Judicial Strict Scrutiny and Administrative Compliance: The Case of Public Contracting Preferences

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dc.contributor.authorLa Noue, George R.
dc.contributor.authorSpeake, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-07T17:13:07Z
dc.date.available2021-01-07T17:13:07Z
dc.date.issued2013-08-28
dc.description.abstractSynopsis What circumstances determine compliance with or resistance to federal judicial rulings in the United States? Compliance may depend on court unanimity, executive branch concurrence, legislative enactment, and stakeholders’ support. Judicial interpretations of the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause and various civil rights statutes made discrimination against minority groups and women illegal. However, they have also functioned as a check against political coalitions that seek to use racial and gender preferences in distributing university admissions, public employment, and public contracting benefits in favor of those groups. In its City of Richmond v. Croson (1989) decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the standard for review of race-based procurement programs was the strict scrutiny test, requiring a government to have a compelling interest and to use the most narrowly tailored means to achieve its goals. Gender based classifications must pass the “exceedingly persuasive justification” test. When Croson was decided there were more than 230 state and local public preferential contracting programs scattered across the country. Since 1989, lower courts made decisions requiring changes in many federal, state and local preferential contracting programs. But what happened after the courts acted? Were the preferential programs permanently suspended or were they continued with only minor changes or were the court decisions simply defied? Using historical, legal, and political science tools, this paper examines the aftermath of judicial rulings for fifteen local, state and federal contracting programs and the factors determining individual outcomes. This analysis will be used to re-examine theories about judicial compliance in the area of public contracting.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://works.bepress.com/george_lanoue/2/en_US
dc.format.extent42 pagesen_US
dc.genreconference papers and proceedingsen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/m2e2tc-4fvu
dc.identifier.citationGeorge R. La Noue and Matthew Speake. "Judicial Strict Scrutiny and Administrative Compliance: The Case of Public Contracting Preferences" ExpressO (2013) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/george_lanoue/2/en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/20361
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherbepressen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Political Science
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC School of Public Policy
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.subjectjudicial complianceen_US
dc.subjectequal protectionen_US
dc.subjectstrict scrutinyen_US
dc.subjectpublic contracingen_US
dc.titleJudicial Strict Scrutiny and Administrative Compliance: The Case of Public Contracting Preferencesen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

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