RHETORICS IN TRANSLATION
A TRANSLINGUAL RE-READING OF LU XUN AND LIN YUTANG

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Abstract

RHETORICS IN TRANSLATION

A TRANSLINGUAL RE-VISIONING OF LU XUN AND LIN YUTANG

This thesis calls for a translingual re-reading of composition and Chinese studies’ approach to discursive canons by re-reading Lu Xun’s canonical “Diary of a Madman” (1918) alongside Lin Yutang’s My Country and My People (1935) and The Importance of Living (1937). By historicizing the contact of the English and Chinese languages through the ratification of treaty documents over the course of the Opium Wars, the thesis places translation at the center of rhetorical and literary discussions of Lu Xun’s and Lin Yutang’s works in order to argue for translingual orientations and practices in composition pedagogy.
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Timeline

1644 Manchu army seizes Beijing, Qing Dynasty established
1839-1842 First Opium War
1856-1860 Second Opium War
1858 Treaty of Tianjin signed
1861-1895 Self-Strengthening Movement
1894-1895 First Sino-Japanese War
1905 Civil service exams abolished
1912 The Qing Dynasty collapses
1912 Republic of China (ROC) established
1914-1918 First World War
1917 Hu Shi’s “Some Modest Proposals for the Reform of Literature” published
1918 Lu Xun’s “Kuangren Riji 狂人日记,” or “Diary of a Madman” published
1919 Student protests in May spark the May 4th Movement
1921 Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao establish the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
1935 Lin Yutang’s My Country and My People published in English in the U.S.
1936 Lu Xun dies
1937 Lin Yutang’s The Importance of Living published in English in the U.S.
1937-1945 Second World War
1949 Mao’s CCP drives the Nationalist government out of China, establishes the People’s Republic of China
1976 Lin Yutang dies
Chapter 1

Introduction

The business of trying to understand a foreign nation with a foreign culture, especially one so different from one’s own as China’s, is usually not for the mortal man. For this work there is a need for a broad, brotherly feeling, for the feeling of the common bond of humanity and the cheer of good fellowship...There must be, too, a certain detachment, not from the country under examination, for that is always so, but from oneself and one’s subconscious notions.


In the last fifty years, the field of composition studies has increasingly turned its attention to the ways in which educators, classrooms and schools can better serve the needs of disenfranchised and marginalized students: the seminal works of Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Shirley Brice Heath, Scott Richard Lyons and Kenneth Bruffee spring readily to mind, though there are many others. Since then, scholars have investigated how the study and appreciation of marginalized rhetorics can not only serve a liberating function in the academy (by deconstructing classroom and institutional relations of power that privilege white, male, standard English voices at the expense of others) but can also enrich mainstream methodologies.¹ A cursory glance over the articles published in recent issues of *College Composition and Communication* demonstrate the continuing efforts by composition studies scholars to include and even adapt such rhetorics. In an article published in the February 2014 issue, Jonathan Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes argue that “multicultural” education often erases radical alterities that ought to be celebrated,

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¹ For example, it appears that Lin Yutang, in the epigraph to this chapter, addresses a male reader capable of achieving transcending the usual abilities of the “mortal man” by accessing a “brotherly feeling.” Although it may be that Lin uses these masculine terms as general descriptors (as in the “man” in “mankind”), they nonetheless participate in more overt exclusionary practices meant to keep women from participation in the public and political sphere. Today, scholars tend to choose gender neutral pronouns (such as they/them) or use masculine and feminine descriptors interchangeably.
confronted and explored; in fact, the authors frame difference itself as a conduit through which students might access subjectivity and justice. And the study and appreciation of difference can change more than the lives of our students. In a 2017 issue, Katja Thieme and Shurli Makmillen, responding to the increasing participation of “indigenous students” in disciplines throughout the academy, investigate how study of indigenous rhetorics across genre can inform established methods in the field of writing studies. This recent turn in composition pedagogy toward social and restorative justice is promising, but much work remains to be done, particularly for English language learners who live at the intersections of race, identity, culture and language. Simply put, it is time to critically assess what exactly we are asking of English language-learners—of non-native speakers of English or English dialects--when we require them to compose in the English language. In addition to the immense cognitive load that composing in a foreign language puts on students, what other demands are we making when we ask non-native speakers to express themselves in the English language, itself an instrument of hegemonic oppression?

The question is pressing, and spurs more. In the second edition of *English as a Global Language* (2003), David Crystal estimates the global ratio of non-native to native speakers of English as a figure of 3:1 (Crystal 69). The increasing number of English language learners across the globe reflects the situation here in the U.S.: in recent years, record numbers of international students have entered the country, the majority of whom

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2 Crystal defines “non-native” speakers here as people who speak English as a second language (as in India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, etc., where English is an official language) or a foreign language (as in China).
are required to study and complete coursework in a variety of different disciplines and exclusively in the English language. These same international students—of whom Chinese students make up a significant portion—report high rates of depression linked to acculturative stress, “a stress reaction in response to life events...rooted in the experience of acculturation” and related to language difficulties, feelings of inferiority and lack of support (Wei et al. 386). Numerous studies have identified and analyzed the psychological stress reported by international students as they study English-language coursework—and yet the symptoms persist. How can we as educators support some of our most vulnerable students? Could it be that the language difficulties associated with acculturative stress range far beyond grammatical error and low marks on term papers? Is there something about the medium of the English language itself, the act of communication with a hegemonic discourse, that leaves many of our students feeling disempowered, unsupported and alone? More importantly, how can we encourage and develop the sorts of communicative strategies that empower English-language learners even as they pursue success within institutions which continue to privilege normative standard English discourse at the expense of other communicative modes?

Analyses from the fields of applied linguistics, postcolonialism, psychology, sociology, and others have posed similar questions, and yet composition pedagogy has yet to adequately synthesize these findings and adapt in return—perhaps due to a misguided belief that overly focusing on the needs of English language learners will
unfairly divert attention from the needs of native English speakers.\(^3\) In fact, this couldn’t be farther from the truth: as analyses of English language learners’ educational experiences grew in sophistication and number, scholars (especially in the field of linguistics) began to discover not only how English language learners have already developed a wealth of communicative strategies by drawing on local and native discourses but also that such strategies could enrich the education of all students—including those who are ostensibly monolingual. This reorientation to how we think of communication in English, spearheaded by linguist A. Suresh Canagarajah, has come to be known as the “translingual approach” or “orientation” to communication. In his introduction to *Literacy as Translingual Practice: Between Communities and Classrooms*, Canagarajah writes:

> A translingual orientation emphasizes that what we treat as “standard English” or “monolingual” texts are themselves hybrid. These labels are ideological constructs that mask the diversity inherent in all acts of writing and communication...[The translingual orientation] makes us sensitive to the creativity and situatedness of every act of communication, even in seemingly normative textual products. In this sense, “translingual practice” is emerging as a term that accommodates hybrid practices without ignoring the inherent hybridity in products that appear on the surface to approximate dominant conventions. The orientation thus enables us to discern agency and voice of both multilingual and monolingual writers in textual products that have varying relationships to the norm. (Canagarajah *Literacy* 3-4)

That is to say, although the idea of a translingual approach to composition grew out of studies meant to address the communicative needs of non-native speakers of English,

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\(^3\) Postcolonial studies in particular have asked many questions parallel to this thesis. In particular, Gauri Viswanathan’s *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India* (1989) argues that the English literary canon in fact derives from the transcultural and transcontinental movements of the British empire—and as such can neither be viewed as innocently divorced from the local realities of imperialism.
these studies in fact uncovered pre-existing communicative strategies that can benefit all
speakers and writers of English by surfacing all communicative strategies (even grammar
and convention) as inherently rhetorical. Responding to the call by Canagarajah in the
same volume to explore different academic communities as avenues through which we
might better understand and serve the needs of translingual (that is, all) students, this
thesis revisits the history of the English language in China—and the history of Chinese
composers in English—in the hopes that looking to the communicative strategies of other
translingual composers of English will help us approach our present rhetorical situations.

My work builds on a trend in literacy scholarship that seeks to situate composition
instruction in space and time in order to critically question our assumptions about writing
practices and pedagogies. Lisa R. Arnold’s “‘The Worst Part of the Dead Past’: Language
Attitudes, Policies, and Pedagogies at Syrian Protestant College, 1866-1902” investigates
how teachers and administrators responded to contemporary political, economic, military
and theoretical conflicts within the Syrian Protestant College. By situating composition
pedagogy in a global and multilingual history, Arnold reveals that our current
conversations about the responsibility of composition instruction and composition
instructors are indeed “not new,” and suggests that such globalizing inquiries better
enable writers to access economic, political, cultural and social power in their local
context (295).

Amy J. Wan in Producing Good Citizens: Literacy Training in Anxious Times
expands on Arnold’s work to de-center American assumptions about literacy by
questioning the American tendency to conceive of literacy as path to citizenship even as
literacy and unaccented English just as often works to limit access to citizenship through mechanisms both de jure (as in the literacy tests of the early twentieth century for immigrants) and de facto (as in construction and response to student “error” in university English classes). In particular, Wan puts pressure on the idea that American literacy education does what it is supposed to do—that is, provide a path to legal, economic and cultural citizenship and its attendant privileges—and again, localizes literacy instruction in government and community-sponsored Americanization and citizenship programs, union-sponsored literacy programs and first year writing programs. Her work complicates the role of composition instruction and composition instructors by surfacing the ways in which literacy practices have been “mutually and contradictorily implicated for disenfranchised individuals, creating a situation in which the allure of democratic citizenship in the U.S. obscures its inequities” (6).

Wan’s careful attention to these contradictions in American composition instruction highlights a common critique of translingualism: namely, that despite its claims that such practices have acute liberating possibility especially for disenfranchised communities, attention to the needs of multilingual students and translingual practices may in fact do little to change the material realities for individuals of these communities precisely because such approaches focus on the literacy practices of the individual. Acknowledging such critiques in Cosmopolitan English and Transliteracy, Xiaoye You applauds such exchanges as productive and draws on them to pose intriguing questions about the ways in which we construct meaning in “a local-global context” and the moral responsibility of U.S. composition instructors and educators, who, willingly or otherwise,
participate in a multicultural discourse “intended to solve internal contradictions in a colonizing nation” (x).

Drawing on the questions You poses in Cosmopolitan English and Transliteracy and the historicizing work he conducts in Writing in the Devil’s Tongue: A History of English Composition in China, I argue that, in examining how translingual Chinese writers of the past drew on their local semiotic resources to navigate contested rhetorical contact zones created by the globalization of English, we as composition scholars and educators may be better equipped to aid translingual students of our own time—students who have been similarly thrust into rhetorical situations increasingly dependent on communicating across languages, cultures and difference. Moreover, by participating in the kinds of rereadings I conduct here—by situating writers not only in their rhetorical and historical moments but also in conversation with each other—we can redefine the bounds of the standard Chinese studies canon to include even ostensibly monolingual and even English-language texts and deepen our understanding of twentieth century China by bringing such texts in contact with each other.

When I began to pursue these lines of inquiry, it became immediately apparent that the problem of the English language afflicted both native and non-native speakers of English because the history of the English language in China cannot be separated from the history of English colonialism. The English language itself only gained a foothold there in the mid-nineteenth century when Western military aggression forced China’s last dynasty to agree to treaty terms that privileged Europeans and European language and subjugated the Chinese—and that fact continues to influence our contemporary
geopolitical situation, as well as our mainstream Western understanding of China and the Chinese people. In her provocative linguistic analysis of Britain and China’s treaties at the conclusion of the Opium Wars in *Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*, Lydia Liu argues that the “contemporary quibbling” during the 1997 transfer of Hong Kong from British rule back to China “echo[ed] a set of older concerns and anxieties” around languages and their meanings:

> The argument over dignity, entitlement, and the proper use of words carried just as much weight as the business of the opium trade insofar as treaty negotiations were concerned in the 19th century. The battle of words and translations in the official archives turned out to be central, not peripheral, to the sovereign will that had driven the Opium Wars. (Liu 1-2)

Liu here highlights how mid-nineteenth century rhetorics and translations during the time of the Opium Wars, which were intricately bound to warfare and colonial occupation, continue to speak and make themselves heard in the official rhetorics of international relations and statecraft over a century later. But if a battle of words of the kind Liu describes did in fact secure the colonial regime through rhetoric and translation, what effects did the results of that battle have on the languages themselves—languages that were forced daily into rhetorical, which is to say *political*, contestations that privileged the English language and English culture at the expense of the Chinese people? Indeed, as LuMing Mao observes while analyzing the twenty-first century revival of Red songs, when we speak of “indigenous rhetorics,” we cannot but look to the “discursive past of the indigenous [which] makes its presence felt in the global present” and is vitally concerned with recovery and reclamation of rhetorical power (Mao “Redefining” 49).
Although the act of translation mediated every interaction between China and West, this fact was for a time largely ignored. After Said’s 1978 *Orientalism* (which itself received much criticism), scholars more carefully considered the intense risk of *theorizing in translation*—that is, the risk of conducting studies in English on a country whose people only learned English quite literally at gunpoint. Unfortunately, it is clear that English-language (and to some extent, Chinese-language) studies of modern China continue to write their theses into Orientalist discourses of the type Said described almost forty years ago:

Compared with *Oriental studies or area studies* it is true that the term Orientalism is less preferred by specialists today, both because it is too vague and general and because it connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century European colonialism. Nevertheless books are written and congresses held with “the Orient” as their main focus, with the Orientalist in his new or old guise as their main authority. The point is that even if it does not survive as it once did, Orientalism lives on academically through its doctrines and theses about the Orient and the Oriental. (Said 2)

That is, these studies, informed as they are by each scholar’s own sociopolitical, geographic, cultural and personal worldviews, also have no shortage of problems, ranging from Orientalism as coined by Edward Said, the dynamics of colonial power as parsed by the fields of postcolonialism and hybridity and the slippery, insidious, and oft-overlooked politics of translation and linguistics. Although ostensibly aware of the power dynamics

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4 As Dr. Xiaoye You remarks in his introduction to *Writing in the Devil's Tongue: A History of English Composition in China* (2010), the history of the English language is intricately bound to the history of Western colonialism in China. Western invasion, international treaties and military subjugation made it necessary for the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) to learn and subsequently teach English language–first to government officials and then to ever-widening circles of Chinese subjects and citizens. Armies and languages of the East and West from the mid-nineteenth century onward, then, met and contested each other simultaneously: English language and writing was a tool not only of modernity, but of survival as well. I will return to the impact of historical events on English composition in China in this chapter and the next.
involved in Western study of China, English-language (and to some extent, Chinese-language) studies continue to write the last two centuries of China’s history into a progressivist binary of “tradition” and “modernity” and to craft histories and analyses into existing ideology rather than to reformulate their ideas in the light of more nuanced discovery and analysis. Such nuanced analysis more accurately captures the dynamic processes by which Chinese people drew on their local and native resources to confront, interact with and shape Western discourses, technologies and languages to their own needs; it more accurately renders China’s interactions with the West not as a process of globalization or Westernization, but as glocalization—the dynamic process by which the local adapts global communicative strategies and makes them its own (Lin et al. Reclaiming 216). In short, it is clear that the specter of nineteenth and early-twentieth century European colonial discourse continues to haunt scholarly and popular writings on modern China, in part due to the difficulties of approaching such a study in and of translation.5

These dominant discourses are indeed “well-known ‘stories,’” but they are critically flawed in that they have at least since the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) depended on translations of political documents and official correspondence between Qing officials and the British imperial government (Zarrow viii). British officials and their translators

5 The "modern" in "modern China" is a term widely used by contemporary East Asian Studies scholars to describe late nineteenth and early twentieth century China—without much consensus on what "modernity" means in this sense, partially because of the tendency of orientalist discourses to unproblematically equate “modernity” with “Westernization.” “Modernity” in East Asian Studies does not refer to a specific movement, but instead to several movements (Self-Strengthening Movement, May 4th Movement, the Great Leap Forward, etc.) meant to bring about modernity. It was used by 20th century Chinese intellectuals as well to describe and bring into existence a modern nation capable of standing up to the West.
had, at best, a limited understanding of Chinese culture and language; at worst, they had a vested interest in using calculated translations “to advance Britain’s aggressive aims… [and] to teach the Chinese how to behave properly in the international sphere” (Zarrow 94). We are obligated to more carefully consider the problems of translation and the stakes of English pedagogy and composition as they reinforce violent politics of power and subjectification regardless of the degree of malice we may suspect in these translations, as Western scholars sharing in a colonialist history with China. The longevity of these imperfect discourses testifies not only to the profound and violent impact of English pedagogy in China but also to scholarship’s general disinterest in the power and (dis)empowerment of translators and English language composers--to say nothing of their lived experiences at the intersection of colonial discourses, cultures and languages. Such inattention deprives us and our students of valuable resources from which we can collectively build strategic communicative strategies and through which we can imagine translingual communication not as “context-bound” but as “context-transforming” (Canagarajah Reclaiming xxv).

