Discordant Warriors:
Maryland's Revolutionary War Militia

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A Thesis
Submitted to
the Graduate Faculty of
Salisbury State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the
Degree of
Master of Arts

Salisbury, Maryland
May, 1992

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Thesis Abstract

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The American Revolution proved not to be a propitious occasion for the Maryland militia. As Maryland remained on the periphery of the conflict, the state's militia devoted more energy to making war upon itself and the government than it did against the British. Throughout much of the war, the muster-field served as the militia's primary field of battle and invective the weapon of choice. Verbal potshots from the rank and file mixed with barrages of written complaints from the politicians and officers in skirmishes that were fought over such matters as the process for selecting officers, absenteeism from muster days, arms and equipment, and the procurement of volunteers.

Ill-armed, ill-disciplined, and ill-led through much of the war, the Maryland militia was never in such a posture that it stood ready to defend the state's coastline from British marauders. However, to do battle with itself was a different matter, for it was in this arena that the organization excelled. After nearly a century of practice in the art of social and political upheaval, the Maryland militia stood as a battle-hardened organization ready to test its mettle again.

Serving as a force of citizen-soldiers, the militia was easily affected by conditions that existed outside of the organization. Thus in the last decades of the seventeenth century as Maryland's provincial society changed, the militia did too. Buffered from outside attack by the surrounding colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania, Maryland was relatively free to divert its attention from matters of security and focus on the acquisition of wealth from the tobacco trade. As concern for defense diminished throughout the province the militia transformed from a military to a social organization.

The quest for wealth from the production of tobacco brought with it adjustments to Maryland's social and political structures that were engendered by the emergence of an elite class of planters and merchants. Socially, the growth of an elitist class fostered resentment and frustration among the yeomanry while politically, the

elite planter-class began an assault on the Proprietor and his placemen in an attempt to further increase their wealth and influence. By the middle of the eighteenth century both the social and political struggles found their expression within the provincial militia. Social upheaval was manifested through absenteeism, insolence, and theft. The political sparring between the planters and the proprietary element centered on the means for funding the militia's arms and ordanance. Although those wealthy planters who opposed the Proprietor's supporters failed to comprehend that the lower class discontent was directed at all segments of the ruling elite, nonetheless, they capitalized upon it for political advantages during the French and Indian War by fomenting disobedience among the ranks of the militia.

While the tactics of the planter-elite met with only partial success during the French and Indian War, it appears to have been enough to warrant using the militia again as a political instrument in the opening phases of the Revolution. But this time, those members of the ruling elite who assumed the reins of power in 1775 learned the extent of their miscalculations concerning the lower class's discontent. With the Proprietor and his henchmen deposed and the British presence in Maryland a virtual nonentity,

it soon became apparent that the yeomanry's hostility was directed at all forms of authority. As with everything else that affected Maryland society, the depth of the hostility was most noticeable in the state militia.

Because the divisiveness among the state's inhabitants threatened the Revolutionary government's maintenance of the political apparatus, the politicians avoided taking a firm stand on any measures and instead, adopted a policy of equivocation. However, the government's irresolution had a devastating effect on the militia's efficacy as a defense force and led to the internal strife that convulsed the organization throughout the war. By waffling in the face of any form of resistance that became manifest in the militia, the state government failed to provide the organization with the kind of leadership that it so desperately needed. Additionally, by failing to secure and maintain an adequate supply of weapons and equipment, the government had an equally deleterious effect on the militia's usefulness in times of military crisis. Thus, in most cases throughout the war, it was a poorly armed and contentious body of men that took to the field of battle.

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CHAPTER I

OF BIG-BANGS AND BLACK HOLES

The militia's contribution to the success of the American Revolution has always been something of an enigma. Even as the war was fought, the militia's value was extolled by some and reviled by others. Patriot leaders, such as Charles Lee and Timothy Pickering, felt that the war could be won if the American forces eschewed "the tinsel and show of war" that characterized the British army and instead opted for militia forces that were familiar with the basics of military drill. Yet there were others who believed, as George Washington did after the debacle of 1776 in New York, that "to place any dependence on the militia is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff." The militia's checkered career during the war did nothing to resolve the argument. While proponents of the Continental army could point to such fiascos as the militia's poor performance during the Penobscot campaign or how quickly it broke and ran at Camden, advocates of the militia could equally recall more glorious moments such as the behavior of John Stark's militiamen at Bennington and Daniel Morgan's militia at the battle of the Cowpens.[1]

The war's end did not conclude the argument concerning the militia's worth, and during the early years of the republic, the debate resumed. While Federalists advocated a strong standing army, Anti-Federalists remained resolute in their sentiment that a militia, composed of virtuous citizen-soldiers, was the best method for defending the nation and guaranteeing the republic's vitality. Far from settling the issue, the Constitution created, as Russell Weigley points out, a "dual military system" that authorized the federal government was authorized to raise a standing army, while the states retained the right to maintain their militias.[2]

By dividing the military into state and federal spheres, the door was left ajar for the proponents of each system to continue extolling the virtues of one and excoriating the worth of the other well into the nineteenth century. The Pennsylvania Packet's rhetorical questions of 1787 asked:

> Was it a standing army that gained the battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill, and took the ill-fated Burgoyne? Is not a well regulated militia sufficient for every purpose of internal defense? And which of you, my fellow citizens, is afraid of any invasion from foreign powers that our militia would not be able immediately to repel?

Such concerns again would be voiced during the nineteenth century by Ralph Waldo Emerson's references to "embattled farmers." On the other side the militia's eighteenth century critics such as Alexander Hamilton, were echoed in the works of Emory Upton and Francis Vinton Greene.[3]

In recent years, historians have treated the militia's performance in the Revolution in a more evenhanded fashion. While the militia is still subject to criticism for its poor showing in set-piece battles, it has received praise for its ancillary activities. Probably the best example of this new viewpoint concerning the militia is Richard J. Kohn's evaluation that

> the militia was central to the winning of independence: screening the Continental Army, preventing the British from maneuvering, foraging, raiding, or pursuing an 'oil slick' strategy without mounting major expeditions, and helping to pen up British forces in urban areas. . . . The militia also operated as a political force, intimidating individuals into declaring their allegiance, enforcing loyalty retaliating against Tories, and drawing the indifferent and the lukewarm into the maelstrom of revolution.4

In a general sense, what Kohn and other historians, such as John Shy and Don Higginbotham, are saying may be true; however, there appear to be some weaknesses not necessarily with their conclusions but more in how they derive them. Part of the problem lies within the complexity of the war and the way that many of the military historians have treated it. Both in Shy's essay

"The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War" and Higginbotham's "The American Militia: A Traditional Institution with Revolutionary Responsibilities" the militia, in a general sense, is evaluated in terms of how it fared in those areas that were the major flash points during the war. Thus, as with most of the major works on the Revolution, the militia's performance is based on its activities in Massachussetts, New York, New Jersey, around Philadelphia, in the Carolinas, and finally in Virginia.[5]

What appears to be notably lacking in most of the historiography of the Revolution is an appraisal of the militias in those states and regions outside of the war's major theatres. Perhaps the close proximity of a location to a major concentration of military force created political, social, and psychological conditions that varied greatly from those areas that were more remote to the war's effects. In order to better evaluate the militia's contribution to the Revolution, what is needed, and what essentially appears to be lacking in the historiography, is a detailed look at the militia on a state-by-state basis. Especially crucial is a look at those states and regions that were relatively untouched by the war's major actions.

The need to study the militia on a state-by-state basis is important because the Revolution encompassed more than just those areas of the country over which the regular armies fought. While the major battles of the war were being fought, smaller skirmishes were taking place elsewhere that were no less critical in their contribution to the Revolution's outcome. In the majority of cases, it was the militia and not the Continental army that held the responsibility for fighting these minor actions.

It is also important to view the Revolution on a more regional basis because of the strategic and tactical characteristics that were peculiar to each. The style of warfare that raged between partisan bands of Patriots and Loyalists in the Carolinas bore little resemblance to that which was being fought in Connecticut. While Pennsylvania and its neighbor to the north, New York, contended with Indian depredations, Maryland, which shared a common border and frontier with Pennsylvania, was relatively free from such attacks. Even within the borders of a single state, the way in which the Revolution was fought was subject to variations. The battles on Long Island, fought in the European tradition, bore little similarity to the bloody raids and ambushes of the Mohawk Valley. By noting the differences in the war's complexion, it becomes easier to understand that a single big-bang theory is not sufficient for an understanding of the

Revolutionary militia. Because of their shared heritage the state militias undoubtedly possessed some common threads; however, the probability is high that enough differences will surface to warrant such examinations.

Because of its position outside the vortex of the war, the Maryland militia has received scant historiographic attention. With the exception of the Philadelphia campaign in 1777 which only touched the state in a peripheral fashion, Maryland remained a spectator as the Revolutionary war swirled around it. In their works concerning dissension within the state and the impulse in Maryland towards democracy, both Ronald Hoffman and David Skaggs respectively have discussed the militia. But both historians use the organization as a vehicle to prove their theses.[6]

Within the more standard histories of the state, the militia's role during the war is curiously absent. Beyond the resolutions of December 1774 and the "Association of Freemen" both of which resurrected the institution, authors such as James McSherry, Robert Brugger, and Esther Dole, among others, have diverted their attention away from the militia and focused instead on the regiments which constituted the Maryland Line. Thus in terms of scholarship, the Maryland militia has remained a virtual black hole.[7]

The only scholarship extant that exclusively evaluates the Maryland militia's performance during the Revolution is a doctoral dissertation by Barry Fowle. Using the concepts that John Shy puts forth in his essay "The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," Fowle believes the state's militia played an integral part in the triangular struggle against "the forces of counter-revolution" by capturing the hearts and minds of the people through "political, quasi-police missions." In addition, Fowle believes the militia performed admirably in the traditional sense through its assistance to the Continental army during the New York and Philadelphia campaigns and its work within the state acting to deter British raids. However, Fowle's assessment of the Maryland militia presents some problems.[8]

Shy's notions of a triangular conflict that hypothesizes revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces contending against each other for the hearts and minds of the people poses no problem when it is used in a general application to the war and especially in those geographic locations that were the Revolution's major flash points. In those regions where the British army was able to exercise military and political control, such as the South in the later years of the war, there is little argument that the militia can be defined as a revolutionary force and the British army as being the agent of counter-revolution.

But in Maryland, where the popular party gained control of the political machinery early in the war and held it throughout, albeit tenuously at times, the militia would have to be construed as the counter-revolutionary force. While this may appear to be merely a matter of semantic quibbling, in fact, as Shy points out, which side of the triangle the militia was on determined the tactics it employed to win those hearts and minds.[9]

Acting as an agent of the de facto government, the Maryland militia could not resort to "those forms of violence, particularly threats, terrorism, and irregular or guerrilla warfare" as a revolutionary force could and did, as in the case of the Loyalists on the Eastern Shore, without jeopardizing the position of those in power. By trying to portray the Maryland militia as an organization in accordance with Shy's definition of the term revolutionary, Fowle's thesis founders. Far from being a force that intimidated the populace into sympathizing with the cause through terrorism and threats, the Maryland militia was itself in some instances intimidated and in others it was helpless to thwart the opposition. In fact, instances occurred during the war where militiamen took part in protests against the government they had sworn to protect.[10]

Concerning the militia's more traditional roles, Fowle defines militia to include the Flying Camp which was composed of six-month enlistees. By doing so, he has been able to incorporate the Maryland militia into the battles around New York City in 1776 and allows for some of the luster that has been traditionally accorded to the Maryland Line to rub off on the militia. However, if Higginbotham's definition of the militia is employed, thus excluding any militia that served as a quasi-regular force (that is to say, those with terms of duty lasting longer than two to three months), the Maryland militia's reputation as an adjunct to the Continental army is greatly diminished.[10]

Additionally, Fowle's appraisal of the Maryland militia's performance as a deterrent on its own ground minimizes the number of gaffes the organization committed and thus exaggerates those few times it was successful. Contrary to Fowle's findings, by the last years of the war, Maryland may have been more vulnerable to British attacks and conquest than it had in 1775. Writing to Governor Thomas Sim Lee in 1781, Mordecai Gist appraised Maryland's state of security noting "[t]his place in its present situation (if attack'd) wou'd fall an easy conquest to a small Body of Troops as the whole system of defence is totally derang'd [sic]." Rather than evaluating the Maryland militia, as Fowle has done, on the basis of

theories which seem to center on those regions more afflicted by the war's effects, what is needed is a study of the organization in its own environment and free of comparisons to the militias of other states.[11]

The purpose of this study is to examine and evaluate the Maryland militia's performance based upon conditions which existed within the state prior to and during the Revolution. Of particular importance is how the changing nature of politics and society in Maryland altered the relationships within the structure of the organization and how the results of those relationships affected the militia's capability to defend the state. Because many of the difficulties that plagued the militia throughout the war began before the first shots were fired, it is necessary to begin with an examination of the evolution of the provincial militia. It becomes apparent from the portrait of the provincial militia that the discord prevalent throughout the war was actually the fruition of seeds that had been planted well in the past. Additionally it will be seen that the political establishment that acquired the reins of government at the war's beginning misjudged the temperament of Maryland society and overestimated the sentiment within the state

for the revolutionary cause. The government then compounded its error by embarking on a policy of equivocation that aggravated the fractiousness within the militia and ultimately undermined the organization's ability to fulfill its mission.

Rather than conforming to both Shy's model and Fowle's findings, the Maryland militia became so rife with discontent as a result of the government's failures that it could act neither as a counter-revolutionary force nor could it mount a credible defense in the face of British depredations. Actually, the militia's Revolutionary War performance was more in accordance with Don Higginbotham's notion that as the war progressed the militia was asked to fulfill military obligations and duties that surpassed its capabilities. In Maryland, this, at least in part, was true. Included among the tasks assigned the militia were such missions as guard duty, accompanying supplies and prisoners, and responding to alarms. However, at variance with Higginbotham's thesis was the state government's role in assigning the tasks to the militia. If the militia failed to respond to the additional burdens placed upon it, in most cases it was not necessarily attributable to the fact that the tasks exceeded the militia's capabilities. Instead, such failures could be blamed on the government which consistently failed to

provide adequate leadership, arms, equipment, and in some cases compensation. By failing to administer the militia properly, the state government abetted the erosion of morale within the organization and thus compromised its own security.[12]

As it will become more apparent throughout the text of this study, the big-bang theory of the Revolutionary militia, which seeks to account for the institution's success or failure by piecing together snippets and forming them into a pastiche, needs to be revised. In this thought lies the second purpose of the study, and that is to encourage the further exploration of the militia on a state-by-state basis to derive more enlightened judgments about an institution that has influenced American military policy for over two hundred years.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

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[2]Richard Buel, Jr., "Samson Shorn: The Impact of the Revolutionary War on Estimates of the Republic's Strength," Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Arms and Independence (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1984), p. 142; Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 84-87, 100; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 87.

[3]Pennsylvania Packet 23 September 1787, as quoted in, Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 85; Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States From 1775 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904); Francis Vinton Greene, The Revolutionary War and the Military Policy of the United States (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Inc., 1911).

[4]Richard H. Kohn, "The Murder of the Militia System in the Aftermath of the American Revolution," David C. Skaggs and Robert S. Browning, III, eds., In Defense of the Republic: Readings in American Military History (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991), p. 74.

[5]Don Higginbotham, "The American Militia: A Traditional Institution With Revolutionary Responsibilities," Don Higginbotham, ed., Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 95-99; John Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," Essays on the American Revolution, Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 148-150; John R. Alden, A History of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969); Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution 2 Vols. John R. Alden ed. (New York: The MacMillan Co, 1952).

[6]David C. Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy, 1753-1776 (Westport: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973); Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension: Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973).

[7]Robert J. Brugger, Maryland: A Middle Temperment, 1634-1980 (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988); James McSherry, History of Maryland, Bartlett B. James, ed. (Baltimore: The Baltimore Book Co., 1904); Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American Revolution (Privately Published, 1941).

[8]Barry W. Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War-A Revolutionary Organization," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1982), pp.7-8; Shy, "The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," p. 126; John Shy, "Hearts and Minds in the American Revolution: The Case of 'Long Bill' Scott and Peterborough, New Hampshire," John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 176.

[9]Shy, "The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," p. 126; John Shy, "Hearts and Minds in the American Revolution: The Case of 'Long Bill' Scott and Peterborough, New Hampshire," John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 176.

[10]Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War," pp. 188-192; Higginbotham, "The American Militia: A Traditional Institution," pp. 91-93.

[11]William Hand Browne, et. al., eds., Archives of Maryland 72 Vols. (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1941) Vol. XLVII, p. 151; Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War," pp. 189-190.

[12]Higginbotham, "The American Militia: A Traditional Institution," pp. 92-93.

CHAPTER II

THE COLONIAL LEGACY

A conflicting set of emotions must have gripped Joshua Beall during the first days of January, 1775. Three weeks earlier, the Maryland Convention had issued a resolution urging all freemen of the province to meet within their respective hundreds for the purposes of forming militia companies and choosing officers. As a prominent member of the Prince George's County Committee of Observation, Beall's spirits must have been buoyed by the warm vocal support that had initially accompanied the convention's resolves. But as Beall and his fellow committeeman were soon to discover, the public's vocal support and its active response were two different matters. The point seems to have been driven home when the committee was forced to postpone its meeting for the Prince George's hundreds because of a poor turnout. The reluctance to respond during a time of crisis was not a particularly new phenomenon for the men of Prince George's County. As a militia captain during the French and Indian War, Beall had witnessed a similar incident.[1]

When Governor Horatio Sharpe ordered two companies of the Prince George's County militia westward to Maryland's frontier, Beall's father-in-law, Colonel Joseph Belt, found himself in a difficult situation. Rather than drafting the two companies from the ranks of the county militia, Belt had to resort to the arduous and time-consuming task of procuring volunteers. Apologizing for his tardiness in dispatching the troops, Belt explained to the governor that the mood of the militia was such that had he employed a draft, the dependability of those men he sent could not be guaranteed. Ten years later, the same reluctance for military service that Joseph Belt had encountered was making its presence felt again. However, where Belt only had to endure it for a short period of time, the truculent mood of the men of Prince George's County would stalk his son-in-law throughout the entire Revolution.[2]

Although some historians have tried to divorce Maryland's Revolutionary militia from its colonial predecessor, Joshua Beall's experiences in both helps to underscore the continuity which linked the two together. In the few instances when the Maryland militia has been accorded some degree of historical consideration, emphasis has been placed primarily on the Convention's decision in 1774 and again in 1775 to allow for the election of officers. While the move did constitute a radical departure from all previous regulations governing the Maryland

militia, it is just as noteworthy to point out that after Maryland declared its independence from Great Britain, the state's lawmakers performed a complete turnabout. Rather than pursue a course that would either radicalize the militia further or at least maintain what had been done, the government chose to fall back on what amounted to a restatement of the old provincial laws. Provisions for such matters as muster requirements, attendance, fines, and discipline were merely echoes from the past.[3]

In all probability, the government's tenuous hold on the reins of power accounts for the overarching reason why the militia was regulated in a similar manner to that of its provincial predecessor. Insecure in its claims to legitimacy, the state's Revolutionary leadership possibly believed that any further radicalization might serve to undermine its authority. Additionally, it appears that for Maryland's political elite, a return to the old was a return to the familiar. Many of the delegates who promulgated the laws either had been militia officers themselves during the provincial era or came from families with strong ties to the old provincial militia. Similarly, the militia that was created in Revolutionary Maryland found strong ties to its past in the number of officers and men, such as Joshua Beall, who also had performed prior service.[4]

For better or worse, Maryland had a military tradition which spanned one hundred and fifty years. Many of the attitudes and behaviors which characterized that tradition were carried over into the Revolutionary era. In order to better understand the motivations, actions and in some cases, the inactions of the Revolutionary militia, it becomes necessary to examine its colonial heritage.

The formal beginnings of the militia date back to 1638, four years after the province was founded. After relying on what appears to have been an ad hoc defense force, the fledgling General Assembly passed "An Act for Military Discipline" which was based on the customary English concept of the "Trained Band." Once enacted, the law regulating the militia was to remain in effect for three years at which time the legislature could either amend or readopt the measure as it originally had been stated. Additionally, provision was made for supplementary legislation to be added in the intervening years either to answer any crisis that arose or rectify any aspect of the law that needed immediate attention.[5]

In those first years of settlement, when all aspects of society were reduced to the common denominators of survival or death, the law of 1638 reflected the severity of the situation by laying out a simple and straight-forward plan of action. Except for women, the ill, or the infirm,

no one was exempt from service in the militia. Masters who impeded their servants from answering any alarms were subject to fines, and all heads of household were required to provide firearms for each male in residence. Command of the militia was placed in the hands of the "Captain of St. Mary's and Commander of the Fort," whose title apparently was more complicated than his duties. Among the most important tasks within his province was the monthly inspection of dwellings to insure that the requirement of "one serviceable fix'd gunn of bastard musket bore" was available along with a proper amount of ammunition. For those who failed to comply, the Captain could either levy a fine or for a price, provide the negligent persons with weapons.[6]

The colony's first plan of defense was also uncomplicated. In any alarm, one male resident in a household of three persons or two males in every household of five were required to muster. Those who lived within the city were to meet at the church where they were to be deployed by the captain, while those living on the fringes of the settlement were to repair to predetermined positions. As the well-being of the colony relied on everyone to do their part, fines were levied against those who failed to answer the call; however, the legislature

cautioned that fines should be tailored to the reasons given by the malefactors. Unlike Jamestown, St. Mary's was spared from any concerted attack by hostile forces outside the colony, and the plan virtually went untested.[7]

The absence of any large invasion from outside did not mean that there were not any problems with the surrounding Indian tribes. Punitive raids against the Indians were launched which were carried out by drafts of men taken from the militia. An act in September 1642 made it legal for raids to be carried out in retaliation "for outrages." Every third man was subject to be drafted into service; however, those conscripted were authorized only to go on raids within the boundaries of the province. Placed in command of an expedition against the Susquehannahs in 1642, Captain Thomas Cornwallis, set a precedent by opting not to employ a draft. Instead, his force was comprised of volunteers whom he felt would be more amenable to service than a force of conscriptees. Cornwallis's precedent found expression in the law where it was reiterated and clarified in a supplementary act passed by the General Assembly in 1650. The law stated that in the event of any war declared outside the province, the militia was under no obligation to serve except in the capacity of volunteers. For its part, the militia was to be used only in the event that the province was invaded. By placing limitations on where and how the militia was

to be employed, the General Assembly created a weakness in the province's abilities to wage war that made itself felt during both the French and Indian War and the Revolution.[8]

The relative security from outside invasion along with a sustained pattern of population growth can be seen as major factors that influenced the deterioration of the militia as a purely military instrument. Maryland's security from an external threat seems to have been assisted by a corresponding growth in both Virginia and Pennsylvania. The westward expansion of these two colonies appears to have diverted much of the Indians' concerns away from Maryland's own westward thrust. At the same time, as both Virginia and Pennsylvania claimed more territory to the west, Maryland's ability to expand in that direction was reduced. Hemmed in by its neighbors, Maryland was left with a smaller frontier to defend, thereby diminishing the need for a large military presence. With Virginia and Pennsylvania providing something of a buffer zone from outside attacks, Maryland's population was given a better chance to thrive.[9]

Fanning out to the north, west, and east, by 1650 the province had grown to encompass three counties, and another eight were added in the last half of the century. Beginning with only a few hundred settlers when the province was first established, Maryland's population

had grown to approximately 12,000 by 1660. By 1704, the population of Maryland was estimated to be at a little less than 35,000 after which it began to follow the pattern of the other colonies by doubling on an average of once every twenty years. Correspondingly, as radical changes appeared in the demographics of the province, radical changes were taking place in the political, economic, and social structure of Maryland, and consequently all of which ultimately gained expression within the militia.[10]

With the colony on a more secure footing and population expanding, Maryland began to make the transformation from a relatively homogenous society to one which became more stratified. The increased social stratification fed by the introduction and growth of tobacco as a cash crop led many Marylanders away from matters concerning the common good and more to those of self-interest. Consequently, as the pursuit of acquiring wealth and status took on more importance, the concern for military matters declined, particularly in the more settled regions of the province. As early as 1650, the militia appears to have begun the process of assuming a decidedly more social orientation as its raison d' etre.[11]

The first indication that the militia was evolving towards that of a social club and away from its roots as a military organization appears within a set of instructions from Governor Willam Stone to the provincial officers in

1650. Although he stressed the continued need to maintain discipline within the militia, Stone advised the officers not to be too harsh in their assessments of fines levied for non-attendance during muster days. He instructed the officers to apply all fines collected toward the purchase of fifes, drums, colors, and most notably, that of food and drink to be served after the men were dismissed. By the tone of the note, it seems that some of the militia companies already were overindulging in their consumption of liquor during muster days, as the governor ended his message to the officers with an admonition not to allow the men to drink to excess.[12]

Whatever weight the governor attached to his warning seems to have been lost on the militia, because over the next one hundred years, military discipline during muster days seems to have lagged significantly behind that of inebriation. By the middle of the eighteenth century, as a means to correct the militia's bibulous propensities, the General Assembly attempted to take a tougher stand than it had in the past. The laws drafted in 1756 to regulate the militia prohibited anyone other than licensed inn-keepers from dispensing liquor to militiamen on muster days and then only at appointed times after the troops had been dismissed. Included in the legislation was the enactment of a ten-shilling fine to be imposed on any member of the militia who showed up intoxicated for training on

muster days. Since the legislation was never enacted because of political in-fighting, it is doubtful whether the militia became anymore abstemious than it was before. Certainly, the militia's proclivity for imbibing in alcoholic beverages during muster activities transcended the end of the colonial period. During the Revolution, at least one county lieutenant complained that the militia's fondness for over-indulging in spirits was having a deleterious effect on the organization's military effectiveness. As drinking and carousing began to exact its toll on the military posture of the militia, other forces within Maryland society began to have a telling effect as well.[13]

The stratification that was becoming more apparent in Maryland society in the latter-half of the seventeenth century and the importance of tobacco to the economy contributed significantly to the militia's transformation from a military to a social organization. The transformation is made more apparent by the elimination from militia duty of those two groups that occupied the lowest rungs of society. In light of the wealth that was to be derived from tobacco-growing, it is less surprising that these two groups were the ones that comprised the labor force that was needed to cultivate and harvest the crop.

In a law passed in 1681, the slaves were the first of these groups to be excluded from service in the militia. As demonstrated by Whittington B. Johnson, the status of slavery in Maryland during most of the seventeenth century appears to be a murky one, and any precise picture of the practice seems impossible to confirm. The first laws which addressed the issue of slavery did not appear until 1664 and seem to have been primarily concerned with the matter of miscegenation. More precisely, the laws addressed the status of both white women who were married to slaves and any children that were born of the union. While these laws did touch on subjects such as durante vita, curiously absent from them was any proscription from carrying firearms or serving in the militia. Because of the proscription written into the law of 1681, it probably can be assumed that up until that time, slaves had served in the militia.[14]

Economic considerations seem to be the largest contributing factor for excluding the slaves from service in the militia. The situation in Maryland began to change dramatically in the last quarter of the century as the number of slaves within the province grew at a rate three times that of the white population. As Johnson points out, the growth was related to a corresponding economic change away from small subsistence farms to that of the larger plantations. Therefore, it appears that the

prohibition of slaves from the militia was born of the economic necessity for them to remain in the fields. In conjunction with economic reasons, the presence of a growing population of laborers who were held against their will seems likely to have created some degree of alarm among the white planters. Deemed to be potentially hostile, it was probably essential, in the minds of the planters, to keep weapons out of the hands of the slaves.[15]

Following slaves, next to be excluded from the militia were indentured servants. They had been an integral part of the militia throughout the seventeenth century and into the first years of the eighteenth. During that time, the laws governing the militia placed stiff fines on those masters who impeded a servant from answering an alarm, but in 1732, all that was changed. A supplementary act to regulate the militia passed by both houses of the General Assembly, forbade servants from enrolling or attending musters unless directed to do so by the local commanding officer in times of emergency. The decision to exclude servants from military duty, like that of the slaves probably can be explained best in both economic and social terms.[16]

During the first years of colonization, the importation of indentured servants provided their masters with economic advantages. In addition to the labor they provided, the headwright system helped to increase the

planters' holdings by allowing them additional acreage for each servant they imported. However, as more acreage was devoted to tobacco and the headwright system was abandoned, the indentured servant became less of an asset to the planters. The intensive labor associated with tobacco made slavery a more attractive alternative. As the number of slaves imported into the province increased, the importation of indentured servants decreased. No longer required or valued as field hands, a number of servants were trained as artisans providing necessary goods and services for the planters. The value that was placed on these goods and services would appear to have made it economically more advantageous for the planters to have the servants excused from their military obligation than to waste time in the muster field.[17]

On a social level, the increased prestige that was normally accorded to many artisans was not forthcoming to those among the servant class. Composed largely of convicts and men and women of Irish extraction, they were still viewed by the predominately English planters as a vile and wretched group of the baser sort. In a militia that was becoming more socially conscious, it would appear that there was no advantage to be derived from having these men among them on muster days. Additionally, like the slaves, it would seem to have been of questionable wisdom on the part of the planters to have allowed an oppressed

and potentially hostile group of men to be allowed access to weapons. As Maryland society became more deferential in character, the need on the part of the burgeoning elite to maintain some means of social control became greater. Certainly the presence of an armed servant-class would have posed a threat. Strangely enough, although servants were excluded from the militia for the remainder of Maryland's colonial period, when substitutes were needed to forestall the draft during the Revolution, they would find themselves highly prized to perform military duty.[18]

The exclusion of slaves and indentured servants left the militia with only the well-to-do planters, the middle class, and other freemen to inhabit the ranks. While the ostracism of the slaves and servants from the social milieu was a relatively quiet one, other changes in the structure of Maryland society appear to have been greeted with more contention. The rise of a propertied elite and the shrinkage of available land, particularly on the Eastern Shore, appears to have engendered a degree of class resentment among the lower rungs of society. As the eighteenth century progressed, the discontent became more noticeable in the militia. By the time of the Revolution, the lower-class resentment that had been simmering throughout the colonial era began to boil over in the Maryland militia.[19]

The homogeneity that had existed in Maryland's embryonic society is probably best illustrated by an act of the General Assembly passed in 1642. In the act, the assembly left all regulatory powers of the militia in the hands of the inhabitants for the months of April through October. Unprecedented in Maryland's colonial history, the assembly called upon all militia companies within the province to hold monthly meetings. The purpose of the meetings was to allow the men to propose and vote on all measures they felt necessary to properly regulate the militia for the stated months. All such measures that were adopted through a voice vote were then to be enforced by the company commander. However, less than ten years later this democratic impulse was gone and the situation began to change.[20]

The first overt attempt to draw a distinction between socioeconomic groups within the militia can be apprehended in a directive to the local commanders written by the governor and his council in 1650. According to the governor's wishes, while all men between the ages of sixteen and fifty were required to enroll in the militia, the Captains were instructed to form a "Constant Trained Band" from those who were judged to be not only physically able but also of the "fittest estate." Possibly the governor was employing the militia as a vehicle for

maintaining and expanding the notion of social control over the lower classes. Whatever his motives were, it seems evident that traces of elitism were beginning to appear in the militia.[21]

The sharpest division between social classes that emerged within the militia was between officers and the rank and file. As was customary in many of the other colonies, officers were appointed by the governor; however, by 1650 there was some latitude given in the appointment of ensigns. This task was delegated to the various captains throughout the province. In a society that was becoming rapidly more elitist as the seventeenth century wore on, fierce competition for positions of power, even at the local level, may have erupted. In the absence of an aristocratic class where positions of influence were passed on through heredity, any means available to keep social and political influence within the province of one family may have been sought by the wealthy. Thus, it appears that as families grew in wealth and status, those who held commissions in the militia attempted to keep them within their families. Within the Ennals family of Dorchester county, three of its members held officer's commissions, and that number swelled as intermarriage with families such as the Hoopers and Woolfords helped to establish the family's dominance over the Dorchester County militia. In many cases, such as that of the Ennals family, the

monopoly created during the provincial era extended well into the Revolution. With the amount of available commissions diminishing as they fell into the hands of the elite, it seems that other means were sought to distinguish those of the militia who wished to appear more socially influential.[22]

In the late seventeenth century another avenue seems to have been opened to promote the growing trend of elitism and deference. In 1681, legislation regulating the militia established the creation of the Horse Troop. While no hard evidence exists that the Horse Troop was designed specifically to separate the wealthier planters from those of the yeoman class, the qualifications for entrance seems to have placed admission into the Horse Troop economically outside the reach of most. Those who wished to be a part of this arm of the militia were required to provide their own horse and accouterments, and all who applied were required to have their horses deemed acceptable by the Horse Troop's commanding officer. Consequently, this provision seems to have been designed to arbitrarily exclude anyone from joining who may have sauntered up with a nag in tow.[23]

The Horse Troop's requirements appear to have denied access to anyone who did not possess a substantial amount of disposable income. In his essay on colonial estates in the Northern Chesapeake, Aubrey C. Land suggests

that between 1690 and 1699, roughly seventy-five percent of the population in Maryland had estates valued at 100 pounds or less. Describing those who fell into this group, Land found that among their possessions they might have owned a saddle horse or two, but that the rest of their estate was of a modest nature, or what he called a "rude sufficiency." Even though Land points out that possession of a saddle horse was financially within the means of many who made up the province's middling-sort, compared to what the elite could afford to purchase, the quality of those horses remains in doubt. In addition to an acceptable horse, the prospective trooper had to expend a considerable outlay for the rest of the necessary equipment, such as "Swords Carbines Pistolls Holsters & Ammunicion [sic]," which again put the more modest planter economically well outside the qualifications.[24]

Another provision of the same law which the yeoman farmer must have found galling, established a pay scale for the members of the Horse Troop that was double the amount paid to the foot soldiers. Already deeply in debt, in most cases living an existence barely above what probably amounted to the subsistence level, and banking heavily on a crop that not only demanded the majority of his time but fluctuated wildly in price, the yeoman farmer could ill-afford to attend musters that must have been viewed as unnecessary given the relative safety of the province.

Even more objectionable, it would seem, was the notion that in the event that the militia was activated, the modest-planter would be paid substantially less than those who could afford to spend time away from their plantations.[25]

As the relative equalitarianism that characterized early colonial society gave way to a structure that was marked profoundly by social deference, the average farmer who comprised the majority of the militia's lower ranks appears to have begun searching for ways to express his displeasure with all that was happening around him. Unable to do so in the larger social milieu, the middling-class farmers found the ways to vent their frustration within the framework of the militia. Corresponding to the shift in the provincial social structure in the last decades of the seventeenth century, unrest began to emerge among the rank and file and with it came open hostility towards those who commanded the militia. Helpless in the face of the rising wave of opposition from the men they commanded, the officers turned to the only agency they believed could restore order, the General Assembly. Unfortunately, legislation did not prove to be the necessary panacea for the social ills that plagued the militia, and the problem continued until the colonial militia's demise after the French and Indian War. Left unremedied, the perceived iniquities and resentments exploded again during

the Revolution. Within the militia, opposition manifested itself in the breakdown of training, rampant absenteeism from musters, the pilferage of public arms, and a growth of insolence that was directed toward the officer corps.

The attempts to instill any military discipline in the militia throughout both the Colonial and Revolutionary eras appears to have been an extended study in futility. The most plausible reason for this would seem to stem from the fact that the men, above all else, were private citizens. The task of indoctrinating men who met infrequently and reluctantly into the ways of military life would appear to have been an almost impossible one to achieve. Adding to the difficulty of exercising these bands of citizen-soldiers were the officers whose positions were derived from wealth rather than any military expertise. In most cases, the militia was trained from a variety of treatises on military discipline that were of dubious quality. Throughout Maryland's colonial history, the records are fraught with the unsuccessful attempts to bring some semblance of military bearing to the militia.[26]

If there was any training done in the colony's first years of existence it probably fell under the auspices of the Captain of St. Mary's. However, it appears that as Maryland's growth reached outward, the Captain of St. Mary's could no longer adequately manage the task of

training the militia. Instead, in 1642, the General Assembly delegated the responsibility to the Sergeants of the Trained Bands. As prescribed by law, the inhabitants of each hundred were expected to pay the sergeant a fee in tobacco for his time, trouble and expertise. Apparently, the effectiveness of the sergeants seems to have been called into question because within a few years the government began casting about for an alternative means of accomplishing the task. According to instructions that were issued by the governor, by 1650 training within the hundred was to be conducted by the local captains; however, the government seems to have believed that more was needed. In the same year, an act was passed by the legislature authorizing pay for a Muster-Master General who was chosen by the Proprietor. Judging by the haphazard nature of the militia law passed the previous year under the title of "An Order of the Assembly for the Defense of the Province as the Present Times Will Permit," the Muster-Master General's primary function may have been to instill some degree of uniformity to the training of militia companies throughout the province.[27]

Apparently, the zeal, if any, that the Muster-Master General brought with him was not enough to inspire the militia of the province to conduct themselves in a military manner. An act passed by the General Assembly in 1661 patently recognized the lack of any effective

regulation for training and exercising the militia. In an attempt to correct the deficiency, the act called for regular periods of training to be carried out once every three months or more often if the governor and council believed it to be necessary. Alarm drills were to be conducted at least four times a year under the auspices of the local commanding officers and at such times that met with their convenience. In order to impose a measure of compliance from the rank and file, the law established a fine of fifty pounds of tobacco for anyone who failed to attend musters with a weapon and ammunition, as well as those who just failed to attend. For those miscreants who missed three meetings, the fine was substantially higher at five hundred pounds of tobacco, and as added punishment, they were required to appear personally before the governor and his council to give an accounting for their absences.[28]

The militia apparently was considered to be in such an abysmal condition by 1696 that Governor Francis Nicholson felt obliged to make a tour of the colony to judge for himself its state of readiness. Probably more aware than the governor of the militia's deplorable condition, the council issued a warning to each of the commanding officers to prepare their companies before the governor began his rounds. Obviously for its part, the militia must have failed to make a favorable impression on the governor, because in June 1697, the General Assembly

embarked on a debate to find the means of properly restructuring the colony's military organization. Apparently, unable to come to any agreement and afraid that a general overhaul of the system would only confuse the people, the assembly sent its proposed changes in the law to the counties for the inhabitants' consideration. Accordingly, after the people had a chance to peruse the proposals, they were to instruct their delegates at the next election as to how they believed the militia should be restructured. Clearly, the legislature was at a loss to find a remedy for the recalcitrance of the colony's militiamen.[29]

For a number of years the problem of absenteeism during muster days had been steadily worsening. The legislators had tried every means at their disposal to stem the problem. In 1701, after more complaints concerning absenteeism had been transmitted to the General Assembly from the officers of the militia, the Committee of Laws, which had been vested with finding a solution, threw up its hands in exasperation. Venting their frustration, the legislators placed the blame squarely in the laps of those who were complaining saying:

> The Greatest reason why the Militia seems unserviceable is not Living up to the prsent Law the neglect of wch must be principally in the Comdrs negligence for they have the power to somo and if disobeyd can fine for such centempt.30

Concluding that it was fruitless, in their estimation, to repair the situation through the enactment of any further legislation, the committee ended their deliberations with an admonishment to the officers:

> The frequent calling their companys together as the law directs and taking due paines and care to instruct and traine them that are able to pforme their duty and this undr penalty to the Comanders as well as those comanded.31

Handing the problem back to those who felt powerless already only seems to have exacerbated the situation, and the complaints to the General Assembly continued.

Added to the existing difficulties in compelling the men to attend training exercises, there was a corresponding decline in discipline and an increase in the amount of disrespect shown to the officers. A petition submitted by the chief officers of the militia to the General Assembly requested that laws be enacted to help reinforce discipline among the rank and file. According to the officers commanding a company of militia, there was a growing amount of disrespect being shown to them by the "privates and sentinels." In a message to the Lower House concerning the affair, the Upper House concurred with the petition and felt that a supplementary act to the militia regulations was necessary in order to give the militia captains the requisite power to fine those men who were disrespectful. Already becoming aware of the futility of legislating behavior among the militia,

the Lower House rejected the matter out of hand. In 1732, Governor Samuel Ogle requested that supplementary legislation regulating the militia be passed because the law in force

> does not Effectually Answer the end for wch it was made; that the officers have not Sufficient power to oblige the private Men to to Appear at Musters and Learn the Necessary Discipline, that sufficient Provision is not made for preserving and cleaning the Arms & other Utensils of War lodged in the several Countys so that many of them are already Spoiled and Lost.32

The General Assembly responded by passing a measure which levied a ten-shilling fine on any militiaman who misbehaved during training or failed to attend musters. In order to collect the fine, the field officer in charge was empowered to fill out a warrant which was then turned over to the sheriff to be executed against the "Body, Goods, or Chattels" of the culprit. As with all attempts to legislate training and discipline, the act appears to have failed to fulfill its intent. By 1740, Ogle was again lamenting that "I cannot find any sufficient Obligation upon either Officers or private men to take the field and behave as they ought to do." For Ogle and his successors, the problem would only worsen. Compounding an already impossible situation, as discipline continued to break down unimpeded by any attempts of the General Assembly or governor to stop it, another difficulty associated with the militia was vexing the provincial lawmakers.[33]

In 1664, the General Assembly authorized that a public magazine be built in St. Mary's to house all weapons belonging to the province. To help defray the costs of defending the province, a requirement was made stating that the Proprietor should return one-half of a two-pence tax that he collected on each hogshead of tobacco exported from Maryland. Despite the Proprietor's contribution towards the purchase of arms and ammunition, the expenditures needed for defending the province traditionally had come from the pockets of the inhabitants who were already heavily burdened with taxes and fees. For the more well-to-do, their displeasure for funding the province's defense was displayed through a running battle with the Proprietor that grew more heated throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth. However, for those of the middling class and below, the amount of fees and taxes imposed upon them eroded what little chance they might have had to achieve financial security. With little voice in the matter, apparently a substantial number of them resorted to the few means available for them to state their objections, and one of those means was manifested in the pilferage of public arms.[34]

When the provincial magazine was built, a great degree of resentment was voiced concerning the fact that the central storage of arms and ammunition prevented those supplies from reaching the hands of the militia forces who had a greater need in the outlying areas. Prior to the establishment of the public magazine, any weapons that were deemed necessary for the use of the militia could be impressed from the local citizenry. But in turn, this left those inhabitants who had their weapons impressed disarmed which created a sense of uneasiness. Additionally, it was believed that the dispersal of arms would relieve those militiamen who lacked weapons from incurring the fines which had been traditionally levied against them for attending musters without weapons. As a further argument, those who advocated the dispersal of arms and ammunition believed that because of the inadequate means of transportation and poor quality of the roads, it was probable that in the event of an emergency, the militia would not be able to mount an adequate response.[35]

By 1681, the act regulating the militia placed a certain quantity of arms and ammunition in the hands of such persons as met the Proprietor's approval, to be dispensed only during training days and in the event of any emergencies. After the law was enacted, the problem of pilferage seems to have begun. At first, Maryland's lawmakers seemed only concerned that the placement of arms

and powder in the hands of locals would result in a certain amount of fraud. Therefore, written into the law was the prohibition against any attempts to exchange old powder for fresh. A decade later the first signs of trouble concerning pilferage appeared. The militia law for 1692 required that all public arms that were distributed during training be returned after musters. If they were not, the militiamen ran the hazard of a forfeiture of a value equal to the article missing and all fines were to be collected by the local sheriff.[36]

A year later the problem of theft became more noticeable. A motion brought before the governor's council by Colonel David Browne of Somerset County called for the necessary means to locate a number of public arms that had disappeared within the county. In response, the council demanded the return of the weapons at the hazard of being called before the Provincial Court. Apparently, the people of Maryland failed to take the governor's threat too seriously, because the practice of pilfering public weapons seems to have continued.[37]

As a means of tracking all public arms and ammunition dispersed throughout the colony, the governor and his council required that each county militia commander return an accounting for all such public military supplies under his care. The poor state of affairs that existed throughout the province was reflected in an account returned

by Captain John Coode in 1694 to Colonel Humphrey Warren. Listing all the weapons disbursed, Coode added a note next to the total of guns and fowling pieces stating that the rest were "Imbezelled plundered & stollen [sic]." In his account, Coode revealed that a great quantity of powder and shot distributed to the soldiers during musters had not been returned. In order to rectify the growing problem, the governor's council issued a warning in 1697 to the inhabitants of the province to either turn over all public arms and equipment in their possession to the officers of the militia or else face prosecution under a felony charge. The number that responded to the threat is unknown, but apparently not enough to put a halt to the thefts that were taking place.[38]

Unable to dry up the steady stream of arms and equipment that was draining the public magazines, the General Assembly altered its tactics in 1732. In what seems to have been an attempt to make the felons more visible, the assembly ordered that all weapons and military accouterments belonging to the province be marked with a stamp for identification purposes. Taking into account the severe tone adopted by the Assembly concerning public arms, the militia regulations drafted in 1756 indicated that the problem had continued to worsen through the intervening years. Judging by the act's wording, not only were the men of the militia taking the weapons for their

own personal use, but apparently a significant number were reaping profits from the sale of stolen property. Militia officers were ordered to search homes in an attempt to ascertain the precise number of weapons and equipment which were in the public's possession. Members of the militia possessing weapons and equipment belonging to the province were ordered to bring them to the next muster, and those who refused to do so were subject to fines assessed at treble the value of the articles they held. Search and seizure warrants could be issued by the local magistrates in cases where theft was involved or there was reason to believe that public equipment had not been turned in.[39]

Prostrate and moribund from the disease that raged within, by the beginning of the French and Indian War the militia had been ground further into the dust by the provincial political establishment. Unable to exact a cure for the militia's internal problems, the politicians instead used it as a battleground in an effort to advance their own personal and political self-interests. Over the course of three wars, Maryland's security was jeopardized from without as the Whigs dominating the assembly's Lower House battled the Proprietor's supporters for political supremacy from within.

