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A Quantum Algorithm To Locate Unknown Hashes For Known N-Grams Within A Large Malware Corpus

1st Nicholas R. Allgood

Dept. of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering
University of Maryland Baltimore County
Baltimore, Maryland
allgood1@umbc.edu

2nd Charles K. Nicholas

Dept. of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering
University of Maryland Baltimore County
Baltimore, Maryland
nicholas@umbc.edu

Abstract—Quantum computing has evolved quickly in recent years and is showing significant benefits in a variety of fields. Malware analysis is one of those fields that could also take advantage of quantum computing. The combination of software used to locate the most frequent hashes and n -grams between benign and malicious software (KiloGram) [1] and a quantum search algorithm could be beneficial, by loading the table of hashes and n -grams into a quantum computer, and thereby speeding up the process of mapping n -grams to their hashes. The first phase will be to use KiloGram [1] to find the top- k hashes and n -grams for a large malware corpus. From here, the resulting hash table is then loaded into a quantum machine. A quantum search algorithm is then used search among every permutation of the entangled key and value pairs to find the desired hash value. This prevents one from having to re-compute hashes for a set of n -grams, which can take on average $O(MN)$ time, whereas the quantum algorithm could take $O(\sqrt{N})$ in the number of table lookups to find the desired hash values.

Index Terms—quantum, malware, quantum computing, Grover’s algorithm, hashgram, ngram

I. INTRODUCTION

Quantum computing, while still in its infancy, is quickly evolving and becoming practical. Each day something is being discovered, making these new concepts applicable across a variety of domains. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, quantum computing was entirely theoretical and came directly from the ideas of quantum physics. Many of the early algorithms created then have since provided a foundation on which to build other quantum algorithms. While many of these algorithms, such as Simon’s [2] and Grover’s [3], were seen as proof of concept or “toy” algorithms, they in fact have more value on their own merits than simply providing a foundation for other algorithms. For example, Simon’s algorithm [2] makes use of a 2-to-1 function and 2-to-1 functions are often found in the domains of quantum cryptography as well as other domains of cybersecurity.

Though the situation is improving, one of the current limitations has to do with availability of quantum computing. While companies such as IBM [4] and D-Wave [5] are providing access to their quantum backends at no cost via cloud platforms, they are still limited in the number of qubits

one can use. For that reason, much of our work is done using Qrack [6], a quantum simulator. Even simulators have limitations based on your classical hardware (approximately 30 qubits).

One of the first steps in malware analysis is to search the suspect binary file for strings that indicate the program’s purpose, what malware family it might belong to, and indeed whether it is malicious or not [7]. It is also desirable to compare the suspect binary with other binaries, malicious or not, to see if the suspect binary is similar to any of them. An n -gram is a sequence of n contiguous bytes, for some small integer n . Files that happen to have many of the same n -grams, in roughly the same proportions, can be regarded as similar [8]. Historically, the value of n might be in the range 2-6. But unlike ordinary text, executable binaries use most if not all of the characters in the range 0×00 to $0\times FF$. For n of 4, for example, that results in 256^4 or roughly 4 billion possible n -grams to be tabulated. More recently, as described below, larger values of n are also of practical value, but in tabulating n -grams for any n larger than say 3 or 4, a hash table would be used to keep track of which n -grams have been seen, and how often. Hash tables are usually sized so that collisions don’t matter too much in practice. As a file is ingested, though, a lot of n -grams are seen multiple times, and the same hash value is computed multiple times. We will show how to improve n -gram tabulation by calculating an n -gram’s hash once, storing the result, and using quantum search to find the desired hash value, without recomputing it, should that n -gram be seen again. This paper is organized as follows: in Section II we provide a review of related work. We present the concept of quantum search as applied to n -grams in Section III. Our numerical and simulation results are presented in Sections IV and V. In Section VI we summarize our results and make suggestions for future work.

II. RELATED WORK

A. n -grams for Malware Analysis

Cybersecurity professionals are constantly under pressure to identify and neutralize incoming threats. While anti-virus

software is essential in current times, it is not always able to keep up with the threat. Often a new piece of malware is released and performs some sort of damage before its signature is identified and updates made in the anti-virus databases. Leveraging the latest techniques in machine learning, static analysis of malicious software has become a great tool in the arsenal against malware. [7] A large variety of malware is in the form of PE32 executables that target the Microsoft Windows operating systems. One example use of n -grams would be to take sequences of bytes from a PE32 executable to construct features [9]. Once such sequences of bytes are identified, the feature selection process goes through and eliminates duplicate or irrelevant pieces of information from the dataset. Using n -grams as features has proven effective in malware detection, showing up to a 97% detection rate [9].

