Risk and Reform: Explaining Support for Constitutional Convention Referendums

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dc.contributor.authorBlake, William D.
dc.contributor.authorAnson, Ian G.
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-12T15:29:07Z
dc.date.available2020-06-12T15:29:07Z
dc.date.issued2020-05-14
dc.description.abstractScholars of comparative constitution-making and direct democracy agree that economic conditions affect public support for constitutional reform but disagree as to how. Prospect theory suggests both approaches may be correct, depending on the political and economic context in which voters operate. Fourteen states periodically ask their citizens whether to call a state constitutional convention, making this the oldest form of direct democracy in the United States. We test our theory in pre-election polls in two of these states and a survey experiment. According to the results, negative perceptions of economic and government performance increase support for conventions when voters view them as opportunities to correct problems. On the other hand, if a convention represents a chance to improve on an acceptable status quo, voters with positive performance evaluations become more supportive. Our findings contribute to the heuristics literature and inform normative debates over direct democracy and popular constitutionalism.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1532440020919680?journalCode=spaaen_US
dc.format.extent42 pagesen_US
dc.genrejournal articles postprintsen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/m27kwi-nlv2
dc.identifier.citationBlake, William D., and Ian G. Anson. “Risk and Reform: Explaining Support for Constitutional Convention Referendums.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, (May 2020). doi:10.1177/1532440020919680.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1177/1532440020919680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/18877
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherSAGEen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Political Science
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.rightsWilliam D. Blake and Ian G. Anson, Risk and Reform: Explaining Support for Constitutional Convention Referendums, State Politics & Policy Quarterly . Copyright © 2020 State Politics and Policy Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. DOI:10.1177/1532440020919680.
dc.titleRisk and Reform: Explaining Support for Constitutional Convention Referendumsen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

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