Situated at this intersection, the roles of the translator and composer of the English language begin to overlap and intertwine in that they both must necessarily cross between communities and positions of power. The translator “must anticipate

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6 Indeed, many seminal works and standard textbooks on China, some of which I reference over the course of this paper (such as Lipman et al.’s 2012 Modern East Asia: An Integrated History and Edward E. Moise’s 2008 Modern China), unequivocally ascribe a set of characteristics to “Traditional China” to explain its inability to resist Western incursion: it was backward, xenophobic, superior and isolationist, largely because it thought of foreigners as “barbaric.” After all, according to British accounts, Chinese people referred to the European strangers as “barbarians” in official documents and in the ports of Guangzhou! I will have very much more to say on all of this in the coming pages—for now, I would simply ask that readers, along with me, attempt to view these designations with a proverbial grain of salt. (For, just as barbarian is a translated word whose meaning depends on the culture enunciating it, so are backward, xenophobic, superior, isolationist and the rest.)
simultaneously the representation of a people or a practice and the reception of the representation in both the culture of origin and in the culture for which the interpretation is being produced” (Sample Legacy 188). In other words, the translator, while obviously crossing between languages, must also necessarily cross between cultures and rhetorical systems of representation. These border crossings are never clean: as the translator moves from language to language, signifier to signified, the referential meanings behind the words collide and intermingle, with consequences and implications that are at times unpredictable but ultimately always political. The non-native composer of the English language similarly swings between two “noetic fields” as they are charged with the task of representing the self in a language which does not belong to them and which continues to bear the mark of colonial oppression. The effort to represent the self in the English language then is always a rhetorical negotiation between (colonial) positions of power and between one’s self and one’s audiences. Like the translator, the composer of English must necessarily anticipate their writing’s reception by native speakers of English and by Chinese speakers who they, as the voice of “the minority” under the authorized/privileged gaze, must represent. That is, I argue that the efforts by non-native speakers of English to represent the self in English writing—and they are always representing themselves and their cultures, no matter the genre—is also necessarily a rhetorical and political translation. The status of composers as cultural translators was as real during the nineteenth century as it is during the twenty-first. Though the rhetorical situations faced by such composers today is undoubtedly different, these situations remain personal, political and highly risky.
The difficulty of speaking across and about languages has long since hampered Western studies of China, and it may be that a translingual reorientation to these studies, by centering the rhetorical act of translation, will shed much light on how language powerfully shapes reality. Since the Opium Wars, there has been no shortage of studies published in the East and West analyzing the history, literature, discourse and culture of modern China. Scholars for two hundred years have been trying to determine exactly what the modern in modern China means. For that matter, they have been trying to do the same with the China in modern China—the word was not used by the people themselves as an identifier in Chinese language texts or conversation until after the turn of the twentieth century (Liu 79). In fact, linguistically speaking, China is a sign whose referent depends on the specific temporal and sociopolitical footing of the person enunciating it. That is to say that issue of the unstable or missing referent for China evolved directly out of foreign demands that the former subjects of the Qing dynasty (a people who had previously identified themselves otherwise, i.e. as dynastic subjects, descendants of the mythical Yellow Emperor, inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom among others) identify themselves through means recognizable or readable to foreigners and foreign discourse—through nationality and race—as those foreigners forcibly occupied the country. And because there was no equivalent Chinese language identifier for “nationality” as we define it in the West, the mandate of the colonial regime wrested from the people their right to define and identify themselves through culturally appropriate means. In other

7 As demonstration, one need only to recall that contemporary Chinese political leadership continues to say China and to mean the contiguous landmass of the mainland, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan, while the peoples actually inhabiting those latter areas continue, albeit with varying degrees of urgency, to assert their independence from the People’s Republic.
words, Western incursion from the Opium Wars onward not only staged a military invasion, but a linguistic and cultural one as well, simultaneously destabilizing the rhetorical and (again, necessarily) political situation and disguising this violent act as “merely” the act of translation.

As Chinese people, in both Chinese and Western languages, began to speak back and into these hybrid rhetorical situations, they employed a range of communicative strategies by drawing on the semiotic and rhetorical resources of multiple languages, applying them across linguistic bounds. Taking a translingual approach, this thesis analyzes such communicative strategies as socially, culturally and geopolitically situated rhetorics meant to re-establish the agency of their writers. Translingual rereadings of treaty documents, official discourses and popular writings therefore allow us to better understand the rhetorical situations produced by glocalization and to build on the strategies of past writers as they navigated such situations.

Chapter 2 outlines the ways in which Chinese intellectuals and students of the English language navigated the contested rhetorical ground in the wake of colonial invasion and subjugation (processes themselves rhetorically justified and stabilized through various discourses) up to the early twentieth century. By synthesizing and extending the arguments of several postcolonial, East Asian studies and hybridity scholars, I first discuss how classical language defined identity and sovereignty during the dynastic period and how the foreign Qing rulers renegotiated such definitions when they established their dynasty in 1644. However, the Qing rhetorical strategy backfired during the Opium Wars, when the dynasty became unable to maintain social stability at
the same time that it lost the rhetorical right to rule—as a direct result of the invasion of English rhetoric through the language of treaty documents. The final section discusses the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the dynastic system as a whole even as Qing officials and the later intellectuals of the baihua vernacular movement began to reconstruct rhetorical sovereignty by straddling Eastern and Western rhetorical strategies. As writing at the turn of the century began to focus on the creation of the modern citizen to support the modern nation in “talking back” to the West on equal terms, English language composers attempted to construct an ethos capable of expressing their selves through personal and political rhetorical means in order to re-establish themselves and their nation as sovereign entities. But Chinese intellectuals of the time expressed intense anxieties about their ability to communicate to the common Chinese people, even as they transformed the Chinese language to make communication ostensibly easier and represent those people to other nations. The chapter closes by detailing the intense political, discursive and linguistic debates that took place over the course of China’s modernization and argues that these debates foregrounded the very real and very high stakes of (self-)definition, (self-)recognition and indeed (self-)determination in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Against the critical backdrop of the baihua movement, Chapter 3 rereads Lu Xun’s famous 1918 short story “Diary of a Madman,” or Kuangren Riji through a translingual lens, with particular interest to the author’s style. Drawing from previous scholarship, I highlight how attention to translation, language and translingual rhetorical
practices may allow us to view perhaps the most famous example of modern Chinese fiction—and its author Lu Xun (1881-1936)—with greater and more nuanced insight.

Chapter 4 reads the English language works *My Country and My People* (1935) and *The Importance of Living* (1937) by the much less well-known Lin Yutang (1895-1976) in a similar translingual fashion and highlights the stylistic similarities between the two authors, despite conventional analyses that seek to polarize them.

Finally, Chapter 5 turns to some possible developments and changes in our composition classrooms, and asks how a translingual approach to composition and a translingual rereading of even canonical texts can help educators, in collaboration with students, engage in education as the practice of freedom. By bringing the kinds of (re-)readings demonstrated in the previous chapters to our classrooms, I argue that we can more effectively work to break down the hierarchical and silencing nature of the academic institution as well as raise the rigor of our academic tasks for all students.
Chapter 2
From Dynastic Subject to National Citizen:
Contesting Identity and Language Across Empire

Even the spoken language presents no difficulty nearly so great as confronts Europe today. A native of Manchuria can, with some difficulty, make himself understood in southwest Yunnan, a linguistic feat made possible by a slow colonization process and helped greatly by the system of writing, the visible symbol of China’s unity.

This cultural homogeneity sometimes makes us forget that racial differences, differences of blood, do exist within the country.

Over the course of this chapter, I attempt to uncover the ways in which Chinese intellectuals and students of the English language navigated the contested rhetorical ground in the wake of colonial invasion and subjugation (processes themselves rhetorically justified and stabilized through various discourses) up to the twentieth century. As Lin Yutang acknowledges in the epigraph of this chapter, the Chinese language served a profound unifying function for the country’s people, smoothing over ethnic differences in order to shape a cultural identity. By synthesizing and extending the arguments of several postcolonial, East Asian studies and hybridity scholars, I explore English linguistic invasion of the Chinese language alongside English gunboats to show how that invasion dangerously destabilized the linguistic, cultural and (necessarily) political environment of the Qing (or Manchu) State even as it used European rhetoric to negotiate its way into modernity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In the first section of this chapter, I will revisit and extend Liu’s argument that classical language defined and regulated foreignness or “Otherness” as opposed to “Chineseness” in dynastic China. By demonstrating how the ethnically foreign Manchu
conquerors rhetorically justified their rule over the Han Chinese, I hope to draw attention to the fact that, to borrow Scott Richard Lyon’s words, the right to rule is always (also) rhetorical. However, I argue that the rhetorical methods of the foreign Manchu conquerors were critically different from those of the Western invaders in that the Manchu Qing emperors justified their rule by reframing pre-existing Confucian notions of sovereignty instead of forcibly displacing them. This rhetorical reframing allowed the Qing dynasty, despite the foreign ethnic identity of its rulers, to maintain control of the dynasty for nearly three hundred years—but critically backfired when military contestations with the West became rhetorical ones. In the second section, I explore how the English colonial officials constructed rhetorical sovereignty of a different kind through the drafting and signing of treaty documents during the Opium Wars, with special attention to Articles 50 and 51 of the Treaty of Tianjin (1858), which undermined Qing rhetorical strategies to the extent that the dynastic system as a whole collapsed and sent the Chinese rhetorical situation and ontological system into a tailspin. Integrating the work of Lydia Liu and Xiaoye You, I discuss of early efforts by Qing officials to recognize and respond to the need for Western language and learning in formal relations with Western countries before turning to how the teaching of English writing around the turn of the twentieth century necessarily had to navigate Eastern and Western rhetorical strategies to redefine “Chineseness” in relation to the rest of the world. Finally, I turn to how the Chinese intellectuals of the era, incensed by Western imperialist expansion and their government’s inability to curb it, led modern political and cultural movements disseminated through and represented by the written Chinese and English languages.
However, the violent rhetorical and political shift brought about by Opium War treaties had also critically changed the relationship of intellectuals to the masses in the new China. Issues of cross-cultural communication, insofar as such communication required the recognition of the West as a modern state, very quickly became issues of *intra-cultural* communication as the stark social and discursive divisions that previously separated elites from the masses destabilized and broke down, causing intellectuals and writers to reimagine, reconstruct and re-communicate their relations to the rest of the population.

**Negotiating Foreignness: How the Qing Dynasty Rhetorically Reconstructed “Otherness” and “Chineseness” to Legitimize Manchu Rule**

As the quotation from Lin Yutang’s *My Country and My People* at the beginning of this chapter attests, the common written language of classical Chinese served a profound and vital unifying function for the Middle Kingdom—indeed, one of the major projects of the first emperor of “China,” the mythologized Qin Shihuang, was the establishment of a standard language at the conclusion of the Warring States Period and the beginning of the first dynasty in 220 BCE. Historically speaking then, the Chinese language has always taken part in the political processes of unification, identification and othering. Under the Qin conqueror and first emperor of China, the language served to unite previously warring states after some two hundred years of bloody conflict; under subsequent dynasties, the language organized social and political relations inside and outside the Middle Kingdom; and under the last dynasty of China, the Qing dynasty, the language served as a rhetorical tool—a means through which foreign Manchu rulers
justified their position by redeploying Confucian beliefs and reconceptualizing the ideas
foreignness and legitimacy. A review of classical rhetorical methods of identification and
otherness will help us understand how the foreign linguistic invasion of the super-sign
through the Treaty of Tianjin fundamentally reorganized and redefined those concepts.

Under the traditional cosmology of *tianxia* 天下 or “All Under Heaven,” the
classical elite conceived of the Middle Kingdom and its emperor as center and pinnacle
of civilization, with the rest of the kingdom and the world organized centripetally around
these entities (Moise 29, Zarrow 11). Much like other classical communities, the Middle
Kingdom was “linked to a superterrestrial order of power” and a universal Truth through
sacred, written language—classical Chinese (Anderson 13). The emperor, or the Son of
Heaven, from the very first dynasty had the most direct contact with this superterrestrial
order and made contact with it through ritual oracle bones inscribed with the earliest
Chinese ideograms. Moreover, by linking the emperor to Heaven and by proxy, his
subjects to Heaven as well, the written language linked a Chinese cultural community:

> Even if [separate groups of people living in the geographic area we now call
> China] could not communicate in speech, their elites all used the non-phonetic
> Chinese script, which enabled them to write to one another...Culture-wide notions
> of how things work, like *yin-yang* theory, *fengshui*, and the five flavors of food,
> had deep roots and wide acceptance. All Chinese lived in a society deeply
> influenced by the social, ethical, and political norms of Neo-Confucianism.
> (Lipman et al. 44)

Indeed, in *Imagined Communities* in which he delineates the origins, emergence and
conception of nationalism, Benedict Anderson argues that all “the great sacral cults,”
including Islam, Christendom, Buddhism and Confucianism “incorporated conceptions of
immense communities...[made] imaginable largely through the medium of sacred
language” (Anderson 13). The closer to classical language, the closer to Truth, as it were—and this connected the emperor and his subjects in highly organized sociopolitical positions throughout the kingdom.

But in addition to linking imperial subjects across geography, it separated them as well. Knowledge of classical Chinese and the teachings of Confucius harshly divided the elites from the masses and constructed personal and interpersonal codes of conduct across the kingdom. Because classical Chinese on the one hand was (and remains) a language attainable only through “long and usually expensive study” and on the other granted access to a higher order, it positioned wealthy scholars, or literati, in an elite social stratum under the emperor. Indeed, Moise identifies the difference in language between the elites and the common people as emblematic “of the great social inequalities that existed throughout Chinese society…. [and concludes that] People who laboured with their minds felt they were born to dominate those who laboured with their hands” (Moise 26). And they did, often in a very literal sense, by becoming local government officials. Sons of the elite could and did take civil service examinations based on the Confucian classics in which they demonstrated command of classical Chinese rhetoric that they might communicate their knowledge and thinking in service of the emperor (Moise 25).

While successive emperors performed rituals to Heaven on behalf of the people, the sheer vastness of the kingdom demanded that a great amount of actual ruling was handled at the local level and through social control. Speaking of the traditional education system in Writing in the Devil’s Tongue: A History of English Composition in China, Dr. Xiaoye You asserts that “traditional Chinese education was deeply shaped by neo-
Confucian views of individual responsibility and agency” and that “for thousands of years, the family [as the basic political and social unit] offered the individual a conceptual framework to define the relationship between the self, the state and the universe” (You 18). Virtue and a “good understanding of the universe and their place within it” further distinguished “ideal communicators”:

[These ideal communicators] establish good character through daily self-examination and public behaviors in agreement with the morally appropriate rituals of the time. [The exam essays, a part of the civil service exam] were part of the social ritual for the consecration of the individual, encouraging self-examination in the light of the Way. In the essay, the students were not expected to articulate unique thoughts about the universe that differed from neo-Confucian philosophy. Instead, they should exemplify their ethos, or “correct” voices, through skillful manipulation of Confucian concepts, commentators’ interpretations, and historical events within an expected structure--like skilled ballet dancers who express their feelings and emotions through performing formal steps gracefully. The multiple [rigid] rhetorical moves constituted a set of rites through which students could examine and cultivate themselves. (You 25)

The traditional literati, charged with maintaining the well-being and stability of their civilization, determined the proper course of action by constructing an unambiguous “neo-Confucian ethos” through chain reasoning, analogy and historical examples (You 20). The ability to construct an appropriate ethos or written 脸 (“face”)—to appropriately write the self into a Confucian social context in which conduct depends on one’s social position--through a rigid set of rhetorical rules therefore formed the criteria of membership in the elite class.8 Although Confucian doctrine was not constant--in that

8 Speaking of the difference between the Chinese and Euro-American public self-image in rhetorical situations in Reading Chinese Fortune Cookie, LuMing Mao notes that “face is a regularly invoked discursive construct in the Chinese rhetorical repertoire...face [is] a public self-image that people, across discourse and culture want to claim for themselves in face to face communication” (Mao 37). Moreover, “Chinese 脸 [face] encodes a moral and normative connotation as it places the self in the judgment of others and as it estimates and/or reinforces a link between the integrity of the self and his or her community” (Mao 39).
later writers from the classical philosopher Mencius to the Qing-era reformer Kang Youwei would modify and reinterpret the Confucian Analects—“the general thrust of Confucianism was the importance of proper human relationships. Subordinates should be reverent and obedient towards their superiors, while superiors should be benevolent and just” (Moise 11). This basic hierarchical view organized individuals from the emperor down to the commoners through the Three Bonds of ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife—and acutely affected the literati (Zarrow 10). These Three Bonds not only informed strict codes of conduct and justified social standing, but were taught alongside and through the classical language of Confucian texts.

Although scholar-officials did occasionally fall from grace by “losing face” (or failing to adhere to an appropriate public self-image) and peasants won access to the elite class by passing the civil service exam, nonetheless, financial and psychical inequalities rigidly separated these groups. The financial inequalities caused by and maintained through these relationships were substantial, but did not come close to the psychological inequalities of such differences in status (Moise 26). The threat of “losing face”—of losing one’s personal dignity and social standing in the public eye weighs heavily in Chinese society (Moise 27). And because Confucian social order depended on proper conduct between these relations, individual conduct—selfhood—was from the first highly political and highly personal, and writing bore heavy ethical burdens (You 18).

Communities that did not use or adopt classical Chinese language were designated as foreigners and, arguably, “barbarians”; those that agreed to use that script “were half civilized” (Anderson 13). I qualify barbarian as arguable because this
delineation is not so clear-cut. We must bear in mind (as we must throughout every study of China) that *barbarism* and *civility* are not so much words as they are what Lydia Liu calls “hetero-cultural signifying chains” which bring together separate cultural concepts into a hybrid (Liu 13). When we ignore the rhetorical nature of these translations, we also miss the ways in which the culturally-informed concepts behind those words intermingle, augment and undermine each other in contestations that reflect the political (which is the rhetorical) situation. That is, every time Westerners say or write *yi* or “barbarian” the culturally-informed concepts *behind* those words rub against each other, leaving imprints, traces and gaps of meaning concealed behind the signifier itself. This kind of problematic translation (which cannot but attach Western cultural connotations to a separate cultural concept) skews our understanding of traditional dynastic methods of identification and othering—and therefore also skews our understanding of what exactly happened when a foreign army invaded and established what would become the last dynasty.

During the mid-seventeenth century, a multi-ethnic army from modern-day Mongolia conquered large portions of central Asia and Tibet as well as the weakened Ming dynasty and set up a new government: the Qing Empire (Zarrow 8-9). Though “many Han Chinese never quite shook off the shame of conquest,” Qing leadership skillfully and rhetorically navigated Confucian ideology in order to shift arguments about legitimate rule from concepts of “foreignness” to concepts of “virtue [*de 德*]” (Zarrow 9). This virtue, which the Qing rhetorically constructed out of Confucian orthodoxy, “was not so much an inner and certainly not an otherworldly goodness but rather far-sighted devotion to the good of the people, that is, maintenance of a stable social order” (Zarrow 25).
10). In other words, the Qing dynasty justified their rule by redeploying Confucian beliefs and reconceptualizing the ideas foreignness and legitimacy. The Qing rested its reputation, its public face, on its ability to rule virtuously and effectively. And when the Qing Empire failed to maintain order during the mid-nineteenth century, they lost face, control of the meanings behind barbarism and civility—foreignness and legitimacy—and ultimately, the right to rule (Liu 40).

