

Acquisition or Theft?:
Civil Asset Forfeiture in Pennsylvania
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Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements

For

Departmental Honors

in the

Department of Political Science

Hood College

April 2017

Introduction

On a drive through the streets of Philadelphia, PA, Nasir Geiger had just cashed his paycheck which netted him \$580 cash in his pocket. Leaving the bank, Nasir was flagged down by police under suspicion of drug dealing. Then the police searched his vehicle but did not find any drugs or anything illegal. Despite this, the Philadelphia police seized his vehicle and his \$580 cash under pretenses that Nasir was using his car to commit crimes. It did not matter Nasir had just cashed his paycheck or that he had a clean criminal record, he was booked in jailed. It did not even matter that he did not have drugs in his vehicle or that he was not a drug user or dealer. Following his arrest, Nasir was released and charges were never filed. Nevertheless, he was released to walk home penniless. Despite never having been convicted of a crime, Nasir was legally stripped of his pay and vehicle he required for work. Nasir's \$8,400 is only one small part of a \$5 billion a year business of civil asset forfeiture (Ingraham). Furthermore, only a few miles down the road, outside Philadelphia city limits, civil asset forfeiture is almost unheard of. Philadelphia, PA has the largest incidence of civil asset forfeiture in the entire country. The city has double the amount of money seized in civil asset forfeiture cases as Los Angeles, CA and New York, NY combined, even though both are larger cities (Forbes). This practice of civil asset forfeiture has stemmed from the War on Drugs. The War on Drugs consists of many criminal justice policies and public health programs that treat drug addiction and drug sales as a criminal justice issue. The War on Drugs has been plagued by decades with racial disparities. The vast array of racial disparities

found in the criminal justice system are found when examining civil asset forfeiture. When examining civil asset forfeiture in one state, like Pennsylvania, it becomes clear that civil seizures are more prevalent in urban communities of color. In Pennsylvania, the rural, mostly white, conservative, and working class areas, tend to have few civil seizures, but the more racially diverse urban centers have huge amounts of civil asset forfeiture.

The prevalence and controversial nature of civil asset forfeiture depends on whether an area is urban or rural. An urban county in PA will usually have higher rates of poverty, larger minority populations, and seize 14 times the amount of assets than its rural counterpart in PA. This is a major political concern within the criminal justice system. This study examines the relationship between civil asset forfeiture and how politics, race, and class are all connected to urban and rural areas in the state of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania is a state deeply divided into large urban centers and disperse rural communities. This large geographic divide creates greatly different communities across the state. This is because there are many divisions in race, politics, and class that are separated spatially, meaning that there are racial, political, and economic differences between urban areas and rural areas. Urban areas in Pennsylvania consist of close to 14% of African-Americans, while the largely white rural counties in Pennsylvania only have 2-4% African American populations. Furthermore, the rural areas tend to be Republican while the urban communities tend to elect Democratic leaders. Urban areas also tend to have larger poor populations than rural counties in Pennsylvania. Poverty, racial diversity, and Democratic politics

are all entrenched in urban areas while rural areas tend to be white, middle class, and Republican leading. This makes civil asset forfeiture incredibly more prevalent than in rural areas, and many rural areas have limited or non-existent amounts of civil seizures.

Civil Asset Forfeiture History

Civil asset forfeiture is the practice where a police officer seizes an asset like money, a vehicle, or even a house from a suspected criminal without ever charging them with a crime. People who have their assets seized, are never charged with a crime. It is a civil issue, not criminal. Then the owner of the property must appear in court and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the assets seized from them were not used while committing a crime. Unlike a criminal trial, the defendant has the burden of proof in these civil cases, meaning police only have to prove that an asset was probably used to commit a crime.

This act of seizing assets is traced to English Common Law, and has been regularly practiced throughout American history (Murphy 80). In many police departments across the United States the seized assets are used by police officers to supplement budgets. Seized vehicles are used to add to a department's fleet of police cars. In some states, the assets cannot be used by the police at all, meaning civil asset forfeiture laws vary by state and some departments have policies regarding what police officers can and cannot do with seized assets.

To complicate matters further, the federal government has a civil asset forfeiture sharing policy that allows local police departments to receive a portion of federally seized assets within a police jurisdiction, even if the state has strict laws against police using the seized assets (Holcomb 872). This makes civil asset forfeiture a result of federalism, with some powers vested in states and some in the federal government, leading to the politicization of the issue. The federal government has a policy that affords freedom to local police departments working on federal investigations to civilly seize assets from people. This means that a state could pass laws restricting the use of civil asset forfeiture, but if local police are working with federal police then the local police can have a share of the assets. This creates political controversy when states try to curb a behavior, but the federal government allows it. This is especially relevant in 2018 at a time with a Republican controlled federal government has a civil asset police that contradicts the goal of many Democratic states to stop the use of civil asset forfeiture, Democratic counties in Pennsylvania seize assets at a rate far greater than in the Republican, and largely rural, counties. This shows the deep divide in civil asset forfeiture within Pennsylvania. The most likely identifier to point to a county's prevalence of civil asset forfeiture is if that county is rural or urban. The rural-urban divide is so much more than simple spatial differences. Politics, poverty, and race are all aspects of the rural and urban divide that starts with federalism. Federalism means that states and the federal government share governing powers. This means that both states and the federal government have the ability to regulate civil asset forfeitures. Some states could encourage it,

some could discourage it, but no state can tell the federal government what to do. This means that the federal government can conduct an investigation in an area that discourages civil asset forfeiture, but still conduct seizures and shared seized assets with local partners. This would greatly influence the areas and people who are subject to civil asset forfeiture, and anger state governments trying to change their criminal justice policies but meeting resistance from the federal government.

Federalism, Politics, and the War on Drugs

Considering the many differences of civil asset forfeiture laws among states, the academic literature on the subject mainly focuses on analyzing the state statutes and data. The rest of the research mainly consists of the apparent racial disparities in who has their assets seized. These issues mainly arose in the last few decades, as drug enforcement policies were ramped up in the 1970s and 1980s in the Nixon and Reagan administrations. Issues with civil asset forfeiture existed before the 1970s, but the War on Drugs' impact on minorities and poor communities brought to light certain racial injustices in civil asset forfeiture that were seen in other areas of the American criminal justice system.

Federal Civil Asset Forfeiture Policy and the War on Drugs

Despite civil asset forfeiture laws existing federally and at the state level, modern civil asset forfeiture has taken shape as a drug fighting mechanism used to wage the government's War on Drugs. In 1970, Congress passed the

Comprehension Drug Prevention and Control Act which greatly increased the freedom police departments have over the assets they seize while investigating drug related crimes (Murphy 80). This was then expanded in the 1980s with the passing of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act that allowed local police departments to keep up to eighty percent of assets seized under federal law (Murphy 81). Congress also expanded provisions that allowed police to seize assets not related to drug crimes. Every subsequent U.S. President, Democrat or Republican, have all continued to fight the War on Drugs, and civil asset forfeiture is simply one tentacle of the War on Drugs. The War on Drugs saw the increase of mandatory minimums for drug crimes, increased police presence and funding, and mass incarceration of drug criminals. During the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government conducted a public perception campaign to portray drugs as immoral and brought a wealth of harsh penalties and punishments to follow. The Clinton Administration fought for a crime bill in the mid-1990s that harshened the federal government's stance on crime. Throughout this time, many political science and criminal justice scholars began to see civil asset forfeiture, as a long reaching tentacle of the War on Drugs, as a way for police departments to supplement their budgets while waging the drug war (Murphy, 87).

