Ways of Manifesting Collectivism:
An Analysis of Iranian and African Cultures

Nina G. Hamedani, MS,* Tristan M. Purvis, PhD,* Sharon Glazer, PhD, & Joseph Dien, PhD

CONTENTS

Ways of Manifesting Collectivism: An Analysis of Iranian and African Cultures

Chapter 1: Introduction

Intelligence analysts might easily misinterpret their observations made in a society other than their own, since their understanding may be filtered through the lens of the shared values, norms, and beliefs of their own culture. For example, given the information that farmers in Kandahar regularly pay the Taliban 50% of their earnings, an analyst might conclude that the farmers are paying extortion money, whereas an alternative probable conclusion might be that they are paying for protection against a corrupt national government. The latter interpretation could lead to a more culturally appropriate policy of working with the village elders to restore their influence as a substitute for that of the Taliban (Flynn et al., 2010).

In an initial report, Dien, Blok, & Glazer (2011) presented a cultural framework by which to analyze human influence situations in collectivistic cultures. Cultural case studies of Afghanistan/Pakistan, China, and Japan were evaluated within the framework. The present supplemental report extends this cultural analysis to Iranian culture and to three African cultures, specifically Somali, Tuareg, and Hausa.

CULTURE

A popular dimension of cultural differences has been dubbed "individualism vs. collectivism". It has become a catchall way of characterizing cultures (Schwartz, 2009). "Individualism" implies social pattern of distinguishing an individual from a collective (e.g., family, work, tribe, nation), with individuals encouraged by society to perceive the self as independent and unique from others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 226). "Collectivism" implies that individuals are closely linked with others in a collective (Hofstede, 2001). In "collectivist" societies, individuals are "primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to members of these collectives" (Triandis, 1995, p. 2). In the Kandahar farmer example above, an individualistic lens focuses on the presumed motivations (greed) of the individual members of the Taliban whereas a collectivistic lens focuses on the social context (the disrupted social order and the resulting need of the farmers for protection).

Collectivism may, however, not be a unidimensional construct. So called collectivistic cultures might be diverse; then it makes little sense to treat the hierarchical Confucian societies of China and Japan as being equivalent to the tribalistic societies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, despite their both being nominally collectivistic. Cross-cultural psychologists are quite cognizant of this issue and many models have been formulated regarding the many different aspects of collectivism, including: relationality of individuals to one another, feelings of group belonging, a sense of duty and obligation, the importance of harmony, social support systems that induce advice-seeking behavior, contextualization required for understanding indirect communication, hierarchy in terms of status, roles, and power, and preference for group interaction (Oyserman,

Coon, & Kemmemlmeier, 2002). Different collectivistic cultures are marked by different combinations of these characteristics. Given the complexity of these different kinds of collectivism, this research team offers an alternative framework with which to categorize and understand collectivistic cultures.

RELATIONAL MODELS THEORY: A RECAP

Fiske's (1992, 2004) Relational Models Theory or RMT is a useful framework for distinguishing between collectivistic cultures (Dien et al., 2011). It is particularly well-suited for such a purpose because it enumerates the types of socio-economic relations found across cultures. Although the theory is well-established, the effort to use it systematically to differentiate between different forms of collectivism and the present effort of this research team to scientifically test the validity of this approach is novel.

Fiske (1992, 1994) proposes that there are four basic ways the human mind is genetically prepared to conceive of relationships, resulting in four ways of organizing socio-economic interchanges (see Table 1), although culturally transmitted practices will elaborate upon these biologically shared foundations to yield culturally specific manifestations. These four fundamental approaches to social interactions are termed relational models. Dien and colleagues (2011) suggested that the overall form of a collectivistic society might differ depending upon the dominant relational model, as depicted in Figure 1.

Table 1. Relational Models, their cognitive operations, and questionnaire treatment examples.

| Relational Model	Cognitive Operation and Social Impact on Interactions (Fiske, 1992, 2004)	RMT Questionnaire Treatment (Haslam, 1995; Haslam & Fiske, 1999)
Communal Sharing	Group items into separate categories based on equivalence; Treat sets of similarly categorized people as if they were identical; Treat those belonging to one's own group, however defined, equally to oneself	"If either of you needs something, the other gives it without expecting anything in return" "Many important things you use belong to the two of you together, not to either one of you separately"
Authority Ranking	Ranking items in a rigid order; Focus on ranking people by importance, although culture must determine the criterion by which the ranking is performed	"One of us sometimes has to turn over things to the other, who doesn't necessarily have to give them back" "One of you is entitled to more than the other"
Equality Matching	Judge relative sizes; Pay special attention to imbalances in the exchange of favors and payments.	"We keep track of what we give to each other, in order to try to give back the same kind of things in return eventually; we each know when things are uneven" "You typically divide things up into shares that are the same size"
Market Pricing	Assign positive and negative values; Cost-benefit judgments about relationships in which to engage	"What you get from this person is directly proportional to how much you give them" "You divide things up according to how much each of you has paid or contributed"

Figure 1. The four kinds of social and economic relational models according to Relational Models Theory.

The relational models are depicted from the perspective of an individual participant (observer) represented by a star:

a) For Communal Sharing, the individuals inside the shape are all stars, highlighting the observers' perceived similarity to those with whom he or she shares resources.

b) Authority Ranking illustrates the division of individuals into distinct social categories, arranged hierarchically.

c) Equality Matching focuses on the dyadic connections between individuals; the line connecting two nodes represents the reciprocal relationship between them.

d) Market Pricing illustrates the tendency of individuals to gravitate towards others who control or represent a valuable asset.

Communal Sharing results in individuals' perceiving themselves as having many points of similarity with others. A common example is kinship bonds, where in-group members are perceived with high similarity and altruistic bonds can be observed (Fiske, 1992). Individuals think about themselves in relation to others due to shared similarity, considering them to be part of their extended self and feeling their needs as their own. On account of this perception of self, members contribute what they are able to supporting others without expectations for return behavior. Thus, this relational model can result in an egalitarian form of collectivism in which the needs of the self are subordinated to the needs of one's in-group.

Authority Ranking results in individuals focusing on hierarchy and authority, which structures social context (Fiske, 1992). According to Dien and colleagues (2011), Authority Ranking results in a focus on the dominance relationships arising from the roles individuals occupy in the social structure. Examples include a division of society into occupations, castes, and/or functions, where individual attitudes are directed toward each group and its role within overall social structure. Herein, the individual is contextualized within perceptions of social categories, authority, and associated privileges.

Equality Matching results in individual focus on exchanges and keeping track of unpaid debts (Fiske, 1992), such as reciprocating favors or exchanging gifts, whereby past exchanges lay the groundwork for future

ones. According to Dien and colleagues (2011), an individual is tied into relationships with others via dyadic exchanges; behavior can be influenced depending on the phase of the exchange (giving or receiving). One's self-perception is rooted in the social importance of maintaining interpersonal connections and repaying favors that may subordinate the goals and desires of an individual.

Market Pricing results in individuals' focus on the utility value that an interpersonal relationship can provide. In this relational model, each observer (via social context) assigns either positive or negative values to others based on perceived utility. Dien and colleagues (2011) suggested that this dynamic results in individuals congregating into groupings of shared goals and mutual positive regard, such as sports teams or political factions (to the extent that they are based on mutual self-interest as opposed to shared ideology). They further suggested that the need to maintain and reinforce these groupings results in high emphasis on those things that win the approval of one's peers, whether it be honor or a reputation for generosity. Thus, this relational model can result in a tribalistic form of collectivism in which members all strive for the positive regard of their peers based on the same set of socially determined values.

While the RMT model stipulates that all societies express all four relational models (insofar as all humans have the same genetic endowment for making such social judgments), Dien and colleagues (2011) suggest that collectivistic societies can be described as having different rankings of the four, resulting in different forms of collectivism. This position was supported by demonstrating how relationships in the collectivistic cultures of Afghanistan/Pakistan, China, and Japan can be categorized by this approach. The present supplemental report extends this cultural analysis to Iranian and selected African cultures. These cultural analyses are case studies that can serve to demonstrate how this framework can be applied to the analysis of cultures as well as providing hypotheses by which this approach can be tested. As with all cultural analyses, it is important to stress that these are generalizations and that conclusions about individuals' motivations cannot be made only by considering the general cultural tendencies of people. Just as with all correlational findings, there are no cause and effect demonstrations.

In subsequent chapters, the above cultural concepts are interwoven into descriptions of Iranian and African cultures in order to propose relational models that likely influence the mindsets of Iranian and African constituents. Available literature from psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, history, and other disciplines are integrated in order to develop these hypotheses.

Chapter 2: Iranian Culture

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF IRAN

Present-day Iran has maintained a position of geo-strategic importance since the historic times of the Persian Empire. Today, on the basis of gross domestic product (using purchasing power parity measures), Iran is the 18th largest economy in the world (CIA, 2012). In addition to the country's rich natural resources, as the world's fifth largest producer of both oil and gas (CIA, 2012), Iran also occupies central territory between the East and the West. Directly prior to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran was a close ally of the United States. However, during the 1979 Islamic Revolution those ties were severed and Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the monarchical rule of the Pahalvi dynasty and instituted an Islamic Republic. Iran's geo-strategic importance further increased as a consequence of the Islamic revolution, the turning tide of religious influences, and its increasing influence on its neighbors (e.g., Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian Territories).

In recent years, relations between Iran and the United States of America (USA) have been tense. During the 1979 revolution and the ensuing 444 day hostage crisis when Americans were held in Tehran, Western powers labeled Iran as the 'arch of crisis' or the 'crescent of crisis.' More recently, former President George W. Bush utilized a similar label by including Iran in the 'axis of evil' during his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002. These categorizations demonstrate the prominence of continuing antagonism between the two countries and Iran continues to maintain a focal position for the USA. A source of antagonism comes from the Western view that Iran and its leadership are unpredictable, unstable, emotional, and irrational (Limbert, 2009). This perception has been reinforced by the bombastic rhetoric emanating from governmental leaders (Stanley, 2009). However, it must be acknowledged that from an Iranian point of view, repeated threats of regime change from the U.S. along with the country's "long-term experience with outright invasion and occupation and direct experience with British and Russian colonialism…interaction with the modern West has not been pleasant" (Stanley, 2009, p. 149).

This apparent unpredictability and hostility arises from dueling nationalistic narratives. Iran espouses the expansionist ideal of the Persian Empire, known as *Iranshahr* (Kashani-Sabet, 2002), while also presenting itself as victimized by foreign invasions and involvement (Limbert, 2009). The former image makes it appear as though Iran is a burgeoning world power, with (unsubstantiated) claims that the Islamic Revolution was an inspiration for the Arab Spring. The Iranian government reinforces this image by emphasizing (1) its willingness to defy the USA and Western powers (Choksy, 2011) and (2) its status as the sole nation with Shi'a Islam as the state religion. In contrast, frustration with delays in attaining the imperial *Iranshahr* reinforce the victimization image, blaming foreign manipulations and plots, such as the CIA-backed coup of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 (see Abrahamian, 2001). Together, these narratives yield the self-image of Iran as a thwarted polity beaten down by crippling Western sanctions and subversive involvements.

Adding further frustration to the *Iranshahr* ideology is that Iranian regional influence is undermined by the fact that Shi'a Islam has limited support outside Iran's borders (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). Iran's neighbors are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea (shared with Russia and Kazakhstan), the Persian Gulf (shared with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE), and the Gulf of Oman. Of these countries, Bahrain and Iraq have the largest number of Shi'a Muslims, though their voices have historically been subdued. After the Arab rule of Iran (642 – 800 CE) and prior to Turkish invasion,

Iranians actively cultivated interest and belief in the Twelver Shi'a sect of Islam (focusing on Imams as God-granted heirs to the Prophet Mohammad, and the 12th Imam's eventual return at the end of the world) in opposition to traditional Arab Sunni beliefs (Arasteh, 1964). This succeeded in distancing Iran from its closest neighbors, in fact preventing the realization of *Iranshahr*. Distantiation from its closest neighbors, who are predominantly ethnically Arab and members of the Sunni sect of Islam, can also provide context for the Iranian geopolitical need for soft-power influences and outreach support to Shi'a groups in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Ultimately, in comparison to these neighbors, Iran is a two-fold anomaly in the region: (1) ethno-linguistically, the Persian language (Farsi) has Indo-European roots, as opposed to the Semitic derivations of most countries in the region, but utilizes the Arab script (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006; Davaran, 2010); and (2) Iran is the only state with Shi'a Islam[1] as the official religion. These socio-cultural foundations are paramount in understanding Iranian culture and will be expanded upon in this chapter.

Throughout the remainder of the report on Iran, we present an analysis of Iranian culture by applying the theoretical framework presented in "Cultural Priming: Adopting the adversary's mindset to improve analysis" (Dien et al., 2011). Further, because Iran has a history of continuity in Iranian identity amidst changing rule, we will make the case that the cultural perspective of Iran's civil society and its theocratic government are sufficiently different to warrant separate analyses. We begin our analysis by introducing tensions rooted in religion, tradition, and change within contemporary Iran and explore the historical influences on its identity and nationalism. Next, empirical studies of Iranian culture values establishes it as a collectivist culture. Finally, we make the case that two different sets of relational model rankings characterize Iranian civil society and Iranian theocracy.

RELIGION, TRADITION, AND CHANGE

Iran can seem as if it is harboring paradoxes (i.e., seemingly contradictory propositions that contain possible truth or reality) that manifest competing images or realities. This section discusses the paradox between tradition and modernity, which is manifested by tensions between anti-religious modernists and religious anti-modernists (Rahnema, 2011). Reza Shah Pahlavi attempted to break clerical influence in order to advance his policies for modernizing Iran; however, this threat actually succeeded in unifying Iranian Shi'a clerics (Rahnema, 2011), thus providing a solid base for the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This contradiction can also be noted in the fact that, despite Iran being an Islamic Republic, the theocracy cannot eradicate Zoroastrian holidays, such as Persian New Year, or *No-Ruz*, nor the cultural importance of music, Sufi poetry, and literature.[2] Although clerics contend that the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains citizen support due to the popular nature of the 1979 Revolution, the 2009 uprisings in Iran indicate that citizens and popular interests can represent a challenge to the theocracy's survival. This contradiction leaves Iran, and its leaders, as seeming both confidently assertive as well as proponents of conspiracy-minded paranoia (Limbert, 2009). An illustration of tension within this dynamic relationship can be seen in the juxtaposition of Pictures 1 and 2 below. The former depicts building billboards in Tehran containing the likenesses of Islamic Republic founder Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Khomeini and current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei. Similar images appear in the public domain in order to remind citizens of Islamic morals and social behavior, indicating the theocracy's continued attempts at impressing conservative Islamic values on the public. However, in the latter image one can clearly

---

[1] The Twelver Shi'a sect of Islam focuses on the Imams as God-granted heirs to the Prophet Muhammad and the 12th Imam's eventual return at the end of the world, as opposed to traditional Sunni beliefs (Arasteh, 1964).

[2] Iranian culture has a deep poetic legacy whereby poets are considered national heroes. In fact, "poetry is the pulse of Iranian culture, the rhyme and rhythm of its collective memory" (Dabashi, 2007, p. 13). Hafez poems embody both ambiguity and contradiction via metaphors, allusions, and images (Yeganeh, 2011), revolving around God, fate, and interpersonal interactions. As Hafez, who lived post-Mongol invasion of Iran, is a national representation of interpersonal interaction and personal relationships with God, the Iranian epic written by Ferdowsi titled *Shah nameh* (Book of Kings) is a representation of Iranian national history and iconic representation of Iranian nationalism (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006; Omidsalar, 2011). It took Ferdowsi, who lived after the Arab invasion and rule, over 30 years to complete and emphasizes the struggle between good and evil (Keddie, 2006), harkening to Zoroastrian influences of the times; Iran as a civilized land continually under assault by hostile and jealous Eastern and Western powers; absolute and divine kingship; and oppressive leaders (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006).

see a young man and woman in Laleh Park in Tehran who do not seem concerned with Islamic guidelines for public behavior between men and women, indicating a more secular approach.

Picture 1. Images on a Tehran building, serving as reminder of Islamic morals and social behavior. **Picture 2.** Provides comparison of contemporary Iranian youth.

Such paradox is further exemplified by the propogated view of women in Iran. Traditional representations of Iran have been known to show women as oppressed. However, in the country's current state, Iranian women have a high literacy rate of 74%, which is comparable to men's at 84%; female life expectancy is 60 years old, which is one year older than the life expectancy for males; and an increasing number of women are surpassing men in passing university entrance exams (Basmenji, 2005). In terms of labor distribution, women comprise 33% of physicians, 60% of civil servants, and 80% of teachers in Iran (N. Alavi, 2006).

