BUSINESS COMMUNITY STRUCTURES AND URBAN REGIMES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT: *Regime theorists often present business interests as coherent and unified communities with unitary interests. A central principle of regime theory, however, is that business elites tend to occupy privileged positions within regime coalitions because of the scope of resources and expertise they command and cities require for economic development and/or fiscal solvency. Cities are generally home to a wide range of business activities operating at various scales, and business elites representing various corporations in different economic sectors arguably command different kinds of resources and expertise that are functional to the economic activities with which they are affiliated. Various mixes of business elites representing different economic activities might therefore produce differentially biased input regarding urban policy-making and affect the types of regime coalitions that cities develop. Utilizing compilations of interlocking directorates among major organizations across three sectors, profiles of the corporate and social community structures of 24 U.S. cities are generated and a correlation matrix comprised of business and social organizational categories is produced. Factor analysis of the correlation matrix identifies three separate mixes of corporate and social organizational categories that generally conform to descriptions of developmental, caretaker, and progressive regime typologies. These three factors serve as prototypes of the three broad regime types and their corporate community structures. Correlations of the 24 cities with each of the three regime prototypes generally match their regime types as identified through previous case studies. Variations in regime types among cities might therefore be attributed to varying degrees of diversity in the kinds of corporations headquartered or located within them. Closer attention to the economic base of cities—the producers, after all, of local business elites—may reveal internal biases and/or material predisposition towards some urban policies over others by local business elites in relation to the economic activities with which they are linked.*

INTRODUCTION

In a thoughtful reflection on the status of urban regime theory, which currently reigns "as the dominant paradigm in the analysis of urban governance" and has so for "more than a decade," Imbroscio (2003, pp. 271–272) suggests that urban regime theory might be further strengthened "by engaging economic issues with a greater degree of seriousness and rigor." Imbroscio's (2003,

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p. 275) own proposal for engaging economic issues entails a focus on "alternative ideas about the nature of city economies and how to promote their vitality." In previous work (Imbroscio, 1998, p. 238), this involves a focus on the entrepreneurial potential of the local state, particularly if the local state is mobilized on behalf of interests more progressive than typical corporate interests. Concurrently, Imbroscio (2003, p. 276) promotes six building blocks through which to engage in a "new alternative economic paradigm" that would ostensibly enable scholars to break with traditional understandings of urban economies and imagine more innovative and inclusionary political arrangements.

While Imbroscio's reflection has inspired further debate and theoretical refinement regarding urban regime theory's normative thrust (Davies, 2004; Imbroscio, 2004; Rast, 2005; Stone, 2004), Imbroscio's general call for sustained and systematic attention to urban economies in relation to urban politics inspires a different approach taken here. Whilst regime theorists imagine more equitable political arrangements by exploring supposed "progressive" impacts of certain civic and/or social organizations as they engage with other actors—for example, always-present business interests—in political coalition-building (Kilburn, 2004, p. 635; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, p. 816; Orr, 1992; Stone, 2001), these same business interests are most often presented as coherent and unified communities with unitary interests (Austin & McCaffrey, 2002, p. 36). Even Stone's (1989, pp. 168–173) seminal work on the nature of urban regimes presents Atlanta's business community as largely unified. A central principle of regime theory, however, is that business elites tend to occupy privileged positions within regime coalitions because of the scope of resources and expertise they command and cities require for economic development and/or fiscal solvency (Dowding, 2001, p. 8; Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1980). Cities are generally home to a wide range of business activities operating at various scales, and business elites representing various corporations in different economic sectors arguably command different kinds of resources and expertise that are functional to the economic activities with which they are affiliated. Various mixes of business elites representing different economic activities might therefore produce differentially biased input regarding urban policy-making and affect the types of regime coalitions that cities develop. Closer attention to the economic base of cities—the producers, after all, of local business elites—may reveal internal biases and/or material predisposition towards some urban policies over others by local business elites in relation to the economic activities with which they are linked.

Civic groups and social organizations in governing coalitions, like BUILD in Baltimore (Orr, 1992) or EPISO in El Paso (Stone, 2004), clearly make their mark on regime orientations by affecting the kinds of policies pursued when they are included in governing coalitions (Kilburn, 2004, p. 635). The question is whether various mixes of business elites also stamp distinctive politics on governing coalitions. The primary objective of this article is thus to explore whether variation in prevailing regime orientations in U.S. cities correspond to different configurations of business elite representation.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A secondary objective is to forward an approach that enables systematic comparative analysis of urban regimes. Much of regime theory explores the political nature of regime coalitions and coalition building, which demands a "holistic and context-embracing approach to understand the contemporary city or the historical trajectory of urban development" (Pierre, 2005, p. 447). However, questions of variation in regime composition, formation, maintenance, or change require a comparative approach that has proved quite difficult given the nature of regime theory's localist formulation. Key components of the urban regime concept—for example, that regime coalitions are "largely informal, contain identifying agendas, display stable arrangements over long periods of time, and have a 'productive character'" (Stone, 2001, p. 21)—demand intensive long-term inquiry into the processes and contexts of regime formation and maintenance, making case studies the methodology of choice among regime scholars.

This poses a problem for comparative studies exploring variation in regime formation, maintenance, or character. Reliance upon interviews and archival data over a period of many years as the primary methodological tool for case studies is problematic for comparative analyses across several cities (Gissendanner, 2003, p. 665). Only two or three cities can be adequately compared using the traditional case-study approach; anything beyond that is unwieldy (Kilburn, 2004, p. 635). Consequently, regime theory as practiced thus far is limited in its ability to explain variation in regime formation or policy orientation (Gissendanner, 2003, p. 664).

One challenge facing urban regime scholars comparing multiple cities is identifying "common categories, concepts or variables that can be measured" (Kantor & Savitch, 2005, p. 136; see also Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, p. 814). A Millsian conceptualization of elites, however, views business and political elites and community and social leaders as linked to locally-based institutions such as corporations and government, or community, business and neighborhood organizations (Mills, 1956). This structural view—that elite status is institutionally-bound (Stone, 2001, p. 22)—offers a window through which to explore common categories and variables among a wide range of cities, at least within a single national context. In the United States, for example, such institutions and organizations are required by federal law to report earnings, assets, outlays, and the like to various regulatory bodies. For corporations and public-private partnerships, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is perhaps the most prominent regulatory authority with whom they must file various reports. One report, the 10-K filing (commonly referred to as the "annual report"), contains overviews of corporate and organization information like addresses of headquarters and other facilities, net sales, expenses, identification of corporate officers and directors, and other variables.

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES

Corporate directors and upper-rank officers are recognized by students of community power structure and organizational network theory as members of the local business, social or political elite (Domhoff, 1967, 1970; Hunter, 1953, pp. 61–111; Moore et al., 2002; Schoenberger, 1991, 2001; Scott, 2003; Useem, 1984, pp. 38–40). Particularly active elites are known to sit on more than one corporate or other institutional board, and often across sectors, forming linkages between companies and organizations through shared, or "interlocking," directorates (Harding, 2000; Useem, 1984, pp. 38–40). The sheer pervasiveness and longstanding tradition of interlocking directorates within and across the spectrum of corporations, civic organizations, and public-private partnerships in capitalist societies has attracted the attention of social scientists and theorists for several decades. Interest among scholars regarding interlocking directorates has traditionally focused on two main questions: (1) what motivates companies and organizations to seek interlocks with other corporations and organizations, and (2) what are the impacts of interlocking directorates on corporate and organizational performance.

Various theoretical explanations for interlocking directorates and their impacts have been advanced over the years. These include models of *resource dependency, bank control, legitimacy,* and *social cohesion.* The four models are generally complementary, and each is briefly described below. The section concludes with a discussion on the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) in shaping boards of directors and establishing inter-firm interlocks, and the relationship between CEOs and corporate boards in general.

Resource Dependency

The *resource dependency* model suggests that firms establish interlocks as a means to exercise some degree of control over other firms with which they are interdependent, such as suppliers, purchasers, or financial institutions (Burt, 1980; Davis & Mizruchi, 1999; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Pfeffer, 1987). The need for some measure of control arises from increasingly complex and competitive market environments within which firms and organizations operate, increased interdependencies among firms, and "market imperfections" such as uncertainty and asymmetrical power dependencies (Galaskiewicz, 1985, p. 282; Pfeffer, 1972a; Pfeffer, 1987; Storper & Walker, 1989, pp. 79–82).

