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## Partisan, Humble Thyself: How Political Overconfidence Fuels Affective Polarization

Ian G. Anson<sup>1</sup>

5/1/2024

Word Count: 4,000

**Abstract:** Ongoing research shows that many Americans erroneously believe themselves to know more about politics than their peers. This form of “political overconfidence” has been associated with extreme ideological position-taking and susceptibility to misinformation, among other patterns of behavior. Does knowledge overconfidence among partisans also drive negative affect towards members of the opposing political party? In this short article, I present the results of a pre-registered survey experiment (N = 1,049) designed to assess the causal link between knowledge overconfidence and negative perceptions of political parties and their members. By randomly exposing experimental subjects to messages designed to mitigate knowledge overconfidence, I measure the degree to which such interventions can reduce negativity towards partisans’ political opponents. Results show that invoking humility among partisans can dampen negative assessments of the out-party and raise respondents’ willingness to communicate with partisan alters. In a concluding section, I comment on the meaning of these findings for theories of partisanship, political socialization, and democratic deliberation.

**Keywords:** Affective polarization, political overconfidence, political knowledge, partisanship

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It is no secret that many contemporary Americans hold their political opponents in bitter contempt. Partisans, fueled in part by messaging from their trusted political elites, frequently rate members of the opposing party as untrustworthy, amoral, incompetent, and devoid of knowledge about politics and society (e.g., Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Druckman and Levendusky 2019; Klar et al. 2018; Martherus et al. 2021; Mason 2018; Myers 2023). Modern partisans often report feeling social distance from out-party members, experiencing deep dislike for the out-party, and perceiving irreconcilable moral contrasts with out-partisans (Dias and Lelkes 2022; Iyengar et al. 2019; Lelkes 2021). Correspondingly, studies have charted a recent decline in partisans' support for, and trust in, the opposing political party (e.g., Druckman and Levendusky 2019).

Among other consequences, this phenomenon of “affective polarization” has resulted in an ongoing breakdown in the capacity of Americans to deliberate productively about political issues and events (e.g., Hobolt et al. 2023; Levendusky et al. 2016; Santoro and Broockman 2022; but see Levendusky and Stecula 2021). Combating affective polarization is therefore a prominent contemporary objective for scholars and concerned activists. Some of these interventions have shown promising results: Levendusky (2018; 2023), for instance, mitigates partisan animosity by reminding Americans of their shared patriotism. Partisans might also reduce their negativity towards their partisan opponents if informed about the parties' coalition membership or issue positions (Marsh 2023), or if they experience direct interparty contact (e.g., Wojcieszak and Warner 2020). However, some other approaches to solving partisan antagonism have either failed to produce reliable effects, or have yielded unanticipated *increases* in polarization (e.g., Bail et al. 2018; Simas et al. 2019).

In this study, I consider a different way to combat negative partisanship. While extant work has often examined the polarizing effects of misperceiving partisan *alters* (e.g., Ahler and Sood 2018; Kane et al. 2021; Marsh 2023; Rothschild et al. 2019), in this research I explore the effects of partisans' *meta-misperceptions* on attitudes towards the out-party and its members (see Stapleton and Wolak 2024). Specifically, I seek to combat negative partisanship by defusing partisans' *overly optimistic assessments of their own political knowledgeability*.<sup>2</sup>

A burgeoning literature has recently shown that many Americans' beliefs about their own political knowledge are not accurately calibrated (e.g., Anson 2018; Benegal and Motta 2023; Lyons et al. 2021; Ortoleva and Snowberg 2005; but see Graham 2020). That is, scholarship shows that some Americans think they know much more about politics—institutions, actors, ideologies, parties, events, news, and issues—than they really do. This form of “political overconfidence,” which may be related to broader patterns of overconfidence in task performance (e.g., Kruger and Dunning 1999; Zhou and Jenkins 2020), is associated with a variety of normatively troubling attitudes and behaviors. For instance, overconfident Americans are more

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<sup>2</sup> Overconfidence is a concept that bears important similarities to the concept of *internal efficacy*. In their recent work on the latter subject, Stapleton and Wolak (2024) identify the concept as a driver of affective polarization, showing that acceptance of discrimination towards members of the out-party increases among partisans that are high in internal efficacy. However, internal efficacy is a concept focused on individuals' perceived ability to effectively act on their interests, whereas knowledge overconfidence is largely about individuals' *unjustified* perception of superior political knowledge relative to their peers. Nevertheless, it is likely that those partisans with high internal efficacy are most likely to express knowledge overconfidence, and vice versa.

likely than others to hold ideologically extreme attitudes (Ortoleva and Snowberg 2005) and are more susceptible to misinformation (Anson 2021; Benegal and Motta 2023; Lyons et al. 2021).

In the present study, I examine whether political overconfidence contributes to affective polarization in the American public. I theorize that overconfident Americans, due to their *over-placement*, or the belief that they know more than their peers, will find it relatively easy to justify attitudes that foster negative partisanship. Correspondingly, they will be less likely to value deliberation with their peers. In a novel pre-registered<sup>3</sup> survey experiment conducted in December of 2023 (N = 1,049 U.S. adults), I measure the effectiveness of an experimental treatment designed to combat affective polarization by mitigating political overconfidence.

Results of the study show that in addition to substantially reducing over-placement among overconfident subjects, this treatment reliably decreases political partisans' negative perceptions of the out-party on several dimensions. In a concluding section, I comment on the meaning of these findings for theories of partisanship, political socialization, and democratic deliberation.

## **Negative Partisanship and Political Overconfidence**

Motivated reasoning causes partisans to internalize information that supports an optimistic (or “congenial”) narrative about the in-party’s skills and competencies (e.g., Bolsen et al. 2014; Peterson and Iyengar 2021; Tappin et al. 2021). These congenial attitudes help partisans obtain psychological rewards and signal loyalty to in-group members. To justify a congenial

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<sup>3</sup>See the Supplementary Information (SI) Section H for pre-registration information.

worldview, partisans may also favor information that casts the out-party in a negative light (e.g., Bisgaard 2015).

