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dc.contributor.authorRose, Morgan Joseph
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-09T16:07:16Z
dc.date.available2020-07-09T16:07:16Z
dc.date.issued2004-10
dc.description.abstractPrevious analyses of the relationship between board structure and firm performance have not considered how that relationship is affected by external ownership concentration. This paper illustrates how, as a result of this omission, estimates of the impact of staggered boards on firm performance have been biased downward. Including external ownership concentration also allows for the first time an examination of the interactions of that variable and board structure, permitting more informative empirical tests of whether, and in what circumstances, effective staggered boards (ESBs) benefit shareholders. Evidence from those tests is consistent with the hypothesis that ESBs represent credible commitments on the part of shareholders not to act opportunistically, and so enhance firm performance.en_US
dc.format.extent54 pagesen_US
dc.genreconference papers and proceedings preprintsen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/m2sn96-gdtd
dc.identifier.citationMorgan Joseph Rose, A Lapse of Concentration: Omitted Variables, Board Structure and Firm Performance, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/82db/9b12afaeb3e45c071348de27f880ed3e1409.pdf?_ga=2.74164816.394368685.1593545506-2145448185.1585330375en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/19090
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Economics Department Collection
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.titleA Lapse of Concentration Omitted Variables, Board Structure and Firm Performanceen_US
dc.typeTexten_US


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