Bank Control

The *bank control* model, a variant of the resource dependency model, finds that financial institutions tend to enjoy a high degree of centrality among interlocked firms, particularly manufacturing firms. Bank centrality is based on "their ability to grant or refuse loans to major firms" (Mintz & Schwartz, 1983; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985, p. 28). By refusing or guaranteeing loans on their own terms, banks can exercise some control over management decision-making in ways that enhance the financial interests of the banks themselves *vis-à-vis* the commercial interests of their clients (see Mintz & Schwartz, 1985, pp. 39–44 for a thorough consideration of bank control theory through a review of relationships between financial firms and airlines). Other studies find that high bank centrality among interlocked firms occurs because they demand inclusion with firms that are in distress and experiencing low performance and debt in order to monitor and protect their investments (Lang & Lockhart, 1990; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Pfeffer, 1972b, p. 222). More recently, studies have found that banking firms experienced a reduction in centrality among interlocked firms in the 1980s and 1990s due to technological advances and market deregulation in the financial and banking industries that allowed for alternative methods of financing for corporations (Barnes & Ritter, 2001; Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). Consequently, major enterprises are able to rely upon various financial institutions for short-term loans and other capital. Nevertheless, financial institutions, while diverse, often share overlapping interests and are deemed able to exercise some degree of control over large enterprises via a "constellation of interests" (Scott, 1991, p. 190).

Legitimacy

The *legitimacy* model contends that companies, particularly newly established companies, and civic groups and philanthropic organizations seek to recruit established executives and managers from other reputable companies and organizations to serve as directors in order to legitimize the company or organization (Boyle & Silver, 2005; Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998, p. 19; Mizruchi, 1996). Potential investors, suppliers, or customers would, it is argued, have greater trust in a company or organization with recognized and respected leaders represented on its board.

Social Cohesion

Models of *social cohesion* focus on the structure of social relations within which firms are embedded by exploring connections between, and engendered by, company directors (Brayshay, Clearly, & Selwood, 2005, p. 210). Corporate communities operate within complex sets of networks and contacts embodied by interlocking directorates that create social relations between two or more firms (Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998, p. 18; Scott, 1991, p. 182). The more widely-cast the network of interlocked firms, the more complex is the web of social relations within which firms are embedded.

Studies of social cohesion draw heavily from community power structure and network theory where the social backgrounds of individual directors are explored. Top corporate officers and directors generally share similar educational and social backgrounds like attending certain exclusive schools and universities, being members of particular social clubs, being members of renowned capitalist or celebrity families, and having accrued (largely, but not exclusively, through inheritance) some substantial measure of wealth (Burris, 1991; Domhoff, 1967, 1970, 1980; Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956; Mizruchi, 1996, p. 279; Useem, 1979, 1980, 1984). Directors are widely recognized as constituting an economic elite and as representatives of a capitalist *class;* the main purpose for interlocks, some argue, is to influence corporate and other institutional decision-making in pursuit of their own class interests (Domhoff, 1967, 1970, 2006; Mills, 1956; Mizruchi, 1996; O'Hagan & Green, 2004, p. 129; Useem, 1984, pp. 38–45).

As a structure of social cohesion among representatives of the capitalist class, interlocking directorates facilitate information exchange and communication among directors. While the Clayton Act of 1914 explicitly prohibits direct interlocks between competing firms in order to limit the potential for collusion, indirect interlocks—those where different corporations and organizations are linked together by membership on a third board—are not prohibited (Finch & White, 2005, p. 175; Lyson & Raymer, 2000, p. 204). Information and knowledge can therefore pass among directors representing a wide range of firms and organizations, including among competitors.

Both explicit knowledge, like new technologies, production processes, or management styles, and *tacit* knowledge, may be exchanged. Tacit knowledge "is highly subjective, less teachable and less observable. Its ambiguous nature makes it difficult to process and communicate. With few exceptions, tacit knowledge can only be learned through face-to-face communication" (O'Hagan & Green, 2002, p. 155). Tacit knowledge includes, among other things, knowledge of foreign economic affairs, "learning about the practice and experiences of another large company, and hearing about the policies of still other companies," and knowledge of the general business environment—all gained through personal contacts among interlocked directorates (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989, p. 27; Useem, 1984, p. 46). Even where no interdependency between interlocked firms exists as the resource dependency model would suggest, general information regarding a company's management, labor, market, or production problems—and the company's responses—prove invaluable to other companies.

In social cohesion models, firms would be expected to act in ways that suggest information exchange between two or more firms. Indeed, numerous studies seeking evidence of information and knowledge exchange among interlocked firms have been conducted and yielded various results (Everard & Henry, 2002; Galetkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Green & Semple, 1981; Haunschild, 1993; Lyson & Raymer, 2000; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985).[1] In addition to market behavior, social cohesion among interlocking directorates has ramifications for the corporate exercise of political power. Useem (1984, p. 146) argues that the dual nature of interlocking directorates as both a network of firms and as a social network of members of the business class means that firms are driven by two separate but interrelated logics: an internal market-based logic of the firm and social *class* logic. For policy areas such as issue advertising, political underwriting, and charitable giving—those issues most defining of a corporation's "public face"—social class influence is often the driving force (Useem, 1984, p. 146). Class considerations affect decisions such as what topics are to be covered by editorials, which political candidates are selected for financial backing, and which organizations are chosen for company philanthropy or other eleemosynary activities (Burris, 1991; Mills, 1956; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985, p. 141; Stone, 1989, p. 173; Useem, 1984, p. 146).

Not all business leaders, however, are active in local or national policy-making, nor does serving as a top corporate manager, chief executive, or director automatically confer class-consciousness or political status (Useem, 1984, p. 1). Instead, proving one's management and organizational skills by successfully leading a large institution, and demonstrating an ability to recognize, articulate, and act upon the general interests of the business class as a whole rather than one's own specific corporation's or industry's interests is the true measure of membership in the small club of influential men and women (Stone 1989, p.170; Useem, 1984, pp. 102–106). This small club represents an "inner circle" of elites who have been further socialized to represent and pursue the interests of the business or corporate class in national and local policy-making (Harvey, 2005, p. 33; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985; Mizruchi, 1992; Ratcliff, 1980; Useem, 1984). This is the group who are called upon to serve on multiple boards of directors among various corporations and organizations and form ties between them.

Requisite skills identified by Useem (1984, pp. 102–106) for inclusion in the "inner circle"—like successful management of large institutions—suggests that only the most senior and experienced corporate officers make the cut. Finch and White (2005, p. 176) note that among large corporations in the United States in 1991, one firm in seven was involved in direct reciprocal interlocks involving the most senior of corporate officers: CEOs. Useem (1984, p. 48) and Lorsch & MacIver (1989, p. 18) report that more than half of all board members in the United States are CEO of a corporation. This suggests that CEOs not only play a central role in the shaping of both board composition and board activities (Demb & Neubauer, 2002, p. 137; Finch & White, 2005, p. 193; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989, pp. 20–22; Pfeffer, 1972b, p. 220), but also seek directors who share similar experiences and challenges within their own firms (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989, pp. 18–19; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). As for outside directors who are CEO of their own firms, Lorsch and MacIver (1989, pp. 27–28) find that such individuals most often cite the opportunity to observe and learn from their peers as the primary reason for accepting outside board appointments.

A major role of the board of directors is to generally support the goals and policies of the CEO (Anderson & Anthony, 1986, p. 3; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989, p. 64; Mace, 1971, pp. 10–42). While boards of directors have the ultimate responsibility of removing a CEO if his or her performance is judged to be detrimental to the firm, the CEO generally enjoys much flexibility in shaping and leading a firm's business strategies. Hence, a CEO instilled with the value of, for example, the arts, can shape company policies towards sponsorship and funding of a city's arts community (Useem, 1984, p. 146). The probability, however, "that a given company is led by such an individual is affected by the firm's ties to the corporate community" (Useem, 1984, p. 146). The more embedded a firm is within the network of interlocked firms, "the more likely is the company to be guided by those who believe they must play a leadership role larger than that required by the firm's quest for profits—and that their role must begin at home. This translates into directing their own firms to underwrite charitable causes, start political action committees, and act in ways the corporate community would define as socially responsible" (Useem, 1984, p. 146).

The most active of corporations in political matters are typically those guided by CEOs at the center of interlocking directorates. The aggregate of directorates comprising the network of interlocked firms and organizations represent the full range of skills and resources available to CEOs for political mobilization. In order to address whether different mixes of director affiliations bias the political orientation of participatory business leaders towards some urban policies over others, directors and their primary affiliations must be identified and analyzed across a range of localities.

CATEGORIZING DIRECTOR AFFILIATIONS

Directorship lists are publicly available through annual reports. Consequently, annual reports can serve as a trove of common concepts, categories and variables for comparative regime analyses. This study utilizes directorship lists from the annual reports of all major institutions across several cities to explore whether variation in regime orientations correspond to different mixes in the kinds of businesses represented on cities' leading boards of directors.