An Iranian culture in flux is further evidenced by the revitalized interest in the ancient past among the populace. This is an important finding, as present day attitudes toward history provides an indication of what Iranians believe and value (Hanaway, 1993). The analysis would conclude that much of Iranian pride is rooted in pre-Islamic Iranian antiquity (Limbert, 2009). Ancient Iran was composed of a multiethnic empire that rarely made religious or culture conformity obligatory (Davaran, 2010; Limbert, 2009). In fact, "kings often tolerated religious minorities and unorthodox sects as long as all paid their taxes and accepted the divine right of kings: the aim was to obtain outward obedience, not inward conviction" (Abrahamian, 1973, p. 272-3). It can be said that Iranian youth are currently living this kind of 'outward obedience' despite a lack of 'inward conviction.'

Young Iranians, in particular, are walking a fine line of maintaining identification with tradition and developing 'new-values-as-you-go' (Eriksen, 1994). More than half of Iran's total population is under the age of 25 and rely on the Internet (Basmenji, 2005), which plays an important role for Iranian citizens. In 2004, there were 4 million Internet users, an increase from only 250,000 in 2000 (Basmenji, 2005). The government in Iran filters websites with many pages 'Blocked by the Islamic Republic of Iran.' However, personal weblogs are extremely difficult to filter and they "enable young people to bypass many of the strict social codes imposed on them by the theocra[cy]" (N. Alavi, 2006, p. 18). They "are caught in the conflict between globalization and tradition" (N. Alavi, 2006, p. 18). However, young Iranians still articulate a strong nationalistic identity. Consider a common mantra from the Green Movement that gained momentum surrounding the 2009 Presidential elections in Iran: No Gaza, no Lebanon, my life only for Iran (*na Ghaza, na Lobnan, jan-e-man fadaye Iran*).

In order to understand how the paradox between tradition and modernity in Iran exists without major upheaval, we must examine the historical trend of cultural continuity despite governmental change throughout Iranian history. The next section focuses on tradition and modernity through exposition of the difference between Persia and Iran.

"PERSIAN" OR "IRANIAN"

Prior to 1935, the nation, language, and citizens exhibited common nomenclature with 'Persia' as the

nation's name and 'Persian' as a marker for both the spoken language and citizenry. In 1935, Reza Shah Pahlavi institutionalized 'Iran' as the official name for the nation (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003; Majd, 2008). Reza Shah sought to fulfill his goal of uniting citizens within a modern political nation under the Pahlavi monarchy, by declaring the institutionalization of the name on March 21, 1935, the same day as the Persian New Year (*No-ruz)*, the most important Zoroastrian holiday (Majd, 2008). However, it is not a simple endeavor to sever Persia from Iran and to rest upon a division where 'Persian' refers to a past cultural identity, evoking a shared history and language, and 'Iranian' refers to a current culture and nationality. When it comes to national character, the past is always linked to the present; Persian history is no exception, as it is embedded within the term 'Iranian.' Likewise, Farsi (Persian) is considered a cornerstone of Iranian identity, "a special symbol of national spirit, a major expression of Persian culture, personality and national character, and a unifying factor even before the advent of the modern state" (Ashraf, 1993, p. 163).

Ultimately, cultural heritage and national character appear to take precedence as foundations of Iranian identity over racial divisions and religious diversity (Ashraf, 1993). Iran is a diverse country, whose population of approximately 74 million can be represented by the following ethnic breakdown: 61% Persian-descendent, 16% Azeri, 10% Kurdish, 6% Lur, 2% Arab, 2% Baluchi, 2% Turkmen, and 1% other[3]; as well as the following religious breakdown: 89% Shi'a Muslim[4], 10% Sunni Muslim, 1% Jewish, Zoroastrian[5], Christian, and Baha'i[6] (Behnam, 2008; CIA, 2012). These demographics demonstrate that the dominant profile is of a Persian-descendent, Shi'a Muslim. However, the search for cultural authenticity requires an investigation beyond ethnic and religious divides to shared history and cultural elements across groups within Iran (Dabashi, 2007). An Iranian identity for "Persian speakers and non-Persian speakers, is equally strong" (Limbert, 2009, p. 21); and the term 'Irani' has been historically used to encompass ethnic and religious pluralism (Amanolahi, 2005). Today's Iranian identity serves to unify languages, religions, and ethnicities by incorporating relevant elements of local cultures (Amanolahi, 2005). The country's diversity has rolled up into a collective cultural identity.

The next section illuminates some cultural elements that are highly influential in Iranian culture today. For simplicity, from this point on, 'Iranian' will be utilized as the cultural demarcation for the focal nation.

IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM

This section delves into an historical analysis, that demonstrates cultural identity continutity despite changing political structures throughout Iranian history. Key to the relevance of this section is the fact that a separation between Iranian civil and political sectors is consistent with the on-going evolution of Iranian culture. A schism between these two societal sectors, in itself, can be considered an Iranian cultural norm. To further understand the historical roots of these societal sectors, we first provide an historical perspective on the development of Iranian identity and then discuss the changing nature of Iranian nationalism.

Social identity refers to a sense of self as shaped by one's perception of his or her relationships to relevant in-groups (see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Turner, 1999). Identity is also reflexive and is influenced by the situation at any given point in time (Eriksen, 1994; Goffman, 1971). Individual identity and national identity (*hoviyyat-e melli*, Ashraf, 1993) are linked via a process of mutual constitution wherein self-annihilation (*bi-khodi)* and self-construction (*khod-sazi)* occur simultaneously (Varzi, 2006). In other words, within this mutual constitution, an individual's identity and national identity are both influenced by and composed of one another.

Nationalism provides cohesion to an 'imagined community' as a cultural artifact that creates unity and attachment across in-group members (Anderson, 1991). It is a category that is imperative to identity formation

---

[3] 51% Persian, 24% Azeri, 8% Gilaki and Mazandarani, 7% Kurdish, 3% Arab, 2% Lur, 2% Baluchi, 2% Turkmen, and 1% other (according to Behnam (2008), an Iranian-origin publication).

[4] Shi'a trace the Prophet's heir not through his elected successor, the Sunni caliph, but through his son-in-law, Imam Ali's line of descent following his martyred son Imam Hussein's line to the 12th Imam (the Hidden Imam) who is expected to reappear in an age of extreme injustice to reinstate divine justice (Abrahamian, 1982).

[5] Monotheistic religion centered on Ahura Mazda, and the duality of good versus evil, was the official religion of Iran prior to Islamic conquest (for more information, see Clark, 1998).

[6] Minority religion in Iran that has been subject to much persecution (both under the Pahalvi administration and theocracy), focus on unification and humanity (for more information, see http://www.bahai.org/).

and maintenance (Anderson, 1991) contingent upon confrontation with an Other for self-identification (Kramer, 1997). Nationalism articulates an identity specific to each nation that is demonstrated by members' desires to see the collective nation strengthen and prosper (Hertz, 1941). The idea of *vatan* in Iranian culture is a supra-nationalist idea, connoting 'Iranian homeland' as "a territory that embodies the history, culture, ethnicity, and myths" (Kashani-Sabet, 2002, p. 166). Despite a supra-nationalist ideology, markers of Iranian nationalism have changed over time due to political circumstances of ruling governments (Kashani-Sabet, 2002). Nationalism evolved with each change; however, a shared cultural identity across individuals remained strong. Below, we address the ever-changing nationalisms through an historial lens.

Historical Perspective

As with many civilizations with long and rich historical roots, past events have shaped Iranian culture and identity (Limbert, 2009). A snapshot of Iranian history illustrates the myriad of events that have shaped the culture: 331-129 BCE, Greeks invaded and overtook rule of the Persian Empire by the Achaemenid Dynasty; after this period, the Sassanid Empire attempted to revitalize Iranian tradition by elimintating Greek influence, but by 642-800 CE, the Arab Conquest established rule[7]; 1050 CE, Turkish nomads conquered Iran and established the Seljuq Dynasty; and by 1200 CE, Ghengis Khan led a successful invasion of Iran and imposed a harsh rule (Arasteh, 1964).

With constant invasion, dynamic in-group/out-group divides allowed Iranians to maintain cohesion in the face of a constant change as "much of Iranian history was a history of communal struggles" (Abrahamian, 1973, p. 272). However, despite invasions and occupying governments (Arasteh, 1964; Yarshater, 1993), Iranians maintained an acute sense of national and cultural identity (Abrahamian, 2008; Yarshater, 1993). Iranians were able to cultivate shared culture (Varzi, 2006) by integrating into their own culture ethnic, religious, and linguistic influences from foreign conquerors (Davaran, 2010; Frye, 1993; Limbert, 2009; Omidsalar, 2011). For example, Iran adopted, but tailored both the Arabic script and the Islamic religion (Twelver Shi'ism; Arasteh, 1964). Thus, while being flexible enough to integrate certain cultural factors, Iranians also maintained unique cultural features.

An Iranian national and cultural identity prevailing over this long list of historical conquerors indicates that Iranians persevered despite enduring leadership that was disconnected from the populace for various reasons, including ethnic or religious ones. In recent history, until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian society was governed by the Pahlavi Dynasty. It was during this rule that the Shah attempted to re-define Iranian identity by instituting 'policies of renewal' (*tajaddod*; Kashani-Sabet, 2002). For example, in 1929 a dress code for men was institutionalized: Pahlavi hats, jackets, shirts, pants, with no ostentatious colors. Furthermore in May 1936, Reza Shah decreed the mandatory unveiling of women in public, which was met with widespread resistance and alienated religious social sectors (Kashani-Sabet, 2002). At this time, "the state, rather than the individual decided what was modern and appropriate, even in something as personal as someone's daily attire" (Kashani-Sabet, 2002, p. 170) in order to foster the uniform collective identity required from subjects in a kingdom.

As with previous rulers, the Pahlavi Dynasty was disconnected from the populace that desired an Iran uninfluenced by Western investment and involvement. The nationalism promoted by the Pahlavis laid the groundwork for the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who defined nationalism via religion, politics, and the international stage. Today's Iranian youth have lived only under the theocratic political system. However, it seems that every step the clerical administration has taken to stamp-out Western practices or values, only served to exacerbate desire for them among Iranian youth today (Basmenji, 2005). Iranian civil society, including the youth are "all-too aware of the difference between the paradise they were promised and the harsh reality of living under the rule of Islamic fundamentalists" (N. Alavi, 2006, p. 89).

---

[7] During the period of Arab rule (642 – 800 CE), Iranians influenced administrative and cultural spheres, which allowed them to preserve pre-Islamic cultural heritage (Davaran, 2010). Especially by not fully adopt the Arabic language despite taking on the script (Arasteh, 1964). The foundational change with the Arab Conquest was the reduction of the influence of Zoroastrianism(Daniel & Mahdi, 2006) in the state realm, as the official Iranian religion since the Achaemenid Dynasty (550 – 533 BCE). Instead, Islam gained prominence as a dominant state religion. However, this did not result in discontinuity of Iranian identity and Iranians maintained their language and culture (Davaran, 2010). Ultimately, it was not until the Safavid Dynasty (1499 – 1736 CE) that Iran had native rule and Shi'ism was declared the official religion (1501; Arjomand, 1989).

Today's Iranian youth are discontented with the current government, as evidenced in the 2009 protests. These protests, however, did not lead to a revolution. Some might explain the backdown, in part, due to the Iranian ability to endure political systems that do not fully align with the populace. It could also be due to fear for life, as protesters faced a harsh crackdown from governmental forces in 2009. Regardless of the reasons for participating in protests, Iranians are proud of their nationality. This is evident in both empirical findings and adages. First, the World Values Survey (2000, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) showed that 91.9% of male respondents and 92.5% of female respondents selected 'very proud' when asked 'How proud are you to be Iranian?' – and 3.5% of male and 2.7% of female respondents selected 'quite proud' (Koutlaki, 2010). Second, a Persian motto, illustrative of national pride, states (Iran substituted for Persia, for emphasis): "one mutilates [Iran] in vain, one divides it, one can take away its name, she will remain [Iran]" (De Gobineau, 1980, p. 217). Thus, national and cultural identity run deep and the pride Iranians display becomes an important factor that partially definines the society's national culture. [For further information about the current disconnect between the Iranian society and political society, see the 'Iranian State Culture' section.]

Still, there is tension between civil society and the state. One example of such tension is *Moharram*, a time in Shi'ism that is most important for mourning Imam Hossein's death and requires public grieving and mourning rituals. Recently *Moharram* fell during the same time as the Zoroastrian holiday of *No-ruz*, which is a festive holiday marking the beginning of Spring and the first day of the new year. From a governmental perspective, state television reminds individuals that this is a somber time devoted to mourning and reflection; however, Iranian businesses, schools, etc. close for approximately 2 weeks to mark the first day of the new year until the thirteenth day (*sizdah bidar*) where it is traditional to go to the mountains or picnic with family. Such mixed messages demonstrate that deep cultural identities exist, irrespective of governmental influences.

Indeed, within Iran, there are multiple identities (Limbert, 2009) and these identities are reinforced by collectivistic values. In the next section, before providing a cultural analysis of the civil society and the state, we justify our view that Iran is a type of collectivisitic culture by referencing existing data on cultural values.

IRANIAN COLLECTIVISM

According to numerous studies of Iranian culture (e.g., Ghorbani, Watson, Krauss, Bing, & Davison, 2004; Hofstede, 2001, 2010; Joshanloo & Ghaedi, 2009), Iran is a collectivistic culture. According to Hofstede's research on cultural values (see http://geert-hofstede.com/iran.html), Iran might be characterized as moderately collectivistic (i.e., individuals can be unique, but group relations are also emphasized) and feminine (i.e., endorsing harmony and egalitarianism), as well as emphasizing power distance (i.e., clear hierarchical structure), and uncertainty avoidance (i.e., endorsing institutional rules and regulations in order to reduce ambiguity). Hofstede explains that Iran's collectivism manifests in displays of loyalty to a 'group' (i.e., family, extended family), a shared responsibility for one another, and conformity value. However, Iran is not ranked high on collectivism (41st out of 76 countries); this may be explained by Iranian self-direction and achievement values (Joshanloo & Ghaedi, 2009), which are often used to describe individualistic cultures.

Hofstede (2001, 2010) also found that Iran ranked 58 of 76 countries on Power Distance value, indicating the country reinforces status differentials. On the Uncertainty Avoidance value, Iran ranked 59 out of 76 countries, indicating the country's preference for for clear rules and structure for interacting with others in order to avoid ambiguity and stress. Finally, on the cultural dimension of Masculinity-Femininity, Iran ranked 43 out of 76 countries suggesting a tendency toward femininity or preference for quality of work life, solidarity, compromise, and negotiation.

In addition to Hofstede, other researchers wrote on the kinds of values, beliefs, and traits Iranians do (or do not) endorse. These are presented in Table 2 below. As shown in this table, the positively valued traits, including tradition, conformity, benevolence, kindness, modesty, loyalty, and preserving group unity are reflective of interdependence and thus related to collectivism, whereas the negatively valued traits are reflective of self-promotion and are often terms used to describe people in individualistic cultures. Another self-promotion variable, narcissism, negatively correlated with identity, internal state awareness, and religion (Ghorbani, Watson, Krauss, Bing, & Davison, 2004), concepts associated collectivism. According to Joshanloo and Ghaedi (2009) and Bateson et al.'s (1977) study, negative traits resemble least valued, self-centric principles. Morevoer, it was found that even "translating [into Farsi] the concepts of individualism (*fardgeraee*) and autonomy

(*khodmokhtari*) is problematic" (Eslami-Rasekh, 2004, p. 191) as these concepts carry negative connotations. In Iranian culture, allocentric (i.e., collectivistic at the individual level of analysis) and idiocentric (i.e., individualistic at the individual level of analysis) values positively correlate at an individual-level of analysis (Ghorbani et al., 2004). Conformity to a norm and feeling secure are desired, as is getting ahead in life due to the fact that "commitment to the self was compatible with allocentric sensitivity to others" (Ghorbani, Bing, Watson, Davison, & LeBreton, 2003, p. 442). However, communal factors, including identity and religion better predicted healthy identity (i.e., pride in being a member of one's society), than individualistic values did. This suggests a strong precedence of communal culture that reinforces individual achievements. Believing in God; the righteousness of work; doing good; as well as being patient and steadfast are Islamic factors that relate to happiness and overall well-being (H. R. Alavi, 2007). Herein, ties can be made to Iranian cultural values of achievement, benevolence, self-direction, and universalism (Joshanloo & Ghaedi, 2009).

Table 2. Salient cultural values as identified by Iranians.

