The moral virtue of open-mindedness
Links to Fileshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1335566
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Type of Work23 pages
Citation of Original PublicationSong, Y. The moral virtue of open-mindedness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, v. 48, issue 1,1-20.
This paper gives a new and richer account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main problem with existing accounts is that they derive the moral value of open-mindedness entirely from the epistemic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly intellectualist. I argue that open-mindedness as a moral virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways that are quite independent of its role in correcting our beliefs. I close my discussion by distinguishing open-mindedness from what some might consider its equivalent: empathy and tolerance.