All publicly traded corporations, public-private partnerships, and civic organizations are required to have independent oversight. Boards of directors serve this purpose (Carminatti-Marchand & Paquerot, 2001; Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Roberts & Murray, 2002; Schoenberger, 2001). Through annual reports, corporations and organizations provide biographical data on board members. Typical information includes the individual's name and institution with whom he or she is affiliated, the individual's official title or capacity within his or her affiliation, other institutions where the individual may be serving as a director, and other data. Since elite status is conceptualized here as being institutionally-bound, and we are interested in whether variation in regime typologies among cities corresponds to different mixes of business elites represented among interlocked firms and organizations, then it is the affiliation of directors that are to be categorized. Categorizing directors' affiliations involves determining the sectors to which they belong. Director affiliations typically span three broad sectors of social, political, and economic institutions (Harding, 2000; Pierre, 2005, p. 453; Stone, 2001, p. 21).

For the economic sector, several institutions, both public and private, categorize economic activities for various purposes. Some categorizations are very specific, like NAIC codes provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, while others are more general, such as those used by Fortune Magazine. For example, Fortune Magazine would place a chemical-producing firm under the category of "chemicals." Several NAIC codes may be attributed to the same chemical producer, however, to depict specific types and applications of various chemicals produced by the firm. For this study, Fortune magazine's categories (Table 1) are preferred because the degree of specificity of NAICS codes is too cumbersome for comparative analyses across a range of firms. Accordingly, the function of each director's affiliation was evaluated and labeled using the most comparable Fortune Magazine category. Local and national business directories were consulted where necessary to aid in the categorization process.

In addition to those affiliated with economic activities and their numerous categories, other directors may be affiliated with the social and political sectors comprised of government, universities, philanthropic organizations, community foundations, public-private partnerships, neighborhood organizations, or other institutions. To account for these groups, this study consolidates remaining affiliations into five additional categories: civic, developmental, education, government, and military (Table 1). The category of "civic" includes neighborhood, philanthropic, civil rights, environmental, and other organizations whose shared interests is generally the enhancement of spatial use values and quality of life (Cox, 1995; Logan & Molotch, 1987). The category of "education" refers to universities, "developmental" refers to public-private partnerships such as development authorities or business roundtables organized to offer business input for government policy-making (Harding, 2000), and "government" refers to any government agency or office at any scale, both foreign and domestic. Finally, the category of "military" encapsulates directors whose affiliations list any branch of the U.S. military.

Data collection for this study occurred from March through October 2004. Twenty-four U.S. cities representing each of the U.S. Census Bureau regions were selected for the purpose of exploring whether variation in prevailing regime orientations correspond to different mixes of business elites (Table 2). Fifteen of the twenty-four cities were previously case-studied and their

TABLE 1

Categories of Board Member Affiliations, in alphabetical order

No.	Category Nomenclatures by Fortune Magazine
1	Accounting services
2	Aerospace & defense
3	Banking
4	Business services
5	Business supplies
6	Capital goods
7	Chemicals
8	Computers—software & services
9	Computers & electronics
10	Construction
11	Consumer durables
12	Energy
13	Entertainment & information
14	Financial services
15	Food distributors
16	Food, drink & tobacco
17	Forest products & packaging
18	Health care
19	Household & personal products
20	Insurance
21	Internet
22	Legal services
23	Metals
24	REIT
25	Retailing
26	Telecommunications
27	Travel & transport
No.	Additional categories
28	Civic
29	Developmental
30	Education
31	Government
32	Military

regimes or governing coalitions characterized (Table 3). These case studies serve as authoritative benchmarks for which to compare findings (Gissendanner, 2003; Kantor & Savitch, 2005, p. 148; Kilburn, 2004). An additional nine cities were included for the purpose of testing the robustness of the technique (Table 4).

Identification of all major corporations, civic groups, foundations, and public-private partnerships for the purpose of categorizing their directors' affiliations took place as follows. For corporations, those ranked in the top 1,000 in 2003 revenue by Fortune Magazine, and companies that employ 5,000 or more workers, were selected. Fortune Magazine is a widely read and highly respected international commercial publication that reports on major economic trends globally. To be a Fortune-ranked company (in terms of ranking by revenue or other criteria) is widely considered to be a prestigious achievement for corporations and their employees. Some of the twenty-four cities are home to only one or two Fortune-ranked companies, however, so the criterion for selecting companies was widened to include the largest employers (at least five thousand employees) to ensure that at least four major corporations were selected for each city to allow for comparative analysis.

TABLE 2

Study Area

City	Region
Boston	New England
Charlotte	South Atlantic
Chicago	East North Central
Cincinnati	East North Central
Cleveland	East North Central
Dallas	West South Central
Denver	Mountain
Houston	West South Central
Indianapolis	East North Central
Kansas City	West North Central
Los Angeles	Pacific
Miami	South Atlantic
New Orleans	West South Central
New York	Middle Atlantic
Norfolk	South Atlantic
Orlando	South Atlantic
Philadelphia	Middle Atlantic
Phoenix	Mountain
Pittsburgh	Middle Atlantic
Saint Louis	West North Central
Salt Lake City	Mountain
San Antonio	West South Central
San Diego	Pacific
Tampa	South Atlantic

Note: Regions defined by U.S. Census Bureau.

TABLE 3

Cities and Case Studies in Urban Regime Theory Literature

City	Regime typology	Case studies
Boston	Progressive	Ward (1996)
Charlotte	Developmental	Smith and Graves (2005)
Chicago	Developmental	Bennett et al. (1988), Mier, Moe, and Sherr (1986), Ferman (1996)
Cincinnati	Developmental	Salmon and Leibovitz (1999), Brown and Paul (2000), Austrian and Rosentraub (2002)
Cleveland	Developmental	Austrian and Rosentraub (2002)
Dallas	Developmental	Elkin (1987)
Houston	Developmental	Kirby and Lynch (1987), Feagin (1985, 1988), Parker and Feagin (1990)
Indianapolis	Developmental	Austrian and Rosentraub (2002)
New Orleans	Caretaker	Whelan (1987), Whelan and Young (1991), Whelan, Young, and Lauria (1994), Ward (1996)
New York	Developmental	Whitt (1987)
Philadelphia	Developmental	Jo (2002)
Pittsburgh	Developmental	Ferman (1996), Jo (2002)
St. Louis	Developmental	Glassberg (1991)
Salt Lake City	Caretaker	Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying (2001)
Tampa	Progressive	Kerstein (1993), Turner (1992)

TABLE 4

Expected Regime Types, and Justification for Expected Regime Types, for Non-Case Studied Cities

City	Regime typology	Justification
Denver	Progressive	Kerstein (1993), Turner (1992)
Kansas City	Developmental	Glassberg (1991)
Los Angeles	Progressive	Kerstein (1993), Turner (1992)
Miami	Progressive	Kerstein (1993), Turner (1992)
Norfolk	Caretaker	Significant presence of military bases
Orlando	Progressive	Kerstein (1993), Turner (1992)
Phoenix	Progressive	Kerstein (1993), Turner (1992)
San Antonio	Caretaker	Significant presence of military bases
San Diego	Caretaker	Significant presence of military bases

Aside from traditional eleemosynary organizations such as United Way and community foundations found in each of the twenty-four cities, the selection of development agencies and civic organizations was based primarily on identifying agencies and organizations included within the networks of interlocked directorates among corporations and by cross-referencing listed affiliations of directors. Firms consistently list other firms and organizations for whom their inside and outside directors also serve as either directors or managers. Civic organizations, foundations, business roundtables, arts organizations, public-private partnerships, and the like, were often listed as secondary or tertiary affiliations, and in some cases, the primary affiliation, for interlocked directors. Indeed, much of the literature on relationships between the non-profit sector and the corporate sector find strong linkages between firms and large cultural institutions through interlocking corporate directors and organizational and university trustees—and for similar reasons as corporate interlocks (i.e., resource dependency, legitimacy, and social cohesion) (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990, p. 141; Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998, p. 18; Martin, 2004; Salzman & Domhoff, 1980, pp. 232–238; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983, p. 141). Outside of the database of interlocked firms and organizations, other non-corporate organizations and institutions were discovered by reviewing business journals and newspaper articles from each of the twenty-four cities and through exploring the websites of city governments, development organizations, chambers of commerce, and other government and public-private partnership entities. Finally, some organizations were discovered through academic journal articles referring to their roles in certain projects.

It is important to note that organizations not interlocked with the corporate sector would be considered peripheral to the networks of business elites (Useem, 1984, pp. 141–147). However, neighborhood groups, religious organizations, or issue groups, while generally smaller in organization and representing more localized constituencies nevertheless can have profound impacts on urban politics as demonstrated by Stone (1989, pp. 67–73). This is where academic journals and newspaper accounts were important in identifying such groups having an impact on urban politics. Nevertheless, given their generally small size and status as peripheral to networks of business elites, it is quite possible that some organizations may have been overlooked, thus possibly skewing our results in some cases.