Source	Positively Valued	Negatively Valued
Bateson et al. (1977), Iranians self-reported positive and negative cultural traits, including:	Kindness (*mehrabani*) Modesty and unpretentiousness (*fortuani*, *tavaqqo*) Sensitivity (*hassas budan*) Commitment to and involvement with others (*ba-atefeh budah*) Emotional responsiveness (*delsuzi*, *khun-garmi*) Generosity (*dast-o delbaz budan*) Loyalty (*vafadari*) Awareness of a spiritual sphere In-group and to preserve group unity	Shrewdness (*zerangi*) Calculating (*hessabgari*) Opportunistic (*forsat-talabi*) Hypocritical (*motazaher*) Hypocrisy (*riya*) Insincere (*charb-zaban*) Dishonest (*chakhan*)
Joshanloo and Ghaedi (2009), Iranians endorsed values as contributing to or conflicting with well-being, including:	Tradition (humble, accepting place in life, devout, respect for tradition) Achievement (successful, capable, and ambitious) Conformity (politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honoring parents and elders) Universalism (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment) Benevolence (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible) Power (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image) Self-direction (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals)	Stimulation (daring, a varied life, an exciting life) Hedonism (pleasure, enjoying life)

Despite these generalities, values that underlie Iranian behavior need to be contextualized in the setting where they are found because the culture has a high flexibility in terms of situation-dependent behavior (Arasteh, 1964). Latifi (2006) critiques Hofstede as unable to provide a dynamic understanding of historical influences and demonstrates that Iranian culture instead has a legacy of tolerating ambiguity, due to invasions and agricultural uncertainty; as well as historical roots for collectivistic cultural values such as obedience, duty, self-sacrifice, faith, and piety. In support of Latifi, the Persian language (Farsi) contains words with multiple meanings that are context-dependent; there are numerous idiomatic expressions that are ambiguious absent of context (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006). Indeed, Iranian communication is context-dependent; communications are understood by considering the context in which it was expressed (Hall, 1976). In describing the current state of Iran, Latifi elaborates on her views of Iran's cultural values. According to Latifi, Collectivism is high due to a

paramount cultural responsibility to look out for and aid in-group members. Power Distance may be lower if considering the social factors, such as love marriages and the role of women in society. Uncertainty Avoidance may be lower due to the current world climate (e.g., sanctions, Western presence in the Middle East). Finally, Iran may be more Masculine as competition and success are of utmost importance. Latifi's findings remain consistent with Bateson et al.'s (1977) positive traits and Joshanloo and Ghaedi's (2009) correlations between values and well-being.

As Iranian culture is collectivistic at its core, the question left to explore is how is Iran's collectivism manifested? On the basis of the definitions of four relational models provided in the introduction, literature on Iranian values, and a review of historical, religious, and national factors shaping contemporary Iranian mindsets, we present propositions concerning- dominant relational models influencing Iranian social interaction. The following sections will investigate Iranian culture as mapped on to the Relational Models Theory; rankings of the relational models will be hypothesized for both Iranian civil society and the political society.

IRANIAN CULTURE: CIVIL SOCIETY

It is hypothesized that Iranian society presents a preference for CAEM [Communal Sharing > Authority Ranking > Equality Matching > Market Pricing]. The family unit provides the greatest foundation to Iranian society and is the strongest social institution (Arasteh, 1964; R. Assadi, 1982; Beeman, 1986; Behnam, 2008; Daniel & Mahdi, 2006; Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003; Nassehi-Behnam, 1985; Yeganeh, 2011).[8] Respect is two-fold in Iranian culture: respect toward "people of higher status and age…[is] not necessarily deeply felt…[as compared to] emotionally charged respect that may be felt toward parents, older siblings, uncles, aunts, mentors, cultural heroes (poets), and religious figures" (Behzadi, 1994, p. 323). In a study on significant social values in Iranian society, 94.2% marked 'family' as 'very important' (Azadarmaki, 2008 summarizing Office of National Projects, 2001). Furthermore, when Iranians were asked how place of birth was related to happiness, 87% of respondents selected 'moderate,' 'high,' or 'very high' importance. In support of the prominence of Communal Sharing in Iranian culture, Mohsenifar et al. (2010) demonstrated that Iranians tend to categorize as a function of similarity by finding that Iranians mixed concepts of 'belonging to' and 'similarity.'

Communal Sharing

In Iranian culture, Communal Sharing can be demonstrated by in-group structures providing the foundation of the self. In fact, the 'Iranian psyche' is relationally oriented and built upon the importance of affectionate interpersonal relations (Behzadi, 1994). Iranian values of kindness, sensitivity and commitment to others, tradition, conformity, and benevolence are found within the familial structure couched in a system of dutiful loyalty necessary to maintain one's most intimate in-group. Shi'a morals for social relations also relate to Communal Sharing and include loyalty, trustworthiness, fulfilling promises, respecting others, and responsibility (Aguilar-Vafaie & Moghanloo, 2008). High levels of collectivism are primarily demonstrated by family loyalty and in-group orientation (Yeganeh, 2011) whereby loyalty to family precedes individual needs and desires (S. M. Assadi et al., 2007), and one's close relationships compose the main criterion for decision-making (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). In Iranian culture, the ideal situation is when family members anticipate one another's needs and provide without selfish thought (Beeman, 1986) – by sacrificing for others one can derive self-fulfillment. Shi'a morals also align with family life, epitomized by the importance placed on paying tribute and attention to one's parents, observing the rights of others, keeping in touch with relatives, and fulfilling the duty of forming a family (Aguilar-Vafaie & Moghanloo, 2008).

---

[8] Documenting the importance of the family in Iranian culture dates back to the 12th century poet Ghazali and the 13th century ethicist Nasir-e od-Din Tusi, who each provided records of familial roles, responsibilities, and expectations (Nassehi-Behnam, 1985). The literary genre (Pre-Islamic), *Andarz*, couches morality in short preambles (or riddles) focused on themes of knowing one's self (*khod shenasi*) (Davaran, 2010). In *Andarz*, family is a central focus wherein men are to protect family members at all costs, children are to respect their parents, and the extended family is given great significance (Davaran, 2010).

Respect for parents is given as readily as parents' sacrifice for their children, for example selling the family's home in order to pay for a child's education. As a common Iranian proverb states, studying and going to university is very important (*dars khanan va daneshgah raftan kheyli mohem ast*). While there is a reciprocal relationship or give and take, socialization of children in Iranian culture centers upon the social ethic of politeness and respect (*adab o ehteram*). This rearing practice can be viewed as the foundation for family togetherness, solidarity within a community, and the overarching collective mindset (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006). Cultural estrangement (when an individual's values differ from social context) has negative impacts on well-being due to the Iranian values of conformity and tradition (Joshanloo, 2010). To ensure that family members avoid this peril, children are taught to recognize similarity prior to difference in theory of mind development (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011). However, if family members offend collectivist values like sensitivity to others' needs, the punishment is a break in communication known as *qahr* (not on speaking terms). The Iranian practice of *qahr* is emotionally hurtful distancing to reestablish social order and meaning to interpersonal relationships via *ashti* (make up or compromise, Behzadi, 1994).

The familial structure in Iran provides a social network and assistance as the extended family forms an organic *dowreh* (group of individuals with shared interests), wherein "members of families must be able to further each other's interests and provide for the survival of the family unit as a whole" (Beeman, 1986, p. 47). Furthermore, family gatherings, with an increasingly limited social scene in Iran, establish the foundation for social life. The family determines an individual's social status, changes in life, protection against threats, and emotional well-being (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006). In Iranian society, the individual relates to the social system through his or her family (Arasteh, 1964), even using the words for brother (*baradar)* and sister (*khahar)* to address strangers (Keshavarz, 1988). Blood ties in Iranian culture are of utmost importance, as demonstrated by the proverb "I have to be good and so does my mother, but my wife is another's daughter" (*khodom-e khoob basham va madaram, zanam dokhtar-e digaran ast*) – the position of a wife becomes elevated once a child is born and the blood line is extended. Self-esteem and one's family are linked, and "the most intimidating remarks are profanities referring to family members or friends" (R. Assadi, 1982, p. 202).

Mothers share in the socialization and maintenance of family functions, refuting the "fallacy of traditional stereotypes of Iranian women as having no share of social power" (Tashakkori & Mehryar, 1982, p. 808). Mothers have an admired role in Iranian families; consider the proverbs: "heaven is under the feet of mothers" (*behesht-e zir-e pah-e madaranast*); and "mother is king" (i.e., matriarchy; *madar shahi*). Iranian women socialize their children (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006) and contribute financially to the family (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). In a study of role differentials among Iranian youth in Shiraz, even male participants stated that the emotional-supportive role of the mother is more significant than that of the father (Tashakkori & Mehryar, 1982).

Authority Ranking

In Iranian culture, Authority Ranking is represented not only by a division of individuals into distinct social categories, but by placement of one's self in relation to others. As demonstrated, Iranian culture ranks fairly high on Power Distance due to a tradition of authoritarianism wherein society demands submission to the will of those in positions of power (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003).

Despite a social hierarchy, Authority Ranking is not absolutely reflected linguistically; instead language is manipulated to reflect and represent hierarchy. For example, there are no gender distinctions for verbs, nouns, or pronouns (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006), but pronouns and verbs will be oriented in a way that corresponds to social relations (Beeman, 1986). To demonstrate relations of inequity, one may engage in other-raising and self-lowering practices. For example, using 'slave (*bandeh)* as a self-referent instead of first person singular pronoun (*man*) while utilizing 'your excellenc(e/y)' (*jenab-e 'ali, hazrat-e' ali*) in reference to another (Keshavarz, 1988). Interactional grammar in Iranian culture is exhibited through "the interplay of cognitive context, in terms of general orientation to inside vs. outside dimensions, with human orientation toward status and equality" (Beeman, 1986, p. 16). For example, it is not common to disagree with teachers due to their esteemed social position, and professional titles are important whereby 'Dr.' or 'engineer' will be used to demonstrate status (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). In Iranian society, status is based on "a complicated set of factors – age, gender, family, wealth, power, etc. – that collectively constitute an individual's status vis-à-vis another" (Dabashi, 1988, p. 124). Status in Iranian culture is attainable and not necessarily ascribed, a phenomenon that

supports values of self-direction and achievement. Entering into any social situation, individuals must know how they will be perceived and what expectations will be at play (Beeman, 1986). Oftentimes elders are greeted first, invited to eat or enter a room first, and given deference when speaking in public (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006); guests are also given exalted deference in Iranian culture (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003).

Obligations of status are so important in Iran that Farsi "contains a number of stylistic devices that automatically help individuals signal each other concerning many aspects of their assessment of their relationship" (Beeman, 1986, p. 12). Furthermore, people in authority positions are expected to rise to meet the expectations of that position and fulfill related obligations toward inferiors (Beeman, 1986) – couched within examples of Authority Ranking there is a focus on reciprocal obligations. This can lead to individuals of superior status being bound to help even if it constitutes a detriment to the individual because fulfilling status-perceived obligations has such a high value (Beeman, 1986).

As in Chinese culture (Dien et al., 2011), the importance of face-saving to maintain status is vital to Iranians (Yeganeh, 2011). Consider the proverbs: protect outer appearances (*zaher o baten ra hefz kon*); and, don't spill the top of the water (i.e., one's secret or dignity as his or her state; *abru-ye mah ra nariz*). The importance of face relates to an emphasis placed on power and achievement values within Iranian culture, as previously discussed. The goal of keeping face is to boost honor or maintain prestige. This ties into the Iranian concept of private self (*batin*, one's true identity within a close circle that would know if one needed help*)* vs. public self (*zaher*, one's good face forward). One's *batin* can include strong personal feelings that are not always appropriate for public settings; whereas one's *zaher* controls for unpredictable behavior by self-monitoring and upholding politeness and proper social states (Beeman, 1986). Ultimately, Iranians exhibit "a public face and a private face" (Majd, 2008, p. 18).

Strict rules for social behavior help form and establish a collective identity (Varzi, 2006), which aligns with Iran's mid-to-high rating on Uncertainty Avoidance previously mentioned.

Equality Matching

Although there are clear lines of authority in Iran, amongst people of similar status, there are also normative pressures toward Equality Matching, as further evidenced by Iranian values of reciprocity, generosity, and politeness (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). All social behavior centers on "patterns of mutual exchange" (Beeman, 1986, p. 12), wherein the notion of self is tied to relations with others (Ahmadi & Ahmadi, 1998). Within Equality Matching, exchanges are not marked by status, rather they are marked by "interaction[s] where two persons are defined as being, or perceived themselves to be close, equal, similar, or intimate in terms of some clear common dimension" (Beeman, 1986, p. 39). For example, gifts among friends may remain unopened for long periods of time. Upon giving gifts one will apologize for its inadequacy and the same behavior would be expected between both parties when visiting one another.

Further, these values positively correlated with Islamic Shi'a morals, including altruism, compliance, and dutifulness (Aguilar-Vafaie & Moghanloo, 2008) whose roots lay in Zoroastrian philosophy (Davaran, 2010), thereby demonstrating the focus on how relationships with members of the in-group are motivated by sense of selflessness, but also the expectation that this selflessness would be reciprocated. An Iranian proverb exemplifies this relational approach: "give with one hand, receive with the other" (*ba yek dast bedeh az an dast begir*). Indeed, favors or help extended to others (with one hand) are expected to be repaid (and accepted with the other hand). Other ways in which social relations in the form of Equality Matching are demonstrated can be found in the ways people interact with each other. More specifically, in Iran there are verbal and non-verbal ways of demonstrating politeness, a ritual known as *ta'arof*, and this demonstration can occur between interacting parties of equal status. For example, even if you arrive hungry to a friend's house, you must politely decline that they prepare anything for you to eat or drink. During this exchange, both individuals are gaining a sense of the other's true desires or intentions. This practice also demonstrates the focus on high-context or indirect communication in Iranian culture. For men, *ta'arof* takes the form of self-depreciation, and between women, the expression "it's yours" (*pishkesh)* is offered when complimented on a possession (Majd, 2008). This practice relates to the positive traits, kindness, modesty, generosity, emotional responsiveness, and sensitivity towards others that Iranians value. Thus, to demonstrate modesty and humility (*shekasteh nafsi*, or literally, 'broken self;' Sharifan, 2005), one may belittle compliments and treat the other with high regard. Some common sayings during *ta'arof* include: *ghadamet ru-ye cheshm* (you can walk on my eyes, demonstrating humility); and

ghorbanet beram (I will sacrifice myself for you, demonstrating benevolence and generosity). It is important to note that *ta'arof* is not a strategy, but an "express[ion of] genuine feelings of respect, honor, dignity, awe, or even dissociation, carefully crafted into verbal and behavioral gestures" (Dabashi, 1988, p. 123) that enhances face (of self or family, Sharifian, 2005).

Ultimately, *ta'arof* is a cultural schema (see D'Andrade; Malcolm & Sharifian; Rice; Strauss & Quinn) for Iranians, that serves as a guide for interactions with equal others based on collective knowledge and behavioral expectations.

Market Pricing

Market Pricing would take the form of others seeking out or avoiding individuals based on their perceived value. Market Pricing is hypothesized as the least prominent relational model in Iranian culture, due to the fact that elements from Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and Equality Matching tend to provide individuals with support in society. It is less likely that individuals would gravitate toward an individual with a perceived desired asset, but who is outside their family (thus bound by loyalty and obedience), or peer group (thus bound by reciprocity, politeness, benevolence). Connections are made within group and not sought from strangers. Social relations that are based on Market Pricing might be viewed as relating to negatively valued traits, including shrewdness, calculating, and opportunism. For this reason, we hypothesized that this relational model has less precedence in Iranian culture.

Ta'arof will manifest itself differently from Equality Matching with Market Pricing due to the latter's unequal reciprocation. In this sense, "*ta'arof* is the active, ritualized realization of differential perceptions of superiority and inferiority in interaction" (Beeman, 1986, p. 56-7), that maintain culturally defined roles. Iranians will employ self-lowering and self-raising language to indicate social position (Arasteh, 1964; Keshavarz, 1988), but intentions will not solely be out of politeness as much as hierarchically dictated and out of respect for authority. Among relations of unequal status, one is expected to assume a lower-hand (one who has a need) and the other an upper-hand (one who can provide). Depending on the actors, "the party with presumed higher status enters the scene expecting to be raised by the other" (Dabashi, 1988, p. 124). In this social relation, interaction does revolve around mutual exchange (Beeman, 1986), yet goods and actions are not kept track of for equitable repayment, as they are in Equality Matching. Furthermore, in this relational model, one party would be providing a service and the other would be petitioning the provision of the good or service (Beeman, 1986). Ultimately, in fact, in Iranian society with unequal exchange relations "material rewards flow from high to low status, material tribute from low to high. Actions flowing from high to low status are interpreted as favors, whereas actions flowing from low to high are interpreted as service" (Beeman, 1986, p. 51). In other words, relations are either within family, hierarchically organized, or matched on the basis of equality with others. There is little motivation to reinforce a Market Pricing relational model.

IRANIAN CULTURE: POLITICAL SOCIETY

The structures of the current Iranian government and religious institutions are such that they deserve attention independently of Iranian civil society culture. Iranian culture has veins that run deep with religiosity and customs, but the civil society expresses anticlerical sentiments (Limbert, 2009; Majd, 2008). With policies of 'de-secularization' and institutional religious change, individual religious belief has remained constant, but outward practices have changed (Kazemipur & Rezaei, 2003). Tezcur and Azadarmaki (2008) demonstrate a schism between civil society and the theocracy in a study on political and religious attitudes. Despite 60% of participants selecting that religion is 'very important,' findings reported 45% of respondents felt that state success 'completely fails' and 35% saw state success as having a 'mixed record' (Tezcur & Azadarmaki, 2008). Furthermore, comparing surveys from 1975 and 2001, Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003) found that respondents participating in collective prayers "most of the time" dropped from 45% to 20%. In other words, the political state reinforces cultural practices rooted in religion, but most Iranians, though believing religion is important, do not support collective prayers sponsored by the state and do not perceive the Iranian theocracy as a successful government.

