Regulatory enforcement, politics, and institutional distance: OSHA inspections 1990-2010

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Regulatory Enforcement, Politics, and Institutional Distance OSHA Inspections 1990-2010.pdf (1.31 MB)

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https://ideas.repec.org/p/tow/wpaper/2012-02.html

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http://hdl.handle.net/11603/10758

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Towson University Department of Economics Working Paper Series

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Author/Creator ORCID

Date

2013-04-25

Type of Work

working papers
Text
application/pdf

Department

Towson University. Department of Economics

Program

Citation of Original Publication

Juergen Jung & Michael D. Makowsky, 2012. "Regulatory Enforcement, Politics, and Institutional Distance: OSHA Inspections 1990-2010," Working Papers 2012-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2013.

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Subjects

Regulation
Enforcement
Industrial safety
Decentralization
United States. Occupational Safety and Health Agency

Abstract

We explore the determinants of inspection outcomes across 1.6 million Occupational Safety and Health Agency audits from 1990 through 2010. We find that discretion in enforcement differs in state and federally conducted inspections. State agencies are more sensitive to local economic conditions, finding fewer standard violations and fewer serious violations as unemployment increases. Larger companies receive greater lenience in multiple dimensions. Inspector issued fines and final fines, after negotiated reductions, are both smaller during Republican presidencies. Quantile regression analysis reveals that Presidential and Congressional party affiliations have their greatest impact on the largest negotiated reductions in fines.