Origination Channel, Prepayment Penalties, and Default

Author/Creator

Author/Creator ORCID

Date

2012-01-18

Department

Program

Citation of Original Publication

Morgan J. Rose, Origination Channel, Prepayment Penalties and Default, Real Estate Economics, Volume40, Issue4 Winter 2012 Pages 663-708, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2011.00328.x

Rights

This item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Morgan J. Rose, Origination Channel, Prepayment Penalties and Default, Real Estate Economics, Volume40, Issue4 Winter 2012 Pages 663-708, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2011.00328.x, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2011.00328.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.

Subjects

Abstract

This article presents evidence that nonbankā€originated subprime mortgages have a higher probability of default than bankā€originated subprime mortgages, but only for loans with prepayment penalties. Evidence also indicates that nonbanks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks do, and nonbanks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties in locales with less financially sophisticated borrowers. State antipredatory lending law provisions restricting the use of prepayment penalties eliminate the elevated default risk of nonbank originations relative to bank originations. These findings are consistent with incentives generated by nonbank compensation via yield spread premiums on loans with prepayment penalties.