State sponsored prayers arise from dominance exerted by the Supreme Leader, to-date the Supreme Leaders

of Iran have each reached some of the highest levels in Islamic clergy, namely, Grand Ayatollah (Khomeini) and Ayatollah (Khamenei). As Figure 2 demonstrates, the position of Supreme Leader, directly or indirectly, controls each element of the Iranian government, including positions for which elections are held, such as Parliament, President, and the Assembly of Experts.


Figure 2. Representation of the current Iranian government. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Iran_gov_power_structure.svg)

Given the above circumstances, when compared to civil society, "the current Iranian leadership has a distinct worldview and perspective that is extreme in its embodiment of broader trends in Iranian society" (Stanley, 2009, p. 148). Iranian political society rhetoric often focuses on foreign threats; however, 37% of respondents identified "cost of life" and only 15% identified "foreign threats" as the most important political issue (Tezcur & Azadarmaki, 2008). The Islamic Republic of Iran's "leadership is a small collective group of decision-makers that is, in large part, well informed and constrained in its behavior by the competing interests of various individuals and factions within the elite" (Stanley, 2009, p. 149). Iranian theocracy is in a constant struggle for permanence, the very "survival of this government and its form is an existential imperative as well as an expression of self-interest…" (Stanley, 2009, p. 150). As the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini articulated, the establishment of a government as Shi'a Islamic authority on earth means that to abandon it would be equal to abandoning the very will of God. It is to protect against this danger that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, *sepah-e pasdaran-e enghelab-e Eslami*) was established and institutionalized within the government itself, aside from the national Army which exists to protect the nation and its citizens.

Due to the complexity of Iranian life, we conjecture that the relational models must be applied to relationships that occur among individuals in the context of civil society, as well as within the ideological political context. Focusing on the relational models from the perspective of the Iranian political society, we hypothesize that the Iranian state is AMEC [Authority Ranking > Market Pricing > Equality Matching > Communal Sharing]. Ruling clerics view themselves as holding vested authority, and expect obedience. From the state perspective, the ultimate survival requirement is deference to authority. "Iranian history leads to an important conclusion: those who oppose the absolute power of the ruling elite tend to repeat the same behavior when they gain power, perhaps because the Iranian culture ingrains the absolute respect for power in its children from an early age" (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003, p. 133).

Authority Ranking

For the Iranian state, Authority Ranking is evidenced by the precedence placed on maintaining rule by an Islamic Republic. The high Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance in Iranian society is epitomized by the "Iranian profile of charismatic leadership [which] does not consist of positive feedback and recognition or going against the status quo" (Javidan & Carl, 2004, p. 685). Clerical rule legitimizes its authority via Ayatollah Khomeini's *velayat-e faqih* (rule by Islamic jurists). This concept is aligned with the idea of divine rule (God-granted rule), which has been a part of Iranian culture since the Achaemenid Empire (Davaran, 2010; Rahnema, 2011; Stanley, 2009).[9] This relational model is dominant in Iranian state culture because clerical authority must be established *a priori* in relation to the entire society. However, an Iranian proverb demonstrates hierarchy: there's always a higher hand (*dast bala-e dast besiar ast*) and despite the fact that *velayat-e faqih* mirrors divine kingship[10], clerics are intermediaries in the place of the Shi'a belief in the 12th Imam (the Hidden Imam, or Mahdi). Using a rhetoric that a religious populace found relatable, Khomeini established charismatic authority that "ingeniously exploited the Shi'ite Messianic yearning by encouraging his acclamation as the Imam from about 1970 onward. Never since the majority of them had become Shi'a in the sixteenth century had the Iranians called any living person Imam" (Arjomand, 1989, p. 113).

Given that more than 85% of the population is Shi'a (Alaolmolki, 1996), the theocracy is able to leverage Shi'a influences of martyrdom and fearlessness to cement footholds into the Iranian authority structure. Martyrdom derives its importance from Imam Hossein, a powerful symbol of struggle between *baten* and *zaher*, whereby the purity of the Shi'a faith survived due to Imam Hossein's unwillingness to compromise and bend to an imposed will. Ayatollah Khomeini utilized this imagery during the 1979 Revolution to "project it onto the struggle between the throne and the people" (Beeman, 1986, p. 71). In this light, the unwillingness to compromise with the USA during the hostage crisis was interpreted as "reemphasis of the need to protect the inner truth of the faith by not compromising with the enemy" (Beeman, 1986, p. 71).

Related to self-achievement and self-direction values, conflicts in Iranian culture usually begin between parties "who perceive that the goals of one are being hindered by the other" (R. Assadi, 1982, p. 201). The goal is to win by defeating one's opponent, or "at least, not to be portrayed as a loser among the people" (R. Assadi, 1982, p. 202). Bluffs are extreme statements employed to psychologically weaken an opponent and buy time (R. Assadi, 1982). This is demonstrated by Iranian nuclear development and the success at binding this aim to national pride. By linking nuclear ambitions to nationalism, the state builds a base for its own authority. In fact, Iranians have elevated nuclear development to a 'sacred value' whereby cost/benefit analysis logic (i.e., sanctions versus stopping and the former is chosen due to the insult value of the latter) can no longer apply (Dehghani et al.; Dehghani et al., 2009).

As previously noted, Iranians identified shrewdness as a negative value. Contrary to civil society, the Iranian political society demonstrates high cultural values of wit, projecting one's social status, as well as concealing motives (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006). The Iranian concept of *zeraengi,* also understood as cleverness, is about message content (what is said) and form (how it is said; Beeman, 1986). Iranian government may exemplify this practice when, for instance, speeches "of the Iranian President [are] full of ambiguities and unrealistic exaggerations about a wide range of issues" (Yeganeh, 2011, p. 225) – such as, military over-articulation as deliberate overstatements to justify authority in society and garner support.

---

[9] The Avesta, Zoroastrian sacred book, states that the chosen king would be marked by divine illumination or fortune (*farnah-e izadi*, or *farr-e izadi*) (Rahnema, 2011). "The notion of king as shadow of God on earth and the embodiment of all Divine graces sought to convince the people that kings possessed Divine attributes and Divine missions" (Rahnema, 2011, p. 16). Thus, due to the connection with the hidden world of the divine and kings; subjects of Ancient Iran were to be obedient primarily due to this connection and secondarily due to military strength.

[10] Zoroastrianism, espoused by Zarathustra, is a "theology in which the god of all good, Ahura Mazda, was balanced by the equally powerful god of all evil and death, *Ahriman*. Under the commandment to do good works, have good thoughts, and do good deeds, Zoroaster's followers saw themselves as in service to *Ahura Mazda* in the eternal struggle against the powers of his evil counterpart" (Stanley, 2009, p. 141). Thus, the divine right to rule came from the ancient Iran kings declaring legitimacy by articulating a special relationship with Ahura Mazda (Rahnema, 2011), also known as Wise Lord (or Lord Wisdom) who was represented as the embodiment of wisdom (Davaran, 2010). Due to the articulation of divine rule, "Zoroastrianism and Iran belonged to each other" (Davaran, 2010).

Market Pricing

For the Iranian state, Market Pricing is demonstrated by gravitation toward superiors with high utility value. When considering Market Pricing in terms of the Iranian state, it can be hypothesized that principles of commitment to others, loyalty, and achievement might be seen related to the negative values of opportunism and dishonesty. The IRGC has entered into a relationship with the clerical leadership that epitomizes this relational model. The IRGC has gained power and momentum in the Iranian political society [i.e., holding numerous seats in Parliament (Bruno & Bajoria, 2011)]. Furthermore, the IRGC engineering firm, *Khatam al-Anbia*, established during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, is a prominent contractor for government and industry projects (Wehrey et al., 2009). The IRGC has received approximately 750 contracts across all sectors (Wehrey et al., 2009). It can be argued that the IRGC gravitates toward the theocracy due to perceived high utility value of doling out contract funds. In the true nature of this relational model, clerics in the Iranian administration do not expect an equal exchange of goods, but do receive IRGC service and loyalty in return.

In contrast, President Ahmadinejad's personality is also an element of Iranian state culture, intertwining civil society and religious life, to gain support across his base. Ahmadinejad activates the utility value of this relational model by claiming that the 12th Imam was in the room when he spoke to the United Nations General Assembly on September 17, 2005, as well as when he spoke at Columbia University on September 24, 2007 (Rahnema, 2011). Referring to himself as a principalist, in order to denote a perspective of true Islamic religious principles in opposition to hard-liner (or fundamentalist) postures, Ahmadinejad denies a direct clerical relation with God and professes to his public: "I am a servant of the Twelfth Imam and he has acknowledged his support for my political-social cause and endorsed me by coming to my aid in New York" (Rahnema, 2011, p. 43).

As described in the previous section on Iranian civil society culture, *ta'arof* exists in Market Pricing among unequals. Ahmadinejad's references to the 12th Imam involve self-deprecating *ta'arof* wherein the Iranian president will make comments such as he is "only a temporary president, and that the Messiah would relieve him of the burdensome responsibility in a 'few' years at the most" (Majd, 2008, p. 121). Along these lines, Ahmadinejad upholds Iranian cultural values of politeness and does not make direct insults during interviews, for example. In order to signal his audience in Iran, Ahmadinejad will use "deceptively blunt language [that] has always been laced with *ta'arof*" (Majd, 2008, p. 110). Consider a 2006 interview on NBC Nightly News, when asked if he would like to see more of the USA, Ahmadinejad responded: *albateh*, *esrary nadareem* (Majd, 2008). This was translated, as "of course, we're not insistent," but to a native speaker this more closely means, "of course, we don't really care" (Majd, 2008).

Equality Matching

For the Iranian state, Equality Matching hinges as it did for the civil society, on reciprocity, however it can be demonstrated on an international stage. An emphasis on reciprocity is linked to values of loyalty, sensitivity to the needs of others, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and power. However, reciprocity can be understood in a different ethos when concerning the Iranian state. True to the nature of this relational model, the state keeps track of historical events and expects, or anticipates, a continuation of the kind of tit-for-tat relationship between Iran and the West regarding representations and an unresolved *ta'arof*.

Due to historical events, Iranian officials consistently use language of desired "mutual respect" (Limbert, 2009). However, similarly to Iran's inclusion in the 'axis of evil' label by America, Khomeini referenced 'Westoxification' (Hoveyda, 2003; Yeganeh, 2011) and 'the Great Satan' for USA categorizations. For an example of this kind of representation of the USA, see Picture 3 below, which contains an image of the American flag whereby stars are skulls and red stripes are bomb trails. This element of duality, or polarity, relates to Zoroastrianism's focus on good versus evil, as well as the Sufi dichotomy between physical desires and spiritual needs (Beeman, 1986). Since the Other is always perceived in relation to oneself, "evil is determined in relation to the national and political interests of Iran…[and good]…is defined in predominately religious terms, emphasizing an Islamic sense of community" (Mehran, 2002, p. 249).

Picture 3. Demonstrating 'Westoxification,' a building mural as seen from the highway entering Tehran.

There is an unresolved exchange relation, or kind of *ta'arof*, between Iran and the West (Mehran, 2002), which risks Iranian face and honor. With the Hostage Crisis and formation of the state post-1979, Iran held the perceived upper hand. Ali Khamenei (current Iranian Supreme Leader) was a Khomeini enthusiast at this time and stated: "We are not liberals…whom the CIA can snuff out" (Abrahamian, 2001, p. 214). However, the Iran-Iraq War (known in Iran as the Imposed War due to U.S. support for Iraq) saw the "near-collapse" of the Iranian military forces, Saddam Hussein staked claim to the Shatt al-Arab River and launched massive multi-faceted attacks on Iran to cripple the budding Islamic Republic (Sick, 2002). Ever since, Iran-U.S. relations have been embroiled in a reciprocal jousting of rhetoric, sanctions, and standstill. Iranian cultural elements of emotional responsiveness, in-group preservation, tradition, achievement, and universalism are relevant to understanding Equality Matching from an Iranian state perspective.

Communal Sharing

For the Iranian theocracy, Communal Sharing could be interpreted as a small in-group maintaining limited membership; however, as demonstrated, the relational model of Authority Ranking more aptly embodies the Iranian political society's desire and behavior to maintain power. Furthermore, this relational model doesn't take precedence in Iranian state culture due to the lack of a cohesive in-group amidst political partitions and power plays. Instead, Communal Sharing can be understood in the ways that the Iranian state attempts to foster a cohesive identity for its citizens. However, one demonstrable example involves Iranian values of awareness of a spiritual sphere, loyalty, and conformity. The Iranian political society is attempting to foster a collective mentality, articulating similarity among youth by institutionalized knowledge production. Mehran (2002) analyzed content and visual representations in Iranian textbooks for Grades 1-5. His findings included that "patriotism and religion are combined to present an Iranian-Islamic identity. Thus, the 'self' has a strong religious nature – decisively Muslim – that does not overshadow his/her national character. Despite heavy emphasis on Islamic unity and solidarity, schoolchildren are frequently reminded that they are Iranians who should keep their national interests in mind at all times" (Mehran, 2002, p. 248). Fostering this collective similarity can lay the groundwork for future calls of obedience, duty, and loyalty to the state.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides an analysis of Iranian culture and society by first providing the socio-cultural context of Iran's identity, evolution of nationalism, collectivist cultural elements and values, as well as an explanation for the schism between the civil society and the state. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to hypothesize a way that Iranian culture, for both the civil society and the political society, can be mapped onto Fiske's (1992, 2004)

Relational Models Theory. It is hypothesized that the Iranian civil society reinforces CAEM [Communal Sharing > Authority Ranking > Equality Matching > Market Pricing] approaches to relations; whereas, the state reinforces AMEC [Authority Ranking > Market Pricing > Equality Matching > Communal Sharing] approaches to relations. Certain cultural elements, or influences, do appear in both rankings but they are utilized or given meaning in different ways. Surely, this can be said for many situations and contexts, but these two particular contexts seem most strikingly different, because the populace does not endorse relational approaches in the same way as the political society culture, and thus warranted two distinct hypotheses.

Overall, this chapter will aid in the progress of the Cultural Priming research agenda laid forth by Dien and colleagues (2011), as scenarios will be developed for an Iranian-American cultural norming study. Ultimately, this Iranian-American sample will be compared to Chinese-American and Afghan-American samples to demonstrate differences across different collectivistic cultures.

Chapter 3: African Cultures

INTRODUCTION

If making global statements about the diverse populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan risks overgeneralization, as noted in Chapter 3 of the original report on Cultural Priming (Dien et al., 2011), this is even more so the case for the continent of Africa. Though often treated, by both administrators and academia, as a monolithic region, Africa is a continent of 54 countries with varying blends of ethnic composition. For example, whereas Malagasy and Swaziland are relatively culturally homogeneous, Nigeria has over 400 distinct ethnolinguistic groups, (Lewis, 2009), including groups with very notably different and often conflicting social practices and beliefs Ethnic groups are also frequently split across political borders due to the legacy of boundaries established by former colonial administrations, or to nomadic traditions as with Fulani and Tuareg groups, or postcolonial migrations, as with Hutu and Tutsi groups displaced from the genocidal turmoil in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s.

After separating North Africa from sub-Saharan Africa, one *can* point to a certain degree of pan-African cultural practices, or common practices and mindsets found in numerous African societies. For example, what is known as *ubuntu*, to use the widely propagated Zulu word, is commonly claimed or attributed as a cultural ethos throughout southern Africa. The literal translation of the term, roughly, is "the quality of being a person," but the foundation of the concept is best captured in the associated proverb "a person is a person through [other] people," often stylized in English translations "I am because we are." Berry et al. (2011) point out that from the standpoint of scholarship on cross-cultural psychology, *ubuntu* would appear to be more or less synonymous with collectivism, yet "local authors tend to portray it as typical for Africa, and as somewhat different from collectivism" (p. 126). This very claim for a certain African uniqueness behind the ethos points to what may be understood as a substantial degree of individual expression and cultural pride to be infused within the more general notion of collectivism.

In the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, we encounter the concept of *ubwenge*, which Goyvaerts (2010) translates as the "culture of the lie" (see also Erny, 2003). As Goyvaerts describes this concept:

> Answering a simple question generally involves an elaborate and strategic reply during which process the person reflects on the strength of the other. Can he cause me harm? Can he bring me certain advantages? Can he arrest me? Has he any authority? Can he fire me? Can he make somebody else fire me? (p. 4-5)

Drawing on relational models theory (RMT), lest the *ubuntu* concept (with parallels in other regions throughout Africa) leave the impression that African cultures are predominantly inclined towards Communal Sharing, the concept of *ubwenge*, which involves the weighing of cost-benefit factors in social interaction, illustrates how attention to the other major cultural models come into play. That is, *ubwenge* clearly reflects Market Pricing as it involves the weighing of cost-benefit factors in social interaction; but it can also be seen to entail Authority Ranking given that a perceived inferior position appears more like to trigger this mindset and Equality Matching to the extent that *ubwenge* can draw upon a reckoning of prior favors exchanged. *Ubwenge* may be mildly associated with other strategies of indirect communication that are ubiquitous in African cultures. Indirectness (e.g. using proverbs and making references with impersonal or ambiguous pronouns, or even artful lying, as with *ubwenge*, is often adopted in light of both social hierarchy (opening lines of communication to those in authority, while maintaining socially accepted decorum) and social balance (face-saving communicative practices necessary to maintain and build social ties).

