Regulatory enforcement, politics, and institutional distance: OSHA inspections 1990-2010

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dc.contributor.authorJung, Juergen
dc.contributor.authorMakowsky, Michael D.
dc.contributor.departmentTowson University. Department of Economicsen
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-16T14:21:15Z
dc.date.available2018-05-16T14:21:15Z
dc.date.issued2013-04-25
dc.date.updated2013-04-25
dc.description.abstractWe explore the determinants of inspection outcomes across 1.6 million Occupational Safety and Health Agency audits from 1990 through 2010. We find that discretion in enforcement differs in state and federally conducted inspections. State agencies are more sensitive to local economic conditions, finding fewer standard violations and fewer serious violations as unemployment increases. Larger companies receive greater lenience in multiple dimensions. Inspector issued fines and final fines, after negotiated reductions, are both smaller during Republican presidencies. Quantile regression analysis reveals that Presidential and Congressional party affiliations have their greatest impact on the largest negotiated reductions in fines.en
dc.description.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/tow/wpaper/2012-02.htmlen
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.format.extent35 pagesen
dc.genreworking papersen
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/M2N29P93D
dc.identifier.citationJuergen Jung & Michael D. Makowsky, 2012. "Regulatory Enforcement, Politics, and Institutional Distance: OSHA Inspections 1990-2010," Working Papers 2012-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2013.en
dc.identifier.otherJEL: K23
dc.identifier.otherJEL: H73
dc.identifier.otherJEL: I18
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/10758
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTowson University. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtTowson University
dc.relation.ispartofseriesTowson University Department of Economics Working Paper Series;2012-02
dc.subjectRegulationen
dc.subjectEnforcementen
dc.subjectIndustrial safetyen
dc.subjectDecentralizationen
dc.subjectUnited States. Occupational Safety and Health Agencyen
dc.titleRegulatory enforcement, politics, and institutional distance: OSHA inspections 1990-2010en
dc.typeTexten

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