This phenomenon gives rise to negative trait stereotypes about the out-party's competence (e.g., Clifford 2020; Rothschild et al. 2019). Busby et al. (2021) show that in response to open-ended questions tapping partisan traits, party adherents increasingly associate the out-party with terms like "stupid," "idiot," and "dumb." These responses are further associated with negative affect towards the out-party. Such findings accord with the idea that one way to perpetuate party-congenial narratives about the world is to discredit the knowledgeability and competence of out-party members.

Epistemic overconfidence may serve to exacerbate this phenomenon. A more overconfident self-perception will allow overconfident Americans to support *relatively more negative* trait perceptions of out-party members than other partisans. This will in turn render it difficult for partisans to engage out-party members in discussions that might counteract their negative stereotypes. Overconfident partisans are more easily convinced than others of the infallibility of their prior negative judgments of political opponents, allowing extreme positions to proliferate (Ortoleva and Snowberg 2015).

By inculcating more accurate appraisals of partisans' own knowledgeability, tailored interventions could reverse this tendency. Increasing humility may cause partisans to moderate their extremely negative ratings of the out-party, as they would lack the certainty required to support an extreme response (Graham 2020). In addition, humility could cause partisans to increase their willingness to attend to disconfirming statements made by political opponents

(e.g., Wojcieszak & Warner 2020).<sup>4</sup> If partisans relax their conviction that they are far superior to out-partisans in knowledge and competence, they may recognize that conversations with out-party members can contribute to a more robust and accurate knowledge of politics.

## Expectations

As a result of this line of reasoning, I arrive at a broad research hypotheses, **H1**, described below:

**H1.** *Among partisans, exposure to interventions designed to reduce political overconfidence will decrease negativity towards the political out-party and its members.*<sup>5</sup>

## Research Design

In December of 2023, a convenience sample of N = 1,049 U.S. adults was recruited using the Prolific online platform. Recent research shows that Prolific platform users are noted for their high data quality, including better question comprehension, attention, and honesty than comparable platforms (Peer et al. 2021). The present sample was 45.5% male, 74% non-Hispanic White, and 64% were under the age of 35. The sample included 18.6% pure political

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<sup>4</sup> By “disconfirming” I refer to information that runs counter to partisans’ congenial narratives.

<sup>5</sup> Note that this hypothesis differs from the pre-registration hypothesis by including only partisans. The pre-registration erroneously failed to discuss the exclusion of pure political independents from the tests. Results are robust to the inclusion of independents; see SI Section H. See also SI Sections C and G for details about a second pre-registered test that is not included due to space constraints.

independents, 24.3% Republicans and leaning Republicans, and 57.1% Democrats or leaning Democrats (based on a standard seven-point Party Identification item). For full sample demographics please see the online Supplementary Information (hereafter SI).

Study participants were asked a series of demographic and attitudinal questions, including questions assessing self-assessment of political knowledge. Next, respondents were tasked with completing a five-item political knowledge quiz and reporting their perceived performance. This quiz, drawn from previous work on political knowledge overconfidence [REDACTED FOR REVIEW], taps various dimensions of political knowledge, including comprehension of ideology, awareness of parties and political actors, and knowledge of issues and current affairs. Third, respondents were randomized into one of two experimental treatment groups. The first group was a pure control condition, while the second experimental group exposed respondents to a short vignette designed to dampen political overconfidence. Treated respondents received the following vignette text:

*Please take a moment to reflect on your own knowledge of  
American politics.*

*The American political system is very complicated. There may be  
lots of things you do not know about politics, and that's OK! Even if  
you think you may know a lot about politics, there may be many  
things you do not know about U.S. government, the Republican and  
Democratic political parties, public policies, and current issues. It  
is always a good idea to stay humble about your knowledge of  
politics. There are always new things you can learn about politics,  
even from people with opposing viewpoints.*



Once exposed to their respective treatments, respondents answered a dependent variable battery of questions designed to tap dimensions of negative partisanship. These items, included in Table 1 below, are derived from extant literature as cited in the rightmost column of the table. They measure, respectively, trust in the Republican and Democratic parties to “do what’s right,” affect towards members of the two parties, and overall approval evaluations of the parties. In the results that follow I also include the results of an additive index that scales and combines the three measures. Finally, respondents completed a manipulation check battery that asks them to appraise their political knowledge and to rate their knowledge relative to others.

**Table 1. Dependent Variable Items**


Item Name	Question Text	Response Options	References
Trust Party to Do What's Right	How much of the time do you think you can trust the [Democratic/Republican] party to do what is right for the country?	5. Almost always 4. Most of the time 3. About half of the time 2. Once in a while 1. Almost never	Druckman and Levendusky (2018); Levendusky (2013)
Party Evaluation	On a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating complete disapproval and 100 indicating complete approval, please indicate your approval of the [Democratic/Republican] Party.	0-100 sliding thermometer scale	Abramowitz and Webster (2018); Lee et al. (2022); Lelkes and Westwood (2017)
Conversation with Partisan	How comfortable would you feel if you were asked to have a conversation about politics with a member of the [Republican/Democratic] party?	5. Totally Comfortable 4. Mostly Comfortable 3. Fairly Comfortable 2. Only a Little Comfortable 1. Not at all Comfortable	Levendusky and Malhotra (2016); Appiah et al. (2022)
Additive Index	Sum of three items	n/a	Druckman and Levendusky (2018)

For clarity of interpretation, I rescale all items to (0:1) continuous measures. Results are modeled using OLS regression methods. In the results that follow, I show treatment effects among partisans and leaning partisans only (see SI Section H for a model that includes independents). The models also recode dependent variables in a way that associates partisans' responses with their respective in-party and out-party. In tests of *in-party perceptions*, partisans appraise their own parties: Republican respondents evaluate the Republican party, while Democratic respondents evaluate the Democratic party. Out-party perception items reverse this association, with Republicans evaluating the Democratic party, and Democrats evaluating the Republican party. In later models, I separate respondents into Democratic, Republican, and “pure” independent categories to observe the potential for heterogeneous treatment effects.