METHODOLOGY

In a recent comparative study of U.S. urban regimes, Kilburn (2004) used qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to measure the impacts of combinations of three urban structural features in producing progressive regimes: the fiscal base, democratic conditions (ward-style city council representation, and degree of civic participation), and the presence of export-oriented economic firms. This study, however, focuses specifically on the social agency of business elites. Interlocking directorates embody the social cohesion of business elites and the aggregate of resources at their command. Interlocking directorates across the twenty-four cities comprise a total seat count of 10,491. Understanding how different configurations of economic affiliations among the 10,491 seats may be related to different political orientations of the group is a question for which factor analysis is uniquely applicable. Essentially a data reduction technique, factor analysis allows one to "identify and summarize the many inter-relationships that exist among individual variables," particularly among a large number of variables (Kachigan, 1991, p. 236). Factor analysis is a procedure for eliminating redundancy among a large set of correlated variables, and separating variables into groups of similarities. Accordingly, exploratory factor analysis is used to identify families of strong correlations among directorship affiliations for which to compare against profiles of directorship affiliations for each of the twenty-four cities indicating the ratio of specific directorship affiliations per each city's total board seat count.

A data matrix was constructed indicating the number of directorships per affiliation category for each of the twenty-four cities (Table 5). The grand total of directorships or "seats" across the twenty-four cities is 10,491. Profiles of directorship affiliations for each of the twenty-four cities were created indicating the ratio of specific directorship affiliations per each city's total seat count (Table 6), and correlation was performed among the directorship affiliation categories (Table 7). A careful visual examination of the correlation matrix for category variables produces two broad observations. First, the vast majority of the correlations are positive and in the mid-to-high level range of correlation coefficients. Second, there appears to be a clear distinction among service-based categories such as banking, business services, financial services, and government on the one hand, and more blue-collar and manufacturing-based categories such as capital goods, chemicals, and consumer durables on the other. The service-based category variables share relatively high correlations among themselves, as do the manufacturing-based category variables, but the two sets have very low correlations when compared to each other. This observation is borne out further by city profiles where those with high director affiliation representations of capital goods, chemicals, and consumer durables have lower affiliation representations of service-sector categories, and vice-versa.

A factor analysis of the category correlation matrix reinforces these observations. A varimax rotation produces the most pronounced differences between clusters of closely associated directorship affiliation categories, drawing out three main factors that each explain a reasonable degree of the common variance: 29.6% (factor one), 25.3% (factor two), and 21.3% (factor three), and a cumulative variance of 76.2% (Table 8). A review of the factor loadings (Table 8) reinforces the clear distinction between service-based and manufacturing-based director affiliations, with the former (e.g., accounting services, banking, business services, and real estate) scoring highest in Factor 2 and the latter (e.g., capital goods, chemicals, consumer durables, forest products & packaging) in Factor 3.

Typologies of regimes described in the literature are too numerous and varied to be reviewed here (see DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1989; Dowding, 2001; Fainstein et al., 1983; Kilburn, 2004; and Ward, 1996, for a range of typology characterizations). However, a review of the directorship affiliation categories grouped among the three main factors appear to correspond to three broad regime typologies presented by Dowding (2001), Kilburn (2004), and Ward (1996) as encapsulating the general themes and policy orientations of other regime characterizations. These three broad typologies are *developmental, caretaker*, and *progressive.*

Developmental regimes generally promote economic development (Dowding, 2001, p. 13; Kilburn, 2004, p. 635; Stone, 1993; Ward, 1996). Caretaker regimes generally maintain a *lasseiz faire* approach to economic development and instead promote a policy focus on traditional municipal service provision (Harvey, 1989; Stone, 1989, p. 188). Progressive regimes promote opportunity expansion for working class and minority populations, or they promote policies that

TABLE 5

Original Data Matrix: Directorship Seat Counts by Affiliation Category

Categories	Boston	Charlotte	Chicago	Cincinnati	Cleveland	Dallas	Denver	Houston	Indianapolis	Kansas City	Los Angeles
Accounting services	3	13	14	3	12	15	6	13	13	2	20
Aerospace & defense	3	8	11	3	3	4	5	1	1	1	14
Banking	8	46	75	35	44	50	20	31	32	17	46
Business services	31	20	63	34	43	26	20	34	26	12	71
Business supplies	1	1	3	1	1	10	0	1	1	0	10
Capital goods	2	4	34	11	37	11	0	6	7	3	3
Chemicals	3	5	10	8	31	3	4	1	8	0	5
Civic	18	8	33	30	38	24	10	28	34	12	49
Computers—software & services	4	5	4	5	2	6	0	3	0	5	12
Computers & electronics	7	4	11	4	5	9	1	2	3	0	15
Construction	1	20	20	14	34	25	15	0	22	8	39
Consumer durables	5	3	21	8	20	1	2	2	3	0	7
Developmental	5	9	14	27	9	6	11	5	24	9	27
Education	27	24	61	29	25	29	11	21	21	13	44
Energy	3	23	31	15	12	37	9	130	19	9	41
Entertainment & information	23	26	45	25	56	19	33	24	38	9	168
Financial services	54	16	100	30	35	43	26	59	23	10	106
Food distributors	4	2	13	9	9	13	3	9	5	2	9
Food, drink, & tobacco	3	0	53	5	6	11	10	6	0	1	18
Forest products & packaging	0	1	10	1	4	1	5	0	0	3	4
Government	5	26	18	13	20	19	3	11	15	15	40
Health care	17	15	42	11	24	14	13	16	34	16	58
Household & personal products	8	0	9	18	5	0	1	2	2	1	6
Insurance	9	4	27	20	12	7	3	5	14	4	27
Internet	0	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	0	4
Legal services	23	23	57	30	55	28	19	32	24	23	91
Metals	1	4	5	1	5	1	5	7	0	1	2
Military	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
REIT	17	28	57	9	7	30	33	21	38	4	87
Retailing	15	16	14	27	11	31	2	13	10	4	10
Telecommunications	6	7	33	8	8	16	11	14	5	9	14
Travel & transport	2	7	9	9	3	18	2	9	10	7	20

Continued

TABLE 5

Continued

Categories	Miami	New Orleans	New York	Norfolk	Orlando	Philadelphia	Phoenix	Pittsburgh	St. Louis	Salt Lake City	San Antonio	San Diego	Tampa
Accounting services	22	2	19	4	3	4	4	3	14	3	6	6	13
Aerospace & defense	5	2	9	6	1	1	5	5	7	0	1	7	1
Banking	56	21	55	14	9	25	13	10	46	14	14	19	35
Business services	47	8	57	6	5	24	22	18	34	13	18	21	36
Business supplies	1	0	10	0	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Capital goods	4	1	16	0	2	4	1	4	6	0	1	4	6
Chemicals	0	3	16	0	0	22	1	11	14	2	0	0	0
Civic	9	4	61	11	4	25	15	23	56	10	5	18	27
Computers—software & services	2	2	7	1	1	1	4	5	6	0	2	3	1
Computers & electronics	7	1	11	1	0	2	4	4	4	1	0	2	9
Construction	31	5	12	5	13	3	3	8	20	8	11	11	37
Consumer durables	7	0	14	1	0	0	1	4	3	0	2	0	1
Developmental	33	0	7	4	7	15	3	13	34	8	4	14	24
Education	28	6	51	12	4	23	13	22	63	7	9	11	29
Energy	9	18	31	1	3	15	17	25	46	18	11	9	22
Entertainment & information	33	12	92	10	11	13	15	9	28	8	16	19	40
Financial services	27	9	220	13	4	37	10	47	62	8	11	22	39
Food distributors	3	2	2	3	4	0	4	8	9	5	9	1	14
Food, drink, & tobacco	7	2	42	7	2	9	3	8	19	4	4	2	3
Forest products & packaging	0	1	6	0	0	5	0	1	3	0	0	0	0
Government	44	2	38	22	8	17	14	25	31	3	7	4	30
Health care	29	8	65	8	10	23	11	21	41	16	13	8	11
Household & personal products	1	1	30	2	1	1	2	4	11	0	2	0	2
Insurance	6	2	47	2	2	11	5	4	10	1	5	3	9
Internet	1	0	4	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Legal services	60	15	60	7	14	19	19	11	37	7	14	13	42
Metals	0	3	8	0	0	1	6	34	5	1	0	0	0
Military	0	1	4	18	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2
REIT	43	8	49	16	16	17	6	8	17	10	5	15	38
Retailing	10	4	32	5	4	11	9	1	32	7	6	4	15
Telecommunications	13	3	35	1	2	6	7	3	10	2	6	14	7
Travel & transport	20	6	9	3	2	4	5	3	4	8	1	3	7