Then in 2000, Congress enacted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, which sought to limit police ability to seize assets from citizens not proven to have committed a crime. This act shifted some of the burden-of-proof to the prosecutors, but the proof did not have to be "clear and convincing (Phillip 476)." This was complicated in the late 2000s by the 2008 financial collapse, so-called

the Great Recession. The Great Recession lead the government to cut funding across the board, one of the hardest hit areas was local police funding. This left many police departments with huge budget deficits and few ways to remedy their financial woes. This made ramping up civil asset forfeiture a likely method to increase a department's budget. These seizure laws that allowed civil asset forfeiture to happen were all signed in under conservative, or Republican presidents with Republican legislators introducing the bills. With press conferences and interviews, civil asset forfeiture became a political issue. The Great Recession and budget cuts became a huge political issue as well that made civil asset forfeiture a priority to cash strapped policed departments. Furthermore, criminal justice laws are political. This can be seen when analyzing how civil asset forfeiture practices differ greatly from state to state based on the political makeup of a state's legislature. States can be divided into three categories of civil asset forfeiture laws. First, states that have attempted to alter the burden of proof requirement. Second, the states that have different civil asset forfeiture regulating to the federal government, and finally states that have given police department's total freedom to decide how they want to conduct civil asset forfeiture, if at all.

State Civil Asset Forfeiture Policy

Several states across the Union have attempted to alter the burden of proof requirement in a civil asset forfeiture trial. The goal is to create a civil asset forfeiture process that benefits police departments but does not violate citizen's constitutional rights. In California, a solidly liberal Democrat state, the police and

prosecutors must supply a wealth of evidence that the seized assets were used during a crime (Murphy 82). This is much like an ordinary criminal trial where the burden of proof lies with the state, but in a civil asset forfeiture trial the accused property has the burden of proof (Murphy 83

The restrictions on civil asset forfeiture explain that, despite Los Angeles being over twice the size of Philadelphia, Philadelphia seizes more assets than Los Angeles. In fact, Philadelphia seizes more assets than any city in the country. This means that the person who had their assets seized has the responsibility to prove that their assets were not used in a crime. States enact their civil asset forfeiture laws based on their political makeup.

Many states pass laws that limit the ability of police to seize assets from individuals that have not been convicted of a crime, but there is a complication. Even police departments that have restrictions in place can still receive a portion of assets seized under a federal law. This means if the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) works with a local precinct to arrest a drug dealer, and the federal government seizes a certain amount of assets from that drug they can then share the seized assets with these local departments. This is seen in Massachusetts, a more liberal Democratic state where Crawford's study of civil asset forfeiture in analyzing the language of the law and the real world implications finds that in Massachusetts "law enforcement agencies are influenced by financial incentives when deciding how to initiate a forfeiture action (Crawford 277)." This is interesting because after many court battles ended in the United States District Court for Massachusetts ruling the state could not seize the


property because they did not meet their minimum burden of proof (Crawford 260). This led Massachusetts to restrict how their officers seize assets of people not accused of a crime. Despite this, an issue in Massachusetts and other states is that the property owners in civil asset forfeiture cases do not have the right to a public defender like they would in a criminal case. This makes lower income individuals especially vulnerable. This has been recognized by the state because they included a provision that if a defendant wins their property back then their lawyer fees are paid (Crawford 283). Despite all the provisions in Massachusetts the federal civil asset sharing law still provides financial incentives to police departments for seizing assets from non-criminals, but in Florida there are no such restrictions and studies into the disproportionate effect on minority communities shows similar patterns to arrest data.

Lastly, Florida, a Republican but moderately conservative state, has civil asset forfeiture laws that afford a lot of freedom to police officers to seize assets. For example, “in 2003, top Tampa Bay, Florida police brass kept a fleet of forty-two seized cars for their own use, including luxury SUVs. (Pertnoy 289).” Many states only allow the seizing of cash, but in Florida, like Massachusetts property such as homes and cars can be seized by police as well without ever charging anybody with a crime. Unlike Massachusetts, Florida does not provide provisions that protect property owners of seized assets.

In Florida, “many interdiction programs train officers to stop vehicles or drivers matching a specific set of characteristics,” and if this set of characteristics are met then the officer’s goal becomes to do whatever they can to conduct a

warrantless search (Pertnoy 290). Pertnoy also points out sociological data that shows “a black person, for example, is likely to be more nervous around the police, regardless of whether he has done anything wrong (Pertnoy 290).” This means that African-Americans in Florida are more likely to be searched and have their assets seized than white Floridians. This is seen in Pennsylvania. The areas with the highest African American populations also have the highest rates of civil asset forfeiture. These findings are echoed in criminal justice literature, showing minorities face more negative encounters with police than the average white person. Similarly to Florida, Arizona has laws that give police freedom to seize a wide range of assets from people, but they have a provision that gives even more power to the state.

In Arizona, a solid Republican and conservative state, if a person or their car or house is searched with an ex parte warrant, a warrant based on probable cause, then the police can seize any assets that they want and not provide legal representation to the person’s assets they seized (Phillip 475). This is like Florida, but allows police officers to seize any assets they want if they have a warrant. Even if the warrant is for selling or manufacturing of drugs and the police find a vehicle in the person’s home they can simply seize it and force the property owner to pay for a lawyer. This drawn out legal battle deters many from attempting to regain their property after it was seized. For these reasons, “law enforcement regards Arizona’s civil asset forfeiture scheme as one of the most favorable civil forfeiture schemes due to its broad scope and limited procedural protections (Phillip 483).”



Source: Institute for Justice

<http://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit/grading-state-federal-civil-forfeiture-laws/>

Politics and Police Budgets

This research makes it clear that partisan differences in a state's legislature will have differing effects on the civil asset forfeiture and greater criminal justice laws passed by a state. Also, politics play a huge role in civil asset forfeiture because Presidential administrations enact policies that states

must react to. This is seen in Massachusetts, a Democratic leaning state, trying to restrict their officers from utilizing a federal law enacted by a majority of conservatives. Therefore, based on the political stance of those governing, there will be different restrictions and policies relating to civil asset forfeiture.

