Feasibility and mitigation of false data injection attacks in smart grid
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2016-10-06
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Kush Khanna and Anupam Joshi, Feasibility and mitigation of false data injection attacks in smart grid, 2016 IEEE 6th International Conference on Power Systems (ICPS) , DOI: 10.1109/ICPES.2016.7584204
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© 2016 IEEE
© 2016 IEEE
Abstract
The power grid is evolving rapidly. With the addition of micro-grids and renewable energy resources, and increasing automation in decision-making enabled by sensors, the grid has become very complex. Research in the area of smart grids shows that the grid is vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In particular, recent studies reveals how false data injection could lead to variety of problems in the smart grid operation. A well-crafted attack can pass the bad data detection systems during state estimation and affect the operation and control of the power grid. In this paper, we build on prior efforts in this space to describe how false data injection attacks can be alleviated using conventional techniques by protecting certain critical sensors in the power system. The feasibility of false data injection attacks with incomplete network knowledge is explained in this paper considering IEEE 14 bus test system. The assumptions for defining the attacking region are also validated with the help of different case studies. This paper depicts the importance of securing the power grid against cyber-attacks.