Dominating the Lower House was a group of men who represented Maryland's growing planter-merchant class. Not only reaping profits from the sale of their own tobacco, a great many of the larger planters had increased their fortunes by serving as middle-men for the yeoman farmers. Marketing the crops for the small farmers and selling them goods on credit, the larger planters were amassing wealth rapidly in their roles as business entrepreneurs. However, as tobacco prices fluctuated, so too did their fortunes. In flush times, this rising class of men stood to increase their wealth significantly, but when conditions in the tobacco market were unfavorable, their fortunes became more vulnerable. It was in those times of depression when the planter-merchants began casting about for a scapegoat. Feeling the pinch from their creditors and finding it difficult to collect from those who owed them, the planter-merchants began looking covetously at the fees and duties imposed by the Proprietor and his placemen. In the proprietary element, the planter-merchants saw a group of men who they believed were lining their own pockets at the expense of the province. As a means to end the steady erosion of their profits, the planter-merchant group began an assault on the Proprietor and his placemen in

order to achieve political and economic control over the province. In the years before the War of Jenkins' Ear, the two factions began squaring off against each other in a battle that would last until the eve of the Revolution.[40]

To gain the support of the yeomanry, the country party, as the planter-merchant faction was called, cloaked its agenda for self-aggrandizement in the mantle of Whig doctrine. Claiming the right to decide all matters concerning the political and economic destiny of the province, the country party pointed to the Proprietor and his henchmen as the source of all corrupt practices and the reason for their own miserable economic conditions. Thus, by marking the proprietary element with the onus of responsibility for the ills of the province, the country party deflected attention away from its own desire for self-aggrandizement. For the proprietary faction, or the court party as it came to be known, the struggle emerged as a life and death battle to protect and maintain its own livelihood. As the two factions engaged in their battle for political and economic supremacy, they became almost oblivious to the danger posed by the colonial wars raging outside of Maryland's borders. Although blind to any threat that Great Britain's enemies might impose, Maryland's opposing political forces were not beyond using the wars to gain their own ends.[41]

The heat created by the two factions ignited into flame over the means to procure arms and ammunition for the militia. Traditionally, the province had purchased military supplies from part of a three-pence duty imposed on tobacco exports. When the measure was allowed to lapse in 1733, the Lower House refused to allow a separate duty to be enacted for the purpose. After another bill was rejected which would have given the Lower House some say in the expenditure of funds, a supply bill based on a separate duty was passed in 1735. The Lower House had assented to the measure with the provision that the bill would be enacted only on a temporary basis. By doing so, the country party's leadership believed that when the duty came up for consideration again, their position would be strengthened considerably. However, the assembly was prorogued by the governor too soon for it to qualify as a session. When the governor failed to reconvene the assembly, the duty was left on the books, thus depriving the Lower House of its wish for some amount of control over the fiscal policies of the province.[42]

Out of session and unable to carry on the fight, the growing probability of war with Spain gave the Lower House the opening it needed to acquire leverage over the proprietary interests. With the commencement of hostilities imminent, the governor was forced to call the assembly back into session when the crown requested military

assistance from the colonies. Since the old supply bill was no longer in effect when the General Assembly convened, a new one was required. Smarting from the Upper House's maneuver after the early prorogation which had kept the tobacco duty in force, the country party mounted a broad attack on a variety of issues the court party desired. In doing so, the supply bill became bogged down in a legislative struggle between the two houses. After war was declared in 1740, the Lower House won a small victory by diverting fees that belonged to the Proprietor to support a military expedition to Cartagena. However, the supply bill was another matter, and it remained unpassed due to the intransigence of both houses.[43]

The deadlock lasted through both the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War leaving Maryland's militia ill-provided for and the province exposed to attack. After the cessation of hostilities, a compromise was struck between the two houses and an arms bill was enacted for a one-year period which provided funds that were to be derived from a duty on tobacco. While the compromise gave the Upper House the fees it had desired, the Lower House had achieved some measure of success in the temporary nature of the supply bill. By insuring that it would be in force for only a short period of time, the country party was assured of another chance for making in-roads against the court party. Although Governor Samuel Ogle had feared

for the worst militarily as the two houses had wrangled over the supply bill, the province had been fortunate in avoiding an attack from either the Spanish or the French. Where Ogle had been lucky, his successor Governor Horatio Sharpe proved to be cursed.[44]

Arriving in Maryland only a few months before the beginning of the French and Indian War, Governor Horatio Sharpe found himself suddenly besieged from both the threat posed by the French and the political war that was swirling about him in Annapolis. As the country party and the court party battled once more over how the war was to be financed, Sharpe found his ability to prosecute the war against the French blocked at every turn. Judging from his concern in matters of defense, Sharpe appears to have been one of the few leaders within the province to grasp the enormity of the threat posed by the French and their Indian allies. For their part, neither the Proprietor in England, nor the General Assembly in Annapolis seemed to be too concerned about anything other than advancing their own particular self-interests.[45]

Seizing upon the military supply issue as it had in the past, the country party attempted once again to reduce the proprietary influence in provincial money matters. Through a variety of means, all of which infringed upon the revenues traditionally collected by the Proprietor and his placemen, the Lower House of the General Assembly

repeatedly tried to assert its supremacy throughout the war. In two measures, the first of which was to impose duties for arms and ammunition, the Lower House was able to gain some concessions from Sharpe despite the initial objections of the Proprietor. Passed in 1754, the first bill used the money collected from licensing fees placed on inn-keepers to procure arms and ammunition for the province. The second measure, passed in the wake of General Edward Braddock's defeat, directed money raised from a variety of taxes, ranging from one placed on wine and spirits to a land tax which included those lands belonging to the Proprietor, to be used for defending the western frontier. With the frontier open to the designs of the French and no funds to stop them, Sharpe was forced to make concessions allowing the Lower House a degree of say in the administration of the monies allocated.[46]

Because the defense bill was enacted for only a five-year period, the gains made by the country party yielded them no chance to achieve any permanent success in reducing the proprietary perogative. After Sharpe exhausted the funds voted to him for defense, the governor requested another supply bill to carry on the war effort in 1757 which gave the country party another chance. However, this time the country party was not able to exploit its earlier victories over the court party, and much to Sharpe's chagrin, a long stalemate settled in again between

the two factions. Over the course of two sessions, Sharpe's request for a supply bill that would allow him to prosecute the war met with rejection on eight separate occasions when the Lower House tried to load the measure with taxes that the Upper House found objectionable. The two houses of the legislature remained deadlocked over the bill until the war's end when it quietly passed from sight.[47]

The quest for supremacy by the Lower House was not confined to just the means of financing Maryland's war effort. The battle spilled over to encroach upon Sharpe's abilities to prosecute the war militarily. Throughout the war, the governor frequently lamented over the inadequacy of the laws that regulated Maryland's militia. In response to a 1756 questionnaire from the Lords of Trade and Plantations concerning the conditions within Maryland, Sharpe and his council blamed the laws of the province for the lack of discipline within the militia. Under the existing regulations, Sharpe believed the militia could not be compelled under any circumstance to assist in the defense of the province. What the governor desired the most was a militia law similar to those of the northeastern colonies. In a letter to Lord Baltimore before General Edward Braddock embarked upon his ill-fated expedition, Sharpe wished longingly for a militia act such as New York's which allowed its forces to serve outside of the colony and additionally provided funds to supply

any such operations. Painfully aware of the restrictions the laws placed on the militia's employment outside of the province, the governor was forced to inform Braddock, when the general requested a party of militia to transport supplies to Fort Duquesne, that it was doubtful he could persuade the men to venture past Fort Cumberland.[48]

For its part, the Lower House believed that Fort Cumberland was too far for the militia to venture. In its assessment, the Lower House determined that the fort lay outside of Maryland's borders, therefore the militia could neither accompany supply trains, nor garrison the fort. Even after the rout of Braddock's expedition left the western settlements exposed to the depredations of French-allied Indians, the Assembly refused to allow Sharpe permission to employ the militia as reinforcements for the remnant of British troops and volunteers stationed there. Unable to deploy the militia, Sharpe was left with no alternative other than to rely on what few volunteers he could assemble.[49]

For Sharpe, the dreams of obtaining an efficacious set of militia laws that would give him the latitude he desired never reached fruition. By 1756, as the incessant battle between the two houses of the Assembly raged, the Lower House refused to consider a draft of new regulations proposed by the upper chamber. When Sharpe asked the leader of the Lower House why they had not debated the issue,

Phillip Hammond masked what appears to be the country party's true intent in Whig rhetoric stating that anything beyond a recommendation for the people to provide themselves with arms and to become acquainted with the use of them was an abridgement of the people's liberties. In what seems to be the true state of affairs, the Lower House held the militia law hostage, tying it to the supply bill in its battle to weaken the proprietary perogative in money matters.[50]

The Assembly's obstinance accelerated, and by October 1757, Sharpe noted in a letter to Lord Loudon that the Lower House wanted the number of volunteers dispatched to the frontier reduced to three hundred which would be used as ranging parties. In regard to the volunteers at Fort Cumberland, the assembly refused to grant any additional supplies, reiterating its belief that the fort lay outside the borders of the province. Sharpe relayed to Loudon his fear that when the news arrived at the fort, the volunteers who had not already deserted would do so in short order. As a means of counteracting the assembly, Sharpe informed Loudon of his plan that would allow him to maintain both the number of militia in the west and the volunteers at Fort Cumberland. The governor planned to wait until the present session of the assembly was finished and then order out the militia to the frontier. Those volunteers still in service were to be placed under

British command as a contingent of the Royal American Regiment. When Sharpe made good his threat and ordered out the militia in December, 1757, an imbroglio ensued between the governor, the Lower House, and the militia as well.[51]

If there was any sense of urgency transmitted to the public throughout the war, apparently the citizen-soldiers of Maryland, for the most part, failed to apprehend it. A call for volunteers in the first year of the war fell far short of expectations, although the call did produce a rather snappy if not overly optimistic song to accompany it. Anticipating the clamor that would ensue and the victories to follow, the song predicted

> On fair Ohio's banks we Stand
> Musket and Bayonet in Hand;
> The French are beat, they dare not stay
> But trust to their Heels and run away.52

Despite this musical assurance, there were few Marylanders who longed to stand on the banks of the Ohio. After a year of recruitment, the company of volunteers under the command of Colonel John Dagworthy remained at half-strength. Complaining to Lord Albermarle in July 1755, Sharpe laid the blame once again on the militia laws, stating that, of the twenty thousand men who were able to bear arms within the province, less than one hundred could be prevailed upon to serve. Writing to Calvert, the governor reasoned additionally that the distances involved contributed greatly

to the people's lack of concern. In Sharpe's opinion, the inhabitants of the eastern counties were too far removed from the situation to display any concern or perceive the extent of danger which existed in the west.[53]

Sharpe's belief seems to have been validated by two false alarms in late 1755. Rumors filtering down from Pennsylvania claimed that the Indians had attacked Lancaster and were moving toward Maryland. As the word passed, approximately fifteen hundred to two thousand militia from Kent, Cecil, and Queen Anne's counties made their way to the head of the Elk river to oppose any invasion, but the force quickly dispersed when the rumor proved false. Other false reports of Indians heading toward Baltimore and Annapolis also brought the militia out in large numbers, and earthworks were begun around Annapolis before the reports were dispelled. While the militia was quick to respond to threats against its own particular neighborhoods, it was slow to respond to the calls for help from the west. Colonel John Hall of Baltimore complained that reports of Indians as close as sixty miles failed to arouse much of a response from the militiamen under his command, and in 1756 Captain Joshua Beall led a party of volunteers from Prince George's county when the militia of that county proved exceedingly reluctant to go.[54]

By 1757, if the militia seemed more disinclined to serve, Sharpe believed he knew why. According to the governor, the citizen-soldier was dependent upon his work in order to survive. If he was not paid for his time in service, he could not afford to leave his home. Because of the General Assembly's refusal to allocate money for the war, the militia had gone unpaid too many times in the past to respond again in the present. Believing the probability was high that no pay would be forthcoming, Sharpe said he was not surprised at the backwardness of the militia. Sharpe's perspicacity regarding the motivational behavior of the militia apparently was neither shared by the Whig leadership of the country party during the French and Indian War, nor would it be by the popular party during the Revolution.[55]

The reluctance to serve by many of the men within the militia did not mean that the sentiment was universally accepted by all. Many companies did answer the governor's call, and of those who went westward, a sizable proportion volunteered to stay on including Joshua Beall. In the absence of any extensive documentation concerning the militia's activities on the frontier, it appears that those companies that did go performed with some degree of competence. However, there were some instances in which the militia's valor was called into question. In August 1756, Sharpe summoned the militia of several counties to

assist in the defense of the western settlements. As stipulated by the governor's order, the county commanders were to send thirty men each to serve a one month tour at Fort Frederick under the command of Colonel Thomas Prather. Upon their arrival at the fort, they were to be employed as a force to interdict the marauding Indians.[56]

A letter appearing in the Maryland Gazette on 4 November 1756 relayed an incident which called into question the behavior of one company of militia sent west under the command of Lieutenant William Teaguard. According to the letter, a patrol from Teaguard's company, following on the heels of a raiding party, found itself being fired upon by those they were pursuing. As they were pinned down, one of Teaguard's men, Matthias Nichols, suggested that they rush the enemy while the Indians were reloading their weapons. However, when he looked around, instead of advancing with him, Nichols saw his fellow militiamen heading in the opposite direction. After the precipitous retreat of his comrades, Nicholls continued on and stumbled upon a man named Postlewaite who had been shot by the party of Indians. Despite the fact that his militia company had abandoned him while the Indian threat remained, Nicholls was able to get Postlewaite to safety. In its conclusion, the letter curtly stated that after the incident, Teaguard's company of militia was not to be seen on the frontier again. In a similar vein, the Gazette lightheartedly reported

on 7 December 1756 that Captain Chapman's company, which had left from South River in October, had returned home without encountering any action other than killing a deer and frightening two Dutchmen.[58]

The political turmoil that had paralyzed the province since the outset of the war boiled over during the winter of 1757-1758. When the legislative session ended without resolving the conflict over the supply bill, Sharpe sprang into action. Determined to emerge victorious over the fractious Assembly, the governor claimed the authority to have the militia march as he saw fit. Activating the plan he had conceptualized in November, Sharpe called out companies of militia from Queen Anne's, Kent, Prince George's, and Calvert counties to march west to Fort Frederick. Accordingly, after those companies had served the required two months they were to be relieved by companies from St. Mary's, Baltimore, Talbot, and Cecil counties. For his part, Sharpe planned to repair to Fort Frederick and oversee the operations. As a means to pay for the expedition, the governor planned to levy a poll tax and impress provisions from the citizenry, thereby avoiding the necessity of having to tangle with the General Assembly.[59]

Although he was determined to force the hand of the country party by calling out the militia on his own initiative, the governor seemed to waver between contrition and resolve. In a letter to Calvert, Sharpe regretted having to force the men to leave their homes and businesses in the dead of winter. As a measure of compassion, he voiced his hope that he could do all within his power to ease their plight. However, in a previous letter to Colonel John Stanwix, Sharpe explained that, although he knew many would refuse to serve and that he could not punish all of the offenders at the local level, he could legally bring them before the supreme court and exact punishment there. Perhaps more as an expression of self-reassurance rather than a statement of his true belief, Sharpe wrote that he was sure that once the men arrived at Fort Frederick they would see for themselves the degree of danger that existed and the extent of the threat that the French presence posed upon the rest of the province. Wishfully, he predicted that after their arrival the militiamen would become inflamed "with fondness for military reputation," and that they would gain the admiration and approbation of the remainder of the citizens of Maryland for their service in the west. As a

consequence, Sharpe must have hoped that the admiration would result in a broader base of support for the war, thus defeating the obstreperous behavior of the Lower House.[59]

The response of the General Assembly when it reconvened in January 1758 was a far cry from admiration. Enraged, the assembly launched an investigation into the governor's actions under the lengthy title of "An Enquiry to the Conduct of Officers and men that have been supported at the expense of this Province for His Majesty and Service and the Security of the Frontier Inhabitants." In a parade of witnesses, who Sharpe characterized as "every Idle and wicked Fellow," the assembly attempted to demonstrate the dereliction of duty exhibited by those officers already on the frontier. After conducting what appears to be a kangaroo-court, the Lower House judged the officers as being negligent in their duties and promptly censured them. Unbounded in their enmity for the governor's perceived nefariousness, the members of the Lower House proceeded one step further and began a campaign to prevail upon those units of the militia that the governor had summoned not to march.[60]

Peregrine Brown, Captain of the Still Pond Company of militia in Kent County, received his instructions from the governor in the early days of December, 1757. After mustering his men and informing them of their impending

mission, forty of the rank and file abjectly refused to go. Unsure of what to do next, Brown wrote the governor for advice. In his letter Brown stated that if the order to march had been given by one of the field officers, it might have carried more weight than he could attach to it. Sharpe replied by ordering Brown to fill out warrants on the men who had refused to march and turn them over to the local magistrate for prosecution. According to the governor, after doing that, Brown was to march the men he did have to Fort Frederick. In stern words, Sharpe cautioned Brown not to

> regard the idle and false Reports of some discontented, or dastardly People or make them an Excuse from Pursuing the Orders given you by your Commanding Officer.[61]

Sharpe tried to bolster Brown's courage by telling him that if those who refused to go believed that they would escape any punishment they were wrong. Closer to the situation than the governor was, Brown refused at first to make out the warrants for fear that his men would exact their revenge on him.[62]

When further efforts to move the Still Pond Company away from its defiant stand proved futile, a company was raised from the ranks of the rest of the county militia with Brown still in command, but the crisis was not yet over. When the men who had been raised gathered to sail across the bay, they found no provisions or housing waiting

for them. To make matters worse, bad weather on the bay prevented them from sailing to the western shore. After one attempt to sail the bay had to be aborted because of a gale that forced the ships back to Chestertown, the men, many of whom were ill and frostbitten, refused to take part in any further attempt to go west. Stating that he believed the law compelling them to go was a cruel one, Colonel Richard Lloyd, the county commander, returned his commission to the governor as well.[63]

After taking an informal poll, William Coburn ascertained that the majority of Stillponians believed that if all of the militiamen refused to go, no harm would come to them in the form of punishment. With so many of the militia dissenting, so the conventional wisdom went, the local magistrates would refuse to prosecute and no juries could be empaneled that would find them guilty. The opinion around Still Pond also reflected the belief that the governor's order was illegal. Some of the residents felt that if the militia did march west it only should stay on the frontier for a day unless a French force was actually present and encountered. Others feared that if the militia complied with the order, roughly half of the men dispatched would die while they were on the frontier. For their part, the Stillponians held fast to their convictions.[64]

After Peregrine Brown had finally summoned the courage necessary to fill out the warrants naming those who had refused to march west, the captain still wavered a bit in his resoluteness and excused fifteen of the forty men due to a variety of alleged physical ailments. For those men who were not excused, County Sheriff William Ringgold issued warrants for prosecution. Apparently after seeing that a number of their compatriots had avoided prosecution by complaining of infirmity, some of those indicted adopted a similar line of defense. Shortly after the warrants were issued, Ringgold convened a court, whereupon six of the militia desperadoes who had been served summonses complained that they had been prevented from performing their obligation due to a variety of ailments running the gamut from pleurisies, to fluxes, to sore legs. Bringing witnesses to corroborate their defense, the six were immediately excused. In light of the prevailing opinion around Still Pond against the militia's westward journey, the testimony of the reluctant militiamen and their witnesses seems to have an air of dubious credibility about it.[65]

Horatio Sharpe was sure he knew what had happened. In a letter to Lord Loudon he accused the members of the Lower House of working to incite the civil disobedience in Still Pond. According to the governor, the delegates had circulated the story that because the House had

adjourned without passing a supply bill, the militia was considered to be disbanded and no longer subject to following the orders of its officers. Sharpe maintained that the delegates had hoped to bias the juries of those who were tried by employing the logic that the militia was only obligated to march in times of invasion, and that the Indian forays into the western part of the province only constituted incursions, consequently the militia was not legally bound to go.[66]

Throughout the spring of 1758, the governor and the General Assembly continued to fight over the control of the militia. The Lower House repeatedly sent notes to Sharpe demanding to know under what laws had he called out the militia. After citing previous acts of the Assembly regarding the governor's jurisdiction over the militia, Sharpe refused to give any further justification for his actions and threatened to call the militia out again.[67]

When General John Forbes began to undertake an expedition to assault Fort Duquesne, the governor made good on his threat. Sharpe planned to employ the militia in relief of the volunteers garrisoning Forts Frederick and Cumberland who were then expected to join Forbes. However, the governor was fearful that the opinion of the Lower House, which still maintained that Fort Cumberland was of no military value, held sway among the populace. Sharpe believed that the militia would not respond if they

thought that they were going to be stationed beyond North Mountain in Frederick County. As the British troops under Forbes began to move out, Sharpe called out two companies of the Frederick County militia to patrol the frontier until the militia of Cecil and Calvert Counties relieved them.[68]

In what almost amounted to a repeat performance of the response to Sharpe's previous order, the militia company from Calvert county under the command of a Captain Broome refused to march. Aware that the threat of prosecution held little weight in persuading the men to obey, Sharpe wrote his council for advice. In reply, the council advised the governor to employ the same method as he had used before and draft a company from the ranks of the other companies. Apparently the governor assented to the advice given him and issued the orders.[69]

From those militia units that answered the governor's summons, Sharpe was able to acquire the services of two hundred and fifty volunteers to use as a garrison force at Fort Cumberland; however, only for a short duration. When the Forbes expedition bogged down in the early autumn of 1758, the governor was forced to withdraw the militia after a number became ill and the others grew restive. While at Fort Cumberland, Sharpe lost two men

who were killed when they inadvertently ignited some old powder during a search for blankets and tents. On 10 October 1758, Sharpe turned the fort back over to a Virginia regiment and withdrew to Maryland.[70]

The conquest of Fort Duquesne by the Forbes expedition virtually removed the French threat from Maryland and shifted the focus of the war back to the north. As the war drew to a close, the militia began to slip back into its somnolent state, but the battle for legislative supremacy raged on into the dawn of the Revolution. The supply bill that had formed one of the centers of controversy was never passed, and consequently neither those militiamen who had ventured west at the call of the governor nor people who had goods impressed were ever paid for their service.[71]

If the militia's colonial experiences are taken into consideration, then the French and Indian War appears to have served as a dress rehearsal for its role during the Revolution. All of the qualities both good and bad that had become stamped on the militia's character over the course of one hundred and fifty years would surface again sometimes to the point of bringing the militia close to complete disintegration. The latent social discontent displayed by the rank and file, the machinations of self-interested politicians seeking to consolidate their position among the elite, the inability of the officers

to bring the rank and file into obedience, and the government's incapability to enforce its laws to end the militia's disputatiousness were seeds that had been sown throughout Maryland's provincial history. They would emerge as a bitter harvest during the Revolution.

NOTES to CHAPTER II

[1]Maryland Gazette, 22 December 1774; 19 January 1775.

[2]Belt to Sharpe, 5 September 1756, in William H. Browne, et.al. eds., Archives of Maryland 72 Vols.(Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1888), Vol. VI., pp. 479-480; Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 21 August 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 434. After serving in a leadership position for six years, Joshua Beall's accumulated frustrations are illuminated in a letter written to the governor concerning the draft. Beall stated, "I have Ever Endeavoured to do Everything in my power for the good of the American cause and shall While I am able, continue to do so, But really people differ so much in opinion, Especially in matters that concern themselves & their own connection, in which they are very apt to ingrosse [sic] to themselves the sole right of judging that a man had almost as well be a pack horse as a Lieut of a County."

[3]David C. Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy, p. 156. Skaggs dismisses the colonial militia in a few lines, referring only to its "demise" at the end of the French and Indian War. He believes that the Maryland Convention abandoned the old militia because many of the officers could not be trusted; however, a significant number of men who served as officers during the provincial era surface again as officers during the Revolution. Barry W. Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War," p. 12. Fowle states that "the Revolutionary militia was not the same organization as the old colonial-era militia." Fowle bases his belief on John Shy's comment that "the colonial militia did not simply slide smoothly into the Revolution." John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, p. 174. Fowle's problem seems to be that he cannot differentiate between Shy's blanket-appraisal of the colonial militia and that of Maryland's in particular. If the Revolutionary-era militia in Maryland is compared to that of its colonial predecessor, it may appear on first examination that those officers who held command positions in both organizations would seem to have been a rather small number. However, the shrinkage is probably a result of the massive mobilization caused by the Convention's

requirement that all men enroll in the militia. Fowle's astonishment at the 1777 militia regulations that called for set training days, fines for absenteeism and misbehavior indicates his failure to adequately research the colonial-era militia. Had he done so, he would have found a remarkable similarity between those laws that regulated the provincial militia and those of the Revolutionary militia. For a view which argues against Shy and Fowle's beliefs, see Clarence Clendenen, "A Little Known Period of American Military History," Military Analysis of the Revolutionary War, Editors of Military Affairs (Millwood: KTO Press, 1977).

[4]"An Act for Regulating the militia of the Province of Maryland," Archives of Maryland, Vol. LXX, pp. 452-462; State Papers [MdHR 4543-2], Liber GR, Folio 91, "An Act to Regulate the Militia, June 1777, Maryland Hall of Records, Annapolis, Maryland (hereafter referred to as MHR). A comparison of the two documents reveals a surprising degree of similarity which seems to indicate the popular party's reluctance to abandon the familiar for regulations of a more radical nature.

[5]"An Act for Military Discipline," Archives of Marlyand, Vol. I, p. 77; and L.D. Scisco, "Evolution of the Militia in Maryland," Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXV(1940) p. 166.

[6]"An Act for Military Discipline," Archives of Maryland, Vol. I, p. 78.

[7]Ibid, pp. 77-78.

[8]Ibid, p. 77-78; James McSherry, History of Maryland, p. 38-39; "An Act For an Expedition Against the Indians," Archives of Maryland, Vol. I, p. 197; "An Act Concerning the Leavying of Warre within the Province," Archives of Maryland, Vol.I, p. 302.

[9]Charles Albro Barker, The Background of the Revolution in Maryland (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940; repr., New York: Archon Book, 1967) pp. 1-26; McSherry, History of Maryland, p. 45.

[10]Mc Sherry, History of Maryland, p. 66; Whittington B. Johnson, "The Origin and Nature of African Slavery in Seventeenth Century Maryland," Maryland Historical Magazine, 73(1978):43., quoting United States Bureau of the Census Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington D.C., 1960) p. 756., The Bureau of Census lists a figure less than Mc Sherry's. Johnson shows a total population of 8426 in 1660 which includes both Africans and whites.

[11]Aubrey C. Land, Colonial Maryland: A History (Millwood: KTO Press, 1981), p. 330; McSherry, History of Maryland, p. 66; Kenneth Lockridge, "Social Change and the Meaning of the American Revolution," Stanley N. Katz, ed., Essays in Politics and Social Development: Colonial America (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1976), p. 493.

[12]"Instructions Directed by the Governor and Council to the Several Captains of the Respective Trained Bands," Archives of Maryland, Vol. III, p. 345.

[13]Archives of Maryland, Vol.I, p. 77-78; "An Act for Regulating the Militia of the Province of Maryland," Archives of Maryland, Vol. LII, p. 460; State Papers [MdHR 4584-102], Joshua Beall to Field Officers, 28 July 1778, MHR. Regarding the militia's ill-discipline, Beall blamed much of his dissatisfaction with its behavior on the "Vile Wretches" who were selling liquor to the rank and file.

[14]Aubrey C. Land, "Economic Base and Social Stucture: The Northern Chesapeake in the Eighteenth Century," Gary B. Nash, ed., Class and Society in Early America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970), p. 127. Using estate records, Land discusses the dispersion of wealth through Maryland from the end of the seventeenth century through the Revolutionary years. As the eighteenth century progressed, the stratification which was barely noticeable in the latter years of the seventeenth, became more pronounced with a large growth in what would be considered the middle class, along with a smaller increase in the upper class. Land's findings seem to corroborate Kenneth Lockridge's theory that society in the seventeenth century was extremely homogenous. Kenneth Lockridge, "Social Change and the Meaning of the American Revolution," Stanley N. Katz, ed., Essays in Politics and Social Development: Colonial America (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1976), p. 490; "An act for the ordering and Regulateing the militia of this Province & for the better Security & defence thereof," Archives of Maryland, Vol. VII. pp. 189-190; Whittington B. Johnson, "The Origin and Nature of African

Slavery in Seventeenth Century Maryland," pp. 236-237. Johnson's findings seem to be corroborated by T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes, Myne Owne Ground: Race and Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). Robert J. Brugger, Maryland: A Middle Temperment, 1634-1980 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), pp. 45-48.

[15]Johnson, "The Origin and Nature of African Slavery in Seventeenth Century Maryland," p. 42.

[16]"A Supplementary Act to the Act for the Ordering and Regulating the Militia of this Province, for the better Defence and Security thereof," Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXVII, p.118.

[17]Land, Colonial Maryland, p. 164.

[18]Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 197-198.

[19]Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States: 1775-1783, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1973), p. 23.

[20]"An Order of the General Assembly for the defence of the Province as the present times will permitt," Archives of Maryland, VoL. I, p. 253.

[21]"Instructions directed by the Governor and Counceil to the Severall Captaines & the respective trained Bandes to be sent with theyr Commissions", 15 June 1658, Archives of Maryland, Vol. III, p. 345.

[22]Ibid, pp. 344-345; Edward C. Papenfuse, Alan F. Day, David W. Jordan, and Gregory Stiverson, A Biographical Dictionary of the Maryland Legislature, 1635-1789 2 Vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979) Vol. 1, pp. 306-313.

[23]"An Act for the ordering and Regulateing the militia of this Province & for the better security and defence thereof", Archives of Maryland, Vol. VII, pp. 189-190.

[24]Ibid, pp. 189-190; Aubrey C. Land, "Economic Base and Social Structure: The Northern Chesapeake in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 120-121.

[25]"An Act for the ordering and Regulateing the militia of this Province & for the better security and defence thereof," Archives of Maryland, Vol. VII, pp. 189-190. "An Act for the Ordering and Regulating the Militia of the Province for the better defence and Security thereof," 4 June 1692, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XIII, pp. 556.

[26]Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXIII, p. 204. Among the items listed in the returns of arms and equipment, are a number of books for the intended use of the officers for training purposes. In his return Colonel Casper A. Herman listed, "2 Bookes Called the Duties of Man, 2 Bookes of Common Prayer, 2 Bookes of Church Catechism, 2 Bookes of Christian Religion, 2 Bookes of Marshall Discipline, 3 Bookes of the Articles of Warr."

[27]"An Act appointing a fee for the Serjeants of the Trayned Band, " Archives of Maryland, Vol. I. p. 159; "An Act for the Muster Master Generalls ffee," Archives of Maryland, Vol. I, p. 292; "An Order of the Assembly for the defence of the Province as the present times will permitt," Archives of Maryland, Vol. I, p. 253. According to the act, all freemen within the hundreds were ordered to gather during the last three days of the months of April through September and propose and enact all laws they thought necessary for the defense of their hundred for the following month. The laws were to be passed by voice vote and it was the duty of the commanding officer to execute them. Since there was no mention pertaining to training, it can be assumed that the men were to decide for themselves the method by which it was to be accomplished.

[28]"An Act for Military Discipline," April-May 1661, Archives of Maryland, Vol. I, p. 412.

[29]By His Excellency the Governor and Council, 15 August 1696, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XX, p. 474; Order to the Colonels to see their Troops, 16 December 1696, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XX, p. 535; Council Meeting, 5 June 1697, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XX, p. 585.

[30]Report of Committee of Laws, 13 May 1701, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXIV, p. 178; The spelling and punctuation errors are as found in the original document.

[31]Ibid, pp. 178-79; The spelling and gramatical errors are as found in the document.

[32]By the Upper House of the Assembly, 22 July 1721, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXIV, p. 133; By the Lower House of the Assembly, 24 July 1721, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXIV, p. 135; Governor to the Upper House, 3 August 1732, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXVII, p. 422.

[33]Governor to the Lower House of the Assembly, 2 June 1740, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XL. p. 511. By the Upper House of the Assembly, 5 August 1732, Archives of Maryland, Vol XXXVII, p. 432; To His Excellency Thomas Bladen, 3 May 1744, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XLII, p. 510.

[34]Brugger, Maryland, p. 33; Council Meeting, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXIII, pp. 248-249.

[35]"An Act for the Ordering and Regulateing the militia of this Province & for the better Security and defence thereof," Archives of Maryland, Vol. VII, p. 194.

[36]Ibid, p. 194; "An Act for the Ordering and Regulating the militia of the Province for the better Security and defence thereof," 4 June 1692, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XIII, p. 555.

[37]Council Meeting, 11 April 1693, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VIII, p. 519

[38]Colonel Warrens Account and List of Armes, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XX, pp. 206-207. Council Meeting, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXIII, p. 249.

[39]At a Conference held at George Neilsons on Friday the 23rd Day of March Anno Domini 1732, 23 March 1732, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXVIII, p. 14; "An Act for Regulating the militia of the Province of Maryland," 22 May 1756, Archives of Maryland, Vol. LII, pp. 452-453.

[40]Barker, The Background of the Revolution in Maryland pp. 129, 144, 215; Land, "Economic Base and Social Structure: The Northern Chesapeake in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 126-127; Tommy R. Thompson, "Personal Indebtedness in Revolutionary Maryland," Maryland Historical Magazine 73(1978): 13-25.

[41]Main, The Sovereign States, pp. 120-121.

[42]Barker, The Background of the Revolution in Maryland, pp. 214-216.

[43]Ibid, pp. 233-234.

[44]Ibid, pp. 234-238; Land, Colonial Maryland, pp. 208-209.

[45]Paul H. Giddens, "The French and Indian War in Maryland, 1753 to 1756," Maryland Historical Magazine 30(1935):282-283. Aubrey C. Land, Colonial Maryland: A History, pp. 211-213. As Land points out, Sharpe did have a military background, and in the months before Braddock's expedition had been placed in charge of military operations, although his plans to launch an offensive against the French went awry through the political difficulties of Maryland, Virginia, and other colonies that had promised men and supplies.

[46]Paul H. Giddens, "The French and Indian War in Maryland, 1753 to 1756," pp. 288-289. Barker, The Background of the Revolution in Maryland, pp. 239-241.

[47]Barker, The Background of the Revolution in Maryland, p. 244. Archives of Maryland, Vol. LV, pp. xliv-l.

[48]Council Meeting, 23 August 1756, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, pp. 143-144; Sharpe to Baltimore, 12 June 1755, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI, pp. 223-224; Sharpe to Braddock, 24 May 1755, Archives of Maryland Vol. VI, p. 211.

[49]Sharpe to Orme, 9 July 1755, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI, p. 243.

[50]Sharpe to Calvert, 5 October 1756, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI. p. 491.

[51]Sharpe to Loudon, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI, p. 91.

[52]Giddens, "The French and Indian War in Maryland, 1753 to 1756," pp. 289-290. Giddens points out that many Marylanders viewed the dispute as a disagreement between the Proprietor and Virginia as to who should possess the lands in the Ohio Valley. Since the Proprietor stood to gain the most personally, many felt that they should take no part in the war.

[53]Sharpe to Albermarle, 23 July 1755, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI, pp. 257-258; Sharpe to Calvert, 9 July 1755, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI, pp. 240-241.

[54]Paul H. Giddens, "The French and Indian War in Maryland, 1753 to 1756," pp. 308-309; Hall to Sharpe, 5 September 1756, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI, pp. 478-479.

[55]Sharpe to Stanwix, 27 June 1756, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, p. 30. Sharpe to Stanwix, 17 December 1757, Archives of Maryland, Vol IX, pp. 109-110.

[56]Sharpe to Belt, 30 August 1756, Archives of Maryland, Vol. VI, pp. 474-475.

[57]Maryland Gazette, 4 November 1756; 9 December 1756.

[58]Sharpe to Calvert, 26 December 1757, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, pp. 118-119.

[59]Ibid, pp. 118-119; Sharpe to Calvert, 9 November 1757 Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, pp. 99-101, Sharpe to Stanwix, 15 November 1757, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, pp. 102-103.

[60]Sharpe to William Sharpe, 1 January 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, p. 125.

[61]Peregrin Brown to Sharpe, 18 January 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, p. 255; Sharpe to Brown, 25 January 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, pp. 136-137.

[62]Ibid, pp.136-137.

[63]LLoyd to Sharpe, 18 January 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX p. 132; LLoyd to Sharpe, 27 February 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, pp. 262-263.

[64]Coburn to Thomas Chandler, 18 January 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, pp. 256-257.

[65]Council Meeting, 1 May 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, pp. 283-289.

[66]Sharpe to Loudon, 2 March 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, p. 141.

[67]Maryland Gazette, 18 May 1758. Archives of Maryland, Vol. LV, pp. xxxviii-xxxix; Sharpe to St. Clair, 31 May 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, p. 193.

[68]Sharpe to Tasker, 29 June 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, p. 216.

[69]Sharpe to Council, 28 July 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, p. 291; Council Meeting, 7 August 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, p. 292.

[70].Sharpe to Baltimore, 3 November 1758, Archives of Maryland, Vol. IX, p. 350.

[71]Sharpe to Egremont, 25 April 1762, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, p. 47; Sharpe to Calvert, 28 December 1763, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XXXI, pp. 124-125.