Furthermore, classical language was so important as a unifying vehicle because it effectively united peoples of many different ethnicities into a single imagined community: that is the work of empire. Every empire must construct concepts of otherness very carefully—especially when the ruling class does not ethnically identify with the subjects in question. The ease with which works on early twentieth century China redeploy the simplistic designation of “foreigners as barbarians” then smacks of irony—because the Qing government purportedly designating those foreigners as such was itself foreign and did not share ethnic identity with the majority of its subjects.

Nonetheless, Qing invasion and Western occupation alone do not explain the ultimate collapse of the Qing Empire and certainly not the collapse of the entire dynastic system in the early twentieth century. In addition to the rule of the Empress Dowager and the successive puppet Qing emperors, Peter Zarrow in After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924 identifies another problem facing the Qing Empire: while the “Qing managed the Manchu-Han relationship with considerable skill throughout the eighteenth century...old anti-Manchu feelings broke out again” by the nineteenth century (Zarrow 16-7). I argue that after two centuries of Qing Empire in
which the Manchu rulers had strategically—and largely successfully—legitimized their rule by flexibly negotiating Confucian and cosmological conceptions of foreignness, not only did “certain [native] intellectual trends” arise which loosened the textual authenticity and ultimate message of the Confucian classics, but also the foreign linguistic invasion of the super-sign through the Treaty of Tianjin fundamentally reorganized how scholar-officials defined foreignness, otherness and difference. The grounds for legitimate Qing rule were not only no longer appropriate (which would mean renegotiation of the Confucian classics would work), they were effectively displaced from previous rhetorical foci of power (which now was understood to originate not in the Confucian classics, but Western discourse). This sudden shift in rhetorical control had as-then-unforeseen implications and consequences, not only for contemporary politics, culture and identity, but for the future of China as well.

The Barbarian in the Mirror, the Invasion of the Super-Sign: How the Treaty of Tianjin Rerouted the Signifying Chain

Lydia Liu in The Clash of Empires astutely observes that in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, British and Qing contestation in the region became deeply colored by each empires’ ideas of civilization and barbarism. Essentially, because each empire conceived of itself as civilized and the other as barbaric, conflicting notions—and of course, translations— of civilization and barbarism haunted each interaction between these empires, with tense and eventually disastrous results (Liu 2). Liu argues that the signing of treaty documents during the Opium Wars led to the creation of what she refers to as the “super-sign” of yi 夷, in that the language of the treaties cemented an artificially
equivalent relationship between two different cultural concepts represented by yi/ barbarian. Liu applies the term “super-sign” not to a “word” as such, but to “a hetero-cultural signifying chain that criss-crosses the semantic fields of two or more languages simultaneously” and identifies “[yi/夷/barbarian] as one here (Liu 13). In particular, Liu’s careful examination of the character yi 夷 in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin as a super-sign reveals much about danger inherent in any kind of translation—and the difficulty in speaking across and about languages. The change in conventions of translation between states that do not share a common language, Liu convincingly argues, reflects imperialist violence on a rhetorical level.

Indeed, it was precisely these treaties, the issue of China’s referent, and who had the right to define, regulate and rule it, that ushered the Qing state into the modern era. In many ways, as Peter Zarrow remarks in After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924, China as a modern nation emerged out of the language of international treaties as British imperial discourse stipulated that the empire could not make treaties with other political entities (Zarrow 4). The critical and contested role of language in China’s modern origins widened the rhetoric of imperial statecraft in that region to include matters of translation. In fact:

The proliferation of international treaties and agreements among sovereign states has left a profound mark on our thinking about language, international politics, national histories, and modernity in general...the regulation of the sign [that is, the authority of “official translation”] and its global circulation had been unthinkable and unnecessary before the onslaught of modern colonial and global warfare. (Liu 9)
Zarrow goes so far as to say of the so-called unequal treaties following the Opium Wars that “Treaties constructed not merely a new framework of international relations into which the Qing was forcibly slotted, but a new language of sovereignty” (Zarrow 93).

It is no mere wordplay when Scott Richard Lyons quips that for indigenous peoples everywhere, “Sovereignty is (also) rhetorical” (Lyons 1131). Lyons’s definition of “rhetorical sovereignty” is particularly helpful here in that it underscores the difficulties of communicating sovereignty and in doing acknowledges the incredibly high stakes of translation and writing in general in communications between nations. He defines rhetorical sovereignty as “the inherent right and ability of peoples to determine their own communicative needs and desires in this pursuit, to decide for themselves the goals, modes, styles and languages of public discourse and has implications on how and what we teach as the written word” (Lyons 1130). International treaties, then, forcibly displace indigenous people’s ability to determine the parameters of their language by cementing an authoritative but ultimately artificial relationship between linguistic signs necessarily embedded in fundamentally different cultures. Such international treaties (especially the “unequal treaties” at the conclusion of the Opium Wars and other treaties of the colonial era) foreground the critical roles of rhetorics in translation through the production of the “same” document in two (or more) different languages.

But the assumed “sameness” of such documents is inherently artificial—and when we consider that such treaties in the colonial era authorized the English translation as the
authoritative version, inherently violent. The idea of translatability—that we can somehow make “hypothetical equivalences between the semiotic horizons of different languages”—stifles the complex cultural connotations of language in a way that reifies colonial authority (Liu 110). The natural outcome of this forcible displacement through translation—linguistic invasion—was the teaching and learning of English, the effort to talk back the the colonial oppressor. When a writer who is not a white European, whose lineage grew through and out of a colonial past, begins to compose in English, that writer must navigate “rhetorical borderlands” (Mao 21-22) or contact zones, “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power” (Pratt 34). In short, recent study of the history of English in China examines and problematizes the intense rhetorical importance of both cultural and linguistic translation between states that do not share a language—and allows us a window into how those cultural and linguistic contestations continue to be negotiated in our contemporary world.

The system of tianxia (or, “All Under Heaven”) mandated that China’s foreign relations recognize and reflect China’s cultural superiority through ritual, by tribute and in all formal communications with the imperial government (Zhu 90). This expectation

9 Nietzsche in “Truth and Lies and in a Non Moral Sense” discusses a related concept when he asserts that “a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases—which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal.” The idea of translatability as it relates to colonial authority adds an element of power to Nietzsche’s early semiotic claims: not only are culturally-informed experiences forced related to the “same” word in a different language unequal by their nature, but the unnatural relation of these experiences inside colonial regimes privileging one language over the other further displace words from the (indigenous) experience behind it.

10 Here, Mao LuMing nods to Mary Louise Pratt’s “Arts of the Contact Zone,” in which she illuminatingly compares the relation of teacher and student to that of colonizer and colonized in that the authorial and authorizing power (de)legitimizes the language of the (dis)empowered.
heavily influenced the Middle Kingdom’s tributary relationships with Korea, Vietnam, Burma and its earliest interactions with the West (Lipman et al. 44; Moise 29). When Westerners began arriving in the early sixteenth century during the Ming Dynasty, they received the usual treatment: the Chinese “regarded [those first Portuguese sailors] as barbarians; they looked odd, had a strange language and customs, and showed little respect for Chinese law...They were eventually allowed to establish a trading base at Macao,” a peninsula walled off from the mainland (Moise 22). Although again, we must be careful about the concept of *barbarism*, the combination of cultural sophistication, isolationism and expectation of assimilation would restrict Western trade to designated zones for almost two hundred years and made certain that the balance of trade remained in China’s favor--China exported tea, silk, porcelain and other luxuries in high demand in Europe and imported gold and silver (Moise 30). But when the British landed in the Middle Kingdom in the early 1800s, things changed-- violently.

At first engaging in a primarily mercantile relationship with the Qing, the British merchants of the East India Company wanted to shift the imbalance of trade with China. They therefore began selling “tremendous quantities of opium, acquired from their new possessions in India, to China” (Moise 30). Their strategy worked: soon, “gold and silver were flowing out of China…[causing] an economic crisis as well as a tremendous drug-abuse problem” (Moise 30). At first, British merchants working under the auspices of the British East India Company accepted their restriction to the southern port of Guangzhou, while opium trade both grew rapidly (Lipman 144). However, this growth skyrocketed in 1834, when the British government ended the East India Company’s monopoly on trade
in the region, allowed private companies to enter the market and sent official government representatives to China (Lipman 144). Officially appointed merchants and Qing officials, then, “no longer dealt with a private corporation but with the British state as protector of its subjects” (Lipman 145). British officials, much less patient with the Qing Dynasty’s apparent superiority than the East India Company had been, saw the Qing restriction of trade as egregious, haughty and, more importantly, costly--claiming that rules for selling opium ought to be no different than those for selling tea, silk, cloth and other items (Lipman 145). Therefore, although Chinese officials tried to restrict the sale of opium, their increasingly direct attempts to stem opium traffic eventually led to open warfare with the British in 1839 (Moise 31).

Chinese resistance to the British forces during the First Opium War was virulent, but ultimately ineffectual: “from a military standpoint there could be no doubt of British technological and tactical superiority” (Lipman 147). And when Britain would again wage war on China in 1856 to expand the terms of the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the results would be the same: China’s defeat in both of the Opium Wars, the cession of Hong Kong and the resulting treaties dealt a monumental blow to China’s ontological and semiotic systems. Liu argues that the resulting treaty led to the super-signification of 奇 and thus redefined the concept of “foreignness.” More than that, I argue that the super-sign’s creation may have actually played a role in reigniting anti-Manchu feelings during the nineteenth century which have previously been contributed primarily to the Qing

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11 This assertion apparently overlooking the fact that even the London Times declared the opium trade indefensible (Lipman 147).
rulers’ inability to protect China from foreign onslaught (Zarrow 17). In short, because of the hegemony of English and the colonialism of the British, the Qing dynasty had lost face--lost control of the writing system they had used to construct that face--and along with it, their right to rule.

Certainly, this loss of rhetorical sovereignty might have doomed the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty--but the collapse of the dynastic system itself, I suggest, was in part a result of the rhetorical implications of treaty law. The unequal treaties resulting from the Opium Wars signaled the beginning of what would later become known as The Century of Humiliation, in which the entire system of *tianxia*--which linked the Chinese people to a superior order and to each other through classical language--crumbled.\(^\text{12}\) International law (more specifically, Western or *English* international law) defined what was True--not the Confucian classics. The discursive implications of this can nowhere be seen more clearly than in the language of the treaties themselves. In particular, Liu’s careful examination of the character *夷* in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin as a super-sign reveals much about danger inherent in any kind of translation--and the difficulty in speaking across and about languages.\(^\text{13}\) The Treaty, which opened more trading ports to Britain and extracted enormous indemnities, also included two crucial articles--Article 50 and 51--addressing language and translation in official correspondence. Since the signing

\(^{12}\) This kind of terminology was in use even in 1915, as societies for national salvation and national humiliation sprang up in urban centers (Luo 309).

\(^{13}\) Here, I refer only to the treaty signed by British and Chinese officials. France, Russia and the United States also drafted and ratified treaties with China during this time and these documents are often referred to in the aggregate as the “unequal treaties.”
of that treaty, *yi* 夷 has been traditionally translated into English as *barbarian*. The relevant articles, which mention the super-sign *yi* read:

**Article L.** All official communications addressed by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of Her Majesty the Queen to the Chinese Authorities shall, henceforth, be written in English. They will for the present be accompanied by a Chinese version, but, it is understood that, in the event of there being any difference of meaning between the English and Chinese text, the English Government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the correct sense. This provision is to apply to the Treaty now negotiated, the Chinese text of which has been carefully corrected by the English original.

**Article LI.** It is agreed that, henceforward, the character “[yi]”/夷/barbarian, shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese Authorities either in the Capital or in the Provinces. [my italics]

Liu applies the term “super-sign” not to a “word” as such, but to “a hetero-cultural signifying chain that criss-crosses the semantic fields of two or more languages simultaneously” and identifies “[yi]/夷/barbarian” as one here (Liu 13). The Treaty of Tianjin effectively erases the political crossing of meanings behind it and attempts to cut *yi* 夷 from its Chinese cultural referents and graft it onto English ones. Therefore, with the signing of this document, the character *yi* became the “monstrosity” of a super-sign in that it “crouches behind the ‘wordness’ of a concept and articulates the latter without itself being articulated in any reified form...as a fantastic hybrid of translated concepts, it can be technically demonstrated with a series of verbal signs connected by slashes, as in *yi/barbarian*” (Liu 34). British translators’ decisions to equate *yi* with *barbarian* cemented a problematic and simplistic--if not flatly incorrect--interpretation of *yi* 夷 as “barbarian” in the English of the day, which was itself a vital rhetorical motif for the British empire.
“The ban [of *yi*],” Liu continues, “was responsible for making the Chinese word refer not to its signified or related Chinese words but onto the English word [and colonial discourse of] barbarian” (Liu 35). Furthermore, because of the stipulation in the preceding article, the ban also cemented power in favor of this particular British translation, where in years previous, other British translators had recorded the translation of *yi* as “foreigner”—not barbarian (Liu 59)!

The change in conventions of translation between states that do not share a common language, Liu convincingly argues, reflects imperialist violence on a rhetorical level. While British pressure on China to open treaty ports increased and the effects of the opium trade grew more pronounced, the British empire needed to justify its increasingly aggressive posture towards China and so began more explicitly resorting to strategies that had worked elsewhere, particularly in the New World: the British began to racialize the Other (Liu 62). Liu explains that “by calling the Native Americans and other non-European races savages and barbarians, the European empires had secured the episteme of colonial otherness as well as a universal order of civilizational superiority and inferiority based on race, cultural, technology, language, proprietorship, and so on” (Liu 62). This led to a blossoming of English-language works writing China into these various (and often essentialist and pseudo-scientific) discourses: for example, Arthur Smith’s *Chinese Characteristics*, which both Lu Xun and Lin Yutang read and commented on, was first published in 1890. One cannot help but notice, once the ink had dried on Articles 50 and 51, who was really calling who *barbarian*.
Here, we see the truly monstrous and insidious power of the super-sign as emblematic of the act of translation itself when it occurs between the Colonizer and the Colonized: the super-sign is the visual evidence of a chameleic linguistic invasion, in that after 1858, yi 夷 is severed from its pre-British life and in every iteration afterwards must be read against and, indeed, under the British concept of barbarian. From this initial penetration, the super-sign seeped from the realm of officialdom into the wider (and ever-widening) reading—and writing—public and its presence can still be felt today. Many of the standard texts of Chinese studies in English, including those I have referenced in this paper, continue to read the history of China’s conception of itself from inside the narrative of “the barbarian Westerner vs. the civilized Chinese.” Let me be clear: I am certainly not suggesting that the Chinese did not view the world hierarchically (such would fly in the face of both Chinese and Western study of Confucianism) or that the Chinese never displayed superior or xenophobic behavior (which would mean ignoring the tributary system and such instances as Chinese attacks against British missionaries and other white foreigners in the late nineteenth century). Nor am I suggesting, more directly, that we ought to discount these standard texts.

What I am suggesting is that scholars, historians, politicians and writers of both Chinese and European descent since the Treaty of Tianjin have failed to sufficiently acknowledge not only the “monstrosity of the super-sign” yi/夷/barbarian as described by Liu—and how that sign has spoken, sometimes violently, into those scholarships, histories, politics and writings over time (Liu 34). As a result of these international treaties, the Qing government was forced to learn and teach English quite literally under
the barrel of a gun, and through subsequent translations of Western scientific—and later, more humanities-oriented—discourse, Qing officials and translators became exposed to the pseudo-scientific, racist, essentialist and eugenicist discourses that informed the European notion of barbarism and civility. In short, they became aware of their image in a world dominated and shaped by the rhetoric of Western imperialism. It was these modern European discourses—not the Confucian classics—that supplied the rhetorical power in this world. This had two effects: Firstly, officials, scholars, and politicians, regardless of Han, Manchu or other ethnic identity (though the Han racial identifier became increasingly important as Mao gained power), had to redefine themselves inside Western discursive and epistemological systems while acknowledging the fact of Western domination across these systems. And secondly, it became painfully apparent to many of these intellectual and political leaders that traditional Chinese education was no longer sufficient in the new rhetorical situation.

China had to modernize—which in the progressive histories translated by Yan Fu (the translator who “turned a generation of intellectuals into social Darwinists”) and others meant necessarily to Westernize (Zarrow 83). Translators participated in the blossoming of study societies, state and private schools, and new media groups which arose in response to the call to modernize, and Yan Fu (1854-1921) was “arguably the first scholar to attack the [Qing] monarchy as inherently despotic” (Zarrow 83). Although Yan received a classical training in his youth, he failed the civil service exam and instead pursued education overseas in England; upon his return, he began translating “key works [that he believed explained] European success” into “difficult classical Chinese,” which
included, alongside Smith’s capitalist economy, Montesquieu’s constitutional
government, Locke’s individualism and free speech, none other than Spencer’s Social
Darwinism (Lipman 223). By translating such works of humanities, social sciences,
pseudosciences and international treaties, Yan Fu, along with the myriad of other late
nineteenth and early twentieth translators acted as figures who ushered the Qing into “an
international system of state relations that was not dominated by Western powers but
defined by them” (Zarrow 92). In this process, far from unproblematically rendering
“true” translations of Western texts, these translators invented neologisms and used new
Western means, methods and frameworks to identify and define China as a sovereign
nation, while not being shy about adding new content to write China into these
frameworks. The profound cultural, social and political effects of these translated texts
cannot be overstated: they changed not only the rules of identification but the rhetorical
strategies of identification themselves. Confucian classics were increasingly seen as
inappropriate tools to construct meaning—scholars instead began to make sense of the
world through these translated Western texts. Thus began the Self-Strengthening
Movement.

Wielding the Pen in Defense of the Nation: English Language Composition,
Learning and Pedagogy During the Self-Strengthening Movement

Early English composition in China was formally intended as a tool of national
defense against foreign domination. In their translations of Western texts, translators had
to read and then write themselves and their people into the new (colonial, which is to say,
hostile) rhetorical situations. In this process, translators and their reading publics became
acutely aware of Western discursive processes that defined, shaped and described their identities to justify colonial oppression—and so, translators began to navigate both Eastern and Western rhetorical strategies to combat these colonialist processes and reassert control over the rhetorical situation. I argue that in these efforts, translators here used both the English and the Chinese discursive strategies to re-envision Chinese identity—but were also critically tasked to do so for two audiences, the Western and Chinese worlds. As first Qing officials and then intellectuals began to learn English, they too became exposed to the critical, combative and political stakes of English reading and writing.