There are a number of machine learning techniques used for malware detection [9]. Using n -grams as features are what makes it possible to leverage automated and intelligent classification methods. n -grams can be used for data, but also to represent a sequence of opcodes, as well as operating system API calls such as *AdjustTokenPrivileges* for Win32 and *execve* for Linux.

B. KiloGram

KiloGram [1] was released as open source software in 2020.¹ KiloGram takes a set of benign and known malicious software as input data. The output will be a list of the top- k most frequent n -grams found that are contained within the malicious software. Benign software is any software that is considered to not contain any malicious code where malware is any software that is design to cause harm in some fashion. We chose the KiloGram approach since it can be used for a large number of n -grams and large values of n . Of use to us, the KiloGram algorithm can handle n grams that are 8-bytes or larger while keeping 1000 or more of the most frequent entries.

In the context of malware analysis, n -grams are used to represent strings that appear in some if not all members of a set of suspected malware specimens. These n -grams then can be provided to other algorithms for a variety of uses, such as classification into malware families. KiloGram was designed with these uses in mind. Recall that the n in n -gram refers to some small integer n . For example, if we wish to process a 4-byte string such as 0xABCD, you would see this called a 4-gram. Unfortunately one major drawback of an n -gram based approach for malware detection, is that the shorter the n -gram, the more likely you will also find the byte sequence also benign software, making your rate for false positives increase. Fortunately, KiloGram was also designed to overcome this limitation by allowing the storing of larger and more specific n -grams, increasing the likelihood they will be unique within a variety or family of malware.

C. Grover's Algorithm

Grover's algorithm [3] was one of the first quantum searching algorithms to be developed. Grover's has even been the inspiration for other quantum algorithms such as Shor's [10] factoring algorithm. While much attention and research has been specifically around Shor's algorithm with regards to quantum cryptography, Grover's has been used and even improved upon in recent years [11].

Grover's search algorithm implements what is known as an amplitude amplification algorithm [12] which has been said to be a generalization of Grover's algorithm (although amplitude amplification was first discovered in 1997 by Gilles Brassard in 1997, and then a year later by Lov Grover). The fundamental idea is to increase (amplify) the probabilities of the desired results, and this is accomplished by using a sequence of reflections.² What is occurring in the amplitude amplification is that the reflections are rotated closer to the desired quantum state along the Bloch Sphere. The target state is marked as $\sin^2(\Theta)$ so that when the amplitude amplification algorithm is applied m times, the probability of obtaining the correct state is $\sin^2((2m + 1)\Theta)$. In other words, we think of the target state on the Bloch Sphere [13] and we keep rotating it until we find the correct result, with each rotation getting slightly closer.

III. QUANTUM N -GRAM SEARCHING

A. Amplitude Amplification

Referring back to the previous statements, we explain that instead of looking up a value by key, we do a direct lookup by value. The reason being is we essentially have to invert the key/value lookup problem when dealing with quantum entanglement. Grover's search [3] makes heavy use of quantum entanglement. What this algorithm will do is when a lookup table is loaded into a quantum machine, Grover's algorithm will entangle all permutations of potential key and value pairs based upon the input. The next step is to perform what is known as amplitude amplification to the entangled pieces of data. Prior to the actual amplitude amplification, the oracle is queried which places a *tag* value equal to our search value. As part of amplitude amplification, a *tag* value that equals the search value is placed into memory and then the phase (sign) is flipped.

While amplitude amplification may sound like a phrase belonging in signal processing, it is heavily used in quantum mechanics to describe the nature of things, and it happens that most of those things happen to be analogue. For practical purposes, in quantum computing amplitude amplification and phase flipping refer to changing the sign of a value. For example, say we look at the following matrix and we wish to locate the value at row 1, column 3:

$$\begin{bmatrix} AB & CD & \mathbf{EF} \\ 12 & 97 & 85 \\ 2D & 3F & 9C \end{bmatrix}$$

¹ <https://github.com/NeuromorphicComputationResearchProgram/KiloGrams>

² <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/quantum/libraries/standard/algorithms>

Once we perform the phase flip, we will get the following matrix:

$$\begin{bmatrix} AB & CD & \mathbf{-EF} \\ 12 & 97 & 85 \\ 2D & 3F & 9C \end{bmatrix}$$

For our purposes, this *tag* value is our *n*-gram we wish to locate and the key is the hash provided (which is also the index value). As mentioned, the key and value are entangled and with each lookup (iteration) of Grover's search, we can visualize the Bloch Sphere is rotated closer to the desired *n*-gram with each iteration.

