—grantees and grantors—believed grant managers being held hierarchically, professionally, and legally accountable does have an impact. The extent grant management would be

impacted by front-line grant managers being held accountable for following federal government guidelines, regulations, and mandates that govern program administration was thought by both groups to be high. For instance, 71.5 percent of grantors believed the impact to be quite a bit to a great deal and 84.2 percent of grantees believed it to be quite a bit to a great deal. Both groups also believed being held politically accountable was less important.

Grantors and grantees believed the impact decision latitude has on grants management to range from a moderate amount to a great deal. There was little variance between the extent grantees and grantors believed grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in varying the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients (grantors – 85.8 percent and grantees – 89.1 percent), choosing the methods used in carrying out the administration of a grant program or programs relative to federal standards (grantors – 85.8 percent and grantees – 97.4 percent), or gaining access to the source of information needed to manage grant programs (grantors – 100 percent and grantees – 97.3 percent).

Overall, grantees and grantors were in accord that decision making, risk taking, effective communication and accountability systems, and decision latitude are important to effective grants management.

Table 4.30 General Management Environment, Questions 1 through 6 (Grantor)

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Unknown	N
<i>Sub-Question 1: Do sub-national highly controlled management environments with weak professional and hierarchical accountability structures alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>							
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having local political influence or pressure over administering a grant program?	7.1%	21.4%	21.4%	7.1%	7.1%	35.9%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by front-line grant managers being held directly accountable (answerable) at the local level for administration of his or her grant program?	0.0%	0.0%	21.4%	28.6%	50.0%	0.0%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by front-line grant managers being held accountable for following federal government guidelines, regulations, and mandates that govern program administration?	0.0%	7.1%	21.4%	28.6%	42.9%	0.0%	15

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Unknown	N
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by front-line grant managers being held accountable for following local government internal organizational standards, procedures, and policies that govern grant program or programs?	0.0%	7.1%	14.3%	21.4%	42.9%	14.3%	15
To what extent do you feel a front-line grant manager being held legally accountable for legislative oversight issues such as fraud, waste, supplanting of funds, co-mingling of local and federal funds, or inventory control of property purchased with federal dollars impact grant management?	0.0%	7.1%	28.6%	28.6%	28.6%	7.1%	15
<i>Sub-Question 2: Do sub-national highly controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information alter the likelihood of effective management?</i>							
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having direct access to information from a grantor agency?	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	35.7%	35.7%	0.0%	15

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Unknown	N
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having clear, accurate, and timely information from direct local supervisors or executive officials?	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	21.4%	35.7%	14.3%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having clear, accurate, and timely information from co-workers?	0.0%	7.1%	28.6%	7.1%	35.7%	21.4%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in gaining access to the source of information they need to manage grant programs?	0.0%	0.0%	28.5%	28.6%	42.9%	0.0%	15
<i>Sub-Question 3: Do grant managers that are discouraged from taking risks alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>							
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having ability to externally share the status of a grant program(s) believed to be ineffective?	7.1%	7.1%	35.7%	21.5%	14.3%	14.3%	15

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Mode-rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Unknown	N
<i>Sub-Question 4: Do grant managers that are discouraged from being creative or innovative; alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>							
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having ability to create new methodologies for improving current workflows without immediate or executive level local management approval?	0.0%	7.1%	14.3%	35.7%	28.6%	14.3%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having control over what happens to him or her on the job?	0.0%	21.4%	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	7.1%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having freedom to decide how to organize his or her workday?	0.0%	7.1%	7.1%	50.0%	28.6%	7.1%	15
<i>Sub-Question 5: Do grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>							

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Mode-rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Unknown	N
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having direct span-of-control authority to implement new policies or procedures for administering grant programs(s)?	0.0%	21.4%	28.6%	35.7%	14.3%	0.0%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having ability to change administrative procedures, processes, or policies without seeking approval from local immediate or executive-level management?	7.1%	28.6%	21.4%	14.3%	14.4%	14.3%	15
To what extent do you feel a front-line grant manager's being allowed to make his or her own span-of-control decisions impacts grants management?	0.0%	7.1%	35.8%	21.4%	28.6%	7.1%	15
To what extent do you feel a high percentage of input a front-line grant manager receives from immediate or executive level management for making daily work decisions impacts grants management?	7.1%	7.1%	28.6%	28.6%	21.5%	7.1%	15

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Mode-rate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	Unknown	N
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in varying the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients?	0.0%	14.2%	28.6%	28.6%	28.6%	0.0%	15
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in choosing the methods used in carrying out the administration of a grant program(s) as it relates to federal standards?	0.0%	7.1%	35.8%	28.6%	21.4%	7.1%	15

Table 4.31 General Management Environment, Questions 1 through 6 (Grantee)

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	N
<i>Sub-Question 1: Do sub-national highly controlled management environments with weak professional and hierarchical accountability structures alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>						
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having local political influence or pressure over administering a grant program?	13.2%	26.3%	23.6%	23.7%	13.2%	43
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by front-line grant managers being held directly accountable (answerable) at the local level for administration of his or her grant program?	0.0%	5.3%	21.1%	44.7%	28.9%	43
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by front-line grant managers being held accountable for following federal government guidelines, regulations, and mandates that govern program administration?	0.0%	2.6%	13.2%	52.6%	31.6%	43

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	N
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by front-line grant managers being held accountable for local government internal organizational standards, procedures, and policies that govern grant program(s)?	2.6%	5.3%	26.3%	44.7%	21.1%	43
To what extent do you feel a front-line grant manager being held legally accountable for legislative oversight issues such as fraud, waste, supplanting of funds, co-mingling of local and federal funds, or inventory control of property purchased with federal dollars impact grant management?	0.0%	5.3%	18.4%	55.3%	21.0%	43
<i>Su- Question 2: Do sub-national highly controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information alter the likelihood of effective management?</i>						

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	N
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having direct access to information from a grantor agency?	2.6%	5.3%	21.1%	39.5%	31.5%	43
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having clear, accurate, and timely information from direct local supervisors or executive officials?	5.3%	5.3%	15.8%	47.4%	26.2%	43
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having clear, accurate, and timely information from co-workers?	7.9%	7.9%	15.8%	42.1%	26.3%	43
As it pertains to a grant program or programs, to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in gaining access to the source of information they need to manage a grant program(s)?	0.0%	2.7%	21.6%	51.4%	24.3%	43
<i>Su- Question 3: Do grant managers that are discouraged from taking risks alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>						

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	N
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having ability to externally share the status of a grant program(s) believed to be ineffective?	15.8%	26.3%	18.4%	31.6%	7.9%	43
<i>Sub-Question 4: Do grant managers that are discouraged from being creative or innovative alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>						
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having ability to create new methodologies for improving current workflows without immediate or executive-level local management approval?	5.3%	18.4%	18.4%	44.7%	13.2%	43
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having control over what happens to him or her on the job?	0.0%	13.5%	27.0%	43.2%	16.3%	43
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having freedom to decide how to organize his or her workday?	0.0%	7.9%	18.4%	47.4%	26.3%	43

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	N
<i>Sub-Question 5: Do grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management?</i>						
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having direct span-of-control authority to implement new policies or procedures for administering grant programs(s)?	5.3%	10.5%	28.9%	39.5%	15.8%	43
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager having ability to change administrative procedures, processes, or policies without seeking approval from local immediate or executive-level management?	18.4%	10.5%	26.3%	31.6%	13.2%	43
To what extent do you feel a front-line grants manager's being allowed to make his or her own span-of-control decisions impacts grants management?	0.0%	2.7%	29.7%	51.4%	16.2%	43
To what extent do you feel a high percentage of input a front-line grant manager receives from immediate or executive level management for making daily work decisions impacts grants management?	0.0%	18.4%	21.1%	50.0%	10.5%	43

Question	Not at all	Just a little	Moderate amount	Quite a bit	Great deal	N
As it pertains to a grant program or programs, to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in varying the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients?	0.0%	10.9%	27.0%	48.6%	13.5%	43
As it pertains to a grant program or programs, to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in choosing the methods used in carrying out the administration of a grant program or programs as it relates to federal standards?	0.0%	2.6%	26.3%	52.6%	18.5%	43

In addition to matching responses from grantors and grantees that compared the extent to which behaviors were perceived to have been demonstrated, tables 4.32 and 4.33 examined the study's five sub-questions to determine the extent behaviors are perceived to impact grants management. There were noticeable differences between the grantees and grantors' perspectives of the impact the five behavioral characteristics may have on grants management.

Sub-Question 1 – Do grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Grantors and grantees were in general agreement that having the liberty to make daily decisions is very much necessary for effective grants management. The degree to which grantors and grantees regarded grantees as actually being required to first request permission prior to making day-to-day grants management decisions was considerably low, implying grantees are empowered to make decisions.

The overall findings indicate grantees and grantors perceived the importance of the ability to make decisions pertaining to the management of grantees without first seeking permission as moderate to relatively high. Additionally, both groups agreed that grantees are demonstrating that they are both willing, and perceive to have liberty available to make grant management decisions with limited restrictions.

