Diplomatic Disarray: Exploring American Brinkmanship in Obtaining Russian Compliance with the INF Treaty

Abstract

This research explores why the Trump administration pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by assessing the strategic culture of the United States and Russia to justify the Trump administration’s use of brinkmanship in the INF proceedings. Based on this research, the Trump Administration used brinkmanship as a short-term strategy to obtain the longterm objective of Russian compliance with the INF treaty. Brinkmanship is a method in which two state actors rely on the impending danger of a conflict, typically nuclear, in order to force stability and caution between them. By creating instability through withdrawing from the treaty, enough caution is created to allow the United States time to bring China into the INF and create a multilateral arms agreement. The United States wants to bring China in as it is one of the largest threats to Russian compliance. The probability of China joining that arms agreement is unlikely, but not impossible. However, the downside of brinkmanship is that even though all parties may use the utmost caution, it is the perfect environment for the misperception of threats.