Many police officers see civil asset forfeiture as an avenue to deter or reduce crime. A study into the political reasons for enacting civil asset forfeiture found that proponents, usually conservative, say ending civil asset forfeiture is an “invitation to drug-related crime and elevated problems with substance abuse (Helms and Constanza 3).” This research also shows conservative proponents see civil asset forfeiture as a necessary measure for police departments to fill out their budgets. This is especially beneficial when the economy is slow and government deficits are swelling. Seizing assets is a lucrative way for police officers to still have enough funding for all their operations and equipment even if they experience budget cuts. According to Helms and Constanza, in a study of 28 undercover narcotics found that these officers used civil asset forfeiture policies in a way that “subvert the original intentions of the governing laws (Helms and Constanza 4).” This means that these officers were using civil asset forfeiture in ways to inflate their department’s budgets. This raises the question of whether civil asset forfeiture can be abused. Murphy observes, “up to 40% of law enforcement managers agree or strongly agree that civil asset forfeiture is necessary for their agency's budget (Murphy 87).” This can create an issue because many police departments would have to cut back their operations or even go defunct if they could not take part in civil asset forfeiture. It also means


that if police departments are forced to seize assets to stay open then that means there must be an increase of civil asset forfeitures.

The limitation of these studies is that they do not look into the type of people having their asset seized, and the areas that have larger rates of seizures. These civil asset forfeiture disparities between areas cannot be understood without first understanding the social and racial disparities in the criminal justice system. The solution to the question about who is more likely to have their assets seized becomes clearer when civil asset forfeiture is analyzed with a racial lens. Also, much of the literature about disparities in the criminal justice system focus on how race and class can greatly influence criminal justice. The aforementioned states all have vastly different populaces with varying amounts of urban areas, poverty, and minority populations. It is clear that civil asset forfeiture is a contentious political issue, but the more pressing question of who is targeted remains unanswered. Both critical race theory and criminal justice literature begin to refine the practice of civil asset forfeiture from one based on state law and politics to one based on race and the criminal justice system.

Race, Politics, and the Criminal Justice System

Large Majorities Of Blacks And Hispanics Say The Criminal Justice System Favors Whites

In general, do you think that the country's criminal justice system...




NOTE: Don't know/Refused responses not shown. Items asked of a half sample of Whites.

SOURCE: CNN/Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of Americans on Race (conducted August 25-October 3, 2015)



Race has long been a main focus of criminal justice literature, and is a huge factor in civil asset forfeiture. The racial discrimination found in the criminal justice system is a product of politics argues Boushey who states "State governments are more likely to adopt innovations that extend benefits to strong, popular, and powerful target populations or that impose burdens on weak and politically marginalized groups." This is supported by Kent and Carmichael who state governments legislate criminal justice policy in a political way. "We thus identify important differences in the political and social context between U.S. states that influence the adoption of criminal justice policies."

When they examined whether or not differing state politics has an effect on criminal justice policies, Boushey found that protect that states tend to offer protections to already strong groups that can in return vote and donate money to campaigns. Furthermore, Kent and Carmichael discuss more conservative areas offering little protection to the wrongfully accused, a weaker group that Boushey's study found states would not protect. They found that in areas with higher amounts of Republican voters and Republican legislators there are fewer protections for the wrongly accused. This helps to explain why Helms and Constanza find lowered socio-economic status greatly increases the likelihood of being subject to civil asset forfeiture. Beyond this, Fosten argues that conservative politicians have enacted the drug war and the prison industrial complex. "The criminal justice system's War on Crime and War on Drugs masquerade as two of the primary political strategies and initiatives playbooks for conservatives' exploitation of race, class, region and religion (Fosten 129)." Then "the Reagan Administration expanded the federal government's role in law enforcement's' abilities to control crime through federal crime policy legislation devoted to the War on Drugs (Fosten, 131).



Source: Slate Magazine

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/08/racial_disparities_in_the_criminal_justice_system_eight_charts_illustrating.html

Race and the Criminal Justice System

This research about African-Americans and the criminal justice system argues that “the United States’ criminal justice system intentionally administers law, order, and justice in a racially-biased and unbalanced manner (Foster 125).” This shows that Foster argues African Americans are treated more unfairly in the criminal justice system than white people, and the bulk of statistical data concurs.

McElrath et al. found that African Americans 2.6 times more likely than white Americans to be arrested for drug possession even though survey data suggests African Americans and whites use drugs at similar rates (McElrath et al, 2).

African-Americans are also less likely to be referred to treatment facilities and drug rehabilitation centers than white Americans when arrested for drug possession (McElrath et al, 3). This means the African-American offenders are being sent to prison while white offenders are being sent to rehabilitation clinics and are not at risk of felony disenfranchisement. Beyond this African-Americans make up 13% of the American population, but 38% of the prison population (Institute of Justice). This figures would indicate that African-Americans and white Americans are treated differently in the criminal justice system, but this these figures are about arrests and legal outcomes. Civil asset forfeitures do not involved arrests, therefore police encounters must be examined to see if there are similar racial biases or not. Police officers have freedom to use civil asset forfeiture in many scenarios. When police pull over a person, they use all the tools they have to investigate the situation. Through the course of a police encounter, a police officer could find evidence of a crime or could be left with an impression that the person they have stopped is actively committing crimes. This means that a police officer can choose whether or not to act on this evidence. Many criminal justice scholars have found that, in these types of police encounters, African Americans face more negative outcomes than white Americans.

According to Banks, in her book about the ethics and the criminal justice system “the one quarter of the 960 LAPD officers surveyed by the commission agreed that officers held a racial bias toward minorities, and more than one quarter agreed that this racial bias could lead to the use of excessive force

(Banks, 67). This shows that police officers can have their personal racial biases crop up when determining who is arrested and the conduct used to make arrests. Beyond this “research in Memphis showed that blacks were no more likely than whites to be involved in armed incidents, but nevertheless, police shot disproportionately more African-Americans when they were fleeing (Banks 70).” This shows that police interaction with African-Americans can get violent quicker than police encounters with white offenders and shows that police officers do greatly have a bias toward African-Americans in police encounters. Knowing that African-Americans are statistically treated differently than whites in the criminal justice issue, it is interesting to see that while African-Americans make up on 13% of the population they make up 40% of the incarcerated population according to U.S. Census data. Also, African-Americans tend to vote for more liberal or Democratic candidates (Banks, 67). This combined with the facts that 98% of felon disenfranchisement laws are proposed by Republicans (Sentencing Project) and 1/13 African-American men fall under felony disenfranchisement (Sentencing Project) leads Banks to go so far as to state that conservative politicians are working to disenfranchise African-Americans in order to have more success at the polls (Banks, 67). This means that not only does the criminal justice system have statistical differences in how white and African-American criminals are treated, but police officer’s conduct towards African-Americans and white Americans is different. This raises the question whether or not police would seize an African-American’s assets before they would seize a white person’s

assets. If racial disparities exist in policing and in the criminal justice systems then that makes civil asset forfeitures at risk to having the same racial biases.