B. Quantum Fourier Transform

Anything written about topics such as signal processing and quantum mechanics would be remiss if it failed to mention the Fourier Transform.³We are given a function $f(x)$ and the Fourier Transform breaks down $f(x)$ to its constituent frequencies [14]. The conceptual structure of quantum mechanics defines the existence of pairs of complementary variables p and q connected by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. We can measure a particle's quantum mechanical position, but by doing so we lose information about the particle's momentum [14]. Going deeper into quantum mechanics, this gets into what is known as the wave-particle duality of nature, for which the physical state of a particle can be described by a wave function. The wave functions are used to describe the physical state of a particle and one can use either a function of p or a function of q , but never both. The real vector space that is the set of all possible physical states and which contain the p -axis and q -axis is known as a *phase space*.

Referring back to phase shifting and amplitude amplification as part of the algorithm, quantum mechanics choose a specific polarization of a defined space and picks a subspace containing half of its dimensions. In contrast to picking all of the points within this selected space that contains the q -axis, the quantum Fourier transform takes the set of all complex-valued wave functions on the axis [14]. We then examine the p -axis which while also having a valid polarisation, has a set of possible states of a particle related to the first representation by the Fourier transform:

$$\Phi(p) = \int \psi(q) e^{2\pi i \frac{pq}{h}} dq \quad (1)$$

Physical states exist inside what is known as an \mathcal{L}^2 space, which is a vector space (specifically a measure space) that contains all of the squarable integral functions. Due to this property, an \mathcal{L}^2 space is also a Hilbert space [15]. According to Plancherl's theorem,⁴ Fourier Transforms also exist inside a \mathcal{L}^2 space. A Fourier Transform within a $\mathcal{L}^2(R_n)$ space applied to itself is unitary, which upholds the requirement for all quantum computing operations to be unitary.

³https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Fourier_transform

⁴<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF03014877>

IV. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

A. Grover's Circuits

Grover's algorithm is an *oracle* based algorithm and in the majority of the literature that discusses Grover's algorithm, it's typically split into four parts:

- 1) Initialization
- 2) Oracle processing
- 3) Amplitude amplification
- 4) Measurement

We now describe how a quantum simulator, in particular Qrack [6], implements both the oracle and amplification components of Grover's search.




Figure 1. Example Grover's Circuit




Figure 2. Qrack Implementation Grover's Circuit

Figure 1 describes a quantum circuit for a standard Grover's search implementation. Figure 2 shows Qrack's implementation of the quantum circuit for Grover's search over a key and value pair. A few comments on the notation: $/^n$ is shorthand to state that each of the gates apply to n qubits. In the Qrack example, we chose $/^k$ and $/^v$ to represent the number of qubits used for the key and value. We use a U_z to represent a phase-flip operation. We chose this over the standard Pauli-Z gate since we want a single permutation's phase flipped instead of flipping the phase on every individual $|0\rangle$. In the Qrack implementation, we are applying the phase-flip to all of the used qubits simultaneously. That is, we start out with setting our qubit permutations to $|0\rangle$. Next we apply a Hadamard gate to each of the qubits to place them into superposition where each qubit now equals $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1\rangle$ and $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1\rangle$. The second step of this circuit is to place all qubits through the oracle as defined in Grover's algorithm. The next series of gates are CNOT gates which were previously place in superposition, the superimposed values of $|1\rangle$ will trigger a NOT operation on the target qubits. The IndexedSBC operation is in reference to Qrack's *IndexedSBC* [16] operator that we will cover later in section IV. We proceed with the phase-amplification part of the circuit by applying either an X or NOT gate on all qubits followed by both a Hadamard gate and a custom unitary phase-flip gate. Finally, we complete the circuit with another series of Hadamard gates, followed by IndexedADC which is Qrack's *IndexedADC* [16] operation, and proceed with measurement of the resulting quantum state.




Figure 3. Qrack Implementation Grover's Oracle

Figure 3 describes a quantum circuit for the Qrack implementation of an oracle used for Grover's algorithm. While the oracle might look small in comparison to the entire Grover's circuit, it's absolutely crucial to the algorithm. In the Qrack [6] implementation of the oracle, we start by doing a *DEC* operation for all qubits. This instruction is what starts the *tag* process by subtracting the target value from a start value, typically 0. For example, if our target value is 100 then we would have $0 - 100 = -100$. From here we do U_z gates on all qubits, flipping the phases of their respective amplitudes. Practically, this translates to flipping the sign of the bits so in the above example, this would make our value $+100$. Lastly, the oracle reverts the previous *DEC* operation with Qrack's *INC* operation to return to the original value, only with the sign flipped. To finalize our example, we add $0 + (+100)$ where $+$ is the phase, with our result being $+100$.