A pan-African cultural model?

In light of such common or similar cultural values found throughout Africa, is it possible to hypothesize a generalized cultural model for Africa? A growing body of work involving macro level and cross-national studies of cross-cultural psychology in Africa claims that there is "evidence . . . for a shared African culture that cuts across national boundaries" (Munene, Schwartz, & Smith, 2000, p. 348). Munene and colleagues, for example, comparing surveys from five African nations (Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) and six West European nations (Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and West Germany), have found the African respondents to reflect a strong commitment to values associated with 'Hierarchy,' 'Embeddedness,' and 'Mastery [of environment].'

In contrast to the RMT framework, which provides a characterization of preferred ways of social interactions, cultural values such as these provide a characterization of the culture itself. The cultural value of Hierarchy establishes one polar end on a dimension regarding the issue of enforcing responsible social behavior. While hierarchical values resolve this by placing emphasis on an established order of authority with rigid roles and rules, Egalitarianism, on the opposite end of this dimension emphasizes viewing fellow members of the society as equals and looking out for one another's welfare. Embeddedness (labeled elsewhere as 'Conservatism') is viewed as antipodal to autonomy on a cultural dimension that defines the status of the individual in relation to the collective society. Finally, Mastery is placed in contrast to Harmony on a dimension that addresses the relationship between humankind and the natural and social world (Munene et al., 2000; Schwartz, 1999). The fact that Mastery is found to be associated with African cultures runs contrary to other popular or generalized notions of African psychology, which is described as "promoting cooperation and harmony" in the natural environment as well as in society (Ayittey, 2006, p. 41; see also Blunt & Jones, 1997).

The GLOBE study comparing cultural values as they relate to characteristics of leadership in 62 nations included data from five countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Namibia, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Black and White populations of South Africa, House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). In their study, all of the African nations exhibited either high or moderate levels of collectivistic values at both the in-group level (family, affiliations of loyalty) and institutional level (broader society). Of the nine cultural values focused upon in the GLOBE study (Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Gender Egalitarianism, Humane Orientation, In-Group Collectivism, Institutional Collectivism, Performance Orientation, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance), the set of sub-Saharan nations scored especially high on Humane Orientation, underlying the notion of *ubuntu* discussed earlier (Chokkar, Brodbeck, & House, 2007).

Noorderhaven and Tidjani (2001) conducted a study of cultural values aimed in part at overcoming and counterbalancing a perceived Western bias in studies on cross-cultural psychology. They sought input from African scholars in the development of the survey instrument and drew from a sample with a more proportionate representation of African countries than that found in comparable studies. Specifically, six African countries (Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, and South Africa) were included in a 14-nation study along with the Netherlands, the UK, Belgium, Germany, the USA, Guyana, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Noorderhaven and Tidjani found the African countries (with the exception of South Africa) to rank especially high on dimensions reflecting Rules and Hierarchy, Importance of Religion, and Traditional Wisdom. Four of the six African countries scored above average on values associated with Sharing. Interestingly, the African nations ranked low on a factor having to do with Human Values, but the authors claim this may be understood to reflect more urban values of the particular respondents (university students). For the remaining value dimensions in their study (Jealousy, Collectivism, Societal Responsibility), the results for African nations were either mixed or inconclusive.

On the basis of the above studies, were we to accept the idea of a generalized cultural model for sub-Saharan Africa, we might hypothesize the following: Communal Sharing > Authority Ranking > Market Pricing > Equality Matching. The relative ranking of the top two and bottom two models requires some additional considerations.

When entertaining this generalized model, the first two relational models are given top rank due to the strength of the related cultural values of Embeddedness and Hierarchy. We rank Communal Sharing above Authority Ranking, because Communal Sharing is arguably more deeply embedded in African culture at all levels of social engagement. While Authority Ranking may be tied to a long-standing and/or localized traditional source in some cases (such as hierarchical chieftaincy structures found throughout Africa, historical

empires, and present-day kingdoms), many social structures now reinforcing Authority Ranking come from the legacy of colonial rule and other forms of governance adopted from Western cultures in modern times (Young, 1994). Nonetheless, even the so-called acephalous or headless societies typically reflect some form of Authority Ranking determined by age, lineage, and gender, despite the fact that this form of social organization is typically qualified as being egalitarian or non-stratified (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Kurimoto & Simonese, 1998; Smith, 1969). Notable examples of acephalous societies in Africa, historically, if not contemporary, are the Tiv in Nigeria, the Tallensi in Ghana, the Nuer in Sudan, and the Somali (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Kurimoto & Simonese, 1998; Smith, 1969). Fortes and Evans-Prichard have defined this category of social organization as "societies which lack centralized authority" where one finds "no sharp division of rank, status, and wealth" (p. 5). As noted by Flanagan (1989), however, although they are typically qualified as being egalitarian or non-stratified, the category of a "stateless society" is rather taken in as a relative term in opposition to more clearly stratified societies with central authority structures such as the Ashanti in Ghana, the Zulu in South Africa, and the Hausa-Fulani (Ayisi, 1992; Smith, 1959, 1974).

Market Pricing might be moderately associated with 'Mastery [of environment]' values that Munene et al. (2000) have found to be important among the African nations covered in their culture-level comparison based on individual responses to survey data. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to rank Marking Pricing after Communal Sharing and Authority Ranking. Furthermore, contrary to potential misconceptions of traditional African economic culture being socialistic in nature, Ayittey (2006) argues that "free enterprise and free trade were always the rule in indigenous Africa" (p. 405). However, Ayittey goes on to conclude that traditional African economic practices are best qualified as "bounded capitalism," "indigenism," or "communitarian capitalism" given that "individual economic liberties were always circumscribed or bounded by social norms and obligations for the survival of the group" (p. 406). Munene have also found that African nations ranked low on the value of 'egalitarianism,' suggesting that Equality Matching would not be a relational approach Africans would take, though it might be one they would feign to take. Despite this perspective, researchers have indicated that Equality Matching is manifested in African culture, as exemplified for instance in the common practice of rotating credit cooperatives known as *esusu* in West Africa and *iddir* in Ethiopia (Sawani & Patterson, 2010). While there is typically no overt reckoning of social and economic exchange on a tit-for-tat basis, to some extent there is an implicit sense that a favor or gesture will be repaid if and when there is a need for it. However, this arguably has more to do with Communal Sharing, stemming from the notion that a family takes care of one another come what may.

Problems with the generalized cultural model

As noted in part by Munune et al. (2000), numerous studies "suggest that there is an African thought and value system" (p. 341, citing Gyekye, 1997; Mbiti, 1969; and several papers from Iguisi, 1997) and many other works, including some of those cited above, also support the notion of a pan-African cultural model (Asante & Asante, 1985; Chokkar et al., 2007; Noorderhaven & Tijani, 2001; Wiredu, 1996). The study by Munene and colleagues, however, is one of the first to make such a clear claim based on empirical findings, despite suffering from numerous methodological flaws and facing contradictory perspectives and evidence. The results are indeed striking, but they might be more aptly attributed to the distinct subset of nations sampled and to the particular social context upon which the study was based: the modern and/or industrial workforce in relatively stable English-speaking countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

First, much of the empirical research on cross-cultural psychology in Africa is inspired by business or modernized workforce interests and consequently draws on related social environments for research participation and observation (Ahiauzu, 1986; Blunt & Jones, 1997; Jackson, 2010; Munene et al., 2000; Nwankwo & Rugimbana, 2003 inter alia). If we were to project the results of these studies onto the broader and more varied context of a given African nation or a given ethnic group in Africa, we are likely to miss nuanced layers of distinctive traditional culture. The specific culture of a given group is arguably more well preserved or emphasized in other environments which draw out ethnic identity more so than in modernizing, urban, or industrialized workplaces or than at a national-level consciousness—e.g., rural setting, relatively insular nomadic groups, revivalist movements, ethnic conflict situations. Noordhaven and Tijani (2001), for example, draw attention to the fact that their results strictly measured the value orientations of urban society in African in order to explain the surprising low ranking of African nations on the "Human Goodness" dimension in their

study. In fact, an underlying or indirect aim of research on African cultural values has been to evaluate the degree of change in values brought about by urbanization and modernization (Fülöp & Büki, (forthcoming).

Secondly, in some cases we can expect distinct historical factors to counteract any trend towards a pan-African cultural psyche. To start, we can consider the impact of different colonial legacies. Munene et al. (2000) acknowledged that similar studies of francophone countries yielded substantially different results. Lubatkin, Ndiaye, and Vengroff (1997), for example, found managers in francophone African countries to be less inclined to follow formal rules for problem-solving, and these authors also generally found that the francophone-based managers tended to behave more like counterparts in other regions of the world as opposed to counterparts in Anglophone African nations. Turning to more distinctive regional or national history, we hypothesize that the strong emphasis of *ubwenge* culture in Rwanda (discussed above) has developed from history of genocidal conflict that has plagued the Hutu-Tutsi population since independence in the 1960s.

Thirdly, alternative stages or paths to development can be expected to lead to differing national cultural models at any given time. Jackson (2010) discussed three idealized types of organizational systems that one can expect to find in Africa. First, postcolonial systems stemming from "the historical and political legacy of Africa" were described as "coercive-oriented" (p. 526) and would therefore reflect an RMT model with high Authority Ranking. What Jackson refers to as post-instrumental systems, in contrast, stem from "modernizing economic and structural influences" and are described as "results-oriented" (p. 526). Consequently, this sort of organizational system leads to higher Market Pricing relational interactions. Finally, African "renaissance" systems are said to arise from "an embryonic cultural and political indigenous revival" and to be "people-oriented" (p. 526), thus reflecting a higher ranking of Communal Sharing relative to the other types of social organization.

Consequently, for the purposes of applying RMT to Africa, we subscribe to the assumption that one must focus on distinct cultural (ethnic) groups. Throughout the remainder of this supplement, we focus on a sample of ethnically-based groups in Africa within which to apply the RMT model for a better understanding of the cultural mindset of these groups.

SURVEY OF SELECT AFRICAN CULTURES

Returning to the issue of diversity in Africa, focusing in on a specific country or region does not necessarily facilitate the task of reaching an appropriate level of generalization. The complications of *localized* ethnic diversity are multi-faceted. On one hand, as noted earlier, it is difficult to make generalizations at the level of polities, as in defining "Ethiopian culture" or "Nigerian culture." On the other hand, focusing on specific ethnic groups in isolation is equally problematic, as one must take into consideration the dynamics of overlapping and embedded layers of social organization and the interactions between ethnic groups within the national or regional socio-political landscape. Thus, in contrast to the sections in the cultural comparison chapter of the original report on Cultural Priming (Dien et al., 2011), we focus on a sample of three major ethnically-defined groups of Africa that exemplify three different settings of the relation between ethnic grouping and national boundaries: (1) the now broken nation of Somalia contains a more or less homogenous ethnic population, though an extended ethnic Somali population spills over into portions of neighboring countries; (2) the Tuareg are a nomadic group with relatively low national allegiance to the various countries of the Sahel that they migrate between; and (3) the Hausa, themselves straddled between Niger and Nigeria, represent one among several major groups within the ethnically diverse nations that they inhabit. The review of these ethnic groups will draw on national and regional history, politics, and interethnic relations to the extent that these factors have a bearing on the analysis of the cultural mindset of a given ethnic group.

Caution is warranted regarding the RMT hypotheses made in the following sections, because the primary cultural descriptions upon which these assertions are based are drawn in part from historical accounts dating back several decades (e.g., notably, Keenan, 1977; Kirk-Greene, 1974; Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Miles, 1994; Nicholaisen & Nicholaisen, 1997; Paden, 1973; Salamone, 2010, the latter of which is largely a compilation of works from 1970-1998). As noted elsewhere within this report, factors such as colonialism and modernization, can and do have important effects, often dramatic and rapid, on a given cultural group and create new bases of culture (e.g., national identity versus more localized ethnic identity) (see Miles, 1994). However, when drawing on works such as those cited above, we adopt the assumption that the fundamental or core values of ethnic

culture are relatively unlikely to have undergone extreme change or reversal and thus the cultural characterizations cited are still valid today.

SOMALI

The Somali are a major ethnic group of the Horn of Africa living in the nation of Somalia, including the autonomous region of Somaliland, as well portions of the neighboring countries of Ethiopia (predominantly in the Ogaden region), Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen. Historically, the Somali are known by their pastoral ways as camel herders, clan-based social fabric and strong sense of a common Somali lineage, and rich tradition of poetry and verbal arts—an oft-cited epithet attributed to Sir Richard Burton being the "nation of poets" or "nation of bards" (Laitin & Samatar, 1987, p. 34).

A subset of Somali clans (the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Daarood), with an estimated population of 14 million (Lewis, 2009), speak mutually intelligible varieties of the Somali language and are sometimes referred to as the Somali proper; this subset most fully encapsulates the Somali cultural analysis covered in this section. Another two million people (Lewis, 2009) come from the Rahanwein, Digil, and related clans, speaking language varieties closely related to Somali (Maay, Dabarre, Jiiddu, Tunni), though their livelihood and language are noticeably different from the so-called Somali proper (Lewis, 1999). The Somali have been torn between a sense of broad cultural unity, on the one hand, and deeper ties of clan identity on the other. After the independence era of the 1960s, a spirit of pan-Somalism fueled hopes for a "Greater Somalia" state. These hopes were first dashed following defeat in the Ogaden war against Ethiopia (backed by the Soviet Union); and later the dream of a unified Somali state was further shattered by clan-driven disputes for regional autonomy (i.e., most notably by the formal British protectorate of Somaliland), leading to the failed state that we find today.

We hypothesized that the RMT hierarchy for Somali culture is ECMA [Equality Matching > Communal Sharing > Market Pricing > Authority Ranking]. The first set of critical rankings involves the two extreme ends of the scale, with Equality Matching taking the highest position and Authority Ranking having a minimal or negative role in the social order. A sense of both egalitarianism and individual freedom are said to be foremost among Somali cultural values, moreso the former, as the value of individual freedom is tempered by strong ties of kinship. This tends to be contrary to the notions discussed earlier regarding stereotypical values attributed to sub-Saharan African culture as a whole. This deep sense of a free spirit is reflected in Somali folklore. In a common tale, the Sheep asks the Gazelle why he persists in running from humans even though pastureland is hard to come by in the wild, the Gazelle replies:

> A sheep cannot understand. My family and yours are not alike. We are the children of liberty and open space. As for me, I prefer to die on my own feet while running away before being gorged with food by a master who would kill me when I became fat or who would kill my children. My heart is not the heart of a sheep. (Duchenet, 1936, cited in Laitin & Samatar, 1987, p. 42)

Laitin and Samatar (1987) also cite examples from contemporary social life that illustrate what they find to be a deep cultural grounding for freedom of expression and egalitarian spirit—scenarios that are rather surprising to members of cultures where Authority Ranking plays a greater role in social organization. For example, it is not uncommon to find a driver arguing over politics and joking with a minister he is chauffeuring, or to see a school bus driver and cook take leave of their occupational functions to engage in debate over educational policy and management issues in a meeting that one might otherwise expect to be restricted to faculty and administrators.

The democratic roots of the Somali are also evidenced in the system for conflict resolution between clans, stemming from the traditionally acephalous nature

Figure 3. Clan elders debate issues of local importance in a meeting in Bruoa Town. (Copyright, Stuart Freedman, reprinted with permission)

of Somali political order prior to the development into a modern nation-state. This is regulated through contracts referred to as *herr*, in which a democratically run group of elders known as the *shir* are called upon to settle disputes (Elmi, 2010; Laitin & Samatar, 1987). For an extreme offense such as the murder of a member of another clan, the case would be settled by the *shir* and a "blood payment" (in the form of a set number of camels, for example) would be owed by the offender and his closest kin, known as the "dia-paying group" (Elmi, 2010, p. 30). However, a certain degree of authority ranking is born from factors such as clan dynamics and religion, as well as social change introduced through modern politics. We will discuss this in more detail later.

Communal Sharing

The next strongest relational model appears to be Communal Sharing. We find a strong sense of cultural unity and community identity at both the national and clan levels—not without negative ramifications for these competing levels of community loyalty. Ignoring for the moment the devolution of Somalia into an increasingly broken state, Somalia is one of a handful of African countries which approaches being a nation-state in the purest sense of the term on a continent where one finds much greater ethnic diversity in most other countries as well as greater heterogeneity in terms of religion, economic livelihood and so forth in many cases. Homogeneity of a society, in and of itself, is by no means a sign of Communal Sharing, as illustrated by Japanese culture, where Communal Sharing is the lowest ranked cultural model. However, within the context of ethnic diversity and national politics in the Horn of Africa, the strong, multi-layered foundation of a shared, inherited group identity arguably contributes to a model of Commonal Sharing among the Somali. For example, this sense of cultural and national unity has served to draw the Somali together in the face of perceived enemies (Lewis, 2010), presumably contributing to disputes with neighboring Ethiopia over the Ogaden region which includes a substantial population of ethnic Somali living outside the borders of Somalia.