CHAPTER III

POLITICIANS AND OFFICERS

The conclusion of the French and Indian War did nothing to end the political turmoil within Maryland. If anything, the struggle became more intense as a depression in the tobacco and wheat markets and a resulting crisis in credit crippled the provincial economy. Exacerbating the problem were Great Britain's mercantilist policies which, in the eyes of many, seemed to hamper any chance for an economic recovery. Taking advantage of the situation in 1773 for its own ends, the popular party, successor to the old country party, was able to weaken the power of its nemesis, the court party. Attempting to ease Maryland's financial crisis in the face of a declining tobacco market, the lower house was able to force a compromise with the upper house and governor. Out of the compromise came a tobacco inspection act that lacked the fees which had normally gone to fill the coffers of the Proprietor and his placemen. Although the measure

helped to enhance its position among the populace and weaken the court party's stranglehold on power, the popular party's campaign to gain control of the political apparatus in Maryland was by no means complete.[1]

Composed of a coalition of wealthy planters and merchants who formed what Ronald B. Hoffman calls the "Baltimore-Annapolis axis," the popular party sought, as its primary goal, "political power at home and control over the colony's economic destiny." However, as Hoffman points out, in order to achieve this goal, unanimity among the popular party was imperative. The coalition of merchants and planters had banded together successfully during the Stamp Act crisis and then again in the confrontation over the tobacco inspection fee, but as the colonial crisis with Britain worsened, the party's unanimity began to erode. Within the popular party a more radical faction emerged seeking to enlarge the political fortunes of the men who were its leaders.[2]

Led by John Hall, Mathias Hammond, and his brother Rezin, the radical faction began calling for measures that many of the party's more conservative members feared would split the coalition of planters and merchants. Their fears became warranted at a town meeting held in Annapolis on 25 May 1774. At the meeting which was convened to discuss a letter from the Boston Committee of Correspondence concerning the Boston Port Act, the leadership of the

popular party, represented by Samuel Chase, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, and William Paca, found themselves forced by the Hall-Hammond faction to resort to more radical rhetoric in order to maintain control over the proceedings. As a result, a measure was passed by the gathering which demanded that lawyers refrain from prosecuting cases involving the collection of debts owed to British creditors.[3]

The passage of the measure found favor among some who owed British merchants and factors, but others were alarmed over the possibility that it would permanently damage the credit of the province. As the situation in the colonies worsened and the Hall-Hammond faction called for even more radical measures, the leadership of the popular party became more alarmed at the possible consequences. Hoffman believes much of the leadership's fear was centered less on ideology and more on the threat the Hall-Hammond faction posed to its own personal aggrandizement. Many of the popular party's leaders earnestly hoped for a rapprochement with the governor, Sir Robert Eden, and in doing so to gain appointment to the lucrative offices and positions which the Proprietor's placemen had formerly enjoyed. The radical position of the Hall-Hammond faction constituted a real threat to this goal.[4]

In addition to creating a public venue for the Hall-Hammond faction, the letter from the Boston Committee of Correspondence denouncing the Intolerable Acts was responsible for the creation of Maryland's Provincial Convention. After the meeting held in Annapolis in May 1774, meetings in other counties throughout the province were convened to discuss the situation in Boston. Acting on the Massachusetts committee's recommendations, delegates were chosen to attend a provincial convention. The chief task of the convention was to select representatives for the proposed Continental Congress to be held in Philadelphia. For the leadership of the popular party, the creation of the convention proved to be a boon as the county elections gave them an overwhelming majority of the delegates.[5]

Following the session of the Continental Congress, the Maryland Convention met again in November 1774 to deliberate on the resolves passed in Philadelphia. The timing of the Convention session was a fortuitous one for the conservative membership of the popular party. With Governor Eden tending to personal matters outside of the province and the assembly prorogued, the Convention constituted "the only representative body in the province at the time." The governor's absence and the lack of any other effective governmental organ made the extra-legal Convention's usurpation of Maryland's political powers

seemingly an easier task. Thus, the November session of the Convention appears to have been the climax to the political Revolution in Maryland. From this point on, with the conservative wing dominating Maryland's political apparatus, the primary objective for the popular party became the maintenance of its control and the elimination of any opposition.[6]

Deliberating over the articles of the Continental Association, the Provincial Convention adopted a series of resolutions which established the machinery for enforcing the non-importation agreement. At the same time, the resolutions effectively gave the extra-legal Convention the necessary means for assuming all political and economic control over the province. Issued in December 1774, the resolutions curtailed the butchering of lambs to increase wool production and sought to increase domestic production of linen and other textiles by encouraging farmers to plant flax, hemp, and cotton. To forestall profiteering from expected shortages, the Convention fixed ceilings on prices and interest rates. Local enforcement of the resolutions was vested in Committees of Observation which were to operate in each of the counties. The most curious of the resolutions however, was the call for Maryland's inhabitants to enroll themselves into companies of militia.[7]

In the absence of any record of the debates within the Convention's sessions, there can be only speculation as to why the delegates felt it necessary to embody the militia. Possibly because of the ambiguous language contained in the resolves, opinions among historians have varied. Herbert Klingelhofer has suggested that the Convention intended to use the militia as a means of usurping the governor's appointive powers. David C. Skaggs believes that possibly the delegates hoped the embodiment of the militia would prevent any further acts of civil violence, as exemplified by the burning of the Peggy Stewart. Other historians, such as Robert J. Brugger, have suggested that the militia was embodied to react to any threats of British invasion. Barry Fowle, in his study of the Maryland militia, believes the Convention's call was a "conscious process of preparation for revolution." While all of the above reasons have a distinct degree of plausibility, at the same time they also contain certain weaknesses.[8]

Klinglehofer's assertion that the Convention sought to use the militia as a means of assuming the governor's appointive powers fails to address the Convention's directive that the individual companies were to select their own officers. With only a skeletal structure, the militia was, at this point, devoid of any appointive positions. In regard to the militia, the

Convention did not assume appointive powers until the militia was reorganized in July 1775. While Skaggs's belief that the embodiment of a military force could have been used as a preventative for civil disturbances has distinct possibilities, the use of the militia as a constabulary force had very few precedents in Maryland's history and none that met with any high degree of success. In light of the militia's rather dubious past, it seems hardly likely that it could have effectively operated as a civil peacekeeping force. In fact, with the exception of a riot in Baltimore during the first months of 1775, the militia appears to have created more civil disturbances than it prevented.[9]

Brugger's thought that the militia was established to watch for and defend against any British designs to invade the province does not appear as a valid argument due to Sir Robert Eden's presence in Maryland as governor. Eden's belief that any crisis within Maryland could be alleviated through conciliation seems to have been met with a certain amount of approbation by the British government. In addition, if Hoffman's assertion holds true that the leadership of the popular party hoped to increase its own personal standing in Maryland by

effecting a rapprochement with the governor, it would seem reasonable to assume that if the Convention's call to arms had been a vigorous one it could have obviated their desires, by escalating tensions even further.[10]

Maryland's continued reluctance to join the ranks of those colonies wishing for independence seems to counter Fowle's argument that the 1774 resolution was a preparation for open revolt. Until just prior to the Declaration of Independence, the Convention's most fervent hope was that a reconciliation with Great Britain could be achieved. By maintaining its moderate stance, the popular party had everything to gain and little to lose if the situation was resolved peacefully. With a redress of the colonies' grievances, the party's goals of political and economic control of the province stood a better chance of realization. In the face of Maryland's deteriorating economy, any relaxation of Britain's mercantilist policies would have given the popular party an increased standing among the voters of Maryland, while refraining from any radical appeals for revolt or independence would have enhanced the party leadership's stature with the governor. Additionally, it seems unlikely that the merchants and planters of the popular party would not have understood that an open revolt would bring with it the British fleet which would have had the effect of curtailing trade even more.[11]

A stronger possibility would appear to be that the conservatives who controlled the Convention sought to use the militia in the same capacity that it had been used during the French and Indian War. As had been the case with the Still Pond incident, the militia, if properly organized could prove to be a potent political tool operating at the grass roots level. Although there had been an outcry in Maryland against the actions of the British in Boston, the leaders of the popular party had to be aware that not all of Maryland's citizens supported either the colonial cause or the popular party's assumption of political power through extra-legal means. With the embodiment of a large organization functioning at the local level and centered on those "gentlemen, freeholders, and other freemen" who could be trusted, it would seem that the popular party had the means at its disposal to generate support for its position while keeping the more radical elements in check.[12]

Rather than being a statement of revolutionary intent, the resolutions seem to indicate the popular party's desire to find a means to consolidate their hold on political power in Maryland regardless of how the crisis was resolved. The popular party's quest for power regardless of how the crisis with Britain was resolved becomes more readily apparent in the ambiguous language of the resolutions themselves. In a resolution that appears

at first glance designed to court the favor of Maryland's radicals, the Convention vowed that it would assist any colony that faced armed attempts by the British to enforce the taxation measures of Parliament. Yet, at the same time, the Convention was careful to avoid articulating the manner in which the assistance would be rendered. Additionally, the Convention managed to veer away from taking an explicitly radical stance in its justification for the embodiment of the militia. Rather than infusing the request for the formation of militia companies with revolutionary dogma, the popular party, instead, invoked the standard Whig rhetoric and claimed that it was calling on the militia in order to "obviate the pretense for taxing" the province for protection or defense.[13]

Again, it appears that if the situation in the colonies got out of hand and enough support for the cause in Maryland was evident, the popular party had placed itself in the best position to assume political control. However, if the crisis was resolved through redress and reconciliation, the moderation expressed in the Convention's justification for the militia's presence could have been enough to keep the popular party in the good graces of the governor and the crown, thereby increasing the popular party's chances for at least a modicum of political power in the future.

The popular party's attempt to maintain its power despite any turn of events additionally appears reflected in the organizational structure of the militia as adopted in the December resolutions. Simply stated, the resolution authorizing the militia urged all "gentlemen, freeholders and other freemen" between the ages of sixteen and fifty to form companies at a strength of sixty-eight men. Of this number, the companies were authorized to have four non-commissioned officers and one drummer. The companies were to be commanded by four officers who were to be chosen by the men. The only other requirements for these militia companies called for the men to provide themselves with their own arms and equipment and to "use their utmost endeavors to make themselves masters of the military exercize."[14]

As it was organized, the militia was radically different from anything that had preceded it in the colonial period as well as from any organizational structure that would follow. Most notably lacking was any comprehensive chain-of-command that could have tied the various companies together. If Maryland had been attacked in the first months of 1775, the militia, as the Convention had organized it could not have mounted any form of a concerted defense. While it may seem reasonable to attribute the Convention's oversight to a degree of military naivete, it must be noted that approximately half of the delegates had been either

militia officers themselves, or were related to men with military backgrounds. A more plausible explanation for the weak structure is that the delegates believed the militia would never be employed as a military force. Instead, believing that the differences with Britain could still be reconciled, it is possible that the popular party hoped that the militia would serve as a political pressure group working the will of the popular party from the top down. If indeed this was the case, the delegates must have been a frustrated group during the first months of 1775.[15]

In the first weeks following the issuance of the resolutions, the Maryland Gazette trumpeted the activities occurring throughout the province. According to the Committee of Observation in Prince George's County, the belief existed that ten companies could be formed, although, a meeting scheduled during the first weeks of January had to be postponed due to a poor turnout. A report from Annapolis proudly hailed the formation of two companies of militia, but silence seems to have prevailed throughout the rest of the province. Judging by the records, there is little to indicate the formation of very many companies within the other counties of Maryland.[16]

If the apparent lack of zeal for militia service demonstrated by the inhabitants did not provoke much anxiety among the delegates, possibly the actions of some of the Committees of Observation did. Because the Convention was an extra-legal body, it could not raise through taxation the funds necessary to supply the militia with arms and equipment. Instead, the delegates decided to resort to voluntary subscriptions with quotas established for each county. Unfortunately for the popular party's leadership, some of the more zealous supporters in the various counties demanded that the subscriptions be used as a test of loyalty to the cause.[17]

At a meeting of the Charles County Committee of Observation chaired by George Dent, subscriptions were opened to all freemen of the county. Collectors were chosen at the meeting and instructed to keep a list of those residents who failed to subscribe in order that their names might be "recorded in perpetual memory." In Ann Arundel county, the Committee went a step beyond just recording the names in "perpetual memory" and called for the names of all non-subscribers to be published in the Maryland Gazette. In addition, the Ann Arundel Committee branded anyone who refused to subscribe as an "enemy to America." Action of this type must have done little to draw a wider array of support for the cause and inspire few but the more radical to align themselves with the Convention.

In fact, the outrage exhibited by many found its way onto the pages of the Maryland Gazette, as the paper was deluged with letters and queries in opposition to the action taken by the Ann Arundel Committee.[18]

Throughout the spring of 1775, while those militia companies that had formed struggled to make themselves "masters of the military exercize," conditions in the province and the colonies worsened. Finding his power in Maryland slipping into the hands of the Convention, Governor Eden attempted to regain control of the local governments by appointing new magistrates and attempting to raise a military force to oppose the Convention. Although both measures failed to achieve their purpose, they did succeed in exposing the divisions of loyalty in Maryland. The combined presence within Maryland of a population segment loyal to the crown and another which can be labeled as neutral in sentiment had a direct effect on the Convention's leadership style. With their personal, political, and economic goals at stake, the dominant conservative membership of the popular party became more reactive.[19]

After the war began in April 1775, the Convention found itself faced with a conundrum. With public opinion becoming sharply divided, the popular party had to find ways of attracting those who were neutral in sentiment, appeasing the already faithful, minimizing the activities

of the loyalists, and at the same time bringing its own goals to fruition. Added to the difficulties already facing it within Maryland, the popular party had to answer the demands placed upon the province by the Continental Congress and the fledgling Continental army. Perhaps, if Maryland had been the scene of a protracted military campaign the Convention might have been forced to take a more decisive stand. However, as Maryland remained primarily a back-water throughout the war, the Convention, and later the state government, consistently reacted to crises within Maryland in a confused and sometimes contradictory manner. Nowhere was this reactive tendency more evident than in the government's handling of the militia.[20]

Acting on the advice of the Continental Congress to bolster the provincial defenses, the skeletal framework of the Maryland militia was given flesh when the Convention passed the "Association of the Freemen of Maryland" in July 1775. In accordance with the recommendations proposed by Congress, the Convention organized Maryland's military forces into a two-tier structure. In addition to the militia, forty companies of minutemen were authorized. The minute companies were to be composed of volunteers and function as a quasi-force of regulars, responding to any emergency that might arise within the province. More importantly, in addition to intra-state duties, the minute companies were authorized to perform service outside of

Maryland. The provision allowing the minute companies to operate outside the province temporarily corrected the traditional limitation placed on the militia which had been so vexatious to Governor Horatio Sharpe during the French and Indian War.[21]

The ease with which the Convention assented to the presence in Maryland of a military organization, in some ways resembling a standing army, appears to indicate how quickly Whig doctrine could be jettisoned when self-interest seemed threatened. Obviously, political theory and principles became secondary to more practical considerations when self-preservation was at stake. This rejection of Whig theory becomes much clearer when the minute companies were eliminated in March 1776 and replaced with independent companies of state troops. The presence of a regular military force obviously gave the Convention more muscle behind its tenuous claims to authority and indicates the delegates gave at least a passing recognition to the inherent weaknesses that had been traditionally associated with the militia.[22]

The Convention's decision to establish the minute companies did not mean that the militia was without a role in the crisis, but it does appear that the role given to it at first was not considered to be primarily a military one. More than anything, the Convention appears to have seen the militia fulfilling the political function that

it was ascribed in the resolutions of the previous December. Moving a step beyond the recommendation that all able-bodied "gentlemen, freeholders, and other freemen" form into companies, the "Association of Freemen" made enrollment into the militia compulsory. Those who refused to do so were to be noted by the local Committees of Observation. Not only does the requirement to enroll appear to be a means of expanding and solidifying the local political support for the cause, it can also be viewed as a blatant attempt on the part of the Convention to identify and isolate those who were in opposition.[23]

Despite the resolute tone of the Convention, the measure concerning the disposition of non-enrollers displayed the first glimmer of the popular party's irresolute behavior that would plague Maryland throughout the war. Although non-enrollers were to be identified by the local committees, exactly what their fate was to be was left unclear. In the "Association of Freemen," the Convention hedged on the issue simply stating that "no further proceedings or measures shall be taken, but by the future order of the convention."[24]

In December, 1775, the Convention heard the case of Robert Buchanan, a resident of Kent County who had refused to enroll in the militia. According to the Committee of Observation for Kent County, not only had Buchanan refused to enroll, he also had encouraged others

to follow his example. Brought before the committee, Buchanan remained silent during the proceedings, believing himself to be "not well treated" at the time. For his silence, his case was referred to the Convention. Rather than pass a harsh sentence for his behavior, the Convention merely censured Buchanan. In its censure, the Convention told Buchanan that if he disagreed with the resolution concerning enrollment, he should have submitted a petition requesting that the next session of the Convention amend the regulation. In the interim, according to the Convention, Buchanan should have just abided by the enrollment policy instead of agitating against it.[25]

When the militia regulations were amended again in January 1776, the Convention tried to clarify its position by ordering all non-enrollers to be fined forty shillings current money, and subjecting them to confiscation of their personal firearms. Although the Convention appeared to be taking a stronger stand on the matter, in actual practice it continued to equivocate in its enforcement of the policy. The Convention set 1 March 1776 as a deadline for all persons not already enrolled to do so and advertised the announcement in the Maryland Gazette. However, the news failed to reach the Talbot County Committee of Observation until 3 March. When the

committee's chairman, James Lloyd Chamberlaine, asked the Council of Safety if Talbot County should proceed with levying fines and confiscating arms, the Council of Safety responded that

> not allowing those in your county that may hesitate to enroll some Time to consider the Alternative would be treating them with too much rigour.26

The Council of Safety moved the deadline to 5 April believing that the extension would give the non-enrollers "sufficient time and Lenity." Although the Council made the decision to extend the time for non-enrollers to comply, acting in the absence of the Convention, the Council believed that its decision to allow for an extension would meet with the Convention's approval.[27]

There can be little doubt that the irresolute behavior of the Convention can be viewed as prudent when faced with a growing tendency among the population toward dissent. In light of the Convention's actions, certain questions can be raised concerning the motivation behind its actions. Was the Convention's prudence the result of an enlightened attitude on the part of the delegates or was it just a politically sound approach at a time of uncertainty? Given the delegates' social and economic standing in the province, the popular party's goals of attaining political and economic control in Maryland, and the party leadership's hopes for reconciliation, it would

appear that the prudence of the Convention's actions regarding non-enrollers was just another means of attempting to consolidate its hold on power regardless of which way the situation in the colonies went.

In its irresolute handling of the question concerning non-enrollers, if reconciliation could not be accomplished then the Convention's lenience could attract a sizable proportion of those who remained neutral. However, if a reconciliation with the crown was achieved then the popular party's moderation possibly could have been used to attract a large following to restore its position of political influence in any future government. In any case, as the war intensified, the Convention's continued hesitance to strictly enforce its policy concerning non-enrollers created more dissent than it prevented, especially in the militia.

By the end of the year, the time and lenience accorded non-enrollers had infuriated some of the militia companies. At a meeting of the Baltimore Committee in November 1776, it was noted with some degree of alarm that the militia was threatening to lay down its arms unless the fines of those "who daily insult them" were collected. If the popular party was trying to strengthen its position by appealing to reason from those on all sides, it failed

miserably. Instead, the popular party had managed to offend those who were charged with carrying out the will of the Convention while at the same time failing to gain the support of those who were in opposition.[28]

Judging by the changes wrought on the militia structure throughout 1775 and 1776, it appears that the Convention saw the officer corps as the means to maintain a degree of political and social control over the militia. As it was first regulated, officers only existed at the company level, and in a radical departure from tradition, the officers were to be elected by the men. Apparently, by doing so, the Convention presumed, as David C. Skaggs points out, that the men would fall in line with the notion of social deference and elect their "betters." If this was the case, then it can be assumed that the popular party believed the regulation to allow the popular election of company officers would fulfill two purposes. First of all, if deference was followed, then the most influential and zealous would exercise control over the companies, and secondly, the concession to a degree of self-determination, miniscule as it was, might attract those who were only luke-warm in their support. As with the other decisions made by the Convention during the first year of the war, it appears that the popular party was trying to anticipate any turn of events in the crisis with their own self-interest in mind. If the war came or if

a reconciliation with Great Britain resolved the crisis, in either case the popular party would appear as the guarantors and promoters of the people's civil liberties.[29]

If indeed the leadership of the popular party was hoping to consolidate its position regardless of which way events in the colonies turned, then it makes a degree of sense why the Convention opted to keep the provision for the election of officers when the "Association of Freemen" was passed in July 1776. However, compulsory enrollment meant also that the militia's ranks would be filled with a sizable number of men whose support might best be considered to be doubtful. In response, the Convention had to find a means to increase both its provincial as well as local control over the militia. The establishment of a staff of battalion field officers, selected in the traditional manner by political appointment, answered the need.[30]

Each battalion was placed under the command of a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, two majors, an adjutant, and a quartermaster. Field officers were appointed by the Convention on recommendation by the local Committees of Observation. In most of the cases, the plan seemed to conform to expectations. Command of the battalions went to such men as Joshua Beall, James Murray, and Richard T. Earle who came from among the most prominent families within their respective counties. Others, such as Richard

Lloyd, Benjamin MacKall IV, and Robert T. Hooe, served as delegates to the Convention at the same time they held commissions in the militia. The fact that the command of the militia was placed in the hands of those who supported the popular party's more conservative faction does not seem to have been accidental. Elections had been held by the Convention as a means of determining who would serve as field officers in the various battalions. By proceeding in this manner, the more conservative elements of the Convention were able to prevail over the radicals, thus denying the Hall-Hammond faction the possibility of exercising a large measure of control over the militia. However, as early as November 1775, the system began to show signs of deterioration.[31]

Some of the militia's deterioration was directly attributable to the creation of the Continental army. Those officers who were probably among the most ardent supporters of the war and the popular party, as well as possessing the greatest leadership potential, left the militia for what must have appeared to them a greater opportunity for achieving some measure of glory. Relegated to a lower military status and filled with a large proportion of men among the rank and file who did not necessarily share the zeal for the cause, the Maryland militia probably held little opportunity for any significant advancement in the eyes of some. For others, after

independence was declared, an apprehension of more lucrative rewards in the state government may have been enough to lure them away. In addition, the fractiousness within the militia seems to have caused some officers to resign out of a sense of frustration. With the loss of a significant number of men of quality to other more lofty pursuits, over the course of the war the door was opened for those ambitious men of a lower social rank to seek what they perceived to be their best opportunity for advancement. In the process, the officer corps was eroded further as a result of an increase in politicization caused by the factional disputes among the popular party. Consequentially, the politicization only served to exacerbate the dissension that was becoming rampant throughout the militia.[32]

As new battalions were formed and vacancies appeared in the older ones, the rivalries for the few positions open became intense. According to the militia laws, field officers were nominated by the Committees of Observation and the nominations were either accepted or rejected by the vote of the Convention or in its absence, the Council of Safety. After independence was declared, the process was changed so that approval was made by the governor and his council. In theory, the process seemed to guarantee that the positions would go to an elite group of men whose sympathies lay with the popular party; however,

in practice the process was a little less orthodox than the laws seem to indicate. The committees of observation and later the county lieutenants, who superseded the committees in 1777, often relied on the advice of the battalion commanders in order to make their recommendations. In turn, the battalion commanders deemed it prudent to seek the approval of their company commanders before making any choices and tendering them to the committees. This chain of events opened the way for some officers to attempt to move up in the ranks by soliciting the votes and approval of the men. In the process, many battalions split into factions, thus destroying any hopes for cohesion and further compromising the military as well as the political value of the militia.[33]

In the Upper Patuxent Battalion of Prince George's County, the six militia companies from "the forest" banded together in November 1775 to nominate four officers of their choosing over a slate of candidates favored by three companies from a different neighborhood. Robert Tyler objected to the nomination of only four men in the belief that the small number precluded the Council of Safety from making its decision without the benefit of any alternative choices. Although Tyler voiced his objections to the battalion during the meeting, ultimately he was ignored. Failing that, Tyler decided to petition the Council. Taking great pains in his letter to condemn those who had been

nominated for their solicitation of votes, Tyler was not above attempting to use his own influence to curry favor with the Council of Safety. Although he was included among those officers who had been polled but not nominated, Tyler, affecting what might be construed as a somewhat modest pose, told the Council that he was writing at the request of "several persons of fortune and character." Apparently Tyler achieved a measure of success from his petition, as three of the six he represented, including himself, were appointed.[34]

As the war progressed, and contention for appointments to the field officer corps became more acute, politicking for militia commissions in Prince George's County rose to a level approaching something of an art form. After William Thomas agreed to act as an adjutant for the 25th Battalion in late February, 1776, an opening was created for the appointment of someone to replace him as a major. Desiring the position for himself, Captain Andrew Beall, Sr., resigned his position as a company commander and actively launched a campaign to become the battalion's next major. Beall's efforts to solicit support from the men apparently created a considerable amount of dissension within the ranks.[35]

As the uproar intensified, Beall decided to put his case before the Council of Safety in an effort to deflect any objections that might arise from other quarters which could effectively compromise his chances. In his letter, Beall modestly claimed that he had not written the Council sooner because he had wanted to be assured that he had the "general approbation" of the men before he did so. After "waiting among the companies to take their sentiments on the matter," Beall assured the Council that he indeed had the support of the men. To further his cause, Beall noted that next to Colonel Joshua Beall, he was the most senior officer in the battalion and had always "exerted himself in defense of liberty." However, word was not long in coming to contradict Beall's appraisal of the situation.[36]

In his notification to the Council of Thomas's appointment as adjutant, Colonel Joshua Beall proceeded to apprise the Council of his interpretation of the events that were transpiring in the 25th Battalion. According to Colonel Beall, because of the contentiousness within the battalion which he believed was attributable to Andrew Beall's activities, he had called a meeting of the officers to be held on 5 March. At the meeting, a number of the officers related their belief to Colonel Beall that Andrew Beall's appointment would be viewed in a negative light by many in the battalion, and that a considerable number

of men would refuse to serve under him if he was appointed major. As a result of the meeting, Colonel Beall nominated Thomas Williams, and Richard Bennett Hall, who would later create even more dissension in the 25th Battalion, for the Council's consideration. Apparently, the Council decided in favor of Williams and a commission was filled out for him. In a letter to the Council concerning another matter, Andrew Beall voiced his bitterness over the Council's decision to commission Williams and denied that he had resigned his commission as Captain to campaign for the vacancy. Instead, in a fit of indignation, Beall cited his intense dislike for Joshua Beall as the true cause for his resignation.[37]

On the surface, as David Skaggs points out, much of the contention between officers for promotions seems to indicate that a nascent form of democracy had taken root in the militia. According to Skaggs, "the democratic voice of Maryland was heard despite accepted standards of order and status in society." Skaggs's point is correct that some form of a democratic spirit may have been present, but he fails to appreciate from where exactly the pressure for democracy was coming. It appears that the "democratic voice of Maryland" was being prompted less from the people themselves than from the radical faction and others within the popular party who wished to increase their own voice and political power. In some cases, what appears to have

been an incident caused by a ground-swell of support for ideology of self-determination may actually have been instigated by someone or some group who already was in a position of political power and was seeking more. The matter is complicated further in some cases by a number of personal differences and conflicts that were occurring simultaneously among the men of the militia.[38]

Arriving at a meeting of five militia companies in September 1776, Colonel Thomas Wright, commander of the 20th Battalion, Queen Anne's County militia, found the men drawn up in a line and being urged to choose new field officers by a Captain James O'Bryon. After nominating himself and informing the men of his qualifications, O'Bryon and three other men were summarily elected to lead the battalion. While the companies were being polled, Thomas Wright became engaged in an argument, apparently concerning the illegal nature of the election, with his cousin Turbutt Wright, who happened to be a delegate to the Convention. During the argument, some of the assembled men threatened to throw Thomas Wright over a nearby fence. Afterward, Colonel Wright lodged a complaint with the Council of Safety about the irregular proceedings that had taken place.[39]

At first glance, the incident appears to validate Skaggs's position that the militiamen harbored a strong desire for self-determination in the matter of who would lead them and at the same time demonstrated an unwillingness

on their part to submit to the dictates of the Convention. In fact, O'Bryon seems to have articulated these feelings when Wright quoted him as stating that "the business of the day was to chuse [sic] Field officers, that there was a probability of their being now gratified." Skaggs's contention that the voice of the people was making its beliefs known is based on the fact that O'Bryon and two of the others who were chosen that day were from a lower socioeconomic group than the incumbent field officers. However, a careful examination of the events surrounding the incident suggests that the pressure for change did not come from the ranks, but apparently somewhere from above. In his argument, Skaggs quotes Thomas Wright's letter to the Council stating, "The people have been induced to believe they ought not to submit to any appointments, but those made by themselves." Where Skaggs places his emphasis on the phrase "the people," it would seem more likely that the word "induced" is the key to the incident and essentially, who was it that was responsible for the inducement.[40]

In his complaint to the Council, Wright placed the blame for the incident in the hands of a few delegates from Queen Anne's County who had originally opposed the Convention's choice of field officers. According to Wright, the delegates had spread the rumor to some of their friends within the county that the Convention had promised to make

changes among the field officers more to their satisfaction, and since the changes were going to take place anyway, there was no time like the present to do so. Indeed, there had been opposition in March, when the original commissions for the battalion had been sent. In protest of the choices, a number of company-grade officers had refused to accept their own commissions when the Council had sent them to Colonel Wright. Apparently at first, Wright refrained from returning the commissions to the Council in the hopes that the officers would retreat from their refractory behavior. However, when they did not, Wright was left with no other choice than to return the commissions to the Council. After making new appointments, the Council applauded Wright's actions and chided the behavior of the protesters stating

> we cannot but flatter ourselves when they reflect seriously on the consequences which will inevitably flow from the measures they have adopted, they will no longer pursue them.[41]

In the event that the protesters did not desist from their position, the Council warned it would follow a course of "different tho' disagreeable expedients." However, for all its bluster, the Council remained noticeably quiet following O'Bryon's actions in September.[42]

If O'Bryon's defiant act of holding elections for new officers in September 1776 seems to demonstrate a democratic triumph of the lower classes over the elite, Turbutt Wright's presence at the proceedings would seem to indicate otherwise. Wright's attendance seems to confirm the suspicion that the pressure for self-determination among the dissident militia companies in Queen Anne's County was in fact being guided by some members of the county's elite who saw an opportunity to advance their own self-aggrandizing agenda. Rather than being in the vanguard of a movement for the advancement of self-determination and democratic principles, it would appear that O'Bryon and his compatriots were merely the pawns in a political maneuver that had its roots in the provincial era. The actions of Turbutt Wright and his fellow conspirators seem to be more in harmony with the actions of the country party during the French and Indian War than any innovative push to secure the rights of self-determination for the masses. If it was the intent of the popular party's leadership to employ the militia as a political pressure group to secure the sympathies of the people, then it appears that Wright and his compatriots co-opted the maneuver to gain their own ends. In doing so, Wright seems only to have succeeded in factionalizing the militia in his county and obviating the organization's ability to keep other dissident elements in the population in check.

Wright's interference in the affairs of the battalion and his detrimental effect on the unit's cohesion was confirmed by his involvement in a personal dispute with another officer. Apparently, the dispute between Wright and the other officer had blossomed in April and May of 1776. Richard Willson, who had been commissioned as a captain in January, challenged Wright to a duel after Wright had called him a coward in a public place. According to Willson, Wright also had spread rumors to the effect that Willson had acted dishonorably during a duel on the Western Shore. Wright declined Willson's challenge and during a heated exchange between the two, allegedly had boxed Willson's ears. Willson denied that Wright had boxed his ears, claiming instead that Wright had assaulted him in an ungentlemanly fashion while he attempted to take off his coat.[43]

In his perception of the affair, Wright believed that Willson's challenge was an attempt to gain the attention of the county's political leaders for the purpose of securing a commission in the regular forces. However, in a rather sarcastic reply Willson gave some indication of the animosity that existed within the 20th Battalion. Willson confirmed the fact that he had applied for a

commission in the army, but stated curtly that unfortunately, he had met with the same amount of luck that Wright's friends had in trying to secure their commissions as field officers.[44]

Although the divisive effect of political factionalism was not singular to the Queen Anne's County militia, its presence in other militia units was not always as blatant as that of the 20th Battalion. In some instances, the political in-fighting assumed a more subtle guise, and only by looking beneath the protests and memorials that were lodged by the participants can it be detected. In Ann Arundel County, Henry Ridgely, a former militia officer and veteran of the Braddock campaign, requested that the Convention relieve him of any further obligation for militia service in September 1776. After lending his assistance to the formation of militia companies throughout the Elk Ridge district, including one led by Thomas Dorsey, Ridgely found himself passed over when commissions for field officers were decided upon by the Convention. Subsequently, Ridgely enrolled in a company twenty miles away from his residence in order to avoid being "harassed by the Committee of Observation composed of Militia officers." In particular, Ridgely wanted to avoid Dorsey, who, Ridgely accused, "shamefully and cowardly quitted his post when under your Memorialists Command twenty one years ago."[45]

Lacking any other information, it would seem that Ridgely's primary opposition to Dorsey and the others was based on his perception that they lacked the proper military qualifications necessary for leading the battalion. But there are other extenuating circumstances which, seemingly, might account for Ridgely's request to be excused from militia duty. Apparently, Ridgely's son-in-law, Nicholas Worthington, and Dorsey's business partner, Samuel Chase, belonged to the opposing factions within the popular party. In fact, in the years following the war, Ridgely, as a delegate to the state legislature, aligned himself with the more radical faction. Probably, more than Dorsey's past proclivity for making precipitous retrograde maneuvers, it may have been his political affiliation which had fanned the flames of Ridgely's discontent.[46]

The irritations posed by the rampant factionalism only accounted for some of the popular party's trouble with the militia and in particular, the officer corps. Essentially, the Convention's own blundering contributed to much of the discontent. In many cases, the Convention, and later the state government has to assume the blame for the inability to use the militia primarily as a political instrument which seems to have been its original intent. If the government hoped to secure its hold on the state's political apparatus and at the same time preserve the existing social order through the militia,

it was incumbent upon the political elite to select only the most capable men to lead the militia. The necessity for doing so became more acute after the state's regular forces had departed to join Washington's army, leaving the militia as Maryland's first line of defense. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case. Consistently, the government failed to either appoint competent staff officers or provide those it did have with the requisite support necessary to carry out their duties in a competent manner.

When Colonel Joseph Sim's subordinates in the 11th Battalion resigned and the government failed to appoint replacements leaving Sim to command the battalion by himself, he tendered his resignation as well. Notifying the Council of his intent, Sim told the Council he felt the burden of serving in his present capacity was too "troublesome to continue." In the Elk Battalion of Cecil County, twenty of the company-grade officers resigned in protest after the Convention appointed William Thomas Savin to serve as a major. Expressing their displeasure, the officers stated emphatically that Savin was incapable of leading the battalion either "in or out of the field." In addition, the officers claimed that the privates steadfastly refused to exercise while he was in command.[47]

Had the delegates implemented a policy in which field officers were promoted on the basis of merit alone, the instances in which men like Savin found their way into positions of leadership may have proven to be exceptional. Unfortunately, they were not. In light of the evidence, there appears to have been no one specific determinant for the selection of field officers. As demonstrated, politics often played a large part in the decision-making process which helped to pave the way for a number of inept men to assume positions of leadership in the militia. Compounding the problem was the government's failure to follow through on the guidelines it had established for the process of nominating field officers. Although the government had charged the local committees of observation with the task of making recommendations, it had made no provision for the manner in which the names of those who were to be recommended should be obtained. Thus, a number of variations existed in the way each county went about the business of obtaining the names it passed on to the Council of Safety.

In some cases, vacancies were filled based solely on the judgment of the local Committees themselves and after 1776, by the county lieutenants. In other cases, the company commanders were polled. Some battalions relied on a seniority system, whereby the most senior company commander was promoted, while others used a poll of the

men as a basis for their recommendations. Confusing the issue further, the government did not establish any particular criteria by which it determined the suitability of those whose names were passed on to them. In a considerable number of cases it appears that the Council of Safety deferred to the wishes of the county officials; however, there were some instances where the Council withheld commissions simply because the candidates were men who were unknown to them. Although the refusal to commission an officer due to the Council's unfamiliarity with the person was rare, in those cases when it did happen the result was often the interjection of more controversy into an already inflammatory situation.[48]

While he was making preparations to reinforce the dwindling Continental Army during the winter of 1776-1777, Brigadier General Thomas Johnson, Jr., found that a number of battalions and companies in Western Maryland were without commissioned officers. One in particular, the Linganore Battalion of Frederick County was lacking commissions for any of its field officers. After Johnson had informed the Council of Safety of the problem, the Council answered that it had been withholding a few of the commissions because of their unfamiliarity with some of the candidates. In the meantime, the Linganore Battalion met in late December and held another election to choose its field officers; however, the results varied

from those of the original group with only three of the incumbents being returned. In the wake of the election, a flurry of accusations were made denouncing the poll as fraudulent and blaming Johnson and his brother, Colonel Baker Johnson, of committing misdeeds for political reasons. Adding fuel to the fire, the Council proceeded to send the commissions for the men who had been originally recommended to them. When they were received by the battalion, the three officers who had been deposed in the election declined to serve. Additionally, the two men who had been returned to office by the battalion refused to accept their commissions. As late as mid-January, as the battalion made its preparations to depart northward, the situation remained unresolved.[49]

In those instances when the men were polled, the result often led to confusion. General Andrew Buchanan complained to the Council of Safety that six companies of militia in Harford County could not be formed into a battalion because they could not agree on who should lead them. In the same letter, Buchanan also cited a quarrel among the 8th Battalion which led him to the conclusion that "the militia in my district had rather battle at home than abroad."[50]

The disputatious behavior resulting from the process for determining who would serve as field officers was mild in comparison to that which simultaneously existed at the company level. Over the course of the war, the selection and replacement of company officers quite often devolved into acrimonious affairs which seriously threatened to undermine any potential for the militia to attain a degree of military efficiency. As it had with the selection of field officers, the government's failure to adhere to and follow through on one policy for choosing company officers tended to exacerbate the problem.

The resolutions passed in December 1774 and again in the "Association of Freemen" of July 1775 constituted a radical departure for the militia by allowing the companies to choose their own officers. However, it is doubtful whether this right for each company to select its officers was a direct result of the state's political elite for a move toward democracy. It is probably more reasonable to assume that the popular party's leadership was convinced that deference would prevail and that men from the counties' higher ranks would be elected to serve as company officers. In the initial stages of the war their belief seems to have been confirmed.[51]

Lists of militia officers commissioned during the first year of the war reveal a large number of men who had connections to the more elite families within the counties. Thus, as it had been throughout the provincial era, the Dorchester County militia was essentially the domain of the Ennals family. Relatives of the Ennals could be found in positions of leadership running the gamut from brigadier general to battalion commanders all the way down to company ensigns. However, the familial glue which bound the militia together throughout 1775 began to show signs of decomposition in the first half of 1776 as a number of officers left to join the Flying Camp. The loss of these men to the Continental army along with their leadership potential proved to be detrimental to the militia. The loss of these officers also appears to have triggered some consternation among the dominant faction of the popular party.[52]

In January, 1776, the Convention amended the militia regulations and altered the process of selecting company officers. While the right to elect company officers was retained, it was limited to encompass only those companies that were in the process of forming. Where vacancies appeared in those companies that were already certified, either the Convention or, in its absence, the Council of Safety, were authorized to name the new officers. The method decided upon to fill the vacancies called for

each officer below the open rank to be promoted to the next higher rank. Thus, if a captain resigned his commission, the policy was for the first lieutenant to be promoted to captain, the second lieutenant would become the new first lieutenant and so on. To fill the vacancy in an ensign's position, the procedure decided upon was to promote either the company first sergeant or where none existed, the most senior of the non-commissioned officers.[53]

Exactly why the Convention decided to establish this new procedure is unclear. Possibly, the Convention recognized that the war might drain the militia of its more prominent men and saw the method as a logical means of maintaining order within the companies rather than sanctioning elections which could result in chaos. Another possible explanation lies within the political factionalism that was posing a threat to the popular party's leadership. By promoting each officer up one position instead of trusting the electoral process, control of the companies and of the militia as a whole could be passed into the hands of those who were most sympathetic to the conservative faction of the popular party. Because of the often contradictory and sometimes arbitrary manner in which the government seems to have enforced its policy, the latter

of the two possibilities appears to have been the most likely. In any case, the regulation and the manner of its application created more chaos and resentment within the companies than it resolved.

The Council of Safety articulated its beliefs concerning the proper procedure for filling vacancies in February 1776 amid a controversy concerning the Nottingham Company of Prince George's County. However, instead of remaining steadfast to its adherence of the policy that had been established by the Convention, the Council set a precedent that further confounded the situation. Stating that the usual procedure was to advance the officers a grade, the Council added the corollary that it would allow variances in cases where such variances seemed warranted. Although a policy of flexibility would seem to have been the most practical and judicious approach for the Council to have taken, by adding the corollary, the door was opened for a number of future controversies. In turn, as these controversies arose, some of them seem to have been decided by how much pressure could be brought to bear on the Council. For the rank and file, pressure usually came in the form of either a remonstration against the violation of their perceived rights or a refusal to participate in any future militia service. For officers seeking advancement, the pressure often came in the form of innuendo and character assassination.[54]

When Andrew Beall, Sr., resigned his commission in the spring of 1776 to embark on his campaign for a position as field officer, he recommended that his son, Andrew Beall, Jr., who was a second lieutenant in the company, be appointed in his stead. However, the Council of Safety followed its policy of promoting everyone up one position and appointed the first lieutenant, William Hamilton, as the new captain. In the meantime, Beall's company petitioned the Council on behalf of his son, claiming that Hamilton was "not a proper person in respect to the office." Additionally, the company threatened to disband if its protests went unanswered. Attempting to anticipate any objection the Council might have, the men of Beall's company also stated in their petition that being free people, they had the right to determine who should lead them and that they would risk their lives only for those they deemed acceptable.[55]

The controversy escalated when Hamilton, who had seen service during General Richard Montgomery's assault on Quebec, also wrote the Council to complain of the elder Beall's solicitation among the company on behalf of his son. Adding to the flurry of letters to the Council, Andrew Beall, Sr. employed a smear tactic by referring to Hamilton's social status. According to Beall, Hamilton was a poor man who lacked an education, owned no slaves, and was hard-pressed to support his wife and several

children. In Beall's opinion, since Hamilton was poor he could not make the proper appearance of a gentleman and therefore could not keep company with the other "gentlemen officers." Andrew Beall's own claims as a gentleman seem to be somewhat dubious if the opinion of his brother-officers has any merit. As Joshua Beall had informed the Council during the previous dispute, in the eyes of the other company commanders, Beall himself was not perceived to be a gentleman. In the absence of any recorded deliberation, it is difficult to ascertain what the Council's frame of mind was when it made its decision, but diverting from the original policy, the Council removed Hamilton and awarded the commission to Andrew Beall, Jr.[56]

While the Council retrenched from its policy in the case of Beall's company and gave in to the choice of the electorate, in other cases it ignored both processes and appointed a person who was neither elected nor in a position within the chain-of-command to be promoted. The Vienna Company of the Dorchester County militia petitioned for the removal of Captain James Shaw, a man the company deemed as "odious." Shaw had been appointed to the captaincy by the Council of Safety after the company's original commander, James Campbell resigned in order to seek a commission in the regular forces. In this case, the Vienna company did not even object to the Council's policy of moving the officers up one grade. Shaw's

appointment seems to indicate that political pressure was being placed on the Council to select him from some other quarter. Vienna was not the only militia company to complain.[57]

The Eden School company of the Somerset County militia complained to the government that it believed the commission for Captain Adam Andrews had been made "fraudulently and surreptitiously." When Captain John MacKall of Calvert County resigned his commission in 1778, the company petitioned the Council to remove his replacement. According to the petition, the man chosen previously had evaded the draft by hiring a doctor to fill out a certificate attesting to his ill-health. In addition, the company claimed he had not mustered or served in any military capacity since 1776.[58]

As a man not unfamiliar with controversy surrounding the selection of officers, Governor Thomas Johnson, Jr., addressed the problem in a 1779 letter to a Captain White's company. The governor revealed little surprise that a number of appointments had been deemed unsatisfactory to the companies, but believed the problem was not as wide-spread as some had suggested. Where unsuitable appointments had been made, Johnson stated that unfortunately there was no means provided by the legislature to remove them. Johnson admitted that in a few cases he could reappoint officers but in most instances, the only

hope was for the offending officer to resign voluntarily. He told the company that he hoped to induce the legislature to pass some measure that would allow him to remove incompetent officers. In the meantime, the governor cautioned the men to continue the fulfillment of their military obligation in order to give a measure of added weight to their complaints.[59]

In an attempt to fill vacancies, the government commissioned some men with what appears to have been little regard to their fitness to hold commands. Peter Sholly of the Upper District of Frederick County returned his commission voluntarily, stating that he lacked the military experience necessary to command the company effectively. In his place, Sholly recommended Caspar Keller whom Sholly believed to be a more capable officer. Others, such as Conrad Hogmire of Hagerstown and John Dimmit returned their commissions stating as their reasons, ill-health and advanced age. In light of the recognition of their own limitations and unsuitability as officers, it would appear that these men had been selected to fill vacancies for their political rather than military qualities.[60]

While men such as Sholly and Dimmit honestly recognized their unsuitability, it is impossible to know how many clearly incompetent men sought commissions and were able to obtain them. One who did try but was ultimately frustrated in his attempt was Archibald Shields

of Queen Anne's County. Apparently, Shields requested a commission and was initially approved by the county lieutenant, William Helmsley, in 1778. Before he could fulfill the commission, Colonel John D. Thompson notified the governor of Shields's past behavior.[61]

Prior to the British invasion of Maryland in 1777, Thompson claimed that Shields had actively avoided attending company musters. When Thompson's battalion was activated during the invasion, Shields refused to serve when he was called upon. However, in the government's haste to fill vacancies and put the militia into some degree of order, Shields was given a commission as an officer. Instead of filling the position himself, Shields gave it to his brother and announced that he was moving away and would not be joining his company again. Apparently, Shields was less than honest, because, according to Thompson, instead of leaving the area, he allegedly carried on a brisk trade supplying the British with cattle. Whether or not it was during one of these business trips is unclear, but somehow Shields had the good fortune one night to accompany a group of militiamen who subsequently captured a British foraging party. Feeling redeemed by his patriotic display, Shields made this incident the basis for his application to the county lieutenant for a commission.[62]

Among the more notorious incompetents was Captain Richard Bennett Hall, a company commander in the infamous 25th Battalion of the Prince George's County militia. Described by his battalion commander as a "mean puppy," Hall had tried to secure a position as a field officer during the Andrew Beall fiasco and had failed. In his competition with Beall, Hall apparently had tried to employ a certain amount of guile himself, but as his commanding officer stated, Hall "has been so foolishly deceptious he is now despised by all his officers." Probably sensing the obvious disdain and feeling that his position was threatened by some officers within his own company, Hall tried to have his first lieutenant, James Mullikin court-martialed.[63]

In his statement of charges against Mullikin, Hall alleged that his first lieutenant had been insolent, used abusive language toward him, and had struck him. After what appears to be Mullikin's acquittal, Hall changed tactics and began a campaign to destroy the company by failing to attend to it at musters. In addition, Hall began handing out discharges to a number of men relieving them of further service in the militia. According to Colonel Robert Tyler, because of his obnoxious behavior, Hall was faced with a dilemma. In Tyler's words, "he can't act under me without being kicked, or give up his commission without his First Lieutenant becoming Captain."[64]

Hall's actions became so contentious that Joshua Beall finally had him court-martialed, but even then Hall acted in an invidious manner by refusing to answer the summons. Finally, Hall sent in his resignation leaving the command of his company to devolve on his avowed enemy, First Lieutenant James Mullikin. Hall was only one example of a number of men who could be perceived as being marginally qualified to serve as officers. Some of those commissioned appear to have bordered on the insane.[65]

When the 28th Battalion of the Caroline County militia met in September 1776 to raise a company for service in New York, Captain John Fauntleroy refused to "draw up his company" in the field. Unable to fathom Fauntleroy's strange behavior, Colonel Benson Stanton requested the Council of Safety to approve a court-martial, believing that if the incident were overlooked, it would "prove injurious to the honor and character" of the battalion. At his court-martial, Fauntleroy behaved in an even more bizarre fashion, remaining impassive throughout the trial until the verdict was rendered, at which time he "acted in a rude and insolent manner" and offered Stanton money "to exchange a ball with him."[66]

While some, such as Richard Bennett Hall, sought to use the militia to gain a measure of personal power, there were others who used the position in an attempt to make material gains. The Castle Haven company of the

Dorchester County militia petitioned the Council to have their captain, Joseph Byus removed from his position because he was caught charging the men for rations which they never received. In addition, Byus took the remaining provisions home with him for his own use. When confronted with the charge by Major Thomas Muse, Byus pleaded ignorance but agreed to sell what he had remaining at home and pay the men back from the proceeds.[67]

In the absence of any substantial records, it is difficult to obtain a definitive picture of the overall efficiency of the officer corps in the militia. Certainly, not all the officers chosen or appointed were of the extremely poor caliber exhibited by Richard Bennett Hall or John Fauntleroy. However, it is doubtful whether a substantial number could be classified as being superior in their abilities.

