Golden Parachutes, Takeover Probability, and Risk-Taking
| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Dong | |
| dc.contributor.author | Rose, Morgan J. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-08T17:36:22Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-06-08T17:36:22Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper is the first to examine the relationships among golden parachutes (GPs), CEO compensation incentives, and managerial risk-taking. GPs are positively associated with risktaking, but only when controlling for the surprisingly negative interactions of GPs with CEO pay-volatility sensitivity (vega) and with pay-performance sensitivity (delta). These results appear consistent with the takeover probability hypothesis that a GP indicates a higher probability that a firm will be acquired, which increases the divergence between the CEO’s incentives as a manager and as an equity owner. The hypothesis that these results are due to CEO entrenchment is not supported. | en_US |
| dc.description.uri | http://ssrn.com/abstract=1952869 | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 53 pages | en_US |
| dc.genre | journal articles | en_US |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.13016/M2N27W | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Chen, D., & Rose, M. Midwest Finance Association 2013 Annual Meeting, "Golden Parachutes, Takeover Probability, and Risk-Taking," Midwest Finance Association, Chicago, IL. (2013). | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | 10.2139/ssrn.1952869 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11603/3998 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Midwest Finance Association | en_US |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | University of Baltimore | |
| dc.subject | golden parachute | en_US |
| dc.subject | corporate governance | en_US |
| dc.subject | risk-taking | en_US |
| dc.subject | pay-performance sensitivity | en_US |
| dc.subject | pay-volatility sensitivity | en_US |
| dc.subject | delta | en_US |
| dc.subject | vega | en_US |
| dc.subject | takeover probability | en_US |
| dc.title | Golden Parachutes, Takeover Probability, and Risk-Taking | en_US |
| dc.type | Text | en_US |