Figure 4. Clan structure of the Somali. (The majority of Somalis trace their lineage to a common ancestral founding father, Saamale.) (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Somalia_ethnic_grps_2002.jpg)

This unity of Somali culture is fortified on a variety of levels: historical, social, economic. National and cultural history is said to play a strong role in Somali society. First of all, Somalis hold a deep "belief that nearly

all Somalis descend from the same source and are therefore drawn together by emotive bonds of kinship and genealogical ties" (Laitin & Samatar, 1987, p. 21). In fact, the term Somali derives from the name of the founding father of the cultural lineage, Samaale. Given the social importance of genealogical roots both for Somali cultural identity in general and for clan affiliation, immigrant residents of Somalia who are of Arab or Persian descent, for example, reportedly create fictitious ties to a major Somali clan in order to fit into society (Laitin & Samatar, 1987, p. 31). At the social level, Somalis described as being 100 percent Sunni Muslim thus share the bond of common religious values and practices (Elmi, 2010). Social unity is further buttressed by shared knowledge of and widespread reference to Somali history, and this is complemented by a strong tradition of poetry and songs (Laitin & Samatar, 1987). Even on the economic sphere, the Somali are surprisingly homogeneous. As recently as 1987, animal husbandry (camel rearing and trading in particular) reportedly accounted for the livelihood of sixty percent of the Somali population, in spite of increased urbanization. The "camel culture" and related pastoral base of Somali society are also now well steeped in other realms of social engagement, from poetry to metaphors and basic communication (see Laitin & Samatar, 1987, p. 25-27).

The fact that this strong sense of cultural unity exists not only at the national or macro ethnic group level but also at the level of clans that are in competition within the macro social order leads to a major paradox of Somali social order—one that has been hypothesized to be among the driving forces behind Somalia's "failed state." As Laitin and Samatar (1987) put it, "A curious feature of Somali segmentation is that it is both centripetal and centrifugal, at once drawing the Somalis into a powerful social fabric of kinship affinity and cultural solidarity while setting them against one another in a complicated maze of antagonistic clan interests" (pp. 30-31). Spencer (1998) also notes that "the strength of [the Somali] lineage system was also its weakness," referring to the inevitable feuding between clans (pp. 168-169). This dichotomy between national and clan-level identity is mirrored to some extent in religious identity. Though Somali are generally unified in Sunni Islam, we also find affiliation to Sufi brotherhoods, some of which are at odds with one another.

Market Pricing

The next strongest model is Market Pricing. The pastoral heritage of the Somali not only serves as a source for shared cultural identity, but served historically as the basis for the development of clientship and resource sharing between nomadic camel herders (predominantly in northern regions) and agriculturalist settlers (predominantly in the south) that has formed the fabric of Somali society (Kaplan, 1969; Laitin & Samatar, 1987). This is another manifestation of the clientship relations between northern pastoralists (who generally represented the more dominant clans) and southern agriculturists and skilled laborers (Kaplan, 1969). As described by Kaplan, the social relations between these groups in the pre-WWII era bordered on the caste-like hierarchy found among the Tuareg (discussed in the next section). Maintenance of clientship, and hence security of one's livelihood, presumably rests in part on reputation-building and trust between the mutually benefitting groups. According to Laitin and Samatar, these relationships were further fortified by the mediation of itinerant sheikhs and holymen who added credibility to a pastoral group's reputation by providing the benefit of a source of religious power and guidance (though here we are bordering on a mixed model of Market Pricing and Authority Ranking).

Authority Ranking

We have categorized Authority Ranking as the lowest model for Somali culture to the extent that it runs opposite highly valued individual freedom. Nonetheless, as already alluded to in the discussion above, Authority Ranking does affect Somali culture by various means. First, national resources have typically been distributed through clans, and this therefore reinforces the authority of the clan structure and clan leaders (Elmi, 2010; Laitin & Samatar, 1987). There has also been a sense of power relations between clans, such that, other things being equal, a given clan and its members are considered to have greater power, prestige, or seniority over other clans (Laitin & Samatar, 1987). While this appears to run contrary to the democratic ideals attributed to Somali culture, it may be more understandable in the light of mystical powers and religious prestige that can also be attributed to the dominant clans (Laitin & Samatar, 1987).

Some of these concepts of "inherited authority" such as *'urad* (first-born rights to power), along with certain values and practices of Communal Sharing, may be understood in light of Somali proximity to and

interaction with neighboring African cultures whose traditions of social order are based on age-grade systems. East Africa is home to a particularly large number of ethnic groups whose social organization centers around age-sets. Some Somali pastoral groups are said to have adopted such age-sets or age-grading systems through influence from neighboring Oromo, an ethnolinguistically related Cushitic people (Abbink, 2003). Furthermore, the southern regions of Somalia are said to have a political culture based on chieftaincies as is fairly typical of agriculturally developed settlements elsewhere in Africa; thus a stronger sense of Authority Ranking can be found among the clans of this region (Laitin & Samatar, 1987).

TUAREG

The Tuareg are a predominantly nomadic people who inhabit an extensive region where the Sahara borders on the Sahel spanning present-day Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Though having a pastoralist tradition similar to that of the Somali, they are especially known, at least historically, as desert warriors, characteristically referred to as the "Blue Men" due to the striking, characteristic indigo-dyed veils and robes of the noble caste mounted on their camels. The Tuareg are considered a subset of the Berber peoples of North Africa based on linguistic affinity and origin myths, but they have also historically incorporated descendants of Arabs and West African ethnic groups.

Figure 5. (a) Map of the range of Tuareg groups (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tuareg_area.png); (b) Tuareg men in Niger, 1997 (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1997_277-31A_Tuareg.jpg)

The cultural analysis presented in this section is based on traditional social order of dominant Tuareg groups that had reportedly been preserved up through the majority of the 20th century (Childs & Chelada, 1993; Keenan, 1977). Tuareg culture encompasses several different 'confederations,' including the so called northern groups of Kel Ahaggar and Kel Ajjer (in southern Algeria, northern Niger, and Libya) and the southern groups of Kel Adragh (Central Mali, Timbuktu area), Iwellemmedan (Southwestern Niger, Northeastern Nigeria, and Southeastern Mali), and Kel Ayr, Kel Gres, and Kel Owey (Central Niger, Agadez area). Much of the analysis below, however, is drawn from description of the Kel Ahaggar (Keenan, 1977), which is one of the better documented Tuareg groups in terms of history and culture.

In comparison with the other two ethnic groups focused upon in this report, the continuity of traditional Tuareg socio-political organization has undergone particularly dramatic upheaval in the face of a combination of external factors: colonialism and post-colonial and national politics, modernization, and most notably devastating climate change (Childs & Chelada, 1993). Consequently, the Tuareg example poses a substantial strain on our assumption that the underlying cultural mindset in place just a few decades ago will still have

resonance in contemporary Tuareg society. Implications of recent changes in social organization and cultural practice will also be addressed.

The social configuration for Tuareg culture is tentatively hypothesized as ACME [Authority Ranking > Communal Sharing > Market Pricing > Equality Matching]. Viewed against the analysis of Somali culture in the preceding section, this illustrates how separate African groups can be found to be quite different in terms of the cultural values that they emphasize in general or the relative importance they give to cultural values in different contexts and levels of social interaction. Thus, here we find Authority Ranking to be the highest ranked cultural model, whereas it was ranked last for the Somali, and, as we shall see in the next section, falls somewhere in between other cultural models for the Hausa.

Authority Ranking

Authority Ranking stands out as a leading cultural model based on traditional Tuareg social order. As Keenan (1977) notes, "Tuareg societies are characterized, perhaps above all else, by their rigid class structure" (p. 10). The primary division of this structure, which has reportedly been lost in recent decades (Childs & Chelada, 1993), was between a ruling class of warriors (known as *Ihaggaren* among northern Tuareg like the Kel Ahaggar and as *Imajaghan* among southern Tuareg) and an associated range of freemen and slaves. The predominant counterpart of the ruling 'nobles' were a 'vassal' class known as the *Imṛad*. Among the Kel Ahaggar, this caste was referred to as the *Kel Ulli* ('people of the goats'), whose designation indicates their primary pastoral, livestock-tending economic activity, in addition to being called upon for warring and raiding. Other categories of vassals or freemen included those of mixed race (e.g., Tuareg mother, Arab father) who were typically traders (*Isekkemaren*), descendants of fallen or outcast nobles (*Ibettenaten*), religious clerics (*Ineslemen*), and those of specialized professions such as blacksmiths and cultivators (Keenan, 1977). The combination of a particular descent group of nobles and their subordinate, or once subordinate, vassal groups is known as a 'drum group' (*ettebel*). A given Tuareg federation, such as the Kel Ahaggar, is composed of several such groups. A sense of social hierarchy was traditionallyreflected both within a given drum group as describe above and between drum groups in the federationnobles and between different 'drum groups' (*ettebel*). That is, the noble groups and vassal groups alike had kinship-based or clan-like cohesion. Within a given descent group, one noble would hold the title of drum chief, thus holding greater authority than other nobles. Likewise, the caste system involved a hierarchy between vassal categories, and members of the freeman castes could also hold slaves. At the same time, among the Kel Ahaggar, one of the noble descent groups, the numerically dominant Kel Ṛela, held a higher status as a whole than the other groups (p. 28).

Communal Sharing

The next strongest model of traditional Tuareg culture is Communal Sharing. While the conventional translation of Tuareg cultural terms (e.g. 'nobles,' 'vassals,' and 'slaves') might lead one to imagine a more highly Market Pricing oriented feudal arrangement, Tuareg culture appears to be infused with a sense of familial bonds cutting across castes that provide added legitimacy to the social order. Keenan (1977) draws attention to what appears to be "a surprisingly high degree of cohesion and solidarity between the classes within the drum groups" (p. 49). According to Keenan, these bonds may be supported by a combination of factors, including a sense of shared ancestry, marriage between classes, and inter-class "joking relationships" (a social practice that serves to create a sense of closeness between groups that are otherwise divided by class or clan affiliation, for example). For example, the origin myth of the Kel Ahaggar creates a sense of group unity at the same time as providing legitimacy for the dominant social status of the noble class: The *Ihaggeren* (nobles) are said to have descended from a queen named Tin Hinan, with vassals descending from Takama, who is described in variations of the original myth as the faithful companion, slave-girl, or younger sister of Tin Hinan (p. 19-21). More straightforward is the sense of Communal Sharing afforded within a particular component group of a given Tuareg confederation. As noted in the preceding paragraph, individual Tuaregs identify with and belong to a specific descent group. Regarding joking relationships, it should be pointed out that this form of social interaction emphasizes the class division at the same time as contributing to broader group cohesion, and thus joking can equally be viewed as a means for "power maneuvering" (Rasmussen, 1993, p. 211).

Symbols of group cohesion are found elsewhere, as with the drum, which "denotes not only 'authority' and 'sovereignty'" for the ruling nobles, "but also the notion of 'belonging' in the context of group membership and descent" for all members of the drum group (Keenan, 1977, p. 41). Even slaves, which otherwise might be assumed to be a more freely tradable "commodity" or a more disenfranchised caste, "were generally considered part of the family" and the risk of bitterness towards captors was mitigated by the practice of immediately trading captured slaves to a different Tuareg federation (Heath, 2010, p. 499).

Market Pricing

In the context of this community cohesion created from origin myths (whether real or imagined) and social dynamics found within the Tuareg drum groups, as summarized above, Market Pricing would appear to rank below Communal Sharing. However, while there may not have been much room for shopping around, bargaining, and fair "pricing," the structure of social relations, particularly between nobles and vassals, was clearly economic and utilitarian in nature. The basic exchange between nobles and vassals appeared to be similar to that of feudal Europe, where the warrior class nobles provided protection and land rights in exchange for the provision of subsistence goods. This came in the form of diverse transactions from annual tributary payments (known as *tiwse*, made directly to the descent group's drum chief or, sometimes, to other prominent nobles) to tribute paid as part of more individualized relationship (known as *temaẕlayt*, 'contract for protection') between a particular noble and a particular set of vassals (Keenan, 1977). In addition to protection and land rights, the nobles served as "communicators" by bringing valued news of the land (Keenan, 1977). Furthermore, the vassals often benefitted from use of the noble's own livestock (e.g. camels) that were sometimes left in their care (p. 48).

Again, however, descriptive accounts of Tuareg history and culture suggest that these *temaẕlayt* arrangements were not necessarily either a market-based or ad-hoc pairing of nobles and vassals, but rather, like other aspects of Tuareg social relations, based on longstanding relations between particular matrilineal groups. Consequently, the rights and responsibilities of a *temaẕlayt* relation would be inherited by a noble of the same matrilineal group and these rights over the particular vassal group may have been held in common with other members of the noble's lineage (Nicholaisen & Nicholaisen, 1997). Keenan (1977), on the other hand, speculates that the vassals may have exercised more of an open-market selection of a protector noble and comments that "it is conceivable that the *Kel Ulli* [vassals] could have reinforced their right of refusal by turning to another noble for protection" (p. 48). Whether driven by community affinity or the reputation-maintaining motivations of a Market Pricing cultural model, Keenan stresses that "it was in the interests of the *Ihaggaren* to ensure that their *Kel Ulli* were rich and well protected, for they were dependent on them to a very large extent for much of their subsistence" (p. 48).

Equality Matching

In terms of the caste system that epitomized traditional Tuareg social order, Equality Matching does not stand out as a dominant cultural model. Keenan (1977), for example, clearly identifies the social relationship described in the preceding paragraphs as having an "'unequal' exchange basis" (p. 47). Unfortunately, the descriptive work on traditional Tuareg culture tends to focus on these relationships between castes, so we have little to observe about the social relationships among peers within a given caste. Presumably however, the nobles' ability to carry out their obligation as protectors could have involved not necessarily confrontational battle with would-be 'enemy' raiders, but also a network of connections through which negotiations for reasonable coexistence would be sought—that is, in the vein of the nobles of medieval Europe to which they have been compared (see, for example, Brower, 2011, on Henri Duveyrier's view of the Tuareg). In such a scenario, Equality Matching could come in a positive form, such as mutual agreement to refrain from raiding one another's vassals, or in a negative manifestation, such as repaying a raid on one's vassals with a retaliatory raid in kind. Keenan also reports that the Kel Ahaggar nobles sometimes received a sort of good faith "protection money" from tribes outside of Ahaggar in the hopes that this would deter Ahaggar nobles from raiding their communities (p. 38). This was neither a communal nor a market-based transaction, as there was no explicit contract or expectation that the payment would be "returned" in the form of peaceful relations and there

was not sense that this payment was due out of familial respect. Thus, this can be seen as a potential example of Equality Matching cultural practice.

With respect to gender relations within a given caste, Tuareg women have traditionally held a relatively high status, prestige, and independence, deriving in part from the fact that the Tuareg lineage system is matrilineal (Keenan, 1977; Nicolaisen & Nicolaisen, 1997; Rasmussen, 1994, 1998). Rasmussen (1994, 1994), for example, notes that this is realized is such practical terms as "ownership of herds and participation in trade, the right to eject husbands from the tent, and self-representation in litigation" among the Kel Ewey Tuareg of Niger (p. 433). While this does not fully reflect a cultural model of Equality Matching, it does suggest a relatively higher degree of gender-based egalitarianism than that found in other ethnic groups such as the Hausa discussed in the next section. Rasmussen (1994, 1998) also observes, however, that the some of the traditional status and respect afforded to women has been counterbalanced by gender inequities influenced by changing lifestyles such as sedentarization (leading to patrilineal-based property ownership) and and adoption of Koranic law.

Studies of Tuareg culture note that this social structure was upheld strikingly well through both colonial rule and post-colonial politics, such as revolution and repressive regimes in Algeria (Childs & Chelada, 1993; Keenan, 1977), in spite the cultural practices such as raiding and slavery that are seemingly quite incompatible with modern nation-state political organization. Keenan, for example, notes not that the noble Tuareg warrior had lost their status in light of the Algerian revolution but rather comments on how their image had been transformed from "flowing robes and indigo-coloured veil, and mounted on a white riding camel" to "in an old army greatcoat and driving a large municipal truck" (p. 7). Nonetheless, scholars suggest that the rigid social order had begun to erode as a result of national politics, including the abolition of slavery. However, it was devastating droughts and subsequent economic hardship in the 1970s and 1980s that reportedly led to the end of the traditional Tuareg caste system among the Kel Ahaggar. As Childs and Chelada put it, "Far superior at manual labor and foraging, the former [vassals and] slave caste managed better than nobles. In the newly forming settlements, clans of different historic caste have found it necessary to finally accept each other on equal terms" (Settling the Land section, para. 4). Other relatively recent studies, on the other hand, suggest that traditional Tuareg traditional culture—that is, especially the stratified political culture—may have survived through recent decades if only "in modified form" (Rasmussen, 1998, p. 247). Thus, we can imagine a shift in the cultural model of Tuareg groups wherein Authority Ranking loses importance in the social order and Equality Matching and Market Pricing take a relatively higher precedence. Communal Sharing likely remains a strong cultural model among the Tuareg, reinforced in part by a heightened sense of a broader Tuareg identity through shared solidarity as seen in rebellion and ethnic revival movements. Consequently, we hypothesize that the Tuareg cultural model is moving closer to that described for the Somali in this report or that of Afghani/Pakistani in Dien et al. (2011), depending on the degree to which Market Pricing or Communal Sharing emerge as more influential cultural factors for Tuareg communities in the aftermath of the economic devastation and political upheaval of the past few decades.

