Demo: Disrupting In-Car mmWave Sensing Through IRS Manipulation

dc.contributor.authorGuo, Hanqing
dc.contributor.authorLi, Dong
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Ruofeng
dc.contributor.authorZheng, Yao
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-30T19:22:30Z
dc.date.issued2025-05-01
dc.description46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) San Francisco, CA, USA, May 12-15 2025
dc.description.abstractIntelligent Reflecting Surfaces (IRS) have emerged as a key enabler for enhancing in-car sensing, enabling high-resolution, non-intrusive monitoring of passenger vital signs through mmWave technology. By intelligently steering wireless signals, IRS significantly improves nonline-of-sight (NLoS) detection, overcoming occlusion challenges in vehicle interiors. However, despite these advantages, IRS-based sensing introduces new security vulnerabilities that have been largely over-looked. In this study, we demonstrate that an adversary can manipulate the IRS to mislead in-car sensing results, posing a significant threat to passenger safety and system reliability. By simply modifying the IRS's movement, an attacker can cause incorrect vital sign measurements, and potential failures in safety-critical applications such as child presence detection and driver monitoring systems. To validate this threat, we design and implement four different attack scenarios, simulating various adversarial control strategies on IRS reflection parameters. Our experimental results reveal that, under optimal conditions, an attacker can achieve up to a 90% attack success rate, effectively disrupting the integrity of IRS-assisted in-car sensing systems. Our study provides the first exploration of IRS-based attacks on in-car sensing, shedding light on a novel security vulnerability in next-generation automotive technology. The demo video can be found in https:youtu.be/1VL5LiFgqTg.
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported in part by OAC-2417891, and Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific.
dc.description.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11050793
dc.format.extent3 pages
dc.genreconference papers and proceedings
dc.genrepostprints
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/m2ixqr-jt5o
dc.identifier.citationGuo, Hanqing, Dong Li, Ruofeng Liu, and Yao Zheng. “Demo: Disrupting In-Car mmWave Sensing Through IRS Manipulation,” 226–28. IEEE Computer Society, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW67851.2025.00031.
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/SPW67851.2025.00031
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/39555
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department
dc.rights© 2025 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
dc.titleDemo: Disrupting In-Car mmWave Sensing Through IRS Manipulation
dc.typeText
dcterms.creatorhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-3144-5104

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