Sub-Question 2 – Do highly controlled management environments with weak professional and hierarchical accountability structures alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Grantors and grantees mutually determined that being held accountable for federal government guidelines, regulations, and mandates that govern program administration would have a major impact on grants management. Conversely, there was a substantial discrepancy between grantors and grantees in the level of impact a grantee being held accountable at the local level would have on grants management. Grantors believed being held accountable at the local level has a low level of impact on grants management, while grantees believed the level of impact would be quite a bit. Finally, grantees and grantors perceived that legal accountability played a lesser role. Generally, grantors' and grantees' perceptions of the level of importance and the actual level grantees are actually held accountable in all areas were nearly equal. On average, grantees perceived the level of being held accountable as more important. The perception of the extent they are actually held accountable was very close.

Sub-Question 3 – Do grant managers that are discouraged from being creative or innovative alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

The ability to have the discretion to improve grant programs through innovation and creativity was viewed by grantees and grantors as being moderately to significantly fundamental for effective grants management. Although both groups indicated this discretion is needed, the two groups did differ in their assessment of the actual decision latitude behavior. Grantees' perception of having more latitude to vary the quality of services, alter or create new methods for delivering the program, or decide how to organize his or her workday was mildly above moderate; on the other hand, grantors

determined the extent to which grantees are demonstrating these flexibilities as being narrowly less than moderate.

Sub-Question 4 – Do grant managers that are discouraged from taking risk alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Both the grantor and grantee respondents generally determined risk to be significantly important to the management of grant programs. The willingness to change administrative procedures, processes, or policies, or share the status of a grant program believed to be ineffective without seeking approval from local immediate or executive-level management was thought to have a moderate to low impact on grants management. Grantors and grantees also were in agreement that the level of importance of being able to externally share the status of a program (that is believed to be ineffective with seeking permission to do so) is also of great consequence. However, when asked to what extent the behavior was engaged in, both groups perceived it to be less than moderately demonstrated.

Sub-Question 5 – Do highly-controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information (closed communication channels) alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Grantees perceived that the ability to receive timely, pertinent, and accurate information would have a principal impact on grants management, whereas the grantors placed slightly less emphasis on the importance. When asked the extent to which information is actually received and shared, both groups perceived that information is only moderately accurate, complete, and received in a timely manner.

Table 4.33 shows that the overall perception of grantee and grantor populations for both the level of importance of the five behaviors and the extent to which the behaviors were demonstrated were largely similar. The most significant difference was between the level of importance and the extent of demonstrated behavior of decision latitude and risk. In both instances, the extent of demonstrated behavior was much lower than the perceived level of importance.

**Table 4.32 General Management Environment, Questions 1 through 19
(Grantee/Grantor)**

1 = Not at all
2 = Just a little
3 = Moderate amount
4 = Quite a bit
5 = Great deal

	Minimu m	Maximu m	Median Grantee	Median Grantor
Sub-Question: Do grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management?				
Choosing the methods used in carrying out the administration	2	5	4	4
Varying the quality of service or product deliver	0	5	4	4
High percent of input a front-line GMs receives	0	5	4	3
Allowed to make his or her own span-of-control decisions	0	5	3	3.5
Sub-Question: Do sub-national highly controlled management environments with weak professional and hierarchical accountability structures alter the likelihood of effective grants management?				
Held legally accountable for legislative oversight issues	0	5	3	2.5
Following government internal organizational standards, procedures, and policies	2	5	4	3
Following federal government guidelines, regulations, and mandates that govern program administration	3	5	4	4
At the local level for administration of his or her grant program	0	5	4	3
Local political influence or pressure over administering a grant program	0	5	3	4

**Table 4.32 General Management Environment, Questions 1 through 19
(Grantee/Grantor)**

1 = Not at all

2 = Just a little

3 = Moderate amount

4 = Quite a bit

5 = Great deal

	Minimu m	Maximu m	Median Grantee	Median Grantor
Sub-Question: Do grant managers that are discouraged from being creative/innovative alter the likelihood of effective grants management?				
Freedom to decide how to organize his or her workday	0	5	4	2
Control over what happens to him or her on the job	0	5	4	4.5
Ability to create new methodologies for improving current workflow	0	5	4	4
Sub-Question: Do grant managers that are discouraged from taking risk alter the likelihood of effective grants management?				
Ability to externally share the status of ineffective programs	0	5	4	4
Ability to change administrative procedures	2	5	4	4
Direct span-of-control authority	0	5	4	3.5
Sub-Question: Do sub-national highly controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information (closed communication channels) alter the likelihood of effective grants management?				
Clear, accurate, and timely information from co-workers	0	5	4	3.5
Clear, accurate, and timely information from local supervisors	3	5	4	4
Direct access to information from grantor agency	0	5	4	3.5
Gaining access to the source of information	0	5	4	3

Table 4.33 Comparison Between the Presence of a Highly Controlled Management Environment Elements and Demonstrated Behaviors

QUESTIONS/SUB-QUESTIONS	Impact on Grants Management		Perceived/Demonstrated Behavior	
	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)
Decision Control				
To what extent do you feel a high percent of input a front-line grant manger receives from immediate or executive-level management for making daily work decisions impact grants management?				
To what extent do you feel a high percent of input a front-line grant manager receives from immediate or executive-level management for making daily work decisions impact grants management?	4	3	2	2
Allowed to make his, or her, own span-of-control decisions?	3	3.5	3	3
Direct span-of-control authority to implement new policies or procedures for administering grant program(s)?	4	3	3	2
Risk				
As it pertains to a grants program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line manager ability to:				
Change administrative procedures, processes, or policies without seeking approval from local immediate or executive-level management?	4	4	3	2

Table 4.33 Comparison Between the Presence of a Highly Controlled Management Environment Elements and Demonstrated Behaviors

QUESTIONS/SUB-QUESTIONS	Impact on Grants Management		Perceived/Demonstrated Behavior	
	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)
Risk (continued)				
Externally share the status of a grant program(s) believed to be ineffective (without seeking immediate, executive or federal level)?	4	4	2	2
Accountability				
As it pertains to a grants program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by a front-line grant manager being held directly accountable (answerable) for the following:				
Local level administration of his or her grant program?	4	2	4	3
Federal government guidelines, regulations, and mandates that govern program administration?	4	4	4	3
Local government internal organizational standards, procedures, and policies that govern grant program(s)?	4	3	4	3
Legislative oversight issues such as fraud, waste, supplanting of funds, co-mingling of local and federal funds, or inventory control of property purchased with federal dollars impact grants management?	3	2.5	3	3

Table 4.33 Comparison Between the Presence of a Highly Controlled Management Environment Elements and Demonstrated Behaviors

QUESTIONS/SUB-QUESTIONS	Impact on Grants Management		Perceived/Demonstrated Behavior	
	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)
Decision Latitude				
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you believe grants management is impacted by the latitude a front-line grant manager has in:				
Varying the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients?	4	4	3	2
Choosing the methods used in carrying out the administration of a grant program(s) as it related to federal standards?	4	4	3	3
Creating new methodologies for improving current workflows without immediate or executive-level local management approval?	4	4	2.5	3
Deciding how to organize his or her workday?	4	2	4	3
Information Sharing				
As it pertains to a grant program(s), to what extent do you feel grants management is impacted by a front-line manager having:				
Direct access to information from a grantor agency?	4	3.5	3	3

Table 4.33 Comparison Between the Presence of a Highly Controlled Management Environment Elements and Demonstrated Behaviors

QUESTIONS/SUB-QUESTIONS	Impact on Grants Management		Perceived/Demonstrated Behavior	
	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)	Grantee (Median)	Grantor (Median)
Information Sharing (continued)				
Clear, accurate, and timely information from direct local supervisors or executive officials?	4	4	3	3
Clear, accurate, and timely information from co-workers?	4	3.5	3	3
Gaining access to the source of information (i.e., primary or secondary data) they need to manage grant program(s)?	4	3	3	3

Cross-Tabulation of Demographical Data

Babbie, Halley, and Zaino agree that the “search for causal variables involves the examination of demographic (or background) variables” (2007, 189). Such variables, they suggest, “often have a powerful impact on attributes and behaviors” (2007, 189). The study’s sub-questions were examined using cross-tabulation to more fully explore the two central questions: 1) Can a highly controlled management environment produce high-risk grantees? and 2) Can a highly controlled management environment in third-party systems alter the achievement of national goals? Demographic data (independent) and behavioral attributes (dependent) were cross-tabulated to determine if there were any associations between the dependent and independent variables.

Demographical data used were:

1. number of years of experience the respondent has managing federal grants at the local level [interval],
2. number of years of experience the respondent has managing federal grants at the federal level [interval],
3. number of grants managed [interval],
4. dollar value of grants managed [interval],
5. percent of workday comprised of grant management [interval], and
6. whether or not grant managers are responsible for delivering a grant program or programs to the public [nominal].

The objective of the cross-tabulation was to determine three things: 1) whether there is any association between the dependent variables and selected independent

variables, 2) the strength of that association, if there is one, and 3) the direction of the association. Cross-tabulations were run on six independent variables and seventy-one dependent variables, resulting in over 200 tables. The cross-tabulation portion of the analysis served to initially determine if associations were present.

The 10 percentage point column difference rule of thumb principle was observed in the majority of the tables generated, suggesting the possibility of relationships or associations. To further explore the suggested associations chi square statistical tests were run to determine the strength of those associations.