A roll of officers in the 5th Battalion of the Somerset County militia helps shed a little light on the situation. Listing the officers by rank and seniority, the roll also includes a column in which either the battalion commander or the adjutant, whoever was responsible for maintaining the list, recorded their comments concerning the officers' abilities. Of the forty officers listed, thirteen were given comments illustrating some degree of potential, ranging from "promising" to "said to be clever." If the comment "you have seen him" is taken as an indication

of some degree of competence, then three of the officers fell into this category. Only two of the forty were given the unqualified acclaim of being "a good officer." Eight of the officers were judged in clearly negative terms with descriptions attached to their names such as "A Stupid Sot," "low-bred illiterate," "altogether unfit," "very insolent and fond of grog," and finally, "A Cub." Of the remaining officers on the roll, seven were listed with no comment, one was dead, one had transferred to another battalion, one had been promoted, and five had resigned. Clearly, the picture painted by the 5th Battalion's roll does not portray a particularly high level of competency. If the level of efficiency that existed in the 5th Battalion can be extrapolated to cover the rest of the militia, then Maryland's means for defense can be said to have presented itself as something less than a formidable military force.[68]

An examination of the reasons why many of the officers chose to resign their positions is indicative of the problems which occurred in the militia throughout the war. Some of the resignations, such as those of Phillip Thomas and Richard Brooke, belie the political machinations transpiring behind the scenes with respect to the appointment of officers. Thomas was chosen by the men to serve as a captain in a militia company from the Middle District of Frederick County but was never sent his commission. Instead, a lieutenant was appointed in his

place and Thomas's first lieutenant was commissioned as a major. Thomas placed the blame on some unknown persons whom he believed had influenced the Convention's decision. As proof to substantiate his claim, Thomas pointed to the number of resignations among the field officers and the growing number of complaints emanating from the battalion. In a similar vein, Richard Brooke sent back his commission as a major in the 29th Battalion, claiming that his enemies "had poisoned the minds" of many, and that a majority of men were now opposed to his appointment.[69]

Some officers resigned their commissions as a protest of what they perceived as the alarming state of the militia. James Mackey returned his commission as a captain in the Elk Ridge Battalion because the battalion was not "modeled according to law," and therefore, he did not feel he could discharge his duties "with any degree of satisfaction or utility." Samuel Calwell sent back his commission when his company ignobly displayed a measure of cowardice during an alarm in Harford County. Offered a commission as an officer in January 1778, William Holmes chose not to serve because of his health, but noted that even if his health had not been bad he would not serve in the militia as it was regulated. Holmes stated that he had observed the militia during the previous summer and thought that overall the organization was "burdensome rather than serviceable."[70]

If the militia was no longer a "serviceable" military organization by 1778, much of the decline could be attributed to the multitude of problems that consumed the attention of Maryland's lawmakers. After independence was declared in 1776, Maryland began the process of implementing the machinery by which it would be governed. In the midst of establishing a system of government, Maryland was convulsed with social and political disorder as a result of worsening economic conditions. Of particular concern to the government was the situation on the Eastern Shore which had become a hotbed of Loyalism and disaffection. In addition to the internal problems of the state, Maryland's lawmakers had to contend with the Continental Congress which was pressing the state constantly for more men and materiel to support the army. In the midst of all the distractions and confusion, an effort was made to better regulate the militia, and new provisions to the militia law were enacted in June 1777. Unfortunately, as in the past, new regulations also brought new problems, once again forcing the government to seek a remedy.[71]

Among the difficulties arising from the new regulations was the stipulation that all officers had to be recommissioned. In the process of reviewing and renewing commissions many officers and men were left in doubt as to whether or not they were legally bound to obey any orders

given by their superiors. The question was exacerbated by the government's delay in rendering its decisions and sending back the new commissions. If the state was hopeful that by carefully considering the officers' qualifications before recommissioning them would end a significant amount of the militia's difficulties, their hopes were dealt a severe blow by the arrival of a British fleet in the Chesapeake Bay. With the militia devoid of commissioned officers and a major invasion on its hands, the question of whether or not the men were legally bound to follow orders given to them by their officers must have loomed before the state government like an ominous spectre.[72]

Arriving at his home in Queen Anne's County from Philadelphia as the British force began its disembarkation, Congressional delegate William Paca sent an urgent message to Governor Thomas Johnson, Jr., apprising him of the situation. Paca was horrified to find that because of the lack of commissions for its officers, the Cecil County militia was unable to effect any sort of effort to conduct a strenuous defense. In light of the crisis, the delegate to Congress thought it would be best if Johnson sent over blank commissions to be filled out by the county lieutenant. In words that revealed his anguish over the existing situation, Paca beseeched Johnson to either put the militia laws into effect immediately or else formulate a better plan. According to the intelligence Paca had received,

Cecil County was not alone in its confusing state of affairs. From other locations on the Eastern Shore, reports were filtering in to him intimating that the militia was slow to rise up due to an absence of properly commissioned officers.[73]

Similarly, on the Western Shore the lack of commissioned officers affected the militia's ability to mobilize during Maryland's worst military crisis. Writing to Governor Johnson, Colonel Benjamin MacKall IV stated that he had sent his field officers to gather men to march in relief of Washington's forces but found the men hesitant to enroll and substitutes refusing to march unless they were paid in advance. Unfortunately, according to MacKall, without commissions, the field officers felt that they could not legally pay the substitutes or distrain the effects of those who failed to answer the draft. Finding itself without any other recourse, the state government abandoned its apparent plan to evaluate each commission and hastily renewed them in what seems to be almost assembly-line fashion.[74]

Although the crisis concerning the British had abated somewhat in Maryland by the winter of 1777-1778, the situation among the officer corps appears to have stayed the same. Reflecting on the sad state of affairs within the militia, Benjamin Rumsey claimed that the militia of his county had not trained in a year or more and much of

the cause was attributable to the lack of commissions for the officers. Rumsey believed that the officers refused to act, because the men would not obey the commands of any officers who were not legally commissioned by the state government. Correspondingly, the officers were of the opinion that without the written authorization for their commissions, they were not legally obligated to comply if the militia was ordered to march. Adopting an attitude that seems to have ascribed a low priority to patriotic concerns, many of the officers worried that if they were captured by the British and found to be without the proper forms, there would be no way to distinguish them from common soldiers. Thus, they would be accorded treatment by their captors unbefitting their proper rank. As another result from the state's failure to sedulously attend to the task of recommissioning officers, Rumsey claimed that discipline within the militia had been acutely affected, because the officers believed it was not in their power to sit on courts-martial. Compounding what appears to have been an already alarming state of affairs, Rumsey had been apprised by his brother, Colonel Charles Rumsey, that the same situation that existed in his county existed in others.[75]

The situation of vacancies among the officer corps that paralyzed Maryland's effort to defend itself in 1777 continued to plague the militia until the war's end. In 1781, Captain John Dean wrote Governor Thomas Sim Lee concerning the distressing condition of his company. Due to death and resignations, Dean was bereft of officers for his company. Dean claimed that the problem had existed for months and nothing had been done about it. As a result, he found it nearly impossible to command his company which happened to be at full strength. Dean ended his letter stating that unless some action was forthcoming he would be forced to disband the company.[76]

After 1781, the difficulties encountered among the militia's officer corps began to fade as the war ended. The politically motivated disputations over the selection process that had occurred in the early years of the Revolution seem to have diminished dramatically after 1778. Probably the most important factor for the diminution was the state's political stabilization after the British vacated Philadelphia. Hoffman believes that when the British returned to New York in the summer of 1778, the fears that the state would be invaded and occupied left with them. This helped to bolster the politicians' own sense of security and at the same time served to disabuse Maryland's Tory element of the belief that direct aid in

the form of British troops would be forthcoming. While factors such as these may have served to at least dampen the political rivalries in the militia's officer corps, they did not solve the other problems.[77]

As illustrated by Captain Dean's complaint, the problem of filling vacancies seems to have been solved only by the war's end which obviated any further need of the militia. The militia's chronic exigency for competent leadership also appears to have gone unattended, although in the later years of the war this may have been partially corrected by the return of a number of officers from the Continental service. An examination of resignation dates from the Maryland line and commission dates in the militia indicates that there were a significant number of men who, after leaving the regular army and for whatever reason, returned to Maryland and accepted commissions in the militia. It is difficult to ascertain both the reasons for their resignations and the degree of competence they brought with them to the militia, but presumably their experiences in the army must have imbued them with at least a somewhat better appreciation for proper military conduct. If so, then the militia only stood to gain from their time spent in the regular service. Writing to the governor in August 1780, Benjamin Nicholson, commenting on officer

appointments, believed that the solution to the difficulties in the militia lay in blending those officers who had performed service in the Continental army in with those officers who had served exclusively in the militia.[78]

The return of veteran officers and the improved political climate may have attenuated some of the officers' concerns, but there were other problems far too deeply entrenched for anyone to solve. Aggravating any possibility of ever achieving a sense of cohesion and efficiency within the militia was the deep-seated social unrest among the rank and file. Rooted in Maryland's provincial past like a festering wound, the social unrest in the militia's lower ranks rose up to infect the entire organization shortly after the Revolution began. As the discontent reached a febrile state, the officers of the militia and Maryland's political establishment found themselves at odds over the means to effect a cure.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]Ronald B. Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 121-125; Barker, Background of Revolution, pp. 366-368; Tommy R. Thompson "Personal Indebtedness and the American Revolution in Maryland," pp. 21-23.

[2]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 91, 124-127.

[3]Barker, Background of Revolution, p. 370; Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 126, 128-132.

[4]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 128-132.

[5]Aubrey C. Land, Colonial Maryland, p. 298; Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 131.

[6]Herbert E. Klingelhofer, "The Cautious Revolution: Maryland and the Movement Toward Independence: 1774-1776," Maryland Historical Magazine LX(1965):262; Land, Colonial Maryland, p. 305. Land states that although Eden possessed control over the proprietary offices during this period, many of those who he appointed simultaneously held positions in the Convention.

[7]Jonas Green, Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland Held at The City of Annapolis in 1774, 1775, and 1776 (Baltimore: James Lucas and E.K. Deaver, 1836), pp. 7-9.

[8]Klingelhofer, "The Cautious Revolution," p. 262; David C. Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy, p. 156; Robert J. Brugger, Maryland: A Middle Temperment, pp. 115-116; Barry W. Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War," p. 12.

[9]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p. 9; Land, Colonial Maryland, p. 166. Land cites an incident in 1739-1740 when Maryland was rife with rumors of a slave conspiracy. Instead of employing the militia, an independent company of horse troops was raised from Annapolis to maintain order. Throughout the colonial period, the militia was never employed as a slave patrol

nor did it serve in a constabulary fashion. "Dorchester Committee to Council," 15 November 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 449-451. Captain Richard Andrew led a group of seventeen persons in a riot through Caroline County and Talbot County during a salt shortage. State Papers [MdHR 4580B-85], Andrew Buchanan to Governor Johnson, 2 October 1777, MHR. When the sheriff of Baltimore attempted to distrain the effects of those militiamen who had not procured substitutes or submitted to the draft, two hundred militiamen rioted to stop the execution of the order. State Papers [MdHR 4584-81], Charles Beatty to Council, 5 December 1778, MHR. Beatty wrote to the Council that the militia "has run mad," during a protest in Hagerstown.

[10]Land, Colonial Maryland, pp. 308-309; Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 140-141.

[11]Klingelhofer, "The Cautious Revolution," pp. 301-309;Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 168. The popular party was opposed to the call for independence as late as May, 1776 and did not actually change its position until late June, 1776 on the eve of the debates in Congress.

[12]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, pp. 8-9.

[13]Ibid, pp. 8-9.

[14]Ibid, pp. 8-9.

[15]Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy, p. 157; Green, Proceedings of the Convention, pp. 8-9; Edward C. Papenfuse, et.al., A Biographical Dictionary of the Maryland Legislature Vol. I, p. 69. Using the two volumes to check the lives and family backgrounds of those members of the November-December session of the Convention reveals that almost one-half of the members were members of the militia, had family members who had been connected to the militia, or relatives who had served on the various military committees of the General Assembly. With such a relatively high percentage of ties to the militia, it can be assumed that the Convention was well-versed in the organization and structure of the provincial defense force.

[16]Maryland Gazette, 19 January 1775; 22 December 1774; 29 December 1774. Prior to the meeting that had to be postponed, the Prince George's County Committee of Observation believed they could raise ten companies of militia.

[17]Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy, p. 158; Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p. 9.

[18]Maryland Gazette, 19 January 1775; Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p. 9; Maryland Gazette, 22 January 1775.

[19]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 143-144.

[20]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p. 170. Maryland's first Continental quota was set at 3,405 men to bolster the strength of Washington's forces.

[21]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, pp. 19-20.

[22]Ibid, pp. 66-67.

[23]Ibid, p. 22.

[24]Ibid, p. 22.

[25]Ibid, pp. 49-50.

[26]Ibid, p. 74; Talbot County Committee of Observation, James LLoyd Chamberlaine, Chairman to Council of Safety, 12 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 240; Council of Safety to Talbot County Committee of Observation, 17 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 259.

[27]Council of Safety to Talbot County Committee of Observation, 17 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 259.

[28]Barry Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War," p. 30. Fowle is of the opinion that the militia was an effective force for the enforcement of the non-enrollment regulations; however, the demonstrations held by the militia in protest of the government's insufficient measures to gain compliance would seem to indicate otherwise. State Papers [MdHR 4590-9], Baltimore Committee of Observation to Council of Safety, 18 November 1776, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4580B-67], William Spencer, Clerk, 11 June 1777, MHR. Captain Henry Scheaff's company protested against the changes in the militia laws. In their remonstrance, the men stated that if they were drafted they would march but only after non-associators were compelled to join the militia.

[29]Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy, p. 157.

[30]Green, Proceeedings of the Convention, p. 22.

[31]Ibid, pp. 21, 78, 86. Council Meeting, 10 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 147. The field officers for Dorchester County were appointed by the Council of Safety in February 1776. After the field officers were initially elected in 1776, the Council of Safety was delegated the authority to fill all future vacanices by its own appointment.

[32]Rieman Steurt, A History of The Maryland Line in the Revolutionary War, 1775-1783 (Baltimore: Society of the Cincinnati of Maryland, 1969); S. Eugene Clements and F. Edward Wright, The Maryland Militia in the Revolutionary War (Westminster: Family Lines Publications, 1987); Both works are genealogical investigations of the two military organizations. Comparing the commission dates of the officers in the Flying Camp and the Independent troops to those of the militia indicates that a considerable number of officers left the militia for regular service in 1776. Skaggs, Roots of Democracy in Maryland, p. 162; Mildred C. Schoch, comp., The Endeavors and Exertions of Queen Anne's County, Maryland During the Revolutionary War 1775-1783, (Queen Anne's County Bi-Centenniel Commission, 1976), p. 105. A number of men receiving appointments to serve as Justices of the Peace and Judges of the Orphan's Court in Queen Anne's County were from the militia. Samuel Smith to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 19 May 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 241. Smith commented to the governor that it was a more difficult task to find men who were willing to serve as officers than to fill the ranks of the enlisted men. In Smith's opinion, those who accepted commissions did so only with the expectation of getting something in return. In many cases, when it was discovered that there was no immediate reward attached to the position, the commissions were returned.

[33]Baltimore Committee to Council, 31 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 105.

[34]State Papers [MdHR 4543-2], Robert Tyler to Council of Safety, 10 November 1775, MHR.

[35]Joshua Beall to Council of Safety, 6 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 205.

[36]Andrew Beall to Council of Safety, 24 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 196.

[37]Joshua Beall to Council of Safety, 6 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 205; Andrew Beall to Council of Safety, 18 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI. pp. 350-351.

[38]Skaggs, Roots of Democracy in Maryland, p. 169.

[39]Thomas Wright to Council of Safety, 20 September 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 287-289.

[40]Ibid, pp. 287-289; Skaggs, Roots of Democracy in Maryland, p. 169.

[41]Thomas Wright to Council of Safety, 20 September 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 287; Council of Safety to Thomas Wright, 18 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 260.

[42]Council of Safety to Thomas Wright, 18 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 260.

[43]Maryland Gazette, 9 May 1776; 16 May 1776; 23 May 1776.

[44]Maryland Gazette, 9 May 1776; 16 May 1776; 23 May 1776.

[45]Ridgely's Memorial, 20 May 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 432-433.

[46]Jackson Turner Main, "Political Parties in Revolutionary Maryland, 1780-1787," Maryland Historical Magazine 62(March 1967): 26-27; Papenfuse, et.al., A Biographical Dictionary, Vol 1, p. 278. The editors present a profile of Thomas Dorsey, and Vol. 2, p. 688. presents a biography of Henry Ridgely. Council Meeting 22 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 178. The Council lists the officers of the Severn Battalion, Ann Arundel County. Examinination of the list of officers commissioned, reveals that the battalion was the domain of the radical faction. After being spurned for a commission as a field officer, Ridgely joined the company of Captain James Tootel of this battalion. Ridgely's son-in-law was an officer in Captain Hall's company of the Severn Battalion. The batalion was commanded by the leaders of the radical faction, Colonel John Hall, Matthias Hammond, and Rezin Hammond.

[47]Joseph Sim to Council of Safety, 23 September 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 296.

[48]State Papers [MdHR 4590-61], Samuel Gilpin to Governor, 4 March 1779, MHR.

[49]Thomas Johnson, Jr., to Council of Safety, 22 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 544; Thomas Johnson, Jr., to Council of Safety, 24 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol XII, pp. 550-551; Council of Safety to Thomas Johnson, Jr., Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 556-557; Upton Sheredine to Council of Safety, 1 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 6; Thomas Johnson, Jr., to Council of Safety, 4 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 14-15; David Moore to Council of Safety, 5 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 22; Thomas Johnson, Jr., to Council of Safety, 10 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 35-36; Council of Safety to James Wells, 17 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 56.

[50]State Papers [MdHR 4590-14], Andrew Buchanan to Council of Safety, 7 February 1777, MHR.

[51]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, pp. 8-11, 19-24.

[52]Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 147; Papenfuse, et.al., A Biographical Dictionary, Vol. 1, pp. 192, 306-311.

[53]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, pp. 66-67.

[54]Council of Safety to Joseph Sim, 20 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 174.

[55]Andrew Beall, Sr., to Council of Safety, 29 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 196; Joshua Beall to Council of Safety, 6 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 205; Ray and Others to Council of Safety, 10 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 324-325.

[56]Hamilton's Petition, 10 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 325; Andrew Beall to Council of Safety, 18 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 350-351; Clements and Wright, The Maryland Militia in the Revolutionary War, p. 50. Clements and Wright list Andrew Beall Jr. as captain with a corresponding date of July 1776. Joshua Beall to Council of Safety, 6 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 205.

[57]State Papers [MdHR 19970-38/1], Vienna Militia Company to Council of Safety, MHR.

[58]Council of Safety to George Dashiell, 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 182; State Papers [MdHR 4570/15], Petition of a Militia Company that was Commanded by Captain John MacKall, 12 June 1778, MHR.

[59]Governor Thomas Johnson, Jr., to Capt White's Company, 25 August 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 503.

[60]Peter Sholly to Convention, 17 June 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 496-497; State Papers [MdHR 4572-87], Conrad Hogmire, 10 Oct 1776, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 6636-1229], John Dimmit to Andrew Buchanan, 21 September 1778.

[61]State Papers [MdHR 4584-93], John D. Thompson to Governor Johnson, 24 November 1778, MHR.

[62]Ibid.

[63]State Papers [MdHR 4581-15], Robert Tyler to Governor Johnson, 9 June 1777, MHR.

[64]Ibid; State Papers [MdHR 4572-27], Richard Bennett Hall to Council of Safety, 18 June 1776, MHR.

[65]Joshua Beall to Council of Safety, 6 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 205; State Papers [MdHR 4581-20], Robert Tyler to Governor Thomas Johnson, Jr., 16 June 1777, MHR.

[66]Benson Stanton to Jenifer, 17 September 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 277-278; Matthew Driver to Council of Safety, 4 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 504.

[67]Petition of Castle Haven Company, 21 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 390-391; Muse's Certificate, 21 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 391-392.

[68]State Papers [MdHR 4579-87], Roll and Military Records of the 5th Battalion, 1777, MHR.

[69]Phillip Thomas to Council of Safety, 7 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 210-211; Richard Brooke to Council of Safety, 15 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 206.

[70]State Papers [MdHR 6636-14-95], James Mackey to Governor, 3 April 1779, MHR; Samuel Colwell to Convention, 28 September 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 310; State Papers [MdHR 6636-10-24], William Holmes to Governor, 13 June 1778, MHR.

[71]State Papers [MdHR 4543-2] Liber GR Folio 91, "An Act to Regulate the Militia," June 1777, MHR; Barry W. Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War," p. 35.

[72]Ibid.

[73]William Paca to Governor Johnson, 25 August, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 344-345; William Paca to Governor Johnson, 30 August 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 354.

[74]State Papers [MdHR 4576-124], Benjamin MacKall IV to Governor Johnson, 13 October 1777, MHR.

[75]State Papers [MdHR 4587-1], Benjamin Rumsey to Governor Thomas Johnson, Jr., 23 February 1778, MHR.

[76]John Dean to Governor Sim Lee, April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 222.

[77]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 240-241.

[78]State Papers [MdHR 6636-20-56], Benjamin Nicholson to Governor and Council, 23 September 1780, MHR.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICIANS, OFFICERS, AND MEN: THE ETERNAL TRIANGLE

In the first moments of the Revolution, Maryland's patriotic fervor found its expression on the pages of the Maryland Gazette. Shortly after the Convention passed the resolutions of December 1774 calling for the formation of militia companies, the paper began printing reports of martial activities throughout the province. Giving in to bombast, the Gazette, commenting on the creation of two companies of militia formed in Ann Arundel County, stated that the companies were "composed of all ranks of men," with "gentlemen of the first fortunes" happily serving as "common soldiers." Optimistically, the Gazette concluded its article predicting that "this example it is not doubted will be followed by every town and county in this province."[1]

The Gazette was not alone in its optimism. In a letter written to Horatio Gates in 1776, Thomas Johnson, Jr. expressed his belief that the Convention had created the proper means "to repel force with force," and should the war commence, Maryland could be counted upon to "go boldly into it at once." Calculating the degree of sympathy

for the cause that existed among the people of Maryland, Johnson felt that even a military setback would not diminish it but instead, would "inflame them to madness and desperation." Concerning the militia, Johnson believed that the regulations set forth by the Convention in the "Association of Freemen" were as "comprehensive as any country in the world." However, unlike that of the Gazette, Johnson's enthusiasm was tempered by the presence of some rather ominous signs. Johnson was concerned about the large numbers of potentially disaffected who might rise up to topple the Revolutionary government if the war was to expand. Reluctant to employ any harsh measures to stifle dissent, nonetheless, Johnson believed the time was right to "separate friend from foe." Apprehending the situation correctly, even as Johnson penned his thoughts to Gates in the spring of 1776, dissension and disaffection were surfacing in Maryland, and just as noticeably, they were beginning to show within the ranks of the militia.[2]

By 1777, the homogeneity that had once been heralded by the Maryland Gazette virtually ceased to exist among the ranks of the militia. No longer were "gentlemen of first fortune" content to serve with the "poorer sort" as common soldiers, and no longer were the "poorer sort" willing to shoulder what they considered to be the iniquitous burden of service. When the state government asked for volunteers from the militia to help quell a

Loyalist insurrection on the Eastern Shore in June 1777, Colonel Robert Tyler notified the governor and his council that the "poorer sort" had refused to answer the call. Although Tyler believed that they were not unwilling to serve, he informed the governor that the "poorer sort" steadfastly believed the sons of gentlemen should volunteer first, because in their opinion the wealthy were the ones who had the most to defend. According to Tyler, if the state required the services of the poorer members of the militia, it would have little recourse other than the use of a draft. The fractiousness and resentment demonstrated by Tyler's battalion in 1777 were neither aberrations limited to one county militia nor were they confined to a particular time-frame.[3]

As wide-spread as the militia's discontent was, so too were its causes. David Skaggs appears to have correctly deduced part of the reason why the homogeneity that characterized the militia of 1775 could not be maintained for any length of time. It is his contention that the first companies formed, in all likelihood, were comprised of only the most zealous adherents to the cause. However, the elite stature that characterized this phase of the militia ended when the "Association of Freemen" required all male inhabitants to enroll in 1775. The addition of such a large body of men to a formerly elitist organization helped to create an environment which fostered

chaos and upheaval. For those "gentlemen of first fortune" who had flocked to the militia in 1775, the loyalties of many of those who were required to enroll after the passage of "the Association" were probably considered to be doubtful. Additionally doubtful was the continued contentment of those gentlemen to serve as mere privates alongside a larger number of men from the lower classes of society.[4]

In his dissertation, Barry Fowle conceptualizes the Revolutionary-era militia as a microcosm of Maryland society. Fowle believes that during the war, the militia presented an accurate depiction of traditional Maryland society that saw the upper-class filling the ranks of the officer corps and the poorer classes relegated to serving in the lower echelons. Additionally, Fowle implies that once these roles were established, the militia exuded a contentment with its static nature. Thus, according to Fowle, the militia was able to preserve order in Maryland throughout the Revolution by acting as a vehicle for the maintenance of social control. Although Fowle appears correct in his fundamental belief that the militia was a microcosm of Maryland society, he is wide of the mark concerning the willingness of many to see that society remain as it was.[5]

The prevalent belief in the idea of social deference had emerged in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as the tobacco-based culture and economy grew but was fast giving way in Maryland by the time of the Revolution because of the class consciousness that was its by-product. Even at its zenith during the colonial era, deference toward one's betters probably had been accorded only grudgingly by the members of the lower class. But, when the Revolution occasioned a serious rupture among the formerly unified elite and removed the legitimate provincial government, any pretenses to remain faithful to an unpopular notion by those of the lower classes rapidly vanished. Into the vacuum created by the disappearance of authority came social chaos bordering at times on complete anarchy.[6]

More than just a manifestation of the Revolutionary era, as Fowle would suggest, the militia was and always had been a microcosm of Maryland society, but during the Revolution, Maryland's was a society in an acute state of flux and so too was the militia. Ronald Hoffman more accurately describes the anarchic situation in Maryland as the expression of a long-standing resentment by many towards authority. As Hoffman states, those of the lower socioeconomic classes "having lived with the economic and psychological disadvantages of being a subordinate class, now lashed out in anger at those figures

dominating their immediate lives." However virulent the anger was and however variant were its forms, this response to authority was not a particularly new phenomenon. Its presence within the militia dated back many years prior to the Revolution. Previous governors and assemblies had attempted to address the problem, albeit on a much smaller scale, and correspondingly, they had met with as little success as would the Revolutionary government.[7]

A large measure of disrespect by the rank and file toward those who commanded them always had been present in the militia, but as Maryland had entered the eighteenth century and social deference emerged as the hallmark of provincial society, the breakdown of discipline seems to have become gradually more pronounced, reaching its height during the French and Indian War. Perhaps Kenneth Lockridge is correct in his theory that the discontent of the lower-class in the years prior to the Revolution, among other factors, was a manifestation of its desire for a return to the more homogeneous structure of seventeenth century society. By longing for this return, possibly the yeomanry believed that they stood a better chance of being left to conduct their own affairs and prosper financially. For the lower classes, the provincial elite presented an almost insurmountable obstacle to any chance for their own economic security or advancement. Resentment from below grew as the elite, through its exclusive control

over the political machinery, continued to increase its wealth and power at the expense of the lower classes. Often, with little or no say in the administration of the government that regulated its lives and strained its finances, the lower strata of society appears to have voiced its displeasure in one of the few avenues available to it, the militia.[8]

Gradually, as the discontent of the lower classes became evident in the militia, a triangular relationship evolved between the government, the officers, and the rank and file. For whatever reasons, social or economic, the rank and file vented its hostility and resentment upon the commanding officers through disobedience. Unable to maintain discipline, the officers, blaming the political establishment for not giving them sufficient means for enforcing discipline, demanded that more laws be passed to gain the rank and file's obeisance. At first, the government acceded to the their requests and did so, but when such laws also proved fruitless, the problem of maintaining discipline was handed back for the officers to solve.[9]

Horatio Sharpe had witnessed first-hand the devastating effects the triangular relationship had on the province's ability to wage war during his tenure as governor and appears better than most to have understood its causes. Although the country party had used it to

its advantage during the internecine struggle for provincial power with the proprietary faction, they seemingly failed to adequately comprehend either its roots or the depths to which those roots were planted. If the country party had, more than likely it would not have committed such blunders as failing to promptly and adequately compensate the militia for its time of service during the French and Indian War. Blinded by self-interest like its predecessor, the popular party seems to have come into power in the years preceding the Revolutionary crisis hoping to use the unrest of the lower classes to its advantage. Once again, as during the French and Indian War, the popular party sought to satisfy its own self-interest by manipulating society through the medium of the militia. However, it appears that the same self-interest that prevailed among many of the popular party's leaders also prevented them from understanding that after years of being a "subordinate class" and with the provincial power structure in disarray, resentment from the lower stratas was now directed toward any form of authority that did not take its needs into account. This became all too clearly illustrated by the chaos that was rampant within the militia after 1775.[10]

As long as the Proprietor and his placemen had held the reins of Maryland's governmental functions, the popular party had been able to channel lower class resentment by deflecting it towards those in power. But by 1776 when political power was usurped by the Convention, the scapegoat, in the form of Proprietary control, no longer existed. Instead, in its absence, the popular party appears to have attempted to use the colonial crisis with Great Britain as a substitute. However, since the crown's presence in Maryland had always been secondary to that of the Proprietor, lower class resentment became focused toward the only agency visible, which happened to be the Revolutionary government. In particular, the hostility and frustration that existed seems to have been directed most at those who represented the Convention at the local level, the Committees of Observation and the officers of the militia. Once again, in the militia, the triangular relationship of politicians, officers, and the rank and file surfaced; this time with a vengeance.[11]

Although the popular party after 1776 had gained control of the political apparatus of Maryland, its hold on power was far from being secure. In the face of rising dissent and with its own self-preservation at stake, the Convention found itself forced to temporize on many occasions rather than stand firm on potentially explosive issues. In those instances when controversy arose, the

Convention's temporizing nature often led it to choose what appears to have been the path of least resistance. This became evident in the multitude of squabbles that arose within the militia over such matters as the selection and appointment of officers. In control of all governmental functions for the first time, the popular party learned, as Sharpe had, that laws may be on the books, but without the approbation of the overwhelming majority of Maryland's society, the laws in and of themselves held no real efficacy. Unfortunately for the military effectiveness of the militia, this lesson was learned over a long period of time. Over the course of the war, the government repeatedly vacillated between its demands that its laws be followed and making concessions when those demands were met with stiff resistance.[12]

Once again, caught in the middle of this triangle were the officers. As the unrest that existed in Maryland's society made itself manifest in the militia, the officers sought relief from the government, as had their colonial predecessors. Time and again, as they found themselves beset by disorder and intransigence from the ranks, the officers of the militia beseeched the government to enact tougher laws. When the government either failed to respond to the wishes of the officers or new regulations proved to be equally unenforceable, the officers were forced to follow a number of divergent paths. Faced with frustration,

some chose to resign their commissions. Others adapted by siding with the rank and file or else like the government, temporizing in their decisions. Still others, despairing of any relief from the government chose to take matters into their own hands.[13]

Because the militia was exclusively a force of part-time soldiers, social and economic problems that affected the rank and file in civilian life appear to have made the transformation with them as the men assumed their military guise. Concern for such matters as their personal economic well-being translated into resentment and recalcitrance when the demands of the militia took them away from their crops. Additionally, the negative attitudes held by many for militia service seems to have been exacerbated by the government's frequent disregard for adequately compensating the men for their time away from home. As was the case in society at large, the rank and file of the militia lashed out at those figures of authority. Referring to Maryland's society in general, Hoffman points out, that the resentment of the lower socioeconomic groups became manifest in a variety of forms. Some openly sided with the British when the opportunity arose, others rioted in defiance of the Revolutionary government, while still others "refused to be disciplined

and showed contempt when their betters demanded respect and deference." Functioning as the microcosm of Maryland society, nowhere were these attitudes and behaviors presented more clearly than in the militia.[14]

As the war began, the muster field often became the place where the rank and file aired their opinions of politics and society. Just as often, the act of sharing their opinions earned them an appearance before the local Committee of Observation if not a trip to Annapolis under armed guard to explain their actions to the Council of Safety. One such person was Robert Gassaway who resided in the Middle District of Frederick County. During militia exercises, Gassaway stepped out of the ranks to editorialize on how he believed the war began and how it should be resolved. According to Gassaway, the war was being fought to protect those patriots in Boston who had destroyed the tea. It was his belief that after the incident, realizing they had made a mistake, the "Parcel of great men" in Boston had ordered that the rest of the colonies should be under arms in order to save their own necks. After being told by the officers present to keep his views to himself, Gassaway continued, stating that the only way to resolve the conflict was for the people to lay down their arms and petition the king themselves. Later, when asked to recant his statement before the Committee of Observation, Gassaway refused claiming that his view was correct. After

being sent to Annapolis, Gassaway apologized before the Council of Safety for his behavior and was ordered by the Council to publicly read his apology before his fellow militiamen. While offenses such as Gassaway's appear to be of a harmless nature, in light of the rising tide of dissension within the state, the government took them quite seriously for there had been others of a more ominous nature.[15]

Meeting at Mellville's warehouse in August 1775, the Caroline County Committee of Observation had listened to testimony concerning the suspicious behavior of a "certain John Williams" who had on 16 June tried to persuade members of Captain Henry Downes's militia company to lay down their arms. According to two of Downes's privates, Patrick Hart and James Walker, Williams "did censure them both for mustering and said they took up Arms against their King and were Fools." During the course of the investigation it became known that Williams and another man, John Cooper, had formed their own company to oppose the militia shortly after the December 1774 resolutions had been passed. Subsequently, Cooper had resigned from the company, but Williams had persisted. Activities such as those of Williams seemingly would have made any type of peculiar behavior all the more suspicious. When another such incident transpired in Caroline County, the local officials reacted quickly.[16]

Meeting on 4 June 1776 to exercise, the company commanded by Captain John Safford of the 14th Battalion Caroline County militia was disrupted after roll call by Cornelius Hogans, a resident of Dorchester County. According to witnesses, Hogans took up the company drum and while beating on it, ordered the company to begin marching. When the company dispersed in order to stop him, Hogans relinquished the drum and instead began to beat a hasty retreat. After being chased by the company and eventually caught, Hogans was placed in custody and brought before the Committee of Observation. According to the testimony given by those militiamen who had chased him, Hogans had made claims to be in touch with a number of people who would take up arms to protect anyone who refused to join the militia. A number of witnesses testified that Hogans stated when he was caught that he was running away in order that he could collect his company and return to oppose the militia. Although Hogans's claims of an organized force appear to have been exaggerated and his actions somewhat eccentric, the incident was of a nature that could only cause a great deal of anxiety among the Revolutionary government. If this had been the only incident of its kind, possibly Hogans's actions could have been written off as the ravings of a lunatic, but it was not.[17]

With regards to the behaviors of Gassaway and Hogans, it is difficult to accurately evaluate whether or not their actions constituted a genuine threat to the security of the Revolutionary government or whether they should be dismissed merely as the ramblings of malcontents. Certainly, the precarious position the government enjoyed in addition to the questionable amount of popularity it held made any suspicious action seem credible. However questions have to be raised as to whether some of those who were brought before the Council of Safety were guilty of nothing more than nursing a personal grudge. Such is the case of James Clark.

Clark, a Baltimore County magistrate, was charged before the local Committee of Observation on 1 July 1776 for making seditious remarks. His accuser, Cumberland Dugan, reported to the Committee that in a conversation he had with Clark concerning the accused's refusal to attend the musters of his company, Clark said that he

> would get back again all those fines he paid to Mr. Levy the Clerk of said Company as he charged Mr. Levy with all that he paid on that account; and that he never would take up Arms in defence of America, or in the present contest.18

According to Dugan, prior to this remark Clark had told him "that if we did keep quiet a little longer, we should soon have People here, who would take care of us and look after us." Certainly, Clark's intemperate remarks can

be construed to mean that he was an active Loyalist sympathizer, but his comments can be taken equally to mean that he was merely piqued about being fined excessively during his company's musters and held Mr. Levy personally accountable for his misfortune.[19]

If Clark's fines were a result of any breach in discipline by him during musters he was not alone in doing so. As Hoffman states, part of the breakdown in Maryland society was the lower classes' refusal to adhere to the previous standards of deference and proper respect for their "betters." This was as true in the militia as anywhere else. As the incidences of deteriorating respect for the old standards increased, the triangular relationship of politicians, officers, and men became more readily apparent.

At a meeting of the 12th Battalion Charles County militia, as the men were about to begin their manual-of-arms practice, they broke ranks and assembled into a mob. When their commanding officer, Josias Hawkins, attempted to ascertain the reason for their behavior, he was told by some that they would not be "mustered by a scotchman [sic]." However, according to Hawkins, the majority resented being exercised by an adjutant, who they believed to be an unnecessary expense. It was their belief that the musters should instead be conducted by the officers themselves. When Hawkins and his subordinates failed to restore order

by "shew[ing] them the absurdity of their conduct" he was left with no other alternative than to dismiss them until such a time as the Convention could pass measures that would "reduce them to order."[20]

What makes Hawkins's statements fascinating is what seems to be implied in them concerning the rank and file's attitude toward the officers. While some measure of xenophobia may have existed which caused the men to resent being trained by a "[S]cotchman," in addition to a certain amount of appreciation for fiscal responsibility, it seems that the men most resented, what appears to be, the perceived uselessness of the officers. Believing that the time spent at musters was time that they could ill-afford to waste away from their livelihoods, it seems likely that the sight of wealthy officers standing idle while someone else endeavored to train the men served to fuel the already smoldering fires of discontent that raged within the militia's lower ranks. In his misapprehension of the true causes of the tumult that had ensued, Hawkins, like so many other militia officers, blamed the inefficacy of the militia regulations for the incident.

Colonel Thomas Gist was another militia officer who hoped that the passage of tougher laws would serve the purpose of restoring order and discipline to the militia. Writing to Governor Thomas Johnson, Jr., in June 1777, Gist complained that he was more than willing to

perform his duties but could not because of the refractory behavior of the men and some of the officers. One of his company commanders refused to turn in the enrollment book for his company and did not attend to it at musters even though it was among the largest in the battalion. Another, John Foster, refused to perform his duties, and his men refused to choose another captain to replace him. One of Gist's captains was out of the state on business, and the first lieutenant, along with part of the company refused to attend any of the scheduled musters of the battalion.[21]

Suffering from the same difficulties as Gist, Colonel John D. Thompson of the 18th Batallion Cecil County militia tried to mount a concerted effort to restore discipline among his men in June 1777 but instead, found himself beset with frustration. After informing his company commanders that henceforth they would train and discipline their men according to the laws, Thompson noticed that Captain James Porter's company was particularly conspicuous for the amount of absenteeism it displayed at a number of meetings. When Thompson asked Porter at one such meeting what he intended to do about it, Porter stated that there was no law that could compel the men to attend and "declared he had nothing to say to them." Showing Porter the militia laws, Thompson asked Porter again if he planned to court-martial those who refused to attend musters. Publicly, in the presence of two companies, Porter responded

that "he would not act in an arbitrary manner." Upon Porter's utterance apparently a disturbance occurred among the men. Trying to quell it, Thompson formed the tumultous companies into a circle and read them the appropriate regulations. After reading to the men, "several [of whom] were still clamorous," Thompson ordered "those who followed the law into a line with the adjutant." According to Thompson, all except two fell into line, and those two miscreants who refused stated that they would not satisfy Thompson. In order to prevent a reoccurrence of the incident, Thompson requested that the governor allow him to convene a court martial for the two men so that they might serve as an example for the others.[22]

Where Thompson attempted to use the militia laws in existence to exert discipline, Colonel Joshua Beall felt the weakness of the militia regulations compelled him to resort to civil law when order broke down among the Middle Battalion of the Prince George's County militia. While the venerable county lieutenant was classing the officers of the battalion and "settling the details of several companies," approximately one hundred men armed with clubs and led by James Short marched out of the formation to protest the classing of the battalion. Undaunted, Beall followed them and ordered them back into formation, whereupon several of the men attempted to knock Beall down. Apparently unfazed by the violent attitude

of the mutineers, Beall reported that his major concern was the influence they would have on the rest of the battalion who, at the time, were "ill-armed." In order to bring the malefactors to justice, Beall felt the only way was to rely on civil law and subsequently issued warrants for their arrest.[23]

Obviously upset with the situation, Beall blamed much of the behavior on the sale of liquor at the muster-field which he had attempted to prohibit in the past. Editorializing on the incident, he stated to the governor's council that the "people were more inclined to evade the laws than to follow them." In his concluding remarks Beall rebuked the government saying that "if no laws were enacted to stop the practice, calling the militia will be more aversive to the people than not." Apparently unhappy with the government's response, Beall wrote out his own set of instructions to be carried out to the letter by the officers. Among these instructions was the prohibition of any liquor sales around the muster-field and the automatic court-martial for any non-commissioned officer or private who missed musters without a valid excuse. In the end, however, even Beall's own regulations failed to achieve the desired effect, because in January

1781 Beall wrote Governor Thomas Sim Lee that unless the sheriffs began executing warrants against those who failed to attend musters, the militia officers would be reduced to being "mean ciphers, indeed."[24]

What sets Joshua Beall's predicament apart from the others is his acute perception of something that Gist, Thompson, and Hawkins had missed. A militia veteran of many years, Beall seems to have realized the persuasive effects that James Short and his mutineers had on the rest of the battalion. Left unchecked, the actions of Short and his men easily could have aroused the latent discontent that probably dwelled within the others. Additionally, Beall seems to have understood better than his colleagues what little impact military regulations had on a body of men who considered themselves civilians first and foremost.

Concerning the disorder among the rank and file, in some cases it is difficult to discern how much can be interpreted as disaffection with the cause and how much can be ascribed merely to what might be classified as rowdyism. Although the county lieutenant for Somerset County, George Dashiell, believed the Rewastico Company of the Salisbury Battalion was guilty of being disaffected in their loyalties, it would appear instead, that they simply did not take their role in the militia too seriously.

