Secure Power Trading in Cooperative Relay Network With Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly Model

Links to Files

https://ebiquity.umbc.edu/paper/html/id/807/Secure-Power-Trading-in-Cooperative-Relay-Network-With-Asymmetric-Cournot-Duopoly-Model

Permanent Link

http://hdl.handle.net/11603/11609

Collections

UMBC Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department
UMBC Faculty Collection

Author/Creator

Author/Creator ORCID

Date

2017-05-31

Type of Work

conference paper pre-print
Text

Department

Program

Citation of Original Publication

Rights

This item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.

Subjects

cournot game
decode-forward relay
outage probability
Nash equilibrium
threshold-based
UMBC Ebiquity Research Group

Abstract

Abstract—In this paper, we consider a source, which communicates to destination, with cooperation of a relay node. An eavesdropper is tapping the second hop, when all the links undergo Rayleigh fading. Relay nodes are the market players, who compete to trade their power to source in order to maximize their incentives. We evaluate the secrecy outage probability of a dual-hop decode-and-forward (DF) threshold- based cooperative relay network. Without assuming that all the relays can always perfectly decode, here we consider that only those relays who satisfy predetermined threshold, can correctly decode the message. We evaluate the utility of relays for both linear/non-linear and static/dynamic Cournot duopoly asymmetric model. We have shown that increase in channel gain from relay to eavesdropper, decreases the profit of relays and can have a dramatic effect on the Nash outcome.