Chi-Square Tests

Chi-square tests generated twenty-seven instances of significant values which fell between $\chi^2=0.05$ and $\chi^2=0.003$, suggesting there were statistically significant associations among the variables which are summarized in table 4.34. Each of the five major behavioral attributes was represented, though at a varying degree. Statistically significant relationships were most prominent for attributes reflecting decision latitude and information sharing.

Sub-Question 1 – Do grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Less prominently represented were the attributes for decision control. Of the ten questions asked of the respondents, only one surfaced as having a significant relationship that may influence the decision-making behavior of the grantee. The chi-square value of $\chi^2=.015$ suggested that *the dollar value of grant programs* and the *extent grantees*

perceived they were required to first request permission to make day-to-day decisions were statistically significant.

Sub-Question 2 – Do highly controlled management environments with weak professional and hierarchical accountability structures alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

The extent grantees are held accountable for reaching goals and objectives, the number of grant recipients in grant programs, and professional performance appeared to be influenced by whether or not the grant manager was also responsible for delivering the program to the public (chi-square values were $\chi^2=.022$, $\chi^2=.044$, and $\chi^2=.006$, respectively). The relationship between professional performance and being responsible for delivering the program to the public, which received a chi-square value of $\chi^2=.006$, indicated this was the most significant of the three relationships (see table 4.34). Chi-square values for both the *extent grantees are held hierarchically accountable at the local level for the effective administration of grants* and *the number of grants managed* and the *dollar value* were $\chi^2=.020$ and $\chi^2=.042$, respectively and indicated a higher level of confidence existed, thereby suggesting that these relationships are significant as well.

Sub-Question 3 – Do grant managers that are discouraged from being creative or innovative alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Decision latitude chi-square values ranged from $\chi^2=.005$ to $\chi^2=.042$. For instance, the relationship between *to what extent did grantees perceive they had the freedom to decide how to organize their workday as it related to managing* and *the dollar value of the grants managed* reflected a value of $\chi^2=.005$, whereas *the extent grantees perceived*

they were able to vary how they administer the grant program at the local level and the dollar value of the grants managed reflected a value of $\chi^2=.014$, indicating that the dollar value of the grant does play a significant role in the management of grant programs.

Sub-Question 4 – Do grant managers that are discouraged from taking risk alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Risk and accountability were moderately represented, although the *number of years of experience working with federal grants at the local level and the dollar value of grant programs* appeared to have had some influence on the grantees' willingness to take risk in three areas: 1) altering internal grant administrative procedures ($\chi^2=.007$), 2) challenging the status quo ($\chi^2=.005$), and 3) recommending that a grant program or programs be discontinued because of failure to achieve the intended objectives or outcomes ($\chi^2=.013$). Being responsible for delivering programs to the public, dollar value, and number of grants managed emerged as influencing whether, and by whom, grantees are held accountable.

Sub-Question 5 – Do highly controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information (closed communication channels) alter the likelihood of effective grants management?

Both the dollar value of grants managed and the number of years of experience surfaced as having significant associations pertaining to transparency of information. The extent to which grantees received timely and pertinent information from local immediate or executive-level management and co-workers generated values of $\chi^2=.003$, $\chi^2=.043$, and $\chi^2=.046$. The association between the extent it was believed that accurate or complete

federal information from federal grant managers and years of experience and dollar value was significant ($\chi^2=.037$ and $\chi^2=.013$). Receiving accurate or complete information from co-workers and the extent to which timely basic information was received from local immediate or executive-level management were found to have significant associations with both the years of experience and dollar value of the grants managed ($\chi^2=.018$ and $\chi^2=.003$).

Regardless of from whom information was being shared, all categories of information (timely, pertinent, accurate, and correct) sharing the chi-square tests results indicated that there were significant associations between the dollar value and years of experience. No distinction was found between the information provided from management or non-management or whether the information was being provided by federal or local sources.

Table 4.34 Summary of Chi-Square Values

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI - SQUARE (χ^2) VALUE
Decision Control		
To what extent are you required to first request permission to make day-to-day decisions?	What is the dollar value of your grant program?	.015
Risk		
To what extent are you willing to alter internal grant administrative procedures?	What type or types of grants do you manage?	.007
To what extent are you willing to challenge the status quo?	How many years of experience do you have working with federal grants at the local level?	.005
To what extent are you willing to recommend that a grant program(s) be discontinued because it is not achieving its intended objectives or outcome?	How many years of experience do you have working with federal grants at the local level?	.013
Accountability		
To what extent are you held accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program(s) you administer?	Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	.022
To what extent are you held accountable for the number of grant recipients in grant programs that you administer?	Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	.044
To what extent are you held hierarchically accountable at the local level for the effective administration of your grant?	How many grants do you manage?	.020

Table 4.34 Summary of Chi-Square Values

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI - SQUARE (χ^2) VALUE
Accountability (continued)		
To what extent are you held hierarchically accountable at the local level for the effective administration of your grant?	What is the dollar value of your grant?	.042
To what extent are you held professionally accountable?	Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	.006
Decision Latitude		
To what extent do you have the freedom to decide how to organize your workday as it relates to managing grants?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.005
To what extent are you able to vary how you administer your grant program(s) at the local level?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.014
To what extent are you able to vary how you administer your grant program(s) at the local level?	How many years of experience do you have working as a grant manager at the federal level?	.042
To what extent are you able to control the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients?	Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	.023

Table 4.34 Summary of Chi-Square Values

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI - SQUARE (χ^2) VALUE
Decision Latitude (continued)		
To what extent are you able to create new methodologies for improving current workflows for grant administration?	What percent of your workday are you directly engaged in managing a grant or grants?	.039
To what extent are you willing to create new methodologies for improving workflows for grant administration?	How many years of experience do you have working as a grant manager at the federal level?	.034
To what extent does management allow you to make most of your own decisions as it relates to management of federal grants?	How many grants do you manage?	.038
To what extent does management allow you to make most of your own decisions as it relates to management of federal grants?	What type or types of grants do you manage?	.009
To what extent does management allow you to make most of your own decisions as it relates to management of federal grants?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.034
Information Sharing		
To what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.003

Table 4.34 Summary of Chi-Square Values

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI - SQUARE (χ^2) VALUE
Information Sharing (continued)		
To what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from co-workers?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.043
To what extent do you believe you receive pertinent federal information from local immediate or executive-level management?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.046
To what extent do you believe you receive pertinent basic information from co-workers?	How many years of experience do you have working with federal grants at the local level?	.018
To what extent do you believe you receive pertinent information from your federal grant manager, which is also timely?	What is the dollar value of your grant program(s)?	.030
To what extent do you believe you receive accurate or complete federal information from your federal grant manager?	How many years of experience do you have working with federal grants at the local level?	.037
To what extent do you believe you receive accurate or complete federal information from your federal grant manager?	What is the dollar value of your grant program(s)?	.013
To what extent do you believe you receive accurate or complete information from your co-workers?	How many years of experience do you have working with federal grants at the local level?	.018

Table 4.34 Summary of Chi-Square Values

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI - SQUARE (χ^2) VALUE
Information Sharing (continued)		
To what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.003

Lambda Test Values

To determine the strength of the association (based on the relationships determined to be statistically significant by the chi-square tests), lambda tests were performed for each chi-square test with significant values under 0.05 (see table 4.35). Lambda tests significantly reduced chi-square results from twenty-seven significant relationships down to five, indicating evidence of strong associations. Three dependent and independent variables emerged as having evidence of extremely interesting or statistically strong associations and fell between $\pm .30$ to $.99$. Dependent variables were risk, accountability, and decision latitude; the three independent variables which emerged were: 1) being responsible for the delivery of programs, 2) the types of grants, and 3) the dollar value of the grant program or programs (see table 4.35). Being responsible for delivering the programs to the public (an independent variable) emerged most frequently. Willingness to alter internal grant administrative procedures and the dollar value of the grant program also surfaced as having a strong association, $.375$ under lambda and $\chi^2=.007$ under the chi-square test. Less than 14.2 percent of those individuals responsible for grant awards manage grants under \$1,000. Those individuals also had less than one year of experience working with federal grants at the local level. Individuals with six or more years of experience managed grants from \$50,000 to well over \$5 million.

Table 4.35 reflects associations between grantees that were responsible for both the management and delivery of their grant programs and being held accountable for reaching goals and objectives and the number of grant recipients served were determined to be strong by the lambda test (Lambda= $.474$ and $.444$, respectively). The strength of the

associations revealed there is a link between program delivery and accountability. The lambda score (.474) indicated a strong association between the extent grantees are able to control the quality of services or products delivered to the program recipients and their being responsible for delivering the grant program or programs to the public.

The association between the extent management allows grantees to make most of their own decisions as they relate to the management of federal grants and the type of grant, while strong, was somewhat weaker than the previous four (Lambda=.364). Given that this particular study question was not broken down to distinguish between grant types and grantee behaviors, the lower lambda score could be attributed to the fact that different types of grants offer varying types of flexibilities.