A late Qing official, Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), would coin the popular slogan of the Self-Strengthening Movement—zhongti xiyong 中体西用—or, Chinese learning as essence and Western learning as utility and thus effectively frame the intellectual dilemma of Westernization for the next century (Zarrow 21). Indeed, as Qian Suoqiao asserts, “up to the contemporary moment, [the question of Chinese modernity] has been characterized, in a sense, by the contention between Western universalism and Chinese identity” insofar as “Western universalism” acknowledges Western modernity as the inevitable reality of a progressive march in history and nationalism contrarily maintains the validity of a modern and uniquely Chinese identity (Qian Legacy 3). As a national defense measure, the particular history of English as a foreign language in China in fact created “a whole different constellation of values and practices in teaching English writing” (You xi). Acknowledging the role of the unequal treaties in the Qing
government’s decision to learn and teach foreign languages, You asserts that the effects of teaching English in China during the mid-nineteenth century were twofold. He writes:

The acceptance of English as a school subject was a reluctant choice made by the Chinese, a choice that was emblematic of a feudal society struggling to respond to the worldwide expansion of colonialism and capitalism…[but the choice] also signaled the beginning of a concerted educational undertaking to enhance transnational understanding and world peace in modern Chinese history. (You 15-6)

The decision to teach English to governmental officials at first served a purely practical purpose: to gain knowledge of Western science and technology. Because of Western learning’s orientation toward practical matters, however, “the majority of the literati despised it”: “only Confucian classics embodied worthy knowledge of the human realm…[learning English and other foreign languages then] were seen as crucial for political functions, but inferior on cultural terms” (You 14).

Chinese composers of English and Chinese therefore, were critically positioned at the crossroads of power and difference, and charged as the guardians, negotiators, and representatives of Chinese identity, a charge that became increasingly pressing as colonial rule persisted, efforts to regain sovereignty became more desperate and warfare both civil and international raged on. However virulent and iconoclastic debates over these responsibilities would become as translators and educators discovered that scientific learning alone would not adequately modernize the Chinese state, the culturally-ingrained connection between writing, identity and responsibility to the state persisted through the turn of the century and onward. Therefore, when the scholar-officials driving the Self-Strengthening Movement realized “that traditional native literacy education was
Inadequate in the pursuit of national modernization,” the Chinese pursuit of modernity—and a modern Chinese identity—“ideologically sustained and shaped writing instruction” (You 6).

In the year 1862—the year after which all treaties with China were written in English—the Tong Wen Guan (同文馆) was established in Beijing for the purpose of training official Qing interpreters (You 15). But the the history of English instruction in China, of course, did not begin with Chinese teachers. Though its students were Chinese, Tong Wen Guan’s administrators were representatives of the British imperial government who “understood that the expansion of Western interests in China depended on a growing cadre of natives who could communicate with Westerners” (You 16). Soon, however, the teaching of English would spread beyond the government and into the populace through Christianity. In ports forced open by the unequal treaties, foreign missionaries set up schools “to train Christian leaders, provide religious training for Christian children, and convert non-Christians”—as such, English was not taught because missionaries believed only Chinese would help their converts reach Chinese audiences. Eventually, in response to “a rising demand for English business and trade,” the school from which Lin Yutang would eventually graduate, St. John’s College in Shanghai, became one of the first missionary schools to teach English in 1881 (You 31; Qian Legacy 1). After the 1890s, other schools followed suit—teaching the English language alongside English subjects such as astronomy, physics, economics, and international law despite some conservative opposition (You 16-7). In fact, “by the turn of the twentieth century, English writing had become a prominent part of English education in mission schools” (You 31). Alongside
and as a result of English teaching and the changing demand for it, Chinese language translations of Western texts ballooned between 1860 and 1900—and alongside translated works on science and technology, texts on Western humanities and social sciences emerged (Zarrow 19-20). Moreover, because Western courses “reconstructed the whole ‘noetic’ field, that is, the specific relationship assumed to exist between language and reality,” the teaching of English composition during the mid-to-late- nineteenth century fundamentally altered “how rhetorical education was understood” (You 30). In a previous section, I have already shown how linguistic invasion, as a particular kind of rhetoric-in-translation, doomed the Manchu Qing state. If Western rhetoric also changed “the relationship between educated persons and the state” in general, then the doom of the dynastic system as a whole must at least in part be a result of such rhetorics-in-translation (Zarrow 23).

Although I have alluded to many problems of translation in Western studies of China, a few more words at this point will demonstrate the complex and powerful role of a translator of language—who must necessarily also translate culture. Translations are problematic in the first place because readers (who often do not speak the original language of the text) tend to assume an unrealistic measure of translatability: that is, a large part of the problem with the English translation of official Qing correspondence (as discussed earlier) was that yi, a character used in a variety of contexts to designate even highly respected Confucian rulers, was translated without annotation as barbarian—a word that, during the violent colonial expansion of the West, could not have been more culturally loaded. The job of a translator then—and indeed, of any non-native speaker of
English—is highly risky at any point, but certainly at this time in history. Speaking of the incredible responsibility and intellectual task a translator undertakes when approaching a new text, Joe Sample astutely notes that:

An interpretation...must be socially and historically situated and be the result of a recursive process whereby the interpreter must anticipate simultaneously the representation of a people or a practice and the reception of the representation in both the culture of origin and in the culture for which the interpretation is being produced...[Moreover, the interpreter] must understand and consider the role of language in shaping or reflecting the values, attitudes and beliefs of the listener and adjust the interpretation accordingly. (Sample *Legacy* 188)

Clearly, the “constellation of values and practices in teaching English writing” that You references could not but acknowledge and grapple with the contested semiotic ground between English and classical Chinese--and as a result, could not but manifest itself in the students’ writings. Because Western rhetoric was “explicitly taught in English composition classes,” You argues that students, “consciously or unconsciously... had to swing between two different epistemological and rhetorical systems” (You 30). More than that, students of the time had to retain a Chinese identity even as they used Western rhetorical strategies to reinvent it. These late nineteenth and early twentieth century translators and writers would leave a profound mark on their country’s emerging national consciousness and language, both through their writings and, perhaps more importantly, their students, who in turn produced their own writings. All of these writings were bound by their very nature to the discourse of nation building and national character. But the discourse of national character has been and continues to be read against an array of political agendas. For the Chinese intelligentsia, the discourse of national character opened the possibility of reinvigorating their entire country and culture. But the
intelligentsia only thought of China as backward and under-developed in the first place because of Western imperialist rhetoric that had to justify its actions to the world. As Liu remarks in *Translingual Practice*:

> The idea of national character...has proved tremendously useful in legitimizing Western imperialist expansion and domination of world. Its rhetoric of racial superiority in particular, has been deployed to explain away the violence of the East-West encounter in terms of cultural essentialism and evolutionary progress, thus depriving the conquered race or nation of the ground of authority from which alternate views of difference, culture or history could be articulated (48).

Acknowledging the incredible responsibility of translators then, requires us to realize that Chinese intellectuals and students were incredibly sensitive to the heightened stakes of composition regardless of the language in which they composed. It makes sense, then, that in two of China’s greatest and most widely-read scholars, writers and translators, Lu Xun and Lin Yutang, we may find the most evocative and informative elocution of such sensitivities. Translators, teachers and composers of the English language necessarily had to navigate two noetic fields and two audiences in response to the destabilization of the rhetorical situation as a direct result of treaty documents signed over the course of the Opium Wars. The hostile political and rhetorical situation transformed the act of writing into one of contestation and (re)negotiation, as Chinese writers responded to traditional sociopolitical norms, the invasion of Western colonialist and nationalist discourses and the need to express a sovereign rhetorical self capable of standing up in these new political realities.

**How New Language of the Early 20th Century Helped Create a New Citizen**
Conventional scholarship of the East and West demonstrates that intellectuals of the May 4th political movement and the New Culture Movement (1915-1923) “promoted science to counter Confucianism, idol worship and superstition that were deeply seated in traditional Chinese mentality” and “called for the birth of a new culture to replace old Chinese language” (You 48). This was certainly true; however (perhaps due to Leftist scholarship which tended to bend historical fact to fit a neat progressive construction of history, each movement is a natural stepping stone for China on her way to Communist Utopia), even contemporary scholarship tends still to paint the iconoclastastic strokes of China’s early twentieth century with too broad a brush (Davies 6). The intellectual debates, which exploded during the New Culture Movement and raged in the newspapers, journals and magazines like *New Youth* (which was founded in 1915 and three years later would later publish Lu Xun’s “Diary of a Madman”) and *Analects Fortnightly* (Lin’s own satirical magazine), ran the gambit from Neo-Confucian conservatism to anti-traditionalism. Lu Xun himself, despite memorably charging the nation to awaken from a feudal sleep, called on his contemporaries to rigorously explore the Chinese tradition for

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14 The May 4th Movement takes its name from demonstrations in May of 1919 protesting the Chinese government’s weak response to the terms of the Versailles Treaty, which returned the Shandong Province in the northeast (which had been under the German sphere of influence during the First World War) not to China but to Japan. The May 4th Movement, generally regarded as a nationalist movement “phrased in Western terms,” involved political protest and scientific development brought on by massive importation—and translation—of Western ideas and intended to modernize the country (Moise 51-52). However, these ideas were available primarily only to the most Westernized of the population—the intellectual elite who lived in the coastal cities—and, for the most part, did not reach the majority of Chinese people. It became quickly apparent to these intellectuals that achieving the kind of economic and industrial modernization they envisioned would require the participation and transformation of the masses into modern Chinese citizens. Thus, large scale efforts to transform the citizen and culture of China became known as the New Culture Movement, the *baihua* vernacular movement and a host of other names--each a part of that overarching goal.
“counter strains in and counter perspectives on” China’s legacy (Lee Legacy 4; Lin Yu-sheng 107-8).

The same is true of the linguistic revolution, or the baihua vernacular movement (see timeline),\textsuperscript{15} that could not but come along with cultural and political movements: translators and writers experimented with new language by drawing “from various linguistic sources including classical Chinese, folk speech, dialects, traditional storyteller’s language, Europeanized expressions” (Zhu & Li 124). Lin Yutang invented a typewriter that could type Chinese characters and both Lin and Lu Xun, as well as other prolific intellectuals, seriously discussed the abandonment of Chinese characters and the romanization of the entire Chinese language (Zhu & Li 124; Peng 70). Meanwhile, these same scholars, including Hu Shi (“the Father of the Chinese Renaissance”), continued to search for baihua’s origins in traditional culture, finding fruitful ground in the translated vernacular Buddhist literature of antiquity and the vernacular traditions of the Han, Yuan, Tang, Ming and Qing dynasties (Lee Legacy 6; Hu Shi 138). That language should more closely approximate daily speech was not a new idea—nor did these intellectuals treat it as such. Scholars from the outset attempted to trace baihua’s origins in China’s history: Hu Shi, one of the most famous contributors to the baihua movement and ideology, asserted that since the Han Dynasty, “translators have been aware of the fact that the classical language is deficient in conveying meaning, so they have used in their

\textsuperscript{15} Exact dates of the baihua movement are difficult to pin down, as it is so intertwined with the May 4th political movement and the New Culture movement. I prefer to use the publication date of Hu Shi’s “Some Modest Proposals for the Reform of Literature” (1917) as a convenient marker for the beginning of the baihua movement and consider the socialist era of the 1930s as its end, when the range of expression characteristic of the movement was forcibly narrowed by the rise of the Communist Party and the censorship of the Guomindang Nationalist Party (see timeline).
translations an ordinary and simple language, whose style verged on the vernacular” (Hu Shi 137). And moreover:

[During the Yuan dynasty,] Chinese literature came closest to a union of spoken and written languages, and the vernacular itself had nearly become a literary language. If this tendency had not been arrested, then a “living literature” might have appeared in China and the great endeavor of Dante and Luther might have developed in old Cathay…It is preferable to house the living words of the twentieth century than the dead words of three millennia past…it is preferable to use the language of The Water Margin and The Journey to the West, which is known in every household, than the language of the Qin, Han, and Six Dynasties, which is limited and not universally understood. (Hu Shi 138)

Indeed, the importance the elite class of intellectuals placed on delivering baihua to the masses of China speaks volumes of the intense anxiety of the period; insofar as Lu Xun can soberly be called the “soul of the nation,” he certainly embodied that aspect. In his review of studies on the New Culture Movement, Zhesheng Ouyang speaks of the Chinese elites’ anxieties as firstly an identity crisis:

The collapse of the traditional system of “all under Heaven” first manifested in the disintegration [I would say, qualification] of the concept of “Chinese versus barbarians.” The military and technological superiority of the West forced the Qing Dynasty [in the late 19th and early 20th century] to implement the Westernization Movement, starting down the path of modernization by studying the West. This was followed by a national identity crisis at an institutional level: with the liberal gentry’s acceptance of constitutional monarchism, and the rising intellectual pursuit of republicanism, the foundations of the autocratic system were shaken, and the traditional political order gradually crumbled. (Zhesheng 90)

The term of “identity crisis” is used widely throughout current scholarship on this period and it is useful in that it helps frame in a new way the old questions. Chinese cosmology (as it linked personal and moral cultivation directly to governmental and social order) demanded that such monumental political transformations in government be registered on an individual level. Questions on how to conduct and conceive of the government
logically corresponded with similar questions about the self. How could China regain its (rhetorical) sovereignty in a Western-dominated world? In this process, which in many ways required a certain extent of modernization (read: Westernization), how could China retain its Chineseness—without that Chineseness being twisted into racial stereotypes of otherness and inferiority that justified further colonial action? The questions asked by intellectuals during the May 4th movement placed an enormous burden on writers’ language and style—on its ability to do the work of nation-building. To change the fate of the Chinese people, the Chinese people had to create a modern nation. To create a modern nation, the Chinese people had to create a modern national self, or character. And to change the character of the nation, the Chinese people had to change the style of their writings (Zhu “May Fourth” 72). They had to be understood.

But how? For thousands of years, rigid social hierarchies and strict attendance to ritual had maintained a stable social order. Because social position not only organized society and dictated moral conduct but also powerfully divided social strata, efforts to reach out and communicate across such separating lines necessitated how the Chinese people related to one another. Where previously it had been done through Confucian text and argument, now intellectuals were required to draw on alternative tradition, European rhetoric and personal ability to meet this challenge. Some were successful—which only means either that they were received well (read with favor) by their (or our) contemporaries; and others were not—which means, conversely, that they were ill-received, by their (or our) contemporaries and were received poorly (read with disfavor)—or perhaps not read at all. In the next chapter, we will see how intellectuals at the turn
of the century approached many of the same problems rhetorically—and how two of China’s most celebrated writers, Lu Xun and Lin Yutang, did so in their country and overseas.

Lu Xun and Lin Yutang, as incredibly gifted writers and translators, were more successful than most at being understood (conveying meaning) and negotiating the relationship between themselves and their audience (constructing their ethos). The intense praise of and continuing interest in their work alone attest to that. However, that is not to say at all that their audiences grasped fully their intended meaning. Firstly, that would require me to claim knowledge of those authors’ intended meaning—an assuredly presumptuous statement. And secondly—and more importantly—both authors proclaimed themselves pessimistic about the ability of their writing, indeed of language itself, to do the work they hoped it to do. Lu Xun, who “abandoned medicine...to treat the ills of society as a whole” over the course of his life lamented “China’s resistance to any structure of meaning”—to the creation of a narrative that could make sense of her past and current predicament (Moise 52; Anderson “Morality” 37). Lin Yutang, “the authoritative modern Chinese writer for the [twentieth century] American public,” in his English works draws frequent attention to “the troubling instability of words and their meanings” (Qian Liberal 1; Sample Legacy 196). Nonetheless, they were both prolific and incredibly talented writers, their style flaring in each (re)negotiation of authorial relation to the audience. Though these writers undoubtedly shared political differences (Qian Suoqiao notes that their debate during the 1930s “proved to be one of the first of its kind between Chinese liberals and Leftists”), in the following chapters, I focus on the writers’
similarities of style as they reflect sociopolitical and personal responses to their times to highlight the dangers and possibilities of writing and being read in colonial contexts and histories (Qian *Legacy* 8). Lu Xun and Lin Yutang in fact share several key stylistic tendencies although the two deploy them to extremely divergent results: both harness and grapple with the hybridity and fluidity of language in the construction of their ethos and both rely on humor and satire to appropriately distance themselves from their audiences.

Perhaps before the 2000s (and certainly before the 1980s), such an argument delineating the similarities between Lin Yutang and Lu Xun would have been preposterous (Tang 1227). Lu Xun even before his death had been considered China’s foremost modern author and was hailed as the vanguard of the May 4th movement (Davies 3). Lin Yutang, on the other hand, appeared for the first time after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in the footnotes of *The Complete Works of Lu Xun* in 1981, in which the editor scathingly charged him as a white-washing counter-revolutionary (Chou 26). But as the haze of the Cultural Revolution faded away, historians revisited the revolutionary canon—indeed, history itself—and began, slowly, to revise it. Today, Lin Yutang is again one of the most popular modern writers in China (Qian *Legacy* 1). Lu Xun, for his part, has been somewhat de-mythologized and more soberly considered as one particularly insightful intellectual—indeed, one particularly insightful man—among many writing in the revolution. And the May Fourth movement, which began that revolution, is no longer seen as quite so totally iconoclastic and anti-traditionalist (Lin
Yu-sheng 112). These historical rereadings have come about as a result of the ebb of Maoist revolutionary fervor and censorship after the Cultural Revolution. A survey of the variety of scholarly studies shows that not only Lin, but also Lu Xun, was a victim of Maoist readings that demonized Lin Yutang and deified Lu Xun, casting the two writers into carefully-crafted molds to suit the needs of the Chinese Communist Party.

