Pro Forma Disclosures, Audit Fees, and Auditor Resignations

dc.contributor.authorChen, Long
dc.contributor.authorKrishnan, Gopal V
dc.contributor.authorPevzner, Mikhail
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-28T14:37:22Z
dc.date.available2017-06-28T14:37:22Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractThe disclosure of non-GAAP (pro forma) earnings numbers by managers in the post-SOX era continues to attract attention from regulators, media, and researchers. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how auditors view clients that emphasize pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings. We study the extent to which audit fees and auditor resignations are associated with opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures. We find that during the pre-SOX period, optimistic pro forma differences, measured using either IBES actual earnings or hand-collected pro forma earnings, are associated with higher audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignations. Additional results indicate that auditors seem to be more concerned with non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-SOX period.en_US
dc.format.extent21 pagesen_US
dc.genrejournal articlesen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/M2X63B532
dc.identifier.citationChen, L., Krishnan, G., & Pevzner, M. (2012). Pro-Forma Disclosures, Audit Fees, and Auditor Resignations, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(3), 237-257 (lead article).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0278-4254
dc.identifier.uri10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2011.10.008
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/4259
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Baltimore
dc.titlePro Forma Disclosures, Audit Fees, and Auditor Resignationsen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

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