Darwinism and Moral Realism

Abstract

In this paper I analyze David Copp’s argument regarding natural selection and moral realism. Copp’s argument is a response to a significant problem for moral realism raised by Sharon Street, which she calls the Darwinian dilemma. The first section begins by describing Street’s adaptive link account. The second section describes the Darwinian dilemma that Street uses to justify why the existence of Darwinian forces in ethics undercuts moral realism. The third section addresses how Copp believes realists can use both the adaptive link account and an amended version of the tracking horn of the dilemma to come up with what he calls the quasi-tracking account. I will also explain why Copp believes that moral realism is still possible even if the adaptive link account and the Darwinian dilemma are both true. This will require using his society-centered moral theory to explain why our moral beliefs tend to semi-track the moral truth. Finally, the fourth section argues that Copp’s belief that the Darwinian dilemma does not necessitate the rejection of moral realism has a valid ground, but his society centered moral theory does not accomplish its task of justifying the quasi-tracking account. Instead, the account is capable of avoiding the Darwinian dilemma altogether for a very different reason than Copp suggests.