In an attempt to bring about some sort of order, Dashiell appointed William Turpin to command the company over First Lieutenant Huett Nutter, the brother of the former captain. For his trouble, Turpin met with a steady stream of abuse from the ranks.[25]

When Turpin asked a private, John Grumble where he had been during the previous meeting of the company, Grumble retorted that he had no excuse and sarcastically added that he did not carry an almanac around in his heart. For failing to attend the muster, Grumble was fined by Turpin and the other officers present. When the captain asked Grumble to pay the fine, Grumble, in turn, asked Turpin "if he would kiss his ass" and called the officers "a parcel of rascals." According to the deposition of Joseph Piper, who had witnessed the affront to Turpin, it was a usual occurrence for the entire company to "insult Captain Turpin with the grossest of language at every meeting." Dashiell confirmed the company's infamous reputation calling it the "most obstinate and insubordinate" in the county and remarking that seldom, if ever, did the company attend exercises. Because of its blotched record for attendance, according to Dashiell, the Rewastico Company had amassed a record amount in fines owed to the battalion.[26]

The insolence and disregard for any vestiges of deference accorded to the officers by the lower ranks of the militia seem to have been in some cases almost justifiable. The militiamen of Captain Richard Chew's company petitioned the Convention on 5 October 1776 for three reasons. The first two concerned alleged irregularities in the poll taken for the selection of officers. The third was directed toward the captain and the company ensign, who happened to be Chew's brother Samuel, for their public expressions of disdain for the lower social classes. In an attached deposition, Gilbert Smith claimed to have overheard the captain remark, that in his opinion, "no poor man was entitled to a vote." In addition, Smith swore that Chew's brother had rendered his own belief that "a poor man was not born to freedom, but to be a drudge on earth."[27]

For its part, the Convention did nothing to alleviate the situation. Coming at a time when the entire state appeared to be in a clamor, Maryland's political and social elite, who dominated the state's political machinery, chose to table the petition and let it die a quiet death. Possibly their reasoning for doing so lay in the fact that the Chews ranked among the state's more

prominent families. Tabled and moribund, the petition may have been conveniently forgotten by the state's politicians, but it was still on the minds of the men who formed the rank and file of Chew's company.[28]

In January 1777, when Maryland was being pressed to send the militia in relief of Washington's encampment at Morristown, the company sent a memorial to the Council of Safety. After reminding the government of their previous petition and grievances, the men of the company let it be known that the only way that they would serve their country during its time of "urgent crices [sic]" was if they were led by officers that they "could rely on for their bravery and conduct." In conclusion the company requested either new elections, or if the Convention was unable to fulfill that wish, make new appointments. Apparently the Convention also relegated this memorial, like the petition before it, to the dustbin.[29]

Certainly the poor regard for authority demonstrated by the men, such as those of the Rewastico Company, in addition to the disdain that some of the officers held for the lower ranks, strained at the militia's potential for effectiveness. But there were other factors which further weakened Maryland's first line of defense. Because the militia was primarily composed of farmers who were concerned with maintaining their own economic well-being, the needs of the state often took a lower

priority to that of the soldiers' crops. The problem was not exclusive to the Revolution; it had existed since the earliest period of Maryland's history. If it had appeared as an insurmountable obstacle to earlier governments, it would also remain so throughout the Revolution. Even when the state was under attack, the government found itself hard-pressed to activate or maintain the militia at a level sufficient enough to mount a proper defense.[30]

When Lord Dunmore's fleet came up the bay in July 1776, Colonel Thomas Dorsey notified the Council of Safety that Captain Elisha Rigg's company had been slow to answer the alarm, because it happened to coincide with the harvest of some of their crops. In the waning days of Dunmore's raid along the coast, Major Thomas Price of Smallwood's regulars was forced to release most of the militia under his command from active service. Explaining his reasons for doing so to the Council of Safety, Price stated that "most of the militia are poor folk whose crops are suffering and have no other labor but themselves." On the Eastern Shore, the situation was approximately the same. Colonel Thomas Ennals worried aloud to the Council that if the situation persisted any longer and the militia was forced to remain on duty, he was afraid most of the wheat crop would be lost.[31]

Throughout the remainder of the war, harvest time often thwarted the government's ability to activate or maintain the militia in times of emergency. Responding to the Governor's proclamation in the Spring of 1777 for volunteers to suppress the Tory uprising on the lower Eastern Shore, Colonel John Dickenson noted that until the wheat harvest was completed he doubted if he would meet with much success. In the following year, militia sent to Cantwell's Bridge to pursue the Tory brigand China Clow and his gang began to leave for home without authorization in order to harvest their crops. As late as 1781, with rumors circulating throughout the state that raids from Lord Cornwallis's army were imminent, Colonel Richard Barnes of St. Mary's County wrote Governor Thomas Sim Lee that an alternative plan of action was needed if the government proposed to keep the militia on active duty throughout the summer. In Barnes's view, to keep the militia embodied would serve more to "act as a harassment on the people" in the long run than an actual raid by the British.[32]

The harvest also interfered with the recruitment of enlistees for the regular forces. In July 1776, Captain Thomas Bourk, who was recruiting in Dorchester County for men to join the Flying Camp, was forced to wait, because the militia had been dismissed from any further meetings until the harvest was completed. When Washington called

upon the states for an additional 2205 militiamen to reinforce his army, the Maryland state government instead chose to raise a battalion of regulars "in consideration of the approach of the harvest" and taking into account the hardship that might otherwise be laid upon the people. Employing a carrot-and-stick approach, the government warned that if no volunteers were forthcoming then a draft would be levied to fill the state's quota.[33]

There were cases where the rank and file were able to profit personally when they were called out during an alarm. Militia troops sent to guard a ship that had been run aground and partially destroyed by the British in 1781 demanded to be paid from the salvaged flour in return for their services. Farther to the West, those militia companies sent to guard the British Convention troops being held at Fort Frederick often proved to be more troublesome than the prisoners who were in their charge. Writing Governor Thomas Sim Lee, Fielder Gantt fervently desired that the companies serving during the winter of 1781-82 be quickly replaced. With much disgust, Gantt wrote on 1 February

> The Guard to the prisoners at Frederick are by no means adequate to the purpose should the prisoners be viciously inclined; they are about 150 but such a banditti you never see collected, they have been pilfering & robing [sic] for several miles round the Town, steers, hogs, behives and geas [sic]-one of their Leivts was broak [sic] the other day for being

> concerned in stealing the latter they carried away 22 from me in one night which is all I've suffered by them yet [sic].34

A few days later Gantt wrote again to complain that the militia had stolen wagon loads of firewood that had been previously cut and corded for the use of the prisoners. In addition, they had broken into the magazine and plundered it. Not only were the guards stealing from the citizenry, but they entered into the practice of exchanging hard money for currency from the local populace at greatly inflated rates, thereby further injuring the already crippled local economy.[35]

Because the militia was an organization of citizen-soldiers, many times when crises affected the population in general the lines between soldier and citizen became blurrier than normal, especially, when those crises had a direct impact on the immediate welfare of society. Already resentful of the wealthy elite who held the positions of authority in the state, the lower rungs of society became more inflamed when the representatives of that authority were perceived to be involved in activities that further oppressed them. During the war when this happened, the people, as Hoffman indicates, rose up in defiance of the authority, and in those instances, the rank and file of the militia could be found among those who rioted.[36]

Throughout the war, British control of the waters on the Chesapeake Bay and along the coast had created shortages of some necessities, particularly of salt. These shortages led many of those among the lower socioeconomic stratas to desperate measures often at the expense of the elite, who were perceived to be hoarding such items. On the Eastern Shore, salt had become so scarce a commodity it was reported that many had taken up begging just to acquire a "few handfulls . . . from those who coud [sic] badly spare any." When rioting and plundering broke out because of the shortage, the militia could not be prevailed upon to instill order. To the contrary, the militia appears to have been well-represented among those who were rioting.[37]

On 15 November 1776, the Dorchester County Committee of Observation notified the Council of Safety that Captain Richard Andrews of the 14th Battalion Caroline County militia had led a number of armed men in search of salt. After searching the premises of James Sullivan of Dorchester County, Andrews and his men proceeded to the house of Colonel James Murray where they took fourteen-and-a-half pounds, leaving the Murrays with some money as compensation for what they had taken. In the wake of the raid on Murray's supply of salt, the Dorchester Committee launched an investigation into the occurrence in hopes of restoring order in the county. After summoning

a few of those men who had been involved in the plundering to an inquiry, the Committee of Observation decided to postpone the proceedings until others could be brought forth. When the Committee reconvened once again to look into the matter, Captain Andrews arrived leading one hundred armed men and disrupted the proceedings. Unable to either pursue the matter or bring about any semblance of order, the Dorchester Committee abandoned its inquiry and petitioned the Council of Safety for a detachment of regulars from the Western Shore to assist them.[38]

According to the Committee, the forces from the Western Shore were necessary because of the unreliability and involvement of the local militia companies. In fact, the Committee reported that several other companies from Dorchester County had also engaged in obtaining salt in the same manner as had Captain Andrews and his banditti. Because the sympathies of so many in the area lay with the rioters, it was doubtful to the Committee whether General Henry Hooper's brigade could be relied upon to apprehend the malefactors.[39]

Exacerbating the outrage of the locals were rumors purporting that the Western Shore had an abundance of the wanted item. However, in its response to the Dorchester Committee, the Council of Safety tried to scotch the rumors by pleading poverty as well. According to the Council, the ships rumored to have been laden with salt were owned

by "adventurers" who had sold their precious cargo to individuals at exorbitant prices. As to the request for troops, the Council refused on the grounds that none could be spared, owing to the presence of British ships on the bay. The Council could only recommend that the affected counties on the Eastern Shore wait until Brigadier General James Lloyd Chamberlaine returned home to take charge of the situation. However, Chamberlaine's return to the Eastern Shore only served to make the situation more divisive.[40]

Apparently, Chamberlaine was perceived to be personally engaged in the storage and hoarding of salt on the Eastern Shore. According to a deposition given by William Melward, whose wife was a domestic servant for Chamberlaine, the family had in its possession approximately six hundred bushels of the commodity of which they only used twelve on a yearly basis for their own consumption. In his testimony, Melward stated that although Mrs. Chamberlaine had been repeatedly approached about selling some of the salt, she had steadfastly refused to do so. On 28 December 1776, a group of armed men led by Jeremiah Colston broke into the storage shed where it was kept and took approximately seventeen bushels, leaving fifteen shillings as payment. Shortly thereafter, Chamberlaine went after the perpetrators and after catching one of them brought charges against Colston and the others.[41]

In a rather illuminating letter to the Council of Safety, John Gibson of Talbot County made a spirited defense of Colston and his actions. Accusing Chamberlaine of participating in the engrossment of salt, Gibson also claimed Colston and his men "to be of a[s] good a[nd] moral character as most men in the country." Continuing, Gibson castigated many of the local patriot leaders stating, "I could wish our leading Gent. on this side of the Bay was as little inclined to partie [sic] designs and self-interest as Colston, who was their leader of that Salt company." Casting a final aspersion at Chamberlaine's character, Gibson applauded Colston's support for the cause stating, "They have been sincere in their Country's cause . . . which is more than can be said with truth of any engrosser of Salt here."[42]

Shortly after these incidents, both Murray and Chamberlaine resigned their militia commissions. In his resignation Chamberlaine vented his displeasure and frustration stating that "many of us are rather disposed to quarrel with his neighbor than face the enemy." Believing that the prevalent attitude led many to "disregard any sort of order," Chamberlaine complained that most of the militia refused "to obey the commands of those appointed over them." In what must have appeared to many of those who were in want of salt on the Eastern Shore a particularly obnoxious piece of effrontery, after his resignation,

Chamberlaine was asked to sit as a member on the Council of Safety; however, Chamberlaine declined the offer because of his urgent need to clear up some pressing personal matters.[43]

It would seem likely that if Chamberlaine, as one of the highest ranking officers in the militia, was engaged in the engrossment of salt that there could be little wonder that the rank and file would refuse in the future to do their duty or show the respect demanded of them by their betters. Doubtless, after Chamberlaine was invited to sit on the Council, few of the lower classes could have been counted upon further to show much active support for a government, which on the one hand publicly deprecated those who tried to extort outrageous profits from the state and public, while on the other seemed to welcome into the highest positions of public trust one who was accused of participating in such activities. Certainly, behavior such as this only helped to attenuate the ranks of those in the militia who were willing to step forward and volunteer their services to the state.[44]

Throughout the Revolution, probably no matter attended to by the state government was met with such a degree of difficulty and refractory spirit as was the state's attempt to raise the requisite number of men needed for active duty. The difficulty encompassed both the attempts to fulfill the state's quota for the regular

service, as had been set forth by the Continental Congress, and the militia for short terms of duty within the borders of Maryland. Maryland's reputation for engaging volunteers during the colonial wars had never been stellar, and it seems to have remained somewhat tarnished throughout the Revolution. All attempts to satisfy the Continental quotas up to and through the eventual employment of the draft repeatedly fell short of the government's expectations. Additionally, calls for militia volunteers to perform a variety of duties ranging from marching north to reinforce the Continental army to guarding prisoners at Fort Frederick often resulted in fewer respondents than the government had hoped for.[45]

Although the great degree of disaffection that existed in Maryland probably accounted for a large proportion of the shortfalls in volunteers, the government itself has to be held at least equally responsible for the failure to attract a large number of enlistees to the cause. The enactment of bounties and allowances may have served to attract some, but the state's inability to make good on its promises appear to have had an equally deleterious effect on others who might otherwise have stepped forward. Additionally, other attempts by the state to promote enlistment into the Continental army seemed to have created a thriving environment for abuses to occur. In turn, as abuses surfaced, it appears that those who

normally might have stepped forward, instead refrained from enlisting. Similarly, the problems incurred in the state's attempts to raise troops for the regular service also appear to have had an equally crippling effect on volunteerism in the militia.[46]

After the survivors of the Flying Camp returned to Maryland in December 1776, the stories of deprivation and the disease they brought home with them seem to have seriously hampered the celerity of the militia's mobilization and movement northward to reinforce Washington's encampment at Morristown, New Jersey. Brigadier General Thomas Johnson, Jr., who was chosen to command the militia forces going north, repeatedly asked the Council of Safety to make certain that the men would be adequately provided for. In one such letter, Johnson beseeched the Council for shoes, blankets, and sugar because a large number of men were marching without, and "the people who go, from the little care given to their countrymen fear fatal illness and lack of clothing."[47]

The residual effect of the ill-treatment accorded to the Flying Camp continually played upon the minds of many during the winter of 1777. Militia officers were in agreement that those who had returned should not be allowed to march again. In Montgomery County only eighty-eight men from one battalion agreed to go and of that number, officers comprised the majority. According

to Colonel John Murdock, many of the men were apprehensive and before making their minds up wanted to know where they were going, how long their time in service would be, and "whether this is really necessary for them to do so."[48]

The validity of Johnson's admonition to the Council of Safety that "the very little care of our men last fall has a bad effect on the minds of many" could be seen throughout Maryland. At a meeting of the 5th Battalion Queen Anne's County militia an exhortation by the Reverend Mr. Keener read to inspire the assembled men resulted in only forty-six of their number volunteering to march to Washington's camp. Informing the Council of Safety of the poor success they had met with, the Queen Anne's Committee of Observation laid a large measure of blame on the fear generated by an epidemic of smallpox that had been brought into the county by returning members of the Flying Camp. But disease was not the only determinant in the reluctance by many to volunteer. There seems to have been social factors as well. Chagrined, the Committee was forced to admit that backwardness among the 20th Battalion had been caused by the reluctance of "the men of property" to step forward. The lower classes informed the Committee that they would go only if those who were among "the men of property" set the example.[49]

To placate the lower classes, the government added palliative measures to the revamped militia law enacted in June 1777. In order to distribute the burden of service in a more equitable fashion, the state ordered that each militia company be divided into eight classes of eight men each. Field officers and company officers were included in the system, but were classed separately from the rank and file. Whenever the militia's services were required, depending on the amount of men deemed necessary, the classes were to be called upon in numerical order. Therefore, it was believed that no particular group of men, after serving once, would have to answer the call until the rest of his comrades had performed their duty.[50]

Superficially, the classing system appeared to be a suitable measure, but there were some who recognized potential problems. Joshua Beall believed that the men should have been divided into four classes instead of the eight demanded by the law. Beall's logic lay in his belief that by doing so, in each company raised, the men would have at least one officer with whom they were familiar. Beall believed that if the rank and file were forced to serve under officers who were considered to be strangers to them, there would be discontent among the men any time the classes were called to duty.[51]

The net effect of the provision may have alleviated the burden of service from falling too hard on the shoulders of some, but it did nothing to encourage the vast majority among the militia to volunteer their services. After informing the governor of his inability to procure volunteers and the reason behind the "poorer sort's" reluctance to do so, Colonel Robert Tyler went on to state that they were more inclined to let him call up the classes. Apparently they reasoned that if the classes were called, the odds were more favorable that some of the wealthy would serve in place of the poor. Nor were they alone in their belief. When County Lieutenant George Dashiell called together the 16th Battalion of the Somerset County militia he could only raise eight volunteers from a gathering of approximately two hundred. Instructing the officers to warn the men that if no volunteers were forthcoming the classes would have to be called, Dashiell was informed by the company commanders that the threat to do so would still fail to achieve the desired effect.[52]

In Baltimore County, Colonel Darby Lux met with the same results even after he had resorted to haranguing the troops about the dire consequences that would result from their backwardness. In Worcester County, Joseph Dashiell lamented that "the greatest part of our men appear to have just courage enough to disobey orders, but not enough to face an Enemy." After prevailing on only fourteen

men to volunteer, Dashiell informed the governor that until the legislature passed a law that had some efficacy to it, "it was not worthwhile to call the battalion together again."[53]

Demands by the Continental Congress for more men to fill out the depleted ranks of the army led the Maryland government to enact further legislation in 1778. In the supplementary act passed under the title of "An ACT to procure troops for the American army" each county was apportioned a quota of men based upon the number of enrolled militiamen within the respective counties. The act instructed that if no recruits were enlisted then the militia was to be placed into classes based upon an equal distribution of the men of property among the classes from which draftees would be taken.[54]

A draft imposed upon the militia could be avoided if the classes could provide the requisite number through the employment of substitutes. For those able to hire a substitute, their military obligations were to be reduced in relation to the term of service the substitute enlisted for. After a substitute was procured, he was to be certified as fit for duty by the battalion field officers before being sent on to camp. In an attempt to further reduce the necessity of resorting to a draft, the law also authorized that vagrants could be apprehended and compelled to enlist. For those who enlisted and those vagrants who

were impressed into service, the bounty and clothing allowance was still in effect. The bounties were to be funded by an assessment laid upon those who were exempt from militia duty because of age or other disqualifications. Hoping to satisfy the state's Continental quota without having to directly resort to a draft, the law failed to achieve the desired results and instead created a system that was ripe for abuses.[55]

Rather than bringing forth any large quantity of volunteers, the law made it possible for those of the lower socioeconomic stratas to wait until the classes were drawn up and then allow themselves to be engaged as a substitute to the highest bidder. In the rush to procure substitutes, fraud and deception became commonplace. Joshua Beall reported to Governor Thomas Sim Lee that one man who was hired as a substitute was paid above the going rate in order that he might cover up the fact that he was afflicted with a sore leg. Another man, William Lasher, was returned to Beall because he was too old to serve. In his reply to the governor, Beall wrote that he had thought that Lasher had appeared to be too old but had been reassured by some of the local residents that he had always been in good health. Enrolled as a substitute by

one of the classes from Prince George's County, Benjamin Whitmore was found to be an apprentice when his master came to take him home. In other cases, substitutes were promised money and never paid or never paid in full.[56]

As unscrupulous as the quest to find substitutes became, the enlistment of vagrants was in many instances equally atrocious. Petitioning the government, Ezekial Dean of Caroline County complained that he had been forced into the army under the vagrant act while still employed. Writing to seek relief, John Schly informed the governor in 1780 that he had been in the employ of Governor John Rutledge of South Carolina to search for ore mines. While returning to Charleston, Schly learned of the British occupation of the city and consequently that the governor was reported to be making his way to Philadelphia. Hoping to overtake Rutledge, Schly was on his way to Philadelphia when he was detained in Western Maryland and labeled by some of the locals as a spy. According to Schly, Captain Richard Davis

> without the least provocation knocked two of my Teeth out after I was a prisoner, handcuffed me and took down to Hagerstown where I was threatened to be hang'd or put in Gaol and other threatening speeches, if I do not list [sic] during War and so was compell'd against Law to submit.57

Another measure passed in 1780 called for the militia to be classed, with each class to "furnish a recruit, take up a deserter, or pay the bounty" by 15 July. In order to pay the bounty of a recruit for those classes that could neither procure a recruit themselves nor find a deserter, each person in the class was to pay a fine of fifteen percent on every one hundred pounds of their personal property. However, because of the economic distress of many, this law also failed to achieve its intended purpose. Because of a lack of hard money within the state, many people paid their fines in wheat. Others who could not pay found their property distressed and held up for auction. Additionally, because of the extreme poverty experienced by many, in a number of cases either the estates did not equal the fine imposed, or no one bothered to bid due to their own penurious circumstances. Some of those who were fined clearly should not have been. In 1781, the governor's council notified Job Garretson to suspend the execution and sale of the property belonging to Oliver Button of Baltimore who had been fined in 1779 when he failed to attend his militia company. Acting on the advice of his wife and neighbors, it was ajudged by the council that Button had died before the fine was levied.[58]

The last piece of legislation enacted to provide recruits was passed in 1781 under the ponderous title of "An ACT to raise two battalions of militia for reinforcing the continental army, and to complete the number of select militia." In this act the militia was to be classed and within five days of being classed either produce a recruit or else two men from each were to be drafted. The results of this act appear to have been as nebulous as all those that had preceded it. Writing to Colonel John Stone, Colonel Francis Ware complained that he was doubtful if he could raise anything beyond a few recruits because the county already had been "pillaged of our youth." William Hemsley of Queen Anne County noted that the "marching of the drafts will bring hardship and misery" to the county because many of those drafted "were poor men who have children who depend on their labor."[59]

Due to the extreme hardship conscription placed upon the family, a considerable number of those drafted from among the ranks of the poor petitioned the state to be released. Stacy Arms, a widow residing in Charles County, was able to secure the release of her only son through a petition to the governor. Some who were drafted were clearly unfit for any kind of service. In the Middle

Battalion of the Prince George's County, Thomas Devin Williams, after being drafted, was found to be both overage and a cripple. For those who were not as fortunate to be released legally from their military obligations, other alternatives presented themselves.[60]

Desertion among those who were drafted became commonplace. After sending the troops who had been raised from his county on to Annapolis, Joseph Dashiell was horrified to learn that they had "returned and are entertained by their friends." Asking the governor for advice, Dashiell tried to ascertain if there was any reward to be offered for their apprehension, and if apprehended, what to do with them since the county jail was not big enough to hold them all. After almost completing his quota in late July 1780, Joshua Beall had three men desert before he could send them on Annapolis. One of them, James More, stole a horse and departed for Carolina. Beall employed someone to track down More, but when More's trail became cold, Beall recalled the man, reasoning that to continue was just a waste of public money. In order to fill his quota, Benjamin Mackall of Calvert County was lucky enough to apprehend two deserters from the Continental army. Unfortunately, he lost them both when they broke a hole in the wall of the jail and escaped.[61]

Hardly able to restrain its own prisoners who were to be used as Maryland's contribution to the regular army, the state government was presented with the even more perplexing task of guarding British prisoners of war. Probably because of its relatively isolated location, Western Maryland was selected in late 1777 by the Continental Board of War as one of the prisoner of war sites. The state was ordered to make ready Fort Frederick, which had fallen into decay since its use during the French and Indian War, and to receive and house the prisoners sent there. In addition to repairing the fort and providing supplies for the prisoners, the most difficult task facing the state was resolving the problem of guarding the prisoners once they were received. Unable to secure any Continental troops for the purpose, the militia was saddled with the task.[62]

When British prisoners first began arriving in Western Maryland, Governor Johnson believed that he had no other choice than to employ the militia as guards until other arrangements could be made. Apparently, Johnson was hopeful that a detachment of sixty men could be enlisted exclusively to guard both the prisoners and the adjacent magazine, but apparently the attempts to do so met with failure. By 5 February 1780, the Frederick County Lieutenant, Charles Beatty, informed the governor that the militia detachment responsible for guard duty refused

to remain there any longer. Appraising the situation correctly, the militia troops stationed in Western Maryland maintained that there were no provisions among the state militia laws to compel them to perform guard duty. For his part, Beatty sympathized with the militia by stating to Horatio Gates that a considerable number of those who made up the guard had done so many times before. Beatty believed that the local militia had done more than its share. Apparently Beatty's sympathy for the plight of the troops arose from the fact that he felt overburdened as well, serving as turnkey, prison guard, wagonmaster, quartermaster and Town Major, all without receiving any pay from the state.[63]

With the militia departing, Beatty had hoped that a number of the more trustworthy prisoners could be put out on some form of work-release which would allow those few guards that remained a better chance of watching over the more unruly prisoners. Although the state government endorsed the plan, the Board of War scotched it because of the alleged mistreatment of those American prisoners who were being held by the British. Instead, the militia was again ordered out to watch over the prisoners. In order to provide some inducement for service, the government allowed for those who were activated to deduct the time they spent on duty from their obligation to serve in classes.[64]

Other attempts were made to reduce the necessity of sending the militia to guard prisoners, but most met with failure. Colonel Moses Rawlins, who had been appointed to command Fort Frederick, expressed his wish that some of the substitutes raised for service with the army might be sent to the fort instead. Although it appears that some men were enlisted to serve as a permanent guard, the state was never able to induce a number that was sufficient enough to obviate the necessity of calling on the militia. In those cases where substitutes were used, often they were taken away to fill the state's Continental quota. In the spring of 1779, Rawlins again asked for permission to let some of the more trustworthy prisoners be released to the care of local farmers so as to reduce the need for the militia and to alleviate the drain on the dwindling supply of provisions. Pressuring the Board of War for a favorable response, the governor pointed out the fact that if the prisoners were placed outside the fort with families that could watch over them, it would obviate the deleterious effect of taking farmers away from their fields to serve as guards. By advocating Rawlins's work-release plan, the governor hoped to convince the militiamen that he was doing all he could to ease their plight, thereby

forestalling any desertions or protests that might otherwise result from their continuance. Apparently this time the request was granted; however, the need for militia troops still existed.[65]

A letter in September from the governor's council to Daniel Hughes of Washington County requested that he send one-half of a company to Fort Frederick where it would be joined with one company of militia from Frederick County. Attempting to ease the burden that had been placed on the militia of Frederick and Washington Counties, the government issued orders to Montgomery County to march a company west to serve at Fort Frederick for a period of five weeks. In turn, the Montgomery County militia was to be relieved by a company from another county. Meanwhile, as more prisoners were moved into Fort Frederick, the government searched for ways to dispense with further need of the militia. When the British Convention troops who had been taken captive after Saratoga were marched into Maryland, the council found it necessary to augment the guard by two companies. However, Moses Rawlins expressed his belief that the increase among the prisoner population mitigated the continued use of militia as guards because of the rank and file's detestation of the task. According to Rawlins, the militia troops already stationed at the fort would not "subject themselves to close duty." Anticipating the possibility of wholesale escapes which were likely with

the influx of more prisoners, Rawlins needed troops who were more amenable to performing guard duty. Apparently, the government agreed, and for a while some of the recruits to the Select Battalion of Militia were placed under Rawlins's command.[66]

As the war shifted to Virginia, the troops of the Select Battalion were deployed to the south to meet the threat, and the militia was again called to perform guard duty. Instead of relying solely on troops from Frederick and Washington Counties, the call was issued as well to Prince George's, Montgomery, Ann Arundel, and Baltimore Counties. The county lieutenants were advised to select from those who could most afford to be away from home, and that the time on active duty would be for two months which would begin as soon as they arrived at the fort. However, the order apparently did not meet with the approbation of the rank and file. Discovering that some of the field officers had taken it upon themselves to shorten the term of service to one month in order to obtain the requisite number of men to march, the governor's council excoriated the county lieutenants that such a precedent would only result in chaos. In the council's eyes, a one month tour would mean that the companies would constantly be in motion therefore leaving the fort destitute of guards and "the law would become a dead letter."[67]

Whether or not it was true that the militia would constantly be in motion, guards in motion were better than no guards at all, and that is almost the way the situation evolved. One month after ordering the counties to send their companies west, the council was informed that none had arrived from Montgomery County and only seventy-five were left from Baltimore County which made it incumbent on Frederick County to make up the deficit. In all probability, the residents of Frederick County, if given a choice, would have chosen to serve themselves and dispense with the Baltimore County militia companies. It was during their time in Western Maryland that the Baltimore County militia committed the thefts and other depredations that Fielder Gantt had written the council about.[68]

After approximately four years of wrestling to find a way in which the militia could be relieved from its task of guarding the prisoners in Western Maryland, the solution was found in the summer of 1782. The burden was shifted to a corps composed of soldiers who had been invalided and were convalescing in Maryland. Later, in January 1783 the duties were given to a detachment of Continental soldiers.[69]

Elsewhere in Maryland, the problems that had stalked the militia throughout the war faded away as the necessity to maintain the militia became diminished. Between the time of Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown

in October 1781 and the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, whenever the need for troops arose usually either state troops or volunteers were employed. For all practical purposes the militia's services were no longer required. Essentially, only the passage of time served to heal the wounds that had been opened from the incessant squabbling between the politicians, officers, and men.[70]

If the Maryland militia accomplished anything during the war, it was to finally overcome the prevalence of social deference. The continued demands placed on the legislature by the officers for militia laws that would force the rank and file into obeisance never achieved the desired effect. Measures that were designed to enforce discipline might have had a better chance of gaining adherence in the relatively isolated environment of the regular forces where few alternatives existed, but the militia was a different matter.

For the average militiaman who, for the most part, performed his service close to home, the choice to obey or disobey the demands placed on his time were essentially his, with relatively few negative consequences attending him if he declined. Because he was a citizen first and soldier second, the harsh disciplinary measures that were a feature of the regular army could not be employed in the militia to bring him into line. If the militiaman felt he was being ill-used by those in command,

he could easily redress his grievances by not attending musters or alarms. Because many of his comrades were in like circumstances, the militiaman who voiced his discontent often found that his actions were met with approbation rather than censure. Given this kind of environment where peer pressure was so apparent and effective, it is not difficult to understand Joshua Beall's concerns for the rest of his battalion when James Short and his associates staged their protest.[71]

For laws to be enforced, the agency responsible for enforcing them must command some degree of respect. Consequently, if those who are charged with enforcement appear to be arbitrary in their administration of the laws, no respect will be forthcoming from those who are to obey. In a society that was supposed to be characterized by deference based on wealth and property, respect and obedience were expected to be blindly given to those who formed the elite. However, as consistently demonstrated by the rank and file, Maryland was not a society where the notion of deference was universally accepted, especially during the Revolution.

Throughout the war, it appears that the group who most exemplified the elite's failure to understand why obedience was not readily given was that of the militia officers. Because of their position among Maryland's elite, apparently many officers believed that deference came

automatically with their commission. However, to the average militiaman, it seems that an officer's leadership abilities counted for more than his social position. This may have been the case when the men of Josias Hawkins's battalion balked at being exercised by an adjutant rather than the officers themselves. Certainly Captain Joseph Byas had not demonstrated good leadership skills when he had absconded with the provisions that the rank and file had paid for.[72]

Competent leadership also means that those who wish to command hold a certain amount of respect for those who are to be commanded. But in a society where deference for one's betters is supposed to be cherished, the potential for mutual respect based upon abilities is held in abeyence. Instead, the likelihood for abuses committed by those at the top is made possible. In Maryland where adherence to deference seems to have been only accepted by those at the top of society, any instances of disregard or disdain for those in the lower ranks was not taken lightly. The petition of Captain Chew's company illustrates the point well. This does not mean that none of the militia officers understood the importance of respect. In his evaluation of the classing system imposed on the militia, Joshua Beall at least indicated some inkling of awareness. It was his belief that the classes should be divided in such a manner that at least one officer from each company should be called

upon whenever the classes were called out. The failure to do so would only serve to increase the discontent of the rank and file because they would be forced to act under officers who were unfamiliar to them. It would seem that to serve under officers of unknown ability exacerbated the fear among the men that they would be treated in an arbitrary manner.[73]

The belief in the need for mutual respect that was held by many of the rank and file crossed back and forth between the militia and the society at large. Actions committed by the elite and perceived to be of an unjust nature by the lower class were not to be tolerated in the militia either. The militia could not be expected to protect those believed to be hoarding necessities when they, as civilians, were suffering from the same shortages. Although James Lloyd Chamberlaine may have not seen it that way, his resignation from the militia, after he was robbed of his salt, may have been the only choice available to him. If he, as a citizen, was perceived to be profiting at the expense of others, it is hardly likely that as a militia officer he could command the respect of those men who were also being victimized by his self-aggrandizement.[74]

This is not to say, however, that all acts of disobedience by the rank and file were justifiable. Certainly the crass behavior displayed by the Rewastico company can hardly be condoned. But even then, the militia's apparent insouciance may have some underlying explanation. Horatio Sharpe seemed to understand during the French and Indian War, that the farther removed physically the people were from the war, the less likely they were to comprehend the degree to which their security was endangered. In an era characterized by poor modes of transportation and communication, the armed conflicts outside of Boston, in New York, and to the South may have seemed to the average Marylander as remote as a war in Europe. Virtually unscathed for most of the war as the conflict swirled all about it, Maryland's relatively isolated position must have led many within the state to deny that any sense of emergency was present. In turn, lacking the presence of any clear and certain danger, many among the rank and file must have apprehended their service in the militia as superfluous and unnecessary. Thus the likelihood for absenteeism and rowdyism at field exercises was increased.[75]

With the British posing no direct threat to Maryland, the conflicts within the militia were magnified and the social causes became more acutely felt, if not misunderstood by the officers. Unable to gain the respect

and obedience they felt should be accorded their military and social rank, the officers had often turned to the politicians for help. However, on such matters as non-enrollment, the selection of officers, and disciplinary measures, the politicians had often temporized leaving the officers, as Joshua Beall had so aptly put it, to be "mean ciphers indeed." In many cases, unlike the officers, the politicians were above the fray and saw the situation differently. As Hoffman points out, with so much social unrest throughout the state and aware of the fragile hold they had on power, the leaders of the popular party understood that some concessions had to be made in order to maintain their grasp of the political machinery. In Hoffman's view, the most important concession the politicians made was to resort to a graduated method of taxing the inhabitants. Hoffman believes that after this measure was passed and the direct threat posed by the British presence in Philadelphia was removed, much of the dissent dissipated in Maryland. Indeed, it may have done much to dampen the people's hostility towards the politicians, but judging by the refractory nature of the militia even after the measure was enacted in 1777 and the British were removed from the middle states in 1778, a large measure of social unrest appears to have remained.[76]

The interminable squabbling that raged between the three sides of the triangle over the course of the Revolution led many in Maryland to believe, as had James Lloyd Chamberlaine in 1776, that the militia was more disposed to "fight with his neighbor than face the enemy." Chamberlaine's point appears to be a valid one. Certainly the militia had consistently demonstrated its penchant for waging war on itself, but as a military organization, the question that arises is how successful was the militia when it was forced to confront its military adversary? The answer appears to be an equivocal sometimes.[77]

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]Maryland Gazette, 22 December 1774.

[2]Maryland Gazette, 18 April 1776.

[3]State Papers [MdHR 4581-15], Robert Tyler to Governor, 9 June 1777, MHR.

[4]Skaggs, Roots of Democracy in Maryland, p. 157.

[5]Fowle, "The Maryland Militia During the Revolutionary War," pp. 53-54. Using tables compiled from tax records, Fowle's statistical analysis that the ranks of the militia conformed to the existing socioeconmic structure in Maryland is probably an accurate picture. However, what the statistics do not show is the degree of discord that existed between the classes and how much of that discord came to light during militia exercises.

[6]Skaggs, Roots of Democracy in Maryland, p. 122; Land, Colonial Maryland, pp. 274-276; Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 224.

[7]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 224.

[8]Lockridge, "Social Change and the Meaning of the American Revolution," p. 506; Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America, pp. 193-96. Although Lockridge concerns himself with conditions that existed in New England, Jackson Turner Main's study of society during the Revolutionary period seems to bear out Lockridge's beliefs. As available land became scarce and the population grew, many of the lower classes became more dependent on the wealthy land-owners in order to continue farming. Many of the smaller farmers were forced to become tenants on the properties of the wealthier. As they did so, Lockridge believes the lower classes wished for a return to the more equalitarian days of the seventeenth century. This wish became manifest in the growing signs of discontent as the Revolution drew near.

[9]State Papers [MdHR 4581-61], Joseph Dashiell to Governor, 28 June 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4576-66], Thomas Gist to Governor, 20 June 1777, MHR; Council to

Murdock, 1 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 3-4. When Murdock apprised the Council that he was encountering difficulties in raising enough troops to march north, the only advice the Council could give him was to try and use the news of Washington's victories at Trenton and Princeton as a means of persuasion. The Council appears to have been naive to believe that an appeal to the rank and file's virtue would triumph over the reality of having to march north in the dead of winter with very little equipment. Richard Dallum to Governor Lee, 16 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 20-21; Maryland Gazette, 7 July 1780. Unable to raise enough recruits to answer Washington's call for 2205 men, the government tried to persuade the state's citizenry with the argument that the draft laws had been legislated by the "representatives of the people who are sensitive to the idea that the war must be fought to a successful end." Not content to leave any stone unturned, the government then used fear tactics by reminding everyone of the British depredations in the Carolinas and New Jersey.

[10]Sharpe to Stanwix, 25 May, 1757, Archives of Maryland Vol. IX, pp. 1-2; Sharpe to Calvert, 5 Oct 1756, Archives of Maryland Vol. VI, p. 491. The country party used the discontent of the people as an excuse to forestall the passage of a militia bill that the governor desired. Sharpe to Stanwix, 27 June 1757, Archives of Maryland Vol. IX, p. 30. Sharpe stated that the militia would not march if called upon because the General Assembly had refused to pay the men for their services too many times in the past. Since most of the militiamen "have to work to live," they "cannot muster without pay." Sharpe to Bouquet, 21 April 1764, Archives of Maryland Vol. XIV, p. 155. Sharpe apologized to Bouquet for not being able to render any assistance during the Indian uprising because the militia refused to march. Sharpe blamed the General Assembly for the militia's backwardness because the Assembly had still not paid the men for time served during the French and Indian War. Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 224.

[11]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 169, 226.

[12]Sharpe to St. Clair, 31 May 1758, Archives of Maryland Vol. IX, p. 193.

[13]Richard Dallum to Governor Lee, 16 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 20-21. Dallum complained to the governor that the militia laws at the time were defective and that "nothing effectual can be done, as the orders of officers are disregarded by the men." George Dashiell to Governor Lee, 17 January 1781,

Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 24. Dashiell echoes Dallum's sentiments stating that under the regulations in effect at the time, it was beyond his power to compel the men to perform any kind of service. Richard Barnes to Governor, 27 July 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 32. Barnes was exceedingly unhappy with the state's methods for procuring recruits from the militia and bluntly told the governor that he wished he could be "out of the business." Barnes further gave his opinion that the method of classifying the men was "the most absurd thing I've ever seen." Thomas Hayward to Governor Lee, 29 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 40-41. Hayward resigned his commission as a captain in the Princess Anne Battalion Somerset County militia because "the dissaffection of the people is not to be bore with," and it was not within his "power to alter." Charles S. Smith to Tilghman, 9 September 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 262. Smith resigned his commission and asked to be allowed to serve as a private because of the discontent and confusion that existed within his company.

[14]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 224. State Papers [MdHR 4570-33], Ezekial Forman to Governor Johnson, 12 July 1778, MHR. Forman, a paymaster for the state, complained that since his appointment he had not been given any money with which to close out his accounts. In the interim, the militia had been called out on three separate occasions and Forman had "not one farthing to pay them."

[15]Committee of Observation for the Middle District of Frederick County to the Council of Safety, 1 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 308-310.

[16]State Papers [MdHR 4574-28], Committee of Observation, 2 August 1775, MHR.

[17]Committee of Observation to Council of Safety, 8 June 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 481-483.

[18]Charge Against Clark, 1 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 540.

[19]Ibid, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 540.

[20]Josias Hawkins to Council, 7 October, 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 325.

[21]State Papers [MdHR 4576-66], Thomas Gist to Governor Johnson, 20 June 1777, MHR.

[22]State Papers [MdHR 4581-18], John D. Thompson to Governor, 14 June 1777, MHR.

[23]State Papers [MdHR 4593-99], Joshua Beall to Council, 16 July 1778, MHR.

[24]Ibid; State Papers [MdHR 4584-102], Joshua Beall to Field Officers, 16 July 1778, MHR; State Papers [4584-97], Joshua Beall to Governor, 2 October 1778, MHR; Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 17 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 24.

[25]State Papers [MdHR 4584-44], George Dashiell to Governor, 24 September 1778, MHR.

[26]State Papers, [MdHR 4584-47], Deposition of Joseph Piper 21 September 1778, MHR.

[27]Petition of Chew's Company, 5 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 322-323.

[28] Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p.268; Memorial of Chew's Company, 29 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 101.

[29]Memorial of Chew's Company, 29 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 101.

[30]Sharpe to Calvert, 26 December 1757, Archives of Maryland Vol. IX, pp. 118-119.

[31]Thomas Dorsey to Council of Safety, 14 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 45; Thomas Price to Council of Safety, 26 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 122. Thomas Ennals to Council of Safety, July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 543.

[32]State Papers [MdHR 4581-62], John Dickenson to Governor Johnson, 26 June 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4588-68], Charles Rumsey to Governor Johnson, 15 June 1778, MHR; Richard Barnes to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 223. When Phillip Feddeman could not prevail on the men of his battalion to form up into classes, he notified the governor that the men told him they would lose all their crops. State Papers [MdHR 4576-38], Phillip Feddeman to Governor Johnson, 14 June 1777, MHR.

[33]State Papers [MdHR 4578-66], Thomas Bourk to Council of Safety, 19 July 1776, MHR; Maryland Gazette, 7 July 1780.

[34]Samuel Smith to Governor, 25 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 37-38; Fielder Gantt to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 1 February 1782, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVIII, pp. 45-46.

[35]Fielder Gantt to Governor Johnson, 4 February 1782, Archives of Maryland Vol. XKVIII, p. 52.

[36]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 224.

[37]Dorchester Committee to Council, 15 November 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 451.

[38]Ibid, pp. 449-450.

[39]Ibid, p. 450.

[40]Council to Dorchester Committee, 18 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 462.

[41]Melward and Larey Depositions, 30 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 562-565.

[42]John Gibson to Council, 4 January 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 16-18.

[43]James Murray to Council, 28 November 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 485; State Papers [MdHR 4574-112], James LLoyd Chamberlaine to Council of Safety, 26 December 1776, MHR.

[44]Papenfuse, et. al., A Biographical Dictionary of the Maryland Legislature, 1635-1789, pp. 206-207.

[45]Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," Maryland Historical Magazine XIII (1947):184-196; Edward C. Papenfuse and Gregory A. Stiverson, "General Smallwood's Recruits: The Peacetime Career of the Revolutionary Private," William and Mary Quarterly, 30(1973):117-132. Cushing, First Laws of Maryland (Wilmington: Michael Glazier Inc., 1981), Chap XLIII, "An Act to Procure Troops," 1780; Cushing, The First Laws of the State of Maryland , Chap III, "An Act to promote the recruiting service," 1777. Unable to retain the numbers the state needed to fulfill its quotas, two groups, slaves and indentured servants, who had been prevented formerly from any active participation in the militia were deemed

eligible during the war to be used as substitutes. Their earlier banishment from military service had been due to the possibility that either group might threaten the security of the province if it was armed.