Table 4.35 Summary of Chi-Square and Lambda Values

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI - SQUARE (x²)VALUE	LAMBDA VALUE
Risk			
To what extent are you willing to alter internal grant administrative procedures?	What type or types of grants do you manage?	.007	.375
Accountability			
To what extent are you held accountable for reaching the goals and objectives of the grant program(s) you administer?	Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	.022	.474
To what extent are you held accountable for the number of grant recipients in grant programs that you administer?	Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	.044	.444

Decision Latitude

To what extent are you able to control the quality of services or products delivered to program recipients?	Are you responsible for delivering your program to the public, as well as managing your grant or grants?	.023	.474
To what extent does management allow you to make most of your own decisions as it relates to management of federal grants?	What type or types of grants do you manage?	.009	.364

Direction of Associations - Gamma

The dollar value of grant programs emerged as a consistent independent variable for four of the five dependent variables (decision control, accountability, decision latitude and information sharing). To determine the direction of those relationships which emerge as having significant chi-square values between $\alpha=0.05$ and $\alpha=0.003$, gamma was run. Only one of the eleven relationships tested produced a negative association.

The dependent variable *to what extent are you required to first request permission to make day-to-day decisions* and the independent variable of *what is the dollar value of your grant program* had a negative gamma value of -.110, which means it reduces errors in predicting the behavior of grantees who are first required to request permission to make day-to-day decisions. It also means that as one variable moves in one direction, the other will move in the opposite direction. The remaining dependent variables depicted in table 4.35 (accountability, decision latitude, and information sharing) and the one independent variable (dollar value of the grant) all had positive directions of associations ranging from .260 to .501.

None of the relationships had perfect negative (-1.00) or positive (+1.00) associations. While it would have been helpful to determine the relationship of the number of grants managed per dollar value with dependent variables, study questions only asked the total dollar value of grants managed. Grantees may manage one grant valued at \$1,000 or ten or more grants of varying dollar value; therefore, limiting the ability to determine how many grants (of a specific cumulative dollar value) a grantee may manage above \$1,000.

Table 4.36 Summary of Chi-Square Values & Gamma

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI-SQUARE (χ^2) VALUE	GAMMA
Decision Control			
To what extent are you required to first request permission to make day-to-day decisions?	What is the dollar value of your grant program?	.015	-.110
Accountability			
To what extent are you held hierarchically accountable at the local level for the effective administration of your grant?	What is the dollar value of your grant?	.042	.399
Decision Latitude			
To what extent do you have the freedom to decide how to organize your workday as it relates to managing grants?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.005	.501
To what extent are you able to vary how you administer your grant program(s) at the local level?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.014	.446
To what extent does management allow you to make most of your own decisions as it relates to management of federal grants?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.034	.386

Table 4.36 Summary of Chi-Square Values & Gamma

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CHI-SQUARE (χ^2) VALUE	GAMMA
Information Sharing			
To what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.003	.260
To what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from co-workers?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.043	.375
To what extent do you believe you receive pertinent federal information from local immediate or executive-level management?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.046	.489
To what extent do you believe you receive pertinent information from your federal grant manager, which is also timely?	What is the dollar value of your grant program(s)?	.030	.495
To what extent do you believe you receive accurate or complete federal information from your federal grant manager?	What is the dollar value of your grant program(s)?	.013	.484
To what extent do you believe you receive timely basic information from local immediate or executive-level management?	What is the dollar value of the grants you manage?	.003	.260

Document Review

To further validate grantee responses, reviews of official or public documents were also conducted. There was little or no official government grants management documentations other than the GVI fiscal year budget book and U.S. Department of Education/Virgin Islands Department of Education compliance documents. The budget books provided a summary of all federal grants received and the dollar increase or decrease of grant awards from year to year. Even though dollar values were included in the budget book there was no true means of determining the reasons for grant award decreases, as the budget book did not provide explanatory information for decreases in grant awards.

External documents were available and provided another perspective of grants management in the GVI. In 2008, A. Pancham of the *St. Thomas Source* (an online newspaper) reported that the “Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, which is funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, had been receiving cuts for years. Reduction in grant awards was reported as being a result of administrative problems and a lack of proper fund management at the local level, along with a historical lag in spending the funds after they have been awarded” (Pancham 2008). Although the article reported the CDBG program had been struggling, it should be noted that the reporter went on to state that “after suffering years of federal funding cuts, the program was making a comeback” (Pancham 2008).

In September of 2002 the Virgin Islands Department of Education (VIDE) entered into a three-year compliance agreement with the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to resolve a number of grant management problems. The GVI was given three years to meet specific performance measures. At the end of the three years, ED determined the GVI had not met the terms of the agreement and VIDE was penalized by being required to acquire the services of a third-party fiduciary to manage grant funds locally on the GVI's behalf (U.S. Department of Education). Most recently, ED's Office of Inspector General conducted an audit of VIDE and reported in January 2008 that the department had been designated a "high-risk" grantee by ED under 34 C.F.R. § 80.12 (U.S. Department of Education).

In yet another instance, ED, via the Office of Special Education Programs, imposed Special Conditions on the Virgin Islands Department of Health (VIDH) for its federal fiscal year 2006 and 2008 grant awards under Part C of the *Individuals with Disabilities Education Act* (2008). Special conditions were imposed due to the fact that VIDH had not demonstrated that it had instituted procedures for ensuring that vendors are paid in a timely manner (U.S. Department of Education). More recently, in a testimony before the USVI legislature in September 2008, VIDE's independent grant manager attributed improperly managed grants funds to "a lumbering and inefficient bureaucracy" (Lett 2008).

Others, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have also cited the GVI as having "longstanding problems which have consistently led them to be designated as "high-risk" grantees" (GAO-07-119, Highlights). In 2006, GAO reported to the U.S.

Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that effective GVI management of grants is “hindered by delayed and incomplete financial reporting that does not provide timely and complete information to management and oversight officials for decision making.” Deficiencies were identified as the “late submission of required single audits, the receipt of disclaimer or qualified audit opinions, and the reporting of many serious internal control weaknesses” (GAO-07-119, Highlights). Overall, review of documents reflects that there was a consensus among the external reports that the GVI has had a history of unsatisfactory performance for not meeting the requirement of grant awards” (Pancham 2008).

DISCUSSION

This study had one core purpose, to examine whether highly controlled management environments change sub-national federal grants management. The study explored two central questions: 1) Can a highly controlled management environment produce high-risk grantees? and 2) Can a highly controlled management environment in third-party (sub-national) systems alter the achievement of national goals?

To answer the core purpose and two central questions, the study explored five sub-questions: 1) Do sub-national, highly controlled management environments with weak professional and hierarchical accountability structures alter the likelihood of effective grants management? 2) Do sub-national, highly controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information (closed communication channels) alter the likelihood of effective grants management? 3) Do grant managers that are discouraged from taking risk alter the likelihood of effective grants management? 4) Do grant managers that are discouraged from being creative/innovative alter the likelihood of effective grants management? and 5) Do grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management? The five sub-questions used in this study were consistent with previous research that suggests behaviors of implementers and their implementation styles are thought to contribute to program outcomes and policy implementation.

A recent study conducted by Tomaž Kolar argues that “decreasing response rates are detrimental to the validity of research data” (2008, 1203). Kolar’s point of the threat to the validity of research is important; however, in this study, the response rate was

acceptable. Approximately thirteen federal agencies award grants to the GVI annually. Six of them award between approximately \$14 million and \$50 million. In fiscal year 2010, the top six grantor agencies are projected to award 89 percent or \$155.2 million of the total \$174.5 million projected. Of those six, the dollar value of grants projected to be awarded by the two non-participating agencies in the study represents 23 percent of the \$155.2 million; thereby, the dollar value of those that did participate represents 77 percent, an acceptable representation of the target grantor population. Although participation from each of the major grant awarding agencies would have been ideal, the results from data gathered from the 77 percent will: a) be useful, b) be generalizable to the larger GVI federal grantor population, and c) maintain the study findings' validity.

There were only a few grantees that declined to participate, one due to retirement, one due to the fact that he or she was only responsible for the inputting of grant award budget allocations into the financial management system, and another who did not provide an explanation for non participation. The overall response rate of 32.1 percent of those grantees and sub-grantees participating online is considered slightly above average (30 percent). The grantee/sub grantee's response rate was further elevated by surveys conducted onsite and phone interviews; therefore, no threat was posed to the validity of the findings.

Sub-question one sought to determine to what extent grant managers that are discouraged from making management decisions alter the likelihood of effective grants management. Responses for sub-question one indicate that grantees and grantors perceived the grant manager to be empowered to make day-to-day and basic management

decisions; however, the percentage represented only 50 to 56.4 percent of the grant managers. From the standpoint of making basic decisions, the findings for this sub-question for the 56.4 percent that feel empowered are substantiated by prior studies that assert decisions are made “at the moment at which administrative actions intersect private choices” (Elmore 1980, 605) and that employees have to make decisions on a variety of tasks without the involvement of upper management (Carrington 2005).

The extent grant managers were willing to change grant programs are consistent with Elmore’s (1980) theory that lower-level administrators have the ability to make discretionary choices as a result of their closeness to the problem and ability to immediately solve the problem; however, the percentage that believed they were empowered to make decisions to make changes to non-statutory or non-mandated internal procedures or policies or implement new management initiatives decreased slightly to 50 percent.

