Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games

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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Scott L.
dc.contributor.authorGrofman, Bernard
dc.contributor.authorMiller, Nicholas R.
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-05T18:01:01Z
dc.date.available2021-02-05T18:01:01Z
dc.date.issued2002-04-01
dc.description.abstractA theorem due to McKelvey implies that, if a single agent controls the agenda of a spatial voting game, he can almost always design an agenda that yields whatever voting outcome he wishes. Here we make use of a geometrical construct called the “yolk” to demonstrate the existence of significant limits on such agenda control. We show that the feasibility of agenda control is inversely related to the size of the yolk. In general, there are strong centripetal forces in spatial voting games, which make it much easier to move voting processes in a centrist direction than in non-centrist one. Thus, outcomes of plausible agenda processes will probably be found in the central area of the space.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis research was partially supported by NSF Grant No. SES-85-09997 to B. Grofman. NSF Grant No. SES-85-09680 to N. R. Miller and NSF Grant No. BNS-8011494 to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0895717789904135#!en_US
dc.format.extent12 pagesen_US
dc.genrejournal articlesen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/m2rxmg-bacr
dc.identifier.citationFeld, Scott L.; Grofman, Bernard; Miller, Nicholas R.; Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games; Mathematical and Computer Modelling, Volume 12, Issues 4–5, Pages 405-416 (2002); https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0895717789904135#!en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90413-5
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/20955
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Political Science
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.subjectspatial votingen_US
dc.subjectagenda controlen_US
dc.subjectfeasibilityen_US
dc.subjectcentripetal forcesen_US
dc.subjectcentrist directionen_US
dc.titleLimits on agenda control in spatial voting gamesen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

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