The Conceptual Unity of Dissociation: A Philosophical Argument
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2019-06-29
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Braude, Stephen. The Conceptual Unity of Dissociation: A Philosophical Argument. In Dissociation and the Dissociative Disorders DSM-V and Beyond edited by Paul F. Dell and John A. O'Neil. Routledge, 2015. https://www.routledge.com/Dissociation-and-the-Dissociative-Disorders-DSM-V-and-Beyond/author/p/book/9781138872851
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This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Dissociation and the Dissociative Disorders DSM-V and Beyond on June 29, 2015, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9781138872851
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Abstract
Psychologists and psychiatrists have studied dissociative
phenomena for a long time. However, they demonstrate
surprisingly little agreement about what dissociation is
and about which things exemplify it. Of course, many
agree that certain l orid phenomena count as dissociative—for example, fugue states and DID. But when mental
health professionals tackle the topic of dissociation theoretically and attempt to dei ne it, they do so in ways that
often conl ict with one another, and (perhaps most surprising of all) they tend to overlook a large and important
class of phenomena. Historically—and contrary to what
the recent clinical literature would lead one to believe—
most (if not all) hypnotic phenomena have been regarded
as dissociative (see, e.g., Gauld, 1992; Van der Hart and
Dorahy, 2008). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
researchers into hypnosis were trying to study systematically the same sorts of subconscious mental divisions
they believed occurred spontaneously in hysteria and to
some extent in somnambulism. Indeed, some considered
hypnotically induced systematized anesthesia or negative
hallucination to be paradigm instances of dissociation.
Yet when clinicians now try to analyze dissociation, hypnotic phenomena are largely ignored.
Despite evidence to the contrary (e.g., Crabtree, 1993;
Braude, 1995; Van der Hart & Dorahy, 2008), historians
of psychology usually credit Pierre Janet with having
originated the concept of dissociation, although he regularly used the term désagrégation instead. Janet focused
on a distinctive and relatively limited type of traumainduced psychopathology. He considered dissociation to
be a kind of weakness, a failure (in the face of disturbing
events) to integrate parts of consciousness and maintain
conscious unity.
However, the concept has evolved in the hundred years
since Janet tackled the subject. Subsequent researchers
(e.g., James, Binet, Myers, Liègeois, Sidis) also recognized
an apparent causal link between trauma and dissociative
pathology. But they tended to agree that the processes
Janet was describing from cases of hysteria (which
28 Dissociation and the Dissociative Disorders
included conversion disorder and double consciousness)
were also at work in a wider variety of phenomena, drawn
not just from psychopathology but also from experimental psychology and even everyday life (see, e.g., Binet,
1896; Myers, 1903; Sidis, 1902). And along with that, they
tended to view dissociation not as a weakness, but as a
kind of capacity (not necessarily maladaptive) to sever
familiar links with one’s own mental states.
Signii cantly, this evolution of the concept of dissociation
happened quite rapidly. Other turn-of-the-century researchers, interested at least as much in hypnosis as in psychopathology, were eager to explore the ways in which hypnotic
states seemed to produce a kind of division or doubling of
consciousness, or creation of seemingly autonomous sets
of mental processes (for a quick history of these developments, see Braude, 1995, and Van der Hart & Dorahy,
2008. For a more detailed account, see Gauld, 1992). As
Messerschmidt (1927) eventually made clear, these apparent divisions weren’t as fully autonomous as they seemed.
But that didn’t undermine the view that the phenomena in
question could arise either experimentally or spontaneously
or, for that matter, pathologically or nonpathologically.
These nonpathological (including hypnotic) contexts, in
which the concept of dissociation has historically played
an important role, tend to be neglected by most clinicians.
Given their pressing clinical concerns, perhaps that is not
surprising. Nevertheless, keeping in mind what pathological and nonpathological dissociative phenomena have in
common may bring clarity to other issues, such as the difference (if any) between dissociation and apparently similar or related concepts—in particular, repression.
In a fairly recent development, some clinicians have
examined the concept of dissociation by using diagnostic
surveys (e.g., the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) and
the Multiscale Dissociation Inventory (MDI)) to consider
how dissociative symptoms cluster. These survey instruments were initially designed as screening devices, to assess
the presence or absence of phenomena already believed by
the test designers to be dissociative. However, subsequent
research on thousands of survey results has a more ambitious goal—namely, to determine more precisely what dissociation is. But data of the sort elicited by these surveys
can’t tell us what the concept of dissociation is. To reiterate,
the surveys look only for symptoms antecedently judged as
relevant by their designers, who are limited by their selective grasp of the history of the concept. What they most
clearly tend to neglect are the many nonpathological hypnotic phenomena that have been considered dissociative,
but simply fall outside the purview of the surveys.
In some cases, the studies in question are even more
problematical than these remarks might suggest. For
example, Briere et al. (2005) apply the MDI to determine whether dissociation is a multidimensional construct, and they conclude that it is, and that “the notion
of ‘dissociation’ as a general trait was not supported”
(p. 221). Apparently, then, the authors see themselves as
trying to settle the issue of what sort of thing dissociation
is. Indeed, on the basis of their survey they claim that
“the term dissociation may be a misnomer to the extent
that it implies a single underlying phenomenon” (p. 230).
We’ll consider shortly whether dissociation can in fact
be regarded as a single underlying phenomenon. But for
now, I want only to observe that Briere et al. can’t possibly
have shown that it isn’t (quite apart from concerns about
using survey instruments for conceptual analysis). Briere
et al. purport to uncover what dissociation is on the basis
of a survey that tracks relationships among a handful of
factors—of course, factors they antecedently determined
to be relevant. Moreover, one of those factors is identity
dissociation and, obviously, one can’t analyze the concept
of dissociation by appealing to that very concept. So if
Briere et al. are (as it seems) trying to analyze the concept
of dissociation, their attempt is blatantly circular.
So I believe we need to do some conceptual and methodological housecleaning. I agree with Cardeña (1994;
Prince, 1905) that when clinicians attempt to characterize dissociation, they tend either to exclude too much
or include too much. However (and apparently unlike
Cardeña), I think it may be possible to pull together many
of the varied intuitions about and approaches to dissociation and come up with a single, general, and useful
characterization of dissociation that covers both its pathological and nonpathological forms, including many of
those once deemed important but largely ignored today.
I shall attempt to dei ne a single inclusive concept of
dissociation that rests only on reasonable and recurrent
assumptions distilled from more than a century’s literature on the subject. I start by identifying specii c assumptions underlying typical uses of the term dissociation,
then see if they can be stated plausibly, and then see
whether we can extract from them a dei nition that has
both generality and utility.1