There are two factors that may contribute to the 50 to 56.4 percent of respondents perceiving they were empowered and the 57.2 to 71.5 percent of grantors perceiving the behavior to be demonstrated. First, there appears to be a correlation between the percent of grantees that perceived they were empowered and the 50 percent of the respondents that were responsible for delivering the grant program to the public. In this case, the grant manager would be closer to the problem and more likely to make the choice to change a procedure if necessary for problem resolution. Second, nearly 50 percent of the respondents were also engaged in managing the grant program for 51 to 100 percent of

the workday, making them more familiar or comfortable with the program and its problems and willing to initiate immediate solutions.

What was not explained by the findings for sub-question one was the fact that 43.6 to 50 percent of the grantee respondents perceived they were required a moderate amount to a great deal to request permission to make decisions. It is important to acknowledge that nearly 50 percent did not believe they were empowered. This may be attributable to the fact that this percentage of the population has less years of experience, to the dollar value of the grant managed, and to the type of grant being managed.

Study findings for sub-question two suggest that the strength of professional and hierarchical accountability structures do alter the likelihood of effective grants management. Implications of the findings reinforce the importance that some form of accountability in principal-agent relationships is necessary for effective grants management. Of the four types of accountability examined (legal, hierarchical, political, and professional), being held professionally accountable at the local level and hierarchically accountable at the federal level were reasoned as most important, thereby indicating grantors and grantees may be most concerned with compliance as local grant managers and grantors may link meeting federal requirements and mandates with being held accountable by the federal government via the conditions of the grant award.

The results of the findings for sub-question two also indicate that while both the grantor and the grantee found accountability to be important and the extent to which grantees are held accountable to the federal grantor agency to be quite a bit, a dichotomy between perception and designation as a “high risk” grantee is present. There was a clear

contradiction between the extent to which both groups found accountability important and grantees held accountable and the continuous designation as high-risk grantees. This contradiction between perception and reality is compatible with Goldsmith and Egger's assertion that when holding agents accountable in principal-agent relationships, "an overreliance on box checking and rule compliance" is more often the rule than the exception (2004, 122-123).

Results of the findings indicate that both groups perceived the grant manager is being held accountable; yet, many grant recipients in the GVI are designated as high risk. Major problems of mismanagement have been cited by grantor agencies and in reports authored by the GAO as recently as 2008. As evident from a recent failure to meet the requirements of a compliance agreement and numerous consent decrees, the GVI struggles to minimally meet compliance requirements; nonetheless, grant awards continue. The anomalous results from both groups demonstrate a contradiction between the perception of being held accountable and the reality of ongoing grant management problems.

The focus on "checking the box" compliance by the grantee and grantor would justify the perceptions of both the grantor and grantee that grant award recipients are being held professionally and hierarchically accountable. Outside of meeting the legal requirements of the grant award, grantees appear to be more reluctant to demonstrate additional behaviors such as decision control, decision latitude, information sharing, or risk taking, which are considered necessary to ensure that grant programs are achieving intended outcomes.

Another factor in a higher perception of professional and hierarchical accountability versus legal and political may be attributed to the types of grants the GVI receives. Approximately 50 percent of the grants received are project and the other 50 percent formula. Of the formula grants, only seven—0.05 percent—are block grants, which provide the grantees with some discretion in how grants are managed at the local level. Thus, the remaining 99.95 percent are formula/categorical and project grants and are accompanied with narrowly defined parameters; the grantee manager may be more cognizant of the legal requirements and restrictions that govern grant resources and less concerned with program outcomes.

The high number of grants permitting limited discretion would further explain the perception of both the grantee and grantor respondents that grant managers are being held accountable professionally, locally, hierarchically, and federally. Both perceptions are in accord with Handley, who contends “the intergovernmental grant system primarily operates within a “top-down model” of federalism, in which sub-national governments are focused on maintaining compliance with a federally controlled system” (2008, 132). By definition, legal and hierarchical accountability are indicative of highly controlled relationships (Radin 2002), thus, further suggesting that a highly controlled management environment in third-party systems may alter the achievement of national goals—particularly if grant managers are primarily focused only on compliance. The results of the finding for sub-question two are in accord with prior accountability studies conducted by scholars, such as Acar, Guo, and Yang (2006), Radin (2002), Goldsmith and Eggers (2004), and Handley (2008), which link accountability to policy implementation.

For sub-question three, the findings present clear evidence which suggests agents that are discouraged from being creative or innovative (decision latitude) may alter the likelihood of effective grants management. Findings for sub-question three were in agreement with Lipsky, who claims street-level bureaucrats create the opportunity to “act with discretion” when protecting their interest (1980, 19). The findings for the question also suggest that in some cases, grantees—and more specifically, sub-grantees—who manage grant programs may not be fully informed as to what their role should be in relation to the federal outcome goals of the program.

An additional explanation for those grantees that perceived they would act and grantors who believed the action was demonstrated is that many of the grant managers who manage grant programs full time get paid via the grant. The salary of the grant manager is 100 percent funded by the grant; thus, their behavior is in direct alignment with Lipsky’s theory of street-level implementers acting with discretion when protecting their interest—in this case, their jobs.

Outside of funding issues, grantees that are not directly involved in delivering the program to the public or engaged in managing the program full time are often not made aware of the national goals. In particular, this may hold true in those cases when the management of the grant is an ad hoc duty. Their interest or role may not always be clear or the intent or goals of the program (beyond funding) effectively communicated.

Rainey and Lee argue that “numerous authors have claimed that government organizations face distinct challenges because they have particularly ambiguous goals” (2005, 2). Goal ambiguity is argued to be a contributing factor to the extent individuals

perceive they have discretion to act (Lipsky 1980, Wilson 1989, Wildavsky 1979). This study's lambda results reveal that only in those instances when grantees were responsible for delivering the program to the public or depending on the type of grant managed (independent variables) was there a significant association between the extent grantees perceived they could control the quality of the services or products delivered to the public or make most of their own decisions (dependent variables).

Nearly 62 percent of the grantees responding to the survey had six or more years of experience working with federal grants at the local level. On the surface, one could conclude that having a number of years of experience would offer the manager a better understanding of the intent and goals of the program; yet, the results of the lambda analysis suggest that neither years of experience nor the fact that the grant manager spent 50 percent or more of their workday involved in managing the grant program have much to do with the extent of creativity or innovation GVI grantees would exhibit. When faced with a choice as to whether to be creative or innovative, individuals that have been in positions for a while are thought to be even less willing to take action and will often revert back to the status quo (Ford and Gioia, 2000).

Ford and Gioia (2000, 711) suggest that "in general, organizational actors tend to resort to familiar, scripted actions even in the face of considerable ambiguity." Ford and Gioia provide an explanation for this lack of creativity when they argue that "access to existing or 'off-the-shelf' solutions tends to inhibit creativity because limited search processes lead to satisfaction, especially when non-threatening or stable situations provide little incentive to produce original solutions" (2000, 711). The low degree of

creativity and innovation within grant programs may be attributed to the high number of grant managers that have been in their positions for a number of years and have grown comfortable with the status quo.

Another consideration regarding the reluctance to engage in creative or innovative behavior is the level of trust and support that the grantees perceive is present in their work environment (Ford and Gioia 2000). Studies have found that individuals first have to trust that they can take action. Second, they must perceive that they have the resources available to them to take the action. The need for trust and the perception of the availability of resources and skill appear to be well rooted in the concept of the theory of planned behavior, whereas Ajzen (1988, 1991) argues that perceived behavioral control plays a role in the individual's intention and behavior.

Findings for this question reveal that the extent to which grantees would be willing to exercise decision latitude is just a little, "indicating perceived limitation" (Langbein 2006, 1). It is a well-known fact that in most departments and agencies within the GVI, resources for engaging in activities beyond compensation and benefits are nonexistent. Any new, creative, or innovative idea would most likely be met with the reality that it could not be funded. This reality, one can conclude (if accepting arguments of prior research studies), would negatively influence an individual's willingness to seek alternative or creative solutions. This low percentage of willingness is concluded to be due to perceived limited discretion and is corroborated by such scholars as Carpenter and Golden (1997), Ajzen (1988, 1991), and Ford and Gioia (2000).

In 1997, Carpenter and Golden found that “individuals engage in different behaviors depending on whether they perceive themselves to have much or little discretion” (199). This study’s findings did reveal that dollar value of the grant, years of experience, and whether or not the grant manager was directly involved in delivering the program to the public do have significant associations with position directions, thus concurring with Carpenter and Golden’s argument on differing behaviors and perception of discretion influencing action.

Sub-question four of the study explored the extent that grant managers would be willing to take risks and the extent that they perceived risk taking to be demonstrated. Responses from grantors and grantees concur that grant managers are generally more willing to take simple day-to-day risks than to take risks that would result in significantly changing administrative procedures, varying the quality of services, or initiating new initiatives for grant programs. This reluctance is not inconsistent with the findings of other scholars that argue it is likely that “when decision making discretion is pushed down to the lower-level officials, actions will most likely result in one of two outcomes: a) greater productivity or b) a shirking of decision making” (Langbein 2006, 1). Findings for this sub question imply outcome “b” (shirking of decision making) via the low percentage of grantors and grantees responding that this behavior was not particularly engaged in or demonstrated. The percentage of grantors and grantees that perceived the extent of risks grantees would be willing to take or had demonstrated to be quite a bit was noticeably low. Both groups of respondents perceived the extent to be not at all or just a little.