16 The question of May Fourth, then, was not so much how best to destroy the traditional Chinese mindset holding the nation back from progress as it was how to determine the most appropriate (read: the strongest) tradition from which the new nation of China could progress in the modern world.
Chapter 3

Writing the (National?) Self into Existence: Lu Xun and the Glocalization of Identity in the 20th Century

Style is a compound of language, thought and personality.
—Lin Yutang, The Importance of Living (1937)

We often think of globalization—and its ramifications—as a contemporary problem with strictly contemporary solutions: technology has brought English to non-native speakers in a way never before possible, enabling English to become a global language. This is certainly true, but only in part. For one, it ignores that the globalization process is not a new phenomenon. Though scholars continue to argue over exactly how old that process is, globalization has a history (Canagarajah Reclaiming 7). And so does English as a global language. As we saw in the last chapter, British interpreters read yi 夷 as it was written by and representative of the Qing government as barbarian at the exclusion of previous interpretations. This selective interpretation not only justified British imperial actions to Europeans, but may have contributed to the downfall of the dynastic system as well by rhetorically deconstructing the cultural and semantic grounds on which the dynastic system was legitimized: classical culture as exemplified by Confucius. Chinese writers were, through the violence of colonialism, drawn into a new rhetorical situation and forced to rewrite—re-legitimize—their own in and to a modern (Western) world. Therefore, when Chinese writers composed in any language—they could not help but be highly aware of and sensitive to their audience’s interpretations of their “self” (their ethos) and their status as agentive, sovereign people in an agentive, sovereign nation. Though the political nature of ethos construction, I argue, remains
today, it could not have been more so during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when China was plagued by international and civil warfare, brutal invasion and foreign occupation. In short, for Chinese writers embedded in and aware of national history and culture, the risks of misinterpretation at home and abroad could literally have deadly consequences.

But calling this process “globalization” is somewhat misleading as well, in that it overlooks the critical means by which non-native English speakers have been and continue to adapt English and its informing rhetorical strategies to fit their communicative needs, in short, how the global becomes localized. I find it useful, then, to borrow a term from linguistics scholars and to think of the rhetorical history of English in China as described in this paper not as globalization but glocalization (Lin et al. 199).

This chapter reviews the broad political, cultural and linguistic movements in China that attempted to confront these risks before narrowing its focus to the strategies of two celebrated writers of the time, Lu Xun and Lin Yutang.

I reread Lu Xun’s “Diary of a Madman” or Kaugren Riji (1918) in this chapter in order to foreground the highly risky nature of style and ethos as critical means by which authors strive to make themselves understood. It is no coincidence that over the course of their prolific literary careers, both Lu Xun and Lin Yutang remained incredibly preoccupied with--and at times extremely pessimistic about--the relationship between language and reality, as well as the ability of language to affect that reality (Lee Legacy 30; Sample Legacy 192). Insofar as Lin Yutang and Lu Xun believed in language’s ability to affect real change, they also believed that the power of language in no small part
depended on their audience’s interpretations of that language. This chapter, after briefly overviewing the political and rhetorical situation of their times, will first focus on the stylistic similarities between the two writers--both Lu Xun and Lin Yutang, by centering the frailty of language in their construction of ethos and drawing on humorous and satirical rhetorical devices such as *reductio ad absurdum*--before turning to why and how they were received so differently. It is my hope that, by reviewing the stylistic similarities of these two authors, we might gain a better understanding of how translingual writers of the past made use of hybrid rhetorical strategies to confront and combat political processes of reading and interpretation, as well as to reassert themselves as agentive and sovereign rhetorical subjects.

Long frustrated with the Qing government’s inability to deal adequately with foreign incursion (id est the Opium Wars, the Sino-Japanese War and the Taiping Rebellion as examples), the revolution under Sun Yat-sen ultimately led to the final collapse of the Qing dynasty and central power in 1912 (Moise 50). Some years later, under the weak leadership of Yuan Shikai, China entered into conflict against Germany during the First World War. Many in China expected, under Wilson’s Fourteen Points to “obtain more independence and respect after the war” for their aid (Moise 51). However, the Versailles Treaty of 1918 returned the territory in Qingdao not to China but to Japan—and student-led protests erupted in the capital on May 4th, followed closely by protests and demonstrations across the country (Lipman 261). These student protests gradually grew into a national movement; and with it, the movement brought “new political forms, including labor unions and political parties…[intended] to advocate social change,
national unity, and resistance to foreign control”-- new means by which China might justify and establish her place in the world (Lipman 263). Although the nation quickly divided along Nationalist and Communist party lines even as Chiang Kai-shek white-knuckled official command of an increasingly totalitarian state, both the Nationalist and the Communist parties endorsed baihua as “a national mother tongue” and baihua literature as a vital instrument of nation building (Davies 9). And although opinions varied widely on precisely what should change and how, the baihua movement nonetheless had a definitively transformative effect on the nation:

Major intellectual figures began writing in a language much closer to that spoken by the common people, thus bringing closer the day when their writings could be read by a mass audience….This shift in language made mass education far easier than it could have been before, thus reducing the difficulty both of modern economic development and of creating a more equal society. (Moise 52)

That is, because leading intellectuals of the early twentieth century believed that the very nature, the style, of classical language was inappropriate for the needs of nation-building, the political and personal transformations demanded by May Fourth and the New Culture Movements would also have to transform language.

But I suggest that the baihua movement had another, more subtle stylistic effect: now that the written word was more readily accessible due to the proliferation of schools, ease of learning and new media (journals, newspapers, etc.), the position of the intelligentsia fundamentally changed at the turn of the century. Certainly, the intelligentsia still (somewhat paternalistically) administered to the laobaixing or common people, but their footing, both socially and stylistically had changed. The “bilingual intelligentsia” no longer “mediated between earth and heaven” as they had during the
dynastic period, but instead acted as the voice of the Chinese nation amidst a global community of other nations (Anderson 16). Therefore, writers were forced to reposition themselves not only among their own people, but in relation to the Western world as well. And during the baihua movement, they drew on both Chinese and Western literary tradition to do it.

In fact, a great many modern Chinese literary forms owe their generic characteristics to the baihua movement. As Zhu and Li summarize succinctly in “The Profound Influence of Linguistic Change on the Development of Modern Chinese Literary Forms”:

Comparatively speaking, the May 4th literary linguistic transformation can perhaps be regarded, to a certain extent, as having generously provided indispensable conditions for success to the fiction, whose major linguistic feature is narrative (by adding to the clarity of its narration); to the essay, whose major linguistic feature is reasoning (adding logic to the argument); to the drama, whose major linguistic feature is dialogue (adding to its colloquial character and action); and to juvenile literature, whose major linguistic feature is colloquial expression (adding to the easy accessibility and liveliness of its language). (Zhu & Li 116)

Classical Chinese, whose words were mostly monosyllabic, relied heavily on schemes like parallelism and was less clear when applied in modern forms; vernacular Chinese, as it more approximated daily speech, allowed for more flexibility in narration and dialogue and was somewhat easier to learn (Zhu & Li 116-17). That is to say that the shift from classical to vernacular language not only made the written word more accessible to more Chinese people than ever, it in fact enabled the development of new genres in Chinese literature and tremendous experimentation with content and style; therefore, it is no

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17 This, according to Anderson, located print and print capitalism as a vital step in the creation of not only nation but also nationalism: language as disseminated by newspapers, magazines, journals and literature—print capitalism—was “the new way of linking fraternity, power and time together” (Anderson 36).
overstatement when Zhu and Li later assert that “in a certain sense it can be said that the
difference of the development of literary forms in China is also a record of the changes of its
literary language” (Zhu & Li 121; Davies 9).

Lu Xun, perhaps the most celebrated baihua writer in the history of China,
carefully manipulated the new language to express the intense anxieties of the period in
general, as well as his personal fears. Born in 1881 in Shaoxing, Zhou Zhangshou, who
would later rise to prominence under the pen name Lu Xun, pursued his education and
grew into maturity as the last dynasty—and its rhetorical authority—collapsed amidst
civil and international conflict. Though he originally studied Western medicine overseas,
Lu Xun soon realized that science could not cure the ills of society—what he saw as a
spiritual, rather than a physical, disease. Depressed and disillusioned, Lu Xun dropped
out of medical school in 1906 and thereafter devoted himself to teaching and literature.
Although he would later come to be revered by Mao Zedong and legions of his
contemporaries as the “Father of Modern Chinese Literature,” the “voice of the nation’s
conscience” and “the sage of modern China,” his career did not have an auspicious start.
His essays received little attention and his translations, rendered in difficult classical
Chinese, didn’t either—that is, until his short story “Diary of a Madman” catapulted him
into national fame in 1918. Continuing his writings until his death in 1936, Lu Xun
inspired scores of Chinese youth to take up the pen—even though he never officially
joined a political party (Lipman 262-263; Davies 2-5).

Readers might understandably question my choice of Lu Xun’s perhaps most
famous short story for my analysis (if any of his other fictional works rival “Diary,” it
might be “The True Story of Ah Q” written three years later). If I am hoping to give
readers a fresh look at the construction of baihua ethos (even as compared to Lin
Yutang’s baihua-influenced American writings), then a primary text of Lu Xun Studies in
China and abroad since the 1930s seems hardly the place to start. But it is the very
conventionality of this piece in our current historical record that attracts me to it—not
only for my interest in translingual re-readings, but also for its marked unconventionality
at the time. “Diary of a Madman” assumed its canonical status in the record of May 4th
history and literature because, from among the many experimental baihua writings of the
first half of the twentieth century, his writing was sanctified by Mao Zedong’s CCP.18

Gloria Davies, in Lu Xun’s Revolution: Writing in a Time of Violence, argues that
Lu Xun’s literary writings, in the trend of historical interpretation in the period as Mao
rose to power, were coopted into Mao Zedong Thought in order to lend intellectual
weight to Mao’s political revolution. This is not to argue, by any means, that Lu Xun did
not believe literature to be a vital tool for the creation of a new Chinese citizenry and
nation. However, this simplistic reading of his life and works, still persistent in Chinese
mainland scholarship today, effectively erases Lu Xun’s “elegant ambivalence” toward
the Leftist movement and the revolution as a whole (Davies 7). But, as mentioned before,

18 Exclusions from Mao’s appropriately revolutionary literature were not made only on the basis of
perceived iconoclasm or anti-traditionalism—Ding Ling’s “Miss Sophia’s Diary” (1928), despite its clear
nod to Lu Xun and its similarly shocking content (in which a New Woman explores identity, emotion and
sexuality through her affairs with different men), never received quite the same recognition, perhaps due to
its author’s gender in a male-dominated literary movement. Insofar as Lin Yutang’s prose might have been
considered “effeminate,” a translingual analysis of Lin and Ding Ling’s style in light of the appropriate
expression of gender leading up to the Cultural Revolution would be a fascinating study—unfortunately,
such an analysis lies outside the confines of this paper. Readers interested in a general introduction to
women’s writings and changing gender roles in twentieth century China may find Tani E. Barlow’s I Myself
Am a Woman (1990) and Lingzhen Wang’s Personal Matters: Women's Autobiographical Practice in
Twentieth-Century China (2004) of particular interest.
the paternalistic and problematic implications of such a conception of the intellectual--of a privileged, elite class of writers uniting the people as the voice of the modern nation--did not go unnoticed, least of all by Lu Xun. These anxieties expressed themselves in Lu Xun’s writings throughout his career, regardless of genre or affiliation with the Leftist League or the Communist Party--but most noticeably in the elaborate narrative forms of his short story writing, a genre indebted itself to *baihua* movement (Lee *Legacy* 5, 44-5). Furthermore, I argue that such exclusively political interpretations force us to read “Diary of a Madman” in a way that crucially overlooks his extreme anxiety about his position as a leading twentieth century writer and the “frailties of literature as...contingent on interpretation” (Davies 20). In fact it seems to me that in many way’s “Diary” may have been a depressingly accurate prediction of the fate of Lu Xun’s own writings: as the frame narrator forces us to read the diary in a certain (sane) light, so too do the cult of Mao Zedong Thought and the conventions of cross-cultural analysis, force us to read to Lu Xun through a set of prescribed interpretations.

Indeed, reading, or interpretation, is a crucial theme in one of Lu Xun’s most short famous stories, “Diary of a Madman” (1918), perhaps rivaled in scholarly attention and general praise only by “The True Story of Ah Q,” published three years later. Numerous studies from the East and West have examined “Diary” as a *baihua* experiment in realism, satire and Marxist critique, pointing to Lu Xun’s ability to read and write German and Japanese and his personal journals as evidence of his exposure to such literary discourse (Lee 5, 8-10; Anderson “Morality” 33; etc.). These studies’ international focus allows for a multitude of literary interpretations, the most salient of which consider the generic
qualities of the short story and the fictional narrator’s role in the story more generally.

Whichever readings we may find persuasive, we cannot ignore the fact that half of Lu
Xun’s fictional works feature a fictional narrator: he was clearly trying to communicate
something through the narrator’s presence. Marston Anderson suggests that the shortness
of the short story does not allow the reader to forget that the story is a story and, as a
result, we react not to the fictional drama, but to the author’s relation to the fictional
world (“Morality” 35). Leo Ou-fan Lee reminds us that Lu Xun’s insertion of a fictional
narrator transforms his fiction into “a kind of story-theater” similar to Peking opera, in
which realistic details are deliberately minimized in order to maximize our attentions to
symbolism and stylistic delivery (Legacy 11). For my purposes, the most interesting
findings of such studies suggest that the qualities of the short story as genre foregrounds
“the relation between feeling subject (the author) and resistant object (the world, society,
the loved one, etc)” and the artificiality of the story as a whole—in other words, the
staged contestations between writer and reader in a situated rhetorical interaction
(Anderson “Morality” 35-36).

In “Diary,” the introductory frame narrative is written in classical Chinese by a
doctor, who has ostensibly published the diary as a written record of a patient’s
experience of pohaikuang 迫害狂 (usually interpreted as “persecution complex” and
considered a kind of schizophrenia) that it might contribute to medical research; that is,
the doctor-narrator reduces the diary’s contents to merely the written record of a
temporary bout of insanity. According to the doctor, he received the diary pages when he
visited the home of two brothers, one of whom he had heard was gravely ill. But by the
time the doctor arrives, the ill brother has already recovered and left the village to take up an official post with the government. Before assuming his post, however, he titled the pages himself as 狂人日记 (Kuangren Riji) “Diary of a Madman” and left them in the care of his older brother. In this section, I will attempt to argue that the stylistic choice of the character kuang (usually translated as “madness” or “insanity” but which in fact refers to a specific cultural connotation of madness) by the diarist acts as a window through which we may glimpse diction—indeed writing and reading more generally—as problematic acts of translation.

The world of “Diary” is a closed one. The spare world of the village—the lack of characteristic fictional description of setting and characters, for example—noted elsewhere heightens our sensitivity to the rich politics of power that bloom throughout the diaries pages and drift into and take root in our reality like so many fungal spores (Lee Legacy 7). From the moment the brother gives the doctor (who practices Western medicine, as his diagnosis of the diarist’s madness as a “persecution complex” attests) the diary, we realize that in the short story, words are not our own. Whenever characters write or speak, whenever they so much as smile, they are at the mercy of the audience’s interpretations which may render meanings drastically—tragically—different from the intended ones. In its most reduced state, then, the tragic proportions in “Diary” implode into a dark joke: for the doctor, the older brother and the recovered madman, it was all (just?) a misunderstanding; life has gone back to normal. Much like theatrical comedies of the West, very real and very dark conflict is reduced to mere absurdity by the return of the status quo as happy ending. I am of course arguing that the key of the joke—what
makes it come off, so to speak—is the rhetorical device reductio ad absurdum as employed by the doctor (frame) narrator.

This is an incredibly jarring display of the frame narrator’s—and the real writer’s—power, even as the same conditions denote their precarious position. As Marston Anderson observes:

The quest for mastery [by the author over the fictional world] is nowhere more evident than in the omniscient narrator’s privileged position vis-a-vis his characters, whose privacy he is perpetually invading and whose blindness to the overall significance of their own stories he is careful to ensure, jealously reserving full comprehension, and thus the right of judgment, for himself. (Anderson “Morality” 40)

In “Diary,” the judgment of the diary’s contents appears already foreclosed: it is nonsense, the ravings of a madman. The doctor has diagnosed the patient, though even his diagnosis was not really required. The patient himself seems to agree that, for a time, he was “mad.” But then again, he wasn’t “mad.” He was kuang 狂. Lu Xun’s 1918 “狂人日记 Kuangren Riji” and Nikolai Gogol’s 1835 short story shared the “same” name. By that I mean, of course, that they both were translated into English as “Diary of a Madman,” which cannot but draw attention to, as Ma puts it, the “transculturation” of a madness. But more than that, Zhou Zuoren (Lu Xun’s brother) in 1923 translated Gogol’s “Diary” as “Fengren riji.” Though Gogol’s story was later more commonly translated as “Kuangren riji,” Zhou was “obviously underscoring the difference between fengren and the kuangren of Lu Xun’s ‘Kuangren riji’” (Tang 1226). The distinction between kuang and other words for madness is a clearly matter of consequence for both Lu Xun and his audience, and it is therefore a matter of translation that I will address below.
The brother’s eventual convalescence and official appointment to local
government foregrounds and problematizes literary translation. Firstly, Chinese audiences
would know that in order to achieve such an appointment, the brother would have had to pass the civil service exam. He and every other prospective government official would have had to demonstrate a “correct” voice and Confucian ethos (You 21). That is, he would have had to deliver an interpretation as endorsed by the state when, as we learn later, his illness apparently expresses itself in his kuang or “mad” interpretation of Confucian texts. But what does “madness” actually mean in the context of the short story? In her article “Transculturation of Madness: The Double Origin of Lu Xun’s ‘Diary of a Madman,’” Xiaolu Ma makes much of the translingual origins of both the title of the story itself and the kuang 狂 character as chosen to represent madness, which nods to Nikolai Gogol’s “Diary of a Madman,” published in 1835, and therefore the Russian and English connotations of madness (Ma 349). Deftly underscor[ing the difference between the conception of Russian and Western madnesses with Chinese madness, Ma points out that, whereas Gogol’s madness represents the opposite of reason, Lu Xun’s kuang represents a prophetic reason (Ma 353). The sticking point, so to speak, is Lu Xun’s diction, his choice of character. The particular character Lu Xun chose to represent madness (狂) is highly stylized—it is meant to draw attention to a particular kind of madness, unlike the more general word for madness (疯 feng) and the more medical one (癫 dian). Ma writes:

In Analects, Confucius defined kuang as a character that does not follow the Golden Mean but pursues transformations. Later on, the manifestation of kuang
rose and fell in alignment with shifts in political power. In the Qin (221-206 BC) and Han (206-220 AD) dynasties, for example, when governing was rigorous and ideological control severe, some intellectuals faked insanity to resist rulers. In the Six dynasties (220-589 AD) and Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), by contrast, when intellectuals obtained greater freedom in discourse, *kuang* was not only a political gesture, but also became a carnivalesque performance. At the end of the Wei dynasty (220-265 AD) and the beginning of the Jin dynasty (265-420 AD), for instance, Zhulin qixian (The seven sages of the bamboo grove), by self-consciously adopting the role of *kuangren* (madman) with eccentric behaviors, gave vent to a caustic view of society. (Ma 366)

A few aspects of Ma’s etymology are particularly relevant. Firstly, during the earliest dynasties, *kuang* was invoked “to resist rulers.” Certainly, the ancient unification of the people during the Qin dynasty and the colonization of the people during the Qing dynasty by the Qin state and British government respectively were both violent and oppressive periods of rule; this lends credence to conventional interpretations of the story. The ancient invocation of *kuang* emphasized criticism of one’s own government--and, as evinced by his fictional narrator in “Diary” and his writings elsewhere (Davies notes his penchant for “presenting the act of writing as a state of heightened alertness against institutionalized truths and received opinions”), his use of *kuang* indicates similar “second thoughts” about both the Nationalist and Communist revolutions especially as revolutionary leaders exerted increasing control on the artistic production through censorship and propaganda (Davies 7; Lin Yu-sheng 108).

