Tolerating Adversarial Attacks and Byzantine Faults in Distributed Machine Learning

Abstract

Adversarial attacks attempt to disrupt the training, retraining and utilizing of artificial intelligence and machine learning models in large-scale distributed machine learning systems. This causes security risks on its prediction outcome. For example, attackers attempt to poison the model by either presenting inaccurate misrepresentative data or altering the models' parameters. In addition, Byzantine faults including software, hardware, network issues occur in distributed systems which also lead to a negative impact on the prediction outcome. In this paper, we propose a novel distributed training algorithm, partial synchronous stochastic gradient descent (ParSGD), which defends adversarial attacks and/or tolerates Byzantine faults. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm under three common adversarial attacks again the ML models and a Byzantine fault during the training phase. Our results show that using ParSGD, ML models can still produce accurate predictions as if it is not being attacked nor having failures at all when almost half of the nodes are being compromised or failed. We will report the experimental evaluations of ParSGD in comparison with other algorithms.