There is disagreement in the literature as to how risk behaviors have been examined when assessing principal-agent relationships. Some take the position that the agent theory alone is too narrow, as it is limited to only considering assumptions of risk adverse behaviors of the agent. Others purport agents are hesitant to engage in risk taking actions due to a fear of unknown consequences (prospect theory). Results of this study indicate that neither theory is fully applicable, but rather findings are more aligned with the arguments of Heifetz (1994), who argues lower-level employees are comfortable with giving over their power to superiors, or Carpenter and Golden (1997), who purport that individuals who feel they have little discretion also perceive they have less power, or Krane (1993), who argues via the donor-recipient theory that within federalism there are always issues of conflict, dependence, and power.

The fifth sub question of the study examined whether highly controlled management environments with a lack of transparency of information alter the likelihood of effective grants management. Results provide strong indication that the strength of the communication system does appear to affect grants management. Transparency of information, while deemed important by grantors and grantee respondents in this study, was perceived to have a moderate impact, suggesting the GVI communication system is neither weak nor strong.

Communication literature has concluded that effective communication is not just critical within organizations, but also vital for effective decision making (Manev and Stevenson 2001, Langbein and Jorstad 2004, Friebel and Raith 2004, Preston 1996). Although questions in the study did not specifically seek to determine the strength of the

GVI's communication system, it was clear from the findings that the means of communication and how information is shared were unequal among all the actors.

Information systems also contribute to the strength of communication systems. Goldsmith and Egger's premise is that "when there are incompatible information systems it can result in uneven communication and poor collaboration" (2004, 44). The study found that only 60 percent of the grantors use automated systems to manage grants and only 14 percent of the grant managers use a fully automated system. This disparity can be concluded to contribute to the perception of a moderate GVI communication structure.

Audit findings of GVI financial management systems has long been a problem for the GVI and has led to one major federal-grantor agency exercising its right to impose a penalty of a third-party fiduciary arrangement by which an external party was put in place to manage grant funds for the GVI. An integral component of the information management system's difficulties was a seventeen-year-old, unintegrated financial management system which failed to provide all players at both levels of government with timely, reliable, and complete information. Goldsmith and Egger offer that "outdated information technology can also affect the flow of information" (2004, 45). The GVI's problems with information systems, which have been cited for blocking the flow of information, further corroborate the argument that the lack of a seamless exchange of information can limit effective communication among the actors.

A point that both addresses and supports the impact of a less than effective communication structure is found in recent research. In 2004, Friebel and Raith discerned that there is a delay in reacting to crises or catching problems when formal, current, or

constant communication channels do not exist within organizations. Documented evidence shows GVI's obsolete and outdated means of communication and information systems contribute to many of its financial management audit findings. One can conclude that these ineffective systems may be playing a role in ineffective communication channels between the GVI and the federal grantors, as well as between local interdependent departments and agencies.

There were differences between both the perceptions of willingness and the action of both groups. In general, the grantor respondents perceived the extent to which grantees would engage in most of the five behaviors to be slightly lower than did the grantees. The complexity of human behavior and the psychology of why individuals behave in one manner, and not another, has been intensively studied and is an enigma that social scientists will be debating and researching for decades to come. Even when conducting research via survey, researchers find that the answers respondents give are often contrary to actual behavior and considered an anomaly.

Grantees were asked questions two different ways: 1) to what extent they would be willing to engage in a behavior, and 2) to what extent they perceived they were empowered to engage in a behavior. Grantors were asked: 1) to what extent the behavior was perceived to be demonstrated, and 2) to what extent they believed the grant manager would be willing to engage in a behavior. Median scores for grantors generally revealed grantees consistently perceived themselves to be willing or actually demonstrating the five behaviors studied to a larger extent than did the grantors.

The disparity in the extent grantees perceived they were actually engaged in behaviors and the extent grantors perceived the behavior to be demonstrated can be due to a number of reasons. Some of these reasons may include: geographical distance, Hofferbert's historic-geographic conditions, small dollar amount of the grant award relative to the overall grantor agency's fiscal year budget, a negative perception of grantors visiting the GVI because it is in a resort area, local capacity to perform, shift from federal surplus to federal deficit, elite behavior, grantor's level of familiarity with grantees, or a combination of any or all of these.

One difference in the perceptions of the grantees and grantors could be a result of the level of familiarity grantors have with grantees. For instance, 53.3 percent of the grantors have less than five years of experience working with USVI grantee agencies. Nearly half of the grantor respondents have oversight duties for ten or more grants and for grants valued at \$5 million and above. Although 53.3 percent manage those grants 76 to 100 percent of the work day, more than half of those grantors have five years or less experience in working with USVI grantees. One can conclude that a limited number of years of experience working with GVI grantees, workload, and large dollar value of grants managed may contribute to a lack of a comprehensive view of GVI grant managers or program management traits. It can be further concluded that federal grantors would follow protocol and most likely speak with senior or more experienced managers when conversing, and thus form their perceptions based on experiences garnered from those relationships only, some of which could be new.

Another consideration for how grantees perceive their willingness to engage in certain behaviors is the impact of some of the incidents cited by Hofferbert that appear to be rooted (at some level) in grantee behaviors, or lack thereof, in grants management. For instance, from the time of the territory's purchase from the Danish Government in 1917 by the United States until 1970, the USVI was not self-governing. The territory has been occupied by England, the United Kingdom, Knights of Malta, Holland, France, and Denmark; thus, it's had a history of not being totally responsible for playing a central role in its own destiny.

The territory remained under direct control of the United States via appointed navy admirals until 1970 when the first governor was elected and provided the USVI with limited self- government. Without their own constitution and after decades of being under the control of other governments, one can infer that the long history of being controlled by someone other than themselves could create a culture that would make it easier to relinquish decision making to someone else to avoid accountability, and in some cases, responsibilities. In addition, although the USVI is cognizant of the fact that they are a possession of the United States, the USVI's geographic location and cultural differences promote a sense of detachment. This history and distance align perfectly with Hofferbert's argument that historic-geographic conditions can produce a direct effect on policy input.

Another reason for the difference in perception of what was actually exhibited and what was thought to be demonstrated is the USVI's desire for more autonomy. The GVI has been in a deficit budget position for a number of years and thus is reliant upon the

United States for assistance, primarily through a variety of grants. The GVI is culturally prideful and would like to be less dependent on the United States for financial assistance and the level of control that comes with federal grant awards; therein lies the struggle between grants management perception and demonstrated behavior.

In years when there have been budget surpluses, federal grantor agencies tended to put less focus on monitoring GVI grantees. Generally, because the amount of the grant award is so small relative to a grantor's overall budget, the GVI often was not on the radar screen of the larger grantor agencies. In times of budget deficits, not only are grantees more heavily scrutinized but they also tend to experience consistent interaction with and more frequent local visits from major grantor agencies.

The study further offers evidence that the implementation of sub-national goals via grants is linked to the collective capacity of the sub-national grantees. J. Hall (2008) identified and suggested there are relationships among sources of capacity and the federal grant recipient. Hall (2008) emphasized five sources of capacity: local area need, local financial capacity, local administration capacity, regional administrative capacity, and local political capacity or influence. GVI's consistent designation as being a "high-risk" grantee suggests, at a minimum, a lack of local administrative capacity (albeit a controllable factor).

Characteristics of an elite environment appear to be present. Fifty percent of the grant managers perceived they are required to request permission prior to making day-to-day decisions as well as before making changes to grant programs

Median scores of grantees and grantors for a majority of the questions pertaining to willingness to engage in a behavior and perceived demonstrated behavior clustered around just a little to a moderate amount, as compared to median scores for the importance of the behavior for effective grants management that clustered around a moderate amount to a great deal. Sufficient evidence was gathered from the five sub-questions to conclusively suggest that a grantee's full capacity for performance does affect the management of grants and, possibly, the full implementation of national goals.

Although the study's findings answered each of the central and sub-questions, further research is required. Sensitivity to the grantee participant's concern with direct questions that asked whether the GVI grant manager works in a highly controlled management environment prevented the study from gathering a more definitive answer to this important question. Reasons for the lack of demonstrated behaviors also remain open. Questions as to why some grantees perceived that they were not empowered to take action remain unanswered as well. Additionally, questions as to why some grantees are willing to engage in some, but not all, of the behaviors and whether this lack of engagement is linked to perceptions of the lack of power, resources, or other reasons.

To conclude, the study's findings were fairly conclusive in answering the overall study question of whether highly controlled management environments change sub-national federal grants management. Implications of the overall study findings underline prior theories that accountability, discretion, decision making, communication systems, and risk taking are key influencers in policy implementation and program results. The overall results of the study's findings are consistent with a number of studies referenced

in the literature review that argue policy implementation cannot be examined without considering varying variables or influencers that impact policy and program implementation.