TABLE 6

Affiliation Proportion of Total Seat Count, Per City

Affiliation categories	Boston	Charlotte	Chicago	Cincinnati	Cleveland	Dallas	Denver	Houston	Indianapolis	Kansas City	Los Angeles
Accounting services	0.974%	3.523%	1.556%	0.674%	2.076%	2.941%	2.113%	2.564%	2.995%	1.000%	1.874%
Aerospace & defense	0.974%	2.168%	1.222%	0.674%	0.519%	0.784%	1.761%	0.197%	0.230%	0.500%	1.312%
Banking	2.597%	12.466%	8.333%	7.865%	7.612%	9.804%	7.042%	6.114%	7.373%	8.500%	4.311%
Business services	10.065%	5.420%	7.000%	7.640%	7.439%	5.098%	7.042%	6.706%	5.991%	6.000%	6.654%
Business supplies	0.325%	0.271%	0.333%	0.225%	0.173%	1.961%	0.000%	0.197%	0.230%	0.000%	0.937%
Capital goods	0.649%	1.084%	3.778%	2.472%	6.401%	2.157%	0.000%	1.183%	1.613%	1.500%	0.281%
Chemicals	0.974%	1.355%	1.111%	1.798%	5.363%	0.588%	1.408%	0.197%	1.843%	0.000%	0.469%
Civic	5.844%	2.168%	3.667%	6.742%	6.574%	4.706%	3.521%	5.523%	7.834%	6.000%	4.592%
Computers–software & services	1.299%	1.355%	0.444%	1.124%	0.346%	1.176%	0.000%	0.592%	0.000%	2.500%	1.125%
Computers & electronics	2.273%	1.084%	1.222%	0.899%	0.865%	1.765%	0.352%	0.394%	0.691%	0.000%	1.406%
Construction	0.325%	5.420%	2.222%	3.146%	5.882%	4.902%	5.282%	0.000%	5.069%	4.000%	3.655%
Consumer durables	1.623%	0.813%	2.333%	1.798%	3.460%	0.196%	0.704%	0.394%	0.691%	0.000%	0.656%
Developmental	1.623%	2.439%	1.556%	6.067%	1.557%	1.176%	3.873%	0.986%	5.530%	4.500%	2.530%
Education	8.766%	6.504%	6.778%	6.517%	4.325%	5.686%	3.873%	4.142%	4.839%	6.500%	4.124%
Energy	0.974%	6.233%	3.444%	3.371%	2.076%	7.255%	3.169%	25.641%	4.378%	4.500%	3.843%
Entertainment & information	7.468%	7.046%	5.000%	5.618%	9.689%	3.725%	11.620%	4.734%	8.756%	4.500%	15.745%
Financial services	17.532%	4.336%	11.111%	6.742%	6.055%	8.431%	9.155%	11.637%	5.300%	5.000%	9.934%
Food distributors	1.299%	0.542%	1.444%	2.022%	1.557%	2.549%	1.056%	1.775%	1.152%	1.000%	0.843%
Food, drink, & tobacco	0.974%	0.000%	5.889%	1.124%	1.038%	2.157%	3.521%	1.183%	0.000%	0.500%	1.687%
Forest products & packaging	0.000%	0.271%	1.111%	0.225%	0.692%	0.196%	1.761%	0.000%	0.000%	1.500%	0.375%
Government	1.623%	7.046%	2.000%	2.921%	3.460%	3.725%	1.056%	2.170%	3.456%	7.500%	3.749%
Health care	5.519%	4.065%	4.667%	2.472%	4.152%	2.745%	4.577%	3.156%	7.834%	8.000%	5.436%
Household & personal products	2.597%	0.000%	1.000%	4.045%	0.865%	0.000%	0.352%	0.394%	0.461%	0.500%	0.562%
Insurance	2.922%	1.084%	3.000%	4.494%	2.076%	1.373%	1.056%	0.986%	3.226%	2.000%	2.530%
Internet	0.000%	0.271%	0.111%	0.449%	0.346%	0.588%	0.352%	0.197%	0.461%	0.000%	0.375%
Legal services	7.468%	6.233%	6.333%	6.742%	9.516%	5.490%	6.690%	6.312%	5.530%	11.500%	8.529%
Metals	0.325%	1.084%	0.556%	0.225%	0.865%	0.196%	1.761%	1.381%	0.000%	0.500%	0.187%
Military	0.000%	0.000%	0.222%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%
REIT	5.519%	7.588%	6.333%	2.022%	1.211%	5.882%	11.620%	4.142%	8.756%	2.000%	8.154%
Retailing	4.870%	4.336%	1.556%	6.067%	1.903%	6.078%	0.704%	2.564%	2.304%	2.000%	0.937%
Telecommunications	1.948%	1.897%	3.667%	1.798%	1.384%	3.137%	3.873%	2.761%	1.152%	4.500%	1.312%
Travel & transport	0.649%	1.897%	1.000%	2.022%	0.519%	3.529%	0.704%	1.775%	2.304%	3.500%	1.874%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Continued

TABLE 6

Continued

Affiliation categories	Miami	New Orleans	New York	Norfolk	Orlando	Philadelphia	Phoenix	Pittsburgh	St. Louis	Salt Lake City
Accounting services	3.943%	1.316%	1.698%	2.174%	2.222%	1.173%	1.778%	0.872%	2.077%	1.818%
Aerospace & defense	0.896%	1.316%	0.804%	3.261%	0.741%	0.293%	2.222%	1.453%	1.039%	0.000%
Banking	10.036%	13.816%	4.915%	7.609%	6.667%	7.331%	5.778%	2.907%	6.825%	8.485%
Business services	8.423%	5.263%	5.094%	3.261%	3.704%	7.038%	9.778%	5.233%	5.045%	7.879%
Business supplies	0.179%	0.000%	0.894%	0.000%	1.481%	0.880%	0.444%	0.291%	0.148%	0.606%
Capital goods	0.717%	0.658%	1.430%	0.000%	1.481%	1.173%	0.444%	1.163%	0.890%	0.000%
Chemicals	0.000%	1.974%	1.430%	0.000%	0.000%	6.452%	0.444%	3.198%	2.077%	1.212%
Civic	1.613%	2.632%	5.451%	5.978%	2.963%	7.331%	6.667%	6.686%	8.309%	6.061%
Computers—software & services	0.358%	1.316%	0.626%	0.543%	0.741%	0.293%	1.778%	1.453%	0.890%	0.000%
Computers & electronics	1.254%	0.658%	0.983%	0.543%	0.000%	0.587%	1.778%	1.163%	0.593%	0.606%
Construction	5.556%	3.289%	1.072%	2.717%	9.630%	0.880%	1.333%	2.326%	2.967%	4.848%
Consumer durables	1.254%	0.000%	1.251%	0.543%	0.000%	0.000%	0.444%	1.163%	0.445%	0.000%
Developmental	5.914%	0.000%	0.626%	2.174%	5.185%	4.399%	1.333%	3.779%	5.045%	4.848%
Education	5.018%	3.947%	4.558%	6.522%	2.963%	6.745%	5.778%	6.395%	9.347%	4.242%
Energy	1.613%	11.842%	2.770%	0.543%	2.222%	4.399%	7.556%	7.267%	6.825%	10.909%
Entertainment & information	5.914%	7.895%	8.222%	5.435%	8.148%	3.812%	6.667%	2.616%	4.154%	4.848%
Financial services	4.839%	5.921%	19.660%	7.065%	2.963%	10.850%	4.444%	13.663%	9.199%	4.848%
Food distributors	0.538%	1.316%	0.179%	1.630%	2.963%	0.000%	1.778%	2.326%	1.335%	3.030%
Food, drink, & tobacco	1.254%	1.316%	3.753%	3.804%	1.481%	2.639%	1.333%	2.326%	2.819%	2.424%
Forest products & packaging	0.000%	0.658%	0.536%	0.000%	0.000%	1.466%	0.000%	0.291%	0.445%	0.000%
Government	7.885%	1.316%	3.396%	11.957%	5.926%	4.985%	6.222%	7.267%	4.599%	1.818%
Health care	5.197%	5.263%	5.809%	4.348%	7.407%	6.745%	4.889%	6.105%	6.083%	9.697%
Household & personal products	0.179%	0.658%	2.681%	1.087%	0.741%	0.293%	0.889%	1.163%	1.632%	0.000%
Insurance	1.075%	1.316%	4.200%	1.087%	1.481%	3.226%	2.222%	1.163%	1.484%	0.606%
Internet	0.179%	0.000%	0.357%	0.543%	0.741%	0.000%	0.444%	0.291%	0.000%	0.000%
Legal services	10.753%	9.868%	5.362%	3.804%	10.370%	5.572%	8.444%	3.198%	5.490%	4.242%
Metals	0.000%	1.974%	0.715%	0.000%	0.000%	0.293%	2.667%	9.884%	0.742%	0.606%
Military	0.000%	0.658%	0.357%	9.783%	0.000%	0.000%	0.444%	0.000%	0.148%	0.000%
REIT	7.706%	5.263%	4.379%	8.696%	11.852%	4.985%	2.667%	2.326%	2.522%	6.061%
Retailing	1.792%	2.632%	2.860%	2.717%	2.963%	3.226%	4.000%	0.291%	4.748%	4.242%
Telecommunications	2.330%	1.974%	3.128%	0.543%	1.481%	1.760%	3.111%	0.872%	1.484%	1.212%
Travel & transport	3.584%	3.947%	0.804%	1.630%	1.481%	1.173%	2.222%	0.872%	0.593%	4.848%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Continued