Race and Socioeconomic status in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases

In areas with high minority population there is a greater arrest rate a higher rate of civil asset forfeiture (Helms and Constanza 5). The explanations for this range greatly, with some researchers saying that there is certain racial motivations that lead police to arrest or seize more assets of minorities, and some researchers say that race is unrelated to the issue. Those who say that race is unrelated to the issue point to the fact that civil asset forfeiture increases and arrest increases are only in neighborhoods that have a large amount of crime. However Helms and Constanza argue that “in general, the social control literature shows that racial characteristics and economic differences are key predictors of variance in police arrest patterns (Helms and Constanza 5).” This would mean that race plays a factor in the prevalence of arrests in certain areas. Even if this is empirically true, civil asset forfeitures are not arrests, not even criminal at all.

Civil asset forfeiture is a civil matter where a police department sues a person’s property. Arrests and convictions require evidence, but seizing a person’s assets does not. This means that “the property owner does not necessarily have the same procedural guarantees, such as the right to an attorney or to a jury trial (Murphy 88). If there is empirical evidence to say that

race plays a role in arrest patterns, then civil asset forfeiture patterns should be analyzed to see if there are similar aspects to arrest patterns.

One such study by Helms and Constanza find certain indicators as to where civil asset forfeiture is more prevalent. First, they find that areas of low income household will experience more civil asset forfeitures when compared to higher income houses in the same city (Helms and Constanza 13). The data shows that poorer citizens tend to commit crimes at a higher rate and are arrested at a higher rate, so it follows that civil asset forfeiture will also be greater in these areas (Helms and Constanza 13). Indigent and poor people are then at a higher risk for civil asset forfeiture because they have little means of recourse to win back their seized assets in a trial. Second, conservative political administrations that have a majority of conservative political leaning citizens --for example a Republican mayor of a city where seventy percent of the citizens are Republicans -- have a statistically significant increase in civil asset forfeitures than other jurisdictions (Helms and Constanza 13). Specifically, counties that carried the Republican Party during the 1988 and 1992 national elections exhibited enhanced levels of asset forfeiture (Helms and Constanza 13). This correlates to criminal justice data that says the criminal justice system has been politicized.

Methodology

This study examines the influence that politics has on civil asset forfeiture, but also how race and class play a role in civil asset forfeiture. There is copious research that connects politics, race, and criminal justice, and there is little research on the types of people most impacted by civil asset forfeiture. There are studies that look at factors such as race, income level, and other related factors as how they pertain to civil asset forfeiture. The issue with these studies is that they examine counties or cities from many states within the United States, and there are so many little intricacies of each law. To demonstrate the logic of this, California has strict restrictions on how assets can be seized by police, but “several loopholes allow California law enforcement to circumvent procedural protections (Chi 1658).” The amount of assets seized and the procedures by assets are seized will increase immensely. It follows, that studying aggregate national data would provide little actual insight into the particulars of civil asset forfeiture.

A state level study that analyzes various communities, and their political affiliations, of a state to see how they are impacted by civil asset forfeiture is the best way to study the issue. Pennsylvania is a prime state to study for two main reasons. First, Pennsylvania has a mixture of large metropolitan urban centers like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, which have sizable minority populations, and rural towns like Hanover, PA or Shippensburg, PA that are largely white. These rural areas tend to be more conservative and Republican while the few urban areas tend to be a bit more democratic. This means that there are deep and clear

political divides as well as deep racial and economic divides within Pennsylvania. In many ways PA is like a microcosm for the entire U.S. There are pockets of people from all walks of life, and even sizable undocumented immigrant populations. This is important because the communities in Pennsylvania are so vastly different that the particulars of each community are obvious. This will allow a study to see the type of people most affected by civil asset forfeiture. The second reason is that Philadelphia, PA is atypical and has double the amount of money seized in civil asset forfeiture cases as Los Angeles, CA and New York, NY combined, even though both are larger cities (Forbes). This makes Philadelphia the number one city for civil asset forfeiture in the entire United States, with around six million dollars' worth of cash and assets seized every single year (Forbes). This makes Pennsylvania the perfect state to study to determine if and how civil asset forfeiture affects certain groups more than others.

Data and Methods

As previously states, the bulk of previous research done into Civil Asset forfeiture is mainly legal studies of the issues of federalism and civil rights as they pertain to the seizure of assets. This means there is a gap in the research when it comes to analyzing civil asset forfeiture empirically and quantitatively as it pertains to race and socioeconomic status. Since criminal justice and political science research done about policing routinely finds racial gaps in arrests and engagements with the police, it is worth studying civil asset forfeiture to see if there is a similar correlation.

This study attempts to begin to fill that gap and others by systematically analyzing civil asset forfeiture in one state to see how different groups are affected differently by civil asset forfeiture program. Considering this, the dependent variable in this study is the total value, in dollars, amount of civil asset forfeiture in each county in Pennsylvania. This dependent variable is reliable because police can seize all kinds of assets from cash to cars to rings. To easily quantify the amount of civil asset forfeitures, I use the dollar amount of the cash seizures and the monetary value of seized assets in U.S. dollars. The factors that influence the amount of civil asset forfeitures, or the independent variables, that I will be testing are political affiliation of county, race, income level, and population size. This information on, race, income level, and population size is found in U.S. Census Bureau Data, and has been used in countless political science, criminal justice, and economic studies as well as other disciplines. For the purposes of this study, political affiliation refers to how the county voted in the 2016 presidential election. This is because Helms and Constanza used the same metric to define political affiliation. This makes the data being collected as reliable as possible.

There are two large issues that must be controlled for or else the data will be skewed. These issues arise if the research is actually analyzing the relationship between the variables accurately and if certain large population centers will skew the data one way or another. First, to make sure this study accurately describes the relation between civil asset forfeiture and politics, race, income level, and population size the research will be focused on Pennsylvania.

One benefit of focusing on Pennsylvania is that laws will not be differing between areas, only demographics will be changing. Second, this study will use a rate of civil asset forfeiture to population size because it logically makes sense that areas with higher populations will have a higher amount of seizures, but that does not mean that the higher amount of seizures is unusual to the surrounding areas with different demographics.

Theoretical Framework

Since this study is primarily with the relationship between politics and race, critical race theory will be used to approach understanding civil asset forfeiture. Critical race theory itself is the thinking that racism has become institutionalized and racism is in power structures. Critical race theory helps us see that racism does not need to exist on a person to person level but racism is ingrained in American society to the point that not individuals but the entire racial group is affected. Using this theory, factors that lead to civil asset forfeiture will be studied with a racial lens. By seeing how civil asset forfeiture affects different demographic groups, this study adds to the overall study of institutionalized racism and institutionalized bias that many social science scholars see in societal, economic and political institutions in the modern United States.

A Note about the Data

This study uses census data information to study the demographics of Pennsylvania. By using census data reported by the government, this study is more objective, and many scholarly studies in many disciplines use census data

the same this way. This study also uses the Attorney General of Pennsylvania's aggregate data on civil asset forfeiture. The data in Pennsylvania is collected at the county level and then the Attorney General makes report that compiles all the county reports. This is being used because it is all that exists for civil asset forfeiture data since it is up to the states to write laws about reporting the data. Also, since it is from the government it should be the most accurate and objective data published about civil asset forfeiture.