[46]State Papers [MdHR 4576-41], Phillip Feddeman to Governor Johnson, 15 May 1777, MHR. Attempting to raise recruits from his battalion, Feddeman was told by his lieutenants that unless some money was advanced by the state for clothing and necessities no one would enlist. When Feddeman responded that they would be clothed by the state "on moderate terms," the men still remained obstinate, saying that they could not depend upon that. Afterward, when Feddeman advanced the officers some money out of his own pockets, the officers quickly came up with twelve enlistees. State Papers [MdHR 4576-139], Zadock Magruder to Governor, 20 June 1777, MHR. After being instructed by the government to raise three companies of volunteers as part of the quota for Montgomery County, Magruder called his battalion together and felt satisfied that he would be able to do so without having to resort to a draft. However, a subaltern in one of the companies stepped out of formation and began complaining loudly that he had never been compensated for marching to Philadelphia the previous winter. According to Magruder, the lieutenant was never paid because he and the company that had marched with him had deserted before they made camp. Nevertheless, Magruder and the other officers present could not restrain him which left them with no other choice than to dismiss the battalion. Uriah Forrest to Governor Lee, 29 October 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 165. Forrest wrote the governor informing him that a number of men who had fulfilled their enlistments in the regular army were complaining about the state's refusal to honor its pledge to redeem pay and clothing certificates. Forrest estimated that three hundred men had gathered to protest but had left when their demands went unanswered. Because of the state's niggardliness and the dissatisfaction of the veterans, Forrest doubted he could prevail on any of the other locals to enlist.

[47]Johnson to Council of Safety, 10 January, 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 36.

[48]Johnson to Council of Safety, 28 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 557-558; John Murdock to Council of Safety, 28 December 1776, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XII, p. 558.

[49]Queen Anne's County Committee of Observation to Council of Safety, 5 February 1777, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XVI, p. 119.

[50]Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," p. 194; State Papers [MdHR 4543-2], Liber GR Folio 91, An Act to Regulate the Militia, June 1777, MHR..

[51]State Papers [MdHR 4580B-99], Joshua Beall to Governor, 20 December 1777, MHR.

[52]State Papers [MdHR 4581-15], Robert Tyler to Governor, 9 June 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4581-65], George Dashiell to Governor, 9 June 1777, MHR.

[53]State Papers [MdHR 4580B-23], Darby Lux to Governor, 24 June 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4581-61] Joseph Dashiell and Robert Done to Governor, 28 June 1777, MHR.

[54]Cushing, The First Laws of the State of Maryland, Chap. V, 1778.

[55]Ibid, Chap. V, 1778.

[56]Council to Captain Levin Handy, 13 March 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLIII, p. 110. Apparently Captain Handy had been recruiting throughout Worcester County but met with no luck. The Council informed Handy that according to reports from Joseph Dashiell, the rumors of a possible draft had been responsible for Handy's inability to secure recruits. Those in the county who did wish to serve were waiting for the draft in order to make money as substitutes. Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 28 August 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol XLV, p. 63; Council to William Hemsley, 29 August 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 586. Peter Baker complained to the Council that he had been engaged as a substitute for the price of one hundred bushels of wheat, but had not received it. Council to Thomas Sprigg, 4 August 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 540. Francis Mathews had been engaged as a substitute for the price of "five half Joes in Gold" but had only received one silver dollar and some paper money which totaled only four half Johannes.

[57]State Papers [MdHR 4570-25], Ezekial Dean to Governor, 29 June 1779, MHR; John Schly to Governor and Council, 7 November 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, pp. 168-169; Council to Captain Eccleston, 20 May 1778, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 98. A minister in Dorchester County complained to the Council that a man

in his employ had been abducted by two militia officers. In the process of taking the man away the officers, Mr. McKeel and Mr. Byas, had resorted to physical force in which the unwilling substitute was wounded. Although very likely, it is difficult to determine whether the Mr. Byas the minister refers to is the same Captain Byas, who had been previously caught for defrauding his company and embezzling the food that was supposed to be provided for the men during muster days. James Dulaney to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 9 August 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 45. After serving in the Continental army for two years, Dulaney came home to find his family in an impovershed state. Shortly thereafter, Dulaney claimed he was abducted and subsequently placed in irons "only to fill up a class and encourage rogs [sic]" to sell him "like a slave." Hardly understating the situation as he perceived it, Dulaney believed the actions pursued by some in order to find substitutes was "poor encouragement when a man has complied with everything that could be requested of him."

[58]Cushing, First Laws of Maryland, Chap. X, 1780; William Whitely to Governor and Council, 24 July 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 27; Richard Barnes to Governor Lee, 23 July 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 25; Henry Downes to Governor, 26 July 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 28; Council to Job Garretson, 15 August 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 564.

[59]Cushing, First laws of Maryland Chap XV, 1781; Francis Ware to Colonel John Stone, 20 March 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 136; William Hemsley to Governor Lee, 10 May 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 236.

[60]Council Meeting, 9 August 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, pp. 551-552; Joshua Beall to Governor, 21 August 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 434.

[61]Joseph Dashiell to Governor Lee, 30 September 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 128; Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 28 August 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 63; Benjamin MacKall to Colonel Forrest, 28 July 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 33.

[62]Clements and Wright, The Maryland Militia in the Revolutionary War, p. 37; Elias Boudinot to Governor Johnson, 23 December 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 445.

[63]Governor Johnson to Charles Beatty, 31 December 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 451; Charles Beatty to Horatio Gates, 5 February 1778, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 491;

[64]Charles Beatty to Horatio Gates, 5 February 1778, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XVI, p. 491; Horatio Gates to Governor Johnson, 11 February 1778, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 490; Council Meeting, 23 February 1778, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 516.

[65]Council to Board of War, 15 April 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, pp. 348-349; Council to Daniel Hughes, 23 April 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 363.

[66]Council to Daniel Hughes, 11 September 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol XXI, p. 525; Council to Lieutenant of Washington County, 10 November 1780, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLIII, p. 356; Colonel Moses Rawlins to Governor Lee, 5 December 1780, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XLIII, p. 397.

[67]Council to Phillip Thomas, 20 February 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 320; Circular to County Lieutenants, 3 December 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVIII, p. 12; Council to Andrew Buchanan, 3 January 1782, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVIII, p. 38.

[68]Council to Andrew Buchanan, 8 February 1782, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVIII, p. 72; Fielder Gantt to Governor Thomas Sim Lee 1 February 1782, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVIII, pp. 45-46

[69]Clements and Wright, The Maryland Militia in the Revolutionary War, p. 39.

[70]Ibid, p. 33.

[71]State Papers [MdHR 4593-99], Joshua Beall to Council, 16 July 1778, MHR.

[72]Josias Hawkins to Council, 7 October, 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol.XII., p. 325. Petition of the Castle Haven Company, 21 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 390-391.

[73]State Papers [MdHR 4593-99], Joshua Beall to Council, 16 July 1778, MHR; Petition of Chew's Company, 5 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII., pp. 322-323.

[74]James LLoyd Chamberlaine to Council of Safety, 26 December 1776, MHR.

[75]Sharpe to Calvert, 9 July 1755, Archives of Maryland Vol. VI, pp. 240-241. As the Indian depredations increased, Sharpe told Calvert that those legislators living on the frontier were well-disposed toward finding assistance to put an end to the threat; however, he believed he could not prevail on the citizens from the Eastern counties to march West because they were too far removed from the situation to perceive the true state of emergency that existed.

[76] Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 17 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 24; Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 240-241.

[77]James LLoyd Chamberlaine to Council of Safety, 26 December 1776, MHR.

CHAPTER V

THE MILITIA AT WAR: ALACRITY AND BACKWARDNESS

Responding to a request from two counties on Virginia's Eastern Shore, the Maryland Convention dispatched three of its minute companies in January 1776 from Queen Anne's, Dorchester, and Kent Counties to go to their assistance. Despite the Convention's best efforts to anticipate all eventualities, the expedition seems to have been beset with obstacles almost from the beginning. Upon receiving the Convention's notification to begin the march to Virginia, Captain Joseph Robson and his company found themselves unable to depart from Dorchester County. After an inspection of the company revealed the fact that it possessed only ten serviceable muskets, the county committee, in accordance with the Convention's directives, sought to procure the necessary weapons from the surrounding counties' supply of arms, as well as from the inhabitants of Dorchester County. However, much to the committee's chagrin, none were to be found. Dorchester County was not alone in its inauspicious beginnings to defend the noble cause.[1]

Marching his company to Snow Hill, Captain Henry Kent found upon his arrival that neither arms, ammunition, nor provisions had been gathered for his men, despite assurances made to the contrary by the Convention. Compounding Kent's dismay, the Convention also had failed to authorize anyone in Worcester County to pay the troops once they arrived in Snow Hill. With many of his men in desperate need of shoes and a number of weapons in disorder, Kent had no choice other than to advance money to the men from out of his own pockets. Failing that, he believed, there was no other means of continuing on to his destination. When the expedition finally arrived in Virginia, it found itself surrounded by both a populace and militia that were less than zealous in their sympathy for the cause. Further adding to the growing litany of miseries endured by Kent and his men, the companies were then informed by the Convention that their tour of duty had been extended for another six weeks. When placed in effect, the extension put the minute companies beyond the dissolution date that had been originally set by the Convention. Obviously annoyed, Captain Kent vented his frustrations in a letter to the Queen Anne's Committee of Observation stating that in his opinion, the government was "stretching" its powers and taking from his men the liberty that they were supposed to be fighting for. Oddly enough, despite all of their attending difficulties, the

minute companies that served did meet with some degree of success in their attempts to repulse the raids perpetrated by Lord Dunmore's fleet along Virginia's shore.[2]

Although the expedition ultimately proved successful, the most notable aspect of the odyssey to Virginia appears to have been how closely it resembled the pattern that would plague all future operations of the Maryland militia over the course of the war. Consistently, in the face of British raids, the militia would find itself to be ill-armed, ill-provided for, and in some instances, besieged with indifference from within its own ranks. When called to action, the problems of poor leadership, poor discipline, and social disorder that characterized the militia's behavior on the muster-field were not always left behind. In many instances, these factors, either by themselves or in a combination, frustrated what little chance the militia had of achieving success. However, this does not mean that the militia always met with failure. In those cases when their homes seemed most to have been in peril, Maryland's citizen-soldiers did display, at times, surprising flashes of spirit and alacrity. While the disputatious behavior of the militia hindered its effectiveness and worked to lower its morale considerably, there were other factors

at play that exacerbated the situation. Probably the most vexatious of these was the state's inability to properly arm, equip, and provision the force that it depended upon most for its continued survival.

Lacking the legitimacy to levy taxes in order to arm and equip the militia, the Convention had used the only means open to it in 1774 when it first urged the embodiment of "gentlemen, freemen and other freeholders" into companies. At that time the extra-legal government could ask only that those who joined be responsible for supplying their own arms and accouterments. Additionally, the militia was to be supplied by voluntary contributions from those residents who supported the cause. Doubtless, as it stood in its embryonic stages, the militia could have provided hardly much more than a token response to any serious military threat made against the province.[3]

After the battles of Lexington and Concord, the Convention began taking more vigorous action to supply its fledgling military force. In April 1775, the Convention requested of Governor Eden that he turn over all provincial arms that were lodged in the public magazine. Despite the fact that he had few other options available to him, Eden decided to delay his answer until he could consult with his council. The next day, presumably after taking the matter into consideration with his council, the governor acceded to the Convention's request with one stipulation.

In what seems to have been designed as a face-saving device, Eden asked only that the county militia colonels, in conformity with the traditional procedure, solicit him directly for the supplies. With the public arms now at its disposal, the Convention began to make plans to augment its arsenal.[4]

Included in the resolutions of the "Association of Freemen," the Convention established the means to make further procurements of arms and ordanance by issuing bills of credit to help underwrite the creation of salt-petre and gunpowder works throughout the province. Citizens were urged to help in the production of crude nitre, and agents were appointed to supervise the process in the various counties. Additionally, agents were appointed to contract for the purchase of arms, and militia commanders were ordered to confiscate the weapons of all non-enrollers. A committee of the Convention, charged with determining the feasibility of establishing an arms factory, believed the idea to be too expensive and instead, recommended that gunsmiths be contracted within each county. The committee also prepared the guidelines for the correct specifications of each weapon produced for the state. While the Convention appears to have adopted most of the recommendations prepared by the committee, it decided to ignore one, and in December authorized the establishment of a gun-lock factory in Frederick County with its initial costs underwritten by

the government. However, as diligent as the Convention seems to have been in its attempts to obtain the materiel necessary for the state's defense, the efforts appear to have met with negligible results.[5]

In a number of cases, those who were contracted by the state to produce items failed to fulfill their promises. Hans Yost and John Unsold, two gunsmiths who had undertaken a contract to produce muskets for the state, found themselves unable to produce the requisite number they had contracted for. In addition, those muskets they did complete were returned to them by the Convention after it was determined that the weapons were unfit for use. In their defense, Yost and Unsold claimed that they had been prevented from fulfilling their bargain because of the time they had been forced to spend repairing weapons that were already in the state's possession. Nor were they alone in voicing this complaint. Other gunsmiths reported delays in producing new weapons because of the repairs that were necessary to put those muskets already in the hands of the state into good order. Apparently, the situation became so bad that the Council of Safety ordered the militia commanders on the Eastern Shore to seek local gunsmiths to repair broken weapons so that Elisha Winters, a gunsmith in Chestertown, could fulfill his contract for producing new ones. Other delays in the

production of muskets and accouterments seemed to have come from excuses ranging from illness, to the necessity of harvesting crops, to one case where a gunsmith's assistants had enlisted in the Flying Camp.[6]

The state's increasing demand for weapons led many of Maryland's gunsmiths to hope that the government would pay more for their products, but their hopes soon foundered. Where many of the gunsmiths believed six pounds for a musket to be a fair asking price, the state refused to go higher than four pounds ten shillings per musket. The state's reluctance to pay higher prices for muskets carried over into the purchase of other items as well. Contracted by the state to make bayonets, Amos Garrett, although promising to make good on his bargain with the state, complained that the process was slow and he could make more money doing other things. Originally, Garrett had hoped that the state would be willing to pay high prices for the weapons but decided that in the end, he probably would lose money on the contract.[7]

The state's inability to procure a sufficient amount of new weapons was compounded by the scarcity and condition of those already in circulation. As early as November 1775, complaints were being lodged concerning the poor condition and shortage of arms within the militia. Stephen West, a gun-dealer in Prince George's County, lamented to the Council of Safety that if the militia was

called upon to answer an alarm, approximately ninety percent of it would be without weapons. According to West, of those few arms that were in the hands of the militia, most belonged to the officers and many were without ramrods. Apparently, weapons were not the only item the militia was lacking; accouterments also seemed to have been in short supply. It was West's estimate that the company in his neighborhood had fewer than five cartridge boxes in its possession. Added to the shortage of weapons was the dwindling supply of powder. According to West, before the previous December there had been an adequate supply in the county, but a considerable amount had been expended for the purpose of firing "Christmas guns" in addition to the practice of taking potshots at birds and squirrels. Although for his part West claimed to have a number of weapons in his possession, he was reluctant to comply with a request that he disperse them amongst the militia, fearing that they would be used on wildfowl and not the enemy. West was not alone in his concerns.[8]

Thomas Dorsey complained that the situation in his battalion was equally deplorable. Dorsey found that many of the militiamen were without any weapons, and of the muskets the battalion did have, a large number were completely unserviceable. The shortage was compounded by the fact that the many of the rank and file of his battalion who did have muskets were too poor to have their

weapons repaired. In those cases where the militia was armed, it was discovered that their weapons came in a variety of shapes and sizes. With companies armed in a varying fashion, ranging from muskets, to rifles, to fowling pieces, the task of providing ammunition became more arduous, as the commanding officers had to have bullet-molds on hand to accommodate all of these weapons.[9]

The problem of sufficiently arming and equipping the militia became more acute after Maryland was called upon to furnish troops for the Continental service. Unable to find the means to manufacture enough weapons, the government requested that arms for the Flying Camp be taken from the public supply. Where deficits occurred, it was suggested that muskets be borrowed from the militia, and local officers make further attempts to disarm all non-enrollers. However none of these recommendations produced the desired effect. Replying to the Council's request, the Dorchester Committee of Observation stated that it would do all that it could, but the county was in a "weak and defenseless" condition. According to the committee, only twenty-five percent of the militia had weapons, and of that number, most were either fowling pieces or squirrel guns. Many were found to be defective, and

although some could be repaired, most were deemed to be unserviceable. The committee also noted that there were no weapons to be had from the supply of public arms, and only two muskets had been taken from the county's non-enrollers.[10]

A similar situation existed in Queen Anne's County where it was noted that the militia abjectly refused to part with its weapons. Echoing the same sentiments, John Hanson notified the Council of Safety that unless something was done, arming the recruits for the Flying Camp in Frederick County would be impractical. According to Hanson, the militia around Frederick refused to relinquish their arms to the recruits unless they were paid adequately for them.[11]

The militia's refusal to part with the few weapons it had in its possession coupled with the pressure coming from Congress to forward the Flying Camp northward put the state government in an awkward position. In Queen Anne's County the situation devolved into a state of confusion and panic after the company of state troops stationed there left for camp. With the state troops gone, the populace became fearful that the county would be defenseless in the face of a raid by Lord Dunmore's fleet. To placate the people's fears, the Council of Safety ordered the company that Captain John Dean was raising for the

Flying Camp to be stationed temporarily on Kent Island until it was fully equiped and could be dispatched northward. Unfortunately for Dean, his arrival on the island became a study in frustration.[12]

In order to equip his company, Dean was authorized to draw weapons from the county militia, but already short of arms and ammunition, the local battalion of militia refused to relinquish its weapons. Making matters worse, the location where Dean's company was posted was found to be lacking a source of water, and the owner of a neighboring plantation, Captain Thomas March, refused to allow Dean's men access to his well. If things were not gloomy enough for Dean and his men, it was discovered that the person who had been appointed as commisary had failed to purchase the requisite provisions and no surgeon was available to minister to the men. While Dean's fortunes were sinking, those of Captain John Dame appeared to be on the rise, but that was to change in short order.[13]

Dame had been lucky enough to recruit enough men to fill out the muster-roll of his company and through his own industry, had been able to equip his company with a sufficient number of weapons. The only reason his company was incapable of embarking for New York was due to a lack of cloth for uniforms which he had ordered from the Council of Safety. Instead of receiving the cloth he desired, Dame was ordered to turn over his weapons to Dean's company

so that it could move northward to camp. To make up the deficit, Dame was advised to contact the local gunsmith Elisha Winters, in the hopes that he would have enough weapons on hand for Dame's men. However, Dame was unsatisfied with the Council's rather dubious decisions and vented his pique in a letter. But Dame was not the only one who was disturbed with the Council's decision.[14]

Bereft of the necessary equipment and provisions to travel on to New York, both Dame and Queen Anne's County were left to contend with a company of impoverished and idle men. Complaining about the situation, the Committee of Observation remarked that they were anxious for Dame's company to be supplied, because the men had "thrown themselves out of business by entering into the service," and "many of them have not holes to put their heads in." Unpaid and unprovisioned because they were not yet considered to be on active duty, many of the company had sought some means of local employment to pay for their room and board but had been unsuccessful in their attempts. Exactly why the Council of Safety chose to award Dame's weapons to Dean is difficult to determine, but it clearly illustrates how the the government's decisions often worked to the detriment of the militia's morale and consequently eroded the organization's efficiency.[15]

Occasioned by the march of the Flying Camp to New York, the accompanying drain on Maryland's supply of arms and equipment served to permanently damage the state's already limited ability to provide for its own defense. When the Flying Camp was disbanded in December 1776, the weapons and equipment still in its possession were ordered by Congress to be left behind in Philadelphia. Unfortunately, the amount of weapons and equipment left in Philadelphia was substantially less than it had been when the Flying Camp had left Maryland. The defeats suffered during the campaign in New York and the Jerseys probably accounted for much of the reduction; however, these shortages were compounded further by the departing troops who were spiriting muskets out of camp illegally as they made their way home.[16]

When the Maryland militia was called north by Congress in December 1776 to augment Washington's encampment at Morristown, the paucity of available arms and supplies crippled the efforts directed toward mobilization. With the counties already stripped of arms and equipment, many of the militiamen were hesitant to leave their homes without some assurance that they would be provided for either during the march or upon their arrival. In addition, there was a concern that the further removal of arms would substantially reduce the counties' abilities to protect themselves from attack once the militia had left.[17]

The militia's reluctance to depart brought a flood of letters to the Council from the local committees and militia commanders seeking advice and some measure of assurance from the government. The Cecil County committee admitted to the Council that only forty men could be fitted out for service. In order to prevent a further display of backwardness by its militia, the committee requested an advance of money to provision the troops during their march to Philadelphia. Also, it was hoped that the money could be used to help the poor men of the county obtain the requisite necessities they were lacking, such as shoes and blankets. Adding to the chorus of the concerned, Henry Hollingsworth reported from Head of Elk that he had met a number of companies already marching to Philadelphia without arms or equipment. Noting their miserable condition, Hollingsworth hoped that the Council would issue some form of assurance to the men in order to relieve the uneasiness that was being experienced by many of them.[18]

Despite all the pleas of the county officials and militia commanders, the Council of Safety did little to avoid an impending disaster. Possibly due to the fact that it was aware that the weapons left behind by the Flying Camp were of dubious quality, the Council was hesitant to make any promises beyond the statement that it knew there were weapons available in Philadelphia. Even worse,

the Council retreated from making any demands of Congress to insure that the Maryland militia would be armed and supplied in an adequate fashion. While it had taken the step of requisitioning arms from Congress, the Council was hesitant to go beyond that. As its excuse for not taking a more strident stand, the Council stated that to do so might cast the state in an unfavorable light with Congress.[19]

For his part, the commanding officer, Brigadier General Thomas Johnson, Jr., had expended much of his efforts to prepare the expedition by trying to exact promises from the Council that his men would be adequately supplied with items such as blankets and shoes. However, most of his efforts appear to have been wasted. After Johnson requested that he be given one thousand pairs of shoes to replace those worn out on the march to Philadelphia, the Council replied that it could only supply five hundred. Arriving at Philadelphia in late-January, Johnson's time in the city turned into what must have seemed to him to have been his worst nightmare.[20]

Writing the Council on 4 February 1777, Johnson stated that much of his time had been spent trying to outfit one thousand officers and men for camp. Of that number, Johnson had been successful in forwarding on to Washington only one hundred eighty. In the general's opinion, the delays he had encountered in supplying the men had "hurt

the cause" as much as if the troops had mutinied. Johnson believed that if he had been able to acquire arms when he had arrived, he would have been able to send fifteen hundred men on to Morristown, but because of his inability to do so, instead, whole companies had departed for home. In addition to those militiamen who deserted after arriving in Philadelphia, Johnson reported that a substantial number had deserted for home while still on the march. Apparently, the poor conditions they had endured along the way caused many to abandon the march in disgust. Relaying a rumor he had heard that weapons were available in Baltimore and Chestertown, Johnson warned the Council that it had better send them or else the number of men lost to desertion would continue only to increase.[21]

To compound Johnson's miseries, his efforts to outfit the men under his command were hampered further by those troops in Washington's camp whose terms of service had expired. Upon their departure for home, a sizable number of men were illegally taking weapons that belonged to the government with them. In an effort to curtail the practice, Washington had required that all soldiers be stopped and searched before leaving camp. For those men who were joining him, Washington demanded that receipts be signed as weapons were issued.[22]

As the shortage of weapons in Maryland became critical, the state government appealed to Congress for some form of assistance. Primarily, the government asked for the return of any arms that had been taken out of Maryland by those troops who had been part of the state's Continental quota. When the Flying Camp had been formed in 1776, the state had tried to acquire some guarantee for the return of its public arms, but Congress had resisted, stating that the weapons that had been lent to it had already been turned over to the Continental army. As a justification for its actions, Congress informed the state's delegation that according to the intelligence it had gathered, there was little possibility that Maryland would be subjected to a British attack. Apparently it seemed to Congress, that if Maryland was under little or no threat of being invaded, then the state did not need its weapons returned. However, Maryland's lawmakers surely disagreed after the British invaded the state during the summer of 1777.[23]

Apparently, there were some who seemed to think that Congress's repeated reluctance to return the weapons belonging to the state was motivated by political reasons. When Governor Thomas Johnson attempted to recover some of the arms Maryland troops had left in Philadelphia, Congress informed the state's delegation that there were only 600 muskets remaining in the city, most of which were

in disrepair. Writing to apprise Governor Johnson of the situation and to commiserate with him, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer was of the opinion that Maryland had been too generous with its contributions in the past. Jenifer was afraid that with Maryland in desperate need of arms to protect itself, Congress would overlook those services the state had previously rendered. It was Jenifer's belief that Congress was concerned more with the welfare of the northern colonies and apparently content to leave the southern colonies to fend for themselves. Venting his frustrations, Jenifer complained that Americans were the "most supine people in the universe, they seldom see the danger until it is past."[24]

Although Congress had pleaded poverty to Jenifer, stating that there were only six hundred stand of arms left in Philadelphia, it seems that Maryland's politicians may have calculated differently. According to a 1778 resolution forwarded from the General Assembly to Congress, Maryland claimed that it had sent 1400 arms with Smallwood's battalion and the independent companies, of which none had been returned. The state further contended that it had delivered up to 3000 muskets along with the Flying Camp, of which 2200 had been left in Philadelphia on the order of the Congress. Although the state admitted that based on those figures 800 should have come back to Maryland with the Flying Camp, unfortunately none could be accounted

for. To make matters worse, when the British had invaded the Chesapeake in 1777 on their way to Philadelphia, the militia had lost approximately 1000 more muskets. Apparently, the General Assembly desired either the return of the residual amount of muskets that were owed to the state which amounted to 1100 or the cash equivalent.[25]

Before the urgent appeals of 1778-79, Maryland had never enjoyed, what most militia commanders considered to be, an adequate supply of arms and accouterments, but an accounting of the weapons in the state's possession illustrates exactly how ill-armed the militia was by 1778. In the public armory of Annapolis there were 1253 weapons on hand that were considered to be fit for service. Of those 1253, 605 were listed as new French weapons with bayonets. Another 408 muskets fell into the category of "differing sorts," and still another 160 of the muskets in the armory were reported to be without bayonets. Separate from this total were 156 fowling pieces which were deemed to be either unfit or beyond repair. The account also listed another 196 weapons which needed both cleaning and some amount of repairs.[26]

Distributed among the counties were a total of 1850 weapons with approximately nineteen percent in the hands of the Baltimore County militia. The remaining counties had in their possession on the average of only 100 to 150 each, many of which originally had been

transferred to them from the armory in Annapolis. The severe shortage of muskets in most of Maryland's counties meant that in the event of an emergency, local militia commanders could arm only about two to three companies from their stores of public weapons to meet the threat. If a crisis was to be met with any more than two or three companies of armed men, the county lieutenants had to either try and requisition weapons from the state's meager supply in Annapolis, or augment their forces through the addition of personal weapons. Unfortunately, neither expedient met with any measure of success. In fact the deterioration of the state's ability to arm and equip its militia became so bad that a request in April 1781 by Captain Nicholas Moore for a trumpet had to be denied because the only two that the state owned had been given previously to Count Kasimir Pulaski's Legion.[27]

In the last years of the war, the difficulty of mounting a proper defense was compounded by the state's inability to secure a sufficient supply of rations for those men who were able to arm themselves during an alarm. During the spring of 1781, as a British flotilla roamed the bay and rivers, the governor's council had to issue orders to the militia commanders instructing them to either procure provisions from the local populace or failing that, to resort to impressment in order to obtain from them what was needed to support the men under arms. In some instances

where it was believed that the militia would only be needed for a day or so, militia commanders were instructed to have their men bring along their own rations from home in order to conserve the state's dwindling supply. The result of these instructions prompted some county leaders, such as Richard Barnes of Calvert County, to advise the governor that many of the people in the counties were less fearful of being plundered by the British than they were of being protected by the militia.[28]

Following in the traditional role that had been set for it during the colonial era, the militia was given the mission of defending and protecting the state from invasion. However, that mission was not defined until after 1776. The creation of such quasi-regular units as the independent companies of state troops and Smallwood's battalion seems to indicate that the government perceived the militia's role initially as a supplemental force. However, as the war expanded and Congress called for men to augment the Continental army, the responsibility of defending Maryland was passed on to the militia as the state troops and the Flying Camp made their way north.[29]

Maryland's geography complicated the task of defense. Straddling the Chesapeake Bay and riddled with a large number of navigable rivers and estuaries, Maryland had a large area of shoreline vulnerable to amphibious attack. Further complicating the matter of defense was

the presence of Maryland's Eastern Shore, a peninsula washed by both the Chesapeake and the Atlantic Ocean and connected to the western-half of the state by a thin ribbon of land at the head of the bay. The virtual isolation of the Eastern Shore made communication and coordination of defensive activities difficult, but with the British Navy easily able to control both the ocean and the bay, mounting a well-coordinated defense became almost impossible.[30]

The presence of a large and exposed area of shoreline combined with the British Navy's ability to strike almost at will left the militia with few strategic alternatives available to it. The deployment of a concentrated force to shadow any movement made by British ships sailing along the bay or rivers was frustrated by the number of creeks and tributaries that had to be forded in order to do so. Any such movement was complicated further by the poor network of roads that existed at the time. Seemingly, the only other possibility was to saturate all likely invasion areas with militia companies to prevent any attempts the British might make at establishing a beach-head. In fact, this appears to have been the strategy that Maryland employed; however, it enjoyed only a modicum of success.[31]

It appears that in the first year of the war the prevalent strategy in Maryland was to alert and activate all elements of the militia along the projected path that the invaders were traveling for the purposes of gathering intelligence and to oppose any initial attempts the British might make to land troops. In those places where an attack seemed either imminent or likely, the government's plan was to augment the militia with state troops who would then assume the major share of responsibility for repulsing an invasion. In fact, this appears to be exactly the case during the two forays made by ships from Lord Dunmore's fleet in April and July of 1776. While Maryland's forces proved to be fairly successful in both instances, the raids also pointed out the inherent weaknesses which existed in the state's strategy.

If the strategy was to succeed over the course of the war and especially in the face of a large invasion force, then certain criteria would have to be met. First of all, it was imperative that the state be able to provide enough arms and ammunition to adequately equip a large force of men. Secondly, if the militia was to be of any assistance at all, it would need to display a degree of discipline sufficient to help the state troops effect a coordinated defensive posture. Additionally, to maintain the kind of discipline that would be necessary to oppose successfully a force of well-trained British regulars,

it was essential that the rank and file of the militia cooperate with their officers and correspondingly, that officers of the militia cooperate with those of the state troops. Thirdly, and equally as important, if Maryland was to repulse any concerted thrust the British might attempt, the men of the militia would have to prove willing to remain at their posts for what could be an extended period of time. Unfortunately, in many instances over the course of the Revolution, the militia was found wanting on all counts.

When the sixteen-gun Otter and her tenders sailed up the Chesapeake in March 1776, Maryland was able to effect initially, what appeared to have been, a good response. Militia forces on both the Eastern and Western Shores turned out in numbers large enough to discourage the flotilla from attempting too many incursions along either shore. In Baltimore, state troops supported by complements of militia erected breastworks along Fell's Point and presented itself as a formidable force to the British lying outside of the harbor. Unable to secure much in the way of provisions and challenged by the state ship Defence, Dunmore's force beat back down the bay for Virginia. Upon the Otter's departure from Maryland waters, much praise was expended by the state's politicians for the spirited and alacritous behavior displayed by the armed forces.[32]

When a false alarm sounded during a parade of militia companies in Baltimore, the city's committee chairman, Samuel Purvience, noted to the Council of Safety that he was convinced if Baltimore was to be attacked, the militia would "behave bravely." In the wake of the Otter's foray, after notifying the Council that he had dismissed his men, Colonel Thomas Dorsey commented that he was happy that both his conduct and that of his militia battalion was so well-received. Similarly, Captain Woodhue was gratified to hear that the militia of his county had "behaved with so much spirit and alacrity" during the alarm. Others receiving the praise and thanks of the Council, such as the Calvert County Committee of Observation and Colonel Benjamin Rumsey, were also pleased to think that their militia companies had acted with such "alacrity" during the Otter's presence. However, obscured by the effusive praise that was directed toward the militia, there were certain incidents that apparently had gone unnoticed.[33]

For all the elan that had been exhibited by the militia as it had bolted from the parade in Baltimore, it appears to have escaped the memory of many that the militia, as it scurried away, had turned a deaf ear to the commands of its officers. Similarly, as Benjamin Rumsey articulated his heartfelt thanks for the accolades he had received, his message to the Council on 7 March seems to have been conveniently forgotten. While trying to mobilize

his men for deployment, Rumsey had complained that he desperately needed officers, because his men were so demonstrably lacking in discipline. To make matters worse, discipline was not the only item that had been in short supply during the alarm.[34]

Writing from Leonard Town on 8 March 1776, John Allen Thomas of the state troops had a rather large catalog of complaints for the Council of Safety to consider. Marching his company to the mouth of the Patuxent River when the alarm was given, Thomas had tried to borrow the weapons that were in the hands of the local militia companies but found them to be in a deplorable state of repair and the militia reluctant to part with them. According to Thomas, if the militia was considered to have been in a defenseless state, his company was even worse off. Although the state had promised Thomas that weapons would be waiting for him, in order to arm his men, he had been forced to send someone from his company to canvass the county. In addition to being unarmed, Thomas complained that there was no ordanance available to him either. Among his other wants, Thomas had listed the need for two drummers and fifers, without which, he believed, little could be done. Cartridge paper was also needed in addition to clothes, blankets, molasses, and rum which the Council had made allowances for but had failed to provide. It becomes obvious that in spite of the Council's satisfaction

with the manner in which Maryland had been defended, had the Otter's crew come ashore in St. Mary's County, among other locations, there would have been little the militia or state troops could have done to repel them.[35]

On the Eastern Shore the situation was relatively the same. Had there been a concerted effort by the British there as well, the militia would have been ill-prepared to resist it. Describing the events in Dorchester County during the alarm, James Murray painted a bleak picture for the Council's consideration. Although the Eastern Shore was rife with Toryism and disaffection throughout the war, Murray's report indicates that at least in the early stages of the war, there was a high degree of willingness to answer the Convention's call to arms. Unfortunately, the woeful lack of arms and ammunition may have done much to cool the ardor of those who supported the Revolutionary cause and contributed to the growing disaffection.[36]

When Murray had activated the militia he had been hopeful that after turning out, the men would be properly armed, but that was not the case. To distribute among the militia, Dorchester County only had one barrel of powder in its possession, and according to Murray, the quality of the powder was so poor that if used, it presented a hazard to the men. After distributing all the arms and ammunition he had, both those belonging to the state and

those that were privately owned, Murray was shocked to find that he could manage to provide the assembled militia with only three rounds per man. With arms and ammunition in such pitifully short supply, Murray commented that the people "grew clamorous."[37]

Beseeching the Council for more arms, Murray noted that Captain Woolford's company of state troops had eighty men enlisted in it but was hardly able to present itself as a deterrent to the British. Of the eighty men, only one had a weapon. In a statement that came perilously close to the truth, Murray predicted that if the county was not supplied properly, he was afraid that "morale will drop," and the "people will slink and cower in front of any attacks." Finally, placing the problem squarely in the lap of the Council, Murray and his fellow committeemen stated that they "are sure of the spirit of the men but not sure what will happen without arms."[38]

Reports from other parts of the Eastern Shore painted the same grim picture that Murray had for Dorchester County. In Kent County, the Committee of Observation demanded the return of both the minute company that had been dispatched to Virginia and the weapons that had been shipped to arm the independent company. As it had in Dorchester County, the militia of Kent County had turned out with alacrity when the alarm had been sounded, but when assembled, the companies were found to have been in

in a poor state of readiness. Upon examining the companies that had mustered, the committee reported that an average of only twenty men per company had a weapon and that most of those had been deemed to be unserviceable. When combined, the two companies in Chestertown could scrape together barely twenty muskets. Although the state had been spared from any serious plundering, the sorry condition of Maryland's defense forces did not bode well for the future. After the Otter's foray in March and another by the Fowey in June, Maryland was subjected to the threat of attack once more in July. Unfortunately, before the July invasion, the state had done little to improve its abilities to repel the invasion.[39]

When the Fowey had entered Maryland waters in June, Captain Rezin Beall's company of state troops stationed at Drum Point found themselves miserably provided for. According to their commanding officer, the men had been unable to secure housing for more than twenty of the company. Feeling neglected by the Council, Beall complained that it "cannot be expected for men to camp outside without tents and blankets." Commenting ascerbically on the weapons he had been sent, Beall called them "Vile Trash," and blamed their condition on whoever had been responsible for manufacturing the muskets. He also managed to lay part of the blame on the Council by claiming that the weapons appeared to him to have been "culled and picked" instead

of being properly inspected. Pointing to another blunder by the Council, Beall noted that, although he had been sent cloth to make shirts, the Council had forgotten to include thread in the shipment. While the first two appearances of the British fleet along Maryland's shoreline were characterized almost exclusively by posturing on both sides, the alarm in July was the first to draw blood.[40]

At 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, 12 July 1776, forty sail of square-rigged vessels menaced the shore close to Point Lookout causing the militia companies of St. Mary's and Calvert Counties to scurry into action while express riders spread the alarm. Already aware of the fleet's presence, the Council of Safety sprang into action by calling on the battalion of state troops commanded by Josias Carvil Hall to deploy around Baltimore and Annapolis. Additionally, Hall was ordered to repair to Annapolis in order that he might assist the Council in drafting plans for the defense of the state. Intelligence from Virginia identified the fleet as that of Lord Dunmore who had been driven by local militia forces from his anchorage off Gwynn's Island.[41]

The Council's first orders instructed that all livestock be removed from the islands dotting the bay to prevent them from being plundered by Dunmore. On 13 July, Colonel Richard Barnes of St. Mary's County, noting that the fleet now was estimated to be at fifty-eight sail and

lying off the Potomac River, ordered five companies of his militia to Point Lookout and the remaining companies of his battalion to a position where any landings along the Potomac could be repulsed. Barnes notified the Council that he had approximately 200-300 militiamen already in place and had sent an express to Colonel Jeremiah Jordan requesting an additional 100-200 men from Jordan's battalion. Barnes also advised the Council that he thought it would be best if Captain Rezin Beall remove his company of independent troops from Drum Point and deploy them along the river. In place of Beall's company, Barnes was to garrison Drum Point with a company of militia. Further intelligence was gathered when the militia intercepted two small boats manned by three whites and two blacks, some of whom were infected with smallpox. According to the prisoners, it was believed that Dunmore intended to take St. George's Island in order to establish it as a base-camp for his fleet.[42]

By 15 July, Dunmore's fleet had increased to eighty sail and was lying at a point just off St. Mary's County. The Council had ordered those independent companies that had been originally instructed to begin marching north to Washington's camp to halt and take up positions along the bay. Brigadier General John Dent was given command of both the militia and independent troops that were operating in Southern Maryland. An express dispatched

from Colonel Jeremiah Jordan to the Council on 15 July relayed the news that the British had landed ten boatloads of men on St. George's Island and were in the process of going back for more. Jordan hoped to have his men ranged along the river opposite the island by that evening and was hopeful that he could obtain more intelligence to clarify Dunmore's intentions.[43]

Arriving at St. George's on 17 July with 100 militiamen, Colonel Jordan informed the Council that at daybreak the British had sent a galley mounted with two swivel guns along the riverbank and raked the sentinels he had posted there with fire for approximately one hour but with no harmful effect. After retiring, the galley did not appear again until the evening when it laid down a barrage lasting for two hours. While the galley made its sortie, Dunmore landed approximately 300 men on the island who then took up positions opposite the militia. Once in place, Dunmore's men began harassing the militia with musket fire and shot from the swivel guns. During the action Captain Beall was wounded in the shoulder with a musket ball which apparently "rendered him incapable of duty."[44]

While the action continued, Colonel Jordan received reports that the British were in the process of constructing another galley in order to begin their raids along the Potomac. For his part, Jordan planned to maintain

his present position, but if it proved untenable, he made contingencies to drop back to a wooded area about one-half mile away. However, the colonel was confident that with 600 men he could accomplish his mission. While Jordan held his position opposite the island, Colonel Richard Barnes had arrayed his men on the other side of the river in the hopes of discouraging the enemy from making any landings there.[45]

After receiving the battle-reports, the Council of Safety, on 18 July, ordered three four-pound cannon to be dispatched to St. Mary's to assist the militia. Additionally, in what appears to have been a rather controversial move, the Council, for some unknown reason, ordered Major Thomas Price of the state troops to proceed from Somerset County to St. Mary's in order to assume command of the entire operation in place of Dent. When Dent was informed of the news a few days later, he tendered his resignation in disgust.[46]

Writing from his headquarters along the Charles River on 19 July before his resignation, General Dent notified the Council that the militia had taken four deserters who had estimated Dunmore's strength to be approximately 50 British regulars from the 14th Regiment, 150 Tories, and another 100 blacks all under arms. According to the deserters, during the skirmish of 17 July, the militia had killed one of the mates aboard the Roebuck.

The deserters also informed Dent that Dunmore had sailed to the area to take on wood, water, and provisions as well as to use the fresh waters of the surrounding rivers to rid his ship's hulls of worms. Once he had completed that, Dunmore planned to burn the smaller boats of his fleet and make his way back to England.[47]

Dent also informed the Council that the fleet had been pared in two with one half going up the Potomac while the other remained at St. George's Island. Exclusive of the independent companies, the militia stood at approximately 400 men with another three companies marching from the interior to augment them. By 20 July, Dent received word that his forces could hear cannon-fire coming from up the Potomac, however he had no idea what was happening in that area. Shortly afterward, Price arrived in St. Mary's County to assume command, and Dent notified the Council of his own resignation.[48]

On 26 July, Price informed the Council of the activities around St. George's Island. From his observations it was apparent that the British were landing men on the island during the day to take on wood and water under the protection of the fleet's guns. In the absence of any fortifications on the island, the work-details were forced to retire to the ships in the evening. To protect the mainland, Price had thrown up entrenchments along the river-bank that were found to be, unfortunately, knee-deep

in water at high tide. Price had also placed some of his cannon on Cherry Point, a distance of one mile from the Fowey to keep the ship from drawing too near the shore. The rest of the artillery was deployed along the Southwest side of the river to protect the approaches leading from the island to the mainland. On the previous day, Price had sent an expedition against the British on St. George's Island.[49]

The action of 25 July 1776 appears as one of the few highlights of the militia's Revolutionary career, although it also served to illustrate one of the militia's inherent weaknesses. At 2:30 a.m. Price had sent a mixed force of state troops and militia onto the island. Moving silently, they took up positions while waiting for daybreak and the British work parties that would follow. According to Price, when the British landed, the ambush was sprung; however, as a result of both their excitement and poor discipline, the militiamen fired too soon, which allowed many of the British forces to make it safely back to the ships. Nevertheless, the surprise engagement was able to effect some British casualties. According to Price, his force had killed at least three of the enemy, wounded several others as the militia had pursued the British back

to their boats, and had taken one prisoner. After the engagement and before retiring from the island, the militiamen destroyed the work-party's water casks and filled in a well that the British had been using to fill them.[50]

Before the militia had registered its victory on St. George's Island, farther up the Potomac another engagement had taken place which was more consistent with the militia's war-time performance. On 23 July between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., two Virginia row-gallies under the command of Captain Robert Conway landed on the Maryland side of the Potomac a short distance away from the British ships that were moored in the river. After pulling his boats onto the shore and stowing the gear, Conway apparently sought protection for his boats from the militia companies that were stationed opposite the Roebuck.[51]

According to the deposition of John Thomas, after Conway requested a party of militiamen to guard the boats, the commanding officer, Colonel William Harrison, said, "Come, let us march down." However, his exhortations seem to have been met with some reluctance from the men. Apparently, one militiaman replied, "I can't bear to shoot a man," while some of the others, to avoid going, claimed that their weapons were out of order. Undaunted, Harrison instructed those who were fainthearted to hand over their weapons to those who would go and then to follow him.

