Duopoly Models for Power Trading in Secure Cooperative Relay Networks

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dc.contributor.authorChopra, Khyati
dc.contributor.authorBose, Ranjan
dc.contributor.authorJoshi, Anupam
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-31T17:31:48Z
dc.date.available2018-10-31T17:31:48Z
dc.date.issued2016-09-08
dc.descriptionIEEE National Conference on Communications (NCC 2016)en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we consider a source, in-need of cooperation of a relay due to limited battery power to communicate with the destination, with an eavesdropper tapping the second hop, when all the links undergo Rayleigh fading. Relay nodes are the market players, who compete to trade their power to source in order to maximize their incentives. Asymptotic analysis of the intercept probability is presented when source-relay and relay-destination average SNRs are the same or different. We evaluate the utility of relays in various novel duopoly economic communication models and show that increase in channel gain from relay to eavesdropper, decreases the profit of relays. We also demonstrate that the choice of strategic variable as output or price, can have a dramatic effect on the Nash outcome in an oligopoly interactive market.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7561106en_US
dc.format.extent6 pagesen_US
dc.genreconference papers and proceedings pre-printen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/M2CZ3285P
dc.identifier.citationKhyati Chopra, Ranjan Bose, and Anupam Joshi, Duopoly Models for Power Trading in Secure Cooperative Relay Networks, 2016 Twenty Second National Conference on Communication (NCC), DOI: 10.1109/NCC.2016.7561106en_US
dc.identifier.uri10.1109/NCC.2016.7561106
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/11803
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department Collection
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.rights© 2016 IEEE
dc.subjectBiological system modelingen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectRelay networks (telecommunications)en_US
dc.subjectAnalytical modelsen_US
dc.subjectcooperative communicationen_US
dc.subjecttelecommunication industryen_US
dc.subjectoligopoly interactive marketen_US
dc.subjectUMBC Ebiquity Research Groupen_US
dc.titleDuopoly Models for Power Trading in Secure Cooperative Relay Networksen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

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