Appendix 1**Reliability of Discussion Guide Instrument**

There are two measuring instruments D. Fields (2002) offers in his book of reliable measurement tools for assessing how employees view their work and organizations that may prove useful, if adapted, for this study. With moderate alterations, the two instruments under job characteristics would adequately address managers' working environments. The first tool developed by Dwyer and Ganster in 1991 assesses work control. The second tool developed by Jackson, Wall, Martin, and Davids in 1993 measures job control, cognitive demand, and production responsibilities. Both tools adequately capture data to address four of the five independent variables: 1) hierarchical accountability structures, 2) risk taking, 3) creativity, and 4) decision-making. The fifth independent variable that examines the transparency of information will be accessed through questions that assess communication and honesty.

The reliability of the Dwyer and Ganster instrument has a coefficient alpha of .87. The validity is stated as "control over aspects of a job correlated positively with sick days taken, job workload, and work satisfaction. In multivariate analysis, control moderates the relationship of workload with work satisfaction" (Fields 1991, 94). The instructions and statement designed by Dwyer and Ganster would be an appropriate and validated survey instrument for using to develop the discussion guide for this study. The validity for this instrument has been established by Fields.

Jackson, Wall, Martin, and Davids developed a measuring instrument in 1993 that "assesses the extent of job control, cognitive demand, and production responsibilities and

employee experiences on a job.” The reliability of the Jackson, Wall, Martin, and Davids’s instrument is stated as follows: “Coefficient alpha values range from .79 to .85 for timing control, .77 to .80 for method control, .73 to .75 for monitoring demand, .50 to .67 for problem-solving demand, and .86 to .90 for production responsibility (Jackson et al., 1993). In Wall, Jackson, Mullarkey, and Parker (1996), method and timing control were combined into a single scale with a coefficient alpha of .86. In Jackson et al. (1993), test-retest reliabilities were $r = .50$ for timing control, $r = .57$ for method control, $r = .51$ for monitoring demand, $r = .43$ for problem-solving demand, and $r = .42$ for production responsibility” (Fields 2002, 96).

Validity for this instrument is stated as:

The structure of the five dimensions of the measure was confirmed with both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis in two separate samples (Jackson et al. 1993). Both monitoring and problem-solving demands correlated positively with job control, job decision latitude, and employee anxiety. Job control correlated positively with employee length of service, job decision latitude, and job satisfaction. Job control correlated negatively with employee depression and employee anxiety (Wall et al. 1996).

In Jackson et al. (1993), the five subscales were used to compare employees in different job roles working on the same process in a production environment as well as employees in the same roles in processes differing in the extent of computerization. The scales described

significant differences between job roles and technology. For example, monitoring demand and production responsibility scores were both higher in a fully computerized process compared to a non-computerized process (Fields 2002, 96).

Appendix 2**Projected Final Project Budget**

The total budget for the study is listed below in table 5.

Table 5: Projected Final Project Budget

Budget Item	How Calculated	Cost
Airfare	One (1) trip from DCA to STT-USVI round-trip, average \$700.00	\$ 700.00
Hotel	One (1) week	\$2,500.00
Food Costs	Six (6) days = 6 days x \$100.00	\$ 600.00
Car Rental	One (1) week = 1 week x \$320.00	\$ 320.00
Office Supplies	Paper, b/w printing	\$ 100.00
Postage	Review of findings to interviewees (estimated 20 x \$1.06)	\$ 21.20
Total		\$ 4,241.20

Appendix 3**Abbreviated Project Timeline**

- Data collection will commence immediately upon the research prospectus being accepted by the Committee and IRB approval. The objective is to have approval not later than January 31, 2008.
- Data collection will take place in the United States Virgin Islands or via phone (if required) during the months of February and March 2008.
- The data analysis will be completed by the mid-December 2008.
- Submit first draft of final project by mid-January 2009.
- Revise first draft of final project by March 2009.
- Re-submit final project by May 2009.
- The researcher plans to defend the final project not later than June 2009.

Appendix 4**Researcher Bio/Resume**

Valerie Richardson – author, coach, trainer, facilitator, consultant, and researcher is President and Chief Executive Officer of TreWyn & Associates, Inc., a financial and strategic management training and advisory practice based in Germantown, Maryland. Formerly, she was Associate Director of the Center for Improving Government Performance (CIGP) at the National Academy of Public Administration, a public policy think tank chartered by the U.S. Congress.

In 2008, Valerie was tapped to participate in a 2008 – 2009 effort to devote particular interest to the requirements of the next incoming presidential administration (Obama) by the IBM Center for The Business of Government, a public policy think tank. Valerie was selected to develop a monograph on the topic of pilot performance reporting. In support of IBM's performance coalition for the presidential transition, Ms. Richardson will contribute her ideas and recommendations on the value of pilot performance reporting to the new administration via synthesizing the financial and operational perspectives. In 2007, Valerie was a member of the Department of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs Transition team to brief the seventh incoming United States Virgin Islands Governor, John P. deJongh, Jr. on performance management efforts.

Valerie has been a leading practitioner of public sector performance management for more than fifteen years. She managed the implementation of the Results Act of 1993 effort at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and played an essential role in the development of the initial performance-based organization legislative language. She served as Theme Chair of the Department of Commerce (DOC) Strategic and Annual Planning Task Force in year one of the Results Act and as liaison in year two. She was selected to participate on two National Partnership for Reinventing Government consortium studies: a) Performance Measurement, and b) the Balanced Scorecard. She also served for two years as an active member of the CIGP's performance consortium. As

a senior manager, Valerie played an integral role in change management (transformation), reengineering, and financial management systems conversion initiatives at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

During the past two decades she has advised numerous private, public, and non-profit sector executives. Valerie's years of experience in implementing the Chief Financial Officer's Act of 1990 and Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 seamlessly blends her knowledge of finance, accounting, budgeting, and planning. She has spent more than two decades working in the field of federal budgeting and her expertise has been shared through training or consulting with public agencies in such areas as budget execution, formulation, and justification; the federal budget process; performance-based management; performance analysis; financial management; process improvement; intellectual capital; strategy mapping; strategic planning; and change and risk management.

In 2007 and 2008, she designed and delivered three major training programs to over 1,500 employees of the Government of the United States Virgin Islands: change management; performance-based budgeting, evaluation, and reporting; and the Certified Grants Management Professional™ Series.

In 2003, she has provided advisory services as a subject matter expert for change management initiatives at the Farm Service Agency. In 2002, Valerie designed and delivered a five-week seminar on Assessment and Evaluation of Intellectual Capital for senior executives from Shanghai, China and has provided performance evaluation services to the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency of the United Kingdom. Valerie has provided training to thousands of employees in both the domestic and international arenas.

Valerie is the author of *Annual Performance Planning – A Manual for Public Agencies* and contributing author on the topics of Performance-Based Organizations (*Advances in*

Management Accounting - Chapter 5) and *The Federal Sector's Shadow Staff—An Unlikely Partnership* (The Organization of the Future Co-Operation & Competition “Co-opetition” – Part 9). She is also published in public administration journals and proceedings. In 2009 she authored a monograph on *Increasing Transparency and Accountability in Federal Performance Reporting: Lessons from the OMB Pilot Program* and was awarded the Best Paper Award—Highest Quality Rating at the Co-operation & Competition Conference in Vaxjö, Sweden in 2002. Valerie is a frequent speaker and globally sought (Spain, Sweden, France, Germany, Canada, and Portugal, as well as in the United States) to write, present, publish, and contribute to books and professional journals specifically to address performance management in public organizations. Valerie is the developer of a Certified Grants Management Professional Program and Certified Customer Service Professional Program. She is a Visiting Fellow and Senior Researcher at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, which annually evaluates federal agency performance and accountability reports and reports the results of the analysis to the U.S. public and Congress. She is also a Visiting Faculty Member with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Eastern Management Development Center.

Valerie has received recognition from the former vice president of the United States for her contributions to consortium studies to improve government operations in the areas of performance measurement and the balanced scorecard. Valerie is the recipient of two Bronze Medal Awards from the U.S. Department of Commerce for implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act and Self-Managed Work Teams.

In 2006, Valerie was inducted into the Pi Alpha Alpha National Honor Society for Public Affairs and Public Administration and was the former President of the Public Administration Doctoral Student Administration. Her accomplishments and interests also include International Who's Who in Professional Management 2002, American Society of Public Administration, International Society for Performance Improvement, American Society for Training & Development, National Association of Government Contractors, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, and Professional Speakers

Bureau International. She served on the Editorial Advisory Board for the International Journal of Co-operation and Competition, was also a member of the International Co-operation & Competition Association, and was selected in 2006 as a Board Member for Integrity Health in Washington, DC.

Valerie is a graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University's Senior Executive Fellows Program. She holds a Master's of Financial Management from the University of Maryland and undergraduate degrees from Trenton State College in Public Administration and Political Science. She is currently pursuing her doctorate in public administration with a specialization in organizational performance and behavior from the University of Baltimore and has completed all required course work with honors.

Appendix 5**Request for Research Study Access Letter**

Dear Government of the Virgin Islands:

As a part of the degree requirements for a doctorate of public administration from the University of Baltimore, Yale Gordon College of Liberal Arts – School of Public Affairs, Baltimore, Maryland; students/researchers must complete a dissertation that includes a research study in a public sector setting. The Doctorate of Public Administration Program relies, in part, on public sector organizations to provide real world laboratories for students to conduct research in the field of public administration.