## Results

Before presenting the results of the experiment, it is instructive to assess the sample's proclivity for knowledge overconfidence. Because the political quiz administered earlier in the study was paired with a pre-test measure of political confidence, it is possible to compare the two items to determine whether a respondent was more optimistic of their knowledge than what the test indicated. Following Kruger and Dunning (1999), Fig. 1, below, shows a contrast between the perceived political knowledge of the present sample and the observed knowledge as measured by the questionnaire.

**Fig. 1. Knowledge Confidence vs. Task Performance, 2023 Prolific Sample**



The x-axis of Fig. 1 summarizes the objective quiz performance of the sample (those with scoring 0 are collapsed into the bottom performance category to organize the sample into five performance groups). The solid line presented in Fig. 1 shows the cumulative proportion of the sample obtaining a score on the quiz. The lowest group, those scoring 0 or 1 on the quiz, is

approximately 9.6% of the sample, while around 23% of the sample answered two items correctly. Around 38% of the sample had 3 correct answers, while about 26% of the sample had 4 correct answers. Roughly 13% of the sample had a perfect score.

When comparing this objective performance to respondents' self-perceptions, clear evidence of miscalibration can be observed. The dashed line shows each performance group's average response to a question about their own political knowledgeability. On average, all five groups thought of themselves as above average in their political knowledge, with even those scoring 0 or 1 correct (placing them in the bottom decile in terms of performance) rating themselves closer to the top of the performance scale than the bottom. Of course, there is also miscalibration in the other direction, which accords with existing research (Kruger and Dunning 1999). Excellent performers discounted their excellence on average, perhaps lacking a clear understanding of the relative dearth of political knowledge in the public. Nevertheless, overconfidence is more prevalent than underconfidence overall. Such miscalibration is especially concentrated among very low performers. See SI Appendix C for further details about overconfidence in the sample. SI Appendix D also shows information about baseline affective polarization in the sample.

### ***Experimental Results***

Next, I describe the results of an experimental intervention designed to reduce subjects' knowledge overconfidence. As detailed in SI Section G, manipulation checks show that this experimental treatment succeeded in diminishing respondents' claims to political knowledgeability. In the full sample the treatment reduced respondents' knowledge self-

assessment by roughly 2.4 percentage points ( $p < 0.1$ ). However, among only those respondents who were initially overconfident prior to treatment exposure,<sup>6</sup> the treatment had a much stronger effect, reducing self-confidence by roughly 6.2 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). These results show evidence that the “humility” treatment succeeded in helping respondents obtain a more calibrated self-regard when it came to the realm of political knowledge (see SI Section E).

Next, I turn to the experimental test of **H1**. Below, Fig. 2 shows the effects of the treatment on the three dependent variable items, as well as their additive index, for partisan respondents only. Independents are excluded from the analysis, a design detail which differs from the pre-analysis plan due to an omission within that plan (see SI Section H). Results are shown as point estimates surrounded by 90% Confidence Intervals (thick horizontal lines) and 95% Confidence Intervals (thin horizontal lines).

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<sup>6</sup> Following the pre-registration, I calculate this binary classification by subtracting respondents’ pre-test knowledge self-assessment from their objective quiz performance quintile. Those whose self-assessment exceeded their performance by at least one point on the respective scales are coded as “overconfident.” While this is an admittedly haphazard way to assess overconfidence, it allows for a relevant analysis of the subgroup’s receipt of the treatment.

**Fig. 2. Effects of Treatment Vignette on Three Outcomes and their Additive Index, In-Party and Out-Party Evaluations, Partisan Respondents Only**




Fig. 2 shows the treatment’s effects on partisan evaluations of the in-party in the top panel, and evaluations of the out-party in the bottom panel. Results show evidence that is consistent with **H1**. For evaluations of the in-party, the “humility” treatment has a small and inconsistent effect on respondents’ perceptions in each test. However, as seen in the bottom facet of the figure, the treatment has a meaningful positive impact on partisans’ perceptions of their political rivals. Relative to the control group, treated respondents were roughly 4.4 percentage points more willing to have a conversation with a political rival ( $p < 0.05$ ). On a feeling thermometer, they also rated the out-party roughly 3.2 percentage points warmer than the control


group on average ( $p < 0.05$ ) and were roughly 3.4 percentage points more willing to say that they could trust the out-party to do what is right ( $p < 0.05$ ). An additive index of these items, emblematic of overall out-party affect, yields a treatment effect of around 3.7 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). Overall, these results show robust evidence in support of **H1**. These results obtain even though respondents experienced a brief, single-shot text-based experimental vignette treatment.

### ***Partisan Subgroups: Assessing Treatment Heterogeneity***

Nevertheless, the possibility remains that these overall results conceal meaningful heterogeneity in responses to the treatments. Though not pre-registered, exploratory analysis of partisan sub-groups is a warranted exercise—especially in light of recent research showing that Republicans and Democrats respond to social situations in different ways (Mansell and Peterson 2023; Marsh 2023). Below, I present Fig. 3, which examines the treatment effects shown in Fig. 2 above when the sample is subdivided into Republican and Democratic subsamples.



**Fig. 3. Effects of Treatment Vignette on Three Outcomes and their Additive Index, By Partisan Group**



The results presented in Fig. 3 should be construed as preliminary, given that they do not form a part of the pre-registered hypothesis tests (see SI Appendix H) and are not powered to the same extent as the pre-registered tests (see SI Appendix F). However, the results show suggestive evidence that treatment effects do not substantially vary in size or direction when studied within Republican and Democratic subsamples. On the left side of the figure, we see evaluations of the Democratic party, while the right side of the figure contains evaluations of the Republican party. In each facet the top bar shows evaluations made by Republican respondents, and the bottom bar

captures Democrats' evaluations. Thus, on the left side of the figure, Democrats (Republicans) evaluate the in-party (out-party), and on the right side, Republicans (Democrats) evaluate the in-party (out-party).