HAUSA

The Hausa represent one of the largest ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa with a population of over 25 million (Haour & Rossi, 2010), the majority of whom live in northern Nigeria and southern Niger. It is difficult to say what epitomizes Hausa culture, due to the actual diversity the community which is nonetheless overshadowed by stereotypical perceptions of the Hausa. The typical image of the modern Hausa is that of the jovial yet disciplined, multi-tasking businessman in a colorful billowing *baban-riga* robe and embroidered *fula* cap (see Worden, 2010 on clothing and Hausa identity), whose market trading magically flourishes, while he fills his day building rapport with colleagues over tea, making social calls to kinsmen, settling disputes between junior family or clients, and heeding the calls to prayer.

The historical ethnic core of Hausa culture is the descendants of the seven independent, centralized states of the Habe people (themselves already presumably a melting pot incorporating dominated minor groups (Salamone, 2010). However, these states, as well as other neighboring conquered populations, were subsumed under a Fulani-ruled caliphate established following the jihad of Usman dan Fodio at the turn of the nineteenth century. The Fulani rulers end up integrating into the sedentary culture of their subjects, including adopting basic customs and accepting Hausa as a lingua franca. Thus, the designation of Hausa often refers to the broader Hausa-Fulani group, as well as individuals descending from yet other ethnic groups who ended up adopting the Hausa culture, thus extending the possible number of people identified as Hausa to upwards of 50 million (Salamone, 2010).

Figure 6. Rural Hausa market, Kano-Katsina Road, Nigeria, 2011 (Copyright, Yusuf Adamu, reprinted with permission)

What it means to identify as Hausa has been a particularly puzzling question for outside researchers (Cooper, 1997; Haour & Rossi, 2010; Miles, 1994; Paden, 1973; Salamone, 2010). Given the diverse reality of what constitutes Hausa culture, created in part by the fact that today's widespread Hausa-Fulani culture is a relatively recent social construct born out of a combination of indigenous empire building at the turn of the 19th century and subsequent colonial rule, Salamone (2010) implies that speaking the Hausa language may be the only clearly defining characteristic, and this is echoed in other works (Miles, 1994). Another major source of Hausa identity, behavior, and mindset, however, is a concept known as *mutumin kirki* (Kirk-Greene, 1974; Salamone, 2010; Salamone & Salamone, 1993). *Mutumin kirki* translates roughly as 'the good man,' having to do with a broad-based sense of 'uprightness, virtuosity,' and comprises a variety of values relating to Communal Sharing, Market Pricing, Authority Ranking, and Equality Matching. The complex of values comprised in the *mutumin kirki* concept, and the way they emphasize a given relational model, is discussed below.

The RMT model for Hausa is hypothesized as CAME [Communal Sharing > Authority Ranking > Market Pricing > Equality Matching]. Thus, of the three sample ethnic groups reviewed here, the Hausa are most representative of the stereotypical value orientations discussed earlier for sub-Saharan Africa. We posit that the highest ranking model for Hausa culture is Communal Sharing. While the core value system of *mutumin kirki* encompasses aspects of multiple RMT categories, that of Communal Sharing and a sense of common identity is ultimately reinforced the most by this complex of values, among other factors. Kirk-Greene (1974) describes "ten principle … features of … character" for the *mutumin kirki*: *gaskiya* ('truth'), *amana* ('friendliness, trust'), *karamci* ('generosity'), *hakuri* (patience), *hankali* ('[good] sense; sound, mature judgment; manners; prudence'), *kunya* ('shame; propriety'), *ladabi* ('courtesy'), *mutunci* ('good will, respect for others'), *hikima* ('wisdom'), and *adalci* ('scrupulous, God-fearing behavior').

Several of these values are tied to reputation and honor, which, as discussed further below, can come with a figurative 'market' value in some contexts. On the whole, however, the cultural connection is presumably built from within, and the ideal traits of *mutumin kirki*, for example, come with an internalized sense of their intrinsic value and of the association of this complex of values with Hausa identity.

Communal Sharing

The strength of Communal Sharing among the Hausa comes from a combination of the general sense of goodwill towards others and related values drawn from the *mutumin kirki* psyche, comparable to the aforementioned *ubuntu* mindset, and more group-specific bonds (Kirk-Greene, 1974; Salamone, 2010). Like the other groups discussed in this report, the Hausa are predominantly Muslim. Some might consider Islamic practice alone to be more of a source of shared regional identity as opposed to ethnic identity, as with

'northerners' in the Nigerian context (Bah, 2005; Clarke & Linden, 1984). To be accurate, the Hausa are not 100 percent Muslim and the general adherence to Muslim practices throughout Hausaland—i.e., especially in certain rural or outlying areas—is arguably not as strong or as unified as that found among the Somali; yet the very syncretic nature of religious practices among the Hausa, as Salmone (2010) puts it, contribute towards the shared identity. That is, even where one finds 'pagans' (*arna*) or more loosely converted Muslims, not to mention a limited number of Christian Hausa, these groups tend to share a common belief in spirits associated with the Hausa origin myth (p. 6). Speaking of the overlapping bonds of regional identity, as the dominant, representative group of the northern region in Nigeria, the Hausa sense of community solidarity is strengthened in general in light of competition for national resources and political power with the two other dominant groups of Nigeria, the Yoruba and Ibo. Taking this into consideration, religious affiliation alone is not enough to define shared identity, as the Yoruba population notably includes substantial number of adherents of both Christianity and Islam, as well as strictly traditional beliefs (Falola & Genova, 2006; Laitin & Samatar, 1987).

Authority Ranking

Authority Ranking also plays a very important role in the Hausa social configuration. Hausa society is described as being highly stratified (Haour & Rossi, 2010; Miles, 1994; Salamone, 2010). Salamone notes,

> Not only is stratification based on occupation, wealth, birth, and patron-client ties. It is
> also based on seniority and gender, even with the family. The system is one also marked
> by patronage. Wealth and power confer great prestige on men, who form patron client
> ties. The stress on power and dominance permeates society, except in its marginal area.
> One's status is also determined by the status of one's family, and within the family males,
> at least theoretically, are dominant. (p. 107)

The Hausa are socialized towards this social stratification at a young age (Salamone, 2010; Smith, 1959). That is, not only are the youth as a whole expected to defer to their elders, but they are also conscious of the seniority of older children and obey their requests, even outside of their own kinship group. Within distinctive Hausa play groups, the older children are given titles to reflect their relative position of authority and leadership (Smith, 1959). Likewise, within the polygamous culture of the Hausa, the wives, who otherwise hold a lower social status than men, recognize social ranking amongst themselves based on the order of marriages to a common husband (Salamone, 2010). The fact that status in the form of political power is often transferred on the basis of birth, however, underlines the fact that Communal Sharing is a generally more active cultural model (Smith, 1959). Authority Ranking is also reflected on the macro or historical level in terms of the traditional political culture of the Hausa-Fulani, which evolved into a highly centralized and hierarchically structured system of governance (Paden, 1973).

Though authority sometimes comes as a birthright, as noted above, it nonetheless comes with clear set of rights and obligations. The inseparable pairing of rights and obligations is symbolized linguistically, as there is just one term in the Hausa language, *hakki*, to designate both of these terms (Paden, 1973). Along these lines, Kirk-Greene's discussion of *mutumin kirki* is presented as a model of leadership among the Hausa as much as a general model for good citizenship.

Market Pricing

Market Pricing is another strong cultural model among the Hausa. Several of the component characteristics of *mutumin kirki* presented earlier center around reputation, which Dien et al. (2011) draw attention to as an indicator of a Market Pricing model at work within social interaction (in reference to Afghani/Pakistani culture, for example). In the case of Hausa culture, however, reputation and honor is arguably more tied to Communal Sharing, having more to do with maintaining honor for the family and upholding dignity as a member of the community. Thus, we can assume a certain degree of interaction between Market Pricing and Cultural Sharing within the Hausa social configuration, among other interactions between the different relational models already alluded to earlier. In any case, reputation is presumably also valued and sought for more economically motivated interactions. One of the stereotypical images of the Hausa, perhaps not so surprising in light of the importance placed on reputation-reinforcing values, is that of adopting and excelling at trade and

commerce as a livelihood. Furthermore, the Hausa market economy is known for Western-like attention to market pricing as opposed to variable pricing based on bargaining and social relations between buyer and seller (Ayittey, 2006).

Moreover, the choice—by individuals or minor ethnic groups—to identify as Hausa can be viewed as a largely socioeconomic decision. Unlike the Somali, for whom genealogical ties play an important role in cultural identity and group membership, the Hausa form a more openly expansionist and inclusivist group (Haour & Rossi, 2010). As the influence of Hausa culture spreads, minority groups in contact with the Hausa invariably adopt the language of this dominant group, and many have adopted or are in the process of adopting the broader cultural identity as well. Historically, Hausa leaders have actively sought the assimilation of these groups, including conversion of the *arna* ('pagans') to Islam. Again, however, here we find an overlap with another cultural model, Authority Ranking, to the extent that the conversion comes under pressure from a dominant group. At any rate, adoption of Hausa culture is not simply a defensive maneuver against domination and possibly persecution in general, but also affords the potential of socioeconomic gains that come with emulating stereotypical Hausa behavior and image (see, e.g., Salamone, 2010, p. 68).

Equality Matching

In light of the general social stratification found in Hausa culture, Equality Matching is assumed to be a relatively weaker cultural model. On the interpersonal level, however, the precepts of *mutumin kirki* do encourage generosity and equal respect, not only to fellow community members, but to fellow human being in general. Hausa are also among the many sub-Saharan African groups whose members, predominantly women, participate in the rotating credit associations as described earlier for sub-Saharan African culture in general (Hill, 1969).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

As noted earlier in this chapter, African cultures are underrepresented, or not covered at all in many cases, in scientific research in cross-cultural psychology (despite beginning efforts with Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits', 1963, work on perceptual geometric illusions among Zulu of South Africa). However, a growing body of research efforts has been moving to address and rectify this state of affairs (see, e.g., Jackson, 2004; Tchombe, Nsamaneng, Keller, & Fülöp, to appear). Not only is this underrepresentation of African cultures unacceptable on scientific grounds, it is also unfortunate given the potential benefits of applied research for economic development and governance solutions for the many developing nations on the African continent and given the growing practical needs for understanding African culture on the part of outside government and industry. During the writing of this report, Tuareg groups have initiated rebellion in Mali, there has been a wave of attacks attributed to the Boko Haram in Hausa-speaking areas of Nigeria, and problems of state formation, terrorism, and piracy continue in Somalia. In this vein, this chapter has sought to augment the work of Dien et al. (2011) with an assessment of a sample of major African cultures that can be of assistance to government analysts seeking to understand these cultures.

This chapter opened with a presentation of reportedly pan-African cultural values found in many societies of sub-Saharan Africa and a discussion of the degree to which we can identify a generalized African cultural model. Research on such a generalized model is arguably worthwhile and relevant for a large number of specific cultural groups in Africa or, more appropriately, for certain social domains (e.g., educated working class in urban areas) across the African continent. However, the subsequent review of three separate exemplary groups in Africa (i.e., Somali, Tuareg, and Hausa) has underlined the importance of accounting for cultural diversity in Africa.

In comparison with many other ethnic groups and regions of Africa, the three groups focused upon in this chapter actually share some relatively unique cultural background. The Somali and Tuareg each had a strong pastoral tradition, and the Hausa culture also grew through incorporation of Fulani rulers who came from a pastoralist tradition. All three cultures evolved through the interaction of groups with differing economic livelihoods in what involved some degree of clientship relations. And all three groups have adopted Islam as a religious practice that contributes in part to their cultural identity, though with differing degrees of religious

adherence. Yet such shared general influences are not enough to lead to similar cultural development or similar ranking of cultural values. The distinctive cultures, as viewed though primary livelihood, traditional governance and social stratification, criteria for group membership, and influences of the ecological environment, among many other factors, contribute to the noticeably different importance placed on certain cultural values and, consequently, quite variable hierarchies of relational models hypothesized for each of these groups. Whereas the cultural model of Hausa was found to pattern roughly as hypothesized for sub-Saharan Africa in general (CAME [Communal Sharing > Authority Ranking > Market Pricing > Equality Matching]); Authoring Ranking was relatively more salient for the Tuareg (ACME [Authority Ranking > Communal Sharing > Market Pricing > Equality Matching]). For the Somali, on the other hand, Authority Ranking was ranked much lower and Equality Matching ranked relatively higher (ECMA [Equality Matching > Communal Sharing > Market Pricing > Authority Ranking]).

Finally, it was stressed in the opening section that cultural analysis must take into account various factors such as interaction within broader national and regional contexts, unique historical developments and events, and differing social domains. The salience of particular cultural models can change depending on whether we are dealing with localized community interactions or an industrial workplace; whether the interaction is between individuals in a relatively tight in-group or a member of an out-group (as with Somali clan identity versus national identity); or whether the interaction is between peers or socially stratified groups (as with the Tuareg castes). In this report which provides an overview of three different cultural groups from Africa, we have only been able to hint at the complexities of understanding African cultures. As Africa becomes an increasingly important area for analysts to understand, future investigations would benefit from specific focus on an individual group and outline variable RMT hierarchies for different domains of analysis.

REFERENCES

Abbink, J. G. (2003). Age group systems. In U. Siegbert, B. Yiman, D. Crummey, G. Goldenberg, P. Marrassini, M. W. Aregay, & E. Wagner (Eds.), *Encyclopaedia Aethiopica* (Vol. 1: A-C, pp. 145-146). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.

Abrahamian, E. (1973). Kasravi: The integrative nationalist of Iran. *Middle Eastern Studies, 9*(3), 271-295.

Abrahamian, E. (1982). *Iran between two revolutions*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Abrahamian, E. (2001). The 1953 coup in Iran. *Science & Society, 65*(2), 182-215.

Abrahamian, E. (2008). *A history of modern Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aguilar-Vafaie, M. E., & Moghanloo, M. (2008). Domain and facet personality correlates of religiosity among Iranian college students. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 11*(5), 461-483.

Ahiauzu, A. I. E. (1986). Management and organization in Africa. *International Studies of Management and Organization (Special Issue), 16*(2), 37-58.

Ahmadi, N., & Ahmadi, F. (1998). *Iranian Islam: the concept of the individual*. London: MacMillan.

Alaolmolki, N. (1996). *The Persian Gulf region in the twenty first century: Stability and change*. New York: University Press of America.

Alavi, H. R. (2007). Correlatives of happiness in the university students of Iran (A religious approach). *Journal of Religion and Health, 46*(4), 480-499.

Alavi, N. (2006). *We are Iran*. London: Portobello Books.

Amanolahi, S. (2005). A note on ethnicity and ethnic groups in Iran. *Iran & the Caucasus, 9*(1), 37-41.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Arasteh, A. R. (1964). *Man and society in Iran*. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill.

Arjomand, S. A. (1989). History, structure, and revolution in the Shi'ite tradition in contemporary Iran. *International Political Science Review, 10*(2), 111-119.

Asante, M. K., & Asante, K. W. (1985). *African culture: The rhythms of unity*. Trenton: African World Press.

Ashraf, A. (1993). The crisis of national and ethnic identities in contemporary Iran. *Iranian Studies, 26*(1/2), 159-164.

Assadi, R. (1982). Conflict and its management: Iranian style. *Anthropological Linguistics, 24*(2), 201-205.

Assadi, S. M., Zokaei, N., Kaviani, H., Mohammadi, M. R., Ghaeli, P., Gohari, M. R., et al. (2007). Effect of sociocultural context and parenting style on scholastic achievement among Iranian adolescents. *Social Development, 16*, 169-180.

Ayisi, E. O. (1992). *An introduction to the study of African culture*. Nairobi and Kampala: East African Publishers.

Ayittey, G. B. (2006). *Indigenous African institutions* (2nd ed.). Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.

Bah, A. B. (2005). *Breakdown and reconstitution: democracy, the nation-state, and ethnicity in Nigeria*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Basmenji, K. (2005). *Tehran blues: Youth and culture in Iran*. London: Saqi.

Beeman, W. O. (1986). *Language, status, and power in Iran*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Behnam, F. (Ed.). (2008). *Iran almanac and the book of facts 2007-2008*: ISBN: 978-964-2865-16-1.