From approximately a force of 300-400 men, as appraised by Thomas, Harrison was able to secure only thirty to forty volunteers. While Harrison marched his men down to where Conway had landed the boats, the British had boarded theirs and rowed toward the militia. According to Thomas, as the British approached the shoreline, they began to emit "huzzahs" at Harrison and his men and then departed to the Virginia shore where they set fire to a plantation. After plundering along the Virginia side of the river, the British then temporarily retired to their ships.[52]

Late in the afternoon, the British boarded a row-galley and headed towards the militia, who were deployed along what Harrison considered a great defensive position. Colonel Harrison had placed the bulk of his men in a small valley approximately forty to fifty yards from shore. The remainder of the men were posted as sentinels. Just off-shore, the row galley, accompanied by a tender, began to fire, causing Harrison's sentinels to run for the woods, exclaiming as they ran that they intended not to stop until they reached Port Tobacco. Thomas testified that as they made their precipitous flight, Colonel Harrison began to laugh. Those militia who were still in the valley apparently ventured a "peep" every now and then at the British but refused to fire. Shortly thereafter, still under fire, the rest of Harrison's men followed in the steps of the sentinels, in the belief that if the British

landed the valley would be raked with fire. Thomas concluded his deposition with the comment that as the militia took to its heels, the British troops witnessing the retreat, began to hoot after them and "called them sundry names." The British then landed, took away one of Conway's boats, and fired their guns at a nearby house.[53]

In his own defense of the incident, Harrison claimed that his men had not fired because the row galley had been enclosed, and without any target he believed it was senseless to waste ammunition. He did admit that he had ordered a retreat, but according to another deposition given by two residents of Alexandria, Virginia who had also witnessed the spectacle, the sentinels had not heard the colonel's orders to rendevous and instead, continued their flight. When Colonel Harrison had ordered the retreat, he had apparently instructed the men to lie down every time they saw the Roebuck's guns flash which they did on many occasions thus causing Harrison's laughing fit. Unlike Thomas, the two witnesses testified that the main body of the militia had not effected a full-scale retreat but instead, had gathered at a nearby fence before marching back to their original encampment. Probably, somewhere between the conflicting evidence lies the actual

truth of the incident, but regardless of the precise details, the 26th Battalion Charles County militia displayed the inept leadership and poor discipline that stalked the militia through the war.[54]

By the beginning of August 1776, Dunmore's fleet had withdrawn from Maryland waters and the militia began to be relieved from duty. As it had during the March alarm, although the militia had been able to successfully frustrate the designs of the British, a number of problems had surfaced. As would always be the case, the lack of arms, equipment, and provisions plagued the operations against Dunmore's fleet. William Harrison laid part of the blame for his debacle on the absence of equipment among his men. Jeremiah Jordan complained to the Council of the difficulties he had encountered procuring provisions for the men under his command. On the Eastern Shore, Brigadier General Henry Hooper, after drafting fifteen privates from every company in his brigade, advised the Council that it would be difficult to keep the men together because he lacked any money to purchase provisions. He had tried to buy supplies for his troops on credit but found that "the country people who have provisions to sell [were] showing a great unwillingness to part with it unless paid for at the same time." Finding himself short of arms and ammunition, Hooper had been forced to borrow some from General James Lloyd Chamberlaine in Talbot County.[55]

Like Henry Hooper, Colonel Josiah Hawkins of Charles County begged the Council for money because of the penurious circumstances of his militiamen and the attending lack of provisions. According to Hawkins, Captain John Parnham's men were "sickly and want relief." Commenting on the conditions of their encampment, Parnham told Hawkins that "it is a shocking place to be at especially without money." Apparently for Major John Allen Thomas, the situation in St. Mary's County was just as deplorable. Fervently hoping that the "business is over soon," Thomas complained that his men had to trek three miles daily to secure potable water. In addition, Thomas described the tents his men were using for shelter as uncomfortable and blamed them for making the men sick. Certainly the militia's living conditions were not alleviated any by the smallpox-infected bodies from Dunmore's fleet that were washing ashore next to the campsite. The presence of corpses so close to where the troops were bivouaced led Thomas to comment that "we are poisoned with the stench."[56]

Discipline, like arms and ammunition, was found to be wanting among the militia also. On the Eastern Shore where disaffection evidently was becoming rampant among the militia, Colonel Thomas Ennals reported difficulties in collecting a force sufficient to halt British plundering in Somerset County. In the days before the fleet was

sighted off Point Lookout, there had been a series of raids along the Eastern Shore carried out by the tenders accompanying Dunmore's ships. After dispatching troops to intercept the British, Ennals reported that they had arrived too late to do anything. With his men complaining of fatigue and wanting to go home, Ennals had to discharge all but forty of them who were employed as lookouts. Ennals expressed his opinion that in Dorchester County, when the British sailed into Nanticoke Sound, the militia had not answered the alarm because many of them were among the disaffected, and when he was able to gather enough, he found the men to be ill-disciplined, not to be relied upon, and unmindful of the orders of their officers.[57]

The problems of maintaining discipline among the militia and independent troops of the Western Shore was nearly as bad as that of the troops arrayed on the other side of the bay. When Captain Peter Mantz's company of state troops was marched from Frederick County to relieve the militia stationed in St. Mary's, his men became so riotous that the county officials pleaded with the Council of Safety to send the company home. Listed among the reasons for the company's "licentious behavior" was its displeasure at being sent there. In addition to the fact that the company had not eaten for forty-eight hours, apparently, a rumor had circulated among the men to the effect that since they had not been born and bred in the

area they were more likely to be afflicted with disease. Expressing their fear in a rather violent manner, the company threatened to "plunder and kill" if any of the men became ill, and further, they vowed to disband and return to commit more depredations to the county if any of them was to die. Fearful that the company meant to keep its word, the St. Mary's County Committee of Observation hoped the Council would send Mantz's men home and replace them with a detachment from Captain Rezin Beall's independents.[58]

Elsewhere, the Council heard other complaints of the militia's poor discipline. Commenting on the militia's behavior during the alarm, John Allen Thomas stated that the "militia performs its duties badly." "The service is so very unknown to them that the whole Burthen lies upon the few regulars that are here." With the state troops forming the centerpiece of Maryland's defensive strategy, the government's hopes for a spirited defense of the state received a severe blow after the Continental Congress requested 3400 men from Maryland to join Washington's army in New York. The Convention's decision to use the independent companies and Smallwood's battalion of regulars as part of the state's Continental quota took

away the underpinnings that were vital to Maryland's defense. After July 1776, Maryland was forced to leave its hopes for the continued survival of the Revolutionary cause in the palsied hands of the militia.[59]

Probably as harmful as anything else to the fighting condition of the militia was the infrequency with which the British ships carried out their raids along Maryland's coast. The long lulls between alarms may have allowed the festering discontent that raged within the organization to sap the militia's potential even more. Had the British carried out their attacks at a more accelerated pace, the militia may have been able to put aside its incessant bickering and congeal into a more formidable opponent, but this was not the case. Even if the militia had been able to put its disputatiousness aside, the lack of weapons and equipment had a debilitating effect on its performance. Additionally, the long intervals between attacks seem only to have served to heighten the rank and file's sense that the time devoted to the militia was probably time better spent elsewhere.

Toward the latter years of the war, the problems of summoning the militia too soon and holding them too long appears to have finally made an impact on the state government. When the British began sailing south from New York in the spring of 1779, rumors circulating to the effect that the fleet may be headed for Baltimore gave

many in the state cause for alarm. Such was the extent of panic gripping Baltimore, that in order to placate the city, the state government prevailed upon George Washington to release Mordecai Gist from his command with the Continental forces so that he could take charge of the city's defense. Although the government was willing to summon Gist, it was loath to accede to the wishes of County Lieutenant Andrew Buchanan to mobilize large numbers of the militia. Citing its reasons for delaying the call to arms, the governor's council stated that once activated it would be impossible to keep the militia together. According to the council, when the militia had been summoned to defend Annapolis in a previous alarm, the men had displayed such resistance to being kept on duty that the government was forced to send them home before the time their tour was scheduled to end.[60]

The fear generated by the reports of British movements during the spring of 1779 became more pronounced when the fleet was sighted at Portsmouth, Virginia. The fear turned almost to panic when three large ships and two smaller ones were spotted sailing up the bay, even though by that time it had been reported that the British fleet had raised anchor and moved south. Preparations were carried on at a frenzied pace throughout the state. Arms and supplies were transferred to Baltimore. Buchanan hoped he could call out the entire militia of the county

in order to instill them with enough discipline to mount a stalwart defense in the face of British regulars. The council warned county officials to monitor the movements of the dissaffected to prevent their assistance to the expected British forces. Finally, on 1 June, the state boat Dolphin had managed to fire upon one of the ships killing an officer and inflicting some damage. To the state's chagrin, it was determined afterward that the flotilla was in fact French and not the British as originally suspected.[61]

The final major threat imposed upon Maryland by a fleet of British ships occurred during the spring of 1781, as Lord Cornwallis and his forces roamed through Virginia. After landing at St. George's Island in April, the fleet began to raid and plunder the coast and in particular, along the Potomac. Shortly after the fleet was first sighted, as they had in the past, the county lieutenants along the affected areas began to flood the governor and his council with requests for arms and ammunition. In addition, the letters to the council were filled with accounts concerning the militia's poor military posture.[62]

Asking for arms and supplies, Richard Dallum of Harford County also desired that the council send him a few artillery pieces to be used, at the very least, to signal the militia. Dallum complained that lacking any

other device, he was powerless to collect his men in a timely fashion. As it stood, Dallum was forced to go out and notify each of his men on an individual basis which rendered the militia virtually useless to prevent any attacks or plundering that the British might launch. Both Richard Barnes and Jeremiah Jordan requested that they be able to mount some of their militia on horseback to facilitate movement and response to the British as the fleet ranged up the river. In addition, Barnes requested a shipment of powder and cartridge boxes. In his request, he noted that what powder he had was old and probably unusable and that the militia had wasted a great deal because of the lack of cartridge boxes. Joshua Beall complained that the two companies of Select Militia in his county were so spread out that it was impossible to gather them in time.[63]

Added to Beall's difficulties was the poor chain of communications that linked the counties together. After some misinformation concerning the movement of the ships had been passed along, Beall wrote Colonel Francis Ware of Charles County asking him, that in any future alarms, Ware should try and obtain the best intelligence he could and then send it along to Colonel William Lyles of Piscattaway. Moving from Lyles, Beall wished that the information then be passed along to Colonel John Addison who would in turn, pass it on to Beall. By doing so Beall

hoped to "prevent a great deal of unnecessary Expence [sic] Trouble & confusion." Obviously, in light of comments such as these, the possibility that the militia would be able to repulse the British successfully was not necessarily guaranteed.[64]

As the requests for arms, ammunition, and equipment rolled in, the council began to play a game with its public stores similar to that of musical chairs. After informing the government that he had weapons sufficient to arm only one company in the entire county, Joshua Beall had to send wagons to the magazine for 150 stands of muskets. Beall also had to send wagons to Montgomery County for another fifty weapons, but some of those had to be shipped on to the militia companies that resided along the Patuxent River. As the British sailed up the Potomac, the dispatches became more frenzied in their appeals for the government's assistance and more dismayed by the defenselessness of the inhabitants.[65]

On 8 April 1781, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer informed the council of an attack on Mr. Young's ferry which had resulted in the destruction of a great quantity of property. Later at 2:00 a.m., Port Tobacco was in a state of alarm when word reached the town of two barges landing at the warehouse; however, no damage resulted, probably because the alarm gun was enough to frighten the barge crews away. After causing more damage and kidnapping

a lieutenant of the state regiment, the British were prevented from landing at one point because of the militia's timely appearance at the scene. However, the barges moved farther up the river and set fire to the home of General George Dent. On the previous day, Jenifer informed the council that a British force had begun to plunder the tobacco from a warehouse at Cedar Point, but the militia had been able to drive them off after killing one of the British sentries during a minor skirmish.[66]

The militia's consistent inability to present a credible defense against the continued depredations of the British raiding parties caused many of the inhabitants to flee their homes along the Patuxent and Potomac Rivers as the alarms became more numerous. Because Prince George's County was "at present alarmed & bewildered more, than you can at a distance, perhaps, imagine," in one of his requests to the government for arms, Stephen West intimated that he planned to meet with Joshua Beall for the purpose of conceiving some plan to effect a proper defense. As "bewildered" and as unarmed as they were, occasionally, the militia had its shining moments. In his letter, West informed the council that a party of British raiders from a fifty-gun ship had landed at a wharf along the Potomac but were repulsed by detachment of militia under the command of Colonel William Lyles.[67]

Recounting the same incident, Joshua Beall presented the event in more detail. According to Beall, a party of British had landed at Colonel Lyles's fishing wharf in the morning and had engaged in killing hogs before rowing back to the ship. Returning that evening, the party included the sailing master, the purser, and approximately sixteen others. They were "strolling about" when a party of militia under the command of Lyles and Lieutenant Osborne Williams cut the British off from their boats and took eleven of them prisoner, including the sailing master. Adding luster to the victory was the valor the men apparently displayed by performing the maneuver successfully while being subjected to cannon-fire from the ships which, according to Beall, lay only a short distance from the shoreline. Beall was so proud of the event that he enclosed

> a list of those Brave men who Attacked the Enemies boats under the Muzzalls of the Cannon of their shiping, & secured one of their Boats & Crew out of three that landed, and their is reason to belive that another of their boats crews suffered very mutch as I could perceive but very few hands in her, on her return, to their shiping, who sent another Boat off to assist her in geting along side.68

After Colonel Lyles's victory, the British began to set sail down the Potomac towards the bay refraining from any

further activity other than to engage in some sporadic plundering. Unfortunately, one of the victims of their final depredations was Colonel Lyles whose house was burned down by a party from one of the ships.[69]

After the withdrawal of the British fleet from the Potomac and Patuxent Rivers, the militia on Maryland's Western Shore was not to see action of any sizable proportions again. Between 1781 and 1783, there were sporadic hit-and-run raids perpetrated by the Loyalist privateers operating in small barges which necessitated the call-up of small parties of militia, but the need to activate the militia on a large scale no longer existed. Throughout the Revolution, the militia on the Western Shore had been subjected to only a few threats that were lacking much in the way of variation. With the raids committed by the British relegated to strikes along the coast, the interior of the Western Shore had remained secure. However, for Maryland's Eastern Shore, the situation presented to the militia units operating there was much more complex. Added to the threat to its coast, the Eastern Shore was faced with the menace of Loyalism and in 1777, an invasion by the bulk of the British army under the command of Sir William Howe.[70]

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1]Council to Maryland Deputies, 11 February, 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 149; Dorchester Committee to Council, 1 February, 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 129-30.

[2]Letter to Captains Kent and Henry, 14 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 159-160; Queen Anne's Committee to Council, 26 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 173; Captains Kent and Henry to Council, 28 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 191-192. The Minute companies reported spotting a schooner manned by thirteen negroes and filled with provisions leaving the Virginia shoreline for a rendevous with Dunmore's fleet. Dispatching some of the minutemen in a whale boat, the schooner was overtaken off of York Spit and brought back. The captains also noted that although they were supposed to receive assistance from the inhabitants of Virginia, they were doubtful of getting any if Dunmore chose to attack.

[3]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p. 9.

[4]William Eddis, Letters From America, Aubrey C. Land, ed. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 108-109.

[5]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, pp. 26, 31-32; Report of Committee Investigating the Manufacture of Arms, 2 August, 1775, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 64; Green, Proceedings of the Convention, pp. 56-60; Council to Charles Beatty and Others, 30 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 142; Skinner to Jenifer, 16 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 61. Skinner wrote the Council to inform them of his inability to fill a request that the Nottingham Iron Works produce cannon for the state's defense because the blast furnace had "blowd out." Thomas Johnson to Council, 22 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 92. Johnson informed the Council that the furnace that he and his brother operated could produce a number of items that the Council needed to supply the militia when the furnace was fired up. However, Johnson sincerly hoped that the Council would give the contract to someone else. Council to Worcester Committee, 26 July

1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 119. Illustrating the state's difficulties procuring weapons, the Council asked that some members of the Worcester committee investigate the possibility of salvaging the cannon off of a Spanish wreck that had been reported lying off the coast for a rather lengthy period of time.

[6]Council to Yost, 3 May 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 400-401; Council to Unsold, 3 May 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 9, 401; Yost and Unsold to Council, 22 May 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 452; State Papers [MdHR 4577-26], Yost to Council, 1 August 1776, MHR; Dallum to Jenifer, 16 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 59. Samuel Smith to Council, 9 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 319. Smith complained that the gunsmiths were not working up to their potential, and even if they were, they could not provide the state with the amount of weapons it needed. Council to Eastern Shore Committees, 16 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 56-59.

[7]Dallum to Jenifer, 22 July, 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 93; Tillard to Council, 10 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 23; Council to Tillard, 11 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 26. Garrett to Rumsey, 22 June 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 508.

[8]West to Council, 2 November 1775, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 89-91.

[9]Dorsey and Others to Council, 2 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 133-134; Andrew Beall to Council, 16 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 166.

[10]Council to Eastern Shore Committees, 16 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 56-59; Dorchester Committee to Council, 23 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 106.

[11]Hanson to Jenifer, 14 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 45; Hanson to Council, 25 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 117. In a situation similar to that in Dorchester County, Hanson notified the Council that only three weapons had been confiscated from the local non-enrollers.

[12]Barnes and Elliott to Council, 16 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 60; Queen Anne's Committee to Council, 30 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 143.

[13]Council Meeting, 17 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 62; Queen Anne's Committee to Council, 2 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 164.

[14]Council Meeting, 16 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 210; Council to Dean, 16 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 210; Dames to Richardson, 20 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 225-226; Council to Dame, 20 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 228; Dame to Council, 21 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 228.

[15]Queen Anne's Committee to Council, 30 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 143; John Dame to Council, 26 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 124. Queen Anne's Committee to Council, 2 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 164.

[16]Council to Brigadier General Beall, 22 November 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 472.

[17]Andrew Buchanan to Council, 15 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 531; Johnson to Council, 19 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 540-541.

[18]Cecil County Committee to Council, 4 February 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 116-117; Henry Hollingsworth to Council, 18 December 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 537.

[19] Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 33-34; Council to Johnson, 26 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 78.

[20]Council to Johnson, 10 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 33-34.

[21]Johnson to Council, 4 February 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 115-116. Considering the deplorable conditions that soldiers were required to endure throughout the Revolution, it is not surprising that many of the militia decided to depart for home before arriving in

Philadelphia. An excellent description of the horrors of military life is presented by John E. Ferling, A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), pp. 95-101.

[22]Ibid, p. 116.

[23]Maryland Deputies to Council, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 477; Council to Hancock, 21 April 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 221-222.

[24]Jenifer to Johnson, 24 May 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 417.

[25]Council to Delegates, 7 April 1778, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 28.

[26]State Papers [MdHR-4570], List of Arms in Public Armory, 30 October 1778, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4570-106A], Inventory of Arms, November 1778, MHR.

[27]State Papers [MdHR-4570-106A], Inventory of Arms, November 1778, MHR; Dallum to Governor Lee, 21 March 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII. pp. 138-139; Francis Ware to Governor Lee, 16 January, 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 24; Joshua Beall to Council, 14 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 15. Beall reported that according to the returns made by his militia commanders, Prince George's County had 264 muskets with 11 bayonets that were in "tolerable order," 162 that were in need of repair, many of which were "scarce worth repairing." Council to Captain Nicholas Ruxton Moore, 10 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vl. XLV, p. 387.

[28]Council to John Smith Brookes, 9 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 386; Council to Colonel Samuel Smith, 14 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 399; Council to John Rogers, Thomas Contee, Joseph Sim, 12 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, pp. 393-394.

[29]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p. 168; Council to Buchanan, 7 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 4; Council to Colonels Weems and Hammond, 7 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 4; Dorsey to Jenifer, 18 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 76. After the state troops were dispatched to New York, militia units were called in to guard both Baltimore and Annapolis until the Flying Camp was formed. After the Flying Camp departed, the state's defense was exclusively left in the hands of the militia.

[30]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 3-5; Council to Maryland Deputies, 11 February 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 149. After dispatching the minute companies to Virginia, the Council reported that it had not recieved any word from the expedition because a frost on the bay had cut communications between the two shores. George Dashiell to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 14 November 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 182. Dashiell had requested that the government send him arms and ammunition that the militia desperately needed but at the same time, was aware that the presence of the British cruisers in the bay obviated any possibility that he would get them within a reasonable period of time.

[31]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 15-18.

[32]Maryland Gazette 14 March 1776. The article presents an account of the alarm and congratulates the militia for its behavior and spirit. Baltimore Committee to Council, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 218.

[33]Purvience to Jenifer, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 219-220; Dorsey to Council, 11 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 238; State Papers [Md HR 6636-3-61] Council of Safety, 21 March 1776, MHR; Council to Calvert County Committee, 7 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 209.

[34]Purvience to Jenifer, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 219-220; Rumsey to Council 7 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 212. Barrister Carroll to Council, 8 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 222-223. Carroll complained that Brigadier General Andrew Buchanan was in need of field officers and hoped that the Council would send him some blank commissions so that officers could be appointed. Carroll also registered a complaint that no one had arrived to assume the duties as commissary officer although the county officials had set up the means to provision the militia.

[35]John Allen Thomas to Council, 8 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 226-227.

[36]Murray to Council, 15 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 248-249; Council to Dorchester Committee, 21 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 273. In the Council's opinion, Murray's shortage of powder could be blamed on the militiamen. The Council believed that the militiamen failed to return it to the public magazine after the alarm was over.

[37]Murray to Council, 15 March 1776, Archives of Maryland, Vol. XI, pp. 248-249.

[38]Ibid, pp. 248-249.

[39]Kent County Committee to Council, 13 March 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, pp. 242-243.

[40]Rezin Beall to Council, 29 May 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 452.

[41]Council to Carvil Hall, 11 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 26; John Page to Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, 13 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 41.

[42]Council Meeting, 13 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 43; Richard Barnes to Council, 13 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 43.

[43]Council to Somervell, 15 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 48-49.; Jeremiah Jordan to Council, 15 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 51; Council to Thomas, 15 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 50; Council to Dent, 15 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 49.

[44]Jeremiah Jordan to Council, 17 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 65-66.

[45]Ibid, p. 66.

[46]Council Meeting, 18 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 71; Dent to Council, 23 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 107. Council to Dent, 29 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 163-164. The Council informed Dent that at the time he had been given command, Price was still on the Eastern Shore. Previous to the alarm, Dent had been given the task of assembling the troops for the Flying Camp and the Council explained that if Price had been on the Western Shore, it would not have taken Dent away from his duties. Although the Council stated that no offense was intended when Dent's authority had been superseded, it did intimate that there had been some unnamed sources who had been "riotous" for Price to command. In light of the Council's revelation that other forces had been at work to remove Dent and replace him with Price, there may have been some political chicanary afoot.

[47]Dent to Council, 19 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 83-84.

[48]Ibid, p. 84.

[49]Price to General Lewis, 26 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 122-123. John M. Luykx, in his article "Fighting for Food: British Foraging Operations at St. George's Island," Maryland Historical Magazine 71(1976):212-219, presents an interesting account of the ambush but fails to note the militia's haste which robbed the expedition of a more faorable outcome.

[50]Price to General Lewis, 26 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 122-123.

[51]Maryland Gazette, 7 November 1776.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Henry Hooper to Jenifer, 19 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 82-83.

[56]Hawkins to Jenifer, 26 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 130; Thomas to Plater, 29 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 136-137.

[57]Ennals to Council, 2 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 542.

[58]St. Mary's Committee to Council, 7 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 184; Mantz to Council, 7 August 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 185. Mantz was as anxious to be relieved of serving in St. Mary's County as the Committee was of having him leave. It was Mantz's opinion that if the company was placed in a location more conducive to the health of his men, he would have no difficulty in persuading the troops to perform their duty, but as it stood, he believed that a third of the men would refuse to serve.

[59]Thomas to Plater, 29 July 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, pp. 136-137.

[60]Council to Delegates, 20 May 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, pp. 404-405; Council to Buchanan, 19 May 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 403.

[61]Council to Lieutenants, 17 May 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, pp. 396-397; Council to Buchanan, 1 June 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 436; Gist to Johnson, 2 June 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 439; Council to Gist, 3 June 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 440; The Chevalier d'Anmours to Governor Johnson, 8 June 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 447; Council to d'Anmours, 10 June 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, pp. 449-450.

[62]John Weems to Council, 21 March 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 140; Richard Barnes to Thomas Sim Lee, 25 March 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 148; Council to Richard Dallum, 4 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, pp. 376-377; Council to Andrew Buchanan, 5 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 378; Council to Wilkinson, 5 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLV, p. 378; Richard Barnes to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 7 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 168.

[63]Richard Dallum to Governor Lee, 7 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 165-66; Richard Barnes to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 3 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 159-60; Jeremiah Jordan, Vernon Hebb, John Thomas to Colonel Barnes, 3 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 160; Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 4 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 161.

[64]Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 16 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 190-191.

[65]John Rogers, Thomas Contee, Joseph Sim, to Council, 11 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 180; Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 16 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 190-191.

[66]Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Governor Lee, 8 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 172-73.

[67]Stephen West to Governor Lee, 12 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. VLVII, p. 184.

[68]Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 17 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 192-94; Spelling and grammatical errors are as appear in the original document.

[69]Ibid, 194.

[70]Hancock to Johnson, 2 April 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 196.

CHAPTER VI

MILITIA ACTIVITIES ON THE EASTERN SHORE: LOYALISTS AND REDCOATS

On Maryland's Eastern Shore, the militia seems to have displayed the same varying amounts of spirit and reticence as its counterparts had across the bay and for the most part, for the same reasons. Communications and transportation between the two regions were not dependable even in the best of times, but with British ships constantly lurking in the bay, the situation became worse. Over the course of the Revolution, the limited access to the Western Shore hindered the flow of arms and equipment which were so desperately needed by the militia units on the Eastern Shore. The same lack of discipline that plagued militia units across the bay had an equally crippling effect on the performance of Eastern Shore units during both muster-day activities and actual alarms. However, the performance of the Eastern Shore militia perhaps appears worse because large numbers of Loyalists and disaffected resided in the area.

There can be no doubt that Loyalism on the Eastern Shore existed in abundance. The activities of Loyalists were enough to alarm both the Continental Congress and General George Washington. Both feared the possibility that the seemingly large population of Tories of the area might encourage the British to attempt an occupation of regulars in force. Exacerbating their fears was the presence of a large population of residents who held little regard for either cause. Much of the disaffection that was evident on the Eastern Shore can be attributed to economic conditions that existed in the region at the time.[1]

The depression that had occurred in the years before the war had a particularly devastating effect on the Eastern Shore's economy, and the advent of the war served to aggravate the situation. With the presence of British ships in the bay, not only was the Eastern Shore denied access to foreign trade, but it was hindered in its ability to carry on trade with the rest of the state. Unable to market their products, many shore residents engaged in a brisk trade with the enemy ships that cruised the bay. More than likely the residents of the Eastern Shore were able to sell their products to the ships' crews at a higher price than the state was willing to pay. Trade between the British and the disaffected people was facilitated also by the large number of navigable rivers and estuaries which lined the region. As the rivers and

creeks worked to the benefit of the disaffected, they also served to hinder the militia's abilities to stop the illicit trade. In many cases, the British were able to stay one step ahead of the militia parties dispatched to intercept them. Thus, with commerce flourishing between the inhabitants and the enemy, British visits to the Eastern Shore were probably many times greater than that of the raids perpetrated along the rivers across the bay. Additionally, given the poor economic conditions of the lower classes on the Eastern Shore, it would seem reasonable to assume that many of the militia's rank and file were hesitant to curtail a practice that they either were engaged in themselves, or at least wished to take part in. As a result, there may have been a significant number of militiamen who found it difficult to sacrifice their economic wellbeing for the sake of a cause which seemed to have only a marginal chance for success.[2]

Because the Loyalist presence on the Eastern Shore was greater than elsewhere in Maryland and due to the region's relative isolation from the rest of the state, it appears that the term disaffection may have had widely varying definitions attached to it. Behavior that was symptomatic of a general dislike for performing militia duty may have been imbued with more sinister connotations in the lower counties on the Eastern Shore than it would have across the bay. As with the case of Captain Turpin's

company, it is difficult to render a verdict as to whether the men's actions can be considered as disloyalty to the cause or just typical of their normal behavior and attitudes. If Turpin's company had been part of a Western Shore battalion, it may be doubtful that the behavior would have been defined by the same motivations as County Lieutenant George Dashiell had attached to it, that is, disaffection to the cause. Quite possibly, instead, it would have been interpreted, as Josiah Hawkins had interpreted the actions of his battalion, to have been just another example of lax discipline due to the state's ineffective militia laws.[3]

Certainly in some instances, Toryism on the Eastern Shore appears to have been another term for opportunism. Whoever seemed to have the strongest presence at any given moment was able to command the sympathies of the people as long as the people could gain some measure of profit from them. Despite the tone of despair that arises from some of the correspondence of the local political leaders, it is often surprising to note also how easily both Tories and patriots commingled on the Eastern Shore. Stanton Atkins, considered to be of Loyalist sympathies, had been implicated in an insurgent movement in 1775 and was arrested during another one in 1777 before being imprisoned in the Annapolis jail. When asked to give a character reference on the man who was posting bond

for Atkins, Joseph Dashiell, the lieutenant of Worcester County, informed the governor that although he could not vouch for the man, he could for Atkins, calling Atkins a man of a more reputable character than many whose sympathies lay with the state's cause.[4]

The same tendency to support alternately the state and then the Loyalists was also to be seen within the militia. Boaz Walston was commissioned as an ensign in Captain Ebeneezer Handy's company of the 10th Battalion Worcester County militia in May 1776. However, when a group of insurgents who had raised the King's standard at Parker's Mill Pond outside of Salisbury were flushed from their lair by an expedition led by William Smallwood, Walston was arrested as one of the participants. Following his arrest, Walston was sent to Annapolis and then imprisoned. After languishing in jail for a considerable period of time, Walston and some of his fellow inmates petitioned the governor for their release in exchange for taking the oath of loyalty. At some point after returning home to Worcester County, family records indicate that Walston later volunteered his services to the state and apparently while in the army participated in Cornwallis's defeat at Yorktown. In the years following the Revolution, Walston was among a group of men who were instrumental in reforming the process for selecting militia officers in Worcester County.[5]

The militia of the Eastern Shore has been portrayed as particularly inept and unwilling to assist in quelling Tory insurgencies, as evidenced by the incident in Salisbury during the Winter of 1777. When Smallwood's force--composed of Virginia troops, Maryland independents, and matrosses--arrived in Worcester County, Colonel George Dashiell had been able to raise a force of only approximately 130 militiamen from the entire county to oppose 250 of the insurgents. In other cases, as when Colonel William Richardson was placed in command of a mixed force of militia and regulars to maintain order in Worcester and Somerset Counties, militia volunteers from the rest of the Eastern Shore were found to be in short supply. Certainly in both instances the militia's zeal easily can be called into question; however, it is just as easy to comprehend the reluctance that they displayed in volunteering for such duty. Soldiers who were primarily civilians hardly could be expected to march against other civilians who, more likely than not, shared the same social and economic plight as they did. At the same time, probably aware that its supply of arms was woefully lacking and fearful of some form of retribution after taking up arms against neighbors, the militia's rank and file adopted a prudent attitude against performing such duty.[6]

While many historians seem quick to point to the militia's shortcomings in these circumstances, what seems to be missing from their criticism is the possibility that by acting in such a hesitant manner, the militia may have saved Maryland from the same barbarous state of civil war that erupted in the Carolinas. Had the militia been better equipped and had the more zealous among them taken up arms against their neighbors, those neutralists who probably formed the majority of the Eastern Shore's inhabitants might have been forced into choosing sides. If the lines that separated Tory from Patriot on the Eastern Shore had been drawn more distinctly, the result may well have been a bloodbath. Fortunately, although both the state and Continental governments were alarmed about the situation in the lower counties, neither was ever in a position where it could take decisive action. With the exception of Colonel William Richarson's regiment, the Continental army was never at such a strength that it could afford the luxury of dispatching troops to the Eastern Shore. Yet, even Richardson's regiment was not exclusively composed of regulars. As designated by Congress, the regiment was formed from a combination of militia volunteers and newly enlisted Continental recruits.[7]

If the Continental army was in no position to pacify the Eastern Shore, neither were the other two belligerents. As far as the state was concerned, with the British in control of the bay, the government was reluctant to drain forces away from the Western Shore to reinforce the Eastern Shore. This, combined with the British Army's failure to reinforce the Tories with anything other than supplies, and the insurgents' inability to raise and sustain a force sufficient to make a concerted stand, left the situation on the Eastern Shore simmering throughout the war.[8]

While the militia of the Eastern Shore proved reluctant to take up arms against its fellow citizens, it did rouse for action from time to time against British raids. In most cases the militia's activities mirrored those of the Western Shore. The lack of weapons, the time expended gathering troops, and the difficulties of marching against a force that was more maneuverable on the water, all worked against the militia's abilities to achieve success. As with the militia of the Western Shore, there were incidents where the lack of discipline also weakened the militia's effectiveness.

On several occasions the British navy attempted to land troops at the inlet leading to Sinepuxent Bay which opened to the Atlantic Ocean. With the Chesapeake Bay guarded by British cruisers, the Sinepuxent inlet was one

of the few places available for Maryland to land cargoes from foreign ports. In those cases when the British attempted to breach the inlet, the local militia often acted in a rather contrary manner. Complaining in a letter to Joseph Dashiell, Colonel Robert Done was mortified to find that he had not been able to prevail upon the militia to march onto the beach in order to secure the passage into the bay. When an alarm had sounded, it had taken Done two days to gather up a mere thirty men for duty. After failing to follow his commands to deploy along the beach, Done noted that many of the men "considered it is making a sacrifice of them to place them there." Shortly thereafter, Done was left with no other alternative than to dismiss the men, which left the inlet guarded only by a sloop, a battery of two six-pound guns, and "twenty men to fight and not one-half to be trusted." Possibly, Done's reluctant militiamen believed that they would have been too exposed to British fire if they were arrayed along the beach, but once again, as relayed by Joseph Dashiell, the majority of those who answered the alarm had been found to be without weapons. In this case, as with the activities that transpired on the Western Shore, the valor of the Eastern Shore militia seems to have been mitigated more by the government's inability to properly provide for it, rather than by the courage of the men who were called upon to serve.[9]

In a similar incident two years later in 1779, the militia again was summoned to Sinepuxent Bay when a British force again raided the inlet. Upon his arrival with forty men, Major John Robins found it prudent to retreat after encountering a force that was superior in numbers to his. Gathering reinforcements, Robins returned the next day but found the British gone after prizing a ship and stealing some cattle. On 21 February, the alarm was sounded once more, and the militia gathered at the inlet to secure the boats that were moored there. On this occasion, the British rowed into the harbor but discovering the militia already there, decided to retreat. However, before leaving, the invaders made it clear to some of the local residents that they would be back. The British threats to return struck a nerve of fear among the local citizens which according to Done, was not without just cause. In his opinion, the people were alarmed because of the militia's past performances and its proven unreliability in times of crisis.[10]

Certainly, the public's lack of trust in the reliability of those who were charged with protecting their lives and property sometimes seems to have been warranted. In some cases it was difficult to ascertain exactly whose side the militiamen were on. In 1781, John Brereton, a private of the White Haven Company, Somerset County militia, was court-martialed after he left his post in the company

of a British soldier who was being held prisoner. According to witnesses, the prisoner, Nathaniel Bloodsworth, had asked permission to step outside the perimeter to relieve himself and Brereton had volunteered to accompany him. Another militiaman, John Polk, was also going to go with them but refrained when "some person near at hand laughed & said that one man was enough to go with another to Shite [sic]." After noticing that they had been gone for an extended period of time, Polk fired his musket as an alarm and "saw two men, whom he supposed to be them go off thro a thickett."[11]

Once alarmed, the company gave chase and caught up with the men after they had crossed Wicomico Creek. When the two were ordered to surrender, Bloodsworth instead, pointed the musket he had taken from Brereton and fired; however, the weapon only flashed. After the company discharged its weapons at Brereton and Bloodsworth with no effect, the pursuers jumped a ditch and cried, "you infernal buggers surrender or we'll put you to death." Fearing for his life, Brereton responded, appealing to his comrades, "for God's sake not to shoot him and arose out of a field of wheat." Although in a peculiar case of leniency, Brereton was aquitted by the court of deserting his post with arms, ammunition, and equipment to join the enemy, as well as the charge that he had voluntarily agreed to abet Bloodsworth in his escape, he was found guilty

of a violation concerning the rules and regulations governing the militia. For his breach of the regulations, Brereton was fined fifty pounds and required to serve in the Continental army for a period of four months. However truculent the Sinepuxent militia might have been or lax in its discipline and loyalty to the cause as the White Haven company had been, the Eastern Shore militia, occasionally did have its valorous moments. Unfortunately, even in those instances where the militia was able to display a certain amount of spirit and alacrity, quite often it proved to be of an equivocal nature.[12]

In March 1781, on a Saturday morning, a British brig, accompanied by two sloops, sailed up the Nanticoke River to plunder the town of Vienna. After the town was subjected to a cannonade of grape and round shot, a detachment of the local militia took up positions along the river bank to oppose any subsequent attempts the British might make to land troops. Although the militia was able to fire a few volleys at a landing party, the barrage from the ships forced the men to retreat. Under a flag of truce, the British informed General Henry Hooper, who had arrived on the scene shortly after the action had commenced, that they were there in search of provisions. The British further informed Hooper that if they were allowed to purchase some grain, they would refrain from plundering the town, but if not, then they were prepared to burn Vienna

to the ground. Thinking it more prudent to take the money and spare the town, Hooper agreed to the British terms which were effected peacefully. However Joseph Dashiell believed that Hooper's actions were cowardly.[13]

In his account, Joseph Dashiell stated that the militia in the area, previous to the raid on Vienna had been able to provide a "formidable & suckesfull [sic] resistance." Unable to penetrate the militia's defensive network, the fleet had gone up to Vienna. Once there, the British had encountered a stiff resistance by the militia under the command of Colonel John Dickenson and Captain John Smoot. According to Dashiell's version, the militia had repelled the landing barges three times before Hooper had arrived in Vienna and ordered the militia to retreat. To Dashiell, the surrender of Vienna "will Disgrace us & Be attended with the worst of Consequences." In his defense, Hooper alleged that the militia was so ill-provided for that it only had twelve weapons in its possession which he considered to have been hardly sufficient for the possibility of effecting a sustained and successful defense of the town.[14]

To some of the more prominent citizens of the Eastern Shore, incidents such as the one at Vienna combined with the militia's chronic lack of arms seems to have been perceived as the result of the state government's long-standing prejudice against the region. This feeling

comes alive in a letter written by Robert Goldsborough and Gustavus Scott to the governor in 1781. Asking the governor for arms and ammunition to equip the militia with, Goldsborough and Scott angrily stated that

> a particular Part of the State when invaded has a right to expect assistance from the more powerful parts of it. . . . . This State has no County in it which has manifested a more uniform & earnest Zeal in the present just & necessary opposition than Dorset, but Invasion without the power of Resistance, however strong the Inclination, will and really has sap'd the Whiggism of our common People: few even of the Vulgar are so ignorant as not to know that allegience & Protection are reciprocal [sic].[15]

The vitriol so apparent in the tone of Scott and Goldsborough's letter seems to have been the result of years of accumulated frustration. Although it is doubtful that the government consciously engaged in any practice of actively discriminating against the needs of the Eastern Shore, the poor lines of communication and the Eastern Shore's relative isolation may have contributed to the feeling by some that the government in Annapolis was acting in an arbitrary manner.

However doubtful it is that the political leadership of Maryland was actively ignoring the conditions on the Eastern Shore, there is enough circumstantial evidence to make it seem plausible. Throughout the provincial era, political considerations demanded that a balance of power exist between the two areas. Fearful

of losing its say in the General Assembly as the population and settlement of the Western Shore grew, new counties had been formed on the Eastern Shore in a corresponding fashion to the creation of counties to the west. Although a county such as Caroline County, which had been formed from parts of Dorchester and Talbot, seemed to be demographically unnecessary to the residents of the Eastern Shore, it was imperative if political parity was to be maintained. However, the balance that had existed throughout the provincial era ended during the Revolution with the creation of Washington and Montgomery Counties on the Western Shore. For the first time the political balance between the two regions no longer existed, leaving the Western Shore with the larger share of power. This loss of power and the attending fear that their needs would go unanswered by the state government may have done much to aggravate the people of the peninsula. Already strapped economically, the reduction of the Eastern Shore's voice in the state government also may have been a contributing factor to the mounting disaffection that afflicted the area.[16]

Possibly fearing that the Eastern Shore's needs would be ignored, rumors implying that the Western Shore was in possession of an abundance of certain commodities may have helped to fan the flames of indignation. The pervasive belief that the Western Shore had a surplus of

salt while the Eastern Shore suffered from deprivation during the winter of 1776 serves as a good example, but there were other examples as well. Writing to the Council of Safety in April 1776, Thomas Smyth stated that Captain John Veasey and the other commanding officers of the Eastern Shore independent companies were perturbed because they were lacking supplies for their men while at the same time, the companies of the Western Shore appeared to be well-armed and well-clothed. In addition to the independent companies, Smyth relayed that the militia companies were upset that they did not have the same amount of ammunition that was available to the militia of the Western Shore. In its reply, the Council apologized for any uneasiness that existed on the Eastern Shore and claimed that it was doing all it could to avoid the appearance of any partiality. In its own defense, the Council claimed that the counties of the Western Shore were as bereft of arms and equipment as any in the province. While most of the counties on the Western Shore were in fact inadequately supplied, there appears to have been one part of Maryland that was comparatively better off.[17]

Ronald Hoffman, in his work on dissension and disaffection in Maryland, intimates that Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, while a member of the Council of Safety, was able to prevent the exposure of his complicity in a plot that had been hatched to kidnap Governor Robert Eden

by promising and delivering a large shipment of arms to Samuel Purvience of Baltimore County. In return for the weapons, Purvience, one of the leading conspirators in the plot, promised not to mention Jenifer's role when he was questioned by the Convention concerning the affair. Baltimore's accessibility to weapons was even more noticeable in the last years of the war. At a time when the county lieutenants throughout Maryland were lamenting over the lack of arms and ammunition during the alarm of 1779, Andrew Buchanan informed the governor's council that he had the ability to put 1500 men under arms to oppose the British.[18]

A certain amount of prejudicial behavior from the political leadership on the Western Shore and distrust from those residing on the eastern side of the bay seems to be apparent in the Tory uprising of February and March 1777 in Salisbury. Certainly, the communications link between the two areas left much to be desired, but it appears that the Council of Safety was taken by surprise by the activities that were happening in the lower counties. Writing to General Henry Hooper on 11 January 1776, the Council asked Hooper to gather information as to whether or not the rumors of loyalist activity on the Eastern Shore were true. When Hooper failed to respond, the Council reiterated its request on 3 February. However, by that time the Council had received a large packet from the

Continental Congress containing depositions from residents on the Eastern Shore who were petitioning the government for assistance. It would seem that the pleas for help emanating from the Eastern Shore had been directed towards Congress for one of two possible reasons. Either the residents believed it was impossible for their depositions and petitions to make it safely across the bay, or they believed that if the depositions were sent to the Council of Safety, they would not receive the help they desired.[19]

During the same time-period, other incidents may have served to raise the level of indignation on the Eastern Shore a notch. After Henry Hooper was requested to raise a force of militia to work in conjunction with the regular forces being dispatched from the Western Shore, Samuel Chase relayed his fears to the Council that the expedition's success might be placed in jeopardy if Hooper was given overall command. For his part, Chase believed that Mordecai Gist could not be prevailed upon to serve if Hooper was given command of the operation. Certainly the refusal of a regular officer to serve under the auspices of a militia officer was hardly a novel experience, but for a man such as Hooper, whose family had a long tradition of militia service, the thought of relinquishing his right to command the operation undoubtedly must have raised his ire just a bit. Although Hooper apparently refrained from making public his feelings on the subject, it would seem

likely that he viewed the situation in a similar light as Brigadier General John Dent had when he was superseded by Major Thomas Price in July 1776. Ultimately, Gist was not given command of the operation, but it was conferred upon another officer of the regular service.[20]

When William Smallwood and his expedition arrived in Salisbury, his appraisal of the people of the Eastern Shore was less than glowing. Laboring under a proclamation from the Council which gave both the insurgents and disaffected forty days to give themselves up and sign an oath of loyalty, Smallwood appears to have been of the opinion that nothing short of force could subdue the people. Although many of those who were thought to be disaffected said they did so from reasons of religion, Smallwood thought otherwise, describing the Eastern Shore as the repository of prisoners, Tories, disaffected, and deserters who had been expelled from the other states. If his demeanor was as vitriolic as his words, Smallwood must have done little to arouse the sympathies of the more neutrally inclined. Additionally, the men under his command did little either to rouse support for the cause. After releasing most of his men from further service in March, Smallwood's troops apparently committed a number of outrages on the local citizens before returning home. For his part, Governor Thomas Johnson, Jr., like Smallwood, appears to have held a low opinion of the people of the Eastern Shore as well.

