Lee, Joonho2024-10-282024-10-282024-09-18Lee, Joonho. “Temptation in Mengzi 1A7.” Dao, September 18, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-024-09956-5.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-024-09956-5http://hdl.handle.net/11603/36741The harmony thesis about a virtuous person, widely held by neo-Aristotelians, supposes that someone highly vulnerable to temptation is not virtuous at all. However, is that the only plausible picture of a virtuous person’s psychology? This essay aims to offer an alternative picture by discussing the account of virtue in the thought of Mengzi 孟子 and his conception of moral exemplars. First, I analyze the Mengzian moral exemplar as depicted in Mengzi 1A7—specifically, the susceptibility of the nobleman (junzi 君子) to compassion and the relevant temptation. Then, I explain how this differs from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories. This passage shows that there is a certain price to being virtuous in Mengzi’s virtue theory. By examining various ways of addressing this challenge, I explore Mengzi’s solution to it, which will shed light on Mengzi’s own way of specifying virtue and its significant advantage as a potential alternative to certain other approaches.20 pagesen-USAttribution 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 Deedhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/CompassionNeo-AristotelianismVirtue ethicsMengzi 孟子Moral exemplarsTemptationText