Results show that Republicans increase their favorability of the Democratic party (left side of the figure) and that Democrats increase their favorability of Republicans (right side of the figure) on each of the four dependent variables presented in Fig. 3. While many of these treatment effects do not obtain conventional statistical significance due to small sample sizes, they are positively signed and similar in size to the treatment effects presented in Fig. 2 above. For instance, treated Republicans increased their additive index rating of the Democratic party by 3.9 percentage points on average ( $p > 0.10$ ), while Democrats increased their additive index rating of the Republican party by 3.7 percentage points ( $p < 0.05$ ). Thus, while these tests are limited in our ability to form definitive conclusions, they do not reveal obvious signs of strong cross-party treatment heterogeneity. Republicans and Democrats both appear similarly responsive to the treatment.

## Conclusions

The present study has examined what happens when partisans are implored to humble themselves in the realm of political knowledgeability. In response to a brief vignette designed to reduce political overconfidence, survey experimental participants reliably reduced their negative affect towards their political opponents on a variety of metrics. Though inconclusive, tests of partisan subgroups showed little evidence that either Democrats or Republicans were notably resistant to the treatment.

These findings work to substantiate a theoretical link between partisans' meta-perceptions and the rise of affective polarization in the public. While partisan motivated reasoning is known to play a role in driving partisans' misperceptions and negativity, this study shows that an overconfident stance also plays a role in exacerbating these attitudes. A simple treatment vignette substantially decreased partisans' antagonism, at least in the short term.

The present study is subject to a variety of limitations. The treatment effects observed above occur in response to a single message (with no way to compare treatment wording), and it shows the effect in just one sample of online respondents. The study has no way of determining how and whether these effects decay over time. And the study lacks the statistical power to make more definitive statements about subgroup heterogeneity. Further, the outcomes of the study do not encompass all aspects of affective polarization, and only capture fixed-choice responses to survey items (as opposed to more qualitative assessments of partisans' feelings towards the out-party).

Nevertheless, together with other recent studies, the results signal the utility of future work that substantiates the link between confidence and polarization (Stapleton and Wolak 2024). Future studies are poised to examine the effectiveness of real-world interventions on partisan attitudes, as well as to study the downstream consequences of overconfidence (and messages designed to reduce overconfidence) on the behaviors of partisans. As theorized above, the quality of intergroup discussion is especially likely influenced by this nexus. For now, though, the present study has shown us the importance of partisans' meta-misperceptions in driving the diminished quality of democratic deliberation, discourse, and mutual respect in the United States. Resolving these critical social dilemmas may require partisans to engage in critical reflection about their own knowledge, the knowledge of partisan alters, and the epistemic quest

for a better understanding of our complex, contentious, and perennially important systems of political decision making.

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Supplementary Information for:  
Partisan, Humble Thyself: How Political Overconfidence Fuels Affective Polarization

5/1/2024

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## Appendix A. Sample and Demographic Information

The present study was conducted from December 4-11, 2023 on the Prolific participant marketplace. Prolific participants are recruited using social media and other referrals to serve as panelists for survey task completion. The sample was recruited to mirror basic Census demography for age, gender, race, and region. Below, please see a summary of basic demographics for the sample.

Table SI1. Sample Information, 2023 Prolific Study

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age (6-point)	1,047	3.249	1.414	1	6
Male	1,049	0.452	0.498	0	1
Nonwhite	1,049	0.262	0.440	0	1
Education (6-point)	1,045	4.189	1.321	1	6
Household Income (6-point)	1,028	3.095	1.493	1	6
Republican	1,049	0.243	0.429	0	1
Democrat	1,049	0.571	0.495	0	1
Ideology (5-point)	1,030	2.614	1.157	1	5
Political Knowledge (Objective, 5-point)	1,049	3.090	1.179	1	5
Political Knowledge (Self-Rated, 5-point)	1,049	3.237	0.894	1	5

## Appendix B. Tabular Results

Below, I provide tabular regression results which correspond to the figures in the main text of the manuscript. First, I show the results for the top half of Fig. 2.

Table SI2. OLS Regression Models Predicting In-party Evaluations, Partisans Only (Top Half of Fig. 2 in Main Text)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Additive Index	Trust Party	Party Evaluations	Convo. W/ Partisan
Treatment	0.006 (0.013)	0.014 (0.020)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)
Constant	0.631*** (0.009)	0.653*** (0.014)	0.662*** (0.011)	0.578*** (0.011)
Observations	853	853	853	853
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0003	0.001	0.0003	0.00003
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
Residual Std. Error (df = 851)	0.192	0.293	0.225	0.223
F Statistic (df = 1; 851)	0.222	0.488	0.214	0.028
<i>Note:</i>	*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001			

Next I show results for the bottom half of Table 2.

Table SI3. OLS Regression Models Predicting In-party Evaluations, Partisans Only (Bottom Half of Fig. 2 in Main Text)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Additive Index	Trust Party	Party Evaluations	Convo. W/ Partisan
Treatment	0.037** (0.012)	0.045* (0.022)	0.032* (0.014)	0.034* (0.014)
Constant	0.241*** (0.009)	0.377*** (0.016)	0.171*** (0.010)	0.175*** (0.010)
Observations	853	853	853	853
R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.005	0.006	0.007
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.004	0.005	0.006
Residual Std. Error (df = 851)	0.178	0.319	0.203	0.199
F Statistic (df = 1; 851)	9.319**	4.203*	5.474*	6.319*
<i>Note:</i>	* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p<0.001			

Next, I show results pertaining to Fig. 3 in the main text.

