Secure Power Trading in Cooperative Relay Network With Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly Model

dc.contributor.authorChopra, Khyati
dc.contributor.authorBose, Ranjan
dc.contributor.authorJoshi, Anupam
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-19T13:32:47Z
dc.date.available2018-10-19T13:32:47Z
dc.date.issued2017-05-31
dc.description12th Annual Symposium On Information Assurance (ASIA’17)en_US
dc.description.abstractAbstract—In this paper, we consider a source, which communicates to destination, with cooperation of a relay node. An eavesdropper is tapping the second hop, when all the links undergo Rayleigh fading. Relay nodes are the market players, who compete to trade their power to source in order to maximize their incentives. We evaluate the secrecy outage probability of a dual-hop decode-and-forward (DF) threshold- based cooperative relay network. Without assuming that all the relays can always perfectly decode, here we consider that only those relays who satisfy predetermined threshold, can correctly decode the message. We evaluate the utility of relays for both linear/non-linear and static/dynamic Cournot duopoly asymmetric model. We have shown that increase in channel gain from relay to eavesdropper, decreases the profit of relays and can have a dramatic effect on the Nash outcome.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://ebiquity.umbc.edu/paper/html/id/807/Secure-Power-Trading-in-Cooperative-Relay-Network-With-Asymmetric-Cournot-Duopoly-Modelen_US
dc.format.extent6 pagesen_US
dc.genreconference paper pre-printen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/M2JQ0SZ8S
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11603/11609
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtThe University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department Collection
dc.relation.ispartofUMBC Faculty Collection
dc.rightsThis item is likely protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Copyright Law. Unless on a Creative Commons license, for uses protected by Copyright Law, contact the copyright holder or the author.
dc.subjectcournot gameen_US
dc.subjectdecode-forward relayen_US
dc.subjectoutage probabilityen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectthreshold-baseden_US
dc.subjectUMBC Ebiquity Research Groupen_US
dc.titleSecure Power Trading in Cooperative Relay Network With Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly Modelen_US
dc.typeTexten_US

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