The unit of analysis used in this study is total dollar amount of seizures. This research, will not be looking into police encounters, arrests or even searches, but will be using only civil asset forfeitures that happened and were reported by the police department and PA state government. Thus this study will use the entire population, or amount, of civil asset forfeitures in USD in Pennsylvania. After the necessary data is collected, it will be entered by county and a rate by which civil asset forfeitures happen compared to population size will be calculated. Then a statistical analysis to see what counties or precincts have the statistically significant amount more of civil asset forfeitures than other counties will be ran. Then a regression analysis on these counties to test the dependent variables and see if any are statistically significant will be run. This helps to find a correlation or even causation between variables like race and income level as pertaining to civil asset forfeitures.

One challenge of this study is that there is little public information about civil asset forfeitures. Some states require publication of the data online, but others, like PA, only require aggregate data to be collected by the state attorney

general. This information then can only be made available by public information request which adequate instructions do not exist online to even start the process. Also, when calling the AG's office information requesters are referred to several extensions and nobody seems to be able to help. Also, the data is whatever the attorney general wants to give. It is organized by county so all my other data must be at the county level. This means the entire study relies on what type of information is reported to the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office.

Civil asset forfeiture data is collected at the county level and then reported to the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office. Each individual police department within a county keep their own civil asset forfeiture records. These records are then compiled into a county wide aggregate report and the Attorney General collects these reports from each county. There are only two laws in the state of Pennsylvania that allow civil asset forfeiture. One is called the Chop Shop law, and it pertains to the search and seizure of automotive parts that are suspected of being stolen or used in a crime relating to a chop shop. A chop shop is a criminal business that steals vehicles and then disassembles the vehicles to sell in parts and pieces on the black market. It is incredibly rare for police to exercise their civil asset forfeiture powers under the Chop Shop Law. In 2016, only around \$130,000 was seized. Only five counties even reported under the chop shop law. The vast majority, \$15 million, is seized by police under the Drug Enforcement Act. This law allows Pennsylvania police to seize any amount or type of property, including cash, if the property is suspected of being used to commit a crime. Every county in Pennsylvania expect three reported civil asset seizures under the

drug enforcement program. This reported data is broken up into cash forfeitures and the value of non-currency assets that police departments seize and sell at auction. The descriptions of sold assets are incredibly lacking. Some of the descriptions are only one word that vaguely identify the item like: electronics, or vehicles. This makes it unclear exactly what police are seizing and selling, but the dollar value is reported for all sales. The report also includes a breakdown of how the money collected from civil asset forfeiture is used. Most of the categories are vague like: equipment, or municipal police funding. This makes it difficult to discern exactly what police departments are spending their civil seizure funds on. Also, it is clear that police bonuses, community drug programs, and municipal police funding combined receive around 90% of all civil seizure funds. This study will use this data and compare it to U.S. Census data to analyze the relationship between civil asset forfeiture and race, politics, and class.

The U.S. census data, found on the Census website, includes racial makeup, income and wealth data, and population estimates. This data is collected every 10 years by the federal government. This data is collected nationwide, and detailed state breakdowns by county or municipality are also generated. This made it quite easy to compare with the civil asset forfeiture data obtained through the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office.

Limitations of the Study


One limit of the study is that it only examines PA, so the study does not necessarily apply to other states. The purpose of the study is to take a diverse area like PA with rural and urban centers and see how demographics influence

civil asset forfeiture. Another limit is that there could be a better way to operationalize political affiliation than by county but since civil asset forfeiture data is reported at the county level it requires political affiliation be assessed at the county level. Also, by only using a statistical quantitative analysis there is no way to understand the thinking that police officers go through when deciding whether or not to seize assets. Also, it is hard to tell if certain police departments urge their officers to refrain from civil asset forfeiture. This makes a study based on the qualitative aspects of civil asset forfeiture to better understand the reasoning behind officer's decision to seize assets or not.

Understanding Pennsylvania

Source: Smart Sync

<http://smartsync.me/pennsylvania-political-map-by-county/pennsylvania-political-map-by-county-pa-counties-of/>




The above map shows the political breakdown of Pennsylvania. The most striking feature of the map is that it creates a T shape with Republican areas in the South Central and Northern areas of the state while Democratic counties are on the far East and West side of the state. This T shape is prevalent in many demographic areas. First, the T shape is seen when looking at what counties in Pennsylvania have large African American populations. In that case, the current blue areas of the map are also the areas that contain large amounts of African Americans. Violent crime also tends to be higher in the blue areas of the above map than in the rural areas. The geography of the Red areas of the T shape are mainly rural areas while the blue portions are urban Democratic strongholds.

Pennsylvania Demographics and Politics

According to U.S. Census data, of Pennsylvania's 12,784,227 citizens, 11.92% are African-American while 77% are white non-hispanic, with 12.9% of the population living in poverty (U.S. Census). Most counties in the state have an African-American population of around 7%-13%, except for Philadelphia and Delaware counties, which surround the PA's largest city Philadelphia that have 44.2% and 21.7% African-American populations respectively (U.S. Census).

Also, of the sixty-seven counties in Pennsylvania only twelve have a population




greater than 276,000- residents, and nine of these counties lie to the Southeast surrounding Philadelphia (U.S. Census). To summarize, most of Pennsylvania is white and rural with small racially diverse urban centers surrounded by open farmland. Most of the racial minority population lives in Philadelphia, the largest urban center in PA, and, also, happens to be the sixth largest city in the country. Furthermore, Philadelphia County has the highest rate of poverty in Pennsylvania at 25% (U.S. Census), and the highest African-American population. These areas that tend to have large minority populations are controlled by Democratic politicians.

The counties surrounding Philadelphia, mainly Philadelphia County, have the highest numbers of people of social and health care assistance programs in Pennsylvania (U.S. Census). Furthermore, Philadelphia has the lowest median income at around \$38,000 then any county in PA, and well below the national average of

\$50,000 (U.S. Census). This shows that there is a large amount of income inequality in Pennsylvania with the more urban areas of Philadelphia being much poorer than most of the rural state. Also, according to Pennsylvania's own crime reporting system, Philadelphia County has the highest rates of arrest in Pennsylvania. This means that there are inequalities in Pennsylvania when it comes to income, crime, and where persons of color live. These inequalities center on Philadelphia, so it is clear that in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia looks much different than the rest of the commonwealth.

