LASCA: Learning Assisted Side Channel Delay Analysis for Hardware Trojan Detection
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2020-01-17
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Vakil, Ashkan; Behnia, Farnaz; Mirzaeian, Ali; Homayoun, Houman; Karimi, Naghmeh; Sasan, Avesta; LASCA: Learning Assisted Side Channel Delay Analysis for Hardware Trojan Detection; Cryptography and Security (2020); https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.06476
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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a Learning Assisted Side Channel delay Analysis (LASCA) methodology for Hardware Trojan detection. Our proposed solution, unlike the prior art, does not require a Golden IC. Instead, it trains a Neural Network to act as a process tracking watchdog for correlating the static timing data (produced at design time) to the delay information obtained from clock frequency sweeping (at test time) for the purpose of Trojan detection. Using the LASCA flow, we detect close to 90% of Hardware Trojans in the simulated scenarios.