Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability for Optical Scan Election Systems using Invisible Ink Confirmation Codes

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dc.contributor.authorChaum, David
dc.contributor.authorCarback, Richard
dc.contributor.authorClark, Jeremy
dc.contributor.authorEssex, Aleksander
dc.contributor.authorPopoveniuc, Stefan
dc.contributor.authorRivest, Ronald L.
dc.contributor.authorRyan, Peter Y. A.
dc.contributor.authorShen, Emily
dc.contributor.authorSherman, Alan T.
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-21T16:09:35Z
dc.date.available2019-02-21T16:09:35Z
dc.date.issued2008-07-01
dc.description2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, August 1, 2008, San Jose, CA, United States.en_US
dc.description.abstractWe introduce Scantegrity II, a practical enhancement for optical scan voting systems that achieves increased election integrity through the novel use of confirmation codes printed on ballots in invisible ink. Voters mark ballots just as in conventional optical scan but using a special pen that develops the invisible ink. Verifiability of election integrity is end-to-end, allowing voters to check that their votes are correctly included (without revealing their votes) and allowing anyone to check that the tally is computed correctly from the included votes. Unlike in the original Scantegrity, dispute resolution neither relies on paper chits nor requires election officials to recover particular ballot forms. Scantegrity II works with either precinct-based or central scan systems. The basic system has been implemented in open-source Java with off-the-shelf printing equipment and has been tested in a small election. An enhancement to Scantegrity II keeps ballot identification and other unique information that is revealed to the voter in the booth from being learned by persons other than the voter. This modification achieves privacy that is essentially equivalent to that of ordinary paper ballot systems, allowing manual counting and recounting of ballots.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evt08/tech/full_papers/chaum/chaum_html/index.htmlen_US
dc.format.extent13 pagesen_US
dc.genreconference papers and presentations preprintsen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/m23zj3-ks6e
dc.identifier.citationDavid Chaum, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability for Optical Scan Election Systems using Invisible Ink Confirmation Codes, 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, August 1, 2008, San Jose, CA, United States, https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evt08/tech/full_papers/chaum/chaum_html/index.htmlen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/12837
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Center for Research and Exploration in Space Sciences & Technology II (CRSST II)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.subjectscantegrity IIen_US
dc.subjectoptical scan voting systemsen_US
dc.subjectincreasing election integrityen_US
dc.titleScantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability for Optical Scan Election Systems using Invisible Ink Confirmation Codesen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

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