Table SI4. OLS Regressions Predicting Party Evaluations (Fig. 3 Main Text, Part 1)

<i>Dependent variable: Trust Party to Do What's Right</i>						
	Evaluations of Democrats			Evaluations of Republicans		
	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Treatment	0.004 (0.024)	-0.076 (0.052)	0.049 (0.040)	0.043 (0.026)	-0.131* (0.051)	0.037 (0.036)
Constant	0.654*** (0.017)	0.500*** (0.035)	0.409*** (0.028)	0.363*** (0.019)	0.535*** (0.035)	0.652*** (0.026)
Observations	599	195	254	599	195	254
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.011	0.006	0.005	0.033	0.004
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.002	0.006	0.002	0.003	0.028	0.0003
Residual Std. Error	0.296 (df = 597)	0.358 (df = 193)	0.315 (df = 252)	0.320 (df = 597)	0.357 (df = 193)	0.288 (df = 252)
F Statistic	0.031 (df = 1; 597)	2.166 (df = 1; 193)	1.547 (df = 1; 252)	2.761 (df = 1; 597)	6.497* (df = 1; 193)	1.073 (df = 1; 252)
Note:	* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001					

Table SI5. OLS Regressions Predicting Party Evaluations (Fig. 3 Main Text, Part 2)

<i>Dependent variable: Party Evaluation</i>						
	Evaluations of Democrats			Evaluations of Republicans		
	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Treatment	0.013 (0.018)	0.049 (0.035)	0.024 (0.028)	0.037* (0.016)	0.016 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.028)
Constant	0.655*** (0.013)	0.292*** (0.024)	0.217*** (0.019)	0.151*** (0.011)	0.293*** (0.023)	0.676*** (0.020)
Observations	599	195	254	599	195	254
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.010	0.003	0.009	0.001	0.0002
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.005	-0.001	0.007	-0.004	-0.004
Residual Std. Error	0.225 (df = 597)	0.243 (df = 193)	0.219 (df = 252)	0.193 (df = 597)	0.241 (df = 193)	0.226 (df = 252)
F Statistic	0.474 (df = 1; 597)	2.007 (df = 1; 193)	0.738 (df = 1; 252)	5.477* (df = 1; 597)	0.218 (df = 1; 193)	0.039 (df = 1; 252)
Note:	* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001					

Table SI6. OLS Regressions Predicting Party Evaluations (Fig. 3 Main Text, Part 3)

<i>Dependent variable: Conversation with Partisan</i>						
	Evaluations of Democrats			Evaluations of Republicans		
	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Treatment	-0.010 (0.018)	0.054 (0.034)	0.043 (0.026)	0.031 (0.016)	0.044 (0.032)	0.014 (0.027)
Constant	0.601*** (0.013)	0.267*** (0.023)	0.195*** (0.019)	0.167*** (0.011)	0.243*** (0.022)	0.524*** (0.019)
Observations	599	195	254	599	195	254
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.013	0.011	0.006	0.010	0.001
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.008	0.007	0.005	0.004	-0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.222 (df = 597)	0.234 (df = 193)	0.211 (df = 252)	0.194 (df = 597)	0.222 (df = 193)	0.219 (df = 252)
F Statistic	0.316 (df = 1; 597)	2.558 (df = 1; 193)	2.675 (df = 1; 252)	3.808 (df = 1; 597)	1.868 (df = 1; 193)	0.252 (df = 1; 252)
Note:	* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001					

Table SI7. OLS Regressions Predicting Party Evaluations (Fig. 3 Main Text, Part 4)

<i>Dependent variable: Additive Index</i>						
	Evaluations of Democrats			Evaluations of Republicans		
	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Treatment	0.002 (0.016)	0.009 (0.029)	0.039 (0.024)	0.037** (0.014)	-0.024 (0.029)	0.015 (0.023)
Constant	0.637*** (0.011)	0.353*** (0.020)	0.274*** (0.017)	0.227*** (0.010)	0.357*** (0.020)	0.617*** (0.017)
Observations	599	195	254	599	195	254
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00003	0.001	0.011	0.012	0.003	0.002
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.002	-0.005	0.007	0.010	-0.002	-0.002
Residual Std. Error	0.195 (df = 597)	0.201 (df = 193)	0.188 (df = 252)	0.172 (df = 597)	0.202 (df = 193)	0.187 (df = 252)
F Statistic	0.020 (df = 1; 597)	0.099 (df = 1; 193)	2.686 (df = 1; 252)	6.981** (df = 1; 597)	0.668 (df = 1; 193)	0.420 (df = 1; 252)
Note:	* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001					



## Appendix C. Assessment of Political Overconfidence

Following the pre-registration plan, I categorize respondents according to their degree of political overconfidence by subtracting their objective task performance on a knowledge quiz (five-point scale) from their stated confidence (five-point scale) to arrive at a continuous variable that is zero if a person's confidence is calibrated, negative if they are underconfident, and positive if they are overconfident. Below I show how the treatment effects are influenced by a respondent's level of political (over)confidence as measured by this variable. Results show that increasing overconfidence has a small, positive, but not statistically significant effect on treatment response. This finding suggests that the treatment had positive effects for the full sample, and only marginally greater effects for those with the highest levels of political overconfidence.

It is hard to obtain definitive conclusions from this test, which corresponds to H2 in the pre-registration. It may be that there is not sufficient statistical power to render an effective measurement of these differences. Or, it could be that very overconfident people were also less attentive, a phenomenon which serves to weaken treatment effects and thus rendering the treatment effect differences between overconfident and well-calibrated people hard to differentiate.

Table SI8. OLS Regression Results Predicting Dependent Variable Outcomes, Treatment Interaction with Political Overconfidence

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Inparty: Additive Index	Inparty: Trust Party	Inparty: Party Evals.	Inparty: Convo./ Partisan	Outparty: Additive Index	Outparty: Trust Party	Outparty: Party Evals.	Outparty: Convo./ Partisan
Treatment	0.006 (0.013)	0.013 (0.020)	0.007 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.015)	0.039** (0.012)	0.045* (0.022)	0.035* (0.014)	0.036** (0.014)
Political Overconfidence	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.036** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.044** (0.014)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)
Treatment * Political Overconfidence	-0.001 (0.012)	0.005 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.014)	0.014 (0.011)	0.015 (0.019)	0.020 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)
Constant	0.629*** (0.009)	0.649*** (0.014)	0.661*** (0.011)	0.578*** (0.011)	0.239*** (0.009)	0.371*** (0.016)	0.170*** (0.010)	0.176*** (0.010)
Observations	853	853	853	853	853	853	853	853
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.017	0.001	0.0003	0.017	0.022	0.009	0.009
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.014	-0.003	-0.003	0.013	0.019	0.006	0.006
Residual Std. Error (df = 849)	0.192	0.291	0.225	0.223	0.178	0.317	0.202	0.199
F Statistic (df = 3; 849)	1.745	4.891**	0.284	0.076	4.808**	6.475***	2.689*	2.703*
Note:	*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001							

## Appendix D. Pre-Treatment Affective Polarization

One salient question in describing the sample is whether affective polarization is detectable prior to treatment exposure. While no pre-treatment affective polarization questions are assessed in the study, it is possible to evaluate the post-treatment responses of the control group to gain an understanding of the degree to which respondents evinced antipathy towards their partisan opponents. Below, I present Fig. SI1, which shows the density of responses to the DV battery among the control condition only (N = 527).