I argue, by bringing both Eastern and Western conceptions of madness to bear on the character 狂 *kuang*, Lu Xun not only problematized the position of the revolutionary writer even as he wrote to involve his readers in the revolution, but he also attempted a similarly ambivalent--and risky--linguistic endeavor: to (re)create and (re)deploy *kuang*
as a super-sign (a hetero-cultural signifying chain that reduces and expands meaning with each utterance). By assigning *kuang* to denote *<madness>* (the state of the diarist as it exists *in reality*), the traditional Chinese meaning of *kuang* must grapple with the (titularly originary) Western madness. Which meaning “wins out” is neither in the hands of the diarist, the doctor, or even Lu Xun himself: it is subject to the (potentially equally violent) interpretations of the audience, whose social, cultural, political and linguistic backgrounds may differ drastically from his own. This is as true whether we are discussing a Western or a Chinese audience. The profound differences between the East and West perceived by Chinese intellectuals could only be rivaled by the profound psychical divisions between them (the elite) and the masses—precisely the people to whom they were charged with communicating the (Western) discourse of modernity. Lu Xun asks how we can speak to one another if our words, the moment they are read, no longer belong to us? It may be that, just as the “truth” of the diarist’s illness remains unresolved in the story, so too does the “truth” of Lu Xun’s predicament as a revolutionary writer insofar as his reputation, success and reputation depended on the audience’s interpretation of his work.

These are bold and evasive statements, as they depend on perception at the periphery of language. It is not *what* happened, but how it was told. Some analysis will help elucidate my point. The diary’s plot, in brief: The “madman,” perhaps driven mad by the bright moon mentioned in the first entry, begins to worry about the strange looks his neighbors, fellow villagers and family give him. One night, when reading a classical text on virtue and morality, he begins to see words between the lines, with the whole book
filled with instructions to “eat people” (从子縫裡看出来, 本都写著两个字是‘吃人’！) Lu Xun 13). The narrator becomes increasingly horrified with his own involvement in the cannibalism of his town, memorably exclaiming that although he will be eaten, his brother, too, is a cannibal, that he is the younger brother of a flesh eater: 我是吃人的人的兄弟! 我自己被人吃了，可仍然是吃人的人的兄弟! (Lu Xun 14). And because the villagers eat only dead things, and cannot help their suspicion of one another (they not only eat people, they eat their own villagers), they are unable to become “real men,” capable of “fac[ing]” other real men” (难见真的人 Lu Xun 18). After numerous and peculiar interactions with the villagers, and the realization that the narrator may have unwittingly eaten a few pieces of his sister himself may be himself the next to be consumed, the diary closes with his exhortation to the Chinese people to “save the children” from a similar fate: cannibalizing their own people.

**Insanity, Laughter, Cannibalism: Humor as Consensual Construction of Meaning**

The implications of the short story’s theme, form and style are deathly serious. And yet, many scholars describe the story as satirical and ironic—Lu Xun’s personal brand of dark humor—for precisely the same highly constructed forms reviewed in the first part of this analysis (frame narration, linguistic slipperiness and contestation, etc). And “form,” Lin reminds us, “is farce” (Lin *My Country* 69-70). The joke of “Diary” depends on our apprehending the problematic politics of translation. Through careful readings, we can glimpse the dark joke; and yet, cannibalism isn’t funny. The joke doesn’t produce laughter for us as readers—but it is worth noting that the characters
themselves do an awful lot of laughing. The trouble pinning down what makes humor work—what produces the laugh—lies in the fact that it is not only “peripheral” but also socially and culturally constructed:

[Humor] is most easily observed from the corner of our eyes, on the edge of our vision, almost out of sight. When put centre stage, humour escapes our grasp. It leads the research astray, to larger, seemingly more momentous issues. But when we allow ourselves this peripheral vision...humour provides a wonderful prism to explore social life. (Kuipers 125)

It must be acknowledged that Giselinde Kuipers is an ethnographer and sociologist—not a literary analyst, linguist or historian. In Etnofoor’s 2016 special issue on humour, Kuipers’s study and others expand and critique conventional interpretations of humor’s social functions, especially among indigenous peoples. Ethnographers and anthropologists in the issue investigate humor as “a heuristic tool to gain insight into people’s emotions” and to gain access to intimate knowledge (Swinkels and De Koning 7-8). Niko Besnier even suggests that humor may serve as an entry point through which we might explore social inequalities, power relations and even indigenous people’s communal and personal reckonings with modernity (Besnier 75). For these researchers, humor (more than serving as a coping mechanism), among indigenous subjects with colonial histories, serves many functions and can do so precisely because of its ambiguity:

Humour is particularly suited to explore and express ambivalent experiences and constellations: contested politics, moral confusion, personal and social inadequacy, hybrid spaces and confused identities, and shame, bad taste and childishness...[It has been demonstrated the ways in which] humour explores but never resolves these issues. (Kuipers 126)
Kuiper’s observations—and indeed, the findings of the entire issue—are both intriguing and useful. The researchers present compelling evidence (from interpersonal interviews, participant observation and even literary analysis) supporting humor’s ability to do all these things. But it seems to me that Kuipers, as well as the majority of Lu Xun scholars, ignores humor’s crucial (perhaps its defining) characteristic: its inherent requirement of co-construction or consensuality that is at least as important as its high ambiguity and its social and communicative flexibility. A person, society or government cannot make humor do any of the things Kuipers lists, even if it can do all those things.¹⁹ For humor to succeed (to pull off the joke), it has to be consensual: much like truth (as it is relative and arrived at through consensus by a group), humor requires the speaker and the audience to meet on the same linguistic referential ground and to agree on the avenue through which humorous expression becomes itself.²⁰ And “Diary of a Madman” is funny—perhaps profoundly so—but the laughter it evokes is more of the tone which might be heard before the firing squad, than by the fireside. It is anguished, tortured and pessimistic—it is the laughter of a madman, a lonely man who has little real hope of being understood, because he and his audience have been so far displaced from common ground.

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¹⁹ Perhaps this is why revolutionary artists during the reign of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four never paid much attention to humor and the humorous as artform. Revolutionary literature, dance, art and theater could be majestic, profound and transformative; but it was hardly ever funny.

²⁰ The avenue discussed here is between the person who tells the joke and the person or people who hear it and laugh. There are, of course, plenty of examples of jokes that are not consensual (for example, racist, sexist, homophobic, etc. jokes); however, the joke will not come off if told to someone who does not share a similar (racist) referential ground or who does not agree on the avenue through which that humor is constructed.
The character 笑 (xiao, to laugh or to smile) appears no fewer than fifteen times in the thirteen-part short story. In such a dark tale, that characters—including the diarist—should smile so much not only adds to eeriness of the story, but also draws attention to smiles and laughter (instances of humor, amusement or something else entirely) as social interactions critically inflected with the interpretations of the audience (the audience within the diary—the townspeople, the audience within the short story—the brother and the doctor-narrator and the “real” audience—us). Social interactions and communication then join reading and writing as similar acts of interpretation, couched in the same problems. And this is apparent due to the multiple contexts of xiao 笑 in the story—its connotations. Smiles and laughter in the story are always doing something more than expressing pleasure in social interaction, whether they are reinforcing social norms (as when the children laugh at the madman) or ridiculing the absurdity of a town cannibalizing itself.

Xiao 笑 appears for the first time in the introductory frame, when the doctor arrives to the village and discovers that the previously ill brother has already left:

“I appreciate your coming such a long way to see us,” he said, “but my brother recovered some time ago and has gone to take up an official post.” Then, laughing 笑, he produced two volumes of his brother’s diary, saying that from these the nature of his illness could be seen, and that there was no harm in showing them to an old friend. I took the diary away, read it through, and found that he had suffered from a form of persecution complex. (Lu Xun 10)

21 The following English translations are borrowed from Gladys Young’s Selected Stories of Lu Hsun, published in 2000 by Wildside Press. The Chinese is the original.
The brother’s laugh emphasizes the harmlessness of the diary’s contents, as well as the lightness with which ownership or authority over the brother’s words can be transferred almost regardless of the consent of the writer. Whoever controls the text has incredible power over its meaning; the audience—here in the form of the brother and the doctor—through the act of reading become both object (of the writer’s writing) and subject (through their interpretations of that writing). And for the diarist, this is highly risky: his writing is, quite literally, out of his hands the moment anyone begins to read it.

In part four, the day after the madman sees instructions to eat people between the lines of the classical texts (which he has referenced, as Tang notes, to make sense of his current predicament), the diarist’s brother brings an old village doctor to examine him (Tang 1228). But the diarist interprets the examination as doctor determining if he is fat enough to eat yet. In response to the doctor’s attempts to calm him, the madman exclaims:

All these people wanting to eat human flesh and at the same time stealthily trying to keep up appearances, not daring to act promptly, really made me nearly die of laughter. I could not help roaring with laughter, I was so amused. I knew that in this laughter were courage and integrity. Both the old man and my brother turned pale, awed by my courage and integrity. (Lu Xun 14)

他們這群人，又想吃人，又是鬼鬼祟祟，想法子遮掩，不敢直截下手，真要令我笑死。我忍不住，便放聲大笑起來，十分快活。自己曉得這笑聲裏面，有的是義勇和正氣。老頭子和大大哥，都失了色，被我這勇氣正氣鎮壓住了。
Of course—if the madman is *feng* 瘋, they are not awed at all, but shocked as his display of insanity. But I have already discussed this problem of interpretation; what is important here is the madman’s attempt to imbue his laughter with meaning, which ultimately and utterly fails in any reading. If the madman is *feng* 瘋, the laughter, though disturbing, is ultimately of no consequence: his madness is later cured. If the madman is *kuang* 狂, and the townspeople really are cannibals, then all his bravado is for naught: his “recovery” means that nothing in the village changed and his laughter is ineffectual. Indeed, it means in fact that the diarist has accepted the reality of his cannibalistic town. Laughter—humor—has little power when it is meant to do something (to show his courage and integrity to intimidate the brother and doctor) in the same way that literature may have little power to affect change in the world or communicate something with other people: it simply does—or it doesn’t. Where Lin Yu-sheng ascribes this futility to the “generically different” nature of their mental categories (in that sanity and insanity in the story separate genre or modes of communication), I find it somewhat more useful to locate the futility of the story as the always-already foreclosed politics of interpretation that occur the moment we begin to read—to communicate. That the “true” meaning of the diary is never revealed to us as readers drives home this fact: for Lu Xun to disclose the “true” meaning of the story, he would have to participate in the same violent processes of interpretation problematized during the story. The author cannot bend a story to his ends any more than the diarist can bend his laughter. It never comes off right. It’s a bad joke.
Xiao 笑 appears for the final time in the tenth section, when the diarist at last speaks openly to his brother in their garden. He implores his brother to join him in standing up against the town’s cannibalistic practices, to “make a special effort to be good” and thereby have a chance to become “real men” and not animals. While the diarist talks, the villagers gather around, becoming spectators to the garden scene:

Outside the gate stood a group of people, including Mr. Chao and his dog, all craning their necks to peer in. I could not see all their faces, for they seemed to be masked in cloths; some of them looked pale and ghastly still, concealing their laughter. I knew they were one band, all eaters of human flesh. But I also knew that they did not all think alike by any means. Some of them thought that since it had always been so, men should be eaten. Some of them knew that they should not eat men, but still wanted to; and they were afraid people might discover their secret; thus when they heard me they became angry, but they still smiled their cynical, tight-lipped smile. (Lu Xun 19)

It may be that, in the end, Lu Xun’s short story became a depressingly kuang prediction of the author’s own fate—as Mao rose to power in China and Lu Xun’s image became increasingly militarized to serve the needs of the Chinese Communist Party (Davies 7). Tang draws our attention to this passage to demonstrate how kuang functions in the story to produce “a radical shift, in the production of meaning, from the chain of the signified to the elusive chain of the signifier”: kuang, by foregrounding the “sociosymbolic” practices that construct “reality” or truth makes us acutely aware of the necessary mediation of reality by language (Tang 1226). What’s more, the facelessness of the villagers and the somewhat obscured smiles highlight the the covert yet concerted
means by which that construction occurs. As one man separated from the group by “insanity” (which here means only different interpretations of reality), he cannot hope to interrupt these processes even if he is aware that they are happening. Lu Xun underscores this point when the diarist’s brother demands that the crowd “clear off,” yelling, “What is the point of looking at a madman?” (疯子有什么好看?; Lu Xun 19). Once labelled “mad,” everything he communicates will be labelled as madness—until he returns to proper sociosymbolic and ideological grounds. Inside the story, Western concepts and medical interpretations of kuang constrain readings of the diary and obstruct the horror of the diarist’s experience; outside the story, foreign incursion and domestic politics increasingly stifled Lu Xun’s critical approach to revolution. The humor inside the story (the laughter of the villagers and the challenging laugh of the madman) is nearly satirical in its exaggeration of communication as crucially dependent on referential consent and consensus. The aggregate effect of Lu Xun’s stylistic decisions is the utter and horrific sense of alienation and isolation.

While Lu Xun ceaselessly struggled with the need to serve the revolution on the one hand and intense anxiety about the subversion of individual style to ideology on the other, Lin Yutang clung to individualism as an aesthetic goal in itself (Chou 21). Like the majority of May 4th intellectuals, both Lu Xun and Lin Yutang wanted to use their craft to serve the nation. But Lin located his highest hopes for China’s future not in the question of modernity or progress, but rather in China’s developing relationship with the rest of the world. That is to say that, more than turning attention from the question of China’s modernity to the “consequences of these ideas,” Lin, by appealing rhetorically to
universal human values, hoped to generate understanding for China and her people abroad, even while he encouraged self-criticism in his Chinese-language writings (Sample Legacy 193). Lin was not, as he has been criticized, a “‘double-faced’ interpreter… saying one thing in Chinese and another in English” (Qian Legacy 11-12). Rather, he wrote in a style across both languages that cause the audience to reorient themselves to his subject matter in a manner remarkably similar to Lu Xun’s, despite socio-political and personal differences that also impact their styles. And ultimately, both authors became victims to the selective sociopolitical interpretations of those audiences.
Chapter 4

Translating for a New Audience: Lin Yutang’s Charming Resistance in *My Country and My People* (1935) and *The Importance of Living* (1937)

I am not deep and not well-read. If one is too well-read, then one does not know right is right and wrong is wrong. I have not read Locke or Hume or Berkeley, and have not taken a college course in philosophy. Technically speaking, my method and my training are all wrong, because I do not read philosophy, but only read life at first hand. That is an unconventional way of studying philosophy—the incorrect way. Some of my sources are: Mrs. Huang, an amah in my family who has all the ideas that go into the breeding of a good woman in China; a Soochow boat-woman with her profuse use of expletives; a Shanghai street car conductor; my cook’s wife; a lion cub in the zoo; a squirrel in Central Park in New York; a deck steward who made one good remark; that writer of a column on astronomy (dead for some ten years now); all news in boxes; and any writer who does not kill our sense of curiosity in life or who has not killed it in himself…how can I enumerate them all?

Thus deprived of academic training in philosophy, I am less scared to write a book about it.

—Lin Yutang, *The Importance of Living* (1937)

The highly stylized form of “Diary” raises the audience’s awareness of the story as a story, surfacing the fraught relationship between author and audience in a way that mirrors the anxiety Lu Xun felt in relating himself as a twentieth century writer and intellectual to the Chinese populace. If Lu Xun’s “Diary” merges Western and Chinese concepts to unsettle his audience from their norms of interpretation, then Lin Yutang’s *My Country and My People* (1935) and *The Importance of Living* (1937) do no less through an opposing process. Opposing, but not opposite, in that Lin seems to use similar rhetorical devices and generic characteristics to very different ends and effects: Lin Yutang’s writings may be so stylized and so artificial as to convey a transparent, fallible and personable *ethos*. His frank style, which both engages and frustrates American cultural, discursive and linguistic norms and expectations, enables him to radically
reposition the relations of author and audience. And by surfacing the artifice and inadequacy of language, with a charming and humorous tone, Lin demonstrates the ways in which the limits of our language trace the bounds of our understanding of life. The social issues of his time thus framed above all as problems of communication, he advocates moral, critical and cosmopolitan conversation in response.

In the preface of The Importance of Living (an excerpt of which serves as the epigraph to this chapter), Lin foregrounds a particular kind of struggle: that of expressing himself inside the forms or expectations of an English-language philosophical discourse. Lin relates his difficulties with naming, organizing and writing the book, expressing wonder that, despite his intentions, he could not name it “A Lyrical Philosophy” (for fear of raising the reader’s expectations too high) or write it, as he intended, in the form of a dialogue like Plato’s (vii). By Lin’s own admission, his training is “all wrong” to write even a personal philosophy; that, “technically speaking,” his training in philosophy is at the very least unconventional, by which he means that he is unfamiliar with the canon of Western philosophy (“Locke or Hume or Berkeley”). This unfamiliarity with Western philosophical discourse would, in the West, mark him as “not well-read,” but one only has to read on for a few moments to witness his many references to ancient authors such as Plato, Confucius and Su Dongpo, modern Western writers like Miguel Cervantes and more current authors like Sir Arthur Keith (a Scottish anthropologist), Lu Xun and Hu Shi.

