Special Session: Security Verification & Testing forSR-Latch TRNGs
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Date
2023-04
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Abstract
Secure chips implement cryptographic algorithms
and protocols to ensure self-protection (e.g., firmware authenticity) as well as user data protection (e.g., encrypted data
storage). In turn, cryptography needs to defer to incorruptible
sources of entropy to implement their functions according to their
mandatory usage guidance. Typically, keys, nonces, initialization
vectors, tweaks, etc. shall not be guessed by attackers. In practice,
True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) are in charge of
producing such sensitive elements.
Fully aware of the central role of TRNGs in the proper
implementation of security in chips, stakeholders have been
formalizing the requirements recently. The methods to strengthen
such requirements are manifold. In this paper, we discuss and
apply three of them by targeting the Set-Reset Latch TRNG
which is an alternative to Ring-Oscillator (RO) TRNGs as it
provides faster throughputs. The first method concerns the
confidence in the TRNG being random enough. It explores how
the TRNG properties can be reliably predicted by simulation,
compared to real silicon experiments. The second aspect dealt
with in this paper is the assessment of the TRNG properties over
time, i.e., considering the impact of aging in the TRNG properties.
Such knowledge is important as secure chips are expected to be
in service for a long period, and it would be detrimental to the
service they render if the quality of the entropy they deliver
would be declining over time. Eventually, the third aspect of this
paper is the timely detection of unforeseen failures or malevolent
attacks. The mitigation lies in leveraging “health tests” launched
prior to using random numbers.
This paper focuses on a particular type of TRNG that is not
prone to biasing by attackers: it is the so-called Set-Reset Latch
(SR-latch) TRNG and exploits a race condition in an arbitration
gate. Such kind of TRNG is of great practical interest as an
alternative design compared to the mainstream “Ring Oscillator”
TRNG, and it is also very amenable to analyses by various sorts
of simulations aiming at properly characterizing its security in
various operational environments.