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dc.contributor.authorSherman, Alan T.
dc.contributor.authorFink, Russell A.
dc.contributor.authorCarback, Richard
dc.contributor.authorChaum, David
dc.description.abstractBuilding on lessons learned from the November 2009 Scantegrity II election in Takoma Park, MD, we propose improvements to the Scantegrity II voting system that (1) automatically print trustworthy receipts for easier on-line verification, (2) highlight ballot features including over/under votes to comply with the Help America Vote Act, and (3) achieve full voter verifiability by eliminating print audits. We call the improved voting system Scantegrity III, which features a new ballot style and a special casting station that highlights ballots and prints receipts. Scantegrity III addresses the major limitations of Scantegrity II and delivers the feature most requested by voters and election officials at the Takoma Park election: printing receipts automatically. We present, analyze, and compare three designs for a Scantegrity receipt printer: a simple image duplicator available to voters in an optional separate station before casting; a mark sense translator, connected to the official ballot scanner, which reads encrypted codenumbers printed on the ballot; and the Scantegrity III casting station, which is an embellished mark sense translator. At the Scantegrity III station, voters cast ballots that include both Scantegrity II codes in invisible ink and Scantegrity I codes in conventional ink; this combination of codes enables print audits to be eliminated. We also design a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) enhancement to bolster privacy, to store keys and verification codes, and to ensure that the correct software is booted. Election integrity does not depend on the correct operation of the TPM. Receipt printers reduce the amount of special voter instruction required, improve accessibility, enable each voter to detect if any additional mark is added to her ballot after casting, and make vote verification easier.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipWe appreciate helpful comments from Josiah Dykstra, Christopher Nguyen, Ronald Rivest, Vanessa Teague, and the reviewers. Sherman was supported in part by the Department of Defense under IASP grants H98230- 09-1-0404 and H98230-10-1-0359.en_US
dc.format.extent16 pagesen_US
dc.genreconference papers and proceedingsen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Center for Research and Exploration in Space Sciences & Technology II (CRSST II)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.subjectapplied cryptographyen_US
dc.subjectEnd-to-End (E2E) election systemsen_US
dc.subjectprint auditen_US
dc.subjectpunchscan and scantegrity voting systemsen_US
dc.subjectreceipt printersen_US
dc.subjectsecurity engineeringen_US
dc.subjecttrusted platform module (TPM)en_US
dc.subjecttrustworthy computingen_US
dc.titleScantegrity III: Automatic Trustworthy Receipts, Highlighting Over/Under Votes, and Full Voter Verifiabilityen_US

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