Theoretically, Grover's algorithm requires an average of $O(\sqrt{N})$ lookups to find a match for the specified target. While we are using a traditional lookup table for Grover's, the input time complexity evaluation might not be that obvious. If we dive into the bare fundamentals of Qrack/VM6502q, we notice we have a *IndexedLDA* instruction [16]. This is a modified *LOAD* instruction that allows loading a key with a superimposed index into a quantum register. The *IndexedLDA* operation is unitary by design so it will not affect the overall quantum state as it is loaded into the registers. The writing of the data with a superimposed index, will actually entangle the classical memory cache and the index register. Knowing this, we can say that the *IndexedLDA* operation takes $O(1)$ to load data into quantum registers. In addition to the initial loads, there will be an input time complexity of $O\left(\sqrt{\frac{M}{N}}\right)$ where M is the total number of keys in the lookup table and N is the total number of matches [17]. This yields an overall input time complexity of $O(1) + O\left(\sqrt{\frac{M}{N}}\right) = O\left(\sqrt{\frac{M}{N}}\right)$.

We use the term *lookups* but practically we mean iterations of Grover's algorithm. To be specific, Qrack uses the following equation to determine the number of iterations to use [16]:

$$\text{floor} \left[\frac{\pi}{4 \arcsin^2\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}}\right)} \right] \quad (2)$$

V. SIMULATED RESULTS

A. Qrack Operations

The Qrack [6] implementation utilizes some specialized methods for implementing many of the operations in the oracle

and amplitude amplification portions of the algorithm. Here are some of the most commonly used operations: [16]

IndexedLDA: Set 8 bit register bits by a superposed index-offset-based read from classical memory.

IndexedADC: Add to entangled 8 bit register state with a superposed index-offset-based read from classical memory.

IndexedSBC: Subtracts to entangled 8 bit register state with a superposed index-offset-based read from classical memory.

INC: Integer addition without sign.

DEC: Integer subtraction without sign.

H: Hadamard gate implementation.

ZeroPhaseFlip: Controlled Z-gate implementation.

Z: Z-gate implementation, non-controlled.

X: X (NOT) gate implementation.

MReg: Measures the current state of a quantum register(s).

B. Benign vs. Malicious Datasets

As briefly mentioned in Section II, there are some limitations with quantum simulations, the most obvious being limited computing resources available for simulation. While Qrack [6] can take full advantage of a GPU for processing using OpenCL⁵, one typically is limited to simulating approximately 30-qubits. Qrack has some development branches of code where they are simulating 128-qubits for testing the quantum supremacy problem released by Google [18], however, these branches are quite experimental. To better appreciate why 30 qubits is a limitation for simulation, we must recall our base formula 2^n where n is the number of qubits we wish to simulate. 2^n specifically refers to the total amount of quantum states we wish to simulate. With 30 qubits, we end up with $2^{30} = 1073741824$ or roughly one billion values. But the amplitudes represented by the quantum states are complex numbers, so we must include the real and imaginary parts when factoring in memory requirements. We use 2^2 bytes for the real value and 2^2 bytes for the imaginary value. This then gives us $2^{2+2} = 16$ bytes for each of those one billion values, or

$$2^{30+4} = 17179869184 \text{ bytes} \approx 16GB \quad (3)$$

Qubits	Real Bytes	Imaginary Bytes	Total Memory
4	2	2	256 bytes
8	2	2	4 KB
16	2	2	1 MB
24	2	2	$\approx 268MB$
28	2	2	$\approx 4GB$
30	2	2	$\approx 16GB$
32	2	2	$\approx 64GB$
40	2	2	$\approx 17TB$

Table 1

SIMULATION MEMORY ALLOCATION

⁵<https://www.khronos.org/opencl/>

For our simulation, we used the following datasets created and used in the KiloGram project [1]:

Benign	Benign Files	Malicious	Malicious Files
Windows 7 System32 MAML	4565 691	Vxheaven 2015 VirusShare 2018	284151 131072

Table II
BENIGN VS. MALICIOUS SOFTWARE DATASET

Benign	Malicious	n -gram size	Kept n -grams
Windows 7 System32	Vxheaven 2015	3 bytes	64
Windows 7 System32	Vxheaven 2015	2 bytes	16384
Windows 7 System32	Vxheaven 2015	2 bytes	4096
MAML	VirusShare 2018	3 bytes	64
MAML	VirusShare 2018	2 bytes	2048
MAML	VirusShare 2018	2 bytes	1024

