Browsing by Author "Essex, Aleksander"
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Item Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy(2009-11-03) Carback, Richard; Chaum, David; Clark, Jeremy; Conway, John; Essex, Aleksander; Herrnson, Paul S.; Mayberry, Travis; Popoveniuc, Stefan; Rivest, Ronald L.; Shen, Emily; Sherman, Alan T.; Vora, Poorvi L.On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Maryland, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members using the Scantegrity II voting system—the first time any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy has been used in a binding governmental election. This case study describes the various efforts that went into the election—including the improved design and implementation of the voting system, streamlined procedures, agreements with the city, and assessments of the experiences of voters and poll workers. The election, with 1728 voters from six wards, involved paper ballots with invisible-ink confirmation codes, instant-runoff voting with write-ins, early and absentee (mail-in) voting, dual-language ballots, provisional ballots, privacy sleeves, any-which-way scanning with parallel conventional desktop scanners, end-to-end verifiability based on optional web-based voter verification of votes cast, a full hand recount, thresholded authorities, three independent outside auditors, fully-disclosed software, and exit surveys for voters and pollworkers. Despite some glitches, the use of Scantegrity II was a success, demonstrating that E2E cryptographic voting systems can be effectively used and accepted by the general public.Item Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability for Optical Scan Election Systems using Invisible Ink Confirmation Codes(2008-07-01) Chaum, David; Carback, Richard; Clark, Jeremy; Essex, Aleksander; Popoveniuc, Stefan; Rivest, Ronald L.; Ryan, Peter Y. A.; Shen, Emily; Sherman, Alan T.We introduce Scantegrity II, a practical enhancement for optical scan voting systems that achieves increased election integrity through the novel use of confirmation codes printed on ballots in invisible ink. Voters mark ballots just as in conventional optical scan but using a special pen that develops the invisible ink. Verifiability of election integrity is end-to-end, allowing voters to check that their votes are correctly included (without revealing their votes) and allowing anyone to check that the tally is computed correctly from the included votes. Unlike in the original Scantegrity, dispute resolution neither relies on paper chits nor requires election officials to recover particular ballot forms. Scantegrity II works with either precinct-based or central scan systems. The basic system has been implemented in open-source Java with off-the-shelf printing equipment and has been tested in a small election. An enhancement to Scantegrity II keeps ballot identification and other unique information that is revealed to the voter in the booth from being learned by persons other than the voter. This modification achieves privacy that is essentially equivalent to that of ordinary paper ballot systems, allowing manual counting and recounting of ballots.