TABLE 6

Continued

Affiliation categories	San Antonio	San Diego	Tampa
Accounting services	3.226%	2.553%	2.595%
Aerospace & defense	0.538%	2.979%	0.200%
Banking	7.527%	8.085%	6.986%
Business services	9.677%	8.936%	7.186%
Business supplies	0.538%	0.000%	0.200%
Capital goods	0.538%	1.702%	1.198%
Chemicals	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%
Civic	2.688%	7.660%	5.389%
Computers—software & services	1.075%	1.277%	0.200%
Computers & electronics	0.000%	0.851%	1.796%
Construction	5.914%	4.681%	7.385%
Consumer durables	1.075%	0.000%	0.200%
Developmental	2.151%	5.957%	4.790%
Education	4.839%	4.681%	5.788%
Energy	5.914%	3.830%	4.391%
Entertainment & information	8.602%	8.085%	7.984%
Financial services	5.914%	9.362%	7.784%
Food distributors	4.839%	0.426%	2.794%
Food, drink, & tobacco	2.151%	0.851%	0.599%
Forest products & packaging	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%
Government	3.763%	1.702%	5.988%
Health care	6.989%	3.404%	2.196%
Household & personal products	1.075%	0.000%	0.399%
Insurance	2.688%	1.277%	1.796%
Internet	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%
Legal services	7.527%	5.532%	8.383%
Metals	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%
Military	1.075%	0.851%	0.399%
REIT	2.688%	6.383%	7.585%
Retailing	3.226%	1.702%	2.994%
Telecommunications	3.226%	5.957%	1.397%
Travel & transport	0.538%	1.277%	1.397%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 7

Category Correlation Matrix

	Accounting services	Aerospace & defense	Banking	Business services	Business supplies	Capital goods	Chemicals	Civic	Computers—software & services	Computers & electronics	Construction	Consumer durables	Developmental	Education	Energy	Entertainment & information
Accounting services	1.00															
Aerospace & defense	0.53	1.00														
Banking	0.84	0.56	1.00													
Business services	0.78	0.64	0.78	1.00												
Business supplies	0.57	0.50	0.49	0.57	1.00											
Capital goods	0.37	0.26	0.66	0.57	0.22	1.00										
Chemicals	0.18	0.12	0.36	0.36	0.19	0.66	1.00									
Civic	0.58	0.48	0.58	0.73	0.56	0.49	0.59	1.00								
Computers—software & services	0.42	0.70	0.40	0.57	0.67	0.12	0.09	0.56	1.00							
Computers & electronics	0.72	0.68	0.70	0.88	0.73	0.43	0.19	0.63	0.66	1.00						
Construction	0.71	0.35	0.63	0.58	0.35	0.39	0.19	0.37	0.26	0.61	1.00					
Consumer durables	0.46	0.47	0.68	0.74	0.28	0.90	0.61	0.53	0.26	0.56	0.39	1.00				
Developmental	0.50	0.26	0.45	0.48	0.05	0.06	0.14	0.46	0.22	0.36	0.61	0.15	1.00			
Education	0.66	0.64	0.79	0.81	0.49	0.53	0.43	0.82	0.59	0.75	0.42	0.62	0.53	1.00		
Energy	0.39	0.07	0.29	0.31	0.22	0.10	0.00	0.38	0.28	0.17	−0.06	0.04	0.02	0.31	1.00	
Entertainment & information	0.66	0.68	0.51	0.81	0.68	0.27	0.24	0.65	0.66	0.77	0.60	0.47	0.35	0.54	0.19	1.00
Financial services	0.58	0.59	0.57	0.74	0.71	0.41	0.37	0.79	0.57	0.71	0.17	0.58	0.12	0.74	0.32	0.67
Food distributors	0.34	0.09	0.41	0.42	0.25	0.45	0.06	0.35	0.23	0.47	0.50	0.34	0.25	0.45	0.38	0.22
Food, drink & tobacco	0.47	0.64	0.68	0.68	0.53	0.58	0.34	0.60	0.39	0.61	0.16	0.69	0.11	0.78	0.20	0.45
Forest products & packaging	0.29	0.52	0.58	0.57	0.37	0.63	0.56	0.49	0.28	0.43	0.18	0.67	0.09	0.62	0.05	0.43
Government	0.77	0.54	0.63	0.63	0.48	0.20	0.24	0.55	0.52	0.67	0.61	0.35	0.58	0.64	0.13	0.58
Health care	0.70	0.63	0.64	0.80	0.65	0.38	0.44	0.81	0.58	0.70	0.39	0.58	0.41	0.79	0.23	0.78
Household & personal products	0.28	0.38	0.40	0.54	0.43	0.38	0.40	0.70	0.45	0.46	0.02	0.56	0.18	0.63	0.09	0.42
Insurance	0.54	0.55	0.63	0.79	0.68	0.52	0.44	0.79	0.54	0.72	0.28	0.68	0.25	0.73	0.14	0.72
Internet	0.59	0.52	0.50	0.58	0.81	0.35	0.27	0.58	0.58	0.64	0.43	0.46	0.13	0.40	0.19	0.73
Legal services	0.82	0.61	0.77	0.94	0.59	0.51	0.32	0.66	0.60	0.84	0.71	0.66	0.50	0.71	0.26	0.87
Metals	−0.09	0.17	−0.09	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.27	0.17	0.22	0.06	−0.17	0.15	−0.08	0.13	0.21	−0.04
Military	−0.10	0.18	−0.11	−0.18	−0.07	−0.08	−0.15	−0.06	−0.14	−0.09	−0.18	−0.04	−0.21	−0.06	−0.18	−0.07
REIT	0.77	0.69	0.66	0.78	0.64	0.20	0.01	0.48	0.47	0.81	0.61	0.38	0.43	0.59	0.21	0.82
Retailing	0.49	0.24	0.60	0.46	0.53	0.33	0.30	0.66	0.45	0.50	0.23	0.30	0.30	0.70	0.30	0.23
Telecommunications	0.61	0.59	0.74	0.73	0.58	0.57	0.21	0.57	0.44	0.64	0.21	0.64	0.09	0.69	0.30	0.48
Travel & transport	0.71	0.35	0.62	0.56	0.60	0.09	−0.14	0.27	0.47	0.63	0.55	0.16	0.44	0.36	0.28	0.52

Continued

TABLE 7

Continued

	Financial services	Food distributors	Food, drink & tobacco	Forest products & packaging	Government	Health care	Household & personal products	Insurance	Internet	Legal services	Metals	Military	REIT	Retailing	Telecommuni-cations	Travel & transport
Accounting services																
Aerospace & defense																
Banking																
Business services																
Business supplies																
Capital goods																
Chemicals																
Civic																
Computers—software & services																
Computers & electronics																
Construction																
Consumer durables																
Developmental																
Education																
Energy																
Entertainment & information																
Financial services	1.00															
Food distributors	0.16	1.00														
Food, drink, & tobacco	0.81	0.29	1.00													
Forest products & packaging	0.60	0.12	0.83	1.00												
Government	0.53	0.20	0.38	0.23	1.00											
Health care	0.84	0.13	0.73	0.61	0.66	1.00										
Household & personal products	0.81	0.09	0.63	0.43	0.36	0.63	1.00									
Insurance	0.91	0.18	0.77	0.63	0.50	0.84	0.85	1.00								
Internet	0.63	0.21	0.41	0.29	0.50	0.62	0.51	0.70	1.00							
Legal services	0.65	0.37	0.56	0.51	0.72	0.77	0.44	0.71	0.63	1.00						
Metals	0.22	0.12	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.14	0.15	0.04	0.10	−0.07	1.00					
Military	0.04	−0.13	0.12	−0.06	0.12	−0.08	0.08	0.00	0.01	−0.17	−0.12	1.00				
REIT	0.61	0.25	0.57	0.46	0.60	0.72	0.25	0.63	0.61	0.79	−0.11	−0.03	1.00			
Retailing	0.55	0.37	0.42	0.21	0.41	0.43	0.66	0.56	0.43	0.38	−0.12	−0.08	0.23	1.00		
Telecommunications	0.82	0.21	0.87	0.70	0.37	0.67	0.60	0.77	0.49	0.62	0.03	−0.04	0.59	0.49	1.00	
Travel & transport	0.29	0.27	0.22	0.07	0.57	0.44	0.06	0.34	0.58	0.64	−0.17	−0.19	0.67	0.34	0.37	1.00

TABLE 8

Factor Loadings (Varimax Rotation)