To fulfill the degree requirements, I am requesting to conduct a study of grant management practices in the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI). The objective of the study will be to contribute to the theories of federalism via investigating sub-national implementation challenges via federal grants. The significant contribution this research seeks to add is value to the grant award process by early identification of various management attributes that alter the stewardship of grant funds, and subsequently the implementation of national goals at the sub-national level.

The proposed study will focus on sub-national governance by exploring how highly controlled management environments alter the ability of grant managers to effectively manage federal grants. More specifically, the study will focus on investigating grants management practices (e.g., U.S. Departments of Education, Justice, and Housing and Urban Development).

The study could prove greatly beneficial for the GVI in addressing many of the deficiencies (real or perceived) cited by grant-making agencies that have expressed disenfranchisement with GVI grant management practices. Data will be collected via surveys with current and prior GVI grant managers. Further, the findings may provide concrete interventions for enhancing grant-making and grant management via the identification of predictive factors for grants mismanagement.

As a researcher, I am required to comply with the American Sociological Association Code of Ethics for conducting research and all data collected during the study is considered to be strictly confidential. At the end of the study, the researcher will be required to analyze, summarize, and present study findings to the researcher's dissertation committee. Responses of study participants are kept in strict confidence and recorded so that participants are, and remain, unidentifiable. Study data will be maintained and stored by the researcher in a secure location for five years, after which all data will be destroyed by shredding.

The final report will be published as a part of the final requirements for the doctoral degree program and the researcher retains rights for future publication. Any participant or GVI official may request a copy of the final report. Anyone that agrees to participate in the study must sign a letter of agreement to participate (Appendix 7). All participants will also be made aware that they may terminate participation in the study at any time without any consequence.

Thank you for your support of the University of Baltimore, Doctorate of Public Administration Program.

Proposed Research Study: Can Highly Controlled Management Environments Change Sub-National Federal Grants Management?

Graduate Student's Name: Valerie J. Richardson

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

GVI Representative: Debra Gottlieb, Director, Office of Management & Budget (Printed)

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Attachment: Participant Agreement-to-Participate Letter

Appendix 6**Request for Research Study Access Letter**

Dear Federal Grantor Agency:

As a part of the degree requirements for a doctorate of public administration from the University of Baltimore, Yale Gordon College of Liberal Arts – School of Public Affairs, Baltimore, Maryland; students/researchers must complete a dissertation that includes a research study in a public sector setting. The Doctorate of Public Administration Program relies, in part, on public sector organizations to provide real world laboratories for students to conduct research in the field of public administration.

To fulfill the degree requirements, I am requesting to conduct a study of grant management practices in the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI) by interviewing the grantee and grant managers at grantor agencies. The objective of the study will be to contribute to the theories of federalism via investigating sub-national implementation challenges via federal grants. The significant contribution this research seeks to add is value to the grant award process by early identification of various management attributes that alter the stewardship of grant funds, and subsequently the implementation of national goals at the sub-national level.

The proposed study will focus on sub-national governance by exploring how highly controlled management environments alter the ability of grant managers to effectively manage federal grants. More specifically, the study will focus on investigating grants management practices (e.g., U.S. Departments of Education, Justice, and Housing and Urban Development).

The study could prove greatly beneficial for the GVI in addressing many of the deficiencies (real or perceived) cited by grant-making agencies that have expressed disenfranchisement with GVI grant management practices. Data will be collected via surveys with current and prior GVI grant managers. Further, the findings may provide concrete interventions for enhancing grant-making and grant management via the identification of predictive factors for grants mismanagement.

As a researcher, I am required to comply with the American Sociological Association Code of Ethics for conducting research and all data collected during the study is considered to be strictly confidential. At the end of the study, the researcher will be required to analyze, summarize, and present study findings to the researcher's dissertation committee. Responses of study participants are kept in strict confidence and recorded so that participants are, and remain, unidentifiable. Study data will be

maintained and stored by the researcher in a secure location for five years, after which all data will be destroyed by shredding.

The final report will be published as a part of the final requirements for the doctoral degree program and the researcher retains rights for future publication. Any participant or U.S. or GVI official may request a copy of the final report. Anyone that agrees to participate in the study must sign a letter of agreement to participate (Appendix 8). All participants will also be made aware that they may terminate participation in the study at any time without any consequence.

Thank you for your support of the University of Baltimore, Doctorate of Public Administration Program.

Proposed Research Study: Can Highly Controlled Management Environments Change Sub-National Federal Grants Management?

Graduate Student's Name: Valerie J. Richardson

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Grantor Agency Representative: _____
(Printed)

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Attachment: Participant Agreement-to-Participate Letter

Appendix 7**Participant Agreement-to-Participate Letter**

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this important study being conducted by Valerie Richardson, a doctoral student from the University of Baltimore, Yale Gordon College of Liberal Arts – School of Public Affairs, Baltimore, Maryland. The purpose of this study is to add value to the federal grant award process by early identification of management attributes that enhance the management of grants via sub-national governance. This study contributes to the student's completion of her doctoral dissertation. As a participant you are being requested to sign this letter as an indication that you agree to participate and are aware of your rights as a study participant.

The study is supported and approved by the Director, Office of Management and Budget (Attachment 1) and the researcher has determined that you will not be harmed in any way because of your participation in the study, such as placing you or your responsibilities, or your current or future employment with the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI) your agency at risk. Your participation could contribute greatly to: 1) improving the management of grants in the GVI, 2) eliminating control of federal dollars by external fiduciary agents, and 3) strengthening the grantee's ability to meet requirements for effective grant administration.

Data will be collected via surveys conducted during the months of February through March 2008. Surveys will be forwarded electronically or take place at your work site in a location that is conducive to privacy to ensure confidentiality of responses. The researcher will ask you a number of general questions related to the management environment within your department or agency. On-site interviews will be recorded to ensure that responses are accurately translated; however, follow-up interviews may be required.

As a researcher, I am required to comply with the American Sociological Association Code of Ethics (which can be provided by request) for conducting research and all data collected during the study is considered to be strictly confidential. At the end of the study, the researcher will be required to analyze, summarize, and present study findings to the researcher's dissertation committee. Responses of study participants are kept in strict confidence and recorded so that participants are, and remain, unidentifiable. Study data will be maintained and stored by the researcher in a secure location for five years, after which all data will be destroyed by shredding.

The final report will be published as a part of the final requirements for the doctoral degree program and the researcher retains rights for future publication. Any participant or GVI official may request a copy of the final report. Anyone that agrees to participate in the study must sign a letter of agreement to participate (Appendix 7). All

participants will also be made aware that they may terminate participation in the study at any time without any consequence.

It is your choice to participate in this study and you may choose to exit the study at any time without consequence. However, once your responses have been submitted and anonymously recorded you will not be able to withdraw from the study.

By signing this agreement to participate you are only indicating that 1) you agree to participate and 2) understand your rights as a study participant. Questions during or after the study should be directed to Valerie Richardson at (301) 515-8854 or via email at valerie.richardson@trewyn.net.

Valerie Richardson

Name of Researcher

Name of Participant (Printed)

Signature of Participant

Date

Attachment: Signed letter for approval to conduct the study.

Appendix 8**Participant Agreement-to-Participate Letter**

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this important study being conducted by Valerie Richardson, a doctoral student from the University of Baltimore, Yale Gordon College of Liberal Arts – School of Public Affairs, Baltimore, Maryland. The purpose of this study is to add value to the federal grant award process by early identification of management attributes that enhance the management of grants via sub-national governance. This study contributes to the student's completion of her doctoral dissertation. As a participant you are being requested to sign this letter as an indication that you agree to participate and are aware of your rights as a study participant.

The study is supported and approved by the your agency (Attachment 1) and the researcher has determined that you will not be harmed in any way because of your participation in the study, such as placing you or your responsibilities, or current or future employment with your agency at risk. Your participation could contribute greatly to: 1) improving the management of grants in the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI), 2) eliminating control of federal dollars by external fiduciary agents, and 3) strengthening the grantee's ability to meet requirements for effective grant administration.

The study will be conducted via electronic survey and should not take longer than 30 minutes to complete. Surveys will be forwarded electronically during the months of February through March 2008. Surveys will take place at your work site or in a location that is conducive to privacy to ensure confidentiality of responses.

As a researcher, I am required to comply with the American Sociological Association Code of Ethics (which can be provided by request) for conducting research and all data collected during the study is considered to be strictly confidential. At the conclusion of the study, the researcher will be required to analyze, summarize, and present study findings to the researcher's dissertation committee. Responses of study participants are kept in strict confidence and recorded so that participants are, and remain, unidentifiable. Study data will be maintained and stored by the researcher in a secure location for five years, after which all data will be destroyed by shredding.

The final report will be published as a part of the final requirements for the doctoral degree program and the researcher retains rights for future publication. Any participant or participating U.S. agency official may request a copy of the final report. Anyone that agrees to participate in the study must sign a letter of agreement to participate (Appendix 8). All participants will also be made aware that they may terminate participation in the study at any time without any consequence.

It is your choice to participate in this study and you may choose to exit the study at any time without consequence; however, once your responses have been submitted and anonymously recorded you will not be able to withdraw from the study.

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Valerie Richardson

Name of Researcher

Name of Participant (Printed)

Signature of Participant

Date

Attachment: Signed letter for approval to conduct the study.

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