Data Integrity Attack in Smart Grid: Optimized Attack to Gain Monetary Economic Profit
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2016-12-08
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Kush Khanna, Bijaya Ketan Panigrahi, and Anupam Joshi, Data Integrity Attack in Smart Grid: Optimized Attack to Gain Monetary Economic Profit, IET Transactions on Generation, Transmission and Distribution, 2016, DOI : 10.1049/iet-gtd.2016.0350
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This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution and is subject to Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at the IET Digital Library.
This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution and is subject to Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at the IET Digital Library.
Abstract
The cyber-physical security of power grid has gained more attention in the research community due to integration of information and communication technologies. Smart meters are vulnerable to cyber-threats and if the security of these meters are compromised then the consequence can be devastating. It is necessary to study all the possible impacts that cyber-attacks may have on the power grid in order to make the grid immune to such intrusions. With more and more renewable energy and information technology integration, electricity companies must make sure that they are not paying for spoofed electricity. In this paper, we are proposing a new attack through which a private actor injects false data into multiple meters to deceive the system operator with new modified system state to gain momentary profit by projecting higher energy export than actual. Assuming real power injection measurement to be secured at all the generator buses, the attack is simulated for IEEE 14 bus and IEEE 30 bus system. From the system operator’s perspective, the most vulnerable buses are obtained and ranked based on the severity and minimum set of meters required to launch an attack