But more than that, Lin here recreates the experience of viewing one’s own experiences through the lens (W.E.B. DuBois would say the veil) of a dominant cultural
discourse. That he has read so widely and across so many genres and discourses, Lin
implies, means that he has not read deeply in any of them. In this frame, Lin’s peculiar
claims that being “too well-read” leads to moral confusion and that he is not “deep” in
fact suggest that over-indulgence in a single discursive sphere (whether the spheres are
“subjects” such as English, philosophy, or history; linguistic communities such as
“English” or “Chinese”; or cultural communities such as American) marginalizes the
knowledge and modes of construction of other communities, limiting our ability not only
to see discursive norms and boundaries as arbitrary, flawed and man-made but also to
recognize our individual experiences as other valid means of knowing.

These other ways of knowing—present in his writing as various “sources” such as
his family’s amah, the deck steward with one worthy remark and a squirrel—he envisions
not as limiting or inadequate but rather as agentive and liberating, allowing him to
express his thoughts and radically include himself in philosophical discourse. Being
“deprived of academic training in philosophy,” Lin can draw on a variety of linguistic
resources, from his “life at first hand,” rather than dominant discursive resources.

As discussed in the introduction to this thesis in the terms of acculturative stress,
dominant discourse communities and institutions often severely punish deviations from
discursive norms, which may often frighten would-be writers and speakers into silence
for fear of being seen as Other. In this way, less attention to or even ignorance of
discursive norms, boundaries and expectations (a momentary loss of double-
consciousness) allow for greater flexibility and specificity of expression. But the same
rhetorical decisions also leave his entire philosophy open to justified critique; more than
that, these stylistic decisions invite criticisms, engagement and conversation. Various individual and communal means of knowing are then equally valid, critically necessary and, most importantly, mutually informing. These different means of knowing must be brought into conversation with one another: they must be translated for and by one another.

In this way, by treating the convergence of ideas in himself as fruitful ground for inquiry and by drawing on a wide array of linguistic, semiotic and stylistic sources, Lin Yutang participates in translingual literary practices reminiscent of the kind Angel Lin, Wendy Wang, Nobuhiko Akamatsu and Mehdi Riazi call for and enact in “International TESOL Professionals and Teaching English for Glocalized Communication (TEGCOM).” In this fascinating article, the four TESOL professionals, each of whom “learned and used English since childhood in different parts of Asia—Mainland China, colonial and postcolonial Hong Kong, Japan and Iran,” first analyze their own experiences of English language learning by noticing specific decisions and actions of their teachers, classmates and parents and by considering similarities across their individual accounts, while preserving and recognizing differences. They then move out of the local to engage the discourse (and discourse communities) of TESOL and applied linguistics. Finally, they destabilize “the discursive and institutional practices of Othering” inherent in current TESOL categories and call for a “paradigm shift” to doing TEGCOM (Lin et al. 199). Though the evidence of social justice and action need not be further emphasized, one final observation may render more concrete the role of such scholarly work for both the academy and the diverse communities it serves: TESOL,
Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages, as a name itself emphasizes the role of the teacher, who teaches to and acts on the speaker. TEGCOM, Teaching English for Glocalized Communication, both emphasizes that education should work for communicators (even as the absence of a speaker in the name foregrounds communication as necessary for a diverse array of individual speakers) and more accurately reflects the realities of English language education by viewing so-called “universal [and] context-free” linguistic practices as localized and embodied (218).

More than that, such a shift underscores the intimate relationship that exists between language and issues related to class, race, gender and sexuality, the relationship which translingualism seeks to surface and deconstruct. By treating linguistic differences as entry point, we may be able “to find ways to live with [issues of language and society] with heightened understanding, appreciation, and tolerance” (You Cosmopolitan 10). This, I argue, is precisely the aim of Lin’s American writings, which focus on issues of translation, difference and cross-cultural communication across a range of topics.

The hard fact of translation—and the resultant breakdowns in communication—is problematic for the relations of China to the West, but it is at least approachable. We can at least talk about it—if we talk about it together. This is why Lin has ostensibly taken up the pen in America: to open discussion about the various ways in which China might relate to the Western world and vice versa, to find common ground and common understanding, in which differences can enrich, rather than detract from, conversations (a central idea in translingual practice). This is why his writings even as they reserve space to critique both Chinese and Western culture, feature chapter and section titles and topics
such as “Footbinding,” “Calligraphy,” “Humor,” “The Importance of Loafing,” “The Enjoyment of Nature” and “Relationship to God.” As Chih-ping Chou observes, Lin in fact tried to promote a sense of humor and leisure as an alternative path for intellectuals to fight against the overwhelming trend of the socialist movement in the 1930s, which had an increasingly distressing habit of subjugating art to politics (Chou 30).

By assuming the role of cross-cultural critic, expanding and elaborating on Chinese concepts in the English language—by translating the Chinese culture for a Western audience—Lin also forced his audience to confront their preconceived interpretations, specifically by drawing attention to their habits of reading Chinese culture into Orientalist modes of thought and the limiting discursive norms of standard English language and standard English genres and forms.

The rhetorical effectiveness of his writing, then, depends in no small part on his ability to construct an *ethos* that is *readable* to the American public. On the one hand, the success of his writing in America demonstrates his mastery of such a construction. On the other, Lin’s practical erasure during the reign of Mao’s Communist Party, paints a far different picture. I argue that the same problematic and political processes of reading, writing and interpretation (the plight of colonialist communication) which tortured Lu Xun also preoccupied Lin Yutang; moreover, his particular style in English-language prose demonstrates his confrontation of these processes in a manner strikingly similar to Lu Xun. But where Lu Xun’s anxiety caused him to close off the world of “Diary,” Lin Yutang’s world radically opens new avenues of communication. Lin Yutang employs a stylistic approach that exposes the discursive conventions of “philosophy” and plays with
them—poking and prodding at the seams in a way that modifies the fabric itself. The process of translation is problematic, as Lin remarks later on, but necessary and even enjoyable, as cultures perceived as so different from one another like America and China can in fact find commonalities in unexpected places, while preserving and honoring their differences.22

**Limited, Yet Dignified: Lin’s Cosmopolitan Rhetoric**

Lin Yutang (1895-1976) was born in Fujian province and, similar to Lu Xun, pursued his education overseas. Also similar to Lu Xun, Lin Yutang had an illustrious career: he wrote for a multitude of publications (including his own satirical magazine *Analects Fortnightly*), invented a typewriter that could type Chinese characters, commented on and criticized both Chinese and American politics and became an internationally renowned writer during the twentieth century (Qian *Liberal* 2). Though *The Importance of Living* (1937) became a U.S. national bestseller list the year it was published and positioned Lin as “the authoritative modern Chinese intellectual for the American public for much of the 20th century,” he was not always as popular with his own countrymen overseas (Qian *Liberal* 1). While Lin enjoyed some fame during the 1920s and ‘30s for his participation in the linguistic and cultural debates of the time and his reputation as “an exemplary Westernized modern Chinese intellectual,” Lu Xun himself attacked Lin Yutang’s writings (which ranged from apolitical humor to small

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22 In fact, in a section I will revisit later entitled “The Chinese Character,” Lin juxtaposes the writings of Laotse (who Lin refers to as the author of the “Bible of Taoism”), the Greek myth of Icarus, and the fiction of Tolstoy, Robert Louis Stevenson and Sir James Barrie. These unlikely pairings draw attention to the fact that similar experiences and understandings, resonances of truth can be found in unexpected places—places of commonality and understanding that can only be discovered when brought together in conversation in the first place (*My Country* 54).
essays) as “bric a brac for the bourgeoisie,” or useless to the revolutionary cause (Qian *Legacy* 7; Denton n.p.). Furthermore, as Lin repeatedly criticized the CCP and its practices, “Lin’s name was banned in Mao’s China for several decades” (Qian *Liberal* 1). Though to a somewhat lesser degree—and because, of course, the CCP eventually mythologized him as the foremost revolutionary writer of the time—Lu Xun’s reputation went through similar highs and lows as the qualifications for appropriately revolutionary writing sharpened and narrowed. As the grip of first the Nationalist, then the Communist government tightened over artistic expression, both writer’s works were subjected to highly political and intensely volatile processes of reading.

Before we turn to how Lin confronted the vulnerability of language to the processes of reading, we must first address his strong command of the English language. Joe Sample in “His Country and His Language: Lin Yutang and the Interpretation of Things Chinese” draws on previous analysis to demonstrate how Lin managed “to talk the English language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude [and] idea” and thereby establish a certain amount of familiarity and rapport with his readers more effectively than his Chinese contemporaries—even those whose works, like Lu Xun’s, were translated into English (Sample *Legacy* 186). Lin’s familiarity with the Anglo-American language, demonstrated not only through his use of words, but also through the comparison of those words’ connotations, is therefore read as a familiarity with the Anglo-American audience which cannot help but be returned. In the first paragraph of chapter one in *The Importance of Living*, Lin writes:

In what follows I am presenting the Chinese point of view, because I cannot help
myself. I am interested only in presenting a view of life and of things as the best and wisest Chinese minds have seen it and expressed it in their folk wisdom and their literature. It is an idle philosophy born of an idle life, evolved in a different age, I am quite aware. But I cannot help feeling that this view of life is essentially true, and since we are alike under the skin, what touches the human heart in one country touches all. I shall have to present a view of life as Chinese poets and scholars evaluated it with their common sense, their realism and their sense of poetry. I shall attempt to reveal some of the beauty of the pagan world, a sense of the pathos and beauty and terror and comedy of life, viewed by a people who have a strong feeling of the limitations of our existence, and yet somehow retain a sense of the dignity of human life. (Lin *Importance* 1)

His command of Western rhetorical strategies is impressive: firstly, the sincerity that rises out of his work forms the basis of his *ethos*, which Lin doubtless knew was indispensable as a foreign writer in America cognizant of the country’s habit of othering non-Europeans. Lin speaks in a middle style with primarily Old English core words, which has two effects. As Jeanne Fahnestock observes, “a passage in which the core vocabulary dominates…will strike most English users as simple and straightforward,” and also possess “the voice of familiarity and truthfulness” (Fahnestock 32). Additionally, while he certainly characterizes the Chinese people in both *The Importance of Living* and *My Country and My People*, he does so in a manner that radically redirects the usual flow of conversations on national character from essentialist and social Darwinist conventions and towards new understandings. Here, by appealing to a set of human values--represented by “the human heart,” similarities “under the skin,” and “the dignity of human life”--and focusing on what the East and West can learn from one another in an unassuming, familiar tone, Lin draws the public closer to his stylistic self and raises his *ethos* in the eyes of that public.
But more than that, Lin’s appeals to his own and his audience’s common humanity, which transcends the borders of country, reveal his belief in cosmopolitanism (which Qian Suoqiao comments on at length in Liberal Cosmopolitan). In Cosmopolitan English and Transliteracy, Xiaoye You defines cosmopolitanism as a “millenia-old notion” which categorizes people “first and foremost [as] members of the human race” and who are “morally obligated to those outside their categories [of family, ethnicity, nation, race and class].” The cosmopolitan perspective, for You, provides anti-essentialist and alternative frames that “both acknowledge the usefulness of national, cultural, and linguistic boundaries and at the same time interrogate and break them down”; he suggests that cosmopolitanism as a moral orientation in writing studies allows the field to re-envision the role of literacy and literacy education as radically inclusive and social justice-oriented as our world, thanks to globalization, is “becom[es] small” (You Cosmopolitanism 6). Like Lin, You envisions discussions of the artificial borders between language as entryways into discussions of artificial borders between humans; though useful, these borders, once seen for what they are, can be crossed.

Indeed, Lin devotes considerable time to the comparison of European and Chinese culture as they affect cross-cultural understanding and interpretation. As Sample astutely observes, Lin “makes a habit of returning conversations about China to language itself,” demonstrating his belief in the difficulty and necessity of cross-cultural communication (Sample Legacy 192). By “cracking open verbal atoms” such as face and character, Lin avoids the “polemical-debunking” style so characteristic of 1930s revolutionary literature because such an approach, in Lin’s view, is “not conducive to cooperation or the
generation of new knowledge” (Sample Legacy 192). I argue that, as an extremely skilled writer and linguist in both Chinese and English, and a self-proclaimed “cross-cultural critic,’” Lin Yutang not only endeared himself to an American audience, but also attempted to bring English and Chinese into a more equal comparative relationship, thus unsettling the Orientalist mode of looking and interpreting (Qian Liberal 61). There are, most assuredly, problems with his personable and familiar stylistic approach, and I will address these in the conclusion of this chapter. But Lin’s direct approach to the ambivalence of language was a powerful rhetorical strategy which allowed him access to the American reading public, even while delivering insightful—and sometimes rather incisive—commentary from a critical distance.

In fact, Lin redirects the charge of national character discourse, a product of Western colonial design, back onto itself by similarly characterizing Westerners. In Chapter 2 of My Country and My People, entitled “The Chinese Character,” Lin first discusses the cultural differences between the English word character and the Chinese word for character that must nonetheless be presented in this work as the word “character” (Lin My Country 42). In The Importance of Living, Lin’s mastery of English and the plain style is so compelling that he dares to represent the national characters, or minds, of the English, French, American, German, Russian, Japanese and Chinese in so-called “pseudo-scientific” formulas (Lin Importance 6-7). So confident in his ability to portray an appropriately familiar, truthful and, indeed, likable, ethos, Lin Yutang can even poke a little fun at his audience from time to time, as he does when explaining his American formula:
There is an interesting tug between idealism and realism in America, both given high figures, and that produces the energy characteristic of the Americans. What American idealism is, I had better leave it to the Americans to find out; but they are always enthusiastic about something or other. (Lin *Importance* 7)

Of course, Lin’s self-proclaimed “pseudo-scientific formula” for the American national character is a political statement in itself: in an age in which Western imperialism justified itself through dissemination of pseudo-scientific (read: racist and eugenicist) rhetoric that proclaimed the barbaric, backward and primitive character of non-Europeans, the discussion of American national character by a non-American was nothing short of subversion. His admission that his formulas are artificial before proceeding to spend an entire chapter discussing them further implicates formulas—and by extension, science as a Western form of knowing—as just one form of knowledge among many. But the familiar and personable nature of his style smooths the interpretation of that subversion to cheekiness—even charm. In this way, Lin bypasses conventional and othering Western modes of reading. Simply put, as his mastery of the English language closes a perceived distance between himself and his audience, Lin gets Americans (who in the general population at least, mostly ignored or were otherwise unaware of Lu Xun’s existence) to listen to him.23

It is not so much that Lin Yutang and Lu Xun’s stylistic approaches are “exactly the opposite,” but moreso that both, by manipulating distance through various rhetorical strategies, express critically different political ideas about what that change ought to

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23 Irene Eber in “The Reception of Lu Xun in Europe and America: The Politics of Popularization and Scholarship” argues that Lu Xun’s reception in the West, as with Lin Yutang’s in China, “often reflects the thaws and freezes in international relations” (242). The critical difference is, of course, that Lu Xun was much less well-known than Lin in America and certainly never as popular among the general population.
affect in their respective audiences (Chou 27). We might say that Lu Xun’s distancing strategy produces anxiety and “unease,”24 while Lin Yutang’s produces thoughtful—even charming—ambivalence (Davies 7).

**Cracking Up and Cracking Open: Lin’s Translation Makes Space for Conversation**

And that ambivalence was precisely his point. Lin’s style portrays large, complex subjects in an approachable manner by maintaining a humorous or cheeky tone in the face of ambivalence. His humor and playful attitude thus de-fangs the complexities of Orientalism, cultural difference and national crises in order to “help resolve the squabble between opposing viewpoints [and thus enable] a means for engaging in productive social critique” (Sample *Legacy* 199).25 A particularly salient stylistic habit of Lin’s is his reduction of complex issues, such as cultural difference and exoticization, to a simpler form. In this case, we see how this habit of simplification and reduction—even as it maintains a comic tone—can be quite critical in his ridiculing of “the Old China Hand” as interpreter of China:

> Who will, then, be [China’s] interpreters? The problem is an almost insoluble one...by a process of elimination, it would seem that we have to put up with the Old China Hand, and that we have largely to depend upon his understanding of pidgin.

> The Old China Hand, or O.C.H.—let us stop to picture him, for he is important as your only authority on China...Let us make no mistake about him. He may be the son of a missionary, or a captain or a pilot, or a secretary in the consular service, or he may be a merchant to whom China is just a market for selling sardines and “sunkist” oranges. He is not always uneducated; in fact, he may be a brilliant journalist, with one eye to a political advisorship and the other to a loan commission. He may even be very well informed within his limits, the

24 *Disease?* I can hardly resist an appeal to Lu Xun’s characteristic medical metaphors.

25 Indeed, Lin Yutang can be credited with the introduction of *youmo*, or humor, to China during the 1920s and ‘30s (Qian *Legacy* 1).
limits of a man who cannot talk three syllables of Chinese and depends on his English-speaking Chinese friends for his supplies of information. But he keeps on with his adventure and he plays golf and his golf helps to keep him fit. He drinks Lipton’s tea and reads the *North-China Daily News* [a popular English-language Shanghai newspaper], and his spirit revolts against the morning reports of banditry and kidnapping and recurrent civil wars, which spoil his breakfast for him...He may have no aristocratic blood in his veins nor ancestral oil portraits in his halls, but he can always circumvent that by going further back in history and discovering that his forefathers in the primeval forests had the right blood in them, and that sets his mind at peace and relieves him of all anxiety to study things Chinese. But he is also uncomfortable every time his business takes him through Chinese streets where the heathen eyes all stare at him. (*My Country* 8-9)

Lin’s sketch of the O.C.H. renders digestible a portrait of the well-intentioned Orientalist of the type Edward Said would speak of half a century later in *Orientalism*. Lin’s characterization, while measured (the O.C.H., Lin allows, may be well-informed and even empathetic), is insightful and critical as it underscores the O.C.H.’s cultural identity as the lens through which he must necessarily interpret China. The O.C.H.’s possible fathers were employed as missionaries (agents of Christian civilizing discourse), military or bureaucratic officers (agents of military colonial aggression and occupation) or merchants (agents of capitalist expansion). His inability to speak the Chinese language ought, furthermore, to demonstrate that his translations should be taken at the very least with a grain of salt (even if he has the help of Chinese friends), even if he believes in his own authority to translate. This authority, Lin reminds us, which may have no familial or concrete links to colonial power and rule through blood, is nonetheless endorsed by social Darwinist, Othering/Orientalizing and racializing rhetorics that prop up colonial regimes. And yet, rather than feeling attacked or rebuffed by Lin’s assessment as we might have by Lu Xun’s, we are merely interested and amused. If we laugh at the O.C.H., it is not a
derisive laughter, but an indulgent one reserved for the under- or mis-informed—because the O.C.H.’s problem (and the problem we have with him) is communication and understanding. His understanding of China is always mediated by the act of translation.