	Component				
Categories of director affiliations	1	2	3	4	5
Accounting services	0.418	**0.834**	0.101	0.239	0.001
Aerospace & defense	**0.730**	0.403	0.206	−0.281	−0.135
Banking	0.305	**0.687**	0.547	0.264	−0.048
Business services	0.556	**0.631**	0.475	0.181	0.007
Business supplies	**0.845**	0.344	0.040	0.166	−0.140
Capital goods	−0.095	0.089	**0.954**	0.145	0.004
Chemicals	−0.010	−0.211	**0.783**	−0.052	0.487
Civic	**0.658**	0.143	0.498	0.248	0.415
Computers—software & services	**0.856**	0.267	−0.112	0.165	0.117
Computers & electronics	0.645	**0.675**	0.232	0.151	−0.030
Construction	−0.026	**0.967**	0.057	0.075	0.146
Consumer durables	0.172	0.168	**0.940**	−0.027	0.033
Developmental	0.009	**0.780**	−0.068	0.090	0.506
Education	0.543	0.351	**0.589**	0.252	0.223
Energy	0.226	−0.095	−0.186	**0.838**	−0.106
Entertainment & information	**0.698**	0.631	0.115	−0.061	0.005
Financial services	**0.864**	−0.009	0.479	0.061	0.004
Food distributors	−0.288	0.408	0.144	**0.719**	−0.048
Food, drink, & tobacco	0.567	−0.011	**0.760**	−0.005	−0.202
Forest products & packaging	0.352	0.000	**0.874**	−0.122	−0.062
Government	0.471	**0.748**	−0.092	−0.078	0.298
Health care	**0.787**	0.356	0.424	−0.026	0.189
Household & personal products	**0.682**	−0.262	0.550	0.004	0.204
Insurance	**0.772**	0.148	0.584	−0.004	0.057
Internet	**0.774**	0.396	0.064	0.037	−0.054
Legal services	0.506	**0.773**	0.314	0.111	0.079
Metals	0.003	**−0.662**	−0.012	0.016	0.331
Military	−0.046	−0.346	−0.149	**−0.611**	−0.419
REIT	0.585	**0.765**	0.068	−0.012	−0.160
Retailing	0.490	0.108	0.290	**0.516**	0.199
Telecommunications	**0.650**	0.151	0.648	0.158	−0.259
Travel & transport	0.377	**0.813**	−0.263	0.255	−0.107
Eigenvalue	9.459	8.085	6.828	2.471	1.461
Percentage of Variance	29.560	25.266	21.338	7.721	4.575
Cumulative (%) of Variance	29.560	54.826	76.164	83.885	88.461

(1) manage and restrict growth, or (2) emphasize historical preservation, quality of design, culture, and the arts (Kerstein, 1993; Sbragia, 1990; Stone, 1987, 1993; Ward, 1996).

Table 9 lists directorship affiliation categories by highest factor score. Contained in the first factor is the category of ‘civic,’ which is the only category that is widely identified in regime theory as meaningful in terms of determining the nature of “progressive” regime types (Dowding, 2001; Kerstein, 1993; Kilburn, 2004; Orr, 1992; Sbragia, 1990). It is the one identifiable category within the factor that suggests the factor may be a list of markers for the mix of business elite affiliations that might indicate a political orientation of a more progressive character. Additionally, the factor contains an eclectic mix of directorship affiliations representing high technology (aerospace & defense, health care), multimedia services (computer software & services, entertainment & information, internet, telecommunications), and traditional services (business supplies, household & personal products, insurance, and financial services). Interestingly, this list of directorship

TABLE 9

Three Major Factors and Their Associated Categories (Varimax Rotation)

Factor 1 (Progressive)	Factor 2 (Developmental)	Factor 3 (Caretaker)
Aerospace & defense	Accounting services	Capital goods
Business supplies	Banking	Chemicals
Civic	Business services	Consumer durables
Computers—software & services	Computers & electronics	Education
Entertainment & information	Construction	Food, drink & tobacco
Financial services	Developmental	Forest products & packaging
Health care	Government	
Household & personal products	Legal services	
Insurance	REIT	
Internet	Travel & transport	
Telecommunications		

affiliations in the economic sector appears to closely resemble Richard Florida's (2002, p. 47) list of "core industries of the creative class." Florida refers to the workforce of these industries as the "creative class" in order to express "the sense that its members are the fountainhead of innovative energy and cultural dynamism in modern urban society" (Scott, 2006, p. 4). Florida (2002, 2003) suggests that cities should embark on economic development strategies centered on tolerance of gay and lesbian lifestyles, promotion of the arts and cultural activities, and creating a vibrant nightlife in order to establish "creativity-inducing" environments coveted by the largely young and *affluent* workforce. Progressiveness in this context more closely resembles the middle-class progressive regime or the middle-class arts-and-culture progressive regime type that focuses on historical preservation, quality of urban design, tourism, or environmental quality rather than a low-income, opportunity-expanding progressive regime prototype (Gladstone & Fainstein, 2001; Stone, 1993). Factor one is labeled here as a middle-class arts-and-culture progressive regime factor to account for both the category of "civic" and also for the mix of categories akin to Florida's "creative" industries.

The second factor contains directorship affiliations that one would expect to find in a city with a developmental regime characterization. Grouped here are public-private partnerships (categorized as "developmental"), real estate firms, travel and transportation firms, construction, and legal services. The literature regarding developmental regimes would indicate that where there is a high representation of public-private partnerships, one would also expect relatively high representations of construction and real estate since developmental organizations are often public-private partnerships, business roundtables, or local authorities that are geared towards altering the land use of urban centers, which would entail the financing and construction of new buildings or landmarks. The association between government entities and legal services is also a logical one. Additionally, one would anticipate a common high score for the categories of "government" and "developmental' given the nature of developmental agencies as public-private partnerships between public officials and business elites. This factor, then, can be thought of as a developmental factor.

Manufacturing-based affiliations cluster together in factor three and represent a stark contrast to factors one and two. Harvey (1989) suggests that the traditional function of municipal governments prior to the entrepreneurial turn of the early 1980s was "managerial" in nature and focused primarily on the provision of municipal services. Urban governments were forced to become more entrepreneurial as a result of structural changes in their economies: manufacturing largely moved south or overseas and federal expenditures on cities were substantially reduced. The caretaker type of regime reflects a managerial style of governance through its focus on municipal service provision and the maintenance of a social and political *status quo*. It is hypothesized that one will find caretaker regimes in cities where manufacturing continues to dominate their economies. Factor three is therefore labeled as a caretaker factor.

The characterizations of the three factors allow for the construction of prototype profiles representing the business resources comprising three general regime typologies of *developmental, caretaker*, and *progressive*. The city profiles are correlated through scatter plots with each of the three prototypes and the findings compared against existing case studies.

RESULTS

Fifteen of the twenty-four cities in this study had been previously studied and their regimes characterized (Table 3). For the remaining nine cities, expectations of regime types, or rather, expectations of high regime prototype correlations are provided along with justification for their expectations (Table 4). Correlations of ten of the fifteen case-studied cities match the regime types ascribed by their case studies (Table 10). Three of the remaining five (New York, Chicago, and Houston) match with qualification; that is, they could reasonably have been expected to correlate with the prototype that they did. This study takes issue with their regime characterizations by previous case studies.

TABLE 10

City Correlations with Regime Prototypes

	Regime prototypes				
City	Caretaker	Developmental	Progressive	Case-study or expected Regime type	Match?
Boston	0.665	0.750	**0.783**	Progressive	Yes
Charlotte	0.801	**0.838**	0.763	Developmental	Yes
Chicago	0.845	0.787	**0.857**	Developmental	No
Cincinnati	0.766	**0.789**	0.775	Developmental	Yes
Cleveland	**0.770**	0.691	0.747	Developmental	No
Dallas	0.821	**0.854**	0.842	Developmental	Yes
Denver	0.736	0.819	**0.829**	Progressive	Yes
Houston	**0.701**	0.614	0.658	Developmental	No
Indianapolis	0.786	**0.893**	0.835	Developmental	Yes
Kansas City	0.780	**0.820**	0.732	Developmental	Yes
Los Angeles*	0.741	**0.835**	0.832	Progressive	No
Miami	0.719	**0.825**	0.704	Progressive	No
New Orleans	**0.877**	0.766	0.813	Caretaker	Yes
New York	0.665	0.716	**0.764**	Developmental	No
Norfolk	0.419	**0.596**	0.481	Caretaker	No
Orlando	0.575	**0.751**	0.617	Progressive	No
Philadelphia*	0.817	**0.829**	0.824	Developmental	Yes
Phoenix	**0.843**	0.819	0.831	Progressive	No
Pittsburgh	0.558	**0.573**	0.563	Developmental	Yes
Saint Louis	0.841	**0.858**	0.819	Developmental	Yes
Salt Lake City*	**0.807**	0.802	0.755	Caretaker	Yes
San Antonio	**0.858**	0.846	0.815	Caretaker	Yes
San Diego*	0.788	**0.883**	**0.883**	Caretaker	No
Tampa	0.788	**0.938**	0.849	Progressive	No

Notes: Bold represents highest correlations. All data, city profiles, and the like, are available upon request to the author.
*Denotes strong correlations with more than one regime prototype.