Pennsylvania has stricter civil asset forfeiture laws than many states, but law enforcement in Pennsylvania still seized millions of dollars in assets a year. Politically, Pennsylvania has been described as a Philadelphia and Pittsburgh with Texas in middle, meaning there are a few liberal and Democratic pockets but most of the state is conservative. Pennsylvania is politically interesting because there is currently a divided government with a Democratic Governor and a Republican led state legislature. Similarly, Pennsylvania has one Republican Senator and One Democratic

Senator, but state politics tend to favor Republicans. Republicans hold a




supermajority, 34 of 50 seats in the Senate and a simple majority in the Pennsylvania House. At the same time a Republican governor was voted out of office last gubernatorial election and a Democrat, Tom Wolf was elected. This shows how political diverse Pennsylvania can be depending on what county is being examined. A county like York is staunchly Republican and filled with Trump signs, but less than two hours east and there is the liberal bastion of Delaware and Philadelphia counties in Southeastern Pennsylvania. All these factors that explain the social makeup of Pennsylvania can be divided into rural and urban. Poverty in Pennsylvania is largely an urban issue. Large minority populations are only prevalent in large urban centers. The Republican Party controls the rural areas and Democratic Party governs over the urban areas. The breakdown of crime in these areas is found in the table below.

Findings


The 67 counties in the state of Pennsylvania vary greatly in terms of amount of civil asset forfeitures. There are some counties, like Forest and Fulton that did not seize a single dollar worth of assets throughout the 2016 fiscal year. Delaware County seized over \$1 million, and Philadelphia twice that. Forest and Fulton are two of the most rural and least populated counties in Pennsylvania, and Philadelphia and Delaware are two of the most populous. To better compare forfeiture amounts between counties, a forfeiture rate found by dividing total assets seized by the population in a county.

The first glaring finding is that, in Democratic counties, every variable or factor being studied in relation to civil asset forfeiture is higher in value. This means the Democratic counties seize more assets, spend more of their seized assets, have higher populations of minorities and impoverished residents, spent more on community drug programs, give higher police bonuses, and have a higher median income. It is clear that there is not a strong correlation solely between party in power and amount of civil asset forfeitures.

Rural and Urban Relationship



Source: PA Attorney General



The divide becomes clear when examining urban and rural counties. This divide is also largely on party lines. The average amount of civil asset forfeiture

for rural counties is a total of \$39,063.55 while urban average civil asset forfeiture amount is \$540,481.60. These are vastly different numbers. The spending of seized assets is equally divided by urban and rural counties. In rural counties, the average of \$12,348.37 was spent on community drug fighting programs. In Urban counties, this number is \$64,028.82. Rural counties give \$15,278.92 in police bonuses while urban counties give a staggering \$110,347.80 on average.

Throughout the entire state of Pennsylvania,

Counties spend most their seized asset dollars on police equipment and salary bonuses to officers. More Republican counties than Democratic counties give police bonuses, but Democrats on average give more than double the amount of money than the Republican counties. This is probably because the Democratic counties seize assets at a much higher rate than the Republican counties.

Nevertheless, more seized assets go to police salary bonuses than programs to mitigate drug issues in communities. These urban counties also tend to much larger percentages of African-American residents: 13.7% compared to 3.9% in more rural areas. Critical race theory and criminal justice literature offers insights into this. Much of the reviewed criminal justice literature for this study shows that police treat African Americans differently than white people. A finding that is echoed in this study. The urban areas that have huge amounts of civil asset forfeiture are the same areas that have high amounts of African American citizens.

The most important finding is how different the rates of civil asset forfeiture are between rural and urban counties. The low range for the mean of urban counties

is still higher than that of the mean for rural counties. This means that, considering all the data, whether a person lives in an urban or rural county is the best factor to predict the civil asset forfeiture amount in that county.



- <https://www.pittsburghdefenselawyers.com/blog/2017/03/dangerous-cities-pennsylvania/>

The above map shows where violent crime is especially bad in Pennsylvania. The concentration of areas with high levels of violent crime are mostly located in Democratic districts, the city of Erie and York being Republican outliers in cities controlled by Democrats. Also, both of those cities have Democratic municipal administrations. The most glaring finding is that these areas all have higher than average civil asset forfeiture rates in Pennsylvania. The factors that lead an area to have more civil asset forfeitures are all tied to the urban and rural divide. Those living in cities have much more exposure to those living in the country. The shape of this graph creates a T shape much like the political graph. The T shape is much less pronounced in the violent crime map

than in the political map, but it is still there. This T shape is also seen in the distribution of African American citizens in the state of Pennsylvania. The same areas that are Democratic in the political map are the same areas that have large amounts of African American citizens and greater incidents of violent crime. These same areas are also urban areas. These areas also happen to have, by far, the highest rate of civil asset forfeitures than any other place in Pennsylvania.

Discussion

Many of the variables in the study showed a clear statistically significant relationship. The variable of the percentage of a county's population that is African American was largely divided by an urban and rural split. The urban areas of Pennsylvania have much larger percentages of African Americans than the rural areas. Urban areas tend to be Democratic and rural areas Republican. Relevant critical race theory literature, concurs that African Americans tend to have more encounters with police that lead to more arrests and more civil asset forfeitures. Urban areas tend to have larger impoverished populations, and criminal justice literature shows that poorer citizens have more negative encounters with the police. Urban areas in Pennsylvania tend to be more Democratic and rural areas more Republican, like political opinion literature has held for decades. In this study, the Urban and classification is the best possible explanation for the increase in civil asset forfeiture in some area.

Seized assets are spent by counties in different ways. Some put all of their civil asset funds into police and municipal budgets. Some spend the majority of their seized dollars on community drug abuse prevention programs or police bonuses. Criminal justice literature has shown that police are using civil asset forfeiture as a way to fill out police budgets. Especially following the Great Recession in 2008, many police departments do not have the funding they want. Instead of cutting officers and instituting other budget restraints, a lot of police departments ramped up their civil asset forfeiture programs. If police have built in civil asset forfeitures to their yearly budgets, then that puts immense pressure on officers to seize assets. There may be lay-offs or pay cuts if they do not. This explains why community drug prevention programs are not a focus of these counties. These counties are spending the seized assets on either police resources or they are offering their officers pay bonuses. If undercover police officers have admitted to seizing assets they know were not used in a crime but it could help their budgets, then it is entirely plausible that many departments urge their officers to do the same thing.

Criminal justice literature and critical race theory discuss how police officers treat African Americans differently than white people. This literature includes interviews with police officers admitting this to supplement decades' worth of policing data that show how police target minority populations. In Pennsylvania, the areas that have large African American and minority populations experience far greater rates of civil asset forfeiture than areas mainly consisting of white people. Many rural counties do not even take part in civil

asset forfeiture and they are all counties with even lower than average size for Pennsylvania of African American citizens. This is interesting because the explanation for increased civil asset forfeiture in some areas is complex. Yes, there tends to be more seizures in urban areas, but these areas also have large populations of African Americans.