**Fig. SI1. Distribution of Responses to DV Question Battery, Control Condition Only**



The results presented in Fig. SI1 above show clear evidence of deep affective polarization in the 2023 sample. Among Democrats, the modal response to the Republican party evaluation question is 0, while among Republicans the same is true in the Democratic party evaluation. Democrats' modal evaluation of Republicans "doing what's right" is the response category "never", and the same is true of Republicans' evaluations of Democrats. The modal category for both parties did not include the lowest possible rating for the items asking about conversing with members of the opposing party, but the majority of respondents are on the negative side of the distribution in both cases. These results point to the multifaceted nature of affective polarization—but also the deep negativity evinced by many partisans in terms of their evaluations of the out-party.

## Appendix E. Robustness Checks

Below, I replicate the findings presented in Fig. 2 of the main text given certain exclusion and inclusion criteria, including attention check passage and inclusion of political independents. To include independents, I randomly assign independents to receive the Republican or Democratic party as the “in-party” or “out-party.” The dependent variable in these tests is the additive index described in Table 1 in the main text.

Table SI9. OLS Regression Results Predicting Additive Index Score under Diverse Sample Criteria

	<i>Sample Criterion:</i>			
	Main Text Result	Includes Independents	Excludes Attention Check 1 Failures	Excludes Attention Check 2 Failures
Treatment	0.037** (0.012)	0.025* (0.011)	0.036** (0.012)	0.032** (0.012)
Constant	0.241*** (0.009)	0.255*** (0.008)	0.241*** (0.009)	0.243*** (0.009)
Observations	853	1,048	827	820
R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.005	0.010	0.008
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.004	0.009	0.007
Residual Std. Error	0.178 (df = 851)	0.182 (df = 1046)	0.179 (df = 825)	0.177 (df = 818)
F Statistic	9.319** (df = 1; 851)	5.006* (df = 1; 1046)	8.431** (df = 1; 825)	6.850** (df = 1; 818)
Note:	* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001			

## Appendix F. Power Analysis

A power analysis was performed to ensure that treatment effects would be likely enough to be detected in order to support statistical interpretation of those effects (<https://researchmethodsresources.nih.gov/grt-calculator>). Relying on effect sizes and standard errors reported in previous literature (Levendusky 2018), this power analysis shows evidence that a sample size of  $N \sim 1,000$  is appropriate for detecting the full-sample treatment effects proposed in H1 of the pre-registration. Subdividing the respondents into two experimental groups of roughly 500 subjects each allows for an appropriately powered test at a level of power = 0.8, type I error = 0.05 (two-tailed), with ICC assumed to be 0.05 for convenience, and with an anticipated treatment effect of roughly 0.1 standard deviations on the outcome variable.

## Appendix G. Manipulation Check and Respondent Attentiveness

### **Manipulation Check**

If the proposed treatment were to successfully influence downstream attitudes towards the out-party in a way that comports with the proposed theoretical mechanism, it is important to show evidence that respondents reduced their levels of confidence in their political knowledge in response to the treatment.

Below, I show the results of a manipulation check designed to assess this possibility. In Table SI10, I show this manipulation check in the full sample, and among respondents with the highest levels of pre-test overconfidence (see SI Section C for details).

The dependent variable in these manipulation checks is a question asking respondents to rate their political knowledge relative to “all Americans”—a direct test of the other-regarding confidence theorized above as most relevant to partisan evaluations. See SI Section I for question wording. The DV is measured on a 0-100 continuous scale.

Table SI10. OLS Regression Predicting Post-Test Knowledge Self-Placement

	<i>Sample:</i>	
	Full Sample	Pre-Test Overconfident Only
Treatment	-2.457* (1.338)	-6.253*** (2.397)
Constant	55.839*** (0.944)	55.630*** (1.695)
Observations	1,049	308
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.019
Residual Std. Error	21.672 (df = 1047)	21.034 (df = 306)
F Statistic	3.372* (df = 1; 1047)	6.806*** (df = 1; 306)
<i>Note:</i>	* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001	

The results of these manipulation checks show evidence of a roughly 2.5 point average reduction in confidence in respondents' knowledge relative to all Americans ( $p < 0.05$ ). However, among respondents evincing the greatest degree of overconfidence ( $N = 308$ ), treated respondents evinced a far greater reduction in post-test overconfidence of roughly 6.3 points on the 100-point scale ( $p < 0.001$ ). This latter result accords with the notion that the treatment, which is especially designed to target the most overconfident respondents in the sample, was effective in reducing confidence among the most relevant group.

### Respondent Attentiveness

Respondents were also largely attentive to the task at hand. This attentiveness also did not vary systematically across the treatment groups. Below I show the results of two pre-test attention checks designed to evaluate attentiveness in the sample. In the left column of Table SI11 I show results of a logistic regression model predicting passage of an attention check with long preamble text and multiple response selections required (a fairly difficult attention check). The right hand



side of Table SI11 shows logistic regression predicting passage of an easier attention check in which respondents selected the smallest object from a list of small objects.

Table SI11. Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attention Check Passage

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Attention Check 1	Attention Check 2
Treatment	0.204 (0.379)	-0.229 (0.332)
Constant	3.464*** (0.254)	3.401*** (0.247)
Observations	1,049	1,049
Log Likelihood	-132.511	-163.148
Akaike Inf. Crit.	269.021	330.297
<i>Note:</i> *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p<0.001		

These results show that passage of the attention check was far more likely than failure (2.7% of respondents failed the first check, and 3.6% failed the second check). Respondents who failed the checks were retained in the final sample, as specified by the pre-registration information.

