Examining the US Withdrawl From Afghanistan Through the Lens of Ibn Khaldun and Carl von Clausewitz

Abstract

History is the ever-changing story of humanity which can be used to examine past mistakes to avoid making those mistakes again. Throughout human history, war and politics have gone hand in hand however when you look at the basis of these two it devolves into the question of power. Carl von Clausewitz said, "War is simply the continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means."

The U.S. has been in two different conflicts both of which started within the realm of politics and ended in the evacuation of troops with the United States as the clear loser. Is it possible to learn from the failures of history and to avoid them in the future? Indeed a 15th century thinker produced a theory quantifying the nature of politics and power to avoid failure. Ibn Khaldun was a philosopher and historian who many consider the father of sociology and other similar fields and produced the theory of Asabiyyah. His theory deals with the sovereignty gained from group cohesion based on the hardy warrior spirit set on political and military dominance. In 2001, Americans invaded Afghanistan however were forced to pull out in 2021 declaring it a failure. It is my contention that Ibn Khaldun's theory of Asabiyyah lies at the heart of both American and Soviet failures in Afghanistan and conversely the success of the local defense effort. Unlike the two world powers, the Pashtun in Afghanistan possessed the crucial element of Asabiyyah- Social solidarity with an emphasis on group consciousness, cohesiveness, and unity- to a degree unimaginable to the occupying forces.

Both the US and Afghanistan have had major changes wrought on them by this interaction. The world has also been forever changed, whether for the better or the worse is yet to be seen. This paper will examine those changes through the lens of the two aforementioned scholars and explain the timeline of the US's invasion of Afghanistan.