Behzadi, K. G. (1994). Interpersonal conflict and emotions in an Iranian cultural practice: Qahr and Ashti. *Medicine and Psychiatry, 18*, 321-359.

Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelmans, S. M., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blunt, P., & Jones, M. L. (1997). Exploring the limits of Western leadership theory in East Asia and Africa. *Personnel Review, 26*, 6-23.

Brewer, M. B., & Brown, R. J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske and G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., Vol. 1 and 2, pp. 554-594). New York: McGraw.

Brower, B. C. (2011). *A desert named peace: The violence of France's empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bruno, G., & Bajoria, J. (2011). *Iran's revolutionary guards*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324

Childs, C., & Chelada, L. (1993). Drought, rebellion and social change in Northern Mali. *Cultural Survival, 17*(4), *n. page*.

Chokkar, J. S., Brodbeck, F. C., & House, R. J. (2007). *Culture and leadership across the world: The GLOBE book of in-depth studies of 25 societies*. New York: Erlbaum.

Choksy, J. K. (2011). Iran takes on the world. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 11*, 62-90.

CIA (2012). The world factbook: Iran. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html

Clark, P. (1998). *Zoroastrianism. an introduction to an ancient faith*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

Clarke, P. B., & Linden, I. (1984). *Islam in modern Nigeria: a study of a Muslim community in a post-independence state, 1960-1983*. Munich: Kaiser-Grunewald.

Cooper, B. M. (1997). *Marriage in Maradi: Gender and culture in a Hausa society in Niger, 1900-1989*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

D'Andrade, R. G. (1995). *The development of cognitive anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dabashi, H. (1988). Review of Language, status, and power by William O. Beeman. *Iranian Studies, 21*(3/4), 122-127.

Dabashi, H. (2007). *Iran: A people interrupted*. New York: The New Press.

Daniel, E. L., & Mahdi, A. A. (2006). *Culture and customs of Iran.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Davaran, F. (2010). *Continuity in Iranian identity: resilience of a cultural heritage*. New York: Routledge.

De Gobineau, J. A. (1980). *Trois ans en Asie.* Paris: Editions A. M. Metailie.

Dehghani, M., Atran, S., Iliev, R., Sachdeva, S., Medin, D., & Ginges, J. (2010). Sacred values and conflicts over Iran's nuclear program. *Judgment and Decision Making, 5*(7), 540-546.

Dehghani, M., Iliev, R., Sachdeva, S., Atran, S., Ginges, J., & Medin, D. (2009). Emerging sacred values: Iran's nuclear program. *Judgment and Decision Making, 4*(7), 930-933.

Dien, J., Blok, S., & Glazer, S. (2011). *Cultural priming: Adopting the adversary's mindset to improve analysis*. College Park, MD: University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language.

Elmi, A. A. (2010). *Understanding the Somalia conflagration: Identity, political Islam and peacebuilding*. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

Eriksen, E. H. (1994). *Identity: Youth and crisis*. London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Erny, P. (2003). Ubgenge: Intelligence et ruse à la manière Rwanda et Rundi. *Cahiers de Sociologie Economique et Culturelle, 40*, 73-86, 126-127.

Eslami-Rasekh, Z. (2004). Face-keeping strategies in reaction to complaints. *Journal of Asian Pacific Communication, 14*(1), 181-197.

Falola, T., & Genova, A. (Eds.). (2006). *The Yoruba in transition*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. *Psychological Review, 99*(4), 689-723.

Fiske, A. P. (2004). Relational models theory 2.0. In N. Haslam (Ed.), *Relational models theory: A contemporary overview* (pp. 3-25). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Flanagan, J. G. (1989). Hierarchy in simple "egalitarian" societies. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 18*, 245-266.

Flynn, M. T., Pottinger, M. F., & Batchelor, P.D. (2010). *Fixing intel: A blueprint for making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan* (Technical Report). Center for a New America Security: Washington, DC.

Fortes, M., & Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1940). *African political systems*. London: Oxford University Press.

Frye, R. (1993). Iranian identity in sncient times. *Iranian Studie*s, 26(1/2), 143-146.

Fülöp, M., and Büki, N. (to appear). Competition and cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa: A cross-cultural approach. In T. Tchombe, B. Nsamaneng, H. Keller & M. Fülöp (Eds.), *Cross-cultural psychology research: An Africa-centric approach*.

Gardner, W. L., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. (1999). "I" value freedom but "we" value relationships: Self-construal priming mirrors cultural differences in judgement. *Psychological Science, 10*, 321-326.

Ghorbani, N., Bing, M. N., Watson, P. J., Davison, H. K., & LeBreton, D. L. (2003). Social science as dialogue: Narcissism, individualist and collectivist values and religious interest in Iran and the United States. *Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 129*(3), 238-268.

Ghorbani, N., Watson, P. J., Krauss, S. W., Bing, M. N., & Davison, H. K. (2004). Social science as dialogue: Narcissism, individualist and collectivist values, and religious interest in Iran and the United States. *Current Psychology, 23*(2), 111-123.

Goffman, E. (1971). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. New York: Basic Books.

Goyvaerts, D. L. (2010). *Nothing is what it looks like in Central Afric*a. Paper presented at the OSD / AFRICOM Roundtable on African Languages and Cultures. Stuttgart, Germany.

Gyekye, K. (1997). *Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience*. Oxford University Press: NY.

Hall, E. T. (1976). *Beyond culture*. New York: Doubleday.

Han, S. (2010). *Cultural neuroscience approach to understanding of self*. State of the art presentation. Paper presented at the XXth International Congress of Cross-Cultural Psychology.

Hanaway, W. (1993). Iranian identity. *Iranian Studies, 26*(1/2), 147-150.

Haour, A., & Rossi, B. (2010). *Being and becoming Hausa: Interdisciplinary perspectives*. Leiden & Boston: Brill.

Haslam, N. (1995). Factor structure of social relationships: An examination of relational models and resource exchange theories. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 12*(2), 217-227.

Haslam, N., & Fiske, A. P. (1999). Relational models theory: A confirmatory factor analysis. *Personal Relationships, 6*(2), 241-250.

Heath, E. (2010). Tuareg. In A. Appiah & H. L. Gates, Jr. (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Africa* (pp. 499-500). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hertz, F. (1941). The nature of nationalism. *Social Forces, 19*(3), 409-415.

Hill, P. (1969). Hidden trade in Hausaland. *Man, 4*(3), 392-409.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organisations across nations* (2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications.

House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.). (2004). *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Hoveyda (2003). *The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian mythology and Islamic revolution*. Connecticut: Praeger.

Iguisi, O. (Ed.). (1997). *Cultural dimensions to appropriate management and sustainable development in Africa* (First Seminar on Cultural Dimensions to Appropriate Management in Africa, Economic Policy Research Centre, Makerere University, Kampala). Maastricht: UNESCO.

Jackson, T. (2004). *Management and change in Africa: A cross-cultural perspective*. London: Routledge.

Jackson, T. (2010). Organizational psychology: An African perspective. In D. Keith (Ed.), *Cross-cultural psychology: Contemporary themes and perspectives* (pp. 524-546). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Javidan, M., & Carl, D. E. (2004). East meets West: A cross-cultural comparison of charismatic leadership among Canadian and Iranian executives. *Journal of Management Studies, 41*(1), 655-691.

Javidan, M., & Dastmalchian, A. (2003). Culture and leadership in Iran: The land of individual achievers, strong family ties, and powerful elite. *The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005), 17*(4), 127-142.

Joshanloo, M. (2010). Investigation of the relation between cultural estrangement and hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of well-being in Iranian young adults. *Personality and Individual Difference, 49*, 733-737.

Joshanloo, M., & Ghaedi, G. (2009). Value priorities as predictors of hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of well-being. *Personality and Individual Difference, 47*, 294-298.

Kaplan, I. (1969). *Area handbook for Somalia*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Kashani-Sabet, F. (2002). Cultures of Iranianness: The evolving polemic of Iranian nationalism. In N. R. Keddie & R. Matthee (Eds.), *Iran and the surrounding world: Interactions in culture and cultural politics* (pp. 162-181). Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Kazemipur, A., & Rezaei, A. (2003). Religious life under theocracy: The case of Iran. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42*(3), 347-361.

Keenan, J. (1977). *The Tuareg: People of Ahaggar*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Keshavarz, M. H. (1988). Forms of address in post-revolutionary Iranian Persian: A sociolinguistic analysis language in society. *Language in Society, 17*(4), 565-575.

Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. (1974). *Mutumin kirkii: The concept of the good man in Hausa* (The Third Annual Hans Wolff Memorial Lecture, 11 April 1973). Bloomington, IN: African Studies Program, Indiana University.

Koutlaki, S. A. (2010). *Among the Iranians: A guide to Iran's culture and customs*. Boston: Intercultural Press.

Kramer, L. S. (1997). Historical narratives and the meaning of nationalism. *Journal of the History of Ideas, 58*(3), 525-545.

Kurimoto, E., & Simonese, S. (Eds.). (1998). *Conflict, age, & power in North East Africa: Age systems in transition*. Oxford: James Currey.

Laitin, D. D., & Samatar, S. S. (1987). *Somalia: Nation in search of a state*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Lewis, I. M. (1999). *A pastoral democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. Hamburg and Oxford: LIT Verlag Munster and James Currey.

Lewis, I. M. (2010). *Making and breaking states in Africa: The Somali experience*. New York: Pluto Press.

Lewis, M. P. (Ed.). (2009). *Ethnologue: Languages of the world* (16th ed.). Dallas, TX: SIL International. Online version: http://www.ethnologue.com/.

Limbert, J. (2009). *Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the ghosts of history*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lubatkin, M. H., Ndiaye, M., & Vengroff, R. (1997). The nature of managerial work in developing countries: A limited test of the universalist hypothesis. *Journal of International Business Studies, 28*, 711-733.

Majd, H. (2008). *The Ayatollah begs to differ: the paradox of modern Iran*. New York: Doubleday.

Malcolm, I. G., & Sharifian, F. (2002). Aspects of Aboriginal English oral discourse: An application of cultural schema theory. *Discourse Studies, 4*(2), 169-181.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review, 98*(2), 224-253.

Mbiti, J. (1969). *African philosophy and religion*. London: Longman.

Mehran, G. (2002). The presentation of the "self" and the "other" in postrevolutionary Iranian school textbooks. In N. R. Keddie & R. Matthee (Eds.), *Iran and the surrounding world: Interactions in culture and cultural politics* (pp. 232-253). Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Miles, W. F. S. (1994). *Hausaland divided: Colonialism and independence in Nigeria and Niger*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Munene, J. C., Schwartz, S. H., & Smith, P. B. (2000). Development in sub-Saharan Africa: Cultural influences and managers' decision behavior. *Public Administration and Development, 20*, 339-351.

Nassehi-Behnam, V. (1985). Change and the Iranian Family. *Current Anthropology, 26*(5), 557-562.

Nicolaisen, J., & Nicolaisen, I. (1997). *The pastoral Tuareg: Ecology, culture and society*. Copenhagen: The Carlsberg Foundation.

Noorderhaven, N. G., & Tijani, B. (2001). Culture, governance, and economic performance: An explorative study with a special focus on Africa. *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 1*(1), 31-52.

Nwankwo, S., & Rugimbana, R. (2003). Africa can take the 21st century. *Management Decision (Special Issue), 41*(3).

Office of National Projects (2001). *Values and attitudes of Iranians: Findings of survey in 28 provinces*, 2 vols. Tehran: Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (in Farsi).

Omidsalar, M. (2011). *Poetics and politics of Iran's national epic, the Shahnameh*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses [Review]. *Psychological Bulletin, 128*(1), 3-72.

Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. *Psychological Bulletin, 134*(2), 311-342.

Oyserman, D., & Sorensen, N. (2009). Understanding cultural syndrome effects on what and how we think: A situated cognition model. In R. Wyer, Y.-y. Hong & C.-y. Chiu (Eds.), *Understanding cutlure: Theory, research and application* (pp. 25-52). New York: Psychology Press.

Paden, J. N. (1973). *Religion and political culture in Kano*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rahigh-Aghsan, A., & Jakobsen, P. V. (2010). The rise of Iran: How durable, how dangerous? *Middle East Journal, 64*(4), 559-573.

Rahnema, A. (2011). *Superstition as ideology in Iranian politics: From Majlesi to Ahmadinejad*. New York: Cambridge.

Rasmussen, S. J. (1993). Joking in researcher-resident dialogue: The ethnography of hierarchy amoung the Tuareg. *Anthropological Quarterly, 66*(4), 211-220.

Rasmussen, S. J. (1994). Female sexuality, social reproduction, and the politics of medical intervention in Niger: Kel Ewey Tuareg perspectives. *Cultural Medical Psychiatry, 18*(4), 433-462.

Rasmussen, S. J. (1998). Reflections on myth and history: Tuareg concepts of truth, "lies," and "children's tales". *Oral Tradition, 13*(2), 247-284.

Rice, G. E. (1980). On cultural schemata. *American Ethnologist, 7*, 152-171.

Salamone, F. A. (2010). *The Hausa of Nigeria*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Salamone, F. A., & Salamone, V. A. (1993). Erikson in Nigeria: Exploring the universality of the theory of psychosocial development. *Anthropos, 88*, 87-98.

Sawani, M., & Patterson, T. (2010). Informal saving practices in developing countries. *Journal of International Business and Cultural Studies, 2*, 1-11.

Segall, M. H., Campbell, D. T., & Herskovits, M. J. (1963). Cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions. *Science, 193*, 769-771.

Schwartz, S. H. (1999). A theory of cultural values and some implications for work. *Applied Psychology, 48*(1), 23-47.

Schwartz, S. H. (2009). Culture matters: National value cultures, sources, and consequences. In C.-y. Chiu, Y.-y. Hong, S. Shavitt & R. Wyer (Eds.), *Understanding culture: Theory, research, and application* (pp. 127-150). New York: Psychology Press.

Shahaeian, A., Peterson, C. C., Slaughter, V., & Wellman, H. M. (2011). Cutlure and the sequence of steps in theory of mind development. *Developmental Psychology, 45*(5), 1239-1247.

Sharifian, F. (2005). The Persian cultural schema of shekasteh-nafsi: A study of compliment responses in Persian and Anglo-Australian speakers. *Pragmatics and Cognition, 13*(2), 337-361.

Sick, G. (2002). Iran's foreign policy: A revolution in transition. In N. R. Keddie & R. Matthee (Eds.), *Iran and the surrounding world: Interactions in culture and cultural politics* (pp. 355-376). Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Smith, M. G. (1959). The Hausa system of social status. *Africa, 29*(3), 239-252.

Smith, M. G. (1969). Pluralism in precolonial African societies. In L. Kuper & M. G. Smith (Eds.), *Pluralism in Africa* (pp. 91-150). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Smith, M. G. (1974). *Corporation and society*. London: Duckworth.

Spencer, P. (1998). Age systems and modes of predatory expansion. In E. Kurimoto & S. Simonse (Eds.), *Conflict, age, and power in North East Africa: Age systems in transition* (pp. 168-185). Oxford: James Currey.

Stanley, W. (2009). Iranian strategic culture and its Persian origins. In J. L. Johnson, K. M. Kartchner & J. A. Larsen (Eds.), *Strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction: Culturally based insights into comparative national security policymaking* (pp. 137-156). New York: Palgrave Macmillian.

Strauss, C., & Quinn, N. (1997). *A cognitive theory of cultural meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. (1978). Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 61-76). London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tashakkori, A., & Mehryar, A. H. (1982). The differential roles of parents in the family, as reported by a group of Iranian adolescents. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 44*(3), 803-809.

Tchombe, T., Nsamaneng, B., Keller, H., & Fülöp, M. (Eds.). (to appear). *Cross-cultural psychology research: An Africa-centric approach*.

Tezcur, G. M., & Azadarmaki, T. (2008). Religiosity and Islamic rule in Iran. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 47*(2), 211-224.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism & collectivism*. Boulder: Perseus Books.

Turner, J. C. (1999). Some Current Issues in Research on Social Identity and Self Categorization Theory. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Social Identity* (pp. 6-34). Oxford: Blackwell.

Varzi, R. (2006). *Warring souls: Youth, media, and martyrdom in post-revolution Iran*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Wehrey, F., Green, J. D., Nichiporuk, B., Nader, A., Hansell, L., Nafisi, R. et al. (2009). The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing thedomestic roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Gaurd Corps. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG821

Wiredu, K. (1996). *Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective*. Bloomington, IN: University Press.

Worden, S. (2010). Clothing and identity: How can museum collections of Hausa textiles contribute to understanding the notion of Hausa identity. In A. Haour & B. Rossi (Eds.), *Being and becoming Hausa: Interdisciplinary perspectives* (pp. 213-234). Boston: Brill.

Yarshater, E. (1993). Persian identity in historical perspective. *Iranian Studies, 26*(1/2), 141-142.

Yeganeh, H. (2011). The "great satan" talks with the "evil": A cross cultural analysis of the American-Iranian communication/negotiation styles. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 22*(3), 219-238.

Young, C. (1994). *The African colonial state in comparative perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.