First Instances in Phylogenic and Ontogenic Selection as Captured by the Verbal Behavior of Scientists and Philosophers of Science
Loading...
Permanent Link
Author/Creator
Author/Creator ORCID
Date
2020
Type of Work
Department
Program
Citation of Original Publication
Stahlman, W. David, Catania, A. Charles (2020) First Instances in Phylogenic and Ontogenic Selection as Captured by the Verbal Behavior of Scientists and Philosophers of Science. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 25-33.
Rights
This item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0)
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0)
Subjects
Abstract
Selectionist sciences such as evolutionary biology and behavior analysis depend on variations. Variations must emerge before environments can act upon them. Yet if first instances in ontogeny are not products of ontogenic selection they are prerequisites for, but not instances of, selection. They count as behavior but not as operant behavior. When Smith (2019) examines how Skinner treats these issues, he relies on snapshots of Skinner's writings over decades, during which Skinner's approach evolved from one anchored in physics as a model science to one increasingly aligned with biology. Skinner's early treatments of the problems of ontogeny and phylogeny differed from his later formulations. Accounts of scientific behavior based only on verbal samples from an evolving scientific corpus typically omit both their antecedents in the laboratory and the research consequences that follow. Furthermore, behavior analytic research has a long history of exploring the sources of novel behavior. Thus, we need not defer to cognitivist views regarding the Problem of the First Instance.