On truth is evident: In Pennsylvania urban areas experience higher rates of civil asset forfeiture than rural areas. Furthermore, these areas are largely, if not entirely, under Democratic control. It is ironic that Democratic controlled states across the country have enacted policies to curb civil asset forfeiture. Democrats in the Congress even put up a political fight to stop the passage of laws that greatly increased police freedoms to seize assets. All this, while in Pennsylvania, the areas that mainly use civil asset forfeiture are all Democratic strongholds. This is happening right in Democrat's backyards. This contradicts most of the political science and legal research that argues that extensive civil asset forfeiture is largely a Republican practice. This is not at all true in Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, the Democrats are seizing assets from the vulnerable people identified in criminal justice literature. This could be a result of the literature focusing on studying civil asset forfeiture nationwide. The variances in state laws and demographics make nationwide civil asset forfeiture data misleading. When looking at a single state, with largely consistent legal restrictions on civil asset forfeiture, the only variables changing are social, economic, and political factors. Additionally, the findings of this study contradict political science literature that shows that Democrats largely attempt to protect those that are the most

vulnerable in their communities. Democratic counties in Pennsylvania could instruct their police departments to lower their rates of civil asset forfeiture. The Democratic Governor of Pennsylvania could even use his bully pulpit to urge the Pennsylvania State Legislature to pass a law restricting the use of civil asset forfeiture. None of this is being done, and these urban Democratic counties make on average over \$500,000 every single year from the use of civil seizures and that number is not decreasing.

Conclusion

Civil asset forfeiture is important to study because it is not a uniform practice. Different people in different areas have varying risks of civil asset forfeiture. An African American living in an urban area has much more of a chance to have his assets seized than a white man living in upstate, rural Pennsylvania. The American criminal justice system prides itself on being fair. American political figures have long talked about equality in all levels of society, but the literature and the data show clearly that the American criminal justice system is not fair. America's war on drugs has been plagued with racial inequalities and over policing. Another tentacle of the war on drugs is civil asset forfeiture laws that seize innocent person's assets based on suspicions that the assets were used to commit a drug crime. This is having a disparate impact on urban communities, and, especially, urban communities of color. This study has found that the disparate impact on urban communities to be accurate. This study also found that Democrats are the first ones to rail against civil asset forfeiture in

a political setting, but they do not change any laws or policies to work towards ending it in areas that they control. In Pennsylvania, it is on the Democrats to reform civil asset forfeiture, and begin to dismantle the inequities in the American criminal justice system.

The limits of this study illustrate perfect opportunities to future studies. A study that compares different urban areas within a state would allow greater understandings of the racial and socioeconomic factors that are prevalent in civil asset forfeiture. Cities have varying amounts of wealth and minority populations, and are also controlled by different political parties. A study like this would show how different cities are impacted by civil asset forfeiture. Furthermore, a study that examines different neighborhoods within a single city would provide insight into the demographics of civil asset forfeiture. Neighborhoods in cities are largely homogenous. This means that there will be neighborhoods with large amounts of African Americans and some entirely white. Some precincts may be more Republican than others, and some precincts will have large numbers of poor citizens. Seeing how police use civil asset forfeiture in these different neighborhoods would show how race and income influence civil seizures.

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Appendix A

This is the complete table generated to analyze civil asset forfeiture data in Pennsylvania. It is included to encourage as many future studies as possible.

Cou nty	Pa rty	Urban /Rural /Subu rban	Me din Inc om e in Do llar s	% in pove rty	% African- America n	Po pul ati on ov er 27 6, 20 7	Ass ets sei zed	Ass et Seiz ure Exp ens es	Com mnit y Drug Prog rams	Poli ce Ben efits extr a Co mp ens atio n	Fo rfe itu re R at e
Ada ms	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	60, 35 6	8.5	1.9	no	\$62 ,70 1.3 3	\$60, 275. 25	\$0	\$16 ,00 0	\$0 .1 2

Alle ghe ny	De mo cra t	Urban	53, 04 0	12.2	13.4		ye s	976 ,25 0.5 6	565, 971. 50	176, 509. 28	92, 446 .90	\$0 .4 6
Arm stro ng	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	44, 94 2	12.6	0.9		no	22, 844 .08	12,1 73.9 4	\$0	0	\$0 .1 8
Bea ver	Re pu bli ca n	Urban	50, 58 1	13.1	6.3		no	119 ,74 9.4 9	107, 059. 81	\$0	12, 933 .81	\$0 .6 3
Bedf ord	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	45, 93 0	13.9	0.6		no	32, 065 .40	12,6 46.5 6	1,00 0	0	\$0 .2 6
Berk s	Re pu bli	Urban	55, 93 6	12.6	7		ye s	413 ,59 3.4 4	593, 593. 58	18,2 43.9 8	91, 933 .53	\$1 .4 3

	ca n											
Blair	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	43, 98 1	15.3	1.8		no	88, 105 .01	74,9 06.0 9	1,60 0	17, 089 .67	\$0 .6 0
Bra dfor d	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	49, 98 7	13	0.7		no	5,4 42. 59	194. 00	\$0	160 .00	\$0 .0 8
Buc ks	De mo cra t	Urban	77, 56 8	6.3	4.2		ye s	418 ,66 2.1 4	678, 118. 09	\$22, 500	2,0 58	\$1 .0 8
Butl er	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	60, 93 4	9.5	1.2		no	46, 762 .22	23,0 42.4 5	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .1 2

Ca mbria	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	42, 10 7	14.9	3.6		no	32, 507 .65	49,6 53.6 8	9,28 0.10	0.0 0	\$0 .3 6
Ca mer on	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	39, 89 7	13.3	0.5		no	5,4 12	0.00	\$0	0.0 0	\$1 .1 4
Car bon	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	49, 97 3	11.5	2		no	7,1 57. 44	12,6 03.4 1	\$0	1,4 94. 74	\$0 .1 1
Cen tre	De mo cra t	Rural	52, 18 6	16.1	3.7		no	482 ,42 2.8 1	61,1 22.0 1	\$0	17, 087 .50	\$3 .0 0
Che ster	De mo cra t	Urban	85, 97 6	6	6.3		ye s	83, 631 .26	187, 417. 95	10,0 00	129 ,87 8.0 1	\$0 .1 6

Clari on	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	42, 53 6	17.4	1.3		no	19, 539 .50	12,1 97.0 1	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .4 9
Clea rfiel d	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	42, 25 7	16.6	2.9		no	210 .00	2,48 8.25	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .0 3
Clint on	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	45, 07 8	16	1.6		no	13, 097 .68	3,40 2.75	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .0 2
Colu mbi a	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	45, 37 4	15	2.1		no	8,7 75. 18	33,8 13.9 6	\$100	11, 109 .09	\$0 .1 3
Cra wfor d	Re pu bli	Rural	44, 57 9	15.3	1.9		no	5,6 94. 25	2,74 1.60	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .0 6

	ca n											
Cumbe rlan d	Re pu bli ca n	Urban	61, 82 0	7.3	4		ye s	224 ,42 8.5 0	244, 091. 56	\$0	91, 667 .23	\$0 .9 1
Dau phin	De mo cra t	Urban	53, 75 4	13.6	19		ye s	422 ,39 2.6 4	370, 876. 56	\$500	66, 103 .37	\$1 .5 5
Dela war e	De mo cra t	Urban	65, 12 3	10.4	21.7		ye s	1,1 00, 139 .00	399, 598 20	56,2	0.0 0	\$1 .9 5
Elk	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	46, 67 1	9.3	0.5		no	28, 737 .03	1,50 0	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .9 3
Erie	Re pu bli	Urban	45, 97 1	17.1	7.7		no	91, 874 .86	44,0 87.4 6	\$0	10, 000	\$0 .3 3

	ca n											
Fayette	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	39, 63 6	20.1	4.7		no	29, 978 .54	82,7 17.5 1	\$0	63, 500	\$0 .2 2
Forest	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	35, 53 3	24.3	20.1		no	0.0 0	0.00	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .0 0
Franklin	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	53, 91 6	9.4	4		no	99, 010 .81	98,3 23.3 5	6,75 2	0.0 0	\$6 .7 7
Fulton	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	48, 31 1	11.6	1.1		no	0.0 0	0.00	\$0	0.0 0	\$0 .0 0