## Appendix H. Pre-Registration and Ethics Information

### **Ethics Statement**

The present study was reviewed by the [redacted for review] institution's Institutional Review Board, exempt protocol #2023-967, and classified as Exempt category research. In concurrence with that IRB's guidance, as well as ethical considerations for online panels as recommended by disciplinary advocates (Marinova 2016). Average participant per-minute compensation rates exceeded [redacted state]'s minimum wage, which is higher than most other states and which far exceeds the federal minimum wage. The survey was also pre-tested for time in order to ensure respondents did not substantially exceed the anticipated survey completion time on average. Care was taken to ensure that no deception was used in the study.

### **Pre-Registration Information**

The present study was pre-registered on Nov. 28, 2023 at [redacted for review]. In order to provide reviewers with pre-registration information, I include an anonymized copy of the pre-registration information below. A link to the live pre-registration will be inserted in its place in the publication version of the manuscript.]

H1. In a comparison of respondents, those receiving the inoculation treatment (T1) are expected to express lower levels of affective polarization than those in the control (T0) group.

H2. The treatment effects of T1 vs T0 on declining levels of affective polarization are expected to be strongest among respondents who are initially overconfident.

### **Design Plan**

#### **Study type**

Experiment - A researcher randomly assigns treatments to study subjects, this includes field or lab experiments. This is also known as an intervention experiment and includes randomized controlled trials.

## Blinding

For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

Is there any additional blinding in this study?

*No response*

## Study design

This is a simple randomized survey experiment that exposes half of respondents to a control condition and the other half of respondents to receive a vignette treatment.

*No files selected*

## Randomization

Simple randomization into two groups, using Qualtrics randomizer

## Sampling Plan

### Existing Data

Registration prior to creation of data

Explanation of existing data

No existing data

### Data collection procedures

Data will be collected using the Prolific respondent recruitment platform. Respondents will be American adults who are active participants on Prolific platforms. Payment for participation will be commensurate with Prolific policies and minimum wage in the state of the researcher's home institution.

*No files selected*

### Sample size

Sample size is expected to be  $N = 1,200$  but may vary depending upon funding availability

### Sample size rationale

Sample size arbitrarily constrained by funding availability.

### Stopping rule

Data collection will terminate when funds are exhausted

### Variables

### Manipulated variables

Exposure to the vignette is randomly assigned to 50% of respondents. T0 text: Thank you for your continued attention. T1 text: Please take a moment to reflect on your own knowledge of American politics. The American political system is very complicated. There may be lots of things you do not know about politics, and that's OK! Even if you think you may know a lot about politics, there may be many things you do not know about U.S. government, the Republican and Democratic political parties, public policies, and current issues. It is always a good idea to stay humble about your knowledge of politics. There are always new things you can learn about politics, even from people with opposing viewpoints.

*No files selected*

#### Measured variables

Covariate The assessment of pre-test overconfidence will be assessed through a five-item political quiz used in Anson (2017, Political Psychology). After completion of the quiz respondents will be asked to rate their performance on the quiz (1:5) and their performance percentile relative to all other test takers (0:100). Overconfidence will be assessed by determining (0/1) whether a respondent's objective quiz performance percentile is lower than their perceived percentile. Dependent variables Q1. How comfortable would you feel if you were asked to have a conversation about politics with a member of the Republican party? (1:5) Q2. How comfortable would you feel if you were asked to have a conversation about politics with a member of the Democratic party? (1:5) Q3. On a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating complete disapproval and 100 indicating complete approval, please indicate your approval of the Republican Party (0:100) Q4. On a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating complete disapproval and 100 indicating complete approval, please indicate your approval of the Democratic Party (0:100) Q5. How much of the time do you think you can trust the Democratic party to do what is right for the country? (1:5) How much of the time do you think you can trust the Republican party to do what is right for the country? (1:5) Manipulation checks How would you rate your overall performance on the political quiz you just took? (1:5) Now would like you to rate your own knowledge of politics relative to all other Americans. Please use the sliding scale to evaluate your political knowledge on a scale from 0 ("I'm at the very bottom") to 100 ("I'm at the very top"). A rating of 50 indicates that "I'm exactly average". How would you rate your overall knowledge of politics?

*No files selected*

#### Indices

Affective polarization scales will be assessed by computing the R-D differences for Q1 vs. Q2, Q3 vs. Q4, and Q5 vs. Q6, respectively.

*No files selected*

#### Analysis Plan

#### Statistical models

H1: Basic treatment group mean comparisons using one-tailed t-tests (analogous to mean contrasts with 90% CIs will be used to assess hypotheses). 95% CIs will also be presented for informational purposes. H2: Separate treatment group mean comparisons using one-tailed t-tests will be presented for overconfident and "non-overconfident" (i.e., calibrated) subgroups. 95% CIs will be presented for informational purposes. Tabular regression models with an interaction between overconfidence and treatment performance will be included in Appendices and significance test of the interaction term will be reported in the main text.

*No files selected*

Transformations

Variables will be transformed so higher values always indicate greater support, greater knowledge, etc.

Inference criteria

$p < 0.05$  on the basis of one-tailed t-tests

Data exclusion

No planned data exclusion

Missing data

Listwise deletion

Exploratory analysis

Exploratory tests of further treatment effect variation, including across the strength of partisanship

Other

Other

*No response*

## Appendix I. Questionnaire Text

age How old are you?

- ☐ Under 18 (1)
- ☐ 18-24 years old (2)
- ☐ 25-34 years old (3)
- ☐ 35-44 years old (4)
- ☐ 45-54 years old (5)
- ☐ 55-64 years old (6)
- ☐ 65+ years old (7)

gender How do you describe yourself?

