Comments on Alexander Field: The Economic Consequences of Mobilization for the Second World War

Abstract

Field’s excellent book provides an impressive blend of careful quantification through total factor productivity analysis with a well developed and documented narrative account of key episodes of U.S. mobilization during the second world war. Field’s basic thrust of the book challenging the common view that U.S. mobilization for war constituted an economic miracle or at least a major economic policy success and arguing instead that the U.S. faced major production challenges and inefficiencies is quite convincing. One important issue to consider regards the relevant counterfactuals. Mobilization as such is not a very clearly defined treatment effect. Field’s assessment is appropriately on actual mobilization efforts as conducted. But that assessment poses the question of whether there were better alternatives and if so what were the margins of choice? One issue of interpretation and context concerns the relationship between mobilization for the "hot" second world war and the subsequent deterrence and containment effort of the “cold” war. A more general counterfactual issue concerns alternative forms for mobilization. U.S mobilization involved some mix of private enterprise, civilian government and military officials. Here comparative analysis with how mobilization worked elsewhere both for allied and axis powers would be informative. A final topic raised by Field’s book that warrants further consideration is is the implications of the war effort for profile of both corporate R&D and Federal government R&D. Field’s book deserves a wide readership well beyond specialists in the history of the second world war.