Table III
BENIGN VS. MALICIOUS SOFTWARE n -GRAMS

The hardware and software used was a 16-Core Intel Xeon E5-2630 @ 2.4Ghz with 32GB RAM and two GeForce GTX 1660 video cards. The machine was running 64-bit Ubuntu Linux 18.04 and OpenCL 1.2. As one can see, due to the limitations of approximately 30-qubits, we had to select the number of bits for our key and value size with care. Since n -grams are typically byte sequences, we were limited to a maximum of n -grams with n set to 3. Using 3-grams gave us 24-qubits for our n -gram value with 6-qubits remaining for our index values. Utilizing a 2-grams gave us a much larger span of bits to use for our index value (14-qubits). Recall that the index for this is the hash for a specific n -gram, and since KiloGram utilizes Rabin-Karp hashing *modulo* B where B is the KiloGram bucket size [1].

Number of n -grams	Number of Lookups (iterations)
64	$\sqrt{64} = 8$
128	$\sqrt{128} = 11.31 \approx 12$
256	$\sqrt{256} = 16$
512	$\sqrt{512} = 22.63 \approx 23$
1024	$\sqrt{1024} = 32$
2048	$\sqrt{2048} = 45.25 \approx 46$
4096	$\sqrt{4096} = 64$
8192	$\sqrt{8192} = 90.50 \approx 91$
16384	$\sqrt{16384} = 128$

Table IV
GROVER'S LOOKUPS FOR n -GRAM SIZES

As we can see from Table IV, more n -grams requires more iterations and the number of iterations increases by a much smaller amount as we keep a larger number of n -grams. Using a practical example, below we describe pseudo-code for the Qrack implementation of Grover's algorithm in addition to showing the output for a 2-byte n -gram with a 10-bit index. We search for a n -gram with the value of 0xF3D7 which has an unknown hash, which we quickly find to be 0x3a9.

C. Example Hash Retrieval for N -gram: 0xf3d7

Table V is an example where we search for an n -gram with the value of 0xF3d7 that has a hash value of 0x3a9.

```
0> chance of match:0.00876619
1> chance of match:0.0242241
2> chance of match:0.0471087
...
22> chance of match:0.98967
23> chance of match:0.998456
24> chance of match:0.999461
```

After measurement (of value, key, or both):
Chance of match:1
Ngram: f3d7
Hash: 3a9
Total Iterations: 25

Table V
SEARCHING FOR THE HASH OF n -GRAM 0xF3D7

D. Qrack Pseudo-code

In Algorithm 1 we show pseudo-code utilizing Qrack that is an implementation of both an oracle and amplitude amplification for Grover's search.

Algorithm 1 Qrack Grover's Search Implementation

```
idxLen = 10
valLen = 16
cryIdx = idxLen + valLen
ngrams = ngramtable[indexLength]
ngram = 0xf3d7
qReg = CreateQuantumInterface(*params)
qReg = SetPermutation(0)
qReg = H(valLen, idxLen)
qReg = IndexedLDA(valLen, idxLen, 0, valLen, ngrams)
procedure TAGVALUE( $tPerms, qReg, valueSt, valLen$ )
    qReg = DEC( $tPerms, valueSt, valLen$ )
    qReg = ZeroPhaseFlip( $tPerms, valueSt, valLen$ )
    qReg = INC( $tPerms, valueSt, valLen$ )
end procedure
procedure AMPLITUDEAMPLIFICATION
    idxLen = 10
    valLen = 16
    cryIdx = idxLen + valLen
    ngrams = ngramtable[indexLength]
    ngram = 0xf3d7
    qReg = CreateQuantumInterface(params)
    qReg = SetPermutation(0)
    qReg = H(valLen, idxLen)
    qReg = IndexedLDA(valLen, idxLen, 0, valLen, ngrams)
end procedure
```

VI. CONCLUSION

We have shown that combining the results of an efficient n -gram collection software such as KiloGram with quantum computing, we can provide a faster way of finding a computed,

but momentarily unknown hash for a known n -gram. We have compared this solution to the classical approach, and have shown that for a large number of n -grams, the quantum based solution outperforms them substantially. When better quantum hardware is available, these concepts could be applied to cryptographic hashes, such as SHA-256. We hope that our work will remain useful when better quantum computers are available. Quantum computing research is continuing to grow each day and while it might seem that adequate enough hardware is far into the future, it is will be upon us before we realize and cybersecurity professionals will need to be ready.

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