- ☐ Male (1)
- ☐ Female (2)
- ☐ Non-binary / third gender (3)
- ☐ Prefer to self-describe (4) \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Prefer not to say (5)

race Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be

- ☐ White or Caucasian (1)
- ☐ Black or African American (2)
- ☐ American Indian/Native American or Alaska Native (3)
- ☐ Asian (4)
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (5)
- ☐ Other (6)
- ☐ Prefer not to say (7)

edu What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ☐ Some high school or less (1)
- ☐ High school diploma or GED (2)
- ☐ Some college, but no degree (3)
- ☐ Associates or technical degree (4)
- ☐ Bachelor's degree (5)
- ☐ Graduate or professional degree (MA, MS, MBA, PhD, JD, MD, DDS etc.) (6)
- ☐ Prefer not to say (7)

hhinc What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?

- ☐ Less than \$25,000 (1)
- ☐ \$25,000-\$49,999 (2)
- ☐ \$50,000-\$74,999 (3)

- ☐ \$75,000-\$99,999 (4)
- ☐ \$100,000-\$149,999 (5)
- ☐ \$150,000 or more (6)
- ☐ Prefer not to say (7)

know\_pre How would you rate your overall **knowledge of politics?**

- ☐ Excellent (1)
- ☐ Above Average (2)
- ☐ Average (3)
- ☐ Below Average (4)
- ☐ Poor (5)

pid7 Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):

- ☐ Strong Democrat (1)
- ☐ Democrat (2)
- ☐ Independent, but leaning Democratic (3)
- ☐ Independent (4)
- ☐ Independent, but leaning Republican (5)
- ☐ Republican (6)
- ☐ Strong Republican (7)



ideo Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

- ☐ Very liberal (1)
- ☐ Liberal (2)
- ☐ Moderate (3)
- ☐ Conservative (4)
- ☐ Very conservative (5)
- ☐ Not sure (6)

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?

- ☐ Most of the time (1)
- ☐ Some of the time (2)
- ☐ Only now and then (3)
- ☐ Hardly at all (4)

We would like to get a sense of your general preferences.

Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables, can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both pink and blue among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of these options.

What is your favorite color?

- ☐ White (1)
- ☐ Black (2)
- ☐ Red (3)
- ☐ Green (4)
- ☐ Pink (5)
- ☐ Blue (6)

Please select the smallest of the following four objects.

- ☐ A mouse (1)
- ☐ A pea (2)
- ☐ A molecule (3)
- ☐ A banana (4)

Now we would like you to respond to a series of questions with **right and wrong** answers. Please try to answer this Political Quiz to the best of your ability. **There is NO penalty for incorrect answers. Please do not cheat in any way on this quiz.**

### Political Quiz

For how many years is a United States Senator elected--that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?

- ☐ 6 years (1)
- ☐ 4 years (2)
- ☐ 2 years (3)
- ☐ 8 years (4)

On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently spend the LEAST?

- ☐ Foreign Aid (1)
- ☐ Medicare (2)
- ☐ National Defense (3)
- ☐ Social Security (4)

Do you happen to know which party currently has the FEWEST members in the U.S. House of Representatives?

- ☐ Democrats (1)
- ☐ Republicans (2)

Which political party is more conservative when it comes to healthcare policy?

- ☐ Democratic Party (1)
- ☐ Republican Party (2)
- ☐ They are about the same (3)

Who is the current U.S. Secretary of Education?

- ☐ Antony Blinken (1)
- ☐ Janet Yellen (2)
- ☐ Deb Haaland (3)
- ☐ Pete Buttigieg (4)
- ☐ Miguel Cardona (5)

Thank you. This concludes our Political Quiz.

Treatment 1: Control

Thank you for your continued attention.

Treatment 2: Experimental Vignette

Please take a moment to reflect on your own knowledge of American politics.

The American political system is very complicated. There may be lots of things you do not know about politics, and **that's OK!** Even if you **think** you may know a lot about politics, there may be **many things you do not know** about U.S. government, the Republican and Democratic political parties, public policies, and current issues. It is always a good idea to **stay humble** about your knowledge of politics. There are always new things you can learn about politics, even from people with opposing viewpoints.

Outcome Measures

How comfortable would you feel if you were asked to have a conversation about politics with a member of the Republican party?

- ☐ Totally comfortable (1)
- ☐ Mostly comfortable (2)
- ☐ Fairly comfortable (3)
- ☐ Only a little comfortable (3)
- ☐ Not at all comfortable (4)

How comfortable would you feel if you were asked to have a conversation about politics with a member of the Democratic party?

- ☐ Totally comfortable (1)
- ☐ Mostly comfortable (2)
- ☐ Fairly comfortable (3)
- ☐ Only a little comfortable (4)
- ☐ Not at all comfortable (5)

On a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating complete disapproval and 100 indicating complete approval, please indicate your approval of the Republican Party.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100



On a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating complete disapproval and 100 indicating complete approval, please indicate your approval of the Democratic Party.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100



How much of the time do you think you can trust the Democratic party to do what is right for the country?

- ☐ Almost always (1)
- ☐ Most of the time (2)
- ☐ About half of the time (3)
- ☐ Once in a while (4)
- ☐ Almost never (5)

How much of the time do you think you can trust the Republican party to do what is right for the country?

- ☐ Almost always (1)
- ☐ Most of the time (2)
- ☐ About half of the time (3)
- ☐ Once in a while (4)
- ☐ Almost never (5)

#### Manipulation Check Battery


How would you rate your overall performance on the political quiz you just took?

- ☐ Excellent (1)
- ☐ Good (2)
- ☐ Average (3)
- ☐ Poor (4)
- ☐ Terrible (5)

Now would like you to rate your own **knowledge of politics relative to all other Americans**.

Please use the sliding scale to evaluate **your political knowledge** on a scale from 0 ("I'm at the very bottom") to 100 ("I'm at the very top"). A rating of 50 indicates that "I'm exactly average".

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Please Rate Your Political Knowledge Relative to All Americans ()	
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How would you rate your overall **knowledge of politics**?

- ☐ Excellent (1)
- ☐ Above Average (2)
- ☐ Average (3)
- ☐ Below Average (4)
- ☐ Poor (5)

### Supplementary Information Works Cited

Marinova, D. M. (2016). On the use of crowdsourcing labor markets in research. *Perspectives on Politics*, 14(2), 422-431.