Greene	Republican	Rural	46,661	15.1	3.4		no	1,373.52	1,169.33	\$0	0.00	\$0.04
Huntingdon	Republican	Rural	44,396	14.3	5.6		no	5,116.74	2,265.99	\$0	0.00	\$0.11
Indiana	Republican	Rural	45,195	18.2	2.6		no	1,946.18	0.00	\$0	0.00	\$0.02
Jefferson	Republican	Rural	42,903	14.6	0.5		no	12,374	31,188.8	\$0	6,438.92	\$0.27
Juanita	Republican	Rural	47,398	12.8	0.8		no	604.89	774.50	\$0	0.00	\$0.02

	ca n											
Lac kaw ann a	De mo cra t	Urban	46, 27 1	15.3	3.5		no	104 ,60 4.8 7	293, 919. 67	76,5 00	0.0 0	\$0 .4 9
Lan cast er	Re pu bli ca n	Urban	57, 72 1	10.6	5		ye s	541 ,98 2.1 0	876, 667. 48	180, 638. 38	0.0 0	\$1 .0 1
Law renc e	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	44, 57 1	17.5	4		no	143 ,64 3.2 1	128, 832. 43	5,28 8	652 .97	\$1 .6 3
Leb ano n	Re pu bli ca n	Urban	55, 49 9	11.6	3.4		no	107 ,22 4.4 1	105, 338. 23	0	0.0 0	\$0 .7 8

Lehi gh	De mo cra t	Urban	56, 11 7	12.1	9.1		ye s	357 ,13 8.7 6	452, 838. 72	3,93 5.35	365 ,31 7.6 6	\$0 .9 9
Luz erne	Re pu bli ca n	Urban	45, 89 7	15.1	5.4		ye s	60, 685 .90	64,2 26.4 9	900	0.0 0	\$0 .1 9
Lyc omi ng	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	47, 31 3	14.8	4.7		no	93, 503 .10	75,2 22.8 6	17,6 20.6 3	23, 402 .23	\$0 .8 1
McK ean	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	43, 96 5	16.9	2.8		no	11, 675 .26	15,2 77.1 0	0	0.0 0	\$0 .2 8
Mer cer	Re pu bli	Rural	44, 15 6	14.2	5.9		no	25, 389 .59	19,8 62.7 6	481. 15	0.0 0	\$0 .2 2

	ca n											
Miffli n	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	41, 28 8	15.4	0.9		no	7,4 81. 10	41,0 13.5 6	0	23, 622 .98	\$0 .1 6
Mon roe	De mo cra t	Rural	57, 36 5	12.7	15.5		no	144 ,85 8.3 2	144, 221. 69	1,46 0.20	39, 243 .32	\$0 .8 7
Mon tgo mer y	De mo cra t	Urban	80, 67 5	6.6	9.6		ye s	1,9 23, 770 .61	1,46 0,43 6.98	361, 763. 87	118 ,17 0.0 4	\$2 .3 5
Mon tour	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	54, 64 8	9	1.7		no	45, 201 .96	1,77 1.52	0.00	0.0 0	\$2 .4 3
Not ham pton	Re pu bli	Urban	60, 97 2	8.8	6.5		ye s	207 ,75 57	251, 297. 57	10,5 40	109 ,17	\$6 .7 0

	ca n						9.2 1			6.7 8	
Nort hum berl and	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	42, 40 6	13.1	2.6	no	15, 139 .40	23,6 09.9 6	0.00	0.0 0	\$1 .6 4
Perr y	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	57, 17 7	9.6	0.9	no	318 .25	1,18 9	0.00	0.0 0	\$0 .0 1
Phil adel phia	De mo cra t	Urban	38, 25 3	25.4	44.2	ye s	2,3 28, 082	1,98 2,56 1	0.00	448 ,91 1	\$1 .4 8
Pike	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	60, 18 0	10.9	6.3	no	17, 186	30,8 16.7 7	500. 00	0.0 0	\$0 .3 1

Pott er	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	40, 65 4	14.3	0.5		no	2.1 2	2,25 0	1,70 0	0.0 0	\$0 .0 0
Sch uylki ll	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	45, 53 5	13	3.2		no	38, 156 .53	51,1 02.3 4	0.00	0.0 0	\$0 .2 6
Sny der	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	49, 91 7	11.7	1.3		no	40, 765 .47	7,43 5.75	145, 819. 00	0.0 0	\$1 .0 1
Som erse t	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	44, 58 7	14.4	2.9		no	0.0 0	810. 00	0.00	0.0 0	\$0 .0 0
Sulli van	Re pu bli	Rural	44, 18 9	13.5	3.5		no	0.0 0	0.00	0.00	0.0 0	\$0 .0 0

	ca n											
Sus que han na	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	50, 47 7	12.6	0.6		no	1,7 92. 77	11,7 16.7 7	2,24 9.21	0.0 0	\$0 .1 2
Tiog a	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	46, 49 4	13.1	0.8		no	0.0 0	0.00	0.00	0.0 0	\$0 .0 0
Unio n	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	49, 80 3	12.4	8.1		no	13, 196 .24	6,91 9.62	0.00	0.0 0	\$0 .2 9
Ven ang o	Re pu bli ca n	Rural	43, 64 4	13.5	1.2		no	3,0 25. 87	2,10 2.75	0.00	0.0 0	\$0 .0 6

Warren	Republican	Rural	44,020	12.2	0.5		no	1.24	6,244.43	0.00	1,382.43	\$0.00
Washington	Republican	Rural	56,450	10.1	3.2		no	73,885.61	61,251.21	3.655.16	0.00	\$0.35
Wayne	Republican	Rural	49,919	13.3	3.7		no	22,392.58	42,386.53	11,666.81	0.00	\$0.44
Westmoreland	Republican	Urban	52,247	11.3	2.5		yes	246,699.81	136,934.07	750.00	0.00	\$0.69
Wyoming	Republican	Rural	51,004	11.1	0.9		no	9,302.77	12,200.62	750.00	8,000.00	\$0.33

	ca n											
York	Re pu bli ca n	Urban	58, 26 9	10.4	6.7		ye s	763 ,49. 49	725, 769. 96	11,7 31.1 3	6,2 72. 69	\$1 .7 2