Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBlake, William D.
dc.contributor.authorCozza, Joseph Francesco
dc.contributor.authorFriesen, Amanda
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-20T15:31:31Z
dc.date.available2021-10-20T15:31:31Z
dc.date.issued2021-09-20
dc.description.abstractWhy are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? Despite the importance of this question to political science and legal theory, there is little consensus regarding the forces that shape constitutional amendments. Some scholars only focus on institutional factors, while others emphasize variations in culture. This paper makes a contribution to both literatures by examining how social capital reduces the transaction costs imposed by amendment rules. We conduct cross-sectional analyses of amendment rates for democratic constitutions globally and time-series analyses of efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution. The results indicate amendment frequency is a product of amendment rules, group membership, civic activism, and levels of social and political trust, but these effects vary across contexts based on the corresponding transaction costs. Our findings suggest social capital can have beneficial effects on social movements that demand constitutional amendments and the political elites and voters who supply them.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/api-gateway/apsa/assets/orp/resource/item/613fad356563690f2b2b2ab3/original/social-capital-institutional-rules-and-constitutional-amendment-rates.pdfen_US
dc.format.extent45 pagesen_US
dc.genrejournal articlesen_US
dc.genrepreprintsen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/m2e9l0-vbv3
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/23133
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Political Science
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.en_US
dc.titleSocial Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Ratesen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
social-capital-institutional-rules-and-constitutional-amendment-rates.pdf
Size:
1.22 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
2.56 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

UMBC Political Science
UMBC Faculty Collection