Restricting Membership: Assessing Agency Compliance and the Effects of Banning Federal Lobbyists from Executive Branch Advisory Committee Service

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https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/psq.12189

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https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12189
 http://hdl.handle.net/11603/27094

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UMBC Political Science

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https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1645-0914

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2015-04-25

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journal articles
postprints
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Citation of Original Publication

Straus, J.R., Ginsberg, W.R., Mullan, A.K. and Petruzzelli, J.D. (2015), Restricting Membership: Assessing Agency Compliance and the Effects of Banning Federal Lobbyists from Executive Branch Advisory Committee Service. Pres Stud Q, 45: 310-334. https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12189

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This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Straus, J.R., Ginsberg, W.R., Mullan, A.K. and Petruzzelli, J.D. (2015), Restricting Membership: Assessing Agency Compliance and the Effects of Banning Federal Lobbyists from Executive Branch Advisory Committee Service. Pres Stud Q, 45: 310-334. https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12189, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12189. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.

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Abstract

In October 2011, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidelines prohibiting lobbyists from federal advisory committee service. Issued as a corollary to Executive Order 13490—which placed limits on lobbyist's government service—OMB's guidelines suggest that lobbyists have had undue influence over policy making. This article explores limited advisory committee literature and examines lobbyists' potential advisory process influence. Using data on lobbyists who served on advisory committees between 2009 and 2012, the article finds that while lobbyists' service has declined, some continue to serve. To conclude, the article explores first-hand accounts from former advisory committee members to offer some perceived consequences of restricting lobbyist committee service.