In the cases of Chicago and New York, previous studies have noted the very active roles of downtown business elites in reshaping their respective downtowns. Bennett et al. (1988), for example, presents the long history of Chicago's downtown business elite's role in planning and shaping the city's North Loop from the 1940s through the early 1980s. They conclude by illustrating the dismantling of Chicago's powerful machine-politics of the 1950s and the subsequent fragmentation of the elite's hold on downtown development strategies by the late 1970s and early 1980s. Bennett et al. argue that a city once dominated by a powerful ward-based political "machine" headed by long-time mayor Richard Daley was forced to change as a growing array of civil rights, neighborhood, social, and political activist groups increasingly challenged the machine's hegemony. By 1985, the year with which the study concludes, Chicago's politics are seen to be fragmented and pluralistic. This study, however, is a snapshot of Chicago's directorship affiliations in 2003 and suggests that Chicago's politics may have continued the trend and more fully transitioned towards a progressive or pluralist orientation since the 1980s.

Further, what Bennett et al. (1988, Chicago) and Whitt (1987, 1988, New York) cite as evidence of a developmental regime at work in both cities were interpreted here as evidence of progressive regimes. For example, Bennett et al. discuss efforts of the Landmarks Preservation Council to restore architecturally historic buildings in Chicago's CBD, and efforts by the Chicago Theater and the Chicago Performing Arts Center to maintain their presence in the CBD. These examples are presented as evidence of a developmental regime in Chicago because both had gained substantial support from the city's downtown business elite. Whitt (1987), meanwhile, points to New York City's performing arts groups' place in the city's urban growth machine. In the case of both cities, such organizations can be deemed active "civic" groups geared towards enhancing quality of life—a use value function of space rather than an exchange value function (Cox, 1995; Logan & Molotch, 1987). Consequently, civic group participation in regime coalitions is interpreted here as indicative of a progressive-type regime. Therefore, the correlations of Chicago and New York with the middle-class arts-and-culture *progressive* regime prototype rather than the developmental prototype are not wholly inconsistent with previous studies—the difference is one of operationalizing regime characterizations.

In the case of Houston, previous studies have indicated that the city's business elites have lobbied against property taxes and for *laissez faire* policies on the part of local government. Normally, *laissez faire* policies are characteristics associated with a caretaker-type regime (Harvey, 1989; Stone, 1989, p. 188). However, for Feagin (1985, 1988) and Kirby and Lynch (1987), the failure of Houston's municipal government to intervene in the growth process, or rather, efforts by regime partners to actively block attempts at growth management even as rapid growth led to mounting social costs, is evidence of a pro-growth developmental-type regime. This study finds that Houston's corporate, civic, and developmental sectors have the makeup of a caretaker-type regime—and the evidence of *laissez faire* policies in Houston largely supports this, in contrast to Feagin's, and Kirby and Lynch's, alternative take on Houston's politics. However, rather than the difference being one of operationalizing regime characterizations, it is most likely that this study's finding of Houston correlating more closely with the caretaker regime prototype is a victim of generalization that a comparative analysis demands. The nuances of Houston politics as documented by Feagin (1985, 1988) are lost in a comparative study like this and represent the weakness of scope versus depth inherent in comparative analyses (Kantor & Savitch, 2005, p. 137).

Each of the Florida cities of Tampa, Orlando, and Miami match the developmental prototype more closely than the expected progressive model. Kerstein (1993) and Kirby & Lynch (1987) provide the main justification for expecting these cities to correlate with the progressive prototype. In fast-growing cities such as Tampa and Houston, citizens were mobilized to form formidable growth-regulating coalitions that the authors labeled "progressive." However, the pro-"smart growth" civic groups and community organizations identified by Kerstein (Tampa) and Kirby and Lynch (Houston) were not found to be prominently represented on those cities' boards of directors in 2003. The relative absence of such organizations thus tilts these cities towards the developmental regime prototype rather than the expected progressive regime prototype.

For the cities of Norfolk and San Diego, it was assumed that with the presence of unusually large military bases, these cities would reflect caretaker-type characteristics. The category of military is irrelevant, however, in terms of influencing a city's political orientation. All of its factor scores were negative, and its largest factor score falls outside of the three main factors. The particular mixes of director affiliations for Norfolk and San Diego instead places them tentatively within the developmental regime prototype along with other Sun Belt cities like Tampa, Orlando, Miami, and Charlotte. San Diego interestingly correlates equally with both the progressive and developmental prototypes.

The city of Cleveland is an interesting case. It correlated more closely with the caretaker regime prototype, but its case-study suggests that Cleveland has a developmental political orientation by virtue of the city's active reshaping of urban land use by emphasizing new stadiums for the city's two major professional sports franchises (Indians and Browns), the building of the Rock 'n Roll Hall of Fame, and other activities (Austrian & Rosentraub, 2002). These are indeed indicators of a developmental orientation and suggest that the Cleveland case, like that of Houston, is a casualty of scope versus depth.

Six of the nine cities that did not correlate as expected (including Norfolk, San Diego, Miami, and Orlando—all discussed above) were not previously case-studied. It is quite reasonable that the disconnection with expected prototypes is a result of underdeveloped assumptions. Clearly more success was gained by relying on previous case studies. While this study suggests greater methodological diversity within regime studies, particularly concerning comparative analyses, this study demonstrates that the case-study method should remain a vital methodological approach within regime theory.

CONCLUSION

Regimes are not static but rather are dynamic and reflect forces of change through time (Stone, 1989, p. 9). The composition and policy agendas of urban political coalitions change in response to broader economic and social forces. We can imagine that the composition of business elites—central to all regime coalitions—changes through time as a result of broader economic restructuring (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1989, pp. 122–125; Fainstein et al., 1983). Corporate mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies, and the rise of new economic sectors and the demise of others are manifest in the changing compositions of business elites and the resources that they command. There is also a spatial component: on the one hand, as new economic sectors rise, so do the places where they are located. On the other hand, as other economic sectors falter, so do the places where they are located.

These changing economic fortunes are manifest in urban politics as well. The rise of new economic sectors like computer hardware and software, multimedia, telecommunications technologies, or even global finance, mean that cities where these industries are based often face problems associated with rapid population growth. These include the funding of infrastructural development for commercial and residential uses, upward pressure on wages and housing costs, rising social inequality, the lack of affordable housing, and environmental degradation. Coalitions that develop in these cities tend to have stable fiscal bases since their economic sectors with whom they partner are generally strong and their populations are stable or growing. Kilburn (2004) suggests that a stronger fiscal base increases the likelihood of a city developing a progressive regime, and Florida (2002, pp. 246–247) suggests that these "new" economic sectors are driven by a "creative" workforce that demands diversity and a vibrant cultural life to stoke the creativity their jobs demand.

Meanwhile, many older industrial cities struggle with declining economic sectors, decreasing population, dwindling tax revenues, aging infrastructure, increased demand for social and municipal services concomitant with increased concentrations of poverty, and other serious problems (Fainstein et al., 1983). These cities must partner with local business elites in order to forge policies aimed at slowing the decline or attempting to (re)position the city so that it benefits in some way from continuing economic restructuring by attracting inward investments (Cox, 1995; Harvey, 1989). In both cases, business elites and the resources they command are at the center of urban coalitions, but the composition of their corporate communities and the resources they represent vary.

Resources are a key ingredient for the ability of regimes to emerge and sustain a policy agenda over relatively long and stable periods of time (Stone, 1989). Stone writes, "the term *resources* includes not just material matters but also such things as skills, expertise, organizational connections, informal contacts, and level and scope of contributing effort by participants" (Stone, 2005, p. 329). Interlocking directorates largely embody the range of skills, expertise, organizational connections, and informal contacts available to regime participants. Additionally, the kinds of skills, expertise and organizational connections attributed to business elites are diverse and contingent upon the particular mix of corporations based in cities and the historical trajectories of local economies.

Further, informal cooperation among local business, political and social leaders is vital to the capacity of regimes to govern (Stone, 1989, p. 3). "But these [. . .] arrangements are not neutral; they bias what can and cannot be done with the capacity to govern" (Stone, 1989, p. 219). The particular composition of local business communities embodied through interlocking directorates may predispose the political orientation of participatory business elites towards some urban policies over others. Various industries contain different corporate structures that are functional to the industries of which they are a part (McNee, 1958; Roberts & Murray, 2002; Stafford, 1979; Storper & Walker, 1989; Van den Berg, Braun, & Otgaar, 2004). That elites command different sets of expertise and resources according to the industries and organizations to which they are affiliated may have some bearing on the kinds of viewpoints they advance and the types of urban policies that they would be inclined to support, therefore biasing what can or cannot be done with the capacity to govern.

ENDNOTE

1 This list of works considering the impact of social cohesion on the market behavior of firms is by no means exhaustive.

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