Moreover, Lin challenged and infuriated as he “vented his views on the world order, racism, and US-China policy”—hardly a white-washing counterrevolutionary or a race traitor (Sohigian *Legacy* 137). Humor was for Lin, therefore, not only an indispensable tool to draw his audience into an intimate relation whereby cross-cultural discussion might exist, but also a political goal *in itself*. Lin’s specific brand of humor, in other words, depended on concepts of play—a lightness of touch that playfully invited, rather than gravitationally charged processes of communication. Tang Xiaobing, when remarking on the gradual and purposeful return to “more creative thinking” in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, shows that in this stance, Lin was ahead of his time:

A new generation of critics and writers realizes that a direct subjugation of literature to political instrumentalization leads inevitably to a failure to grasp literature as a distinct social discursive praxis with its own logic and historical determinations. Together with this awareness surfaces widespread interest in the rhetoric of the autonomy of literature, in formalism, and in the textual analysis of New Criticism. This apparent depoliticization of literary studies paradoxically subverts the entrenched political tradition of reducing the individual to a faceless functionary in a revolutionary cause. It is part of what Vaclav Havel calls “antipolitical politics” in a totalitarian system. The critical urge to read a poem first as a poem, therefore, has the same implication and force as does the demand to treat a human being first as a human being. (Tang 1228)

Lin, perhaps, might have been too far ahead of his time. Even as readers from China and the West today revisit Lin as a talented and steadfast defender of the human right to free expression, we must remember that our politics of reading, informed by our present
sociopolitical and historical moment, differ dramatically from Lin’s immediate audience: the Chinese and Americans readers of the ‘30s and ‘40s.

In China, this kind of humor was a very singular one, tied up with concepts of “leisure” (xianshi 闲适), both of which were “in vogue” during the 1930s, especially in cosmopolitan Shanghai, where Lin lived before moving to the United States--and both of which were increasingly villainized as the Communist Party rose to power (Chou 26). Lin’s habit of reduction, a modified *reductio ad absurdum*, was read by Chinese audiences as white-washed apologetics. Though I believe this judgment to be a simplistic interpretation of Lin’s work, it is not a wholly unreasonable claim: the Versailles Treaty of 1918 which sparked the May 4th movement became, in Lin’s writing, merely the “extreme silliness” of France and Germany, in spite of previous discussion on how a cross-cultural approach might have literally changed history (Lin *My Country* 60). Lin’s cozying up to Westerners—despite the critical “detachment” necessary for his style and to whatever ends—did not read well as the Leftist movement rose to a fever pitch in China and art was increasingly enlisted to serve ideology (Sample *Legacy* 197). To borrow Qian Suoqiao’s term, his “middling politics” were not good enough to the Leftists eager to dominate the ideological battleground, and so they decided to silence Lin’s voice, while militarizing Lu Xun’s, on the intellectual scene.

In America, on the other hand, a different, but equally problematic politics of reading occurred when *My Country and My People* and *The Importance of Living* were published for a popular audience. For one, old (reading) habits die hard—and, as Lin’s works were for a time the most widely available, and, indeed, the *only* authoritative
writings on China by a Chinese person, his writings were all the more vulnerable to Western essentializing readings. Though he claims to present his own views (which, in his own words, cannot but be Chinese) the danger of a single story as discussed by Chimamanda Adichie leaves his writing—and the culture he of necessity represents—vulnerable to critical misunderstandings. That is, his voice, as the authority on China for Americans at this time, falls prey to the very essentialist and Orientalist readings he was trying to combat.

Like Lu Xun, Lin Yutang, through powerful stylistic choices, confronted the problem of his volatile and globalizing rhetorical situation by drawing on local knowledge and subjectivity. Lu Xun and Lin Yutang’s writings sought to communicate with and transform audiences across divisions of race, class and geography that desperately needed to understand one another. In some ways, they succeeded; in others, they failed. But in the end, the relative “success” or “failure” that we may conclude of Lin Yutang and Lu Xun’s writings is almost beside the point. Rather, the translingual approach to rhetorical analysis—an approach that allows us to situate writers and their texts socially, geopolitically, culturally and linguistically—invites us and our students to consider and learn from past writers as they navigated their own rhetorical situations.

Such an approach has the potential to transform our students’ understandings and beliefs in what writing and education can do, and may lead them radically reassess writing as a means to transform their own lives and their own social and geopolitical contexts. And in charging our students to develop a “global literary awareness,” and in turn to produce their own literature, drawing on their own situated subjectivities, we are truly enabling
students to access education as a practice of freedom. These are not new claims:

Canagarajah, bell hooks, Paulo Freire, Min-zhan Lu and others have suggested as much.

But it is high time for rhetoric and composition studies to develop practical approaches to accommodate a translingual writing pedagogy. The final chapter gives some suggestions on how we might do so.
Reading...is an act consisting of two sides, the author and the reader. The net gain comes as much from the reader’s contribution through his own insight and experience as from the author’s own.

—Lin Yutang, *The Importance of Living* (1937)

I introduced this thesis by proposing that we as composition studies scholars in increasingly diverse classrooms more critically examine what demands we put on students when we ask them to compose in English. I pointed to the widespread and recently documented evidence of acculturative stress as international students struggle to learn not only new languages but also new cultures—and demonstrated that such reading habits, far from coming into existence in our age of globalization, are actually deeply rooted in history as the political processes of nation-building and colonialism cemented themselves through the written word, through discourses that in many ways created identifiers like race, foreignness, barbarism and other convenient categories of Otherness to justify and reify colonial oppression. By historicizing such questions and following in the footsteps of other scholars who have looked at the history of English and English instruction in local contexts (Liu 2004, Lin et al. 2005, You 2010, Arnold 2014), I found that not only are our current questions about language, linguistic difference and linguistic practice not new, but they are also not unique to one discourse community (such as international students or Chinese composers of English).

In fact, many communities which have themselves been historically marginalized experience many similar difficulties in expression and in making themselves heard in the
English language and in our American educational and political spheres. However, I do
not mean to suggest an essential commonality of experience. Rather, I suggest that the
exploration of various discursive strategies may allow our students to discover more
accessible means of expression which they may borrow and adapt to speak into what
remains for many a hostile rhetorical situation. Such a pedagogical approach requires us
not only to expand our curricula and the canons of our discourse to include lesser-known
writers like Lin Yutang, but also to revisit the classics like Lu Xun and to situate those
writers in their historical contexts. Such studies demonstrate for us how authors engage
and act upon their realities and how such authors radically cross artificial bounds of
linguistic and cultural difference and in so doing transform those bounds. This thesis adds
to ongoing conversations which largely examine student autobiographical work within a
single locale (such as the writings of university students in Chinese coastal cities) or in
several different ones (such as the experience of learning English in Hong Kong,
mainland China and Iran) by participating in a rereading of the traditional Chinese studies
canon and advocating for new admissions into that canon. My thesis closely resembles
Xiaoye You’s work in *Cosmopolitan English and Transliteracy* when he advocates for a
“less-bounded perspective” to better appreciate language practice and the literature of
globalization as “an integrative and dynamic use of semiotic resources” (89). But where
You demonstrates the insights to be gained from reading widely, selecting texts written by
writers of Indian, Chinese and African American descent, I demonstrate through
translingual analysis of Lu Xun and Lin Yutang how translingual orientations to
composition instruction can allow us to read both widely and deeply and to view the bounds of our canons as useful, but also artificial and limiting.

Translingual writers’ abilities to cross between and draw from multiple languages and semiotic resources to convey meaning renders their work a precursor to our understanding of what Canagarajah calls literacy as translingual practice. Prompted partially by the prevalence of scholarly work acknowledging the impact of “rapidly expanding globalization” on language policy and practice, applied linguistics research and other areas, Canagarajah challenges educators to reorient their approach to literacy, communication and writing. If what we call globalization in our contemporary moment is really a descriptor for ever-widening and ever-changing rhetorical situation(s), as rhetorics, discourses and ideas increasingly migrate, meet and mesh as humans do and have done at least since the nineteenth century, then a translingual approach to composition pedagogy is already running late.

Moreover, if globalization as literate practice can be understood “as individuals moving out of local reading and writing scenes and forming [novel and uncertain] networks of interactions,” then we must do more than simply reorient ourselves to composition studies. As globalization continues to create these new rhetorical situations and to demand new strategies for their navigation, we as educators must be constantly reflexive and highly critical about our practices. We must follow the advice of Lin Yutang—not read too deeply and not convince ourselves of the “truth” of our disciplinary knowledge; rather, we must read widely and write widely, making space for new knowledge in our discipline by studying other discourse communities and even resources.
that are not traditionally thought of as belonging in the academy. If we are to enact practices that make education work for our students, we must, as Audre Lorde has powerfully asserted in *Sister Outsider*, dissolve the artificial boundaries between the personal and the political and bring them into contact with one another.

As English spreads further into local areas, interacting with local languages and transforming the rhetorical situation—transforming, indeed, the languages themselves—Canagarajah calls us to consider all communication acts “as involving a shuttling between languages and a negotiation of diverse linguistic resources for situated construction of meaning” (Canagarajah *Reclaiming* ix, *Literacy* 1). In response to the induction of local rhetoric into global communication networks (again, often in asymmetrical relations of power established across divisions race, class, geography and language), all communication studies, including English composition pedagogy, must shift to better fit the needs of our students. If we are to adequately meet the needs of students as they prepare to enter these new glocalized rhetorical situations, situations in which linguistic border-crossing is the norm instead of the exception, we must radically change how we conceive of English composition pedagogy: we must develop a translingual approach.

A translingual approach, as opposed to a *multilingual* or *plurilingual* approach, breaks down the artificial barriers that exist between languages and enables us to recognize, encourage and develop our students’ pre-existing ability “to merge different language resources in situated interactions” (Canagarajah *Literacy* 1). Indeed, far from shedding semiotic and rhetorical resources when they move between linguistic codes,
writers translate those sources as needed between and through different codes. This is obvious when codes are synonymous with language, as in the case of Lin Yutang and Lu Xun, whose works have served in this thesis as useful and instructive historical precursors to the sort of translingual communicative strategies we want to encourage in our students. To scholars less familiar with translingualism as a concept—such as those involved in composition studies—the advantages for ostensibly monolingual students are less apparent.

Perhaps our field lags in adopting a translingual approach because of three immediately raised—but ultimately shortsighted—criticisms. Surprisingly, the first is summarized best by David Crystal in *English as a Global Language* (2003) in which he criticizes academia’s general response to English’s global status. He argues that our response to the English language and its place in our academy cannot stop at recognition of asymmetrical power relations developed during the colonial era, going so far as to call such responses overly simplistic, naive and even “anachronistic” (Crystal 22). Though he later qualifies this criticism in that he acknowledges colonialism as “historical fact,” Crystal maintains that we should shift our study of global English to a “functionalist” one—one that soberly acknowledges economy (and not colonialism) as the driving force behind the contemporary spread of English and one which views English as an instrument that “enabl[es] people to achieve particular goals” (Crystal 24). He rightly points out that the position of English in our world is not equivalent to the position of English during the colonial era and that the spread of English across the globe has the potential to grant its users access to a variety of social, educational and career
opportunities. But Crystal somewhat oversteps when he attacks postcolonial analyses of the English language as anachronistic. It cannot be denied or ignored that the primacy of America (and therefore, American Standard English) on the global stage was established on the backs of indigenous peoples and with resources extorted during the colonial era.

Moreover, when we consider that many American corporations, businesses and individuals continue to consider (accentless) American Standard English proficiency as requisite for acceptance or exclusion into mainstream society, we must acknowledge that the English language today continues to serve in a role strikingly similar to the one it served during the colonial era: as a powerful marker of otherness, identification and assimilation. While it is true, then, that our studies cannot stop with critical analyses of colonialism, they do have to start there. Failure to do so would foolishly and unfairly deprive ourselves and our students of valuable contextualizing knowledge from which we might better understand the position of the English language today and of invaluable examples of previous attempts to navigate globalizing rhetorical grounds.

The second criticism is that, by encouraging our students to “code-mesh” instead of code-switch, we are de-emphasizing communicative and discursive norms—and in so doing, actually harming the very students we mean to help.26 But this criticism also somewhat misses the mark in that it overlooks the “inherently rhetorical” nature of the translingual approach. Dominant discursive norms do “have to be taken seriously”—[as]

26 The power of code-meshing strategies has been explored in Writing Center studies as well, with scholars analyzing embedded tutors’ abilities to model for students strategies to write themselves into expertise in discourse communities while drawing on more familiar communicative codes. In particular, Shelton & Howson (2014) describe the ways in which fellows model “code-meshing” for students who may use non-Standard Englishes outside of the classroom, and so involve the Writing Center in antiracism efforts across the university.
social and educational success depend on engaging with these norms,” but students do
not have to and indeed should not uncritically accept or conform to them (Canagarajah
Literacy 9). The translingual approach enables students to view the norms of discourse as
rhetorical in themselves—and therefore also historically, socially and geographically
situated, lending them a vital and critical lens through which they understand these
normative discourses.

The final criticism is connected to the first: it assumes that, in shifting our
analytical efforts and devoting our classroom time to approaching writing as a
translingual endeavor, we are ignoring or harming monolingual students, as well as non-
native speakers of English who wish to produce standard English texts. In fact, this
couldn’t be further from the truth. For students belonging to the dominant discourse
community, viewing composition as a translingual endeavor is a highly sophisticated
analytical activity. The translingual approach challenges these students to confront their
subject positions and critically appraise how their modes and instruments of looking and
reading affect the process of knowledge construction. To demonstrate how normative
modes of looking affect and limit knowledge construction, Canagarajah insightfully
critiques the academic terms used in applied linguistics discourse to describe language
acquisition. He problematizes the ways in which the field’s terminology assumes a
language primacy even in the face of local realities—namely, that in many areas of the
world (such as South Asia), children learn multiple languages simultaneously and do not
have a “primary,” “dominant” or “native” language (Canagarajah Reclaiming 16-17).

Embracing a translingual pedagogy encourages all students to see languages for what
they are—tools and resources—and challenges all students to seek out different languages and language resources (such as rhetorical, stylistic and even generic strategies) when a single language proves limiting or inadequate.

Therefore, the translingual approach to composition pedagogy approximates what bell hooks and Paulo Freire have referred to as education as the practice of freedom by foregrounding the agency of the writer as translator even when the writer appears to share membership in the dominant discursive community (hooks Teaching 13; Lu & Horner 28). All students learn to draw from their own experience—the texts and contexts of their lives, cultures, languages and societies—as vital and powerful means through which they communicate with and shape the world around them. For students who do not belong to the dominant discourse community (whether the dominant discourse is the English language itself or the discursive norms of a particular academic or professional field), this kind of analysis breaks down the false barrier between the public and the private spheres, transforming their lived experiences at the intersection of a multitude of identities and memberships into texts whose critical analyses hold real transformative possibility. In the process of meaningfully critiquing their lived experiences as politically, historically, socially and, yes, linguistically situated, marginalized students can access powerful and agentive subjectivities through which they can speak into and transform our world.

And yet, what appears to be absent from translingual scholarship has appeared over and over again in this historical study. For all that translingualism promises to do for composition and communication, the act of historicizing such practices in fact yields up the pessimism and anxieties of translingual authors. Among the agency that translingual
practice may afford our students, how do we make sense of the fact that words, even in
the act of translation, may still be ultimately subject to the interpretations of the reader,
that our words may not belong to us (as when the madman’s diary is transferred from the
brother to the doctor or when Lin in the epigraph of this chapter refers to contestation
between author and reader in the act of reading)? Despite my hopes for the possibilities
of a translingual approach in literacy education and composition studies, the reality of the
situation—the hard facts of translation—still places much anxiety on our students and
many opportunities to be misunderstood. Perhaps the best thing we can do as teachers is
to treat such anxieties, which stem from ambivalence we experience in navigating new
rhetorical situations, as the norm rather than the exception.

As I have stated before, this means radically reformulating our curricula and
rereading our canons. This also may mean that we rethink the separations of English and
history as academic subjects in elementary education and beyond, making the
contextualization of literacy practices a matter of course. If education should prepare
citizens—and I believe it should—we should be preparing global citizens, not
“American” or “English” ones, to adapt to many diverse rhetorical situations, not just the
ones at home. Perhaps most importantly, we should view our own discourses, even our
own translingual ones, as imperfect discourses, open to criticism and redefinition—open
to change as we radically include new voices and perspectives into our discourse
communities.

There is much work to be done, for a fundamental change in the way we think
about reading and writing must occur. In the translingual approach, educators and
students must see text and language as inherently hybrid, and engage in readings of even the most traditional canonical texts like Shakespeare and Eliot that situate them inside “an expanded historical and geopolitical framework” (Canagarajah Reclaiming xvii). Indeed, the very processes of reading and writing, must be understood as “linguistic transactions across asymmetrical relations of power…[in which] meaning is necessarily and always the product of translation across differences, even in ostensibly monolingual settings” (Lu & Horner 27-28). Moreover, as we shift our focus in writing from “rules and conventions” to (rhetorical) “strategies,” from language as “context-bound” to “context-transforming,” we will see radical changes in our own professional discourses and structures--changes that level classroom hierarchies and radically include traditionally marginalized voices the academy (Canagarajah Reclaiming xxvi-xxvii). It is time for composition studies to embrace translational as a vital reorientation to our pedagogical values--and to demand as much of ourselves as we have and will continue to demand of our students. To our students and to our teachers engaged in this practice and dedicated to bringing this vision to fruition: *jiayou 加油！*
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