CBM-TI: Code-Based Masking against Glitches by Hybridization with Threshold Implementation

Files

CBMTICodeBasedMaskingagainstGlitchesbyHybridizationwithThresholdImplementation.pdf (1.14 MB)

Links to Files

Permanent Link

http://hdl.handle.net/11603/38926

Collections

UMBC Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department
UMBC Faculty Collection
UMBC Student Collection

Author/Creator

Author/Creator ORCID

https://orcid.org/0009-0000-6776-2542
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5825-6637
 https://orcid.org/0009-0001-3906-6117

Date

2025-04

Type of Work

conference papers and proceedings
preprints
Text

Department

Program

Citation of Original Publication

Rights

This item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.

Subjects

Novel masking scheme (CBMTI)
Leakage detection by T-test
simulations
UMBC Cybersecurity Institute
emulation
Threshold Implementation (TI)
Glitch-resistance
Code-Based Masking (CBM)
High-order side-channel protection

Abstract

Code-Based Masking (CBM) has been introduced to enhance high-order Boolean masking by increasing its resistance order via further decorrelating the coordinates of each symbol involved in the computation. Additionally, CBM enables cost amortization and fault detection. Notably, as demonstrated at CHES 2024, CBM facilitates the computation of provably masked operations under the Strong Non-Interference (SNI) security assumption with quasi-linear complexity. On the other hand, Threshold Implementation (TI) serves as an extension of Boolean masking, armoring it against combinational hazards. In this article, we show that merits of CBM and TI can be combined, paving the way to more secure hardware (high-order) masked implementations. We demonstrate CBM-TI, which is proven secure as well under SNI assumption and security when glitches worsen the leakage model.