In language which seems out of character from much of his official correspondence, Johnson, in a letter to John Hancock, described the prisoners that had been brought to Annapolis from Worcester County as a group of the most miserable and ignorant people he had seen.[21]

While the evidence certainly does not indicate conclusively that there was an active conspiracy directed against the Eastern Shore, the perceptions may have been enough to convince a sufficient number of the residents, such as Scott and Goldsborough, over a protracted period of time that they purposefully were being ignored. Even if it was not true, the perception by the people that injustices were being done to them by the state government may have been enough to dampen the ardor they held for the cause. If so, then this may have given the rank and file another justification for refusing to answer the state's calls for help.

The Loyalist problems that racked the Eastern Shore in the early months of 1777 were overshadowed by the arrival of Sir William Howe's expedition in August. For Maryland and most of the militia, Howe's campaign against Philadelphia marked the first occasion they had to go up against a large force of British regulars. However, there had been some militiamen who had engaged Howe's army only a few months before in New Jersey.

Except for Thomas Johnson's record of his travails in organizing and equipping his force, there is little documentation chronicling the expedition to Morristown during the Winter of 1776-77. Summoned by Congress in December 1776, most of those who went did not reach Philadelphia until January, and based upon Johnson's dispatches to the Council, it is doubtful whether he was able to forward anything other than a handful of companies on to Washington's encampment. By 27 January, there is evidence that the militia was on its way to Morristown. The diary of Sergeant William Young of the Pennsylvania militia recounts his being delayed from returning home at Corryell's ferry on the morning of 27 January as elements of the Maryland militia crossed the Delaware River.[22]

While at Morristown, it appears that the militia did present a good accounting of itself. An extract from a letter written on 25 March 1777 described the events at Quibbletown, New Jersey on the previous day. According to the letter, a detachment of Continental forces from Sampton under the command of Major Henry Ritney had made contact with the British near one of the enemy's outposts and was forced to retreat in the face of a superior force. However, during his retreat, Ritney was reinforced by a detachment of Maryland militiamen commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hollingsworth in addition to some Virginia volunteers. With Hollingsworth's reinforcements, Ritney

began to resist the British troops and eventually drove them back into their breastworks. Although the militia suffered no casualties, with the exception of two broken muskets, the British were reported to have been seen carrying some of their men back into the encampment, and a bloody handkerchief was found among the equipment the British had left behind. The letter closed with the estimate that during the skirmish, American forces totaled approximately one hundred thirty against a British force of about three hundred. Reports from Maryland's delegates to the Congress intimate that the militia was engaged in other skirmishes with British foraging parties, but the elusiveness of any documentation makes it difficult to confirm.[23]

The spirit and valor of the militia's performance at Morristown was not to be repeated as Howe landed his forces along the upper reaches of the Chesapeake Bay. Much of the blame for this lies not with the militia itself but rather is attributable to the actions of the state government. Although Maryland's leaders had approximately three months to anticipate the possibility of an invasion, little in the way of precautionary measures seem to have been effected. When Howe did land his troops at the head of the bay, the militia was unprepared to put up any form of opposition. Part of the reason for the militia's state of unreadiness was due to the unsettled condition of the

command structure. With the new militia law just enacted in June and officers waiting to be recommissioned, there were very few commanding officers who were able to exercise any type of authority.[24]

When the state made its first attempt to initiate a command structure for the militia, four brigadier generalships had been created to coordinate all military activities within certain geographic areas. While they were still required to answer directly to the Council of Safety, the brigadiers did have some latitude in those cases when communications with Annapolis were rendered impossible. However, by 1777, the rank of brigadier general no longer seemed to have existed. Instead, command devolved upon the newly created position of county lieutenant. Functioning as both a civil and a military leader, the county lieutenants, in theory, could better manage any military crises that occurred within their environs. Unfortunately, whatever advantage this gave the state on a local level was offset by the further fragmentation of the command structure. Instead of directing operations through four brigadier generals, the state had to try and coordinate activities through the several county officials. The situation was hampered further by the poor lines of communications between the county lieutenants. As Joshua Beall noted in 1781, in those instances when British cruisers raided the coast, if the county lieutenants

coordinated their activities through close communication, then the British efforts stood a better chance of being thwarted. But in the face of a large invasion force, such as Howe's, it was imperative that someone higher than the county lieutenants assume command.[25]

Perhaps, the state believed that the governor, Thomas Johnson, Jr., who possessed the experience of commanding a combined militia operation could assume the position, but this was precluded by his presence in Annapolis. With the lines of communication to the Eastern Shore virtually cut by the British fleet on the bay and Howe's force occupying the thin strip of land that joined the regions, there was no possibility for Johnson to properly regulate the militia's movements or activities. Certainly, Washington apprehended the problem and strove to correct the deficiency.[26]

Upon receiving instructions from Congress calling on the militia to repel the invasion, Washington ordered Smallwood and Gist to gather and command the militias of the Western and Eastern Shores respectively as soon as they could repair to Maryland to do so. In the interim, he had requested that Brigadier General John Cadwalader be responsible for arraying the militia that was collecting on the Eastern Shore. Writing to Governor Johnson, Washington expressed his concerns over the necessity of having to detach officers from his service to command the

Maryland militia. It was Washington's opinion that Maryland's lack of a suitable command structure over the militia was a problem that the state government needed to address. Washington also recommended Cadwalader for the position if the state followed his advice and corrected the problem.[27]

For his part, Cadwalader, a Maryland resident, had spent most of the war commanding forces in the Pennsylvania militia. As he assumed the task of gathering and coordinating the movements of the Eastern Shore militia forces that were in the process of mobilizing, Cadwalader's presence appears to have met with the approbation of the men. Writing to the governor, William Paca stated that the people on the Eastern Shore were more than willing to submit to his command. However, the governor's council was not well-disposed to the idea. In a mild rebuke of Washington's initiative, the council informed Paca that it could not empower Cadwalader to command. Originally the government had chosen Colonel Francis Ware from St. Mary's County to command the Western Shore militia and Colonel William Richardson to command those forces that were gathering on the Eastern Shore. However, Ware was left in St. Mary's County, Richardson was notified to temporarily remain at his post in the lower counties of

the Eastern Shore to prevent any Loyalist uprisings that Howe's presence might occasion, and instead, Smallwood and Gist were given the assignment. But as Cadwalader probably had discovered, theirs was not an easy task.[28]

From the moment that British forces began disemarbarking from their ships, militia commanders began complaining that they were powerless to do anything to stop the invasion. Of his own initiative, Benjamin Rumsey had ordered out two companies of militia in Harford County when the British fleet was sighted off the mouth of the Gunpowder River; however, he found that he could only arm forty of those who had responded. Notifying the governor of his predicament, Rumsey succinctly added that the "governor, no doubt can conclude that unarmed men can be of no service to repel an enemy." As a means to present some sort of defense, Rumsey had erected a small fort on the top of a hill and emplaced four four-pound cannon. Unfortunately, he could only muster thirteen muskets to arm the men he had positioned there. In the absence of an adequate supply of weapons, Rumsey employed those of his militia who were lacking arms to assist in the evacuation of all livestock and inhabitants from the path of the British.[29]

Bypassing the state government, Colonel John D. Thompson had petitioned Washington for assistance in acquiring weapons but was frustrated in his attempts. In his reply to Thompson, Washington apologized, stating he wished that he had the power to supply everyone with a weapon but barely had enough to arm his own men. The general could recommend only that Thompson rely on what was available to him. If fowling pieces were all that the men had, then they would have to make use of them. The only additional advice Washington could give to Thompson was that he gather what weapons he had, class his men, and send those who were unarmed home.[30]

As the militia began to gather on both shores, the state government echoed Washington's advice. Finding the militia throughout the state in the same deplorable condition as Rumsey and Thompson had, the government countermanded the marching orders of a number of companies and requested instead, that they remain home. County officials were notified to keep those companies not dispatched in a state of readiness so that they might relieve those already departed. However, it appears that many such companies enroute for the collecting points were themselves in an equally pitiful state. For its part, the government contended that many of those who had left their homes and joined the march unarmed were doing so because they had refused to bring their own weapons along.

Additionally, the government was of the opinion that they had done so for fear of not being compensated if the weapons were lost. To correct the misapprehension, the council ordered that the county lieutenants spread the word among the people that if they surrendered their weapons to the state, the county officials would affix a value to the weapons. If the arms were lost during the operation then the residents would be compensated by the state for the value of the missing items. However, it appears that the order failed to achieve the desired results, and the militia remained inadequately armed.[31]

In addition to arms, equipment and provisions also were found to be in short supply. Ignatius Craycraft was ordered to round up as many head of cattle as he could and drive them north from St. Mary's using an interior route to frustrate any British attempts to intercept them. On the Eastern Shore, William Paca found that the militia was in dire need of all forms of equipment including tenting. To remedy the situation, he confiscated the sails from a ship that lay at anchor. In addition, finding the Eastern Shore's magazines to be devoid of sufficient amounts of lead for bullets, Paca had requested that the people of the area give to the militia all the clock weights and window weights they could spare to correct the deficiency.[32]

As the British moved inland, the militia did what it could to frustrate the enemy's foraging parties and minimize the plundering; however, the attempts met with mixed results. Some prisoners and deserters were taken, but with few arms and little ammunition, the militia was unable to do much on a large scale. After observing the British movements along the Elk River, Benjamin Rumsey rode to Cecil County to see what assistance he could provide. Arriving at the head of the Northeast River, he discovered that Howe's forces had occupied an area of two miles, plundered the inhabitants, and set fire to the records in the Cecil County Courthouse. The best that the local militia could do was to gather a force of one hundred men, but only sixty-two of them had any weapons. In Rumsey's opinion, if the British moved out, the militia, because it was powerless to do otherwise, had no alternative other than to fall back on the Susquehanna River. With so few arms available to the men, the militia was reduced to gathering what intelligence it could.[33]

The mission assigned to the militia companies that were assembling around Smallwood and Gist had been formulated by Washington. Hoping to defeat Howe's forces before they reached Philadelphia, Washington believed that Smallwood and Gist should concentrate their activities on harassing the British supply lines and blocking the path of retreat. Accordingly, Gist was to marry his forces

to those of Smallwood, Rumsey, and Richardson at a crossroad eight miles above Nottingham, Pennsylvania. Once that was done, they would begin their activities. However, like those militia forces that Rumsey and others had employed as the British landed, Smallwood and Gist's detachments were too ill-equipped to accomplish the task. Most notably lacking for everything in the way of arms and equipment were the militia companies commanded by the governor's brother, Colonel Baker Johnson.[34]

Moving his forces across the Susquehanna River, Smallwood was forced to leave Johnson's detachment behind due to the unarmed state of his troops. Writing his brother, Johnson stated that there was not a cartridge box to be found in his entire division. Begging the governor for supplies, Johnson was miserable at the prospect of missing any action that might occur. On 15 September, four days after his first request, Johnson was still unprovided for. Writing his brother again, he complained that he had no tents, no cart for the purpose of carrying his baggage, only a few arms for his men, and "not four axes among them." To add to the problem, Johnson stated that the quartermaster's department "is all confusion." Although his men were reputed to be in good spirits, the governor's brother was afraid the situation was about to change for the worse. Smallwood was equally desirous that Johnson's men be properly equipped. In a letter apprising

the governor of his plans and equipment needs, Smallwood asked for eighty-seven stands of arms for Baker Johnson and his men. It was Smallwood's belief that if anyone should be armed, it should be them, because they appeared to be good men, unlike some of the others under his command.[35]

Smallwood's reference to the poor behavior exhibited by some of the militia who had "come with reluctance" was directed at Colonel Thomas Dorsey's battalion from Ann Arundel County. Although Smallwood and others referred to them as the Elk Ridge Battalion, it seems that among them were companies from the Severn Battalion as well. When the militia had been ordered out after the British arrival in the Chesaspeake, several members of Captain John Hammond's company refused to march and allegedly entered into a conspiracy to oppose any measures that the state might adopt to compel them. The diffident behavior appears to have carried over to those who marched.[36]

Before crossing the Susquehanna near Peach Bottom, Maryland, Baker Johnson noted to his brother that the "Elk Ridge lads acted as tools of the Hammonds" and refused to go any farther. However, at Smallwood's urging they were obliged to cross "at the point of a bayonet." Upset with the battalion's behavior and the increasing number of men who were deserting it, Smallwood asked the governor

to dispatch a copy of the state's militia laws so that he could properly discipline the "Deserting Poltroons." Whatever action Smallwood put into effect apparently failed to either diminish the desertions or reduce the political intrigues. When the militia was finally relieved from its obligations, the battalion had been reduced due to desertions to only twenty-eight men. Commenting to the governor, Smallwood believed that the men of the Elk Ridge Battalion, as well as the others who had come from Ann Arundel County, "shine more at election than in the field." In his opinion, the necessity of having to labor under the state's existing militia regulations "will ever render them contemptible in the field."[37]

Certainly, the Maryland militia's performance in the Philadelphia campaign did prove to be less than exemplary in a number of cases. After the defeat at Brandywine, Washington changed Smallwood's mission from harassing the British rear to joining up with his forces. Moving in to meet with the units under General Anthony Wayne's command, Smallwood's force arrived during the final moments of the Paoli massacre. Approximately a mile away from Wayne's encampment at the time of the engagement, Smallwood's men encountered a small party of British soldiers who were in pursuit of the routed Pennsylvanians. Although the combined force of militia was estimated to number 1850, after running into the British, Smallwood's

men became seized with panic and fled the scene. As a result of the massive confusion that had taken place, it took Smallwood and Gist the entire next day before they could reorganize their force and instill some semblance of order among the troops.[38]

At the Battle of Germantown, there seems to have been some controversy over Washington's orders to Smallwood concerning the deployment of the militia. Combined with a detachment of New Jersey militia, Smallwood was assigned the task of attacking the rear of the British right flank. According to an article written to commemorate the anniversary of the battle, Alfred C. Lambdin quotes Washington's orders for Smallwood to approach his destination by

> the left-hand road which leads to Jenkins' tavern, on the Old York Road below Armitage's, beyond the seven-mile stone, half a mile from which a road turns off short to the right hand, fenced on both sides, which leads through the enemy's encampment to Germantown Market House.[39]

According to Lambdin, had Smallwood done so, he would have placed himself either alongside or to the rear of General Nathanael Greene's command which would have prevented him from reaching his objective and may have served to increase the confusion of the battle. However, Smallwood did not join the action until the retreat was already under way.[40]

Before the action, as the militia was being deployed, Colonel William Hopper of Caroline County complained of an uneasiness in his stomach when British pickets began engaging the militia. Excusing himself, Hopper started for the rear, and according to Gist, the colonel did not stop until he had safely returned to his home in Caroline County. Making some concessions for Hopper's singular retrograde movement, Gist believed "that mankind cannot be answerable to weaknesses of the human heart," but he could not find any excuse for Hopper's actions after the colonel had made it back to the state. According to Gist, after Hopper had reached Maryland and safety, he began spreading blatant lies about the militia's role in the battle. Apparently Hopper had spread the story that the Maryland militia had been deployed along the front of the battle-line and then had been deprived of any avenue for making a safe retreat. It was Gist's belief that Hopper's indiscreet remarks had caused the next class of militia that was scheduled to march to rethink its willingness to do so.[41]

In the wake of the battle, the Maryland militia retreated to an encampment at Tomansin Township. In the time left to him, Smallwood had endeavored to instill some military discipline among the troops. By 14 October, he reported that the militia was "somewhat better disposed and disciplined," but was dismayed because they were

scheduled to depart for home in short order. It was his belief that after the militia left, whatever effect his training had accomplished would be lost. By early November, most of the militia was gone. Returning to his command in the Maryland Brigade, Smallwood noted that he still had 400 militia from both shores with him. Asking Maryland's lawmakers for a variety of supplies for his troops, Smallwood stated that although the condition of the units from the other states was bad, Maryland's was worse. In a final comment alluding to the public's attitude toward the war, and probably based upon his experiences with the militia, Smallwood stated in a disconsolate tone that

> Professions are made and Wars carried on, with more facility in a Warm Room than in the field. Amidst all this boasted Patriotism the burthen has and must hang on a handful of worn out and worried Continentals.42

Despite the British presence in Philadelphia over the winter of 1777-78, militia activities in Maryland dropped off significantly. However, the militia was alerted again in the spring, when Sir Henry Clinton, who had relieved Howe from command, began to move his forces back to New York. Primarily, the Maryland militia was given the responsibility of moving and protecting supplies that might be subjected to seizure as the British withdrew from Philadelphia. Heightening these activities was the militia's pursuit of a Tory marauder, China Clow, and his

band who had robbed and pillaged a number of inhabitants in Caroline County and other areas of the upper reaches of the Eastern Shore. After Clow and his men were finally driven from their camp on Jordan's Island in Delaware, the Maryland militia returned to its characteristic pattern of long lulls of inactivity punctuated only by intermittent raids and alerts.[43]

As the war's immediacy faded from Maryland, so too did the need for the state's venerable militia. Certainly, its reputation was never to be exalted like those militiamen who had first met the British at Lexington and Concord, but despite the obstacles that had been placed in its path, as well as those of its own making, the Maryland militia on occasion had shown flashes of competence. Had the war been fought in Maryland for any protracted period of time and on a larger scale than it was, the militia may have acted in a more spirited and alacritous manner than it did. Over the course of the Revolution, probably the majority of those who served in the militia were never presented with the opportunity to prove themselves, and those who did were often so ill-provided for and ill-led that they may have been prevented from fulfilling their potential. Perhaps if Maryland had constituted one of the war's major battlegrounds as had its neighbors, the militia might have been able to put aside its disputatiousness long enough

to acquire the everlasting glory that was conferred upon those who did, but that can only be left to conjecture. After Yorktown, the Maryland militia did what it always had done so well. It faded quietly back into the routine of everyday life, content to allow others the honors of war.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1]Samuel Chase to Council, 6 February 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol XVI, p. 122; Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 203.

[2]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 226-227; State Papers [MdHR 6636-11-65B], Deposition of John Fanning and Others, 22 April 1778, MHR. Outerbridge Horsey serves as an excellent example of the economic opportunism that arose on the Eastern Shore. Commissioned as a captain in the Dorchester County militia, Horsey was court-martialed for trading with the enemy. Mistaking the crew of the state boat Dolphin for English sailors, Horsey invited the men to his house for a drink and some food. Although Horsey admitted that he had taken the oath of loyalty to Maryland, he believed that it was "nothing more than a piece of blank paper." After purchasing twenty-eight barrels of pork from Horsey, the crewmen were told to fire their guns as they left. By dicharging their weapons, it would be perceived by the surrounding inhabitants that Horsey had been plundered "or else the guard wood tare [sic] to pieces if they found that he had sold it."

[3]Josia Hawkins to Council, 7 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XII, p. 325; State Papers [MdHR 4584-44], George Dashiell to Governor, 24 September 1778, MHR.

[4]State Papers [MdHR 4572-74], Deposition of Phillip Rain, 25 November 1775, MHR; State Papers, [MdHR 6636-7-33A], Stanton Atkins and John Bennett to Governor, 5 April 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4581-68], Joseph Dashiell to Governor, 13 May 1777, MHR.

[5]Clements and Wright, The Maryland Militia in the Revolutionary War, p. 133; State Papers [MdHR 4590-21], Joseph Dashiell to Council of Safety, 16 February 1777, MHR; State Papers [Md HR 6636-2-168] [MdHR 6636-2-168A], Petition of Davis and Others, 13 March 1777, MHR; Herbert C. Fooks, Fooks Family (Wilmington: Stansell's Craft and Bookbinding, 1953), p. 240; Harry Franklin Covington, ed., "The Worcester County Militia of 1794," Maryland Historical Magazine XXI(1926):157.

[6]Samuel Chase to Council, 6 February 1777, Archives of Maryland, Vol.XVI, p. 122; Johnson to Hancock, 21 April 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 222; Council to Colonels, 6 May 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 242; State Papers [MdHR 4581-61], Joseph Dashiell to Governor, 28 June 1777, MHR. Trying to raise volunteers to serve with Richardson's combined regiment of militia and regulars, Joseph Dashiell explained to the governor that he had used every argument he could think of to exhort the men into volunteering but only could prevail upon fourteen to step forward. State Papers [MdHR 4576-38], Phillip Feddeman to Governor, 14 June 1777, MHR. Feddeman lamented that he could neither form the men into classes or prevail upon them to volunteer because they felt they would lose all of their crops. State Papers [MdHR 4581-25], Robert Tyler to Governor, 22 August 1777, MHR. Tyler, like Dashiell, tried through exhortation to obtain volunteers but no more than forty to fifty men stepped forward from the entire battalion. Unfortunately, shortly afterward, most of them deserted.

[7]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, p. 197.

[8]Ibid, pp. 201-202; Council to Dorchester Committee, 18 October 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 462.

[9]State Papers [MdHR 4581-34], John Done to Joseph Dashiell, 9 June 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4581-35], Joseph Dashiell to Richardson, 9 June 1777, MHR.

[10]State Papers [MdHR 4593-25], John Done to Joseph Dashiell, 22 February 1779, MHR.

[11]At a General Court martial held at Lowe's Point in Somerset County, 29 May 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 670-673.

[12]Ibid, pp. 670-673.

[13]State Papers [MdHR 6636-26-28], Henry Hooper to Governor, 13 March 1781, MHR.

[14]Joseph Dashiell to Governor, 13 March 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, pp. 120-121.

[15]Robert Goldsborough and Gustavus Scott to Governor Lee, 16 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol XLVII, p. 22.

[16]Brugger, Maryland: A Middle Temperment, pp. 96-97; Main, "Political Parties in Revolutionary Maryland,"p. 3.

[17]Thomas Smyth to Council, 9 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 318; Council to Thomas Smyth, 13 April 1776, Archives of Maryland Vol. XI, p. 330.

[18]Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension, pp. 160-162; Andrew Buchanan to Governor, 10 August 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 403; Council to Henry Hooper, 24 May 1779, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 414. Hooper had requested arms and powder during the false alarm, but his request was denied by the governor and council who determined that Baltimore was in greater need. In his report Hooper noted that there were only 165 muskets available for the Dorchester County militia. In its reply, the council advised Hooper to get whatever other arms he needed from private sources. By doing so, the council believed that he would have enough to fend off any raids, although as it has been noted, the method of procuring arms from the populace never met with much success.

[19]Council to Henry Hooper, 3 February 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 110; Council to Henry Hooper, 11 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 41.

[20]Samuel Chase to Council, 6 February 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 122.

[21]Smallwood to Jenifer, 14 March 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 175; Smallwood to Jenifer, 16 March 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 178-179; Johnson to Hancock, 23 April 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 225-226.

[22]William Young, "Journal of Sergeant William Young, Written During the Jersey Campaigns in the Winter of 1776-7," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, VIII 3(1884):275.

[23]William S. Stryker, ed. Documents Relating to the Revolutionary History of the State of New Jersey Vol. I (Trenton: The John L. Murphy Publishing Co., Printers, 1901), pp. 326-327; Chase to Council, 28 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 86. Chase relayed the information to the Council that the Maryland militia had participated in a skirmish that resulted in the capture of 53 wagons, and 200 horses. Casualties apparently amounted to 20 British dead and 30 taken prisoner.

[24]Hancock to Johnson, 2 April 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 196. Hancock notified the governor that intelligence gathered by Washington indicated that Maryland would be invaded by the British forces departing from New York. Paca to Johnson, 30 August 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 354. As Paca indicated, when the British landed, the militia was in such an unsettled state that it was useless to mount any kind of proper defense.

[25]Green, Proceedings of the Convention, p. 76. The position of brigadier general was created by the Convention on 4 January 1776. State Papers [MdHR 4543-2], Liber GR, Folio 91, An Act to Regulate the Militia, June 1777, MHR.

[26]Council to Richard Dallum, 4 April 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVIII, pp. 376-77. As late as 1781, the government found the task of commanding the militia during an alert impossible. After Dallum had requested advice from the council concerning some dispositions he had made, the council replied that it would have to leave all decisions to his discretion because it was not in a position to do otherwise.

[27]Washington to Governor Johnson, 3 September 1777, Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington Vol.9, pp. 174-175; Washington to Brigadier General John Cadwalader, 28 August 1777; Fitzpatric, The Writings of George Washington Vol. 9, pp. 142-143; State Papers [MdHR 4562-3], Cadwalader to Paca, 25 August 1777, MHR.

[28]Council to Paca, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 358; Paca to Council, 30 August 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 352-253; John Cadwalader, "Prelude to Valley Forge," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXXII(1958):46.

[29]Rumsey to Governor Johnson, 24 August 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 342-343.

[30]Washington to Colonel Richard D. Thompson, 27 August 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington Vol. 9, pp. 140-141.

[31]Council Meeting, 30 August 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 351; Council Meeting, 28 August 1770, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 346-347; Council to Richard Barnes, 1 September 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 357; Council to Francis Ware, 3 October 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 388; Council to Daniel Hughes, 2 October 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI p. 386.

[32]William Paca to Governor Johnson, 30 August 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 352-353, Governor Johnson to Ignatius Craycraft, 23 August 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 342.

[33]State Papers [MdHR 4561-78], Rumsey to Governor Johnson, 24 August 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4561-69], Rumsey to Governor Johnson, 25 August 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 45761-83], Thomas to Governor Johnson, 30 August 1777, MHR.

[34]Washington to Mordecai Gist, 31 August 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington Vol. 9, pp. 149-150; Washington to William Smallwood, 9 September 1777, Fitzpatric, Writings of George Washington Vol. 9, pp 198-199; Washington to Brigadier General William Smallwood, 14 September 1777, Fitzpatric, Writings of George Washington Vol. 9, pp. 222-223.

[35]State Papers [MdHR 4576-97], Colonel Baker Johnson to Governor, 8 September 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4576-95], Colonel Baker Johnson to Governor, 10 September 1777, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4576-93], Colonel Baker Johnson to Governor, 15 September 1777, MHR; Smallwood to Johnson, 11 September 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 369-370.

[36]Smallwood to Johnson, 11 September 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 369-370; Council to Robosson, 1 September 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 356-357.

[37]State Papers [MdHR 4576-95], Colonel Baker Johnson to Governor, 10 September 1777, MHR; Smallwood to Johnson, 8 September 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 366-377; Smallwood to Governor Johnson, 14 October 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 397.

[38]Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution; or Illustrations, by Pen and Pencil, of the History, Biography, Scenery, Relics, and Traditions of the War for Independence 2 Vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1859-60), Vol. II, p. 164; Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington Vol. 9, pp. 210-211.

[39]Alfred C. Lambdin, "Battle of Germantown," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography IV(1877):376-377.

[40]Ibid, p. 377.

[41]Gist to Johnson, 31 October 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 406-407; Gist to Johnson, 7 November 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 411-412; State Papers [MdHR 6636-1070], William Hopper to Governor, 19 February 1778, MHR; Apparently, Hopper's actions at Germantown were not responsible for any loss to his prestige. After the incident, Hopper retained his position as Caroline County Sheriff until he voluntarily resigned in February 1778.

[42]Smallwood to Johnson, 14 October 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 397; Smallwood to Johnson, 8 November 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 413-414; Gist to Johnson, 7 Novemeber 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 411-412. Both Gist and Smallwood complained to Governor Johnson about the high rate of desertion that occurred among the militia. Trying to prevent fraud when the militia was to be paid, both officers had endeavored to make a return of all militiamen as they left camp. According to Gist, the Troop of Light Horse disappeared along with their mounts, and in an even more audacious display, the Quartermaster and Wagonmaster, Mr. Clark and Mr. Black, after being dispatched to gather supplies, were never seen again. In an earlier letter Smallwood, a stickler for discipline, declared that all deserters should be dealt with severely. "[I]f they are suffered to remain at Home the example will have a most pernicious Effect on the rest of the Militia." Smallwood to Johnson, 11 September 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 370.

[43]Council to Henry Hollingsworth, 8 April 1778, Maryland State Archives Vol. XXI, p. 18; Council to Richard Dallum, 8 April 1778, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 19; Council to William Bordley, 17 April 1778, Archives of Maryland Vol. XXI, p. 40; State Papers [MdHR 5429-61HH], Wiliam Bordley to Governor, 16 April 1778, MHR; State Papers [MdHR 4566-1], Patterson to Smallwood, 15 April 1777, MHR; Cesar Rodney to President of Congress, 24 April 1778, Delaware Archives 3 Vols. (Wilmington: Charles L. Story Press, 1919), Vol. 3, p. 1283; State Papers [MdHR 4566-2], Pope to Smallwood, 14 April 1778, MHR. Clow had built a fort on Jordan's Island ten miles west of Dover, Delaware and only a few miles from the Maryland line. Aided by a guide, Pope led a force of approximately forty men to rout the insurrectionists, but found himself to be outnumbered and was forced to retire after a short skirmish. Pope later returned with a larger force and flushed Clow and his band from their hiding place. After setting fire to the fortress and collecting the articles that Clow had plundered from the local populace, Pope was able to round

up and capture fifty of the insurgents. Clow was later captured and convicted in Delaware of murdering Joseph Moore. Conviction of Cheney Clow, 5 May 1783, Delaware State Archives Vol. 3, pp. 1297-1299.

CHAPTER VII

THE MARYLAND MILITIA: PAST AND FUTURE IMPERFECT

When the Paris Peace Treaty was signed in 1783, the Maryland militia befitted the Republican ideal and faded into obscurity. Casting aside the implements of war, the citizen-soldiers who had filled the militia's ranks for so long turned their attention to their peace-time vocations. Although it no longer existed as a physical entity after 1783, the militia's spirit remained as the battle-lines began to be drawn concerning the young nation's future military policies.

Transformed from a physical reality to an abstraction, the militia was kept alive by those who opposed the concept of a standing army as the primary arm for the nation's defense. Instead, men such as Thomas Jefferson clung to the Whig ideal that a force composed of virtuous citizens was crucial to the young republic's preservation. The debate over the merits of the militia's worth was not new to the former colonies. In the years leading up to the Revolution, the arguments had been put forth in condemnation of those British forces that had been left

to protect the colonies after the French and Indian War. But how successful had the militia been as the embodiment of the Republican ideal during the Revolution and what, if anything, had caused its shortcomings? Was it a lack of virtue on the part of the citizen-soldiers or could the blame be placed elsewhere? [1]

Militarily, the Maryland militia's contributions to the success of the Revolution were at best minimal. The organization's most heroic moments had occurred primarily because of matters of chance rather than the result of any strategic design and execution. Poorly administered, loosely structured, governed by regulations that in some cases had been in place since the early years of the provincial era, led by many officers who were clearly incompetent or overly ambitious, and populated by a rank and file whose devotion to duty ranged from truculence to outright hostility, the Maryland militia could only be characterized as an organization that was "burdensome rather than serviceable." Thus during the Revolution, the hinge on which the militia's success or failure turned was the state's political elite, its relationship with Maryland society in general, and the militia in particular, which was a microcosm of that society.[2]

Crucial to the hinge was the period and manner in which it had been forged. On the strength of an economy that was driven by tobacco as a cash crop, Maryland's social structure had undergone tremendous changes throughout the latter years of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth. The wealth that was derived from tobacco led Maryland away from a relatively homogeneous and equalitarian society to one that was increasingly more stratified, thus giving birth to a small but powerful elite.

As the elite gained more power and prestige through the acquisition of property and land, the opportunities for the lower stratas of society lessened and friction between the two was created. Complimenting the rise of the elite was the notion of social deference, which although it was quite understandably accepted by the elite, appears to have remained generally unpopular with the masses. Nowhere were the strains between the various elements of society more evident than in the militia which functioned as the state's largest social institution. As the seventeenth century waned, the discontent that was fomenting among the lower stratas began to manifest itself within the framework of the militia, often surfacing in the forms of absenteeism, insolence, and theft.

Unable to correct the problems within the militia and quite possibly blinded by its own adherence to the notion of deference, it appears that as Maryland entered the era of colonial warfare, the elite made a critical miscalculation. Unaware of the discontent's true causes and fueled by its own quest for political and social dominance, Maryland's elite channeled the dissension into avenues which suited its own purposes as it began to challenge the Proprietor for supremacy. Nowhere was this more apparent than during the French and Indian War when the country party was able to rouse the antipathy of the militia in an effort to wring concessions from Horatio Sharpe and the Proprietor. Whatever short-term gains the country party was able to make from the maneuver, by actively encouraging the militia not to march to the western frontier, the country party unwittingly weakened the abilities of its successor, the popular party, to control the militia during the Revolution.

As hostilities broke out between the colonies and Great Britain, the ephemeral nature of the lower classes' support for the popular party became apparent. Hoping to employ the militia as a political tool as it had during the previous war, the popular party instead was faced with resistance when it embodied the organization to solidify and guarantee the party's grasp of Maryland's political machinery. As opposition to the Revolutionary

cause became more visible during the last months of 1775 and into 1776, the popular party embarked on a policy which drastically undercut the militia's future potential as both a military force and a political instrument.

Instead of taking the firm position to "separate friend from foe" that Thomas Johnson, Jr., believed was the proper course of action, the popular party equivocated in many matters in an obvious attempt to woo the disaffected and neutral segments of the populace. In such matters as the disposition of non-enrollers, the Convention refrained from adopting a hard-line approach in favor of one that granted them leniency. However, the Convention's proclivity for waffling in its decisions instead, angered those of the militia that already supported the cause and at the same time, failed to engender any new converts from those who were opposed. By rousing the ire of its adherents within the militia, the Convention squandered its ability to use the organization as a means for political intimidation.[3]

The state government's inability to remain firm in its decisions may have prevented the outbreak of civil war in Maryland, but it also seems to have had a profoundly negative effect on the individual militiaman. The Convention's irresolution over which path it should follow concerning such matters as the punishment for non-enrollers and the process of selecting officers appears

to have left many militiamen of all ranks confused and angry. With the militia's rank and file already simmering over the state's social and economic climate, the confusion and anger was transmuted into a breakdown of the organization's discipline. Thus the Convention, already having demonstrated its inability to correct refractory behavior, became culpable for much of the ill-discipline that was the hallmark of the Maryland militia.

As the militia's querulousness rose to a febrile stage, it appears to have had an adverse effect on those militiamen who wished only to perform their service in the prescribed manner. Turbutt Betton, a private in the 20th Battalion Queen Anne's County militia, found himself in a perplexing situation in 1776 when his company became involved in the dispute over the selection of battalion officers. Believing his company's actions of meeting separately from the rest of the battalion to be illegal, Betton refused to attend its musters, and for his negligence he was fined by the captain. Although the fine was later rescinded after he petitioned the Council of Safety, Betton's experience may have soured his future devotion to both the militia and the cause. Additionally, the division of loyalties engendered by such a case as Private Betton's ultimately would destroy any possibility for cohesion and thus neutralize the company's military efficiency.[4]

Also affected by the government's irresolute behavior were the officers, whose job it was to transform the citizens into soldiers and thus fashion the militia into something resembling the military organization it was supposed to be. Instead of establishing a set of rigid guidelines for the selection of both field-grade and company-grade officers and then demanding that they be followed to the letter, the government initially appears to have implicitly sanctioned a variety of methods that were at odds with its own wishes. The result was the politicization of the nominating process for militia officers and an outbreak of further discord within the organization.

The government did not boltster its support from the militia when it amended the process. Far from ending the controversies, the Convention and its executive arm, the Council of Safety, managed to aggravate the situation by adopting methods which appeared arbitrary and unjust to many of the men. Of the changes, the government's decision to rescind the right of each company to choose its own officers proved to be the most detrimental to the militia's cohesion. While the government may have succeeded in assuring that men of the proper political sympathies would be appointed to fill all future vacancies, it also created an aura of doubt and distrust among the rank and file that fostered more divisiveness. At the same time,

the government's amended policy opened the way for a number of men to assume positions of leadership in the militia who were blatantly inept and incompetent. The process of electing company-grade officers was no guarantee that incompetence would be eliminated; however, the trust and the confidence that these men might have engendered among the rank and file could have possibly compensated for whatever military skills they were lacking. Certainly in many cases, those who were elected were no worse than the officers selected and commissioned by the government.

After filling the officer corps with men whose aptitude for military command was doubtful, the state government then aggravated the organization's chaotic condition by failing to adequately find the means by which discipline could be maintained. Lacking any substantial means to gain obeisance from the rank and file, the officers found themselves in one corner of a triangle with little hope of successfully fulfilling the requirements of their positions. Repeatedly, the state made demands upon the militia that the officers found impossible to meet after opposition swelled up from the ranks.

Turning back to the politicians for tougher regulations that would allow them to carry out their orders, the officers often found their pleas for help treated with indifference. Instead, the officers were instructed to gain compliance from the men by appealing to their sense

of reason and virtue. When appeals to reason failed to produce a diminution of the disciplinary problems, the government adopted the attitude that there was little else that it could do. As the war dragged on and the rank and file maintained their truculent stand, the officers, lacking the support of the political machinery, found themselves, as Joshua Beall noted, to be "mere ciphers, indeed."[5]

Certainly, the government's temporizing nature by itself was sufficient to undercut the militia's effectiveness; however, the politicians' inability to properly arm and equip the force they depended upon to protect the state left the militia almost militarily impotent . Ill-armed and sadly lacking for equipment from the start, the situation deteriorated rapidly after the Flying Camp was formed to augment the Continental army in 1776. In order to expedite the movement of this body northward to New York, the government ordered that the Flying Camp be armed and equipped from those weapons and supplies in the hands of the militia. Although the decision to strip the state of weapons and equipment to supply the Flying Camp appears to have been the only option open to the government at the time, for those who were left behind with little means of defending either themselves or their property, the decision must have been perceived as being of doubtful wisdom.

The wisdom of the government's decisions must have been questioned further in the following years, as the militia found itself time and again incapable of putting sufficient numbers of men under arms to repel the enemy. As with most of the government's other actions, the inability to provide its military force with even the most basic necessities for mounting an adequate defense had an adverse effect on both the individual militiaman's perception of the organization's worth and the private citizen's faith that in times of attack, he would be protected.

The policy of equivocation that was followed by the popular party throughout the war seems to attest to the fact that it was aware of its precarious hold over the people of Maryland and the questionable amount of popularity it enjoyed. Alternating between stern demands for action and appeals to reason and virtue when those demands were met with resistance, the state's ruling elite appears to have never fully understood nor appreciated the plight of those it sought to govern. Exactly how removed from those they governed these men were it is difficult to ascertain, but their continued reliance upon the appeal to reason and virtue as a means of eliciting support for the cause seems to indicate that they did not comprehend the circumstances that the lower classes labored under.

Whenever crises arose, the higher reaches of the government continually appealed to the virtue of the rank and file in the hope that by doing so, the rank and file would either lay aside their fractious behavior or arise from their torpor to come to the state's aid. In the winter of 1776 after finding the rank and file of the militia loath to leave their homes and family to march to the aid of Washington even though they had been ordered to do so, the government, adopting the Enlightenment view, urged the militia officers and local government officials to touch upon the men's virtuous nature by regaling them with accounts of Washington's victories at Trenton and Princeton. During the spring of 1777 when the militia was called upon to quell the Loyalist disturbances on the Eastern Shore, militia officers were asked to exhort the men with tales of British and Tory atrocities in New Jersey in the hopes that it would inspire the men to volunteer. But in both cases, the appeal to virtue and reason were met with rejection, leaving the government bewildered and frustrated.[6]

Unfortunately, the ruling elite appears to have misunderstood that virtue and reason were of secondary concern to men whose families depended upon them and their labor for subsistence. For those men who did perform their duty, they quickly learned that virtue and reason were not enough to adequately compensate them for being

shoeless, hungry, and without sufficient clothing to ward off the cold as they made their way to Philadelphia in the snows of January 1777. Where was the virtue of those wealthy members of society who hoarded necessities as others went without? Where was the virtue of the upper classes who failed to volunteer for service themselves, leaving those of the lower classes to bear the hardships of the war? And what became of the virtue of those who were wealthy enough to flee for other parts of the state when the Eastern Shore was wracked with dissension? In cases such as these, it is easy to comprehend why the rank and file of the militia and the poorer sort of society failed to step forward when the government requested their assistance.

Just how little Maryland's ruling elite understood the plight of those it asked to fight for it was illuminated in a rather revealing letter written by one of the state's leading politicians and idealogues, Charles Carroll of Carrollton. After spending time with Smallwood's force of militia during the Philadelphia campaign of 1777, Carroll complained that he found all aspects of the "sauntering life" of the militiaman "fatiguing," and that the "hard lodging" and the "irregular hours of eating" were especially

disagreeable with his lifestyle. The tone of the letter seems to belie the inability of those who led to appreciably understand the sacrifices that were made by those who chose to fight.[7]

The Maryland militia's spotty record of success during the Revolution has to be blamed, not on either those who chose to serve or those who declined, but on those men who were charged with the responsibility of overseeing it and whose fortunes, reputations, and lives were most dependent upon it. Their poor judgment and leadership had wreaked havoc upon the organization during the provincial era, had nearly destroyed it during the Revolution, and their benign neglect of the militia would ill-serve the state again during the War of 1812. Rather than the organization itself, it was the politicians who rendered the Maryland militia's past and future imperfect.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

[1]Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 84-87, 100.

[2]State Papers [MdHR 6636-10-24], William Holmes to Governor, 13 June 1778, MHR.

[3]Maryland Gazette, 18 April 1776.

[4]State Papers [MdHR 4573-43], Turbutt Betton, Jr., to Convention, 1776, MHR.

[5]Joshua Beall to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, 17 January 1781, Archives of Maryland Vol. XLVII, p. 24.

[6]Queen Anne's Committee to Council, 5 February 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, p. 119; Maryland Gazette, 7 July 1780; State Papers [MdHR 4580B-23], Darby Lux to Governor, 24 June 1777, MHR; Council to Murdock, 1 January 1777, Archives of Maryland Vol. XVI, pp. 3-4.

[7]Charles Carroll to Thomas Johnson, 8 September 1777, Library of Congress, Letters of the Delegates to Congress 18 Vols. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), September 1777 to January 1778.

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