Information is primary and central to meaning-making

Abstract

There is the misconception that the concept of information is not applicable to meaning-making in living beings. What is more generally believed is that Peircean semiosis provides a more robust framework to explain meaning-making. This involves the production, exchange, and interpretation of signs as the basis for meaning to an organism. Semiosis establishes a continuous and developing occurrence of triadic relations between a representamen (sign), an object (the other), and an interpretant as the organism engages with its umwelt, resulting in the appearance of meaning as a factor in its life. However, it is not clear that Peircean semiosis is the most fundamental process by which meaning-making may be instantiated in nature. Here we show that information defined by Gregory Bateson as ‘a difference which makes a difference’ can more fundamentally serve as a basis for meaning-making. Both its etymological origins and Bateson’s dictum naturalize the concept of information to identify its cybernetic dynamic motivated by constitutive absence, or the ability of an organism to find in its environment what it teleologically deems missing. This implies an ability to interpret its environmental surroundings. Furthermore, detecting a difference is the most fundamental of acts, revealing that information is the basis for meaning-making for an organism, allowing any level of intricacy in its interpretative capabilities. Indeed, Peircean semiosis is shown to be a special case of informatic meaning-making. In short, information provides a firm foundation for meaning-making for living beings.